WO1988006826A1 - Systemes d'acces - Google Patents

Systemes d'acces Download PDF

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Publication number
WO1988006826A1
WO1988006826A1 PCT/GB1988/000151 GB8800151W WO8806826A1 WO 1988006826 A1 WO1988006826 A1 WO 1988006826A1 GB 8800151 W GB8800151 W GB 8800151W WO 8806826 A1 WO8806826 A1 WO 8806826A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
access
security code
sub
operable
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/GB1988/000151
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
James Joseph Armour
Andrew Jim Kelley Glasspool
Original Assignee
Mars Incorporated
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Mars Incorporated filed Critical Mars Incorporated
Publication of WO1988006826A1 publication Critical patent/WO1988006826A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F17/00—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services
    • G07F17/28—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services for radio apparatus
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
    • G06Q20/12—Payment architectures specially adapted for electronic shopping systems
    • G06Q20/127—Shopping or accessing services according to a time-limitation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/215—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass the system having a variable access-code, e.g. varied as a function of time
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F17/00—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services
    • G07F17/0014—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services for vending, access and use of specific services not covered anywhere else in G07F17/00
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/20—Servers specifically adapted for the distribution of content, e.g. VOD servers; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/25—Management operations performed by the server for facilitating the content distribution or administrating data related to end-users or client devices, e.g. end-user or client device authentication, learning user preferences for recommending movies
    • H04N21/254—Management at additional data server, e.g. shopping server, rights management server
    • H04N21/2543—Billing, e.g. for subscription services
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
    • H04N21/426—Internal components of the client ; Characteristics thereof
    • H04N21/42684—Client identification by a unique number or address, e.g. serial number, MAC address, socket ID
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/60—Network structure or processes for video distribution between server and client or between remote clients; Control signalling between clients, server and network components; Transmission of management data between server and client, e.g. sending from server to client commands for recording incoming content stream; Communication details between server and client 
    • H04N21/63—Control signaling related to video distribution between client, server and network components; Network processes for video distribution between server and clients or between remote clients, e.g. transmitting basic layer and enhancement layers over different transmission paths, setting up a peer-to-peer communication via Internet between remote STB's; Communication protocols; Addressing
    • H04N21/633—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client
    • H04N21/6332—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client directed to client
    • H04N21/6334—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client directed to client for authorisation, e.g. by transmitting a key
    • H04N21/63345—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client directed to client for authorisation, e.g. by transmitting a key by transmitting keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/80—Generation or processing of content or additional data by content creator independently of the distribution process; Content per se
    • H04N21/83—Generation or processing of protective or descriptive data associated with content; Content structuring
    • H04N21/835—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates
    • H04N21/8355—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates involving usage data, e.g. number of copies or viewings allowed
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N7/00—Television systems
    • H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
    • H04N7/162—Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N7/00—Television systems
    • H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
    • H04N7/167—Systems rendering the television signal unintelligible and subsequently intelligible
    • H04N7/1675—Providing digital key or authorisation information for generation or regeneration of the scrambling sequence

Definitions

  • This invention relates to access systems in which access, e.g. to a service, a product or a location, is gained by means of an electronic key storing a security code.
  • the invention is particularly but not exclusively concerned with conditional access television systems, e.g. for satellite broadcasting systems.
  • Figure 4 on page 382 illustrates one such system, in which a transmitter transmits scrambled television picture and sound signals and encrypted control signals.
  • the control signals are decrypted and used for descrambling the picture and sound signals.
  • Decryption is carried out in a detachable sub-system (also referred to herein as a key).
  • the sub-system stores a distribution key (also referred to herein as a security code) and a validation code which are combined to form an authorisation key used for decryption.
  • the authorisation key corresponds to the one used in the transmitter for encrypting the control s ignals .
  • Each user would have a different distribution key stored in his detachable sub-system.
  • the control computer alters the authorisation key, and, for each user who has paid his subscription, calculates a validation code from the new authorisation key and the user's distribution key.
  • This validation code is broad ⁇ cast, and the user's detachable sub-system receives and stores the validation code. Accordingly, anyone who Sails to pay his subscription will not have his valid ⁇ ation code renewed when the authorisation key is changed, and therefore the sub-system will no longer be able to decrypt the control signals so that the picture and sound signals cannot be unscrambled.
  • Such an arrangement requires transmission of a large number of codes, and thus if there are many subscribers a large bandwidth is needed.
  • each detachable sub-system has a stored credit value and a stored expiry date. Instead of paying subscriptions, a user will pay for the services by buying a sub-system. As the sub ⁇ system is used, the stored credit value is decreased. When it reaches zero, or the expiry date is reached, the sub-system can- no longer be used. The article states that this system does not require the use of validation codes. Both the above techniques are subject to fraud, particularly by means of copyi-ng the sub-systems. It i s proposed to mitigate this problem by making the sub ⁇ systems detachable and issuing new sub-systems when fraud is detected. However, this is an expensive solution, and it would not always be apparent when replacement of sub ⁇ systems is required.
  • a key for a controlled access system is operable to produce a security code to be used in determining whether access is provided to the system, wherein the key is operable to produce a different security code after a selected time.
  • the key which for example could be detachable, and which could form a sub-system for a controlled access pre-payment television system, may be arranged so that the produced security code varies depending upon the current time (e.g. in dependence upon the date).
  • the current time may be determined by signals generated by the television receiver, or by signals transmitted with a television signal.
  • the security codes being produced by all keys or sub-systems for decrypting control signals used for descra bling television signals, and the code used by the transmitter to encrypt such control signals, would change in synchronism.
  • the invention is preferably embodied in a pre ⁇ payment system. If the system does not require the transmission of validation codes, the arrangement may be such that, at any given time, all the sub-systems used for receiving a particular broadcasting service generate the same security code.
  • the invention also extends to systems which use transmitted validation codes, e.g. subscription systems.
  • Each sub-system may have a unique identity code, so that validation codes can be transmitted individually to the different sub-systems.
  • the validation code and the stored security code are used together to form an authorisation key to enable access (e.g. to enable de-scrambling of broadcast signals).
  • the sub-system is only effective for a limited duration, it is no longer necessary for the system to transmit signals to the individual sub-systems in order to maintain them operational and, the end of the subscription, to disable them. Instead, the sub-system automatically remains operational throughout the subscription period, and is automatically disabled at the end of the subscription by virtue of the fact that it will no longer store a security code appropriate for the current date. This substantially reduces the number of validation signals which need to be transmitted, and thus the bandwidth requirements are relaxed.
  • an access system comprises a plurality of sub-systems, each storing a security code and each arranged to receive a validation code, each sub-system being operable to permit access on condition that an authorisation key derived from the validation code and the security code is deemed appropriate, wherein the sub ⁇ systems are divided into groups according to expiry date, and wherein sub-systems within a group having a common expiry date also have a common security code.
  • the number of signals needed to be transmitted can be greatly reduced as compared with the prior art.
  • only a single validation code is transmitted for each user in order to render his sub ⁇ system operational.
  • Further validation signals may be directed to the sub-system, e.g. to maintain it operational and/or to disable it at the expiry date, but the same signals would be used by other sub-systems in the same group, and therefore the total number of different signals needed to be transmitted is greatly reduced.
  • any signal which is transmitted is desirably repeated at intervals over a period to ensure that it has been received properly by all the sub-systems to which it is directed.
  • this operation it is not necessary for this operation to be performed at regular intervals in order to maintain individual sub-systems operational throughout the subscription period and individually to disable the sub-systems at the end of the subscription period.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of an access system in accordance with the invention.
  • picture signals delivered along a path 4 are scrambled by a picture signal scrambler 6 and then delivered to a transmitter 8.
  • the transmitted signals are received by a receiver 10 which then delivers the scrambled picture signals to a descra bler 12.
  • the descrambled picture signals are then presented to a display 14.
  • the scrambler 6 scrambles the signals according to a code generated by a scrambling controller 16.
  • the code is also delivered to an encrypter 18, which encrypts the codes in accordance with an authorisation key received from a control computer 20.
  • the encrypted codes form control signals which are delivered to transmitter 8 and transmitted along with the transmitted picture signal.
  • a receiver 10 separates the encrypted control signals from the picture signals and delivers them to a key or sub-system 22.
  • the control signals are delivered to a decrypter 24, in which they are decrypted in accordance with an access signal in the form of an authorisation key received from a sub-system controller 26.
  • the authorisation key generated by the sub-system controller 26 should correspond to that generated by the control computer 20, and hence the control signals can be decrypted by the decrypter 24, whereby they can be used by the descrambler 12 in order to descramble the picture signals.
  • sound signals can be treated in the same way.
  • the control computer 20 receives a signal indicative of the current time and date from a clock 28. This signal is used to determine which address in a memory 30 is accessed in order to obtain the authorisation key sent to the encrypter 18.
  • the memory 30 stores- substantial number of authorisation keys which are used in succession. By way of example, a new authorisation key may be used once a month.
  • a signal indicative of the current time is delivered to the controller 26 on line 31.
  • This signal may be generated by a clock in the receiving installation, or may be derived from signals transmitted by the transmitter 8.
  • the controller 26 uses the time signal to determine which location in an author ⁇ isation key store 32 is read to derive the authorisation key sent to the decrypter 24.
  • the memory 32 stores a limited number of authorisation keys corresponding to those generated by the computer 20 over a limited period. Accordingly, once this period has expired, the sub-system 22 is no longer operable to enable correct descrambling of the picture signals.
  • the period over which the sub-system 22 is useful is governed solely by what authorisation keys are stored in memory 32.
  • the sub-system 22 stores further information which places additional restrictions on the useful life of the sub-system 22.
  • This further information may also be contained in the memory 32, and may include any or all of the following: (1) An expiry date.
  • the controller 26 can compare this with the current date and not permit accessing of an author sa ion key if the current date is later than the expiry date.
  • the controller 26 would compare this with the current time, and prevent the reading out of authorisation keys if the current time is prior to the start date.
  • the start date could be programmed into the sub-system by the supplier.
  • the controller would check whether the sub-system has been used for a period longer than the lifespan, and if so would prevent reading out of the authorisation keys- To achieve this, the sub ⁇ system would record the time at which it was first used. This could be accomplished by using the programmed start date referred to in paragraph (2). Alternatively, the sub-system could be arranged automatically to record the time at which it is first used.
  • the sub-system could contain author ⁇ isation keys suitable for a period of 15 months, together with a lifespan of 12 months. This would allow the sub ⁇ system to have a shelf life of 3 months within which it could be purchased and still provide 12 months of use. If the lifespan, start date, and/or expiry date are programmable by the supplier he will be able to determine the periods for which the sub-system may be used. These parameters are preferably stored in the form of units corres ponding to the period between changes in authorisation key by the control computer 20. For example the start date could be recorded as the value "4" if the first authorisation key to be used by the sub-system is that corresponding to the fourth time period for which the authorisation keys stored in memory 32 are valid.
  • a system according to the present invention has the advantage over the prior art pre-payment system described above, in that there is a risk that the prior art system could be "fooled” into thinking that the expiry date has not yet been reached by interfering with the signals supplied to the sub-system which are intended to indicate the current time. In the present system, this would result in the sub-system producing the wrong security code, so that fraudulent reception of the service could not be achieved by this means.
  • means are preferably provided to determine whether an authorisation key is valid so that the controller 26 could perform a search operation in which authorisation keys are successiveively selected until the correct one is chosen. To this end, an encrypted version of the correct authorisation key could be transmitted, and the sub ⁇ system could compare the decrypted version with its generated authorisation key to determine if the latter is valid.
  • a different authorisation key could be selected in response to a command broadcast by the transmitter 8. Accordingly, if it is found that the security system has been breached and that fraudulent access is being gained to the system, the security codes can be changed without requiring the users' sub-systems to be returned to a distributor and without requiring new sub-systems to be issued.
  • the key may be arranged to look up the security code (or a value which is used to calculate the security code) in a stored table, the look up location being determined at least in part by the current time.
  • the key could be arranged to generate the security code using an algorithm dependent at least in part upon the current time. It is however preferred that the security codes be produced using a look-up table, because using an algorithm to generate the security codes results in a risk that the algorithm will be discovered to enable the fraudulent generation of security codes.
  • the authorisation key sent by the controller 26 to ' the decrypter 24 is determined in dependence on both a security code accessed from the memory 32 and a validation code stored in a further memory 34.
  • This validation code has been derived from the control signals transmitted by the transmitter 8.
  • the validation codes are transmitted to. individual sub-systems. For this purpose they are transmitted along with addresses which correspond to unique identification numbers stored in the sub-systems. Accordingly, as is per se known in the art, the memory 3 ⁇ will receive only the validation code which is appropriate for the particular sub-system for which it is installed.
  • the validation code is generated by the control computer 20 prior to transmission, and for this purpose a database 36 storing customer details and sub-system identification numbers is used.
  • the sub-systems can be arranged in groups sharing a common security code.
  • the sub-systems are divided into groups according to expiry date, and sub-systems within the same group use a common security code at any given time.
  • the security code is combined with a validation code stored in the memory 3 to generate the authorisation key.
  • An individual validation code is transmitted to a user when he first starts to use the sub-system to render his sub-system operational. Thereafter group messages are sent at regular intervals to all sub-systems having the same expiry date to maintain them operational, e.g. by transmitting the validation code appropriate for the next period.
  • the messages are the same for all sub-systems within the group, and different from those sent to other groups. As the expiry date for a group approaches, no further enabling messages are sent to that group.
  • sub-systems could be divided or sub ⁇ divided geographically, such that sub-systems for use in the same geographical area have the same security code.
  • each instead of all sub ⁇ systems storing corresponding tables of security codes, each stores only a single security code which is common to the group.
  • the sub-systems described above could be easily modified to store a conventional security code in addition to the security codes referred to above so that the same sub-system can be used in a conventional manner for reception of one channel and in one of the ways described above for reception of another channel.
  • validation codes can contain information used to control the manner in which access is provided. For example, they could control which channels the sub-system is enabled for, and specific periods within which to enable them. Alternatively, they could contain keys used to decipher transmitted control signals determining the manner of access.
  • the decrypter 24 shown in Figure 1 could alternatively lie outside the sub-system 22.
  • the sub-system should provide a signal in dependence upon whether there is any remaining credit stored in the sub-system, and an enabling signal which is used only if the credit-indicating signal is present for enabling access, e.g. by descrambling broadcast tele ⁇ vision systems.
  • a conditional access system in which a key or sub-system is operable to generate enabling signals for enabling access only on condition that the sub-system stores a credit value.
  • the sub-system 22 of Figure 1 stores a credit value (e.g.
  • the sub-system 22 is shown in Figure 1 as having several functional blocks, including controller 26, decrypter 24, memory 32 and, optionally, memory 34. Although each of these blocks can be formed by respective circuits, it is preferred that the sub-system be formed by a microprocessor having a single memory and arranged to perform all the necessary functions. Thus, the access signal could be a multi-bit word transmitted to a decrypter, or could simply be a stored data value used by the microprocessor in performing a decryption function.
  • control signals may be generated locally, rather than being broadcast by the television signal transmitter, or the signals frbm the sub-system could be used directly for descrambling television signals rather than decrypting control signals which are then used for descrambling.
  • the authorisation keys produced by the sub-system may be used for other purposes than descrambling.
  • the invention is useful also in terrestrial broadcasting and cable systems.
  • the invention is also applicable to systems other than broadcasting systems.
  • the system could be used for controlling access to buildings, computers e.t.c. It is particularly useful where access is dependent upon the current time, e.g. for shift workers, because the security code produced by the key may be selected according to the current time.
  • the key or sub-system described above be detachable, and preferably portable.
  • Devices which are particularly suitable for use as the key are the tokens described in published patent applications.GB- A-2153128 and GB-A-2196450 and GB patent application 8626233- However, some aspects of the invention are useful also with non-detachable sub-systems.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

Dans un système d'accès, tel que de préférence un système de télédiffusion à accès conditionnel, une clé placée dans un récepteur enregistre une table de codes de sécurité et commence à fonctionner à des moments prédéterminés, de façon à utiliser un nouveau code parmi lesdits codes de sécurité, afin d'émettre une clé d'autorisation qui permet l'accès. La clé enregistre aussi de préférence un temps de départ indiquant le premier moment d'utilisation de la clé et un temps de validité indiquant la durée totale pendant laquelle elle peut être utilisée. Le temps de validité est de préférence plus court que la période totale pendant laquelle les codes de sécurité enregistrés sont valides.
PCT/GB1988/000151 1987-03-02 1988-03-02 Systemes d'acces WO1988006826A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB878704850A GB8704850D0 (en) 1987-03-02 1987-03-02 Access systems
GB8704850 1987-03-02

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO1988006826A1 true WO1988006826A1 (fr) 1988-09-07

Family

ID=10613187

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/GB1988/000151 WO1988006826A1 (fr) 1987-03-02 1988-03-02 Systemes d'acces

Country Status (4)

Country Link
EP (1) EP0304458A1 (fr)
JP (1) JPH02500316A (fr)
GB (1) GB8704850D0 (fr)
WO (1) WO1988006826A1 (fr)

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EP0271748A2 (fr) * 1986-12-13 1988-06-22 GRUNDIG E.M.V. Elektro-Mechanische Versuchsanstalt Max Grundig holländ. Stiftung & Co. KG. Système de traitement d'informations transmises en forme brouillée
EP0371451A2 (fr) * 1988-11-28 1990-06-06 Secure-Time, Inc. Commutateur de commande électronique
WO1991006926A1 (fr) * 1989-10-31 1991-05-16 Security Dynamics Technologies, Inc. Methode et dispositif destines a assurer la securite de l'identification et de la verification
EP0438154A2 (fr) * 1990-01-19 1991-07-24 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Système de réseau multimédia
EP0485887A2 (fr) * 1990-11-16 1992-05-20 General Instrument Corporation Of Delaware Appareil et méthode pour l'amélioration de terminaux en vue de maintenir la sécurité d'un réseau de communication
EP0618736A1 (fr) * 1993-03-31 1994-10-05 Philips Electronique Grand Public Procédé et dispositif pour l'embrouillage et le désembrouillage d'une émission déterminée de télévision
EP0618550A1 (fr) * 1993-03-31 1994-10-05 N.V. Nederlandsche Apparatenfabriek NEDAP Système de contrôle d'accès ayant des autorisations décentralisées
EP0776131A3 (fr) * 1995-11-24 1998-02-11 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Méthode et appareil pour la communication bidirectionnelle de données
FR2757300A1 (fr) * 1996-12-16 1998-06-19 Ricard Claude Taximetre prevu pour pouvoir etre exploite en location
WO2002102075A1 (fr) * 2001-06-08 2002-12-19 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Dispositif et procede d'acces selectif a un service crypte utilisant un mot de commande, et carte intelligente
US6985583B1 (en) 1999-05-04 2006-01-10 Rsa Security Inc. System and method for authentication seed distribution
EP1863206A1 (fr) * 2006-05-30 2007-12-05 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Procédé de commutation d'un clé de décryptage, un dispositif de décryptage et un équipement terminal
US7363494B2 (en) 2001-12-04 2008-04-22 Rsa Security Inc. Method and apparatus for performing enhanced time-based authentication
CN100455010C (zh) * 2004-12-27 2009-01-21 国家广播电影电视总局广播科学研究院 一种数字电视用户管理系统授权指令生成控制的实现方法
CN1647497B (zh) * 2002-04-05 2010-12-01 Abb研究有限公司 用于对系统进行远程控制和调节的方法
EP2334069A1 (fr) * 2009-12-11 2011-06-15 Irdeto Access B.V. Fourniture de mots de commande à un récepteur
EP2334070A1 (fr) * 2009-12-11 2011-06-15 Irdeto Access B.V. Génération d'un flux de données brouillé
US8370638B2 (en) 2005-02-18 2013-02-05 Emc Corporation Derivative seeds

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EP0153837A2 (fr) * 1984-02-15 1985-09-04 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Système de télévision à péage
EP0178809A1 (fr) * 1984-10-12 1986-04-23 John David Wiedemer Système de télévision payante à haute sécurité

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EP0271748A2 (fr) * 1986-12-13 1988-06-22 GRUNDIG E.M.V. Elektro-Mechanische Versuchsanstalt Max Grundig holländ. Stiftung & Co. KG. Système de traitement d'informations transmises en forme brouillée
EP0371451A2 (fr) * 1988-11-28 1990-06-06 Secure-Time, Inc. Commutateur de commande électronique
EP0371451A3 (fr) * 1988-11-28 1991-04-03 Secure-Time, Inc. Commutateur de commande électronique
WO1991006926A1 (fr) * 1989-10-31 1991-05-16 Security Dynamics Technologies, Inc. Methode et dispositif destines a assurer la securite de l'identification et de la verification
US5159633A (en) * 1990-01-19 1992-10-27 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Multimedia network system
EP0438154A2 (fr) * 1990-01-19 1991-07-24 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Système de réseau multimédia
EP0438154A3 (en) * 1990-01-19 1992-07-22 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Multimedia network system
EP0485887A2 (fr) * 1990-11-16 1992-05-20 General Instrument Corporation Of Delaware Appareil et méthode pour l'amélioration de terminaux en vue de maintenir la sécurité d'un réseau de communication
EP0485887A3 (en) * 1990-11-16 1992-12-09 General Instrument Corporation Apparatus and method for upgrading terminals to maintain a secure communication network
EP0618736A1 (fr) * 1993-03-31 1994-10-05 Philips Electronique Grand Public Procédé et dispositif pour l'embrouillage et le désembrouillage d'une émission déterminée de télévision
EP0618550A1 (fr) * 1993-03-31 1994-10-05 N.V. Nederlandsche Apparatenfabriek NEDAP Système de contrôle d'accès ayant des autorisations décentralisées
FR2703552A1 (fr) * 1993-03-31 1994-10-07 Philips Electronics Nv Procédé et dispositif pour l'embrouillage et le désembrouillage d'une émission déterminée de télévision.
NL9300566A (nl) * 1993-03-31 1994-10-17 Nedap Nv Toegangsverleningssysteem met decentrale autorisaties.
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EP0776131A3 (fr) * 1995-11-24 1998-02-11 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Méthode et appareil pour la communication bidirectionnelle de données
FR2757300A1 (fr) * 1996-12-16 1998-06-19 Ricard Claude Taximetre prevu pour pouvoir etre exploite en location
US7502467B2 (en) 1999-05-04 2009-03-10 Rsa Security Inc. System and method for authentication seed distribution
US6985583B1 (en) 1999-05-04 2006-01-10 Rsa Security Inc. System and method for authentication seed distribution
WO2002102075A1 (fr) * 2001-06-08 2002-12-19 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Dispositif et procede d'acces selectif a un service crypte utilisant un mot de commande, et carte intelligente
CN1305310C (zh) * 2001-06-08 2007-03-14 皇家菲利浦电子有限公司 用于选择性地提供对一项利用控制字加密的业务的访问的设备和方法以及智能卡
US7477744B2 (en) 2001-06-08 2009-01-13 Irdeto Eindhoven B.V. Device and method for selectively supplying access to a service encrypted using a control word, and smart card
US7363494B2 (en) 2001-12-04 2008-04-22 Rsa Security Inc. Method and apparatus for performing enhanced time-based authentication
US8032749B2 (en) 2002-04-05 2011-10-04 Abb Research Ltd Method for remotely controlling and/or regulating a system
CN1647497B (zh) * 2002-04-05 2010-12-01 Abb研究有限公司 用于对系统进行远程控制和调节的方法
CN100455010C (zh) * 2004-12-27 2009-01-21 国家广播电影电视总局广播科学研究院 一种数字电视用户管理系统授权指令生成控制的实现方法
US8370638B2 (en) 2005-02-18 2013-02-05 Emc Corporation Derivative seeds
EP1863206A1 (fr) * 2006-05-30 2007-12-05 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Procédé de commutation d'un clé de décryptage, un dispositif de décryptage et un équipement terminal
EP2334069A1 (fr) * 2009-12-11 2011-06-15 Irdeto Access B.V. Fourniture de mots de commande à un récepteur
EP2334070A1 (fr) * 2009-12-11 2011-06-15 Irdeto Access B.V. Génération d'un flux de données brouillé
CN102098543A (zh) * 2009-12-11 2011-06-15 耶德托公司 生成加扰的数据流
CN102149006A (zh) * 2009-12-11 2011-08-10 耶德托公司 向接收机提供控制字
EP2334071A3 (fr) * 2009-12-11 2013-05-15 Irdeto B.V. Fourniture de mots de commande à un récepteur
EP2334072A3 (fr) * 2009-12-11 2013-05-22 Irdeto B.V. Génération d'un flux de données brouillé
CN102149006B (zh) * 2009-12-11 2016-01-20 爱迪德技术有限公司 向接收机提供控制字

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
JPH02500316A (ja) 1990-02-01
EP0304458A1 (fr) 1989-03-01
GB8704850D0 (en) 1987-04-08

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