RU2665506C1 - Method for dynamic modeling of communication networks taking into account the mutual dependence of elements thereof - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: communication equipment.SUBSTANCE: invention relates to modeling communication networks and can be used in designing and analyzing communication networks to determine the probability of an operational state and the average time of an operational state of information directions, taking into account the mutual dependence of used resources, as well as for research purposes. Technical result is achieved by taking into account the mutual dependence of resources used by subscribers.EFFECT: technical result is the increased adequacy and reliability of modeling.1 cl, 4 dwg

Description

The invention relates to the field of modeling communication networks and can be used in the design and analysis of communication networks to determine the probability of a healthy state and the average working time of information directions, taking into account the mutual dependence of the resources used, as well as for research purposes.

Currently, a number of methods and devices for modeling communication networks are known.

A known simulation method implemented [Patent 2251150 Russian Federation, IPC G06G 7/48 (2000.01). Device for modeling a communication system. / Grechishnikov E.V., Lyubimov V.A., Klimenko I.V .; applicant and patent holder Academy of special communications and information under the Federal security service of the Russian Federation. 2003105355/09, claimed 02/25/2003; publ. 04/27/2005, bull. No. 12].

The method consists in modeling the mode of bringing circular messages from the main station to N subscribers and the mode of confirming receipt of information from subscribers to the main station under conditions of failures and restores of communication lines in each communication direction.

The disadvantage of this method is the lack of the ability to quickly adjust the simulated communication network relative to a real-time real-time mode, taking into account the following factors: movement of communication network elements (nodes and means of communication); features of the physical and geographical conditions of the area of operation of the communication network; changes in the structure of the communication network depending on external influences. The simulation also does not take into account the interdependence of network elements in the distribution of security threat implementations, which reduces the adequacy and reliability of the simulation.

A known modeling method implemented in [Patent 2311675 Russian Federation, IPC G06F 11/25, G06F 15/173) (2006.01). Communication network analyzer. / Grechishnikov E.V., Lyubimov V.A., Pominchuk O.V., Belov A.S., Shaposhnikov D.K .; applicant and patent holder State educational institution of higher professional education Academy of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (Academy of the Federal Security Service of Russia), - 2006107095/09, decl. 06/03/2006; publ. 11/27/2007, bull. No. 33].

The method consists in forming a graph of the probabilistic network under study, writing the probability values of the ith vertex of the network graph to the registers of the pseudo-random sequence generators, writing the code for the number of planned experiments, generating a sequence of pseudorandom numbers whose distribution law corresponds to sudden failures of the network vertices, forming a sequence of pseudorandom numbers, the distribution law of which corresponds to the gradual failure of the network nodes, the formation of a sequence pseudorandom numbers, the distribution law of which corresponds to network branch failures resulting from external influences, resulting in the formation in each of the statistical experiments of a graph in which there may or may not be a path from the source of the graph to each of the connected vertices.

The disadvantage of this method is the lack of the ability to quickly adjust the simulated communication network, relatively realistically functioning in real time, taking into account the following factors: the movement of communication network elements (nodes and means of communication); features of the physical and geographical conditions of the area of operation of the communication network; changes in the structure of the communication network depending on external influences. The simulation also does not take into account the interdependence of network elements in the distribution of security threat implementations, which reduces the adequacy and reliability of the simulation.

A known modeling method implemented in [Patent 2286597 Russian Federation, IPC G06G 7/62 (2006.01). (Н04В 7/24) Device for modeling a communication system. / Grechishnikov E.V., Ivanov V.A., Belov A.S., Panasenko A.N .; applicant and patent holder State educational institution of higher professional education Academy of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (Academy of the Federal Security Service of Russia) .-: 2005111458/09, decl. 04/18/2005; publ. 10/27/2006, bull. No. 30].

если сумма равномерно распределенного случайного числа ξ и условной вероятности ошибки р будет больше единицы, что соответствует сигналу ошибки, формируется информация об ошибках в m каналах, производится переключение рабочего канала (имитация отказа в канале), если в рабочем канале ошибки не произошло, то переключение рабочего канала (имитация отказа в канале) произойдет, осуществляется имитация доведения информации до каждого абонента с учетом надежности линии связи, производится расчет вероятности доведения информации по линиям связи.The method consists in generating pulses for transmission over a communication system, generating and storing a uniformly distributed random number ξ that determines the number N of the selected communication channel, through which information will be exchanged between subscribers, recording the number N of the communication channel, generating and recording the Markov chain status code for m channels, generating a sequence of pulses m according to the number of channels, reversing readings of the conditional probability of error p according to the status code, checking the condition

if the sum of the uniformly distributed random number ξ and the conditional error probability p is greater than unity, which corresponds to an error signal, information about errors in m channels is generated, the working channel is switched (simulating a failure in the channel), if no errors occurred in the working channel, then switching a working channel (simulating a failure in a channel) will happen, an imitation of bringing information to each subscriber is carried out taking into account the reliability of the communication line, the probability of bringing information along the communication lines is calculated and.

The disadvantage of this method is the lack of the ability to quickly adjust the simulated communication network, relatively realistically functioning in real time, taking into account the following factors: the movement of communication network elements (nodes and means of communication); features of the physical and geographical conditions of the area of operation of the communication network; changes in the structure of the communication network depending on external influences. In addition, the simulation does not take into account the interdependence of network elements during the distribution of security threat implementations, which reduces the adequacy and reliability of the simulation.

The closest in technical essence and performed functions analogue (prototype) to the claimed one is a method for modeling communication networks [Patent 2488165 Russian Federation, IPC G06N 5/00 (2006.01). (G06F 17/50, Н03М 13/00) A method for modeling communication networks. / Ageev D.A. Balenko O.A. Bukharin V.V., Zhilkov E.A., Kiryanov A.V., Sagdeev A.K., Starodubtsev Yu.I.; Applicant and patent holder Federal State Treasury Military Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education "Military Academy of Communications named after Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny "of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.-2012130787/08, declared. 07/18/2012; publ. 07/20/2013, bull. No. 20].

измеряют номинальные скорости V_H передачи сообщений иThe prototype method consists in forming the initial graph of the network under study with the given values of N vertices of the network graph and M branches connecting them, set the number of static experiments, set the set of W possible types of security threats, Z adequate protection means and assign them certain numerical indices, form sequences of pseudorandom numbers and the laws of their distribution, which correspond to the unintentional failures of the vertices and branches of the network, form the laws of distribution of random numbers, corresponding to s emergence of a certain kind of security threats that have arisen during their implementation failures vertices of the network and restoration of peaks when using the remedies imitate the process of functioning of the simulated communications network in the presence of unintentional failures of vertices and branches, measured values of customer service time t _obsl, calculate its maximum value, and compare it with a predetermined desired value

measure the nominal speed V _H message transmission and

времени обслуживания абонентов удовлетворяет условию

корректируют условия имитации угроз безопасности путем добавления еще одной угрозы безопасности, после чего повторно имитируют реализацию угроз безопасности с учетом добавленной угрозы, а при

запоминают количество Р_УБ реализованных угроз безопасности, затем выявляют вершины сети, которые были подвержены воздействию угроз безопасности, имитируют использование средств защиты, для чего фиксируют одну из реализуемых угроз безопасности, выбирают из ранее заданной совокупности Z адекватное средство защиты, и формируют итоговый граф, включающий восстановленные вершины и соединяющие их ветви, находящиеся на маршруте между исходящим и входящим узлами с учетом использованного средства защиты, и повторно для итогового графа измеряют время

обслуживания абонентов, которое сравнивают с

и при

корректируют условия имитации использования адекватных средств защиты путем добавления еще одного средства защиты, после чего повторно имитируют использование средства защиты с учетом добавленного средства защиты, а при

измеряют текущие скорость V_T передачи сообщений и количество ошибок K_T переданных сообщений, затем сравнивают значения текущих V_T, K_T и номинальных скорости V_H передачи сообщений и количества K_H ошибок переданных сообщений, и при выполнении условий V_T<V_H и K_T<K_H запоминают количество реализуемых угроз безопасности с учетом использования средств защиты Р_СЗ, и вычисляют критическое количество Р_кр реализуемых угроз безопасности, а при V_T=V_H и K_T=K_H повторно корректируют условия имитации угроз безопасности с учетом использования средств защиты путем добавления еще одной угрозы безопасности.the number of errors K _H in the transmitted messages for the available channels of the communication network, and calculate their average values, after which they simulate a security risk, by exposure to a threat corresponding to a numerical index from a predetermined set W, randomly generated according to a given distribution law, then an intermediate a graph that includes the remaining vertices and their connecting branches located on the route between the outgoing and incoming nodes after the occurrence of unintentional failures and the implementation of the security threat if the measured value

customer service time satisfies the condition

adjust the conditions for simulating security threats by adding another security threat, after which they re-simulate the implementation of security threats taking into account the added threat, and when

remember the number of P _UB implemented security threats, then identify the network nodes that were exposed to security threats, simulate the use of security tools, for which they fix one of the security threats that are implemented, select an adequate security tool from the previously set Z, and form a final graph including restored peaks and branches connecting them, located on the route between the outgoing and incoming nodes, taking into account the means of protection used, and remeasuring for the final graph t time

customer service compared to

and with

adjust the conditions for simulating the use of adequate protective equipment by adding another protective equipment, after which they re-simulate the use of protective equipment taking into account the added protective equipment, and when

measure the current message transmission speed V _T and the number of errors K _T transmitted messages, then compare the values of the current V _T , K _T and the nominal message speed V _H and the number K _H of transmitted messages errors, and when the conditions V _T <V _H and K _T <K _H remember the number of realizable security threats taking into account the use of protective equipment P _SZ , and calculate the critical number P _{kr of} realizable security threats, and at V _T = V _H and K _T = K _H re-adjust the conditions for simulating security threats taking into account the use of means protect you by adding another security threat.

The disadvantage of the prototype method is the lack of consideration of the mutual dependence of network elements during the distribution of security risk implementations, which reduces the adequacy and reliability of the simulation.

The technical result of the invention is to expand the functionality of the prototype method, as well as improving the adequacy and reliability of modeling by taking into account the mutual dependence of resources used by subscribers.

множеством поврежденных (D={d_1; d₂,…,d_L}), если в множестве транзитных элементов присутствует хотя бы один элемент из множества поврежденных, то помечают информационное направление как неработоспособное, если в множестве транзитных элементов (G) отсутствуют элементы из множества поврежденных элементов (D), то i-е информационное направление считается работоспособным, запоминают данные о состоянии информационного направления на текущем шаге моделирования, по окончании заданного числа экспериментов рассчитывают вероятность работоспособного состояния и среднее время работоспособного состояния каждого информационного направления на каждом шаге моделирования.The technical result is achieved by the fact that in the known method of dynamic modeling of communication networks, taking into account the mutual dependence of their elements, the initial graph of the network under study is formed with a given number of N vertices of the network graph and M branches connecting them, set the number of statistical experiments (E), pose a security risk W simulate the process of functioning of a simulated communication network, characterized in that it additionally set the simulation time (T) and the step duration of the model time (Δt), R of information directions between With the vertices of the graph, the propagation time (t _p ) of the security threat implementations, the recovery time of the network element (t _c ), the security threat entry point, the probability of a security risk occurring at the entry point (R _UB ), the shortest routes are constructed in all given information directions and stored at every simulation step of: generating a random number in the interval [0,1], if the risk of safety hazards in the entry is less than the generated random number P _UB <θ, the process proceeds to the next step of the simulation and ovtoryayut action as long as the risk of security threats at the point of entry is greater than the generated random number R _UB> θ, if the probability of a threat over the generated numbers, then simulate the implementation of security threats to the entry point, mimic implementation of security threat to all elements directly associated with already damaged elements, in accordance with the recovery time (t _in ) restore damaged elements, sequentially for each formation direction: data on transit elements are extracted from the memory, multiple transit elements are compared elementwise

set invalid (D = {d _1; d _2, ..., d _L}), if a plurality of transit elements there is at least one element of the plurality of insulation, the tag information direction as the inoperable if a plurality of transit elements (G) no elements of the set of damaged elements (D), then the i-th information direction is considered workable, data on the state of the information direction at the current modeling step are stored, at the end of a given number of experiments, the probability of a workable about the state and the average working time of each information direction at each modeling step.

The analysis of the prior art made it possible to establish that analogues that are characterized by a combination of features that are identical to all the features of the claimed solution are absent, which indicates the compliance of the claimed method with the condition of patentability "novelty".

Search results for known solutions in this and related fields of technology in order to identify features that match the distinctive features of the prototype of the claimed method showed that they do not follow explicitly from the prior art. The prior art also did not reveal the popularity of the impact provided by the essential features of the claimed invention, the transformations on the achievement of the specified technical result. Therefore, the claimed invention meets the condition of patentability "inventive step".

"Industrial applicability" of the method is due to the presence of the element base, on the basis of which devices that implement the method can be made.

The claimed method is illustrated by the following drawings:

FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for dynamically modeling communication networks taking into account the interdependence of their elements;

FIG. 2 is a flowchart explaining the process of implementing a security threat in accordance with the propagation time;

FIG. 3 is a flowchart explaining a process of repairing damaged items in accordance with a recovery time;

FIG. 4 - graphs of the functioning of the i-th information direction.

The claimed method can be implemented using a set of actions presented in the flowchart (Fig. 1).

In block 1 (Fig. 1), a graph of the network under study is formed with a given number N of vertices of the graph and M branches connecting them. The vertices of the graph correspond to network nodes (for example, routers, servers). Branches of the graph correspond to communication lines connecting network nodes.

In block 2 (Fig. 1) set the source data:

- the number of statistical experiments E;

- simulation time T;

- step duration model time Δt;

- security risk W;

- R information directions between the vertices of the graph;

- propagation time of security threat implementations t _p ;

- the recovery time of the network element t _in ;

- entry point of a security threat;

- the likelihood of a security risk at the entry point R _UB .

In block 3 (Fig. 1) of the variable E _tech counter corresponding to the number of the current statistical experiment, set the initial value equal to one.

In block 4 (Fig. 1), the shortest routes are constructed in the given information directions. The criterion for choosing the shortest route is the smallest number of transit elements, as, for example, in the OSPF protocol [Olifer V, Olifer N., Computer networks. Principles, technologies, protocols: Textbook for universities. 5th ed. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2006. 992 s: ill. - (Series "Textbook for universities") p. - 526].

состоящее из F последовательно соединенных узлов сети данного информационного направления.In block 5 (Fig. 1), the constructed routes are stored in the given information directions. At the same time, for each of the R information directions, many

consisting of F series-connected network nodes of a given information direction.

In block 6 (Fig. 1) simulate the process of functioning of a simulated communication network.

In block 7 (Fig. 1) of the variable t _tech corresponding to the current simulation time, set the initial value equal to zero.

In blocks 8-10 (Fig. 1) simulate the process of a security risk at the entry point. A security threat entry point is an edge network element connected to an element or elements of another network or networks. It is assumed that after the implementation of a security threat in relation to a network element, the distribution of threat realizations is carried out in relation to all elements directly connected to it. The propagation time of security threat implementations t _p must be a multiple of the duration of the model time step.

To simulate the process of occurrence of a security threat at the entry point, a random number ϑ in the interval [0,1] is generated and compared with the specified probability of a security threat at the entry point P _UB .

By the probability of a security threat at the entry point R _UB understand the probability of a threat for the duration of the step model time.

If the probability of a security risk at the entry point is less than the generated random number Р _УБ <ϑ, then proceed to the next modeling step (t _tech : = t _tech + Δt) and repeat the actions until condition P _УБ > ϑ is fulfilled, which will correspond to the moment of occurrence of a security threat at the entry point.

The step duration of the model time Δt is selected based on the minimum time the network is in an unchanged state [Patent 2541169 Russian Federation, IPC G06N 99/00 (2010.01), G06G 7/48 (2006.01). The system of modeling dynamic processes. / Alisevich E.A., Evgrafov A.A., Nizhegorodov A.V., Starodubtsev Yu.I., Sukhorukova E.V .; Applicant and patent holder Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education "St. Petersburg State University of Trade and Economics". - 2013108784/08, declared. 02/26/2013; publ. 02/10/2015, bull. No. 4.-17 s; Sukhorukova E.V., Zakalkin P.V., Andreyanov S.N. Modeling trade business processes: methods for setting model time // Problems of Economics and Management in Trade and Industry. 2013. No1.C. 104-109.].

In block 11 (Fig. 1) they imitate the implementation of a security threat with respect to the entry point, for which they exclude the element from the network topology and mark it as damaged.

In block 12 (Fig. 1), in accordance with the propagation time, they imitate the implementation of a security threat in relation to all elements directly related to already damaged elements.

The process of implementing a security risk in accordance with the propagation time is described in detail using the flowchart shown in FIG. 2.

To implement a security risk in accordance with the propagation time in block 28 (Fig. 2), the initial data is set: the current simulation time t _tech and the propagation time of the implementation of the security threat t _p .

In block 29 (Fig. 2), the set S = {s ₁ , s ₂ , ..., s _M ] is determined, consisting of M elements subject to damage. These are elements that are directly related to already damaged ones.

In block 30 (Fig. 2), the counter variable q, corresponding to the element number from among the plurality of damage, sets the initial value equal to one.

In block 31 (Fig. 2), the qth element of S.

In block 32-33 (Fig. 2), it is checked whether the qth element is determined by the time moment of the implementation of the security threat in relation to it (t _y6 ). If not defined, then in block 33 (figure 2) calculate it. If defined, then control will be transferred to block 34 (figure 2).

In block 34 (figure 2) check whether the condition t _tech = t _UB , corresponding to the onset of the moment of implementation of the security threat. If it is, then in block 35 (Fig. 2) they imitate the implementation of a security threat, for which they exclude an element from the network topology, mark it as damaged, and control is transferred to block 36 (Fig. 2). If the condition is not met, then control is transferred to block 36 (Fig. 2).

In block 36 (Fig. 2), the counter variable q corresponding to the element number from the set of susceptible to damage S is increased by one.

In block 37 (Fig. 2) check whether all M elements of the set S are checked. If not, then repeat the steps in blocks 31-37. If all elements are checked, i.e. the condition q> M is fulfilled, then the process of implementing the security threat is completed in accordance with the propagation time.

Next, in block 13 (Fig. 1), damaged elements are restored in accordance with the recovery time. The recovery process begins immediately after an item is damaged.

The process of repairing damaged elements is described in detail using the flowchart shown in FIG. 3.

In block 38 (Fig. 3) the initial data is set: the current simulation time t _tech and the recovery time of the element t _in .

на текущем шаге моделирования. In block 39 (FIG. 3), a plurality of damaged elements are determined

at the current modeling step.

In block 40 (Fig. 3) calculate the end time of the restoration of damaged elements:

(

(

where t _tech is the current simulation time,

t _in is the recovery time of the element.

In block 41 (Fig. 3) of the variable and counter corresponding to the item number from the set of damaged D, an initial value equal to one is set.

In block 42 (Fig. 3), the u-th element of D.

In block 43 (Fig. 3), it is checked whether the moment of restoration of operability of the u-th element has arrived, i.e. whether the condition t _tech = t _s . If it is performed, then in block 44 (Fig. 3), the restoration of operability is simulated, for which they include an element in the network topology and remove the label about its damage. If the condition is not met, then control is transferred to block 45 (Fig. 3).

In block 45 (Fig. 3), the counter variable u corresponding to the element number from the set of damaged ones is increased by one.

In block 46 (Fig. 3), it is checked whether all L, elements of the set D are checked, i.e. Does the condition u> L hold. If not all damaged elements have been checked, then the steps described in blocks 42-46 are repeated (Fig. 3).

If all damaged items are checked, then complete the process of repairing damaged items.

Next, in block 14 (Fig. 1) of the counter variable i corresponding to the information direction number, an initial value equal to one is set.

In block 15 (Fig. 1), data on the transit elements of the i-th information direction (G) is extracted from the memory .;

In blocks 16-17 (Fig. 1), the set of transit elements G is compared element-wise with the set of damaged elements D. If at least one element of the set D is present in the set G, then the ith information direction is considered inoperative and control is transferred to block 18, where mark the information direction as inoperative at the current modeling step.

If the set G contains no elements from the set D, then the ith informational direction is considered operational and control is transferred to block 19, where the informational direction is marked as operational at the current modeling step.

In block 20 (Fig. 1), data is stored on the state of the i'th information direction for the current modeling step.

In block 21 (Fig. 1), the counter variable i corresponding to the information direction number is increased by one.

In block 22 (Fig. 1), the fulfillment of the condition i> R is checked, which corresponds to the fact that all R information directions are checked. If the condition is not met, then in the cycle, the actions in blocks 15-22 are repeated (Fig. 1). If executed, control is passed to block 23 (FIG. 1).

In block 23 (Fig. 1), the current simulation time is increased by the step duration of the model time.

In block 24 (Fig. 1), the condition t _tech > T is checked, the fulfillment of which corresponds to the fact that the simulation time is over. If the condition is not met, then in a cycle the actions in blocks 12-24 are repeated (Fig. 1). If performed, control is passed to block 25 (FIG. 1).

In block 25 (Fig. 1), the counter variable E _tech corresponding to the number of the current statistical experiment is increased by one.

In block 26 (Fig. 1), the condition E _tech > E is checked, the fulfillment of which corresponds to the fact that all statistical experiments are carried out. If the condition is not met, then in a cycle, the actions in blocks 7-26 are repeated (Fig. 1). If executed, control is passed to block 27.

In block 27 (Fig. 1) after the completion of all statistical experiments, the probability of a healthy state and the average time of a healthy state of each information direction are calculated.

The probability of a working state of the i-th information direction at the j-th step of modeling is the ratio of the number of experiments at which the i-th information was working at the j-th step of modeling to the total number of experiments:

where R _{RS is the} probability of a healthy state of the i-th information direction at the j-th modeling step;

X is the number of experiments in which the ith informational direction was operational at the jth modeling step;

E is the total number of experiments.

The average working time of the i-th information direction at the j-th simulation step is the arithmetic average of the time of the working state from the start of the modeling process to the j-th modeling step, in all experiments:

среднее время работоспособного состояния i-го информационного направления на j-м шаге моделирования;Where

the average working time of the i-th information direction at the j-th modeling step;

t _PCn is the total time of a healthy state for the period up to the j-th simulation step in the nth experiment;

E is the total number of experiments.

The procedure for calculating the probability of a healthy state and the average time of a healthy state of the information direction can be explained using figure 4.

In FIG. Figure 4 shows the graphs of the functioning of the i-th information direction, which can be constructed according to the data obtained as a result of each statistical experiment. The graphs reflect the state of the information directions at each modeling step (the abscissa axis of the graph corresponds to time, and the ordinate axis to the state “operable / inoperative”) .

To calculate the probability of a working state of the i-th information direction at the j-th modeling step, it is necessary to calculate the total number of experiments X when the i-th information direction was operational. So in FIG. 4 i-th information direction at the j-th step was operational in the first and E-th experiments (highlighted by hatching). Next, the calculated number X must be divided by the total number of statistical experiments E.

To calculate the average working time state of the ith information direction at the jth simulation step, it is necessary to calculate the total working state time (t _PCn ) from the moment the simulation starts to the jth modeling step inclusively in each statistical experiment. In FIG. 4, in the second statistical experiment, the dotted line shows the region within which it is necessary to calculate the working time of the i-th information direction t _PCn . In this case, in the presented figure, it is equal to three durations of the modeling step. These calculations must be repeated for each experiment. Then, the obtained values of the working time state of the ith information direction t _PCn must be summed up and divided by the total number of experiments.

As a result of the described actions, the probability of a healthy state and the average time of a healthy state of the information direction can be calculated.

Thus, by taking into account the mutual dependence of resources used by subscribers, a technical result is achieved by expanding the functionality of the prototype method and increasing the adequacy and reliability of modeling.

Claims (1)

The method of dynamic modeling of communication networks, taking into account the mutual dependence of their elements, namely, that they form the initial graph of the network under study with a given number of N vertices of the network graph and M branches connecting them, set the number of statistical experiments (E), pose a security risk W, simulate the functioning process of a simulated communication network, characterized in that it additionally sets the simulation time (T) and the step duration of the model time (Δt), R information directions between the vertices of the graph, the propagation time the solutions (t _p ) of the security threat realizations, the recovery time of the network element (t _in ), the security threat entry point, the probability of a security risk occurring at the entry point (R _UB ), build the shortest routes in all given information directions and remember them at every step simulations: generate a random number in the interval [0,1], if the probability of a security risk at the entry point is less than the generated random number Р _УБ <ϑ, then proceed to the next modeling step and repeat the steps until if the probability of a security threat at the entry point does not exceed the generated random number Р _УБ > ϑ, if the probability of a threat is greater than the generated number, then they imitate the implementation of a security threat in relation to the entry point, imitate the implementation of a security threat in relation to all elements directly related to damaged elements, in accordance with the recovery time (t _in ) restore damaged elements, sequentially for each information direction: ekayut data from memory of a transit elements, element-wise comparing a plurality of transit elements (G = {g _1, q _2, ..., g _F}) with a plurality of invalid (D = [d _1, d _2, ..., d _L}), if at least one element from the set of damaged elements is present in the set of transit elements, then the information direction is marked as inoperative, if there are no elements from the set of damaged elements in the set of transit elements (G) (i), the ith information direction is considered operational, the data about state of information the current simulation step, at the end of a given number of experiments, the probability of a healthy state and the average time of a healthy state of each information direction for each modeling step are calculated.

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