US6185507B1 - Microprocessor, in particular for use in a chip card, with a control unit and with a housing surrounding the control unit - Google Patents

Microprocessor, in particular for use in a chip card, with a control unit and with a housing surrounding the control unit Download PDF

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Publication number
US6185507B1
US6185507B1 US09/255,991 US25599199A US6185507B1 US 6185507 B1 US6185507 B1 US 6185507B1 US 25599199 A US25599199 A US 25599199A US 6185507 B1 US6185507 B1 US 6185507B1
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United States
Prior art keywords
sensor
control unit
microprocessor
housing
measurement signal
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Expired - Lifetime
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US09/255,991
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English (en)
Inventor
Michael Huber
Peter Stampka
Josef Heitzer
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Infineon Technologies AG
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Siemens AG
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Assigned to SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT reassignment SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: HEITZER, JOSEF, HUBER, MICHAEL, STAMPKA, PETER
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Assigned to INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG reassignment INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/86—Secure or tamper-resistant housings
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/86—Secure or tamper-resistant housings
    • G06F21/87—Secure or tamper-resistant housings by means of encapsulation, e.g. for integrated circuits
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/0716—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips at least one of the integrated circuit chips comprising a sensor or an interface to a sensor
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
    • G06K19/07309—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers
    • G06K19/07372—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers by detecting tampering with the circuit
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/0806—Details of the card
    • G07F7/0813—Specific details related to card security
    • G07F7/082—Features insuring the integrity of the data on or in the card

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a microprocessor, in particular for use in a chip card, with a control unit and with a housing surrounding the control unit. Furthermore, the invention relates to a chip card with such a microprocessor.
  • a chip card has the function of a “money storage facility”.
  • a microprocessor which has a control unit, a data memory for storing the amount of money stored on the chip card, interfaces, in particular for inputting and outputting data which are relevant to payments, a control device for controlling the processing procedure of the data which are processed in conjunction with the chip card, and an instruction memory which stores the operating program for the control device.
  • Such chip card systems are used in the field of credit cards, in pay TV application systems and also in systems for monitoring access to devices concerned with security and to buildings.
  • microprocessor which is surrounded by a housing
  • the housing of the microprocessor is subjected to an aggressive substance, such as an acid for example, over a specific period of time, so that the housing is etched away and the microprocessor is exposed.
  • the structural configuration of the exposed microprocessor can then be analyzed.
  • different input signals can be applied to the terminals of the microprocessor, so that information on the program, present in the instruction memory, for controlling the processing procedure can be acquired. This information can be used to decrypt, for example, the data in the data memory.
  • a microprocessor including: a control unit; a housing surrounding the control unit; at least one sensor connected to the control unit and disposed in a region of the housing and outputting a sensor measurement signal; at least one substance disposed in the region of the housing and being detectable by the at least one sensor, the at least one substance having at least two components, at least one of the at least two components present in a predefined concentration detectable by the at least one sensor; a memory connected to the control unit, the sensor measurement signal generated by the at least one sensor containing a value reflective of the predefined concentration being received by the control unit and stored in the memory; and The control unit going into an inactive state if the sensor measurement signal differs from a predefined threshold concentration.
  • the object is in particular achieved according to the invention in that at least one sensor which indicates ambient states and which is connected to the control unit is provided in the region of the housing of the microprocessor.
  • the control unit is configured in such a way that it can be placed in an inactive state if a measurement signal that indicates a predetermined ambient state is fed to it from the sensor.
  • control unit can also be configured in such a way that it can be placed in an inactive state if no measurement signal that indicates a specific ambient state is fed to it from the sensor.
  • the invention is based on the basic idea of providing a chip card with a microprocessor which can no longer easily be exposed by chemical and/or physical methods without significantly deactivating or destroying the microprocessor itself.
  • a sensor that is connected to the control unit is provided.
  • the control unit regularly senses the sensor and checks whether the sensor is indicating an ambient state that corresponds, for example, to the ambient state when the microprocessor was fabricated. If the ambient state in the region of the sensor is modified, for example by applying a chemical, the signal originating from the sensor changes, and this is sensed and detected by the control unit. In this case, the control unit goes into an inactive state, so that, even when a microprocessor has been exposed, its function can no longer easily be discerned.
  • control unit is to be understood in a broad sense, that is to say any component of the microprocessor or of the chip card may be deactivated as long as it is ensured that access to the data or to the structure of the data memory, program memory or control unit is prevented or made more difficult.
  • a sensor which indicates as an “ambient state”, in particular, the presence of typical chemicals used for exposing microprocessors.
  • sensors that respond to acids can be used. If such a sensor indicates the presence of an acid in the region of the housing, it can be assumed that an attempt has been made to manipulate the microprocessor. This is sensed by the control unit, in response to which it goes into an inactive state.
  • the two embodiments are also possible at the same time, at least two sensors or one sensor with a double function then being provided.
  • the control unit is configured in such a way that it can be placed in an inactive state if one sensor feeds it a measurement signal which indicates a predetermined “suspicious” ambient state and/or if the other sensor stops sending it a measurement signal which indicates a predetermined “normal” ambient state.
  • the control device is then placed in an inactive state if at least one of the sensors indicates an ambient state which differs from the normal state.
  • the sensor, according to the invention, which indicates a predetermined ambient state is expressly not restricted here to a sensor which indicates the presence or absence of a chemical. Sensors that indicate physical changes are also conceivable, it being possible to provide, in particular pressure sensors or mechanical sensors. Such mechanical sensors can be constructed, for example, as fine conducting wires in the region of the housing, which wires inevitably have to be destroyed when the microprocessor is being exposed by scraping.
  • a substance which can be perceived by a sensor is provided in the region of the housing, it also being possible for the substance, to have at least two components, at least one of which can be perceived by the sensor.
  • the senor is provided in the interior of the housing.
  • the senor is configured as a biosensor.
  • biosensors are already known in the prior art and may be configured in a reliable, accurate and particularly small form, so that they are made suitable for use in conjunction with microprocessors.
  • sensors for measuring sugar in human blood are known and these sensors can be used easily and advantageously in conjunction with the microprocessor according to the invention.
  • biosensors can measure quickly and easily determine both the existence of a substance and the individual concentrations of the substances in a mixture of substances.
  • biosensors can be used both as qualitative sensors, which react only to the presence of a specific substance, and as quantitative sensors, with which concentrations of substances can be detected.
  • the senor in the microprocessor according to the invention supplies a digital output signal.
  • a sensor of this type is suitable particularly for quantitative analyses. This may be the case, for example, with a sensor that is intended for sensing the application of acid to the housing of the microprocessor.
  • the senor can also supply an analog output signal. Particularly in conjunction with a sensor which is disposed separately from the control device or from the housing of the microprocessor.
  • a sensor which is disposed separately from the control device or from the housing of the microprocessor.
  • Such a refinement provides increased protection against undesired manipulations, to be precise particularly if the ambient states which are necessary for the operation of the control device and which are sensed by the sensor are stored in the control unit or in the data memory of the microprocessor.
  • the data which characterize the ambient state that is necessary for the operation of the control unit can then in fact be read out only if the sensor keeps the control unit in an active state.
  • the sensor senses the manipulation and switches off the control unit, and thus disables access to the data characterizing the sensor, before these data can be accessed.
  • a sensor which supplies an analog output signal can also be used particularly easily in conjunction with the known microprocessors, since, in the vast majority of cases, these already have digital/analog converters, which can convert the data of such a sensor in such a way that these data can be processed by the microprocessor.
  • a sensor which supplies a measurement signal that has a hysteresis character with respect to the repeated sensing of a changing ambient state is quite particularly advantageous in conjunction with the inventive microprocessor which is configured as above. After the sensor has been exposed, this prevents the possibility of the microprocessor being reactivated after restoring an ambient state after the exposure of the sensor. This is because a hysteresis character of the sensor, which is in fact undesirable for sensors, has the result that, in the case of temporally staggered, repeated restoration of an ambient state, for example by removing and re-applying the same characteristic substance in the region of the sensor, the sensor supplies different output signals in each case.
  • control device is then advantageously set up in such a way that this difference can be sensed and it can thus be determined whether manipulation is taking place in the region of the microprocessor.
  • the microprocessor according to the invention is advantageously configured in such a way that a signal that is fed to it from the sensor can be stored permanently.
  • Such storage of a signal, which has been fed to the microprocessor from at least one sensor, is especially appropriate if an ambient state which is indicative of the time of fabrication is to be stored for the comparison with an ambient state at a later time.
  • Such storage is possible particularly easily in the case of the microprocessors known from the prior art since they already have a small electrically programmable read-only memory (PROM), which has previously been used only to store, for example, a serial number.
  • PROM electrically programmable read-only memory
  • FIG. 1 is a diagrammatic block diagram of a circuit in a chip card according to the invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a graph of an output signal of a typical sensor of the chip card.
  • FIG. 3 is a graph of an output signal of a further typical sensor of the chip card.
  • FIG. 1 there is shown a block circuit diagram of a chip card according to the invention with a microprocessor 1 , which is connected to ISO contacts 2 , which are provided on the surface of the chip card.
  • the microprocessor 1 has a control unit 3 and a data memory 4 .
  • a sensor 5 is provided in a region of the control unit 3 .
  • the control unit 3 , the data memory 4 and the sensor 5 are disposed in an interior of a housing 6 .
  • the housing 6 includes a thermally curable material 7 having a substance to which the sensor 5 responds.
  • the microprocessor 1 exchanges data from a non-illustrated external memory of a read/write unit, via the ISO (International Standards Organization) contact 2 , with data from the data memory 4 , and vice versa.
  • the control unit 3 checks whether the sensor 5 responds to the substance present in the housing 6 . As long as the sensor 5 responds to the substance present in the housing 6 , the control unit 3 maintains operation. As soon as the sensor 5 no longer senses the substance present in the housing 6 , for example because the substance has been removed during a manipulation and has been replaced by a substance with another composition, the control unit 3 switches off inevitably and irrevocably. Analysis of the functional procedure within the microprocessor 1 is thus ruled out.
  • FIG. 2 shows an operational graph of the sensor 5 that can be disposed in the microprocessor 1 according to the invention and in the chip card according to the invention.
  • the abscissa of the graph in FIG. 2 indicates the concentration X of the substances provided in the housing 6 .
  • the concentration varies from 0 to 1.
  • the ordinate indicates the scaled output voltage Ux of the sensor as a function of the concentration of the substance in the housing 6 .
  • a scaled output voltage Ux is produced.
  • the control unit 3 can determine whether the substance is present in the surroundings of the sensor 5 , and in what concentration.
  • FIG. 3 shows an operational graph of a sensor that essentially corresponds to the one whose graph is shown in FIG. 2 .
  • the sensor whose operational graph is illustrated in FIG. 3 has a distinct hysteresis characteristic. This characteristic can be used particularly advantageously with the chip card according to the invention in order to protect against undesired manipulations, as described below.
  • the output voltage U OUT of the sensor 5 illustrated in FIG. 3 rises from “0” to the value ⁇ .
  • the value ⁇ is input by the control unit 3 , after the manufacture of the microprocessor 1 has been completed, and is permanently burnt into a PROM region of the data memory 4 . If the substance surrounding the sensor 5 is removed during a manipulation of the chip card, the output voltage of the sensor 5 drops to the value ⁇ , which is indicated in the region of the ordinate of the diagram shown in FIG. 3 . Owing to the hysteresis characteristic of the sensor 5 , the value ⁇ is greater than the output value “0” before the microprocessor 1 was manufactured.
  • the output voltage of the sensor 5 rises again, specifically to a value ⁇ , which is greater than the value ⁇ which was obtained after the microprocessor 1 was manufactured. This difference is also due to the hysteresis characteristic of the sensor 5 .
  • the difference in the output voltage ( ⁇ ) is sensed by the control unit 3 and it concludes there has been a manipulation in the region of the microprocessor 1 if the value ( ⁇ ) exceeds a specific limit which is provided in order to compensate for an undesired failure of the chip card owing to an ageing effect of the sensor 5 .

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Investigating Or Analyzing Materials By The Use Of Fluid Adsorption Or Reactions (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Microcomputers (AREA)
  • Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
US09/255,991 1996-08-23 1999-02-23 Microprocessor, in particular for use in a chip card, with a control unit and with a housing surrounding the control unit Expired - Lifetime US6185507B1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19634133A DE19634133C2 (de) 1996-08-23 1996-08-23 Mikroprozessor, insbesondere zur Verwendung in einer Chipkarte, sowie Chipkarte mit einem ebensolchen Mikroprozessor
DE19634133 1996-08-23
PCT/DE1997/001457 WO1998008189A1 (de) 1996-08-23 1997-07-10 Mikroprozessor, insbesondere zur verwendung in einer chipkarte, mit einer steuerungseinheit und mit einem die steuerungseinheit umgebenden gehäuse

Related Parent Applications (1)

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PCT/DE1997/001457 Continuation WO1998008189A1 (de) 1996-08-23 1997-07-10 Mikroprozessor, insbesondere zur verwendung in einer chipkarte, mit einer steuerungseinheit und mit einem die steuerungseinheit umgebenden gehäuse

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US6185507B1 true US6185507B1 (en) 2001-02-06

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Country Link
US (1) US6185507B1 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
EP (1) EP0923763B1 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
JP (1) JP3242670B2 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
KR (1) KR100327710B1 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
CN (1) CN1133936C (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
AT (1) ATE199463T1 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
BR (1) BR9711359A (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
DE (2) DE19634133C2 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
ES (1) ES2155256T3 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
IN (1) IN191988B (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
UA (1) UA46118C2 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
WO (1) WO1998008189A1 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)

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FR2823887A1 (fr) * 2001-04-24 2002-10-25 Gemplus Card Int Dispositif electronique, notamment carte a circuit(s) integre(s) muni d'une protection contre les intrusions
US6546489B1 (en) * 1999-03-04 2003-04-08 Western Digital Ventures, Inc. Disk drive which provides a secure boot of a host computer system from a protected area of a disk
US20030084285A1 (en) * 2001-10-26 2003-05-01 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for detecting a tamper event in a trusted computing environment
US6874092B1 (en) 1998-10-06 2005-03-29 Ricoh Corporation Method and apparatus for erasing data after tampering
WO2005086546A3 (en) * 2004-03-04 2006-01-12 Lipman Electronics Engineering Secure card reader
US20060156381A1 (en) * 2005-01-12 2006-07-13 Tetsuro Motoyama Approach for deleting electronic documents on network devices using document retention policies
US7152095B1 (en) 1998-10-06 2006-12-19 Ricoh Company Ltd. Method and apparatus for erasing data after tampering
US7346783B1 (en) * 2001-10-19 2008-03-18 At&T Corp. Network security device and method
US20080083033A1 (en) * 2006-09-28 2008-04-03 Infineon Technologies Ag Module with a controller for a chip card
US20080106605A1 (en) * 2004-10-18 2008-05-08 Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. Secure Sensor Chip
US20080155278A1 (en) * 2001-12-05 2008-06-26 Sandra Lynn Carrico Network security device and method
US20080164320A1 (en) * 2004-03-04 2008-07-10 Lipman Electronics Engineering Limited Secure Card Reader
US20090195394A1 (en) * 2008-02-01 2009-08-06 Apple, Inc. Consumer abuse detection system and method
US20090309745A1 (en) * 2008-02-01 2009-12-17 Apple Inc. System and method for accessing diagnostic information
US20100327856A1 (en) * 2009-04-09 2010-12-30 Direct Payment Solutions Limited Security Device
WO2011076514A1 (en) * 2009-12-24 2011-06-30 International Business Machines Corporation A method for deactivating an authentication device
US8272028B2 (en) 2008-10-15 2012-09-18 Ricoh Company, Ltd. Approach for managing access to electronic documents on network devices using document retention policies and document security policies

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DE19901057A1 (de) 1999-01-14 2000-07-27 Bosch Gmbh Robert Kraftstoffeinspritzventil für Brennkraftmaschinen
DE19947574A1 (de) * 1999-10-01 2001-04-12 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Verfahren zur Sicherung eines Datenspeichers
DE10007285A1 (de) * 2000-02-17 2001-08-23 Orga Kartensysteme Gmbh Chipkarte zum Erfassen von Messdaten sowie ein Chipkartensystem mit einer solchen Chipkarte
DE10248389A1 (de) * 2002-10-17 2004-08-05 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Sicherheitstoken
ES2264877B1 (es) * 2005-02-21 2007-11-16 Universal De Desarrollos Electronicos, S.A. Dispositivo modular para la proteccion de datos.
DE102005062800A1 (de) * 2005-12-28 2007-07-12 El-Me Ag Elektronik-Sicherheits-Modul
DE102005062802A1 (de) * 2005-12-28 2007-07-12 El-Me Ag Elektronik-Sicherheits-Modul
DE102005062799A1 (de) * 2005-12-28 2007-07-12 El-Me Ag Elektronik-Sicherheits-Modul

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CN1133936C (zh) 2004-01-07
JP2000501871A (ja) 2000-02-15
JP3242670B2 (ja) 2001-12-25
KR100327710B1 (ko) 2002-03-08
IN191988B (enrdf_load_stackoverflow) 2004-01-31
ES2155256T3 (es) 2001-05-01
CN1228857A (zh) 1999-09-15
EP0923763B1 (de) 2001-02-28
KR20000068292A (ko) 2000-11-25
DE19634133C2 (de) 1999-03-11
BR9711359A (pt) 1999-08-17
WO1998008189A1 (de) 1998-02-26
UA46118C2 (uk) 2002-05-15
EP0923763A1 (de) 1999-06-23
ATE199463T1 (de) 2001-03-15
DE19634133A1 (de) 1998-02-26
DE59703068D1 (de) 2001-04-05

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