RU2446481C2 - Method of preventing unauthorised use of aircraft - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: physics.

SUBSTANCE: in the method, during unauthorised operation of aircraft, a harmonic oscillation is generated on-board the aircraft at carrier frequency ω_c, and then phase-shift keyed with a pseudorandom sequence which is the identification number of the aircraft. The generated composite phase-shift keyed signal undergoes frequency conversion using a first heterodyne frequency ω_r1. Voltage of the first intermediate frequency, which is equal to the sum ω_pr1=ω_c+ω_r1 is picked up, power amplified and broadcast at frequency ω₁=ω_pr1=ω_r2. The phase-shift keyed signal at frequency ω₁ is received at the air-traffic control station. A harmonic oscillation at carrier frequency ω_c is generated at the air-traffic control station and then phase-shift keyed with a modulating code which displays commands for reconfiguration of the on-board equipment of the aircraft. A composite phase-shift keyed signal at frequency ω₁ is then received on-board the aircraft. Low-frequency voltage which is proportional to the modulating code is picked up and then used to reconfigure the on-board equipment of the aircraft. Heterodyne frequencies ω_r1 and ω_r2 are separated by a second intermediate frequency value ω_r2-ω_r1=ω_pr2.

EFFECT: high reliability of duplex radio communication between air-traffic control stations and aircraft.

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Description

The proposed method relates to the field of technology involved in the development of on-board equipment and on-board systems of aircraft (LA), providing both flight safety and the safety of ground objects of special importance (nuclear power plants, arsenals, control centers, government agencies, warehouses and enterprises that are particularly toxic products, venues for public events, etc.) in case of unauthorized use of aircraft by ill-wishers.

A significant number of devices, systems and methods for ensuring flight safety are known, described both in the patent and in the scientific and technical literature (RF patents Nos. 2,015.940, 2.089.449, 2.114.374, 2.115.163, 2.137.303, 2.137 .678, 2.148.781, 2.151.714, 2.192.116, 2.228.543; US patents Nos. 4,775.116, 4.821.982, 5.071.087; French patent No. 2,322.350; Dobrolensky Yu.P. et al. Methods of engineering and psychological research in aviation. - M., 1975, p. 34 and others).

Of the known methods, the closest to the proposed one is the "Method of preventing unauthorized use of aircraft (RF patent No. 2.228.543, G08G 5/00, 2002), which is selected as the base object.

The known method prevents the deliberate infliction of irreparable damage to especially important objects using the “kamikaze method” of an aircraft forcibly captured by terrorists by creating conditions on board that impede the change of a predetermined flight path of an aircraft, making it difficult to pilot them, and preclude the possibility of aimed aiming of an aircraft at a selected object.

The method consists in the fact that in the process of preflight preparation, programmed path parameters are introduced into the onboard control system of the aircraft, during the flight, a mismatch between the real and programmed path parameters of the flight of the aircraft by onboard, ground, air and space means is detected, conflict-hazardous aircraft are identified by their energy the potential and importance of objects located along the flight path or in the zone of reach. In the event of the unauthorized occurrence of the indicated mismatch by a value greater than the specified, these means form and transmit aboard the crew to reconfigure the on-board systems and / or on-board equipment. These circumstances make it difficult to pilot the aircraft and create discomfort when piloting it, which can lead to the abandonment of unauthorized intentions.

Thus, the effectiveness of preventing the unauthorized use of aircraft largely depends on the reliability of duplex radio communication between an air traffic control center and aircraft.

An object of the invention is to increase the reliability of duplex radio communications between air traffic control centers and aircraft by using complex signals with phase shift keying and two frequencies.

The problem is solved in that a way to prevent unauthorized use of aircraft, which, in accordance with the closest analogue, is that the means of air traffic control points determine the current coordinates and motion parameters of the aircraft, predict the possibility of an abnormal change in its flight path, form and transmit on board the aircraft crews to change flight parameters, while in the process of preflight preparation for on-board navigation the system of the aircraft is introduced with deterministic programmed trajectory parameters with the impossibility of changing them; during the flight, the determination of the current coordinates and parameters of the aircraft’s movement is additionally carried out using the aircraft’s own means and space and airborne surveillance tools informationally coupled with air traffic control points with constant determination by the indicated means mismatch of the parameters of the current trajectory of the aircraft and from the deterministic software, according to the information placed in the database server system of the updated data information associated with the air traffic control points, about the energy potential of the aircraft, about the importance of objects located along the flight path of the aircraft, and their relative position during the flight, identify conflict-hazardous aircraft and track attempts to unauthorized use of identified conflict-dangerous aircraft according to information about them an unacceptable deviation from the deterministic programmed path or by an alarm message from the aircraft, and upon the occurrence of this message, reconfiguration of the aircraft’s onboard systems or aircraft’s equipment is performed according to the commands generated by the aircraft’s onboard correction device, or according to the commands generated and transmitted to the aircraft by the indicated means observation and control points, and the removal of this reconfiguration after reducing the mismatch to an acceptable value, ex differs from the closest analog by the fact that on board the aircraft during its unauthorized use form a harmonic oscillation of the carrier frequency ω _s, manipulate its phase pseudorandom sequence which is an identification of the aircraft number, the generated composite signal with the phase shift keying is converted in frequency by using frequency ω _r1 of the first local oscillator is isolated voltage of the first intermediate frequency equal to the sum frequency ω = ω _{c pr1} + ω _r1, increase its power and of uchayut broadcast at the frequency ω ₁ = ω _pr1 = ω _r2, receiving a composite signal with a phase shift keying at the frequency ω _1, in paragraph air traffic control, increase its power, is converted in frequency by using frequency ω _r1 of the second local oscillator is isolated voltage of the second intermediate frequency equal to the frequency difference ω _pr2 = ω ₁ -ω _g1 , synchronously detect it using harmonic oscillations of the carrier frequency ω _s as a reference voltage, select a low-frequency voltage proportional to the identified flyer number of the aircraft, register and analyze it, at the air traffic control point, form a harmonic oscillation of the carrier frequency ω _s , manipulate it in phase with a modulating code that displays commands for reconfiguration of the aircraft’s onboard equipment, convert it in frequency using the frequency ω _{g2 of the} first local oscillator, select voltage of the third intermediate frequency equal to the frequency difference _PR3 ω = ω _z2 -ω _s, increase its power and emit the air at the frequency ω = ω ₂ = ω _{r1 PR3,} receiving a composite signal with a phase manipulation at a frequency ω ₂ on board the aircraft, increase its power, is converted in frequency using frequency ω _r2 of the second local oscillator is a voltage of the second intermediate frequency equal to the frequency difference _np2 ω = ω _z2 -ω _2, it is detected in synchronism with the harmonic oscillations of the carrier frequency ω _with as a reference voltage, allocate a low-frequency voltage proportional to the modulating code, and use it to reconfigure the on-board equipment of the aircraft, and frequencies ω _g1 and ω _z2 heterodyne spread on the magnitude of the second intermediate frequency ω _z2 -ω _d1 = ω _np2, on board an aircraft complex signals with a phase shift keying radiate at frequency ω _1, and the take - at frequency ω _2, and an air traffic control point on the contrary, complex signals with phase shift keying emit at a frequency of ω ₂ , and receive - at a frequency of ω ₁ .

The technical essence of the method is illustrated in figure 1 by the example of a flight of a manned aircraft (for example, a passenger long-haul aircraft) from one point to another. The structural diagram of the on-board equipment of the aircraft is presented in figure 2. The structural diagram of the equipment placed at the air traffic control point, is presented in figure 3. A frequency diagram explaining the conversion of signals by frequency is shown in FIG. 4.

The aircraft on-board equipment and the equipment located at the air traffic control center contain serially connected master oscillator 11.1 (11.2), a phase manipulator 13.1 (13.2), the second input of which is connected to the output of the pseudorandom sequence generator 12.1 (modulating code generator 12.2), the first mixer 15.1 (15.2), the second input of which is connected to the output of the first local oscillator 14.1 (14.2), the amplifier 16.1 of the first intermediate (16.2 third intermediate) frequency, the first amplifier 17.1 (17.2) power, the duplexer 18.1 (18.2), the input-output of which connected to the transceiver antenna 19.1 (19.2), the second power amplifier 20.1 (20.2), the second mixer 22.1 (22.2), the second input of which is connected to the output of the second local oscillator 21.1 (21.2), the amplifier 23.1 (23.2) of the second intermediate frequency, the phase detector 24.1 ( 24.2), the second input of which is connected to the output of the master oscillator 11.1 (11.2), and the registration unit 25.2 (unit 25.1 reconfiguration of on-board equipment).

The proposed method is implemented as follows.

The crew of aircraft 1, located at airport 2 (only the runway is shown), with the permission of air traffic control point 3 serving this airport, is preparing to fly to airport 4, which is served by air traffic control point 5. Along the flight route, there may be several such points, informationally interconnected with each other and with the side of the aircraft they are accompanying during the flight.

In the process of preflight preparation, memory units with deterministic programmed trajectory parameters placed in them with the impossibility of changing them are introduced into the on-board navigation system calculators.

Therefore, the crew during the flight does not have the ability to somehow change the incorporated trajectory parameters. Their change is possible only at the initiative of the air traffic control center, in the control zone of which the aircraft is currently located (for example, via a radio channel), in case of a thunderstorm circumvention, impossibility to land at the airport under weather conditions, and technical malfunctions. The same determinate trajectory parameters are located in the memory of computer systems of all air traffic control points located within the reach of an aircraft of this type. In the general case, they also contain the determined trajectory parameters of all aircraft that are in the visibility zone of stable information exchange in accordance with the flight schedule and routing. Trajectory parameters, including the areas of post-take-off turns and maneuvering before landing, can be set in various forms, for example, by a combination of pairs H (L), ψ (L) (current altitude and orthodrome course in range L), current coordinates X, Y, Z along range L or time t in a coordinate system connected with the earth or in another form.

After the aircraft takes off and begins its flight along a deterministic programmed trajectory, the air traffic control points determine the current coordinates and parameters of the aircraft’s movement and predict the possibility of an abnormal change in the flight path by mismatching the parameters of the current aircraft trajectory from the deterministic program by more than a predetermined amount. In this case, the allowable value of the mismatch can be variable in different parts of the trajectory: in the approach area, it should be less. During the flight, the determination of the current coordinates and parameters of the aircraft’s movement, as well as the identification of the mismatch between the current and deterministic programmed trajectory parameters, is additionally carried out by its own on-board means and by means of space (for example, reconnaissance satellite) and aerial surveillance (for example, Avax type aircraft).

Inertial navigation system (ANN) or satellite navigation system equipment is one of the own means of determining the current coordinates. It is also assumed that the computing systems of airborne and space surveillance equipment also contain deterministic programmed trajectory parameters of the aircraft located in the zones of their visibility and stable information exchange.

Both in the flight zone and in the reachable range of an aircraft with significant energy potential (hundreds of tons of total mass, tens of tons of fuel, high flight speed), there are a large number of objects of varying degrees of importance, including objects of special importance (nuclear and hydropower facilities , government agencies, launchers with nuclear charges, warehouses and enterprises of particularly toxic products, control centers, venues for public events, large facilities on the water surface and etc.), the destruction or destruction of which is fraught with irreversible catastrophic consequences. The coordinates of these objects are located in database servers 6.

An abnormal situation may occur on board aircraft 1 flying along trajectory 8 with predetermined deterministic trajectory parameters, which may result in the appearance of a mismatch signal between the current and deterministic program trajectory parameters by a value more than previously admissible, which will be detected by the aircraft's onboard means , by means of an air traffic control center and by means of air and space observation. Suppose that this happens at point 9 of trajectory 8, and the aircraft, having switched to manual control, made an unauthorized turn and continued along the path 10 in the direction of the object of special importance 7. The signal noted above appears in the absence of a technical reason (for example, operational analysis telemetered parameters) is identified as an attempt to unauthorized use of the identified conflict-dangerous aircraft (for example, when seizing control of an aircraft by terrorists). This attempt can also be identified by an alarm message from the aircraft crew before the start of its unauthorized turn or during take-off. In this case, the master oscillator 11.1 is turned on, which generates a high-frequency oscillation

,

,

,

,

where U _с1 , ω _с , φ _с , T _с1 - amplitude, carrier frequency, initial phase and duration of high-frequency oscillation;

which goes to the first input of the phase manipulator 13.1. The second input of the phase manipulator 13.1 is fed a pseudo-random sequence (PSP) from the output of the generator 12.1 PSP, which is the identification number of the aircraft. At the output of the phase manipulator 13.1, a complex signal with phase shift keying (PSK) is formed

,

,

where φ _k1 (t) = {0, π} is the manipulated phase component representing the law

phase manipulation according to identification

aircraft number

which is fed to the first input of the first mixer 15.1, the second input of which is supplied with the voltage of the first local oscillator 14.1

At the output of the mixer 15.1, a voltage of combination frequencies is generated. Amplifier 16.1 distinguishes the voltage of the first intermediate frequency

;Where

;

ω _pr1 = ω _s + ω _G1 = ω ₁ - the first intermediate (total) frequency (figure 4);

φ _CR1 = φ _G1 + φ _s ;

which, after amplification in the power amplifier 17.1 through the duplexer 18.1, enters the transceiver antenna 19.1, is broadcast by it, is captured by the transceiver antenna 19.2 of the air traffic control station, and through the duplexer 18.2 and the power amplifier 20.2 it is supplied to the first input of the mixer 22.2, the voltage of the second input of which u _{g1 (t) of the} local oscillator 21.2. At the output of the mixer 22.2, voltages of combination frequencies are generated. Amplifier 23.2 distinguishes the voltage of the second intermediate (differential) frequency

,

,

;Where

;

ω _CR2 = ω _CR1- ω _G1 - the second intermediate frequency;

φ _CR2 = φ _CR1 + φ _G1 ;

which is fed to the first (information) input of the phase detector 24.2. A voltage is applied to the second (reference) input of the phase detector 24.2

,

,

,

,

from the output of the master oscillator 11.2. As a result of synchronous detection, a low-frequency voltage is generated at the output of the phase detector 24.2

;Where

;

which is fixed by the block 25.2 registration.

According to the recorded low-frequency voltage, the identification number of the aircraft captured by the terrorists and its location are determined. In this case, the high-frequency oscillation u _c2 (t) from the output of the master oscillator 11.2 is fed to the first input of the phase manipulator 13.2, the second input of which is supplied with the manipulating code M (t) from the output of the generator 12.2. At the output of the phase manipulator 13.2, a complex QPSK signal is formed

,

,

where φ _k2 (t) = {0, π} is the manipulated phase component that displays the phase manipulation law in accordance with the modulating code M (t);

which goes to the first input of the mixer 15.2, the second input of which is the voltage of the local oscillator 14.2

At the output of the mixer 15.2, voltages of combination frequencies are generated. Amplifier 16.2 distinguishes the voltage of the third intermediate frequency

,

,

;Where

;

ω _pr3 = ω _u2 -ω _s is the third intermediate frequency;

_PR3 w = ω _z2 -ω _s

which after amplification in the power amplifier 17.2 through the duplexer 18.2 enters the transceiver antenna 19.2, is radiated by it at the frequency ω ₂ , it is captured by the transceiver antenna 19.1 of the aircraft and through the duplexer 18.1 and the power amplifier 20.1 go to the first input of the mixer 22.1, to the second input of which voltage u _g2 (t) of the local oscillator 21.1 is supplied. At the output of the mixer 22.1, voltages of combination frequencies are generated. Amplifier 23.1 distinguishes the voltage of the second intermediate (differential) frequency

,

,

;Where

;

_np2 ω = ω _z2 -ω _PR3 - second intermediate frequency;

_WP4 w = ω _z2 -ω _PR3,

which is fed to the first (information) input of the phase detector 24.1. The second (reference) input of the phase detector 24.1 is supplied with voltage u _с1 (t) from the output of the master oscillator 11.1.

As a result of synchronous detection, a low-frequency voltage is generated at the output of the phase detector 24.1

Where

which enters the block 25.1 reconfiguration of on-board equipment.

Block 25.1 may perform the following types of reconfiguration of aircraft onboard equipment:

- the introduction of blocking the hydromechanical part of the steering control system;

- disable the recognition system "friend or foe". This achieves the allocation of conflict-hazardous aircraft in the airspace among a large number of other aircraft in order to orderly concentrate on it the attention of air traffic control points, air defense systems and fighter aircraft;

- the inclusion of the block of oscillation in the stabilization machine, which will lead to the rocking of the aircraft in all axes to the boundary of its instability, the difficulty of piloting the aircraft and pointing it at the object;

- the inclusion of blocks of distortion in the systems for constructing the course, pitch, for example, by cyclic summation with a variable installation in magnitude and time. This circumstance will lead to a loss of orientation in space and complicate the search for the target of ramming;

- the inclusion of a distortion unit in systems for measuring altitude and speed, which makes it difficult to pilot the aircraft;

- inclusion of a distortion block in the flight information display system on the pilots dashboard (attack and slip angles, engine speed, etc.), for example, by “flickering” of readings;

- forced inclusion of the emergency alarm system about the abnormal functioning of all vital aircraft systems. This circumstance will entail the stressful state of the crew with the loss of the depth of logical actions with the possible subsequent rejection of unauthorized actions;

- turning off one or a group of engines, as well as turning on the emergency fuel drain system, which complicates the piloting of the aircraft and reduces its reachable flight range;

- inclusion of a block of negative multimedia effects (sound accompaniment at frequencies that adversely affect the hearing aid, as well as displaying images on the on-board display that are unpleasant for terrorists to sense). This circumstance will entail the stressful state of the crew with the loss of completeness of logical actions;

- inclusion of a block for issuing recommendations to the crew, for example, inclusion of an image of the head of a terrorist organization ordering to stop unauthorized actions;

- inclusion of the control transfer unit in the remote piloting mode (for example, to an escort aircraft or air traffic control center);

- the inclusion of systems to give opacity to the glazing of the cabin by polarizing the glazing, its internal or external splashing, as well as the compelling blindness of the crew. This action is especially effective at the initial stage of take-off, when unauthorized use of the aircraft can be excluded in principle;

- forced mechanical fixation of the parts of the crew’s body, which may complicate manual piloting of the aircraft or preclude the transition to manual control of the tug of war;

- inclusion of a forced stall block in a tailspin, for example, by simultaneously generating signals to reverse or turn off the engines, but elevators (to increase the angle of attack), roll and course. This action is one of the last when it is inevitable that an aircraft collides with an object of special value when all the others are exhausted, but such an operation is carried out on command from the air traffic control center to make an appropriate decision with a time limit on the use of air defense and fighter aircraft.

The sequence of issuing commands on the types of reconfiguration of on-board systems or on-board equipment is determined by the measure of enhancing the effect of their consequences. Moreover, this sequence of commands can be formed on ground-based facilities, at air traffic control points, as well as on board the aircraft itself, subjected to an attempt of unauthorized use (except for the command for compulsory stalling).

Therefore, on board the aircraft there is a reconfiguration block 25.1, informationally coupled with elements of the on-board equipment and on-board systems, forming a sequence of commands when an unacceptable mismatch occurs between the current and deterministic trajectory parameters. It should be noted that when the discrepancy is reduced to an acceptable value (which can be interpreted as the crew refuses unauthorized actions), previously issued commands for reconfiguring the on-board equipment and on-board systems are removed.

Thus, the proposed method in comparison with the base object and other technical solutions for a similar purpose provides increased reliability of duplex radio communications between air traffic control centers and aircraft. This is achieved by using complex signals with phase shift keying and two frequencies ω ₁ and ω _2. Moreover, onboard the aircraft, complex PSK signals are transmitted at a frequency of ω ₁ , and reception at a frequency of ω ₂ . And at the air traffic control point, on the contrary, complex PSK signals are transmitted at a frequency of ω ₂ , and reception is at a frequency of ω ₁ . The frequencies ω ₁ and ω _2, are spaced apart by the value of the second intermediate frequency: ω _z2 -ω _d1 = ω _np2.

Complex QPSK signals from the point of view of detection have high energy and structural secrecy.

The energy secrecy of these signals is due to their high compressibility in time and spectrum with optimal processing, which reduces the instantaneous radiated power. As a result, a complex QPSK signal at the receiving point may be masked by noise and interference.

Moreover, the energy of a complex QPSK signal is by no means small; it is simply evenly distributed over the time-frequency domain so that at each point in this region the signal power is less than the power of noise and interference.

The structural secrecy of complex QPSK signals is due to the wide variety of their forms and significant ranges of parameter changes, which makes it difficult to optimize or at least quasi-optimal processing of complex QPSK signals of an a priori unknown structure in order to increase the sensitivity of receivers.

The use of this method using duplex radio communication at two frequencies with the use of complex PSK signals allows you to prevent the intentional damage to particularly important objects by ramming an aircraft by force captured by terrorists by creating conditions on board that impede the change in the flight path of the aircraft, making it difficult to fly LA, excluding the possibility of aiming the aircraft at the selected object, reducing its reachable range, as well as creating psychologists eskogo discomfort when piloting and to reduce the exhaustion of all other operations, when he discovered the inevitability of collision of aircraft with the object of special value.

Claims (1)

A way to prevent unauthorized use of aircraft, which consists in the fact that the means of air traffic control points determine the current coordinates and motion parameters of the aircraft, predict the possibility of an abnormal change in the trajectory of its flight, form and transmit commands to change the flight parameters on board the aircraft, while in the process of preflight preparation, a deterministic program path is introduced into the aircraft's on-board navigation system It is possible to determine ornal parameters with the impossibility of changing them, during the flight, the determination of the current coordinates and parameters of the aircraft’s motion is additionally carried out using the aircraft’s own means and space and airborne surveillance tools informationally coupled with air traffic control points with constant determination by the indicated means of mismatching the parameters of the current aircraft path from deterministic software, according to information placed in the system conflicts of updated data bases informationally connected with air traffic control points about the energy potential of the aircraft, about the importance of objects located on the flight path of the aircraft, and their possible position during the flight, identify conflict-dangerous aircraft and track attempts of unauthorized use identified conflict-hazardous aircraft according to information about their unacceptable deviation from a deterministic program path or by an alarm message from the aircraft, and upon the occurrence of this message, reconfiguration of the on-board systems or on-board equipment of the aircraft is carried out according to the commands formed by the on-board corrective device, or according to the commands generated and transmitted aboard the aircraft by the indicated monitoring devices and control center, and removal this reconfiguration after reducing the mismatch to an acceptable value, characterized in that on board the aircraft when it is unauthorized When used, a harmonic oscillation of the carrier frequency ω _s is generated, the phase is manipulated with a pseudo-random sequence, which is the identification number of the aircraft, the generated complex signal with phase manipulation is converted by frequency using the frequency ω _{g1 of the} first local oscillator, the voltage of the first intermediate frequency equal to the sum of the frequencies is isolated _pr1 ω = ω _c + ω _r1, increase its power and emit the air at the frequency ω = ω ₁ = ω _{z2 pr1,} receiving a composite signal with a phase shift keying frequently those ω ₁ at the air traffic control station, amplify it in power, convert it in frequency using the frequency ω _{g1 of the} second local oscillator, isolate the voltage of the second intermediate frequency equal to the frequency difference ω _pr2 = ω ₁ -ω _g1 , synchronously detect it using harmonic oscillation carrier frequency ω _c as the reference voltage, emit a low-frequency voltage proportional to the identification number of the aircraft, recorded and analyzed, the control point of air motion generates dissolved harmonic oscillation of the carrier frequency ω _s, manipulate it by modulating code phase, displaying commands to reconfigure the board equipment of the aircraft, is converted in frequency by using frequency ω _r2 of the first local oscillator is isolated voltage of the third intermediate frequency equal to the frequency difference ω _PR3 = ω _z2 - ω _s , amplify it in power and radiate it at a frequency of ω ₂ = ω _pr3 = ω _g1 , receive a complex signal with phase shift keying at a frequency of ω ₂ on board the aircraft, amplify it in power, convert the frequency using a frequency ω _r2 of the second local oscillator is a voltage of the second intermediate frequency equal to the frequency difference _np2 ω = ω _z2 -ω _2, it is detected in synchronism with the harmonic oscillations of the carrier frequency ω _c as the reference voltage, emit a low-frequency voltage proportional to the modulating code and use it to reconfigure the board equipment of the aircraft, wherein the frequency ω _d1 and ω _z2 heterodyne spread on the magnitude of the second intermediate frequency ω _z2 -ω _r1 = ωp _p2 carrying letatel complex signals with phase shift keying emit at a frequency of ω ₁ and receive at a frequency of ω ₂ , and at the air traffic control point, on the contrary, complex signals with phase shift keying emit at a frequency of ω ₂ and receive at a frequency of ω ₁ .

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