US20080046263A1 - Methods and Systems for Making, Tracking and Authentication of Products - Google Patents

Methods and Systems for Making, Tracking and Authentication of Products Download PDF

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Publication number
US20080046263A1
US20080046263A1 US11/664,841 US66484105A US2008046263A1 US 20080046263 A1 US20080046263 A1 US 20080046263A1 US 66484105 A US66484105 A US 66484105A US 2008046263 A1 US2008046263 A1 US 2008046263A1
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Prior art keywords
code
secret
checking centre
codes
item
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Abandoned
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US11/664,841
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English (en)
Inventor
Alain Sager
Philippe Chatelain
Erwan Fradet
Jacques Weiss
Marc Chemla
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Philip Morris USA Inc
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Philip Morris USA Inc
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Application filed by Philip Morris USA Inc filed Critical Philip Morris USA Inc
Assigned to PHILIP MORRIS USA INC. reassignment PHILIP MORRIS USA INC. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: CHEMLA, MARC, WEISS, JACQUES, CHATELAIN, PHILIPPE, FRADET, ERWAN, SAGER, ALAIN
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce
    • G06Q30/018—Certifying business or products
    • G06Q30/0185—Product, service or business identity fraud
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K17/00—Methods or arrangements for effecting co-operative working between equipments covered by two or more of main groups G06K1/00 - G06K15/00, e.g. automatic card files incorporating conveying and reading operations
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K17/00—Methods or arrangements for effecting co-operative working between equipments covered by two or more of main groups G06K1/00 - G06K15/00, e.g. automatic card files incorporating conveying and reading operations
    • G06K17/0022—Methods or arrangements for effecting co-operative working between equipments covered by two or more of main groups G06K1/00 - G06K15/00, e.g. automatic card files incorporating conveying and reading operations arrangements or provisious for transferring data to distant stations, e.g. from a sensing device
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce
    • G06Q30/02—Marketing; Price estimation or determination; Fundraising
    • G06Q30/0282—Rating or review of business operators or products
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials

Definitions

  • This invention relates to the marking, tracking and authentication of goods, in particular, but not exclusively, of packaged goods, for example packs or cartons of cigarettes and other tobacco products.
  • the invention also relates to production control.
  • Contraband and counterfeiting cause significant loss of revenue to producers of traded goods as well as for national authorities. Moreover, the illegal sale of counterfeited goods of inferior quality is detrimental to the customer and to the manufacturer.
  • Legally produced goods may also be illegally imported or traded, for example in order to evade taxes or national regulations. It is therefore a major concern in several trade areas to detect and avoid unauthorized parallel import channels.
  • contraband and counterfeiting are particularly acute for goods subject to special taxation, like tobacco products. They also exist for many other kinds of traded products carrying a strong brand value, in particular for internationally traded products, such as perfumes, alcohols, watches and luxury goods in general.
  • a limitation of this practice is that the interpretation and validation of these production codes can be time-consuming and cumbersome. For example, authentication may require every production code impressed on a manufactured item to be recorded in a database and/or the transfer of a large amount of confidential data from the manufacturing site to a central database. These requirements may jeopardize reliability and safety.
  • the present invention aims to address the deficiencies in the prior art approaches described above.
  • a method of marking manufactured items comprising: providing a plurality of secret codes to a checking centre and to a production line for the manufactured items; generating an ID code for each manufactured item; digitally signing each ID code by means of a secret derived from the plurality of secret codes and known to the checking centre; and marking each manufactured item with said signed ID code.
  • the present invention also provides a method of authenticating an item marked according to the method above comprising transmitting the said signed ID code to said checking centre; and authenticating the ID code at the checking centre.
  • the invention also provides a system for marking manufactured items comprising: a generator, for generating collections of secret codes; a production line for manufacturing the items to be marked, the production line comprising: a code generator for generating an ID code for each manufactured item; a digital Signor for signing the ID codes with a secret derived from the secret codes; a data transmitter for transmitting the secret to a checking centre; and a marker for marking each manufactured item with the signed ID code.
  • the invention also provides a method of authenticating a manufactured item, comprising: generating a code and signing said code with a digital signature within a code generator; marking the item with the signed code; transmitting the signed code to a checking centre over a public network; authenticating the digital signature by the checking centre; retrieving the significance of the code at the checking centre; and transmitting the significance to a user over the public network.
  • a further aspect of the invention resides in a method of controlling the volume of manufactured items marked the marking method above, comprising: gathering manufacturing volume information at the checking centre; and providing the manufacturing volume information to a user.
  • the invention also provides a method of tracking an item marked by to the marking method above, comprising: transmitting the signed ID code to the checking centre; authenticating the ID code by the checking centre; and retransmitting the tracking information related to the ID code to a user.
  • Embodiments of the various aspects of the invention have the advantage that marking and authentication can be accessed and interrogated remotely by an ordinary network, such as a land or mobile telephone.
  • the marking and authentication has the further advantage that it may not be violated by counterfeiters.
  • the genuineness of a manufactured item on sale can be checked easily, for example within a few seconds at the point of sale.
  • Embodiments of aspects of the invention have the further advantage that cloned codes and unauthorized code duplications may be identified, and that the production volume, for example of a given manufacturer, manufacturing site or manufacturing line, may be controlled.
  • Embodiments of aspects of the invention have the further advantage that they may be used to replace the system of fiscal stickers that is used in many countries to collect taxes, for example on tobacco products.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic view of a marking and authentication system embodying the invention
  • FIG. 2 shows schematically a marking code format embodying the invention
  • FIG. 3 is a flow chart showing a code generation scheme embodying the invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a flow chart showing a code authentication scheme embodying the invention.
  • each production line represents a production facility for one or more manufactured items.
  • a production line may be a cigarette making and packaging line, with the manufactured items being, for example, cigarette packs and cartons of at least one brand.
  • the production may be organized in batches, each batch being dedicated to the production of a certain amount of identical manufactured items, for example cigarette packs and cartons of a particular brand and type.
  • these lines may be physically located at one manufacturing site 10 , or at different production centres 10 having various geographical locations.
  • Each production line comprises a code generator 106 arranged to generate and encrypt an identification code for each item manufactured on the production line 101 .
  • the production line 101 also comprises a marker 107 .
  • Any suitable marking means may be used such as a continuous inkjet printer, a drop-on-demand inkjet printer, a laser printer, or any other printer or marker that allows the marking of variable information, to impress or print the identification code on each manufactured item.
  • the identification codes can be impressed on each item, on an external package, on labels or in any other convenient way.
  • the identification code is printed on adhesive tags, or labels, to be applied to the manufactured items, preferably non-removably.
  • the identification code is printed by a laser beam on a layer of laser-sensitive material deposited on the item or on the item's package. This method allows the code to be impressed through a transparent wrapping layer.
  • identification code examples include holographic printing, for example using the HoloSpot® format.
  • Embodiments of the invention may also include radio, electronic or magnetic recording of the identification code, for example using an RFID transponder, EMID® tags or any other tagging means.
  • the system has means to count and report the number of codes generated and printed codes in each production batch or in a given production period, as will now be described in detail.
  • the production lines 101 include a code generation system 106 which generates a unique encrypted identification code SUPI for each item produced.
  • the code generation system 106 is a fully autonomous computer or microcontroller dedicated to a particular production line 101 .
  • the code generation system 106 can communicate with a checking centre 30 via a secure internet connection 34 , a local central server 15 , or any other suitable data communication means.
  • the checking centre 30 receives and centralizes production data and processes queries from users 80 , 70 .
  • several levels of packaging such as packs and cartons comprising several packs, which are manufactured on the same manufacturing line 101 , may be marked using common hardware resources.
  • the code generation system 106 may comprise different or shared software modules, loaded on a computer common to several production lines, and serve several production lines at the same time.
  • the code generation system 106 may be remotely located, for example in the checking centre, and communicate the generated codes to the production lines, as required, by appropriate network means.
  • the code generation system performs a number of functions, as described below, including the generation of ID codes for the items and the signing of those ID codes.
  • the unique identification code SUPI is obtained by processing data in a Production Information Code PIC.
  • the PIC combines various data related to the manufacture of the item, such as a code MC identifying a manufacturing centre 10 , a code PL identifying a particular production line 101 within a manufacturing centre 10 , and codes YR, DY, HR identifying the year, day and hour, respectively, when a particular item was manufactured.
  • the PIC may include a code generator ID instead of the manufacturing centre and production line codes MC, PL.
  • the individual data elements can be combined by decimal or binary digit juxtaposition, by algebraic composition, by applying a predefined shift value each data element and adding all the shifted values together, or by any other computational means.
  • the composition function is invertible, to allow decomposition of the PIC into the original elements MC, PL, YR, DY, I-IR.
  • an additional element may be introduced into the PIC to ensure uniqueness.
  • a production line fabricates a large number of items 43 .
  • Each item 43 is identified, within a production hour, by an individual number TI, for example a progressive number corresponding to the chronological production sequence. Other manners of generating or assigning individual numbers are possible.
  • each UPI is unique to an item, for example to a single cigarette pack or cigarette carton.
  • the invention is not limited to this case, and includes variants with non-unique UPI numbers, distinguishable from each other by their different digital signatures.
  • the structure of the UPI code and the significance of the various fields composing the UPI code are exemplary and are not limiting. Any code suitable as item identifier code, having any arbitrary structure and significance, may be employed in the frame of the present invention.
  • a pseudorandom noise value code is combined with the UPI to authenticate the code generator 106 that produces the code.
  • the noise value acts as a digital signature for the code marked on each manufactured item produced by a particular manufacturing line 101 applied by the code generator 106 which can be verified by the checking centre 30 .
  • the pseudorandom noise code may obtained by encrypting a copy of the UPI code with a secret shared by the code generator and the checking centre.
  • secret designates any data used for generation or authentication of a digital signature.
  • Other ways of adding a digital signature to the UPI code are possible, for example by using asymmetric cryptography, and are included within the scope of the invention.
  • the secret is derived from secret codes, which may be regarded as static secret codes.
  • a centralized salt generator centre 20 generates a large collection of secret codes, hereinafter designated as a ‘salt matrix’ containing a large number of precalculated random or pseudorandom data.
  • Each salt matrix is preferably unique and is transmitted, in duplicate, to the intended manufacturing line 101 and to the checking centre 30 .
  • Each manufacturing line 101 receives a unique salt matrix.
  • the salt matrices transmitted to the checking centre are stored in a database 31 accessible to the checking centre 30 and preferably included in the checking centre 30 , with identification of the production lines 101 , 102 to which they belong.
  • the salt matrices are used to generate secret keys used to encrypt the UPI and to generate an electronic signature, as it will be explained later.
  • the matrix is preferably not transferred over a network connection, but rather recorded on non-volatile data carriers 50 such as CD-ROMs (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory), DVD-ROMs (Digital Versatile Disc Read-Only Memory), removable hard disks, magneto-optical devices or any suitable non-volatile memory device.
  • non-volatile data carriers 50 such as CD-ROMs (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory), DVD-ROMs (Digital Versatile Disc Read-Only Memory), removable hard disks, magneto-optical devices or any suitable non-volatile memory device.
  • the data carriers are physically transferred to the checking centre 30 and to the production lines 101 , 102 .
  • the salt matrices are encrypted and digitally signed by the salt generator 20 , using a suitable encryption and authentication technique, such as DES (Digital Encryption Standard), RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman algorithm), and the like.
  • DES Digital Encryption Standard
  • RSA Rivest Cipher, GTE
  • the salt matrices are not sent to the checking centre as part of the checking process for items as will be discussed.
  • a salt file contains the following components:
  • the code generator of every production line 101 must register with the checking centre 30 . This registration occurs only whenever a new salt matrix is used, or at prescribed intervals. The system does not require constant communication between the code generators and the checking centre.
  • the registration procedure comprises the following steps:
  • the registration procedure is arranged such that the salt matrix is never transferred over the internet. Only a one-use decryption key is transmitted from the checking centre 30 to the code generator 106 .
  • the salt matrix is made available to the code generator only after a valid registration with the checking centre. This prevents unauthorized use of the code generator as no valid code can be generated.
  • the decrypted salt matrix is deleted when the code generator is put out of service to prevent a malicious user from gaining access to the salt matrix without proper registration. Additional means for disabling the code generator and preventing unauthorized use of the code generator and the production line may be provided.
  • the operation of the code generator 106 will now be described with reference to FIG. 3 .
  • the code generator 106 At each production line 101 , 102 at the beginning of each production batch, the code generator 106 generates a random salt index alpha, which it transmits to the checking centre 30 , with various information related to the item to be manufactured such as, for example, brand, intended market of destination, packaging.
  • a new salt index alpha is generated at every change of production batch.
  • the checking centre acknowledges successful receipt of the index alpha to the code generator.
  • the index alpha may be regarded as a dynamic secret code.
  • the UPI code of the first item to be produced in the batch is transmitted with the index alpha to the checking centre 30 .
  • the salt index alpha is stored in database 31 related to various information about the item to be manufactured. This enables the checking centre 30 , upon receipt of a request to check a particular SUPI code, to retrieve the particular alpha and knowing the salt matrix used by the code generator 106 to sign that SUPI code, validate the signature.
  • the salt index alpha does not need to be communicated in real time to the checking centre 30 , at the beginning of each production batch. Once a value of alpha has been chosen, the code generator can immediately start to generate valid codes and the value of alpha can be communicated after a delay of some hours, or more depending on the availability of the network connection.
  • the random salt index alpha, the salt matrix and the UPI code are used by the code generator for generating a noise code (step 301 ) which is safe from cryptographic attacks. It does not allow the reconstruction of the original values of alpha, salts matrix and UPI.
  • a variety of known techniques are available for generating the noise code including, but not limited to, table substitution, indexing, hashing, and variations thereof.
  • the noise code so generated is unequivocally calculated from the UPI, yet the inverse operation is computationally impossible.
  • the noise code is used as a digital signature, allowing validation of the UPI code.
  • the alpha code and the salt matrix are combined in a different way for each manufactured item, in order to render the digital signatures robust against decryption attempts.
  • the salt matrix and the alpha code are known only by the code generator and by the checking centre. Together they constitute a secret allowing the code generator to generate signed codes which the checking centre can subsequently verify.
  • the UPI number and the calculated noise code are combined at step 302 and, preferably, the resulting code is obfuscated step 303 , destroying correlations between successive codes.
  • the obfuscation operation is reversible, allowing the checking centre to retrieve the original UPI and noise value.
  • Several known obfuscation techniques are possible. The particular obfuscation algorithm chosen is preferably not published.
  • the result of the obfuscation is the unique SUPI code, which is printed on the manufactured items by the printer 107 .
  • Each of the items 43 is marked with a unique digitally signed SUPI code, allowing identification of the production batch in which it has been manufactured.
  • data relating to the production batch e.g. product type, brand, intended market of destination, packaging is stored in the database 31 with the index alpha at the start of the batch.
  • This data is accessible to the checking centre.
  • the SUPI code can be printed on the manufactured item by a variety of printing and marking techniques, for example continuous inkjet printing, drop-on-demand printing, laser, etc.
  • the SUPI code may be printed in a human readable format, or a machine-readable formats such as 1-D or 2-D barcodes or characters suitable for OCR (Optical Character Recognition).
  • the SUPI code is printed or recorded by a printing or recording means comprising a device such as a code counter or a register, for counting the exact number of marked items, either during a production batch or in a given time interval.
  • a printing or recording means comprising a device such as a code counter or a register, for counting the exact number of marked items, either during a production batch or in a given time interval.
  • the exact number of marked items may be stored in the database 31 accessible to the checking centre and used for production volume control.
  • the SUPI code is printed with an ink containing a covert taggant, to allow a quick validity check without querying the checking centre.
  • the production line 101 may have a sensor to detect the presence of the SUPI (either using a vision system and/or by detecting the covert taggant, if applicable).
  • the sensor can be connected to the controller of the production line, thus enabling the rejection of items not properly marked.
  • the controller can be set to prevent the production line from operating if the sensor unit is disconnected, faulty or on rejection of a defined number of items.
  • a history of rejections may be logged in the Code Generator and communicated to the Checker for monitoring purposes by authorized users.
  • the production information code (PIC code) may be repeated on the manufactured item, in plain format without encryption or obfuscation, allowing the user to verify the answer provided by the checking centre 30 and useful for management and monitoring of the supply chain.
  • the manufactured items 43 are distributed and commercialized in the usual way.
  • the authenticity of the item can be verified by sending a query containing the SUPI code of the package to the checking centre.
  • Such verification may be requested for example by generic users, such as retailers, consumers, or customs agents, and by privileged users, for example employees of the manufacturers, or organizations having a privileged agreement with the manufacturer.
  • the SUPI codes may also be employed for tracking the manufacturing items along the distribution and commercialization chain.
  • FIG. 4 shows the processing of a request to validate a SUPI code in the checking centre.
  • the received SUPI code is first de-obfuscated at step 402 , by applying the inverse of the obfuscation function described above.
  • the original UPI and noise component are extracted.
  • the checking centre performs a first level authentication at step 404 on the manufacturing centre MC and the production line PL. If PL is found to correspond to an existing production line of manufacturing centre MC, the authentication proceeds to the next level, otherwise a response is generated at 420 that the SUPI code is invalid, and the item is counterfeit.
  • the checking centre 30 uses the secret salt matrix received by the salt generator 20 and the alpha code transmitted at the beginning of a production batch.
  • the checking centre retrieves the information related to the production batch corresponding to the received UPI code from the database 31 . If the retrieval is successful, the retrieved salt matrix and the alpha code are used at 411 to reconstruct the noise code from the received UPI code and to verify the validity of the signature. If the received noise and the reconstructed noise do not match, or if no data corresponding to the PIC is present in the database, the SUPI code is identified as invalid and the checking centre responds at 420 that the item is counterfeit.
  • a third level of authentication at step 412 the checking centre verifies whether queries for the same SUPI code have been submitted more than a predefined number of times. In this case, there is then a suspicion that the SUPI code may be a clone of a valid code, identically printed on a large number of counterfeits. The checking centre then issues a reply at step 430 specifying, that the submitted code is valid, but the item is likely to be counterfeit.
  • the discovery of cloned codes can be refined by making use of other information, for example the origin of the query, which can be determined if the query originated from a phone, or the elapsed time between queries.
  • ‘cloning’ means multiple copying of a valid production code, for example for tagging counterfeited articles. If the code has been found valid (step 440 ), the checking centre retrieves the significance of the code and transmits it to the user, preferably in natural language, for example: “your code corresponds to a pack of brand XYZ, intended market of retail Switzerland”, or another appropriate formulation.
  • the information returned by the checking centre may allow the tracking of the production information for each item, for example information about the production unit, the production line, the date and time of production. Such information can be returned in encoded form, or in natural language.
  • the checking centre can formulate the significance of the codes into several languages, and choose the most appropriate language for the reply, according to the origin or language of the query.
  • the public interface to the checking centre includes a SMS (Short Message Service) or USSD (Unstructured Supplementary Services Data) portal 60 of a public radio communication network, for example a telephone network supporting text or numeric messages like GSM, TDMA, CDMA, PDC, or UMTS standard networks, through which the users 80 can send queries to the checking centre 30 in form of text messages, or SMS, from their own cell phone 82 , and receive the reply from the checking centre in the same way or by another channel, for example by a voice call. In this way the user 80 can verify an item 43 directly at the point of sale 77 .
  • SMS Short Message Service
  • USSD Unstructured Supplementary Services Data
  • the communication may alternatively or additionally be over the internet 32 by a web server at the checking centre 30 , by an email server or a WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) server.
  • a web server at the checking centre 30 by an email server or a WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) server.
  • WAP Wireless Application Protocol
  • the communication may be to a telephone voice server, able to interpret voice commands or DTMF (Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency) signals generated by a telephone keyboard.
  • DTMF Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency
  • Embodiments of the present invention allow a generic unidentified user to authenticate a manufactured item over a public network, such as the internet 32 , a telephone network or a mobile telephone network.
  • a public network such as the internet 32 , a telephone network or a mobile telephone network.
  • the user need not identify himself, nor has he to have access to any secret code or sensitive information.
  • each item can be identified in a cryptographically safe way.
  • a privileged user 70 may have a preferred access to the checking centre 30 and retrieve additional privileged information, unavailable to generic users, for example production volume information, or statistical information on the access to the checking centre.
  • a privileged user may query information on a particular SUPI without marking it as cloned for successive queries from ordinary customers 80 .
  • the privileged user may communicate with the checking centre 30 by a public network, or an intranet connection 33 .
  • the checking centre may provide, to generic or privileged users, additional information to which it has access, which are not contained in the UPI code, for example expiry date, warranty information, address of local support, or previous trade steps, importation routes and so forth.
  • checking centre may gather and store information on production volumes, for example the number of items produced in each production batch by each production line, as well as statistical production data per brand and per intended market. Such production volume information may be used for production management, or for official purpose, and may be available to selected users.
  • Identification steps may be provided to identifying known privileged users, for example by passwords, cookies, voice or biometric data, or by any suitable identification means.
  • the checker may include, or have access to, a user rights database for storing the profiles of various users, and determining to which information each user has access.
  • embodiments of the present invention do not require a permanent connection between the manufacturing lines and the checking centre, nor that all the SUPIs be individually stored in a database.
  • no identification code is stored.
  • the digital signature ensures that each item can be verified with a minimal transfer of confidential data, providing a high level of reliability and safety. Moreover production volume can be exactly accounted for.
  • the database required by the checking centre is relatively small compared to that which would be needed if the codes were stored.
  • the checking centre 30 may be maintained by a trusted third party independent from the producer of the manufactured items 43 .
  • the embodiments described may be used to replace the system of fiscal stickers that is used in many countries to collect taxes, for example on tobacco products.
US11/664,841 2004-10-08 2005-09-29 Methods and Systems for Making, Tracking and Authentication of Products Abandoned US20080046263A1 (en)

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Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP04104954A EP1645992A1 (en) 2004-10-08 2004-10-08 Methods and systems for marking, tracking and authentication of products
EP04104954.5 2004-10-08
PCT/IB2005/003103 WO2006038114A1 (en) 2004-10-08 2005-09-29 Methods and systems for making, tracking and authentication of products

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US12/839,166 Active 2026-11-23 US8671062B2 (en) 2004-10-08 2010-07-19 Methods and systems for making, tracking and authentication of products
US14/144,829 Active 2028-07-26 US11080719B2 (en) 2004-10-08 2013-12-31 Methods and systems for making, tracking and authentication of products
US15/606,343 Active 2028-03-25 US11379854B2 (en) 2004-10-08 2017-05-26 Methods and systems for making, tracking and authentication of products
US17/839,993 Pending US20220309517A1 (en) 2004-10-08 2022-06-14 Methods and systems for making, tracking and authentication of products

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US14/144,829 Active 2028-07-26 US11080719B2 (en) 2004-10-08 2013-12-31 Methods and systems for making, tracking and authentication of products
US15/606,343 Active 2028-03-25 US11379854B2 (en) 2004-10-08 2017-05-26 Methods and systems for making, tracking and authentication of products
US17/839,993 Pending US20220309517A1 (en) 2004-10-08 2022-06-14 Methods and systems for making, tracking and authentication of products

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