US20020141582A1 - Content security layer providing long-term renewable security - Google Patents

Content security layer providing long-term renewable security Download PDF

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Publication number
US20020141582A1
US20020141582A1 US10/113,363 US11336302A US2002141582A1 US 20020141582 A1 US20020141582 A1 US 20020141582A1 US 11336302 A US11336302 A US 11336302A US 2002141582 A1 US2002141582 A1 US 2002141582A1
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US
United States
Prior art keywords
content
playback
player
cryptographic
program logic
Prior art date
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Abandoned
Application number
US10/113,363
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English (en)
Inventor
Paul Kocher
Joshua Jaffe
Benjamin Jun
Matthew Carter
Peter Pearson
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Adeia Solutions LLC
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Individual
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Filing date
Publication date
Family has litigation
First worldwide family litigation filed litigation Critical https://patents.darts-ip.com/?family=26810964&utm_source=google_patent&utm_medium=platform_link&utm_campaign=public_patent_search&patent=US20020141582(A1) "Global patent litigation dataset” by Darts-ip is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Priority to US10/113,363 priority Critical patent/US20020141582A1/en
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Priority to EP02757909A priority patent/EP1379936B1/de
Priority to PCT/US2002/010098 priority patent/WO2002079906A2/en
Priority to EP08075213A priority patent/EP1942392A1/de
Priority to JP2002577675A priority patent/JP4798935B2/ja
Priority to EP08075208.2A priority patent/EP1942391B1/de
Priority to AU2002307021A priority patent/AU2002307021A1/en
Priority to AT02757909T priority patent/ATE535853T1/de
Assigned to CRYPTOGRAPHY RESEARCH, INC. reassignment CRYPTOGRAPHY RESEARCH, INC. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: JAFFE, JOSHUA M., CARTER, MATTHEW T., JUN, BENJAMIN C., PEARSON, PETER K., KOCHER, PAUL C.
Publication of US20020141582A1 publication Critical patent/US20020141582A1/en
Priority to US10/614,765 priority patent/US7987510B2/en
Priority to US11/974,594 priority patent/US7760876B2/en
Priority to US11/977,862 priority patent/US7756272B2/en
Priority to US11/982,234 priority patent/US7778420B2/en
Priority to US11/981,977 priority patent/US7996913B2/en
Priority to US11/981,990 priority patent/US7984511B2/en
Priority to JP2008016935A priority patent/JP2008186571A/ja
Priority to JP2008102669A priority patent/JP2008228330A/ja
Priority to HK08111195.2A priority patent/HK1116885A1/zh
Priority to JP2009129559A priority patent/JP2009282525A/ja
Priority to JP2009151297A priority patent/JP2009266248A/ja
Assigned to MACROVISION CORPORATION reassignment MACROVISION CORPORATION ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: CRYPTOGRAPHY RESEARCH, INC.
Assigned to ROVI SOLUTIONS CORPORATION reassignment ROVI SOLUTIONS CORPORATION CHANGE OF NAME (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: MACROVISION CORPORATION
Priority to US13/175,238 priority patent/US8949624B2/en
Priority to JP2012015867A priority patent/JP5302425B2/ja
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

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Definitions

  • This application relates generally to securing the distribution of digital content against piracy and other unauthorized use or redistribution.
  • Content protection schemes are generally customized for a particular playback environment.
  • anti-piracy systems in software-only streaming content players designed for personal computers lack the security benefits of tamper resistant hardware but can generally be upgraded without great difficulty (e.g., if the user uninstalls the player and downloads an updated version from the manufacturer web site).
  • such systems may provide less robust security than hardware-based players, but the consequences of an attack are relatively small since upgraded security features can be deployed by modifying the content stream and requiring that users upgrade their software.
  • Content player 100 includes software in nonvolatile program memory 105 , which implements the player's security policies 110 , decryption code 120 , and player keys 130 . This code and keys are used by processor 140 to validate whether the content read from media 150 is valid and, if so, to decrypt the content and supply the results to output interface 160 .
  • protection systems like the one shown in FIG. 1 include the copy control scheme used with digital audio tape, the content scrambling system (CSS) intended to protect DVD video, and the CPPM scheme proposed for protecting DVD audio.
  • Anti-virus software Methods for detecting and blocking known viruses, Trojan horses, and other malicious code are well known in the background art. These methods generally involve scanning for attributes of known viruses, such as known instruction sequences. These programs can work in a variety of ways, such as scanning files during start-up, scanning files on-the-fly, scanning programs as they execute, scanning memory, scanning new media, scanning network communications, etc.
  • DRMs Many features have been proposed or included in commercial DRMs, including support for superdistribution (where encrypted content can be exchanged between users), pay-per-use billing (including off-line pay-per-use with reporting via a telephone line), variable billing rates (charging different amounts based on promotions, number or duration of uses, requested user operations, user history, etc.), protection for various data types (audio, video, text, software, etc.), support for various formats, and support for various playback device types (portable, set-top, computer-based with hardware assistance, software-only, etc.)
  • Cryptographic oracles Using block ciphers or other cryptographic functions, it is possible to construct “cryptographic oracles” which apply a secret cryptographic transformation to arbitrary externally-supplied input messages and return the results. Cryptographic oracles can be constructed so that it is computationally infeasible for an attacker who knows the oracle's algorithms and protocols to determine the oracle's keys. In addition, because the number of possible inputs to an oracle can be extremely large (e.g., 2 256 for an oracle constructed from a 256-bit block cipher), it is not feasible for an attacker to anticipate or pre-compute the responses to random queries.
  • Interpreters, emulators, and virtual machines A variety of interpreted computer languages are known in the background. Some interpreted languages, such as Java, require a compilation process to convert source code into an executable or interpretable form. In contrast, most BASIC interpreters operate directly on the source code. Some interpreters allow self-modifying code, while others do not. Technology for implementing interpreters and for emulating assembly languages is also known in the background art. For example, sophisticated emulators such as Virtual PC and SoftWindows can run programs designed for Microsoft Windows on Apple Mac computers. Virtual machine (VM) designs, such as those used for Java and JavaCard, are known, and it is also known that VMs can interact with native code on the computer, or call other VM functions in different memory spaces.
  • VM Virtual machine
  • Key management A wide variety of methods for assigning and managing cryptographic keys have been proposed. It is known that devices can have device-specific keys, group keys, public keys, private keys, certificates, etc. Keys can be assigned to individual devices, to selected groups of devices (e.g. as described in U.S. Pat. No. 5,592,552 to Fiat), to all devices, etc. Devices can contain a variety of keys of different types, including symmetric keys, public keys (e.g., to verify certificates and digital signatures) and asymmetric private keys.
  • Media technologies are known that can offer tremendous storage capacity, low manufacturing cost, and good durability. Examples of current media technologies include optical discs (CD, DVD, etc.), magnetic media, flash memory, and ROMs. Newer technologies, such as holographic memories, are also being developed. It is known that a single piece of media can include data of many different types. For example, a compact disc can contain standard Red Book audio tracks as well as a data session for use on personal computers (e.g., containing software, compressed bonus tracks, images, videos, lyrics, etc.) Compact discs for use for use in personal computers can contain both encrypted content as well as the playback software required to play the content.
  • Network communication Sophisticated data networks, including the Internet, are known. These networks can provide flexible, reliable, high-bandwidth data communication. Although networks with a physical connection usually provide higher bandwidth, wireless communication channels are also popular.
  • renewable security In some cases, it is not practical to produce a security system that is guaranteed to be able to prevent all possible attacks. As a result, it is desirable that it be possible to renew security after an attack, e.g. by discontinuing the use of any compromised keys and correcting the vulnerability. Although renewable security is desirable, many deployed and proposed systems lack any effective recovery mechanism for many kinds of attacks.
  • Security modules Many security systems employ removable security modules so that the security upgrades can be performed without the difficulty or expense of replacing other portions of the system. For example, removable security modules are used in many pay television systems.
  • Software updates can be performed by receiving a proposed software update, verifying a digital signature or message authentication code validating the update, then (if the signature is valid) performing the update.
  • digital audio players can receive code updates, verify digital signatures or message authentication codes on the updates, and (if valid) update their code.
  • Methods for ensuring that updates are applied in the correct order e.g., using sequence counters
  • for recovering from failed or unsuccessful updates e.g., by reverting to previous software versions or by activating special recovery code
  • software updates can be delivered via virtually a wide variety of distribution mechanisms, such as the Internet, optical media, ROM cartridges, etc.
  • Steganography involves hiding information in data. For example, it is known that encrypted data can be placed in the least-significant bits of an image or sound recording. An attacker who obtains this image or recording but does not know the decryption key cannot even determine whether there is any hidden data because low-order bits often appear random and ciphertext produced by a strong encryption algorithm cannot be distinguished from random data without the key.
  • Tamper resistance Many methods are known for designing and constructing devices that are resistant to attack. Tamper resistant hardware is commonly used in systems where it is desirable to prevent attackers from reverse engineering devices or extracting keys from cryptographic modules. For example, Wave Systems markets a tamper-resistant microprocessor-based integrated circuit product called “Embassy” which can be integrated with content players or general-purpose computers and is advertised for use in securing the distribution of digital content. Methods for implementing tamper resistant software have also been proposed (see, for example, U.S. Pat. No. 5,892,899 to Aucsmith et al.).
  • Traitor Tracing has been proposed to identify the source of compromises or attacks, typically by tracing keys used in unauthorized devices back to a customer particular or compromised device.
  • Watermarks are signals embedded in content that can be detected by a specialized detector but do not affect (or minimally affect) human perception of the content when played. Watermarks embedded in pictures, sound recordings, and images have been used by copyright holders to indicate that copying is not authorized. “Robust” watermarks are known that can withstand conversions between formats (including re-recording from analog outputs) and provide varying degrees of security against attacks attempting to remove the watermark. In contrast, “fragile” watermarks have little or no ability to withstand format conversions but are easier to design and can carry more information.
  • Indefinite security policies Effective security systems must specify rules or other decision-making procedures for determining whether to allow or prevent user-requested specific actions. In many systems, these rules or procedures are not well specified.
  • Untraceability of attacks If attacks do occur, systems should be able to identify the source of the attack so that the compromised (or misused) device can be revoked and so that criminals can be prosecuted.
  • the present application relates to various embodiments, and aspects, of a standardizable content protection system that can be implemented in a manner providing flexible and renewable content protection across a wide variety of interoperable platforms.
  • the system provides participants (manufacturers, publishers, artists, and/or consumers, etc.) with unparalleled flexibility to make decisions about security and functionality.
  • An exemplary player usable with the system includes several components.
  • the first is a data or media input interface, such as for an optical disc drive.
  • the player loads a sequence of data processing commands from the input interface and begins executing these commands using an interpreter or other execution module.
  • This execution environment preferably provides a Turing-complete language (one that can execute any algorithm, subject to the player's memory, user interface, and performance limitations).
  • the content can query the player to determine the configuration of the playback environment and to perform cryptographic operations using the player's keys.
  • Content can thus be designed so that playback will only proceed on players that provide satisfactory responses to queries. Publishers can also provide limited playback.
  • One exemplary embodiment includes the capability to perform robust, essentially on-the-fly watermarking. Enabling the content itself to control what data regions are played, makes it possible to embed information in the output by selecting between output data versions with tiny differences. Pirate copies can be traced back to a specific player by analyzing these differences.
  • any content protection system be usable to unite content publishers and consumer electronics manufacturers in the common goal of providing the best possible security consistent with their business and operational constraints.
  • the systems disclosed herein allow publishers to determine their own security requirements then allow the content itself to implement policies that consider a wide variety of factors and determine whether (or how) to play in each environment. Also, manufacturers can be motivated to design products that offer good security and do not facilitate piracy so that their customers will have the broadest-possible access to content.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary media player using content protection methods disclosed herein.
  • FIG. 2 shows an exemplary embodiment of a player using physical media 200 .
  • the playback process is controlled by processor 210 , which can access media 200 via media interface 205 .
  • processor 210 begins by initializing the media interface, reading the media's table of contents, and recognizing the protection system supported. If so, the processor loads a small initial portion of media 200 into execution and data RAM 220 .
  • Other procedure calls allow the content to determine the playback environment configuration 225 .
  • the content can thus analyze the playback environment characteristics (e.g., player type, requested user action, etc.) to determine if playback should proceed. In an exemplary embodiment, if correctable problems are detected (e.g., if the media contains a security firmware upgrade for the player), these can be addressed.
  • the content can also query output interface 250 and, if supported, destination program/device 260 (e.g., amplifier, digital speakers, speaker driver, etc.) to check security characteristics, load cryptographic keys, specify output parameters (e.g., to specify reduced output quality if security is uncertain), etc.
  • destination program/device 260 e.g., amplifier, digital speakers, speaker driver, etc.
  • the interpreter executes the data processing commands specified by the content in a “sandbox,” meaning that the content does not have access to cryptographic secrets (such as oracle keys) that could otherwise compromise the player.
  • Sandboxing is useful where not all content is necessarily trustworthy. For example, an attacker could try to produce malicious content that attempted to extract the cryptographic keys from players. (Additional information about exemplary cryptographic oracles and their operation is provided below.)
  • the content determines that playback should proceed, the content then awaits a signal from the player specifying that playback should begin from a specific location on the media (e.g., a particular track).
  • Interpreter 215 processes the request using the data processing instructions loaded into execution/data RAM 220 when the media was mounted. If the content decides that playback should proceed, it uses procedure calls to direct media interface 205 to begin loading encrypted content from the appropriate location on media 200 .
  • the content specifies valid decryption keys and parameters to bulk decryption module 240 , which retrieves the encrypted content from RAM 220 (or, alternatively, directly from media interface 205 ) and decrypts it.
  • the decrypted content is then supplied to output interface 250 , which converts it to the appropriate analog or digital format for destination program or device 260 .
  • the data processing instructions being processed by interpreter 215 can load new decryption parameters, specify new blocks of data to read from media 200 , etc.
  • the content can re-initialize the RAM 220 .
  • a first category of attack involves attempts to use uncompromised players to perform unauthorized actions.
  • content can be mastered to allow copying from original media but disallow copying from copies. If an attempt is made to copy such content from a copy (which the content could, for example, recognize by detecting modifications inserted during the copying process or by comparing the current media's serial number and/or type with the original), playback can be blocked by the interpreter code.
  • the interpreter can allow content to play with reduced fidelity (such as playing stereo audio with a 44.1 kilohertz sample rate even though multi-channel audio with a higher sample rate might be available), or by inserting additional anti-piracy warnings.
  • reduced fidelity such as playing stereo audio with a 44.1 kilohertz sample rate even though multi-channel audio with a higher sample rate might be available
  • a second category of attack involves compromise of a player's cryptographic keys. If a player's cryptographic keys have been compromised, an attacker could (at least in theory) emulate the compromised playback environment completely by emulating the cryptographic oracles and (optionally) providing false responses to queries about the playback environment. Security can be re-established after such an attack by making the interpreted code in future content require at least one cryptographic key that was not present in the compromised device. If a particular player model or manufacturer is the source of many attacks (e.g., because the player implementation has inadequate security), publishers can create content that will not play (or will play at reduced quality) on such platforms.
  • a third category of attack involves compromising a particular piece of content or a group of titles containing similar interpreter security code. Such attacks could potentially be mounted by modifying the content itself to bypass security checks or by producing a malicious interpreter tailored to play the target title. Such attacks can be addressed by deploying different or better protection software in future content.
  • a fourth category of attack involves copying content from protected media to unprotected formats, then redistributing the content in the new format.
  • No content protection system can completely prevent such attacks, but the techniques and systems disclosed herein provide for powerful, flexible watermarking capabilities that can be used to trace a compromise back to a particular device which can then be revoked to prevent future attacks. Because the number of users who actively upload content for piracy is relatively small, piracy can be reduced significantly by identifying and revoking these users' players. Imperceptible differences can be introduced in the decryption output by selectively skipping portions of the ciphertext.
  • the content can watermark a “zero” bit by directing the player's decryption module to decrypt and output a first ciphertext portion then skip a second ciphertext portion.
  • the content can direct the module to skip the first ciphertext portion and output the second one.
  • the interpreter code including without limitation the identity of the player, results of cryptographic operations, user action descriptions, output device information, etc. If a pirated copy of the content is discovered, the watermarks can be analyzed to trace the illegal copy back to a single player, which can then be revoked in future content releases.
  • Media type identifiers can prevent content sold on read-only media from being redistributed on recordable media.
  • content can (for example) obtain authentication from a server prior to playback (or the first playback) to validate that the media is valid.
  • Players with nonvolatile storage can even store a table of known-bad media serial numbers, which the content and/or player can query to determine whether the media has been revoked.
  • the content can be configured to decide whether it will allow itself to be decoded. To assist with this decision, the player can provide the content with information about the playback environment. Although very limited information (such as the user's requested action and the player model) may be adequate in many cases, more detailed and accurate information is desirable so that the content can make a more informed assessment as to whether playback should proceed. Although the specific information and capabilities provided to the content depend on the player implementation, the following describes (without limitation) some exemplary functions and capabilities that can be provided to content. Note that for players constructed out of multiple connected components (such as output ports, connected output devices, operating system device drivers, security modules, etc.), some or all of the following information may be provided for these connected as devices as well as the main part of the player containing the interpreter.
  • connected components such as output ports, connected output devices, operating system device drivers, security modules, etc.
  • Security Support Information Security specification version, supported query functions, and/or security module form factor (replaceable hardware, embedded hardware, updateable firmware, ROM firmware, PC software, etc.), etc. (Exemplary cryptographic processing functions and playback control/decryption functions are discussed in detail below.)
  • Manufacturer Information Name, identifier, web site, public key/certificate, manufacturing batch, manufacture date/time, region of manufacture, country of manufacture, manufacturer address, technical support contact information, and/or manufacturer warranty information, etc.
  • Device Information Product line, serial number, model number, firmware/software versions, device public key/certificate identifiers, GPS location or other physical location/region, content supported Codec types, network/Internet support information, network addresses, device telephone number, IP address, watermark support, interpreter performance ratings, security certification ratings, device distributor(s), device retailer, device form factor, and/or security specifications, etc.
  • User Information User name, geographical region, country, address, GPS location or other physical location/region/country/etc., user telephone number, IP address, e-mail address, web address, preferred language, tolerances for controversial material, preferred payment methods/accounts, payment limits, purchase history, and/or privacy preferences, etc.
  • Media Control Query media format, recordable vs. non-recordable, media serial number, recording device type, recording device owner, recording device serial number, recording device security information, and/or recording device watermark-checking capabilities, etc. Functions can also allow reading from media, writing to media, formatting media, testing media, and/or ejecting media, etc. Additional functions can provide access to cryptographic functions or other special capabilities supported by particular media formats.
  • Requested User Operation For example, play, record, translate to new format, load to portable device, make first copy, make multiple copies, and/or simultaneous play/record, etc.
  • the content can also be given the ability to initiate or modify requested operations.
  • Output Information Information about output ports, output port configurations, output port security characteristics, connected devices, output data format, and/or output data quality/resolution, etc. If supported, content can directly query output devices, to obtain additional information about the device, and/or request cryptographic operations, etc. The player can also allow the content to modify these parameters, for example to specify reduced-quality output if security is poor.
  • [0066] Environment Identities/hashes/versions of other running programs and device drivers on the platform; contents or hashes of memory; versions of installed attack detection modules; results of system scans for attacks, and/or status of tamper detectors, etc. These functions can also allow the content to modify memory, e.g. to correct security weaknesses in other programs.
  • Time Date, time, time zone, elapsed clock cycle count, time since last reset, time since manufacture, time since last security upgrade, time since last battery change, and/or estimated battery life remaining, etc.
  • Connectivity Determine player communication capabilities, check current connection status, establish network connections, establish modem connections, specify criticality of establishing network connections, check/specify connection security characteristics, transmit data, receive data, close connections, and/or idle connections, etc.
  • User Interface Display user messages, display lyrics, display graphics images, print graphics images, display advertising/promotional messages, identify available user interface controls, obtain user input, play speech to the user using a player's speech synthesizer, and/or error reporting, etc.
  • Watermark Control Select content regions to output, select external watermarking algorithms, control external watermark detectors, and/or check mark detector status, etc.
  • Player/playback status information e.g., pay-per-play billing control (e.g., player-based finding sources), error handling, playback termination, secure nonvolatile memory support (see below), apply player firmware update, and/or invoke external modules (such as dynamically linked libraries), etc.
  • pay-per-play billing control e.g., player-based finding sources
  • error handling e.g., playback termination
  • secure nonvolatile memory support see below
  • apply player firmware update e.g., apply player firmware update, and/or invoke external modules (such as dynamically linked libraries), etc.
  • external modules such as dynamically linked libraries
  • Some standardization of functions and parameters is useful to ensure interoperability between implementations (e.g., so that content can function effectively in player environments designed after the content was originally published) and to simplify the task of authoring secure content. Standardization is particularly helpful for functions where a variety of different manufacturers' products should provide the same types of information or operations. For example, a function and response codes to allow the content to determine the player form factor (home audio/video, portable, automotive, personal computer software-only, personal computer software with hardware assistance, professional studio, movie theater, etc.) can be standardized. Standardization has the additional benefit of preventing manufacturers from trying to avoid security controls by reporting pertinent risk-related information in nonstandard formats that pre-existing content cannot understand.
  • the system may also be configured to allow for manufacturers to add additional proprietary functions for use by content producers who choose to use them.
  • the ability to add new functions is particularly valuable for manufacturers who wish to add new features to their products, since they can add these features, then establish co-operative business relationships with content publishers to support the features.
  • Such an embodiment can be extended easily while (if desired) maintaining backward compatibility.
  • an exemplary player In addition to providing information describing the playback environment, an exemplary player also implements cryptographic operations that can be invoked by the content. These operations can behave like cryptographic oracles, allowing the content to supply an input datum (for example, a 64-bit plaintext block) and returning the result of a cryptographic computation.
  • the inputs to the cryptographic computation include at least a key (whose value is normally unknown and inaccessible to the content) and the content-specified input datum.
  • Block cipher oracles The oracle encrypts (or decrypts) an input message using a secret key, producing a ciphertext (or plaintext) result.
  • Hash function oracles The input message is hashed, typically with a secret key (for example using an algorithm such as HMAC-SHA), to produce the result.
  • a secret key for example using an algorithm such as HMAC-SHA
  • Digital signature oracles The input message is digitally signed using the secret (private) key to produce the result.
  • the function can also provide the public key and its certificate(s) to the content.
  • Random number generators can provide the content with unpredictable information, for example to use in preventing replay attacks in on-line connections.
  • Mathematical functions Basic mathematical operations can be provided to help the content optimize its computation processes. For example, optimized modular multiplication or exponentiation functions can be used by the content to perform the RSA algorithm of U.S. Pat. No. 4,405,829 to Rivest et al. to produce and verify digital signatures and to encrypt and decrypt messages.
  • Optimized cryptographic primitives Optimized implementations of standard cryptographic algorithms can help improve performance. These operations can be used to help decrypt or hash blocks of data, including without limitation regions of the interpreter code space or sectors of content loaded from media.
  • Decryption control If the content decides that playback is authorized, the interpreter code can initialize the content decryption module with the correct decryption key for each segment of content. In addition, the interpreter code can specify portions of the content that should be rendered or skipped (e.g., to allow real-time watermark insertion during playback). To ensure synchronization between the interpreter and content streaming from media, key changes (or skipped regions) can be specified in advance then triggered by signals in the content. For example, an exemplary embodiment could allow the content to specify a 64-bit value that triggers a key change when encountered in the ciphertext, the number of ciphertext bytes to skip following a key change, and the new key value to use.
  • Key management These functions allow the content to determine which keys are known to the player.
  • the system can be configured so that expected result for a particular input can be computed in advance (e.g., when the content is mastered).
  • the publisher can thus program the content to submit a chosen input to the oracle, then verify that the expected result is obtained. Malicious players that lack authorized cryptographic keys will be unable to compute the correct oracle response. Because the number of possible oracle inputs is enormous (e.g., 2 128 for an oracle using a block cipher with a block size of 128 bits), it is not practically feasible for an attacker to precompute or store the results to all possible queries.
  • cryptographic oracles can also be used to identify invalid players. For example, if keys extracted from a legitimate player are being used for unauthorized purposes, content can be mastered so that it will refuse to play on players that contain the revoked oracles. Because content will not play without valid keys, unauthorized players must include stolen keys. However, by using these stolen keys, unauthorized devices reveal their status to new content that is aware of the compromise.
  • a wide variety of methods can be employed for incorporating oracle results or checking whether a particular oracle query response is valid. The simplest is to simply perform a comparison against an expected value. Because this can (at least in theory) be circumvented by a maliciously-designed interpreter that behaves as though all comparisons match, content can include “dummy” comparisons that are expected to fail or other such tests designed to thwart malicious interpreters.
  • the oracle itself can also be used to decrypt code or influence self-modifying code.
  • the input to the oracle can be an encrypted version of the desired code.
  • Such oracles thus allow content publishers to include on media code that can only be decrypted by authorized players or a subset of players, thereby helping to keep the content's code away from potential attackers.
  • Another way to use oracles is to use their outputs as cryptographic keys or to derive keys. These keys can then, for example, be used to decrypt code, content, other keys, or any other data.
  • This flexible decryption capability can be used to implement a wide variety of protocols and policies in content. For example, if players have an adequate assortment of keys, content can be programmed to use schemes such as the method of Fiat and Naor (see A. Fiat and M.
  • publishers may benefit from having access to oracle input/output pairs.
  • the oracle uses a private key for an asymmetric cryptosystem such as RSA
  • the publisher simply obtains the public key and uses it to perform the inverse of the oracle operation.
  • player manufacturers can compute for publishers inverses of the symmetric oracles provided in each player. For example, if the player oracle uses a block cipher to decrypt 256-bit data blocks under a secret key, the manufacturer can provide publishers with access to the corresponding encryption function.
  • manufacturers could (for example) provide the inverse-oracle computation via a publicly-accessible web server using SSL. Manufacturers could also provide publishers with outputs from randomly-selected oracle inputs. (Although manufacturers could provide publishes with actual oracle functions as implemented in players, these functions could potentially be misused to construct unauthorized players that emulate of legitimate ones.)
  • players are assigned a variety of symmetric cryptographic oracle keys, including (without limitation): player symmetric keys chosen (pseudo)randomly from a larger global pool of such keys; player-specific symmetric keys generated (pseudo)randomly by the manufacturer; symmetric keys unique to the manufacturer, player model, etc.; and/or symmetric keys authenticating that the player does not have particular characteristics (e.g., was not produced by particular manufacturers).
  • the content can identify which keys are implemented in the player by calling a separate function that returns a list of the supported keys.
  • Players can also contain asymmetric keys.
  • players have a player-specific public/private keypair; a player certificate issued by the manufacturer by signing the player public key using the manufacturer's private key; a certificate issued by a root key issuing authority validating the manufacturer's public key; a public key used to validate requests to access the player's secure memory areas (see below); and/or a public key used to validate player firmware updates.
  • the memory available to content is typically volatile, providing content with a “clean” execution environment each time it is run. For some features, however, it is useful for content to be able to store data between playings and between titles.
  • players can provide content with secure, nonvolatile storage for maintaining state between playings. Such storage can require additional security protections to ensure that only authorized interpreted code is able to read or modify the nonvolatile memory contents. Ensuring the security of nonvolatile memory is important for publishers so that, for example, this memory can be trusted to track offline pay-per-view viewing histories for later billing. It is not adequate to simply have a key on the media for unlocking each memory slot, since this key would soon be discovered by pirates, compromising the memory slots of all players.
  • one embodiment provides for explicit cryptographic authentication of the code that accesses these secure nonvolatile memory regions.
  • players contain several blocks of nonvolatile memory, which are locked (i.e., read and write permissions are denied) by default.
  • the player also contains a public key used to authenticate requests to unlock memory blocks.
  • the content calls a function that takes as input a digital signature over the block of code that is authorized to access the memory.
  • This signature is verifiable using the public key embedded in the player and specifies the memory block to unlock and the access privileges authorized (arbitrary read, arbitrary write, increment, decrement, zeroize, etc.) within each portion of the block.
  • the interpreter verifies the digital signature and, if the signature is valid, unlocks the memory and executes the digitally-signed code.
  • the following shows an example of this process for use in billing for off-line pay-per-use content with occasional (e.g., monthly) auditing:
  • Publisher X writes a function for the interpreter that checks the memory contents. If the value is below a spending limit, the function increments the counter. Otherwise, the function establishes an Internet connection with the publisher, transmits a payment request including the counter value, a random number, and payment information (such as a credit card number or other funding source stored in the player). If the publisher accepts payment for the past purchases indicated by the counter plus the current purchase, the publisher transmits to the player a cryptographic authorization to clear the counter, which the player verifies and (if valid) zeroes the counter. The player concludes by relocking the memory and returning a code indicating success or failure.
  • Publisher X produces content including the signed code and distributes it to a user.
  • a pre-paid smart card is purchased by a consumer and inserted into a slot on the player.
  • the card contains a plurality of write-once memory slots into which the player can write identifiers corresponding to pay-per-view content titles. Once written, the content identifiers are incorporated into cryptographic oracle computations implemented in the card.
  • content can verify that a purchase has been consummated by verifying that the correct oracle is present before allowing playback.
  • Security policies can be enforced in several different ways. Cryptographic protections allow the construction of content such that revoked or unauthorized players will lack the cryptographic keys necessary to decrypt the content. Unauthorized players cannot access content which they lack keys (provided, of course, that good ciphers are used). This approach is relatively inflexible since it provides the content owner with only the ability to block playback on a particular device. (although a more sophisticated embodiment could use different key sets to offer somewhat more detailed control, key-based controls lack the flexibility required to solve more complex access control challenges.) Nevertheless, it is extremely effective at addressing the case where a particular player is compromised or otherwise deemed untrustworthy to have the ability to decrypt the content.
  • player cryptographic keys and software can be updated using digitally-signed code or key updates. These updates can be delivered to the player on media containing software that performs the key update. For example, if a legitimate user's player ends up being revoked because a previous owner compromised its security, the new owner can call the product's technical support line and obtain new keys. (Of course, the customer service personnel may wish to obtain some user information such as name, address, credit card number, telephone number, e-mail address, IP address, etc.
  • Updates can also be distributed via the Internet (or other network connections), modem calls, entry via the remote control or keyboard, etc.
  • updates should be cryptographically secured whenever possible so that attackers cannot use the update process to inject compromised keys or otherwise attack a player.
  • a removable security module such as a smart card.
  • the smart card would implement some or all of the cryptographic oracles as well as other security-related functions provided to the content. If a compromise does occur or if a security flaws is found, it is possible to replace the smart card instead of replacing or upgrading the entire player. Note that it may be sufficient to simply provide a smart card slot, but not deploy smart cards until such time as it becomes necessary for security reasons. To prevent smart cards from being removed from legitimate players and used in malicious ones, the smart card can be cryptographically linked to the receiver (e.g., by having them share a symmetric key) before the player and/or card are sent to the consumer.
  • the systems and techniques disclosed herein may include on-the-fly watermark insertion that is not susceptible to a general mark removal attack because the mark format, encoding process, and detection process are all chosen by the publisher.
  • a publisher (or, more precisely, a control program written by the publisher) wishes to embed some information in some output content.
  • Each bit of this information can be encoded by decrypting and outputting either a first content portion or a second portion.
  • These portions can be different encrypted regions on the media and can be encrypted with different keys.
  • the differences between these portions can be chosen by the publisher when the content is mastered, and can be anything from imperceptibly-subtle variations to total dissimilarity. Because there is no predetermined relationship between the two portions, there is no way for a pirate who knows only one portion (including the decryption key for that portion) to determine the other.
  • content is authored so that only a subset of all players have the keys necessary to decrypt each version of a region of the content, yet substantially all players have the keys necessary to decrypt at least one version of the region.
  • the publisher can determine information about the attacker. Note that this is true even in the case where attackers manage to analyze a (vulnerable) program and decrypt more than one alternate region, since the resulting combination of several regions still reveals to the publisher which versions were decrypted.
  • attackers manage to analyze a (vulnerable) program and decrypt more than one alternate region, since the resulting combination of several regions still reveals to the publisher which versions were decrypted.
  • the only way reliable way that users can avoid revealing their identity (or their player's identity) to publishers' anti-piracy enforcement experts is to refrain from participating in piracy in the first place.
  • the technology can be used for other features including, without limitation, implementing a sweepstakes where winners' players output a congratulatory message, delivering of security alerts to users whose players offer inadequate security, and providing bonus content to certain users.
  • watermarking schemes can also be used with the techniques and systems disclosed herein.
  • traditional watermarks for which the mark detection algorithm is standardized
  • watermarks in incoming content can be sensed (again, either by the content's code or by external detectors), for example to detect attempts to make unauthorized copies or introduce unauthorized content.
  • the choice of what watermarks to embed and how to respond to detected watermarks can be implemented in the player and/or in the content.
  • CDs that are backward compatible.
  • Such CDs would utilize non-standard CD formatting to produce discs that play correctly on most audio CD players but confuse computer-based ripping software.
  • Authorized (e.g., licensed) personal computer software can also play the disc by correcting the portions that are read incorrectly or otherwise confuse the computer.
  • playback is enabled on (most) legacy audio players because they can play the non-standard (copy protected) Red Book audio portion, and playback is enabled on personal computers that have appropriate player software (which can, for example, be included on the CD or can be downloaded over the Internet).
  • Players can optionally also support low-density DVDs using the improved security, as well as high-density DVDs using legacy protection methods (although using a widely-broken security scheme for new content generally provides little benefit).
  • the quality of the output from the DVD player can be controlled by the content. For example, the content can elect to output lower-resolution output if the player and/or HDTV output device do not provide adequate security.
  • the content can (for example and without limitation) direct the player to down-convert HDTV signals to lower resolution (for example, using a degradation module specifically designed for this purpose), supply the player with only the keys required to decrypt lower-resolution portions of the signal (and withhold keys required for the higher-resolution portions), or direct the player to output a low-resolution version of the content that is encoded on the media separately from the higher-resolution version.
  • content can be customized for specific players.
  • the content is playable only on a single player or small number of players, but code that is not required for playback on the recipient device(s) does not need to be transmitted.
  • this approach is of particular value when it is difficult, expensive, or slow to send information to users, e.g. if storage space is limited or of the content must be sent over a slow network connection.
  • the content can still, however, query the player to verify that the playback environment is suitably secure.
  • the systems and methods can be configured to allow content to be exchanged from one device to another.
  • the specific security characteristics of such exchanges depend factors such as whether on-line communication with a trusted (e.g., publisher-operated) server is available.
  • the form in which the content is transferred depends on the security policies enforced by the content and the devices' hardware capabilities.
  • the sending device transmits the raw encrypted content (as stored on the original media or encrypted with another key, optionally with watermarks included) along with code for controlling the playback.
  • the playback control code can be customized by the sending device for the recipient device.
  • the sending device may verify that the security characteristics of the output port and destination device are acceptable, negotiate a shared key with the destination device, decrypt and watermark the content, re-encrypt the content with the shared key, and send the re-encrypted content to the destination.
  • Players with adequate nonvolatile storage can be used to store updateable code that is called from the interpreter.
  • the player can be configured to always store the latest security code for a particular publisher. In this case, if a newer version of the security code is encountered, the old version will be updated (e.g., after verifying a digital signature on the new code). In this way, older content can benefit from security updates carried on new content.
  • content can require that players include current security updates by obtaining the current date/time from the player and comparing against the date/time of the latest known security upgrade. In this manner, content can ensure that players have reasonably up-to-date security upgrades.
  • a green light emitting diode (LED) under the control of the content indicates that output is of high-quality (i.e., the security is satisfactory), an orange LED indicates reduced quality (i.e., marginal security), and a blinking red LED can indicates that no output is provided because the player is revoked.
  • LED green light emitting diode
  • a brief spoken or written notice (in the user's language, if known) is provided to report the status of the security.
  • the decision whether to report and/or use the higher quality versus the lower quality output can be based on other factors, such as the presence and/or absence of a robust and/or fragile watermark.
  • a degradation module can be included with the player to enable the content to reduce the quality of playback (e.g., to the quality of a legacy format) for security or other reasons.
  • Degradation modules can, for example, be included to convert high-definition television signals to NTSC-resolution or to convert high-resolution multi-channel audio into 2-channel CD-quality audio.
  • Embodiments that receive content on physical media can use virtually any media format. While optical discs (such as CD and DVD) provide high storage densities at low cost, other storage systems can also be employed, including without limitation magnetic media, holographic memories, battery-backed RAM, ROM, EEPROM, and flash memory.
  • the storage capacity of the media can be used for storing data of many different types, including information related to the techniques and systems disclosed herein (such as executable programs that implement decoding methods for various computer platforms, content protected using methods disclosed herein, etc.) as well as data that is not directly related to the techniques and systems disclosed herein (such as unrelated executable programs, unprotected content such as Red Book CD audio, content protected using other security schemes, etc.).
  • Media can include tamper-resistant circuitry for performing cryptographic computations to enable players to verify that the media is not an unauthorized copy.
  • tamper-resistant circuitry for performing cryptographic computations to enable players to verify that the media is not an unauthorized copy.
  • optical media can include cryptographic capabilities.
  • a contactless cryptographic module such as the contactless smart card of U.S. Pat. No. 5,640,306 to Gaumet et al.
  • cryptographic media authentication is preferable, other authentication mechanisms can be employed instead.
  • general media authentication methods known in the background art include writing serial numbers to difficult-to-copy locations (such as regions that are not writeable using commercially recordable media or drives) and including a digitally-signed “description” of various characteristics of the original physical media.
  • cryptographic mechanisms offer the advantage that, even if attackers discover methods for compromising existing media, future media can be issued with improved security without requiring any changes to the player.
  • players implementing the techniques and systems disclosed herein may be configured to support these legacy formats.
  • different versions of the interpreter may be supported by a particular player.
  • the player needs to analyze the media or content to identify the appropriate security system to use. For example, a digital video player might detect whether the disc is a legacy DVD using CSS (and, if so, select a CSS decryption system) or is a DVD using the techniques and systems disclosed herein (and, if so, activate a language-based decryption system).
  • Robust watermarks included in the content can be used to detect if content that was originally protected with one security system has been copied to a format lacking the original protections. For example, content that does not allow copying could include a watermark to indicate that any devices that encounter a copy in any other format (e.g., in an unprotected format) can recognize the copy as unauthorized and (for example) refuse playback.
  • the techniques and systems disclosed herein can also be implemented in a variety physical devices. If only one device is responsible for decrypting content, it is preferable to have security policies enforced by that device. However, output devices and intermediate processing devices (such an audio equalizer or mixer), can also benefit from the techniques and systems disclosed herein and/or by providing query capabilities that can be used by such techniques and systems to verify their security.
  • output devices and intermediate processing devices such an audio equalizer or mixer
  • a home entertainment server downloads, stores, and manages content, and forwards content to playback devices (speakers, headphones, video displays, etc.) whose security has been successfully verified. Connections to these devices are encrypted, preferably under the joint control of the techniques and systems disclosed herein and the destination device, to prevent theft of content in transit.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Virology (AREA)
  • Signal Processing For Digital Recording And Reproducing (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Television Signal Processing For Recording (AREA)
  • Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)
  • Traffic Control Systems (AREA)
  • Analysing Materials By The Use Of Radiation (AREA)
  • Treatments For Attaching Organic Compounds To Fibrous Goods (AREA)
  • Management Or Editing Of Information On Record Carriers (AREA)
US10/113,363 2001-03-28 2002-03-27 Content security layer providing long-term renewable security Abandoned US20020141582A1 (en)

Priority Applications (21)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US10/113,363 US20020141582A1 (en) 2001-03-28 2002-03-27 Content security layer providing long-term renewable security
AT02757909T ATE535853T1 (de) 2001-03-28 2002-03-28 Inhaltssicherheitsschicht, die langzeit- erneuerbare sicherheit bereitstellt
AU2002307021A AU2002307021A1 (en) 2001-03-28 2002-03-28 Content security layer providing long-term renewable security
PCT/US2002/010098 WO2002079906A2 (en) 2001-03-28 2002-03-28 Content security layer providing long-term renewable security
EP08075213A EP1942392A1 (de) 2001-03-28 2002-03-28 Verfahren, Vorrichtung und optisches Medium zur Aktivierung der Wiedergabe von verschlüsselten digitalen Videos auf einer Vielzahl von Wiedergabegeräten mit unterschiedlichen Sicherheitsmerkmalen
EP02757909A EP1379936B1 (de) 2001-03-28 2002-03-28 Inhaltssicherheitsschicht, die langzeit-erneuerbare sicherheit bereitstellt
JP2002577675A JP4798935B2 (ja) 2001-03-28 2002-03-28 長期にリニューアル可能なセキュリティを提供するコンテンツセキュリティ方法、その装置およびコンピュータ読取可能記憶媒体
EP08075208.2A EP1942391B1 (de) 2001-03-28 2002-03-28 Computerlesbare Mediumvorrichtung und Verfahren zum Abspielen von verschlüsselten digitalen Videos
US10/614,765 US7987510B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2003-07-07 Self-protecting digital content
US11/974,594 US7760876B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2007-10-15 Content security layer providing long-term renewable security
US11/977,862 US7756272B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2007-10-26 Interpreter using cryptographic values of a playback device's keys to authorize the playback device
US11/981,990 US7984511B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2007-10-31 Self-protecting digital content
US11/981,977 US7996913B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2007-10-31 Self-protecting digital content
US11/982,234 US7778420B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2007-10-31 Content security layer providing long-term renewable security
JP2008016935A JP2008186571A (ja) 2001-03-28 2008-01-28 長期にリニューアル可能なセキュリティを提供するコンテンツセキュリティレイヤ
JP2008102669A JP2008228330A (ja) 2001-03-28 2008-04-10 長期にリニューアル可能なセキュリティを提供するコンテンツセキュリティレイヤ
HK08111195.2A HK1116885A1 (zh) 2001-03-28 2008-10-09 播放加密數字視頻的計算機可讀介質，設備和方法
JP2009129559A JP2009282525A (ja) 2001-03-28 2009-05-28 長期にリニューアル可能なセキュリティを提供するコンテンツセキュリティ方法、その装置およびコンピュータ読取可能記憶媒体
JP2009151297A JP2009266248A (ja) 2001-03-28 2009-06-25 長期にリニューアル可能なセキュリティを提供するコンテンツセキュリティ方法、その装置およびコンピュータ読取可能記憶媒体
US13/175,238 US8949624B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2011-07-01 Method and system for secure access to non-volatile memory
JP2012015867A JP5302425B2 (ja) 2001-03-28 2012-01-27 長期にリニューアル可能なセキュリティを提供するコンテンツセキュリティ方法、その装置およびコンピュータ読取可能記憶媒体

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US27932301P 2001-03-28 2001-03-28
US10/113,363 US20020141582A1 (en) 2001-03-28 2002-03-27 Content security layer providing long-term renewable security

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US10/614,765 Continuation-In-Part US7987510B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2003-07-07 Self-protecting digital content
US11/974,594 Continuation US7760876B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2007-10-15 Content security layer providing long-term renewable security

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US20020141582A1 true US20020141582A1 (en) 2002-10-03

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US10/113,363 Abandoned US20020141582A1 (en) 2001-03-28 2002-03-27 Content security layer providing long-term renewable security
US11/974,594 Expired - Fee Related US7760876B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2007-10-15 Content security layer providing long-term renewable security
US11/977,862 Expired - Fee Related US7756272B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2007-10-26 Interpreter using cryptographic values of a playback device's keys to authorize the playback device
US11/982,234 Expired - Fee Related US7778420B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2007-10-31 Content security layer providing long-term renewable security

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US11/974,594 Expired - Fee Related US7760876B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2007-10-15 Content security layer providing long-term renewable security
US11/977,862 Expired - Fee Related US7756272B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2007-10-26 Interpreter using cryptographic values of a playback device's keys to authorize the playback device
US11/982,234 Expired - Fee Related US7778420B2 (en) 2001-03-28 2007-10-31 Content security layer providing long-term renewable security

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US (4) US20020141582A1 (de)
EP (1) EP1379936B1 (de)
JP (6) JP4798935B2 (de)
AT (1) ATE535853T1 (de)
AU (1) AU2002307021A1 (de)
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CN106209896A (zh) * 2016-07-29 2016-12-07 网宿科技股份有限公司 基于音视频格式的流媒体加密方法和模块

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US20080049935A1 (en) 2008-02-28
EP1379936A2 (de) 2004-01-14
EP1379936B1 (de) 2011-11-30
WO2002079906A2 (en) 2002-10-10
US20080130886A1 (en) 2008-06-05
JP2008228330A (ja) 2008-09-25
WO2002079906A3 (en) 2003-10-30
ATE535853T1 (de) 2011-12-15
JP5302425B2 (ja) 2013-10-02
JP2012110026A (ja) 2012-06-07
JP2004532495A (ja) 2004-10-21
JP2008186571A (ja) 2008-08-14
US7778420B2 (en) 2010-08-17
EP1379936A4 (de) 2005-05-04
US7756272B2 (en) 2010-07-13
US7760876B2 (en) 2010-07-20
AU2002307021A1 (en) 2002-10-15
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