US20130166686A1 - Data Transmission Security Improvements - Google Patents

Data Transmission Security Improvements Download PDF

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Publication number
US20130166686A1
US20130166686A1 US13/806,385 US201113806385A US2013166686A1 US 20130166686 A1 US20130166686 A1 US 20130166686A1 US 201113806385 A US201113806385 A US 201113806385A US 2013166686 A1 US2013166686 A1 US 2013166686A1
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Prior art keywords
terminal
identification variable
data signal
communication information
coordinate measurement
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US13/806,385
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English (en)
Inventor
Ralph Mahmoud Omar
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Omarco Network Solutions Ltd
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Omarco Network Solutions Ltd
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Publication of US20130166686A1 publication Critical patent/US20130166686A1/en
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/02—Protocols based on web technology, e.g. hypertext transfer protocol [HTTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of secure data transmission and in particular to an improved steganographic method of securely transmitting data between remotely located parties.
  • the ability to securely transfer data between remotely located terminals is a necessary requirement for many present day applications, in particular where the data being transferred is confidential, such as in electronic transactions of financial and/or other confidential data between remotely located terminals.
  • Cryptography is one known way of securely transmitting information.
  • a signal comprising the confidential information is encrypted at a sending device using an encryption key, which encrypts the information in accordance with a selected algorithm.
  • the encrypted signal comprising the encrypted information is subsequently transmitted to a receiving device.
  • a decryption key is used at the receiving device.
  • the security of known cryptographic protocols often resides in the computational complexity required to derive the decryption key.
  • the computational complexity required to crack a cryptographic protocol often means that several hours, if not days are required to crack the protocol!
  • the increasing complexity of the applied encryption algorithms has the converse undesired effect of increasing the computational power required at the receiving end, to carry out decryption.
  • Increasingly sophisticated specialised hardware is required to provide such robust levels of security.
  • a further shortcoming associated with known cryptographic systems is that the presence of encrypted data itself, may be sufficient to alert and attract the unwanted attention of a malevolent third party. After all, only sensitive and confidential information tends to be encrypted. Thus, in effect whilst cryptography can be very successful in maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive information in transit, it can also alert a malevolent third party to the existence of such data in the first instance.
  • Steganography provides a known way of overcoming the afore described shortcoming associated with known cryptographic protocols. Effectively, steganography is the art and science of writing hidden messages in such a way that no one, apart from the sender and intended recipient, suspects the existence of the message, a form of security through obscurity. Often this is achieved by hiding a confidential message within a “carrier” message. The carrier message effectively disguises the confidential message. In this way, the steganographic message does not attract the unwanted interest of malevolent third parties.
  • steganographic messages are commonly comprised of a carrier file, within which the confidential information is disguised.
  • a carrier file within which the confidential information is disguised.
  • text files such as PDF files are used as the carrier, and the confidential information is disguised within the text of the file in accordance with an algorithm.
  • this improved security requires increased processing capabilities at both the sender and the receiver, which inevitably increases the costs of the required hardware.
  • a first aspect of the present invention relates to a method of securely transmitting communication information from a first terminal operating in a first coordinate measurement domain to a second remotely-located terminal operating in a second coordinate measurement domain.
  • the method comprises combining the communication information with extraneous information to create a data signal, and determining a value of an identification variable expressed with respect to the first coordinate measurement domain.
  • the identification variable value enables the location of the communication information concealed within the data signal to be determined.
  • the data signal and the identification variable value are transmitted from the first terminal to the second terminal.
  • a coordinate transform function configured to map coordinate values from the first coordinate measurement domain to the second coordinate measurement domain is used to calculate a value of the received identification variable expressed with respect to the second coordinate measurement domain.
  • the information is extracted from the received data signal using the calculated identification variable value to distinguish the communication information from the extraneous information.
  • An advantage of the present invention is that it provides a convenient, effective and relatively simple method of concealing communication information within extraneous information and securely transferring the combined information within a data signal.
  • Implementation of the present method does not require special hardware and may be carried out using commonly available components at relatively low cost. This contrasts with other known secure transmission methods where special apparatus is often required.
  • the concealed communication may be recovered at the receiving terminal relatively quickly once the identification variable value has been expressed with respect to the receiving terminal's coordinate measurement domain. Accordingly, the present method is particularly suitable for use in applications where large volumes of information need to transmitted securely, and information recovery times minimised.
  • the present method is particularly effective in protecting against intercept-resend type attacks (e.g. eavesdropping).
  • An eavesdropper cannot accurately extract the communication information from the data signal without knowing the coordinate measurement domain with respect to which the identification variable value is expressed. Provided that this information is maintained confidential, an eavesdropper cannot accurately distinguish between extraneous information and communication information (i.e. the information that the sending terminal wishes to securely transmit to the receiving terminal).
  • the first terminal may be provided with the coordinate transform function and is arranged to carry out the using step prior to the transmitting step. This reduces the processing requirements of the receiving terminal (the second terminal) even further, since the act of calculating the identification variable value expressed with respect to the second coordinate measurement domain is carried out by the first terminal. Accordingly, on receipt of the data signal, the second terminal simply uses the re-expressed identification variable value to recover the communication information. The processing requirements of the receiving terminal are thus advantageously further minimised.
  • the communication information is transmitted to a second receiving terminal operating in a second coordinate measurement domain and to a third receiving terminal operating in a third coordinate measurement domain.
  • the using step comprises calculating a value of the identification variable expressed with respect to the second coordinate measurement domain, and with respect to the third coordinate measurement domain.
  • the identification variable may comprise a receiving terminal identifier, the identifier being indicative of the receiving terminal coordinate measurement domain the identification variable value is expressed with respect to.
  • the extracting step may comprise identifying the identification variable value expressed with respect to the receiving terminal's coordinate measurement domain on the basis of the terminal identifier. Subsequently using the identification variable value to extract the communication information from the received data signal.
  • the identifier provides each receiving terminal with a simple means for readily identifying the identification variable value that is expressed with respect to its adopted coordinate measurement domain.
  • the data signal may comprise first and second communication information
  • the extracting step further comprises: extracting the first communication information at the second receiving terminal using a first identification variable value calculated in the using step, the first identification variable value having been identified on the basis of a first identifier; and extracting the second communication information at the third receiving terminal using a second identification variable value calculated in the using step, the second identification variable value having been identified on the basis of a second identifier.
  • An advantage of such embodiments is that different communication information may be securely transmitted to different receiving terminals via a single data signal, which is received by each one of the different receiving terminals.
  • Each terminal is only able to extract the communication information whose location is determinable from the received identification variable value expressed with respect to the coordinate measurement domain of the subject terminal. This ensures that only the receiving terminal's intended recipient is able to extract the communication information, and avoids the need for creating a separate data signal for each intended recipient terminal.
  • the method of the present invention may be used to securely transmit communication information to a plurality of different receiving terminals using a single data signal.
  • the transmitting step comprises transmitting the identification variable value from the first terminal to the second terminal via a third terminal.
  • the third terminal may be provided with the coordinate transform function, and the method further comprises: encrypting, at the first terminal, the identification variable value using a first cryptographic key shared with the third terminal, and transmitting the encrypted identification variable to the third terminal; decrypting, at the third terminal, the received encrypted identification variable prior to carrying out the using step; and encrypting the identification variable value expressed with respect to the second coordinate measurement domain, using a second cryptographic key shared with the second terminal, and transmitting the encrypted identification variable to the second terminal for carrying out the extracting step.
  • An advantage of such embodiments is that neither the first or second terminal are required to carry out any identification variable value calculations. Furthermore, neither of the terminals possess the coordinate transform function. Therefore, even if the integrity of one of the terminals is compromised by a malevolent third party, the malevolent third party, the transmission protocol itself is not compromised. In other words, the malevolent third party may be able to recover the confidential information by posing as a genuine receiver using the compromised terminal, however the confidentiality of the sender's coordinate measurement domain is still maintained, and can continue to be used.
  • a second aspect of the present invention relates to a system arranged to carry out the above described method, and specifically to a system arranged for securely transmitting communication information from a first terminal operating in a first coordinate measurement domain to a second remotely-located terminal operating in a second coordinate measurement domain.
  • the system comprises: combining means, provided at the first terminal, for combining the communication information with extraneous information to create a data signal; determining means provided at the first terminal, for determining a value of an identification variable expressed with respect to the first coordinate measurement domain, the identification variable value enabling the location of the communication information concealed within the data signal to be determined; a transmitter for transmitting the data signal and the identification variable value from the first terminal to the second terminal; a mapping means provided at the second terminal, for using a coordinate transform function configured to map coordinate values from the first coordinate measurement domain to the second coordinate measurement domain to calculate a value of the received identification variable expressed with respect to the second coordinate measurement domain; and extracting means, provided at the second terminal, for extracting the information from the received data signal using the calculated identification variable value to distinguish the communication information from the extraneous information.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic overview of a system for transmitting a secure data signal from a sender terminal to one or more recipient terminals;
  • FIG. 2 is a simplified schematic of the transmission system of FIG. 1 comprising a sending terminal, a single receiving terminal, and an eavesdropper, and is incorporated herein to illustrate the security of the present transmission method from eavesdroppers;
  • FIG. 3 a is an example of a transmission signal comprising concealed confidential communication information as prepared by terminal A illustrated in FIG. 2 ;
  • FIG. 3 b is an example of the transmission signal of FIG. 3 a as received by terminal B illustrated in FIG. 2 , and measured with respect to terminal B's adopted measurement frame;
  • FIG. 4 is a process flow chart of the steps comprised in the method carried out by the apparatus of FIG. 2 ;
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic of an alternative transmission system comprising a third secure terminal C.
  • FIG. 6 is a process flow chart outlining the method carried out by the system of FIG. 5 .
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic overview of a system 1 for transmitting a secure data signal comprising confidential communication information combined with extraneous information—the communication information is effectively concealed within the extraneous information.
  • the data signal is transmitted from a sender to one or more recipient's in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the system 1 comprises a sender terminal 3 and one or more receiver terminals 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 .
  • the sender terminal 3 (also referred to as terminal A in the ensuing description) may further comprise a signal generator 13 , arranged to generate a carrier signal; a signal modulation module 15 for modulating a selected signal; and a data store 17 .
  • the data store 17 comprises a plurality of data 19 associated with communication information and extraneous information.
  • the communication information is information that a user located at the sender terminal 3 wishes to securely transmit to one or more of the selected receiver terminals 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 .
  • the extraneous information provides a means for concealing the communication information, and relates to authentic information.
  • the extraneous information may relate to any type of information.
  • the extraneous information may relate to a graphical image, or to a moving image (e.g. a video).
  • Other types of information may also be used, the provided example is non-limiting, and such alternatives fall within the scope of the present invention.
  • the data signal is generated at the sender terminal 3 and comprises the user selected communication information combined with the extraneous information, as mentioned previously.
  • the data signal itself may be generated by modulating a carrier signal generated by the signal generator 13 with the combined information, using the signal modulation module 15 . It is envisaged that any known modulation method may be used.
  • the data signal is subsequently sent to one or more user nominated receiver terminals 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 via a shared communication channel.
  • the communication channel may relate to a communication network 21 such as the internet, or alternatively to a private communication network.
  • the sender terminal 3 In addition to sending the data signal to one or more selected receiver terminals 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 , the sender terminal 3 also sends data associated with an identification variable value, which may be generated by an identification variable generator module 23 operatively connected to the sender terminal 3 , to the one or more user nominated receiver terminals 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 .
  • the identification variable generator module 23 is arranged to determine the value of an identification variable associated with the location of the communication information concealed within the data signal.
  • the functionality of the identification variable generator module 23 my be provided by processing means local to the sender terminal 3 .
  • the identification variable enables a receiver to extract the concealed user selected data from the data signal.
  • the one or more user nominated receiver terminals 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 use the received identification variable value to extract the concealed communication information from the received data signal.
  • the identification variable value is expressed with respect to a confidential measurement domain (also interchangeably referred to as a measurement frame in the ensuing description) unknown to third parties.
  • a confidential measurement domain also interchangeably referred to as a measurement frame in the ensuing description
  • This requirement may be implemented in several different ways, preferred embodiments of which are described herein.
  • the security of the system is dependent on the confidentiality of the measurement frame with respect to which the identification variable value is expressed.
  • an eavesdropper cannot accurately extract the confidential communication information from the intercepted data signal—knowledge of the identification variable value alone is useless, since the eavesdropper cannot interpret it.
  • knowledge of a coordinate value in itself does not convey any information without knowledge of the coordinate frame with respect to which it is expressed.
  • the data signal may be generated by populating the carrier signal, with both extraneous and confidential communication information prior to transmission, as mentioned previously.
  • the data signal may relate to either an analogue or a digital signal, and may relate to a data packet.
  • the confidential communication information is combined and concealed within extraneous information in accordance with a selected encoding algorithm.
  • This combining step may be carried out at the sender terminal 3 , using the local processing capabilities of the terminal 3 .
  • the combining step may equally be carried out by an alternative processing device operatively connected to the terminal 3 .
  • the combining step may comprise, for example, encoding the binary sequence associated with the confidential communication information within the binary sequence associated with the extraneous information, in accordance with a selected encoding algorithm to generate a resulting transmission binary sequence.
  • a carrier signal may subsequently be modulated with the resulting transmission binary sequence to form the transmission data signal, which comprises both the confidential and the extraneous information.
  • the transmission data signal is subsequently sent via the shared communication channel, to one or more intended recipients.
  • the one or more identification variable values may be sent to the intended recipients simultaneously with the transmission signal, or separately.
  • the one or more receivers must be able to interpret the received identification variable value.
  • the recipients must be able to express the identification variable value within a known coordinate measurement domain. Provided that the coordinate measurement domain with respect to which the identification variable value is being expressed is unknown to an eavesdropper, or any other non-authorised malevolent third parties, then the eavesdropper and/or third parties will not be able to extract the confidential communication information from the intercepted data signal, even when in possession of the identification variable values.
  • the confidential communication information is extracted by the intended recipient (e.g. any one of terminals 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 ), using the received one or more identification variable values to distinguish the confidential communication information from the extraneous information comprised within the data signal.
  • the intended recipient e.g. any one of terminals 5 , 7 , 9 , 11
  • conversion of the received one or more identification variable values into the measurement reference system of the recipient is required.
  • the identification variable values may either be converted by the sender prior to transmission, or by the receiver on receipt of the transmitted data signal, to values expressed with respect to the recipient's adopted coordinate measurement domain. This is analogues to performing a coordinate transform between the two different coordinate measurement domains adopted respectively by the sender and the receiver.
  • the receiver In embodiments where the transmitted identification variable values are expressed with respect to the sender's adopted coordinate measurement domain, the receiver must be in possession of the correct transform function, mapping variable values expressed with respect to the sender's adopted coordinate measurement domain to variable values expressed with respect to the receiver's coordinate measurement domain. In this way, the receiver is able to map the received variable values from values expressed with respect to the sender's coordinate measurement domain, to variable values expressed with respect to the receiver's coordinate measurement domain. This ability to convert and to re-express received identification variable values in the receiver's coordinate measurement domain, enables the receiver to distinguish between extraneous and confidential communication information, and to extract the confidential communication information from the received data signal.
  • the transmitted identification variable values may be expressed with respect to the receiver's coordinate measurement frame.
  • the receiver is not required to perform any coordinate transform operation on the received information variable values, since the variable values are already expressed with respect to the receiver's coordinate measurement frame.
  • the mapping function is carried out by the sender prior to transmission of the one or more identification variable values. Accordingly, the sender must possess the coordinate mapping function, enabling the sender to convert identification variable values expressed with respect to the sender's measurement coordinate frame to variable values expressed with respect to the receiver's measurement coordinate frame.
  • FIG. 2 is a simplified schematic diagram of a transmission system 25 incorporated herein to facilitate the reader's understanding of the system and method of the present invention, and to highlight the security of the invention.
  • the system 25 comprises a sending terminal 27 —terminal A—and, a receiving terminal 29 —terminal B, arranged to communicate via the shared communication channel 31 .
  • the integrity of the shared communication channel 31 has been compromised by an eavesdropper 33 , who is able to intercept all communication signals sent between the terminals 27 , 29 via the shared channel 31 .
  • the identification variable may relate to a time variable, and defines the location of the confidential communication information concealed within the transmission signal.
  • Clocks A 35 and B 37 represent respectively terminal A's 27 adopted coordinate measurement frame, and to terminal B's 29 adopted coordinate measurement frame.
  • FIG. 3 a is an example illustrating an arbitrary transmission data signal f(t) 39 expressed as a function of time in terminal A's 27 selected coordinate measurement frame.
  • the confidential communication information 41 is defined as being comprised in the region b ⁇ t ⁇ a, where t is the time-variable, and a 43 and b 45 refer to the maximum and minimum values of t.
  • extraneous information 47 All information falling outside the defined range of values of t relates to extraneous information 47 . It is important to note that the term “extraneous information” is used in the present description to describe information which does not relate to the information the sender wishes to send to the intended receiver, and is comprised within the transmission signal solely as a means of concealing the confidential communication information 41 .
  • the extraneous information 47 may relate to valid data, or could be false information specifically created by the sender (i.e. terminal A 27 ) to mislead the eavesdropper 33 .
  • the extraneous information 47 may be noise.
  • the extraneous information 47 may relate to text, video, audio, or any other type of information.
  • both the confidential communication information 41 and the extraneous information 47 may be encoded within the carrier signal using modulation techniques known in the art.
  • FIG. 3 b is an example of the transmission signal f(t′) 49 received by the recipient—terminal B 29 .
  • Transmission signal degradation effects in both the amplitude and frequency domain resulting from transmission in the shared communication channel 31 may be corrected using known techniques and/or apparatus.
  • signal repeaters may be used to mitigate attenuation effects.
  • the present invention may be used in accordance with any known method and/or system for mitigating against signal deformation effects resulting from transmission along the shared communication channel 31 .
  • M is a coordinate transform function, which maps between points in terminal A's (i.e. the sender) coordinate frame 35 , and terminal B's coordinate frame 37 (i.e. receiver).
  • a′ 51 is the projection of the coordinate value a 43 expressed with respect to terminal B's coordinate frame 37 .
  • a′ 51 is the value of a 43 expressed with respect to terminal B's coordinate frame 37 .
  • b′ 53 is the projection of coordinate value b 45 expressed with respect to terminal B's coordinate frame 37 .
  • the coordinate transform function M is known only to terminal B 29 (the recipient).
  • the coordinate transform function M may also comprise a correction factor to compensate for any attenuation and/or signal degradation in the amplitude, and/or frequency domain, arising during transmission in the shared communication channel 31 .
  • the sender i.e. terminal A 27
  • the receiver i.e. terminal B 29
  • the copies may be sent in temporal succession, or at random discrete temporal intervals. Once the copies of the transmission signal have been received, the receiver can faithfully reconstruct the transmission signal. In this way any transmission errors resulting from non-faithful signal transmission, can be mitigated.
  • the identification variable may relate to any physically measurable variable and/or observable associated with the data signal, and need not necessarily relate to a time variable.
  • the data signal may equally be expressed in the frequency domain, in which case the identification variable value may relate to a frequency value.
  • any physically measurable variable and/or observable associated with the data signal may be used as the identification variable. Since such measurable variables and/or observables will be known to the reader skilled in the art of signal processing, a detailed list of all possible variables and/or observables is superfluous.
  • the confidential communication information may be encoded within a digital image file which is subsequently sent to the intended receiver.
  • the identification variable may relate to pixel location information.
  • the confidential communication information may be encoded in every tenth pixel value.
  • the sender provides the receiver with the identification variable values, which in this specific embodiment relate to pixel location values expressed in the sender's selected measurement frame, or alternatively to an algorithm enabling the location of each required pixel to be determined.
  • the algorithm may effectively relate to a series (e.g.
  • each tenth pixel represents a component of the communication information.
  • the receiver converts the received pixel location values to coordinate location values expressed in the receiver's selected coordinate measurement domain, as previously described.
  • FIG. 4 is a high level process flow chart, illustrating the different steps comprised in the afore described method, and highlights how information may be securely transmitted between remotely located terminals sharing a communication channel, as illustrated in FIG. 2 .
  • the sending terminal i.e. terminal A 27
  • the receiving terminal i.e. terminal B 29
  • All the embodiments described so far comprised the sender and receiver selecting different measurement frames. However, embodiments wherein both sender and receiver select the same measurement frame are equally possible and are described in further detail in the alternative embodiment section below.
  • the measurement frames are selected and defined at the point of manufacture of terminals A 27 and B 29 in order to avoid transmitting sensitive information over a potentially compromised communication channel, which if intercepted could compromise the integrity of the transmission system.
  • this may comprise terminal B 29 being provided with information regarding terminal A's 27 selected coordinate measurement frame, such that the coordinate transform function M can be determined.
  • the transform function M may alternatively be simply provided to terminal B 29 during configuration at the point of manufacture.
  • terminal A 27 may be provided with the transform function M to enable terminal A 27 to transmit the identification variable values expressed with respect to terminal B's 29 adopted coordinate measurement domain. This initial configuration is preferably carried out at the point of manufacture.
  • the coordinate transform function M may be provided to either terminal A 27 or terminal B 29 by transmission via a known secure channel.
  • the coordinate transform function M may be transmitted to either terminal A 27 or terminal B 29 from a secure source via a secure channel that is known not to be compromised.
  • terminals A 27 and B 29 may be used for secure data transmission.
  • terminal A encodes the confidential communication information in a transmission signal comprising extraneous information, as previously described.
  • This encoding may be carried out in accordance with a selected encoding algorithm, a selected steganographic algorithm, and/or any selected data embedding security schemes.
  • a selected encoding algorithm may result in confidential communication information being interspersed at irregular intervals within the data signal.
  • the confidential data may be dispersed at regular intervals within the data signal.
  • the precise nature of the employed encoding algorithm is not critical to the present embodiment, and such algorithms and/or schemes are widely known in the art, and accordingly are not discussed further.
  • the interested reader is referred to any textbook regarding steganographic encoding algorithms, and/or data embedding security schemes for further details.
  • terminal A 27 sends the data signal to terminal B 29 along with one or more identification variable values.
  • the one or more identification variable values are transmitted separately from the transmission signal.
  • recovery of the confidential communication information may only occur once terminal B 29 has received the time-variable values.
  • the data signal and the one or more identification variable values may be transmitted in any order, or they may be transmitted simultaneously.
  • terminal B 29 receives the data signal along with the one or more identification variable values expressed in the coordinate measurement domain adopted by terminal A 27 .
  • the one or more received identification variable values are transformed, using the coordinate transform M, to calculate the identification variable values expressed with respect to terminal B's 29 adopted coordinate measurement domain.
  • the converted identification variable values are subsequently used to identify and recover the confidential communication information comprised within the received data signal at step 67 .
  • the receiver has recovered the confidential communication information concealed in the data signal, and the process is completed at step 69 .
  • both sender and receiver may share the same coordinate measurement domain.
  • the coordinate transform function is no longer required to map identification variable values expressed with respect to the sending terminal's coordinate measurement domain, to values expressed with respect to the receiving terminal's coordinate measurement domain.
  • the identification variable values are transmitted to the receiving terminal expressed with respect to the shared coordinate measurement domain.
  • the security and confidentiality of the transmitted data signal is maintained provided that the shared coordinate measurement domain remains confidential.
  • an eavesdropper cannot effectively use the intercepted identification variable values to extract the communication information from the intercepted data signal.
  • An eavesdropper requires knowledge of the shared coordinate measurement domain to effectively use the intercepted identification variable values for the purposes of extracting the communication information.
  • the present system and method may be used to securely transmit information to a plurality of receiving terminals 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 as illustrated in FIG. 1 .
  • Each receiving terminal 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 adopts a different confidential coordinate measurement domain, which is unknown to the other terminals.
  • Selected information may be transmitted to the plurality of receiving terminals 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 using a single transmission signal.
  • a plurality of confidential communication information is encoded within the data signal.
  • the plurality of confidential communication information is comprised of individual confidential communication information components each associated with a different intended receiving terminal 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 .
  • the sending terminal 3 is provided with a plurality of coordinate transform functions, each function associated with a different receiver terminal 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 .
  • the sending terminal 3 determines the identification variable values associated with each different confidential communication information component and uses the known coordinate transform functions to express the identification variable values in the coordinate measurement domain adopted by the intended receiving terminal.
  • the sending terminal 3 is now in possession of the identification variable values associated with each different confidential communication information component and expressed in the coordinate measurement domain of the intended receiving terminal.
  • An optional identifier may be appended to each one of the plurality of identification variable values.
  • the identifier which may relate to a binary string appended to the identifier variable values, enables the receiver terminals 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 identify which one of the plurality of identifier variable values is applicable to them. In other words, the identifier tells the receiver terminal which one of the plurality of identifier variable values is expressed in its adopted coordinate measurement domain.
  • the identifier does not compromise the security of the system, since it does not reveal information regarding the coordinate measurement domain adopted by the intended receiver to a malevolent third party.
  • the data signal and the plurality of identification variable values are sent to each receiving terminal 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 along with the associated identifiers.
  • a receiving terminal 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 Upon receipt of the data signal, the identification variable values and the associated identifiers, a receiving terminal 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 will first identify the identification variable values associated with its selected coordinate measurement domain. Once it has identified the variable values associated with its selected coordinate measurement domain, the confidential communication information intended for the subject receiving terminal may be extracted from the received data signal.
  • a receiving terminal 5 , 7 , 9 , 11 may only extract confidential communication information from the data signal that was intended for it.
  • receiving terminal 5 cannot extract confidential communication information intended for terminal 7 , since terminal 5 does not know the coordinate measurement domain adopted by terminal 7 . Therefore, even though terminal 5 may be able to identify the identification variable values associated with the confidential communication information intended for terminal 7 , to correctly extract the confidential communication information intended for terminal 7 , the variable values and the coordinate measurement domain with respect to which they are expressed (i.e. the measurement system adopted by terminal 7 ), must be known. In other words, terminal 5 cannot correctly apply the identification variable values to extract the confidential communication information intended for terminal 7 , without knowledge of the coordinate measurement domain with respect to which the identification variable values have been expressed. Accordingly, the method and system of the present invention lends itself for use in securely transmitting a plurality of different communication information concealed in a single data signal, to different intended recipients, without compromising the confidentiality of the different communication information.
  • the Lorentz transforms of special relativity may be used, which are defined as follows:
  • Terminals A 27 and B 29 both select fictional coordinate measurement frames, one of which moving at close to the speed of light such that relativistic effects, such as time dilation, become noticeable. This is an important requirement since the premise of this embodiment is that both terminal A 27 and terminal B 29 will observe different time-coordinate values, which is only possible when relativistic effects become significant and result in a deviation from classical Newtonian Mechanics.
  • terminal A 29 may select to express its time-coordinate variable values t with respect to an inertial frame of reference moving at 0.992c, where c is the speed of light (approximately 3 ⁇ 10 6 ms ⁇ 1 ).
  • terminal B 29 applies the appropriate Lorentz transform—in this case the transform for t′ however, any other Lorentz transform could equally be used.
  • terminal B 29 is provided with both the identification variable value signal time coordinates associated with the confidential communication information, as measured by terminal A 27 , and the fictional velocity of terminal A's 27 selected frame of reference.
  • the velocity of terminal A's 27 selected frame of reference is preferably provided to terminal B 29 at the source of manufacture, prior to data transmission or is provided via a known secure communication channel.
  • terminal A 27 is provided with a clock measuring time at irregular intervals, or in accordance with a selected algorithm.
  • the irregular clock is used to define the time-variable coordinate values associated with the confidential communication information, comprised within the transmitted data signal.
  • terminal B 29 is provided with a coordinate transform function enabling the received identification variable time-values to be expressed in terms of the temporal coordinate frame adopted by terminal B 29 —or in other words, terminal B is provided with the transform function required to express the received time-coordinate values with respect to the time-coordinates associated with its own clock.
  • both sender and receiver may use clocks having different base time-interval units.
  • time-intervals measured in the sender's temporal coordinate frame i.e. the adopted coordinate measurement domain
  • the coordinate transform function may simply comprise a coordinate shift.
  • a third secure terminal may be incorporated into the transmission system, and is used as a proxy terminal to distribute the identification variables expressed in the receiver's coordinate measurement domain.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram illustrating an example of such a system 71 .
  • Terminal A 27 (sender) and terminal B 29 (receiver) are operatively connected via a shared communication channel 31 as previously described in relation to FIG. 2 .
  • Terminal C 73 (the proxy terminal) is operatively connected to both terminals A 27 and B 29 via, respectively shared communication channel 75 and shared communication channel 77 .
  • the difference between the present embodiment and previously described embodiments is that neither terminal A 27 or terminal B 29 is provided with the coordinate transform function M required to express the identification variable values in the receiving terminal's measurement frame.
  • terminal C is provided with this information.
  • terminal C is provided with the coordinate transform function M required to convert identification variable values expressed with respect to terminal A's 27 coordinate measurement domain into variable values expressed with respect to terminal B's 29 coordinate measurement domain.
  • terminal C 73 may be provided with the coordinate measurement domain of terminal A 27 and terminal B 29 . In this way, terminal C 73 can calculate the coordinate transform function M when it is required.
  • terminal C 73 shares a different pair of unique encryption keys with each attached terminal.
  • terminal C 73 shares an encryption key pair with terminal B 29 , which is different to the encryption key pair shared with terminal A 27 .
  • the encryption key pairs may relate to a public-key encryption pair, wherein one key is publicly available and is used to encrypt information, whereas the private key used to decrypt encrypted information is known only to terminal C 73 . It is immaterial for present purposes which type of cryptographic keys are shared between the terminals, suffice to say that the encryption keys must be sufficiently complex to ensure that a malicious third party and/or eavesdropper is not able to derive the decryption key from knowledge of the encryption key.
  • the encryption function is selected such that its inverse is not well defined. This ensures that an eavesdropper cannot derive the decryption key from knowledge of the encryption key.
  • Public-key cryptography is one example of a widely known cryptographic protocol which satisfies this requirement however, other types of cryptographic protocols exist which also satisfy this requirement and may equally be used with the present invention.
  • terminal C is configured with knowledge of the coordinate measurement domains of terminals A 27 and B 29 at the point of manufacture.
  • the encryption keys are also preferably distributed at the point of manufacture and prior to data transmission.
  • the cryptographic key pairs shared between terminal C 73 and terminal A 27 are denoted e A
  • the cryptographic key pairs shared between terminal C 73 and terminal B 29 are denoted e B .
  • the encryption key is further denoted by a 1 subscript, for example e A1 denotes the encryption key member of the key pair shared between terminal C 73 and terminal A 27 .
  • e A2 denotes the decryption key member of the key pair shared between terminal C 73 and terminal A 27 .
  • Terminals A 27 , B 29 and C 73 are remotely located with respect to each other.
  • Terminal C 73 is located in a secure and trusted location. Accordingly, for present purposes it is assumed that the integrity and confidentiality of the information stored at terminal C 73 is secure.
  • the encrypted identification variable values are sent to terminal C 73 in step 83 .
  • the data signal f(t) may simultaneously be sent to terminal B 29 .
  • the decrypted identification variable values t′ ⁇ a′,b′ ⁇ expressed with respect to terminal B's 29 selected measurement frame, are used by terminal B 29 to extract the confidential communication information concealed in the received data signal, which ends the process in step 95 .
  • an eavesdropper does not possess sufficient information to allow an intercepted identification variable value to be re-expressed in terms of its own coordinate measurement domain. Accordingly, an eavesdropper can not identify and recover the confidential communication information within an intercepted data signal with any degree of certainty.
  • the identification variable values and/or the data signal may be encrypted prior to transmission.
  • the confidential communication information may be encrypted and embedded in encrypted form in the data signal.
  • the identification variable values may be encrypted, and transferred to the receiving terminal in encrypted form. In this way, an eavesdropper must obtain the decryption key, in addition to knowing the receiver's coordinate measurement domain to be able to extract the confidential communication information from the data signal.
  • the present method may be used with any type of data and any type of digital file format. Including voice-over-IP (VoIP), audio data files (e.g. mp3, mp4, WAV, flac etc.), video data files (e.g. avi, mpeg etc.), image data files (e.g. jpeg, RAW etc.), and any other data file formats.
  • VoIP voice-over-IP
  • audio data files e.g. mp3, mp4, WAV, flac etc.
  • video data files e.g. avi, mpeg etc.
  • image data files e.g. jpeg, RAW etc.
  • terminal relates to any electronic device capable of receiving and transmitting data signals.
  • this includes but is not limited to a PC, a mobile telephone, a smart telephone, a telephone, a modem, a Portable Data Assistant (PDA) etc.
  • PDA Portable Data Assistant
  • the herein described embodiments relate to one-way communications—namely, information is sent in one direction, from a sender (i.e. terminal A 27 ) to a receiver (i.e. terminal B 29 ), the herein described methods may equally be used for two-way communication, in which case each terminal is both a receiver and a sender of confidential communication information—e.g. terminal B 29 transmits information to terminal A 27 .
  • the present invention may be used in conjunction or independently from known cryptographic methods.
  • a data terminal for securely transmitting communication information to a remotely located second terminal comprising: combining means, for combining the communication information with extraneous information to create a data signal; determining means, for determining a value of an identification variable expressed with respect to a first coordinate measurement domain, the identification variable value enabling the location of the communication information concealed within the data signal to be determined; and a transmitter for transmitting the data signal and the identification variable value to the second terminal.
  • the terminal may comprise: a mapping means, for using a coordinate transform function configured to map coordinate values from the first coordinate measurement domain to a second coordinate measurement domain to calculate a value of the identification variable expressed with respect to the second coordinate measurement domain.
  • the data terminal may be arranged to operate in the first coordinate measurement domain.
  • the data terminal of may comprise: encryption means, for encrypting the identification variable value using a cryptographic key shared with a receiving terminal to thereby improve the confidentiality of the transmitted identification variable value.
  • the encryption means may be configured to encrypt the data signal to thereby improve the confidentiality of the transmitted data signal.
  • the encryption means may be configured with one of the keys comprised in a public cryptographic key pair.
  • the combining means may comprise an algorithm generator, configured to generate an algorithm for combining the communication information with the extraneous information.
  • the algorithm generator may be configured to generate a random algorithm such that the communication information and the extraneous information is combined randomly.
  • the combining means may comprise a signal modulator configured to modulate a carrier signal with the combined communication information and extraneous information to create the data signal.
  • the combining means may comprise a signal generator arranged to generate the carrier signal.
  • a data terminal for securely receiving communication information (referred to as a receiving terminal) from a remotely located transmitting terminal, the data terminal comprising: a receiver, for receiving a data signal comprising the communication information combined with extraneous information, and for receiving a value of an identification variable enabling the location of the communication information within the data signal to be determined; and a demodulator, for extracting the combined communication and extraneous information from the received data signal.
  • the receiving terminal may comprise: data storage means; and wherein the demodulator is a computer executable code stored in the data storage means.
  • the receiving data terminal may comprise: information distinguishing means, for distinguishing the communication information from the extraneous information using the identification variable value.
  • the receiving data terminal may comprise: information extraction means, for extracting the communication information from the extraneous information using the identification variable value.
  • the receiving data terminal may comprise: a mapping means, for using a coordinate transform function configured to map coordinate values from a first coordinate measurement domain to a second coordinate measurement domain to calculate a value of the identification variable expressed with respect to the second coordinate measurement domain.
  • the receiving data terminal may be arranged to operate in the second coordinate measurement domain.
  • the receiving data terminal may comprise: decryption means, for decrypting an encrypted identification variable value using a cryptographic key shared with the transmitting terminal.
  • the decryption means may be configured to decrypt an encrypted data signal received from the transmitting terminal.
  • the decryption means may be configured with one of the keys comprised in a public cryptographic key pair.
  • the receiving data terminal may be a computer terminal.
  • the receiving data terminal may be a mobile telephone.
  • the receiving data terminal may be a smartphone.

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Information Transfer Between Computers (AREA)
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WO2011161660A2 (en) 2011-12-29
MX2013000119A (es) 2013-06-13
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GB201010735D0 (en) 2010-08-11
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AU2011268514A1 (en) 2013-01-31
SG186331A1 (en) 2013-01-30
US20160164843A1 (en) 2016-06-09
EA201291464A1 (ru) 2013-11-29
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