TW201319513A - Apparatus and method for protection of objects - Google Patents

Abstract

In order to ensure that the probability of a successful defensive attack on RAM threats is significantly increased, it is proposed to determine and to monitor a deterrence volume (2) around the object (1) and/or a deterrence distance to the assault ammunition body (3) for the protection of objects (1) from assault ammunition bodies (3) by defensive rounds. For this purpose, at least one imaginary penetration point (4a) of the flight path (4) of the assault ammunition body (3) is determined, at which the last possible defensive attack on the assault ammunition body (3) by one weapon (5) or a plurality of weapons (5) can take place from inside and/or from outside the deterrence volume (2) and/or the deterrence distance. This zone is monitored. On detecting a threat, a threat analysis is carried out as well as the subsequent coordination of the operation, possibly taking into account the operating maxim, target tracking, aiming and the triggering of an individual round, a salvo and/or a plurality of partial salvos with preferred firing pauses.

Description

Device and method for protecting objects

The present invention relates to a method and apparatus for protecting an object against an airborne ammunition body, in particular adjacent to the object.

Air assault ammunition can be rockets or cannons and mortars (collectively referred to as RAM threats) or even for cruise missiles, airplanes, helicopters, drones or even umbrellas. Systems to be protected, such as buildings, roads, bridges, power supply equipment, petroleum and gas transmission equipment, and infrastructure objects for power generation facilities, or even military objects such as field tents, ammunition storage, and other assets, Or even moving objects such as fleets or other military units.

For example, a method for defending an airborne assault ammunition is known from DE 10 2007 007 403 A1, after determining the orbit of the assault ammunition, a large-caliber weapon launches an explosive projectile adjacent to the assault ammunition Explosion in the body. In this way, the assault ammunition is damaged or deviated from its original flight path. The use of large-caliber defensive shells is unprofitable because the aiming weapon itself is only very slow and can only fire one projectile because the second loading and aiming procedure for one of the large-calibre weapons exceeds the RAM shells. Normal flight time. The probability of successful defense for one of the close proximity protection of an object is therefore estimated to be low.

For example, another defense measure using a defensive munition body with a dispersing effect is known from DE 44 26 014 A1. After the detonated explosive of the defensive munition is detonated, the assault munition encounters an impact battle of one or more pieces. It is unfavorable here because the number, shape and size of the fragments cannot be pre-determined, and the dispersion effect does not propagate in the space, but it is concentrated in one of the flight paths around the assault ammunition. On the cone ball.

Other methods are known in which the assault munition body encounters a plurality of non-explosive subprojections placed in its flight path, and the assault munition system deviates from its assault flight path by being damaged by a collision with such projection bodies or Caused a premature explosion. EP 821 215 A2 refers in particular to this method. Here, the subprojection systems are ejected from a rotating stable intercepting missile.

CH 688 727 A5 describes a spin-stabilized projectile that is fired from a tubular weapon as a defensive ammunition. A payload consisting of a plurality of heavy metal cylindrical subprojections is ejected into the flight path of the assault munition after a dispersed explosive is detonated. When using this type of ammunition, it is also known to increase the number of effective sub-projections in the flight path of the assault ammunition, to launch a plurality of shells in a fast single firing sequence or in a volley, and the shells are tied in one Ignition in a pre-calculated volume. Because of the high speed of the assault ammunition and the defensive ammunition, in some combat situations, the last shot of a volley has been ignited from the tubular weapon before the first projectile hit the assault ammunition. In this case, it is not possible to track the tubular weapon and respond to a strike pattern control volley parameter. In addition, the defensive munitions can distort the measurement signals of the sensors. Therefore, there are considerable requirements for such sensors and firing control systems for this method.

Accordingly, it is an object of the present invention to provide a method and an associated device In order to significantly increase the probability of successful combat against the RAM threat.

This object is achieved with respect to the method of claiming the characteristics of claim 1 and by means of the device of the patent claim item 11. Advantageous embodiments can be found in the dependent claims.

The present invention is based on the fact that when combating an assault ammunition at close range, there is a fundamental risk that damage to the object to be protected can occur through the combat itself (eg, from the assault and defense debris and other ammunition portions). consider. Therefore, for the protection of the close distance and very close distance of the object, it is considered that the positioning of the defensive measures is maintained at a minimum distance from one of the objects to be protected. Therefore, an assault ammunition should only be able to approach the object to a minimum distance (referred to as the deterrent distance). This distance forms, for example, a radius called a hemisphere that is one of the deterrent volumes surrounding the object. The deterrent volume may be different from the shape of the half sphere, in particular when the geographical conditions (mountain, valley, building, etc.) of the environment of the object to be protected are required. Therefore, the deterrent volume can take any shape and is not limited to the shape of a half sphere. More specifically, the deterrent volume is determined by the respective deterrent distances in each spatial direction around the object to be protected.

Fighting with the assault ammunition after determining the relevant ballistics and flight parameters can occur at different times. In the case of a very early attack, the assault ammunition will be blocked away from the deterrent volume, but the uncertainty of the orbital calculation is still very large and the natural scattering of the weapon has a greater impact. The probability of successful defense operations is reduced. In the case of a later attack, it is more accurate to know the orbit of the assault ammunition and the natural scattering of the defensive weapon has less influence, which increases the probability of successful defensive operations. But in this case, there is the assault bomb The drug can penetrate into the risk of this deterrent volume.

In the case of a single cannonball or a plurality of single shells or one of the volleys to defend against an attack, if the last single shell or the last shot of each shot can each deploy its attack effect at the edge closest to the deterrent volume, then The probability of successful defensive operations will be estimated to be a maximum. This is shown in the calculations and tests. Therefore, the final defensive attack should occur before the imaginary penetration point of the flight path of the assault ammunition by frustrating the volume (hypothetical) casing. This means that in the case of one of the subprojectors defending the ammunition, the final projectile of the projectile is produced at its imaginary point of penetration closest to the flight path through the deterrent volume casing. The ignition of a dispersed explosive can still occur within the detonating volume itself. This also applies to scattered or HE high-explosive bombs (grenade), shells that are fired by temperature or by remote or near contact. The ignition itself may thus occur within the deterrent volume, but as long as it is observed at the object to be protected or from the object to be protected, its effect on the assault ammunition occurs through the flight path of the assault ammunition body. Defeat the volume of the outer shell of the imaginary penetration point.

This weapon system includes, for example, component sensors, firing controls, and weapons. Prior to a defensive attack, the type of ammunition and the number of shells used for each type of assault ammunition can be determined manually or automatically and by system parameters. Using commonly known parameters (such as the firing rate of the weapon, the mouth velocity of the projectile, the distance of the assault ammunition, the orbit and velocity, and the size of the deterrent volume), a point in time (Ta) can be calculated or known. The weapon should be fired at that point in time so that the last projectile, consisting of one or more shells, can deploy its defensive attack effect closest to the deterrent volume. Direct triggering of a command to fire one of the weapons in a fully automatic or manual mode Health.

In the fully automatic mode, the weapon system performs the task autonomously and automatically, without the intervention of an operator (by which one of the operators veto is feasible at any time): monitoring the space on the inside and outside of the volume, Threat analysis, coordination of operations, may consider operational guidelines, target follow-up, aiming and projectile launch and termination of the launch sequence.

In the half automatic mode, a firing command is triggered by an operator at a point in time (Tf = time of the transmission command). This means that there are several situations in which it is necessary to distinguish between time (Tf) and (Ta = optimal trigger time):

1. (Tf) is earlier than (Ta): The manual launch command is issued before the best time point for triggering the weapon. The weapon is then not triggered directly, and the trigger is delayed by the firing controller until the time of arrival (Ta).

2. (Tf) and (Ta): This manual firing command overlaps with the optimal trigger point. Then there is no delay to start the launch.

3. (Tf) Later (Ta): This manual firing command occurs at a point in time when the best trigger time for the weapon to fire the entire volley has elapsed. The launch is initiated without delay, but the volley is reduced so that the final shot of the reduced volley can still exert its defensive combat effect closest to the deterrent volume. A defensive attack will not occur within this deterrent volume.

If, for a particular type of assault ammunition, no direct destruction or explosion is triggered, but the aerial assault ammunition has been deflected out of its original flight path (eg, by the first shot of the volley), then The last projectile hit did not hit the assault ammunition and did not have an effect on the defensive attack.

Therefore, it is advantageous to have a specific type of assault ammunition in a first step Once the launch is reduced, the number of shots is reduced and the effect of the defensive attack on the assault ammunition is analyzed. Correspondingly, in another preferred embodiment, the number of shots determined for a threat type is not transmitted in a single shot, but is preferably divided into a plurality of partial volley shots. These partial volleys may each have the same number of shells that may have different defensive ammunition. The total number of shells, for example 36 rounds, can be divided into two parts of each 18 rounds, each time the three parts of the 12 rounds are volley or alternatively the number of partial volleys is volleyed with each part. Any other combination of the number of shells.

There is preferably an emission pause between up to a few seconds between the single partial volats. The minimum length of a single firing interval is affected by various conditions. Dispersing the explosives of explosives, the debris and components of the defensive munitions that were partially volleyed earlier must have been at least partially diffused from the target area, making the use of the weapon system's sensor to the authenticity and precise detection of the assault ammunition The test is once again feasible. It takes extra time for the detectors to acquire the assault ammunition, then the weapon or even the weapons (if several weapons are deployed) must be ready to launch again. The weapon may then have to aim at the target again and launch. It is equally feasible to set the duration of the transmission pause to a fixed value, for example one of the values of 2 seconds. The target acquisition, aiming and weapon launching for another volley is fully automated by the firing control system, whereby it can be vetoed by one of the operators if at all times.

Using a pre-defined combat model, the probability of a successful defensive attack for each type of assault can be calculated based on the number of partial volleys and the number of respective shells. In the case of a particular threat, the firing control unit selects the best combination of partial volleys and the number of respective shells. An operator automatically One of the decisions to revoke is feasible at any time because it is a fixed pre-option for one of the number and length of such volleys.

As long as the assault ammunition is not destroyed, its orbit is analyzed during the launch interval and during another portion of the launch (possibly deviating from the original orbit). The combat effect of this additional partial volley can be analyzed during a subsequent interval. However, even in the case where the volley is divided into a plurality of partial volleys, the defensive attack on the assault munition must stop at the boundary of the deterrent volume. Thus, even for this preferred embodiment, the point in time at which the weapon is fired must be selected such that the last projectile, which consists of a plurality of partial volleys, volleys, can deploy its combat effect closest to the deterrent volume. Direct triggering of one of the weapons' firing commands occurs in a fully automatic mode or in a manual mode, even in the case of a volley consisting of a plurality of partial volleys. In the case of a delayed transmission command, the firing control unit also performs an automatic reduction of one of the volleys, whereby the earlier partial volley is preferably reduced or even not transmitted, and the target has the highest combat. The (partial) final partial volatility of the probability of success includes (one or more) complete partial volatility.

In another embodiment, all types of assault munitions do not select the same deterrent volume or deterrent distance. Rather, to achieve an equal probability of success for each type, the deterrent distance is chosen individually for each type (eg, rocket, cannonball, mortar).

In another preferred embodiment, the horizontal and vertical extents of the deterrent volume are separately defined for different types of assault munitions considering their flight paths and reducing potential indirect damage; where the mortars are basically classified as having " The target of the flight path from above, while the rocket basically represents "from the side The goal of the face. This classification can then be considered, especially in terms of the targeting of the weapon.

The invention will be described in detail using an exemplary embodiment with the drawings.

A deterrent volume 2 (Fig. 1) is defined around an object 1 to be protected, and the assault ammunition 3 is not penetrated therein. One of the imaginary penetration points 4a of the flight path 4 of the assault ammunition body 3 passes through the imaginary outer casing of the deterrent volume 2, and some weapons 5 (not illustrated with its firing control system and sensor) are used for the assault ammunition body. The last viable defensive attack of 3 may occur from the inside and/or outside of the volume 2 of the deterrent.

Figure 2 shows a schematic illustration of a defensive attack on a single volley of an assault ammunition 3 between the ballistic points 10a and 10b, wherein the defensive attack at the ballistic point 10b The end overlaps with the imaginary penetration point 4a of the flight path 4 of the assault munition 3 passing through the deterrent volume 2.

A schematic illustration of a defensive attack against a single assault ammunition 3 having a volley is shown in Figure 3, which consists of two parts: between the ballistic points 11a and 11b, and between 11c and 11d. The volley, and one of the launch intervals between the ballistic points 11b and 11c. If the assault munition body 3 has been deviated from its original flight path to 11b by the first partial volley 11a, a defensive attack between the ballistic points 11c and 11d is applied to the modified trajectory of the assault munition body 3 ( Not shown). The end of the defensive attack at the ballistic point 11d overlaps with the imaginary penetration point 4a of the flight path 4 of the assault munition body 3 passing through the deterrent volume 2.

Figure 4 shows a schematic illustration of a defensive attack on a single assault munition body 3, which consists of: between ballistic points 12a and 12b, 12c and 12d, and 12e and 12f. The three portions are volleyed and one of the launch intervals between each of the ballistic points 12b and 12c and 12d and 12e. If the assault munition body 3 has been deviated from the original trajectory by the first or second portion of the trajectory, a defensive attack by a slightly late partial volley or a later partial volley is applied to the blasting ammunition body 3 Change the ballistics (not shown). The end of the defensive attack at the ballistic point 12f overlaps with the imaginary penetration point 4a of the flight path 4 of the assault munition 3 passing through the deterrent volume 2.

1‧‧‧ objects

2‧‧‧ Deterrent volume

3‧‧‧Assault ammunition

4‧‧‧ Flight path

4a‧‧‧ imaginary penetration point

5‧‧‧Weapons

10a‧‧‧ ballistic point

10b‧‧‧ ballistic point

11a‧‧‧ ballistic point

11b‧‧‧ ballistic point

11c‧‧‧ ballistic point

11d‧‧‧ ballistic point

12a‧‧‧ ballistic point

12b‧‧‧ ballistic point

12c‧‧‧ ballistic point

12d‧‧‧ ballistic point

12e‧‧‧ ballistic point

12f‧‧‧ ballistic point

Figure 1 is a schematic illustration of a defensive attack on an assault munition outside the volume of one of the objects to be protected, and Figure 2 is a schematic illustration of a single volley of defensive attack against the assault ammunition. Figure 3 is a schematic illustration of a defensive attack on a single assault munition consisting of two partial volleys. Figure 4 is a defense against a blast ammunition consisting of three partial volleys. A schematic illustration of the attack.

1‧‧‧ objects

2‧‧‧ Deterrent volume

3‧‧‧Assault ammunition

4‧‧‧ Flight path

4a‧‧‧ imaginary penetration point

5‧‧‧Weapons

Claims (11)

A method for protecting an object (1) against an assault ammunition (3) by means of a defensive projectile, the projectile being fired from at least one weapon (5), characterized by the following steps: determining that one of the objects (1) is scared The resistance volume (2) monitors the space inside and outside the deterrent volume (2) and performs a threat analysis including the determination of the flight path (4) of the assault ammunition (3), defining the assault ammunition (3) The flight path (4) triggers at least one weapon (5) to emit at least one defensive projectile through at least one imaginary penetration point (4a) of the imaginary outer casing of the deterrent volume (2). The method of claim 1, wherein the time point at which the at least one weapon (5) is triggered is selected such that the last projectile launched can deploy its combat effect closest to the point of penetration (4a). The method of claim 1 or 2, wherein the modulating projectiles are to be fired in a single volley or in a plurality of partial volleys, wherein the voicing each includes an equal number or a different number of defenses Shells. The method of claim 3, wherein an analysis of the operational effects of the earlier partial volley of the assault ammunition (3) is performed between the partial volleys. The method of claim 3, wherein the individual portions are volatically inserted into a transmission interval of up to a few seconds, wherein the minimum length of the single transmission interval is determined by various conditions, such as dispersed explosives in the combat zone. Residual gas, a first part of the volcanic debris and components and with the weapon (5) The sensors detect the assault ammunition (3). The method of claim 3, wherein the single-part volley is inserted in a firing interval of up to a few seconds, wherein the duration of the firing interval is set to a fixed value. The method of claim 3, wherein a pre-defined combat model is used for each type of assault ammunition (3), and a probability of a successful defense attack is calculated based on the number of partial volleys and their respective numbers of shots, wherein A particular threat-shooting control unit selects the best combination of such volleys and their respective numbers of shells. The method of claim 1 or 2, wherein the same detonation volume (2) is not required for all types of assault munitions (3), but the maximum viability of combat success for individual types of assault munitions (3) is used. Probability determines the deterrent volume (2). The method of claim 1 or 2, wherein the horizontal and vertical extents of the deterrent volume (2) are defined separately from each other. An apparatus for performing the method of any one of claims 1 to 9, comprising at least one sensor system, a fire control system, and a weapon (5) disposed about the object (1) The deterrent volume (2) is inside and/or outside. The device of claim 10, wherein the assault munitions (3) are rockets, artillery and mortar shells or even rifle missiles, aircraft, helicopters, drones, and umbrella objects.