RU2355596C1 - Method for traction equipment control and traffic safety ensuring and integrated complex system (ics) for its implementation - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: railway engineering.

SUBSTANCE: group of inventions can be used on railway transport traction equipment, predominantly on railway system sections with ultimate filling of their design throughput. In the method following functions are performed: monitoring of train speed by independent automatic train driving subsystems (1), automatic control of service braking (2) and movement safety control (3); synchronous comparison of current train movement speed with speed-limit threshold for given train position and subsystem switch-over to control mode of speed lowering when it reaches speed-limit threshold determined by functional connection stated in formula. In integrated complex system of traction equipment control and traffic safety ensuring (ICS), independent subsystems are connected by system-wide CAN interface (9) and are provided with electronic data base containing own speed-limit thresholds for given train movement coordinate, calculated in correlation with other subsystems. Locomotive driver waking-state monitoring device (5) is made interactive with physiological control units and units for control of locomotive driver train driving actions with possibility to affect service braking automatic control subsystem via system-wide CAN interface.

EFFECT: invention provides improvement of rail traffic efficiency and safety level.

2 cl, 1 dwg

Description

The group of inventions relates to locomotive control devices for traffic and ensuring the safety of traction rolling stock and can be used on traction rolling stock of railway transport, mainly on sections of the railway network with the maximum filling of their estimated capacity.

A complex locomotive safety device KLUB-U is known (RU 2248899 C1, MPK7: B61L 25/04), by means of which the control of the permissible speed of the train is not exceeded, the ALSN signals are decrypted, and the coordinate reference is via the GPS satellite navigation system.

The main disadvantages of this device are its lack of the ability to control the traction and service braking of the locomotive and the use, even with a slight, not posing a threat to traffic safety, speeding as the only control effect of autostop (emergency) braking, which in itself is a powerful negative factor causing violation of the safety of train movement (jamming and formation of sliders of wheelsets, squeezing and descent of cars, injuring passengers, etc.). In addition, the accuracy of the coordinate reference performed by the CLUB-U device using the GPS satellite navigation system, amounting to about 30 m, is clearly insufficient to ensure the safe movement of the train at the station, where the vast majority of statistically stable violations of traffic safety in train and shunting, including due to inaccurate location of rolling stock.

A device is known for automatic control of braking of a train (RU 2283786, IPC: B60T 8/172 (2006.01), B61L 3/12 (2006.01), which allows automatic selection and adjustment of the control algorithm for service braking of a train (calculation and implementation of the braking trajectory with determination of the actual braking coefficient) to ensure a given value of speed reduction on a given stopping distance or an aimed stop at a prohibiting signal, taking into account the actual conditions of movement (train mass, speed, track profile, etc.).

In the specified device there is no functional ability to control the traction of the locomotive. The operation of locomotive equipment directly depends on the availability, quantity and serviceability of floor devices. The system has a relatively low resistance to failures of locomotive microprocessor equipment.

A known system for controlling the movement of a passenger electric locomotive (USAVP) (RU 2273567 C1, IPC: B60L 15/40 (2006.01), B61L 3/20 (2006.01), which calculates the energy-optimal mode of train movement along the route, generates signals for controlling the locomotive traction and braking trains, which ensures the implementation of the set speed on the basis of the schedule for minimizing energy consumption for traction needs, the set speed of access to places of speed limits, traffic lights requiring a decrease in speed, as well as stops train service brake before the traffic light with the prohibiting signal. In addition, USAVP implemented automatic digital register locomotive operating parameters and the train traffic on a removable nonvolatile storage medium, which provides an opportunity after-recording processing and analysis modes as the trains of reference machinist and automatic driving system.

The disadvantage of the ASAW system is, as in the CLUB, the lack of accuracy in determining the location of the train, especially at the station, as well as the dependence on the operation of other locomotive systems when decoding ALSN signals.

The closest analogue for the CEN is the European train management and safety system ERTMS / ETCS (E. Voyanovsky. Tests of new train control systems under the ERTMS project, World Railways, No. 12, 1998), based on continuous and point-to-point data transfer between outdoor devices and the train, the modular architecture of the on-board computer and intelligent sensors that allow the train to determine its location on the line with high accuracy. This system has three levels that allow you to implement various operational programs, depending on the degree of equipping the line with outdoor equipment. The level 1 system provides control of the speed of the train depending on the data transmitted from the train, generated on the basis of indications of floor signals. The level 2 system is a complete control and safety system for the movement of trains without the use of floor signals, but with the preservation of strict separation of the line into block sections. Outdoor devices determine the location of trains and control their completeness. Level 3 system is a complete control and safety system for train traffic without using floor signals and with moving block sections. The location of the train and the control of its completeness are carried out by airborne means.

These three levels are compatible with each other both functionally and technically, that is, a train equipped with a high-level system can go on a line equipped with a lower-level system. A level 1 or 2 system can be upgraded to level 3 by adding expansion modules. At the same time, for the implementation of levels 2 and 3, special connections are made via radio channels between the train and outdoor equipment, in particular, using the GSM cellular standard.

The main disadvantages of the ERTMS / ETCS system are:

- redundancy of hardware, which consists in the need to equip both loaded and inactive sections of the track with a large number (at each traffic light) of outdoor transceiver and measuring devices to ensure reliable continuous two-way exchange of digital information between them and trains;

- the complex infrastructure of the railway, consisting in the need to build blocking centers on the basis of radio communications to regulate the intervals of passing trains using radio-controlled stationary and mobile block sections;

- the complexity of the functional scheme, which consists in the need to use a special transmission module in the system to ensure the compatibility of the point and continuous ALS.

The aforementioned shortcomings determine the incompatibility of the ERTMS / ETCS system with the existing infrastructure of the Russian Railways, the adaptation of which will be costly and, therefore, the practical impossibility of using this system in conditions of a long network.

The task of the group of inventions is to increase the efficiency and safety level of railway transportation.

The solution to this problem is achieved by the fact that in the method of controlling and ensuring traffic safety, based on the synchronous comparison of the actually measured speed of the train with a given threshold value of the permissible speed for a given coordinate of the location of the train with three functionally independent subsystems (automatic train driving, automatic control of service braking and safety control movement) with the implementation of each of the subsystems of control actions to reduce the speed of movement upon reaching the train speed of a given value for each of the subsystems, in contrast to the prototype, the threshold values of permissible speeds for each subsystem are set from the conditions:

V ₁ <V ₂ <V ₃ <V _B ≤V _P ,

Where:

V ₁ is the threshold value of the permissible speed for the train's automatic driving subsystem;

V ₂ - threshold value of the permissible speed for the subsystem of automatic control of service braking;

V ₃ - threshold value of permissible speed for the traffic safety control subsystem;

V _B , V _P - the limit values for the permissible speed of the train established for a given coordinate of the location of the train, respectively, according to time (including the indications of traffic lights) and constant restrictions,

wherein

V ₂ ≥V ₁ + ΔV ₁ + ΔV ₂ ;

V ₃ ≥V ₂ + ΔV ₂ + ΔV ₃ ,

where ΔV ₁ , ΔV ₂ , ΔV ₃ are, respectively, the values of the error in measuring the current speed of the train by the subsystems of automatic train guidance, automatic control of service braking and traffic safety control.

To implement the method in a single integrated control system and ensure traffic safety of traction rolling stock (CEN), which includes automatic train driving subsystems, automatic service braking control and traffic safety control, as well as separate functional blocks, including a system of track and speed sensors, automatic receiving devices locomotive alarm and satellite navigation system, locomotive equipment troubleshooting device, sensor system eniya in basic units of the locomotive pneumatic braking system, the driver's wakefulness control device, the engineer visualize information and device information registration device of the locomotive and the train of equipment situation nonvolatile memory, unlike the prototype, subsystems and functional blocks connected in parallel CAN-system-wide interface. At the same time, each subsystem is equipped with an electronic database of its own threshold values of the permissible speed according to the coordinate of the train’s movement, and the driver’s wakefulness control device is interactive with nodes of the physiological control and registration of the driver’s train control actions with the possibility of controlling the output via the system-wide CAN interface to the automatic subsystem service braking control.

The combination of the automatic train management subsystems, automatic service braking control and traffic safety control systems (USAWP, SAUT and CLUB) at the basis of the CEN allows, with integrated work, to fully compensate for the above-mentioned drawbacks of these systems, which are manifested during their autonomous operation on the locomotive.

The drawing shows a schematic diagram of the CEN.

CEN includes the automatic driving subsystem of train 1, which can be used, for example, the unified system of USAWP, the automatic service braking control subsystem 2, which can be used, for example, the SAUT-TsM system, traffic safety control subsystem 3, for which can be used, for example, a CLUB-U locomotive device, a fault detection device (HCV) 4, an interactive device for intelligent wakefulness monitoring of a driver 5, including a physical Logic control (UFC) 6, which can be used, for example, the telemechanical system of monitoring the wake of the driver (TSKBM), and the registration unit of the control actions of the train driver (URU) 7, two interactive devices for visualizing information 8, one in each the driver’s cab, each of which contains a color graphical LCD display and a display device and safe manual input of critical information BIL-CEN, a system-wide high-speed CAN interface (CAN-250) 9, combining all subscription emy, devices and units CEN system and providing the exchange of digital information between them and transmitting the control commands, the registration unit (EQ) 10 in real time, the entire digital information circulating in CAN-interface on nonvolatile media SD. As a UR, for example, a train motion recorder (RPDA) can be used. CEN also includes a system of track and speed sensors (DPS) 11, a receiver for automatic locomotive signaling (PU ALS) 12, a receiver for a satellite navigation system (PU SNA) 13, a system of pressure sensors (DD) 14 in the main units of the pneumatic brake system of a locomotive .

CEN works as follows.

During the movement of the train, the system-wide CAN interface 9 continuously receives data from the DPS sensors 11. Upon receipt of this data in the automatic driving subsystems of the train 1, automatic service braking control 2, and traffic safety control 3, the actual speed and the distance traveled from the moment are determined the beginning of the movement, on the basis of which the coordinate reference is made to the electronic map of the movement section embedded in the subsystems 1-3, and the current coordinate of the train is determined. Using PU SNA 13, an additional refinement of the coordinates of the train. The system also receives continuously data from DD 14 and PU ALS 12, based on which the system selects the control modes of the train. Each of subsystems 1-3 performs analysis of incoming information, processing in accordance with the laid down algorithms, and generating control actions on the braking devices of the locomotive and its traction equipment. The subsystem operation algorithms are coordinated in such a way that simultaneous transmission of control commands from various subsystems is excluded. Commands for traction current control (dialing and resetting the positions of the main controller) are issued only by train auto-subsystem 1. If it is necessary to reduce braking speed, for example, when the maximum permissible speed is reached, the train auto-subsystem initiates a control action on the locomotive braking system that provides service braking. In case of failure of the auto-driving system in the implementation of such an impact, the service braking control is intercepted by the automatic service braking control subsystem 2. If the service braking is insufficient, the braking control process is intercepted by the traffic safety control subsystem 3, as a result of the control action of which the voltage is removed from the EPC coils and emergency braking of the train is initiated . The information necessary for the driver to guide the train is displayed to the driver through an interactive information visualization device 8. During the operation of the system, dangerous malfunctions of the traction, braking and auxiliary equipment of the locomotive, railway track and interval control devices that can lead to traffic safety violations are automatically detected. The IOC informs the driver by issuing messages to the operator about the occurrence of malfunctions or operating modes of equipment that threaten the safety of the train, on the basis of which the driver can take timely measures to prevent negative consequences. The device of intelligent wakefulness control performs physiological control of the wakefulness of the driver using UFK 6, which controls the level of the skin-galvanic reaction of the driver (RAG), and also, using the URU 7, controls the presence of the driver’s control actions for the train, which, for example, control the handle of the controller, crane operator, sand, sound signal. With a decrease in RAG, but with active train control actions, as well as in the absence of actions, but a high level of RAG, the system does not issue requests for confirmation of wakefulness. In the case of a low level of RAG and the absence of control actions, the system issues a request for confirmation of wakefulness, in the absence of a response to this request, it initiates service braking of the train.

The CEN mutual coordination of subsystems 1, automatic driving, automatic braking control office 2 and 3 control traffic safety is ensured diversity threshold setting allowable train speed constant at V _P and V _The time constraints. Thus, the construction of databases provides for the separation of threshold values of their permissible speeds in such a way that for each coordinate of the train’s movement the following relation holds:

V ₁ <V ₂ <V ₃ <V _B ≤V _P ,

Where:

V ₁ - the threshold value of the permissible speed in the auto-driving subsystem, generated from the database of this subsystem taking into account constant, temporary speed limits, and also taking into account speed limits for non-green readings of the ALS and speed limits corresponding to the current coordinates of the acceleration or deceleration trajectories that line up a subsystem when switching from one permissible speed to another or when making an aim stop;

V ₂ is the threshold value of the permissible speed in the subsystem of automatic control of service braking, generated from the database of this subsystem taking into account constant speed limits, and also taking into account speed limits for non-green readings of the ALS and speed limits corresponding to the current coordinates of the braking paths that are built by the subsystem when switching from one permissible speed to another or when making an aim stop;

V ₃ is the threshold value of the permissible speed in the traffic safety control subsystem, generated from the database of this subsystem taking into account constant speed limits, and also taking into account speed limits for non-green ALS readings and speed limits corresponding to the current coordinates of the braking trajectory that is built by the subsystem when transition from one permissible speed to another, or during a stop.

V _B , V _P - the limit values for the permissible speed of the train set for a given coordinate of the location of the train, respectively, according to temporary and permanent restrictions, including speed limits according to the indications of traffic lights.

Wherein

V ₂ ≥V ₁ + ΔV ₁ + ΔV ₂ ;

V ₃ ≥V ₂ + ΔV ₂ + ΔV ₃ ,

where ΔV _1, ΔV ₂ , ΔV ₃ are, respectively, the error values of the measurement of the current speed of the train by the subsystems of automatic train driving, automatic control of service braking and safety control of the train.

In the practical implementation of the TSA, the following dependencies of threshold values of permissible speeds are established:

V ₂ = V ₁ +2 km / h;

V ₃ = V ₁ +5 km / h.

The stated ratios are valid both when driving at a constant speed, and when moving from one speed to another, including the braking speed. Thus, with the correct operation of all subsystems, the TSA provides independent construction of the paths of permissible speeds in all modes of train movement. So, with the correct operation of subsystems 1-3, the value of the permissible speed, which is the lowest, that is, V ₁ , is in demand. While a working subsystem 1 ensures that the permissible speed is not exceeded, the CEN does not perceive an increase in speed through other subsystems, therefore, a dangerous failure condition does not occur.

Since the subsystems from the standpoint of not exceeding the permissible speed work independently, this reasoning remains valid in relation to other subsystems. For example, if, during proper operation of the subsystem for automatic control of service braking 2, subsystems 1 and 3 fail, the maximum speed will be exceeded by this particular subsystem.

The possibility of a dangerous failure in the CEN by exceeding the permissible speed is only possible if all three subsystems fail in any sequence during the considered time interval. Since the probability of such an event is equal to the probability of the simultaneous occurrence of three events, that is, the product of the probabilities of each of them, it is significantly less than the smallest of these values, which is the probability of failure of the security control subsystem.

In addition, the case of a dangerous event consisting in the passage of a protective failure by a subsystem at a threshold value of the permissible speed and the departure of this subsystem into a dangerous failure (for example, for a CLUB-Us device with an intensity of λ = 10 ^-11 1 / h) will remain for the CEN unnoticed when the other two subsystems (or any of them) are working properly, which is achieved by monitoring the TSE threshold values of permissible speeds for each of the subsystems according to the ratio stated in the claims.

CEN implements the principle of unity of control and ensuring traffic safety and is built on the basis of combining at the software interface level three functionally independent, but mutually coordinated according to the conditions for the formation of control actions: the train auto-subsystem, the automatic service braking control subsystem and the traffic safety control subsystem.

Implementation of the claimed combination of features of the formula ensures the achievement of a number of technical results: a safe increase in the technical speed of trains, which helps to increase the degree of utilization of the capacity of the loaded sections of the railway network, ensuring accurate execution of the traffic schedule, if necessary, energy-optimal surge within the permissible speed values, while safe the implementation of the self-diagnosis system and intelligent wakefulness control of the machine NIST.

Thus, the solution of the problem posed by the invention is achieved: increasing the efficiency and level of safety of rail transportation.

Claims (2)

1. A method for controlling and ensuring the safety of the movement of traction rolling stock, including monitoring the speed of the functionally independent subsystems of automatic train guidance, automatic control of service braking and monitoring traffic safety, synchronously comparing the measured current speed of the train with the threshold speed value for the given coordinate of the location of the train for each of the subsystems and when the speed of the train reaches the set value, the translation subsystem s into a control mode for speed reduction, characterized in that the permissible threshold values for each speed sub set of conditions:
V ₁ <V ₂ <V ₃ <V _B ≤V _P ,
where V ₁ is the threshold value of the permissible speed for the train’s automatic driving subsystem;
V ₂ - threshold value of the permissible speed for the subsystem of automatic control of service braking;
V ₃ - threshold value of permissible speed for the traffic safety control subsystem;
V _B , V _P - the limit values for the permissible speed of the train set for a given coordinate of the location of the train, respectively, according to time and constant restrictions, including speed limits according to the indications of traffic lights,
wherein V ₂ ≥V ₁ + ΔV ₁ + ΔV ₂ ;
V ₃ ≥V ₂ + ΔV ₂ + ΔV ₃ , where ΔV ₁ , ΔV ₂ , ΔV ₃ are, respectively, the values of the error in measuring the current speed of the train by the subsystems of automatic train guidance, automatic control of service braking and traffic safety control. 2. A unified integrated control and safety system for traction rolling stock (CEN), including subsystems for automatic train guidance, automatic control of service braking and traffic safety control, as well as separate functional units, including a system of track and speed sensors, receiving devices for automatic locomotive signaling and satellite navigation system, locomotive equipment troubleshooting device, pressure sensor system in the main aggregates axle of the pneumatic brake system of a locomotive, a driver’s wakefulness control device, a driver’s information visualization device and a non-volatile memory information recording device, characterized in that the subsystems and function blocks are connected by a system-wide CAN interface, each subsystem having an electronic database of its own threshold values for the allowed speed according to the coordinate of the train’s movement, and the driver’s wakefulness control device is interactive with physiological nodes eskogo control and monitoring control driver actions on the train with the possibility of conducting exposure through a system-wide CAN-interface subsystem automatic service brake control.