US20110282789A1 - Card false-positive prevention - Google Patents

Card false-positive prevention Download PDF

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Publication number
US20110282789A1
US20110282789A1 US13/138,286 US201013138286A US2011282789A1 US 20110282789 A1 US20110282789 A1 US 20110282789A1 US 201013138286 A US201013138286 A US 201013138286A US 2011282789 A1 US2011282789 A1 US 2011282789A1
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transaction
region
communication device
data identifying
mobile communication
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Pat Carroll
John Petersen
Jonathan Alford
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Valid soft (UK) Ltd
Validsoft Ltd
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Valid soft (UK) Ltd
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
    • G06Q20/18—Payment architectures involving self-service terminals [SST], vending machines, kiosks or multimedia terminals
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
    • G06Q20/20—Point-of-sale [POS] network systems
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/322—Aspects of commerce using mobile devices [M-devices]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/322—Aspects of commerce using mobile devices [M-devices]
    • G06Q20/3224—Transactions dependent on location of M-devices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/107—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources wherein the security policies are location-dependent, e.g. entities privileges depend on current location or allowing specific operations only from locally connected terminals
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/18—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/126—Anti-theft arrangements, e.g. protection against subscriber identity module [SIM] cloning
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/02—Services making use of location information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/02—Services making use of location information
    • H04W4/021—Services related to particular areas, e.g. point of interest [POI] services, venue services or geofences
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/63—Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/02—Services making use of location information
    • H04W4/029—Location-based management or tracking services

Definitions

  • This invention relates to determining the validity of a requested transaction and to false-positive prevention such as card present false-positive prevention. More particularly, this invention relates to financial transactions and to card-present false-positive prevention as well as to cross-border card present false-positive prevention.
  • a false-positive event occurs when a user attempts to carry out a legitimate financial transaction which is declined because the financial provider (for example an issuing bank providing customers with a debit card or credit card) has incorrectly identified that transaction as being potentially fraudulent.
  • the transaction may be a cross-border card-present transaction.
  • a cross-border transaction may be on in which the transaction occurs in a different region to the region where the user is registered with the financial provider. That is to say, a cross-border card-present transaction could be one where a user withdraws cash from an ATM (automated teller machine) using his credit or debit card abroad or one where a user purchases goods at a Point-of-Sale (PoS) using his credit or debit card abroad.
  • ATM automated teller machine
  • PoS Point-of-Sale
  • the card In both cases, the card must be physically present at the point of the transaction e.g. at the ATM or PoS. This is in contrast to a card-not-present transaction where the details of the card are present, for example the name of the card holder, the card number, expiry date, as well as security information. The card itself is not present at the location where the transaction is carried out.
  • a card-not-present transaction may occur as a result of an internet or mail order transaction.
  • the transaction may be a cross-border transaction, i.e. one where the transaction occurs in a country other than the country where the cardholder's issuing bank issued the card.
  • Chip and PIN personal identification number
  • skimmed (counterfeit) cards are simply used at ATMs and PoS devices in countries that don't support Chip and PIN, such as the US, when verification reverts to the card's magnetic stripe.
  • Chip and PIN technology allows payment using debit or credit cards. Instead of using a signature to verify payments, the card user must enter a PIN number known only to the card holder.
  • Banks and other financial service providers generally attempt to prevent card-present fraud through the use of 3rd party software risk engines or in-house logic within the real-time authorisation process in an attempt to determine whether a transaction is likely to be fraudulent. Others will decline all cross-border transactions unless the cardholder has previously supplied the financial service provider with an accurate travel itinerary (which may still prove insufficient).
  • the financial service provider because the financial service provider has declined the transaction, it usually contacts the cardholder to confirm whether the transaction was actually fraudulent. This is done either manually by fraud centre operators, which is very expensive, or electronically by outbound dialling services, some of which can be inefficient and expensive. In many cases, however, because of the time taken for the financial service provider to instigate this process, the cardholder contacts the financial service provider directly (from abroad) to attempt to resolve the issue.
  • a method for deriving probability data relating to the validity of a requested financial transaction comprises the steps of: receiving location data relating to a requested transaction; receiving data identifying a mobile communication device associated with a person requesting the transaction; determining from Home Location Register (HLR) data for the mobile communication device location data for the mobile communication device; comparing the location data relating to the transaction with the location data from the mobile communication device; and determining probability data relating to the validity of the requested transaction in dependence on the result of the comparison.
  • HLR Home Location Register
  • apparatus for deriving probability data relating to the validity of requested financial transaction comprises: means for receiving location data relating to a requested transaction; means for receiving data identifying a mobile communication device associated with a person requesting the transaction; means for determining from Home Location Register (HLR) data for the mobile communication device location data for the mobile communication device; means for comparing the location data relating to the transaction with the location data from the mobile communication device; and means for determining probability data relating to the validity of the requested transaction in dependence on the result of the comparison.
  • HLR Home Location Register
  • Preferred embodiments of the invention derive probability data relating to the validity of a requested financial transaction by receiving location data relating to a requested transaction; receiving data identifying a mobile communication device associated with a person requesting the transaction; determine from Home Location Register (HLR) data for the mobile communication device location data for the mobile communication device; compare the location data relating to the transaction with the location data from the mobile communication device; and determine probability data relating to the validity of the requested transaction in dependence on the result of the comparison.
  • HLR Home Location Register
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of the system architecture of an embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 2 shows a flow diagram showing the main steps performed by an embodiment of the invention.
  • a false positive prevention system comprises a server or computer 101 .
  • the server or computer 101 determines whether a transaction is likely to be fraudulent or not, as described in further detail below.
  • the system can further comprise a mobile network data aggregator 103 ; mobile networks, 105 , 106 , a mobile communication device (not shown), a bank 107 , and a customer 109 .
  • the system may also comprise a resolution system 111 , although this feature is not essential, and so it is shown in dashed lines in FIG. 1 . The main steps carried out by an embodiment of the invention will now be described.
  • a user first starts a transaction at a means for performing or carrying out a transaction, at step 201 .
  • the means for carrying out the transaction may be an ATM or PoS. If the transaction is being requested at an ATM, the user inserts a card into the ATM and enters his PIN number. Alternatively, if the transaction is being carried out at a PoS, then the user may physically pass the card to the retailer who inserts the card into a card reader for processing. The user may optionally enter a PIN, if the card is a chip and PIN card. Other verification schemes such as signature may also be used, alternatively or in addition to a PIN.
  • the card comprises data associated with an individual or user which allows the user's account to be identified. Usually this information is in the form of a sequence of decimal numbers.
  • the ATM or PoS then contacts the financial service provider (card issuer) 107 at step 203 , and the Issuing bank or financial service provider 107 authorisation process starts.
  • the financial service provider receives a transaction request, at step 205 .
  • the ATM or PoS sends information enabling the identity of the card holder to be deduced. This information may comprise the card number and may be sent by conventional means or using wireless means known to the skilled person. The information also may be sent in any suitably encrypted form known to the skilled person.
  • the bank or financial service provider 107 may optionally perform additional processing to determine (using software risk engines or in-house logic) whether the transaction is likely to be fraudulent, for example if the transaction is for a large amount. However, if the financial service provider 107 determines that the transaction is likely to be genuine, then it can proceed directly to the authorisation process, at step 217 , allowing the transaction at step 219 . If the financial service provider determines that the transaction is likely to be fraudulent, then it passes the request to the server, 101 .
  • the financial service provider passes the transaction information directly to the server 101 .
  • the server 101 may be located within the financial service provider's organisation. However preferred embodiments have a server 101 which is physically separate from the financial service provider, and the transaction information (for example card number or/and name or/and transaction amount) is sent using wireless or conventional wire technology to the server, 101 .
  • the transaction information for example card number or/and name or/and transaction amount
  • the server 101 then extracts country code information contained within the transaction information, at step 207 .
  • the financial service provider extracts the country code information from the transaction information.
  • the financial service provider may also assign a reference number to the transaction. This has the advantage that potentially sensitive financial information such as the card number does not have to be sent to the server 101 .
  • the financial service provider searches a customer data base or look up table for information identifying a mobile communication device, as shown in table 1.
  • the look up table has card holder identifying information for each card holder and also information enabling the card holder's mobile communication device to be determined.
  • the card holder identifying information for each user is associated with at least one piece of information enabling the card holder's communication device to be determined. If the mobile communication device is a portable telephone, then this information may be the (unique) telephone number of the portable telephone associated with the user carrying out the transaction. Further, each card holder may have more than one entry in the look up table because they may have more than one card with the financial service provider.
  • the financial service provider then sends the information identifying the mobile communication device as well as the extracted country code (i.e. location) relating to the transaction to the server 101 .
  • a transaction reference number is also sent. This could be an arbitrary number assigned to the transaction by the financial service provider. This information may be sent in an encrypted form.
  • the server 101 receives the information identifying the mobile communication device (mobile telephone number) of the customer 109 from the issuing bank it then performs a HLR lookup from a commercially available database.
  • An HLR database is held by every mobile network provider and comprises information on that provider's permanent subscribers. Included in the information is the Network Country Code to which a subscriber is currently assigned, for use with customers who are roaming.
  • the HLR database is frequently updated to take account of changes in the user's position.
  • the server 101 performs the HLR lookup by opening one or more communication channel(s) to a mobile network data aggregator 103 , at step 209 .
  • the network data aggregator holds HLR information for mobile communication devices registered with a mobile network provider.
  • the network data aggregator may have HLR data of more than one mobile network service provider 105 , 106 . This has the advantage that it is not necessary to interrogate each service provider separately in order to obtain the HLR data of a mobile communication devices registered with different service providers.
  • the network data aggregator 103 is able to extract the Mobile Country Code (MCC) indicator held for every permanent subscriber within the Home Location Register (HLR) database of the subscriber's mobile network, at step 211 using the information enabling the card holder's communication device to be determined (i.e. mobile telephone number).
  • MCC Mobile Country Code
  • HLR Home Location Register
  • the MCC code associated with the information identifying the mobile communication device (telephone number) is then passed to the server 101 .
  • the server 101 compares the received country indicator contained within the (cross-border) ATM or PoS transaction with the received Mobile Country Code (MCC) indicator.
  • MCC Mobile Country Code
  • the probability of a transaction being legitimate is calculated. There are a number of ways in which this may be performed. The simplest way in which a legitimate transaction is detected is if the extracted country code of where the transaction is taking place matches the determined MCC indicator. For example, a transaction with an extracted country code relating to Australia will have a high probability of legitimacy if the determined MCC indicator also relates to Australia. In this case, the transaction is likely to be legitimate, because it is most likely that the legitimate card holder is in the same or a similar location to their mobile communication device. For a legitimate transaction the legitimate card holder carrying out the transaction is likely to have the mobile communication device on their person. In this case, the location of the transaction will be the substantially the same as the location of the user's mobile communication device.
  • the HLR data of a mobile communication device can be determined using techniques known to the skilled person, for example using the mobile GSM (Global System for Mobile) network or using 3 rd generation mobile networks. This allows the position of the mobile communication device to be determined to an accuracy of at least 50 m.
  • GSM Global System for Mobile
  • system can be configured so that a transaction is determined to be genuine only if the thus determined location of the mobile communication device is within a predetermined distance of the location where the transaction is occurring, for example 50 or 100 m.
  • the system is configured such that a transaction is determined to be genuine only if the mobile communication device is determined to be in the same city or state or country as the place where the transaction is taking place. This embodiment is useful because card users frequently leave mobile devices at home or in hotels when performing a transaction.
  • the transaction country code will not match the MCC indicator, even though the transaction is being carried out by a legitimate user. This could occur if the transaction is taking place close to the border of a country, for example the border or France and Germany.
  • the MCC indicator is determined to be close to a border, the transaction may be allowed even though the transaction country code and the MCC indicator do not match, provided the transaction is occurring in a country which neighbours (i.e. within a predetermined distance) of the country code determined using the MCC.
  • the system may also determine the probability of a transaction being fraudulent, at step 213 , rather than just determining whether the transaction is genuine ( 1 ) or fraudulent ( 0 ). In this case a number between 0 and 1 may be assigned to the transaction.
  • the probability of the transaction being fraudulent is larger when the distance between the location of the transaction and the user's mobile communication device is larger.
  • the transaction request is updated with the determined probability value, for example 0.9 (meaning that there is a 90% probability that the transaction is genuine) or whole number for example 1 or 0 (meaning that the transaction has determined with 100% probability of it being genuine or fraudulent).
  • the probability is then passed to the bank or financial service provider 101 as part of the transaction information, and at step 217 , the bank or financial service provider allows or denies the transaction in dependence upon the determined probability. If the transaction is allowed it is completed at step 219 .
  • embodiments of the invention reduce the incidence of false-positive transactions.
  • Embodiments of the invention therefore, to achieve maximum effectiveness, require cardholders to take and activate their mobile communication devices (mobile phones) abroad (though not necessarily to carry them on their person) and also require issuing banks to record accurate mobile phone information on their cardholder databases. This is an increasing trend due to the increasing incidence of cross-border false-positives and is actively encouraged by banks.
  • the Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS) advises card holders to make sure their card company has up-to-date contact details for them, including a mobile number, especially if travelling overseas.
  • an automated resolution process at step 221 , is provided, however this is optional. This allows for the immediate and automatic resolution of any transaction declined through having a low probability of legitimacy (potentially fraudulent transaction).
  • the automated resolution process predicts if the decline is a true-positive (fraudulent transaction) or false-positive (legitimate transaction).
  • the automated resolution process connects the cardholder directly with the bank or financial service provider (i.e. fraud department) to resolve the issue of the fraudulent card and any previous fraudulent transactions. Alternatively it can update the cardholder's information and request the cardholder to resubmit the declined transaction. Because the resolution process can occur immediately the transaction is declined, it streamlines the process, provides a better customer experience and provides the opportunity for the cardholder to retry the transaction, in the case of false-positive, whilst still in the vicinity of the original declined transaction.
  • Embodiments of the invention use HLR information in conjunction with card-present financial transaction data to predict the probability of legitimacy.
  • HLR databases to determine the country location of a subscriber has advantages over techniques such as Latitude/Longitude tracking in terms of cost, timeliness and privacy.
  • Embodiments of the invention allow more true positive cross-border card present financial transactions to be identified, while also reducing the number of false positive transactions.
  • Embodiments of the invention also allow invalid mobile telephone numbers to be identified (ones that are no longer in use) using the HLR information thereby avoiding processing errors. This also allows these numbers to be identified and for the financial service provider to request new telephone numbers from the card holder.
  • Embodiments of the invention can run as a hosted service or in-house. Although embodiments of the invention have been described with reference to financial cards, it is not in fact necessary for any card to actually be present when the transaction is taking place. For example, a user may use biometric information such as finger print(s) or retina scan(s) as a unique identifier of their account whilst also giving authorisation information.
  • the authorisation information can be an additional PIN or can be the biometric information itself.
  • a user can be provided with a unique combination of code or/and pin number to enter at an ATM. This allows their financial service provider to provide the user with cash from the ATM without the need for a physical card. The withdrawn cash is then debited from the user's account which is identified using the unique code.
  • the present invention finds applicability in determining the validity or authenticity of any transaction being attempted at an ATM or PoS or any other means for carrying out a transaction.
  • the transaction may be a financial transaction.
  • embodiments of the invention may be implemented in hardware or software.
  • Embodiments may be implemented in the ATM or PoS or other means for carrying out a transaction, although, it is preferable to implement the system at a centralised computer or server 101 .
  • the system 101 may use Visitor Location register database information. These databases may be referred to as Location Register (LR) databases.
  • LR Location Register
  • the location data relating to where a financial transaction is being requested may comprise data identifying a region where a transaction is being requested.
  • embodiments of the invention may use an ATM country code indicator or a PoS country code indicator.
  • These financial transaction country indicators may be labels such as “UK” or “44” and serve to identify a particular region, but do not contain sufficient information to determine where the region is located or even where within the region the ATM or PoS is located or positioned.
  • the location data of the mobile communication device may comprise data identifying a region where a mobile communication device is located.
  • embodiments of the invention may use a Mobile Country Code (MCC) indicator, such as “UK” or “44”.
  • MCC Mobile Country Code
  • the server 101 may extract the Mobile Country Code indicator from the Home Location Register Data.
  • the server 101 may extract the Mobile Country Code indicator from the LR data of a number of mobile devices using the data identifying a mobile communication device which is associated with a person requesting the transaction.
  • the LR data corresponding to the mobile device of the user requesting the transaction may then be searched to extract the country code indicator. For example, a search for the field “MCC” in the LR database, will reveal a match, and the data value associated with that match is the MCC value or indicator.
  • the data identifying a mobile communication device may be a mobile telephone number or other subscriber information such as an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI).
  • IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
  • the data identifying a region where a mobile communication device is located may be a label such as “UK” or “44” and serve to identify a particular region where the device is located, but do not contain sufficient information to determine where the region is located or even where within the region the device is located or positioned.
  • the server 101 does not know the position of the mobile communication device, so that a user's privacy is maintained.
  • the server 101 just knows what the value is of the identifier which represents a particular region. For example, if the user's mobile communication device is located within the UK, the data identifying the region where the mobile device is located may be a number such as “44”. This information does not allow the position of the mobile communication to be determined.
  • the indicator or data identifying a region where the financial transaction is requested are not unique. That is to say, all ATMs or PoSs within a particular geographic region are assigned a particular country indicator, such as “44”.
  • the indicator or data identifying a region where a mobile communication device associated with a user requesting a transaction is located is also not unique. That is to say, the mobile phone country indicator assigned to a particular phone is not unique and that a number of mobile phones within a particular region or country share the same code.
  • Having indicators which are not unique has the advantage that the step of comparing the data identifying a region where a financial transaction is requested with the data identifying a region where a mobile communication device is located is simplified.
  • a transaction may be validated or determined as authentic if the region identifier where the ATM or POS is located matches the region identifier where the mobile communication device is located.
  • the data identifying the regions where a mobile device is located also may comprise a city or state identifier. This identifier is also located in the HLR data.
  • these city or state identifiers are also not unique in that a number of mobile devices may be assigned the same city or state identifier. Further, the city or state identifiers may not contain sufficient information to enable the location of the region covered by the city or state to be determined or indeed to determine where within the city or state region the mobile device is located.
  • embodiments of the invention may receive the HLR data from a mobile network aggregator.
  • the transaction may be a card-present transaction or a card-not-present transaction or a cross-border transaction.
  • the location data of the mobile communication device may be receivable from more than one network aggregator.
  • the LR data may comprise data from more than one mobile network service provider. Further, a probability of legitimacy of the requested transaction may be determined in real time or post authorisation.
  • embodiments of the invention may decline a transaction if a determined probability of legitimacy is below a predetermined value.
  • the probability data may also be used to identify a false positive transaction.
  • the transaction data and the data identifying a mobile communication device may be received from a financial service provider.
  • the method may also comprise the step of automatically contacting the person requesting the transaction, for example via telephone.
  • Embodiments of the invention may also comprise the step of controlling a means for carrying out a transaction in dependence upon the result of the comparison. This step may be an alternative to the step of authenticating the transaction in dependence on the result of the comparison.
  • an ATM or PoS or other means for carrying out a transaction may be controlled such that cash is dispensed or such that the PoS performs the transaction.

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US20210142305A1 (en) 2021-05-13
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