US11916877B2 - System and method for the protected transmission of data - Google Patents

System and method for the protected transmission of data Download PDF

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Publication number
US11916877B2
US11916877B2 US16/764,503 US201816764503A US11916877B2 US 11916877 B2 US11916877 B2 US 11916877B2 US 201816764503 A US201816764503 A US 201816764503A US 11916877 B2 US11916877 B2 US 11916877B2
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Prior art keywords
vehicle
electronic filter
data
vehicle controller
interface
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US20210014199A1 (en
Inventor
Georg Lohneis
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Siemens Mobility GmbH
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Siemens Mobility GmbH
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Assigned to SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT reassignment SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: LOHNEIS, GEORG
Assigned to Siemens Mobility GmbH reassignment Siemens Mobility GmbH ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Publication of US20210014199A1 publication Critical patent/US20210014199A1/en
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
    • H04L63/0245—Filtering by information in the payload
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0027—Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0036—Conductor-based, e.g. using CAN-Bus, train-line or optical fibres
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
    • G05D1/00—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots
    • G05D1/0011—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots associated with a remote control arrangement
    • G05D1/0022—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots associated with a remote control arrangement characterised by the communication link
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
    • G05D1/00—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots
    • G05D1/20—Control system inputs
    • G05D1/22—Command input arrangements
    • G05D1/221—Remote-control arrangements
    • G05D1/226—Communication links with the remote-control arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H04W12/088—Access security using filters or firewalls
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
    • H04W4/48—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for in-vehicle communication

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a system for transmitting and receiving data, in particular for a rail vehicle, and a method for transmitting data.
  • Methods for intrusion detection are furthermore known which can be used to protect communication connections of the rail vehicle.
  • the software-based protection mechanisms can furthermore be manipulated by third parties, which can have disadvantageous repercussions on the operation of the rail vehicle.
  • third parties can have disadvantageous repercussions on the operation of the rail vehicle.
  • software-based protection of communication connections a risk always exists that modifications can be made to the software and the protective mechanisms of the rail vehicle can be bypassed.
  • the object of the invention is to propose a system and a method for manipulation-proof protection of a control level of a rail vehicle against third-party access.
  • a system for transmitting and receiving data, in particular for a rail vehicle.
  • the system has at least one in-vehicle control unit for processing and generating data.
  • At least one external server unit of the system has a communication device for establishing a communication connection to at least one in-vehicle interface.
  • the system further has at least one in-vehicle interface for transmitting data generated by the at least one in-vehicle control unit and for receiving data sent by the at least one external server unit.
  • the at least one in-vehicle control unit and the at least one in-vehicle interface are interconnected, having a data transmission capability, via an electronic filter device.
  • the communication connection between the at least one in-vehicle interface and the at least one control unit can be decoupled by a hardware filter.
  • the filter or the electronic filter device is designed on a hardware basis and can check and protect the data traffic between the in-vehicle interface and the at least one in-vehicle control system. It can thus be ensured that only permitted messages or data are forwarded to the at least one control system.
  • the at least one in-vehicle interface, the at least one in-vehicle control device and the electrical filter device can be disposed in a rail vehicle as part of its electrical components.
  • at least one rail vehicle can be a component of the system according to the invention.
  • a technically simple protection of the control systems of a rail vehicle can be guaranteed by means of this solution.
  • a manipulation-proof protection against unauthorized access to control systems of the rail vehicle can be implemented by means of the electronic filter device.
  • data transmitted between the at least one external server unit and the at least one in-vehicle control unit are verifiable by means of the electronic filter device.
  • the electronic filter device is preferably a device consisting of discrete electronic components, electively in combination with integrated circuits, with at least one function for checking a data stream.
  • the data stream or the data can be configured in the form of data packets or in the form of data messages. It can be ensured by means of the at least one filter function that only data or data messages which do not impact on an operational functionality of the at least one in-vehicle control unit are transmitted via physical interfaces of this type, such as, for example Ethernet, RS232 and the like.
  • data transmitted between the at least one external server unit and the at least one in-vehicle control unit are verifiable in terms of the validity and/or permissibility of the data by means of the electronic filter device.
  • the data can preferably be transmitted in the form of protocols or data packets. A syntax and/or the semantics of the protocols can be verified in order to check the validity and/or permissibility of the transmitted data packets. Depending on the result of the check, the data can then be forwarded unhindered or can be blocked.
  • the electronic filter device can preferably operate and check the data bidirectionally.
  • feedback messages generated by the at least one in-vehicle control unit in response to queries from an external server unit can also be securely transmitted.
  • the data or data packets blocked by the electronic filter device can be transmitted here back to the preceding component with an error message.
  • the at least one in-vehicle interface is a communication device for establishing a wireless or wired communication connection to the at least one external server unit.
  • the at least one interface may, for example, be a communication device for establishing a wireless communication connection.
  • the wireless communication connection can be based, for example, on a WLAN, UMTS, GSM, GPRS, LTE or similar transmission standard.
  • the at least one in-vehicle interface can be a wired interface for the provision of services, such as, for example, maintenance work, diagnostic work and the like. These functions can similarly be protected or checked by the electronic filter device.
  • the hardware filter or the electronic filter device is disposed, having a data transmission capability, between an interface designed as a service access and at least one in-vehicle control unit.
  • the at least one external server unit is a control center outside the vehicle or a control device outside the vehicle.
  • the at least one external server unit can thus be a computer system of a control center or of a railroad station which can communicate, having a data transmission capability, with a rail vehicle via a wireless communication connection.
  • the computer system has communication devices to perform a wireless data transmission.
  • the at least one external server unit can be a control device or a portable computer which can be coupled via a wireless or wired connection to the at least one in-vehicle interface.
  • the at least one external server unit can be a control device or a portable computer which can be coupled via a wireless or wired connection to the at least one in-vehicle interface.
  • the electronic filter device is deactivatable or activatable via a switch.
  • the electronic filter device can be disabled via a hardware switch in order to guarantee unrestricted data traffic, for example between a radio system and a control unit. This may be necessary, for example, in order to be able to access the control unit during a commissioning of the control unit.
  • the electronic filter device is deactivatable or activatable by the at least one in-vehicle control unit.
  • the electronic filter device can thereby be controllable by at least one in-vehicle control unit.
  • the switch can be actuatable directly by the at least one in-vehicle control unit in order to activate or deactivate the electronic filter device.
  • the at least one in-vehicle control unit can be connected directly to the electronic filter device so that the functional capability of the electronic filter device can be influenced directly by the at least one in-vehicle control unit.
  • the at least one control unit can thus directly or indirectly activate or deactivate the electronic filter device.
  • the electronic filter device is activatable by the at least one in-vehicle control unit depending on an operating mode and/or a speed of the rail vehicle.
  • the switch can be connected to the control system or at least to an in-vehicle control unit so that the filter function of the electronic filter device is not accidentally left deactivated during the operation of the rail vehicle. If certain conditions prevail, such as, for example, if the maintenance mode of the rail vehicle is deactivated or if the rail vehicle has a speed higher than e.g. 5 km/h, the filter function of the electronic filter device is forcibly reactivated. The correct function of the electronic filter device can thereby be guaranteed.
  • the electronic filter device is automatically activatable by the at least one in-vehicle control unit.
  • the hardware filter can be forcibly reactivated by the at least one control unit through the automatic activation of the electronic filter device despite an error on the part of maintenance personnel or a forgotten manual activation of the hardware filter.
  • the electronic filter device is connected, having a data transmission capability, directly or via a network to the at least one in-vehicle control unit.
  • the at least one in-vehicle control unit can be connected directly to the hardware filter or to the electronic filter device.
  • the electronic filter device can be integrated into the at least one in-vehicle control unit or can be connected via a data cable to the at least one control unit.
  • the electronic filter device can be coupled via a network to the at least one in-vehicle control unit.
  • the network can preferably be an Ethernet network, a vehicle network or a vehicle bus of the rail vehicle. The entire network or a communication with a plurality of components can thus be secured by the electronic filter device.
  • the filter unit or filter device can preferably be designed as dedicated hardware or as a control device or can be integrated into existing hardware, such as, for example, a control unit.
  • the at least one in-vehicle interface is a wireless communication device or a service interface.
  • the at least one in-vehicle control unit can be of flexible design and can offer a multiplicity of different coupling options.
  • a method for transmitting data with a system according to the invention is provided.
  • a wireless or wired communication connection is established between the at least one in-vehicle interface and at least one external server unit.
  • Data can be transmitted unidirectionally or bidirectionally via the established communication connection.
  • the data can be transmitted in the form of packets or messages.
  • the data transmitted to the at least one in-vehicle interface are verified by an electronic filter device.
  • the permissible and/or valid data verified by the electronic filter device are forwarded unchanged by the electronic filter device to at least one in-vehicle control unit.
  • the impermissible and/or invalid data verified by the electronic filter device are blocked by the electronic filter device or are transmitted back to the at least one in-vehicle interface.
  • Corresponding control devices having a filter function according to the invention can furthermore be more easily authorized, since the necessary supporting evidence can be provided in a technically simple manner. This can be achieved by checking the filter function and the absence of a disadvantageous impact on an operation of the vehicle by the filter function.
  • a technically simple protection of the control systems of a vehicle can be guaranteed by the method according to the invention.
  • a manipulation-proof protection against unauthorized access to the control systems of the rail vehicle can be implemented by the electronic filter device.
  • the electronic filter device is activated or deactivated via a switch or the at least one in-vehicle control unit.
  • the electronic filter device can thereby be controllable via a mechanical or electronic switch.
  • the hardware filter can be bypassable by means of the switch.
  • the electronic filter device can be activatable or deactivatable by at least one in-vehicle control unit. The filter function can thus be disabled, thereby enabling unrestricted access to all control devices in the vehicle.
  • the electronic filter device is disposed in a rail vehicle and is automatically activated in a deactivated state depending on time, speed and/or an operating mode of the rail vehicle.
  • a forcible activation of the electronic filter device which corrects an accidental deactivation of the filter function can thus be implemented.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic representation of a system according to a first example embodiment according to the invention
  • FIG. 2 shows a schematic representation of a system according to a second example embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic representation of a system 1 according to a first example embodiment according to the invention.
  • the system 1 has a rail vehicle 2 and an external server unit 4 .
  • the external server unit 4 is, for example, a control center or operational center for monitoring and controlling rail traffic.
  • the rail vehicle 2 has a communication device 6 which can establish a wireless communication connection 8 to a communication device 10 of the external server unit 4 for bidirectional transmission of data or data packets.
  • the communication connection 8 is configured here as a mobile radio connection, for example via a UMTS or LTE network.
  • the data transmitted by the external server unit 4 can be received by the communication device 6 of the rail vehicle 2 .
  • the communication device 6 of the rail vehicle 2 is an in-vehicle interface 6 .
  • the data are then forwarded by the communication device 6 to an electronic filter device 12 .
  • the electronic filter device is designed as integrated into a separate control device 14 of the rail vehicle 2 .
  • the permissible data are forwarded by the filter device 12 to at least one in-vehicle control unit 16 , 18 .
  • the rail vehicle 2 has, by way of example, two in-vehicle control units 16 , 18 .
  • the control units 16 , 18 can receive and process the transmitted data.
  • the in-vehicle control units 16 , 18 are configured as two independent control devices for processing or calculating data.
  • the two control units 16 , 18 are coupled via a network 24 to the filter device 12 for data communication purposes.
  • a switch 20 is disposed in the rail vehicle 2 to deactivate and activate the filter device 12 .
  • the control device 14 can be thereby bypassed.
  • An in-vehicle control device 16 is similarly coupled to and can automatically actuate the switch 20 .
  • the electronic filter device 12 can thus be automatically activated, provided that the rail vehicle 2 is moved at a defined speed.
  • FIG. 2 shows a schematic representation of a system 1 according to a second example embodiment according to the invention.
  • the rail vehicle 2 has a second in-vehicle interface 7 which is designed as a service interface 7 .
  • a diagnostic device 22 can be coupled via a wired communication connection 9 to the service interface 7 for maintenance work purposes.
  • the diagnostic device 22 may, for example, be a tablet or notebook which is connectable via a cable 9 to the in-vehicle interface 7 .
  • Direct access to the control units 16 , 18 can thereby be implemented, wherein the data transmitted via the communication connection 9 are checked by the electronic filter device 12 .

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Medical Informatics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Aviation & Aerospace Engineering (AREA)
  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
  • Remote Sensing (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
US16/764,503 2017-11-15 2018-11-07 System and method for the protected transmission of data Active 2041-06-22 US11916877B2 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102017220370.6A DE102017220370A1 (de) 2017-11-15 2017-11-15 System und Verfahren zum geschützten Übertragen von Daten
DE102017220370.6 2017-11-15
PCT/EP2018/080430 WO2019096643A1 (de) 2017-11-15 2018-11-07 System und verfahren zum geschützten übertragen von daten

Publications (2)

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US20210014199A1 US20210014199A1 (en) 2021-01-14
US11916877B2 true US11916877B2 (en) 2024-02-27

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US (1) US11916877B2 (de)
EP (1) EP3688958B1 (de)
DE (1) DE102017220370A1 (de)
ES (1) ES2886209T3 (de)
HU (1) HUE056795T2 (de)
PL (1) PL3688958T3 (de)
RU (1) RU2734764C1 (de)
WO (1) WO2019096643A1 (de)

Families Citing this family (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102019209338A1 (de) * 2019-06-27 2020-12-31 Siemens Mobility GmbH Vorrichtung zum Übertragen von Daten zwischen einem spurgebundenen Fahrzeug und einer landseitigen Datenverarbeitungseinrichtung
DE102019218875A1 (de) * 2019-12-04 2021-06-10 Siemens Mobility GmbH Überprüfungsverfahren für eine Vorrichtung und System
DE102022206426A1 (de) * 2022-06-27 2023-12-28 Siemens Mobility GmbH Verfahren zur Absicherung einer Datenverbindung

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DE102011076350A1 (de) 2011-05-24 2012-11-29 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren und Steuereinheit zur Erkennung von Manipulationen an einem Fahrzeugnetzwerk
US20130151111A1 (en) 2011-12-12 2013-06-13 Clay Skelton Systems, Devices and Methods for Vehicles
DE102014212484A1 (de) 2014-06-27 2015-12-31 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Datennetzwerk einer Einrichtung, insbesondere eines Fahrzeugs
WO2017024078A1 (en) 2015-08-03 2017-02-09 Icon Labs A method for detecting, blocking and reporting cyber-attacks against automotive electronic control units
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WO2017077857A1 (en) 2015-11-02 2017-05-11 Sony Corporation Communication between a vehicle ecu and external devices in proximity
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DE102011076350A1 (de) 2011-05-24 2012-11-29 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren und Steuereinheit zur Erkennung von Manipulationen an einem Fahrzeugnetzwerk
US20130151111A1 (en) 2011-12-12 2013-06-13 Clay Skelton Systems, Devices and Methods for Vehicles
DE102014212484A1 (de) 2014-06-27 2015-12-31 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Datennetzwerk einer Einrichtung, insbesondere eines Fahrzeugs
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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE102017220370A1 (de) 2019-05-16
WO2019096643A1 (de) 2019-05-23
PL3688958T3 (pl) 2021-12-20
EP3688958A1 (de) 2020-08-05
RU2734764C1 (ru) 2020-10-23
EP3688958B1 (de) 2021-07-28
HUE056795T2 (hu) 2022-03-28
ES2886209T3 (es) 2021-12-16
US20210014199A1 (en) 2021-01-14

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