RU2151714C1 - Flight safety system for manned flying vehicle - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: safety systems of manned flying vehicles. SUBSTANCE: proposed system includes position and motion parameter meter and technical state parameter meter of flying vehicle; position parameter meter of control, indication and warning units; autopilot which are connected in unit for determination of present dangerous factors; safety system includes also control complexity index shaper and control command shaper, motion parameter present limitation shaper, automatic control mode shaper, automatic control operating condition shaper and control signal shaper; motion parameter present limitation shaper is made for taking into account technical state of manned flying vehicle; automatic control operating condition shaper and control signal shaper are used for prevention of motion parameter limitation and for taking into account technical state of manned flying vehicle. EFFECT: avoidance of critical modes of flight by means of control means. 1 dwg, 2 tbl

Description

 The field of technology.

 The invention relates to signaling and control means for a wide class of human-machine systems, including for manned mobile objects such as watercraft, submarines and aircraft, spacecraft, etc.

 The prior art.

 Accidents, as a rule, are the result of complex and emergency situations caused by malfunctions of the facility and its systems, external influences and errors of the human operator, as a rule, in conditions of insufficient time to make a decision. The difficulty of making decisions in such situations, hereinafter referred to as special, is determined by the large amount of information that needs to be processed in a short time, and by the large, reaching tens of thousands, number of possible special situations.

 An analysis of the materials of the investigation of aircraft accidents of domestic civil aircraft with gas turbine engines of grades 1-3 over the past 10 years shows that most of them (84%) occurred as a result of deviations from the norm in the crew's work to maintain flight parameters and work with aircraft systems.

 In such situations, it is necessary to prevent the manned aircraft from reaching critical operating modes by providing timely assistance to the crew in deciding how to counter the current situation, and if the crew does not fulfill the commands prescribed to it, then preventing the manned aircraft from reaching critical operating modes using automation management. Critical operating modes are understood as modes leading to a complete or partial loss by the system of its functions, or loss of an object, or loss of an object and the death of a crew.

 A known system of semi-automatic control of the aircraft, which measures the parameters of the position and movement of the aircraft, the parameters of the technical condition of the aircraft, the parameters of the position of the aircraft controls (Dobrolensky Yu. P. et al. Methods of engineering and psychological research in aviation. - M.: Mechanical Engineering, 1975 ., p. 34). The system generates command signals that are received by the command device and are used to control the aircraft in certain modes: stabilization of altitude, speed, etc.

 A control device is known for preventing the loss of consciousness of a pilot by limiting the magnitude and duration of an overload. In this device, the parameters of the movement and the position of the aircraft are measured and control signals are generated to prevent the aircraft parameters from exceeding restrictions (US Patent N 4821982, MKI B 64 C 13/16 NKI 244-76K).

 A known warning system for critical conditions of a manned aircraft, comprising a meter for the position and motion parameters of the manned aircraft, a meter for the technical condition of the manned aircraft, a meter for the position of the controls of the manned aircraft, indicators and alarms, autopilot, a unit for determining current dangerous factors the inputs of which are connected to a meter of position parameters and navigation of a manned aircraft, a meter of the technical condition of the manned aircraft, a meter of the position parameters of the controls of the manned aircraft, a control complexity indicator and a control command generator, the second input of which is connected to the second output of the control complexity indicator, and the output - with indicators and signaling (Patent RU 2114456 C1, IPC G 05 B 13/00 G 05 D 1/00).

 This system does not solve the problem of preventing a manned aircraft from reaching critical conditions in cases when the crew for some reason does not fulfill the commands prescribed to it.

 SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

 The basis of the invention is the solution to the problem of ensuring flight safety by preventing the manned aircraft from reaching critical flight modes using control automation.

 This goal is achieved by the fact that in the flight safety system of a manned aircraft containing a meter for the position and movement parameters of the manned aircraft, a meter for the technical condition of the manned aircraft, a meter for the position of the controls of the manned aircraft, indicators and alarms, autopilot, sequentially connected unit for determining current hazardous factors, the inputs of which are connected to measure by the parameters of the position and motion of the manned aircraft, the meter of the parameters of the technical condition of the manned aircraft, the meter of the parameters of the controls of the manned aircraft, the driver of the control difficulty indicator and the driver of control commands, the second input of which is connected to the second output of the driver of the control difficulty indicator, and the output is with indicators and alarms, the driver of the current restrictions of the parameters is introduced I, the shaper of automatic control modes, the shaper of automatic control response conditions and the shaper of control signals, the inputs of which are connected to the shaper of automatic control modes, the shaper of current restrictions of the motion parameters, the shaper of automatic control response conditions and the meter of the position and movement parameters of the manned aircraft, and the output is with autopilot, and the input of the shaper of the current restrictions of the motion parameters is connected n with a unit for determining current hazardous factors, and the output with a conditioner of automatic control operation, the other inputs of which are connected to a conditioner of automatic control and a measurer of the position and movement of the manned aircraft, the input of the conditioner of automatic control is connected to the conditioner of control commands, the shaper of the current restrictions of the diameters of the movement is made with the possibility of taking into account the technical condition of the manned aircraft apparatus shaper triggering conditions and automatic control of the control signal generator configured to prevent release movement parameters manned aircraft restrictions and technical state of the account of the manned aircraft.

 Information confirming the possibility of carrying out the invention.

 The possibility of carrying out the invention is illustrated by the example of a flight safety system for a transport aircraft. This example should not be construed either as limiting the scope of the invention, or as the preferred form of its implementation for all cases.

 The block diagram of the device shown in the drawing.

 The system includes a meter for the parameters of the position and movement of the manned aircraft 1, a meter for the technical conditions of the manned aircraft 2, a meter for the parameters of the controls of the manned aircraft 3, indicators and signaling 4, autopilot 5, unit 6 for determining current hazardous factors, a shaper of complexity indicator control 7, shaper of control commands 8, shaper of current restrictions of motion parameters 9, shaper of modes automatic manual control 10, the driver of the operating conditions of the automatic control 11 and the driver of the control signals 12.

 Block 1 may include airborne sensors for flight information of altitude, speed, pitch, roll, heading and attack, angular velocity, overload, etc., as well as airborne sensors for the position and movement of the aircraft (aircraft) relative to external objects (airfields, goals, etc.) (not shown).

 Block 2 may include airborne health sensors for aircraft systems; power plant, hydraulic systems, control systems, etc. (not shown).

 Block 3 may include position sensors: aircraft control knobs, engine control knobs, chassis, etc. (not shown).

 Block 4 may include an indicator and a voice informant, for example, Colling firms either Sextant or Honeywel 1 (not shown).

 Blocks 6-12 are computers based, for example, on a processor such as Intel 276 or Intel 376.

 Block 6 contains a shaper 13 of time reserves until the parameters of the aircraft motion are limited, block 14 of the memory of the reference values of the parameters of the position and movement of the aircraft, the first comparator 15, a recorder 16 of the current reference values of the parameters of the position and movement of the aircraft, the block 17 of the memory of the reference values of the parameters of the technical condition of the aircraft , the second comparator 18, the registrar 19 of the current reference values of the parameters of the technical condition of the aircraft, block 20 memory reference values of the position parameters of the controls of the aircraft, the third comparator 21, the registrar 22 of the current reference parameters of the position of the aircraft controls, the memory block 23 of the reference values of the time reserves until the parameters of the aircraft movement to restrictions, the fourth comparator 24, the registrar 25 of the current reference values of the reserves of the time until the parameters of the aircraft movement to the restrictions, block 26 of hazardous factors memory, fifth comparator 27, block 28 of storing current hazardous factors.

 Block 7 contains a block 29 of the memory of a priori probabilities of a crew error, a block 30 of memory of the conditional probabilities of a crew error under the action of each hazard factor, provided the hypothesis about the possibility of a crew error is false and true, and a calculator 31 of the control complexity index.

 Block 8 contains a block 32 of the memory threshold values of the increments of the probability of error of the crew, a block 33 of the memory of the controls, a shaper 34 of the threshold value for the magnitude of the increment of the probability of error of the crew and the calculator 35 of the control signal for translating the manned aircraft into a state characterized by an acceptable level of indicator of complexity of control.

 Block 9 contains a memory block of restrictions of motion parameters and controls 36, a fifth comparator 37 and a registrar of current restrictions of motion parameters and controls 38.

 Block 10 comprises a memory block for motion control commands 39, a sixth comparator 40, and an automatic control mode recorder 41.

 Blocks 14.15, 16 are connected in series. The second input of block 15 is connected to the output of block 1, which is also connected to the input of block 13. Blocks 17,18,19 are connected in series. The second input of block 18 is connected to block 2. Blocks 20,21,22 are connected in series, the second input of block 21 is connected to block 3. Blocks 23,24,25 are connected in series. The second input of block 24 is connected to block 13. Blocks 26,27,28 are connected in series. Other inputs of block 27 are connected to blocks 16,19,22,25. The output of block 28 is connected to the inputs of the blocks 37,29,30,31. The other inputs of block 31 are connected to blocks 29.30. The inputs of block 35 are connected to blocks 33.34 and the second output of block 31. The first output of block 35 is connected to blocks 4.40, the second output to block 33. The inputs of block 34 are connected to the first output of block 31 and block 32. The output of block 36 is connected with blocks of 37.38. The second input of block 38 is connected to block 37. The output of block 38 is connected to the first input of block 11 and the second input of block 12. Block 39 is connected to block 40, the output of which is connected to block 41. The output of block 41 is connected to the first input of block 12 and the second input block 11, the output of which is connected to the third input of block 12. The output of block 1 is connected to the third input of block 11 and the fourth input of block 12, the output of which is connected to block 5.

 The following describes the operation of the device in relation to aircraft control. Block 1 measures the parameters of the position and movement of the aircraft: altitude, velocity components, pitch, roll, attack course, acceleration components, angular velocity components, etc.

 Block 2 determines the parameters of the technical condition of the aircraft: condition of engines, serviceability of hydraulic systems, control systems, etc., the presence of fire, icing, etc.

 Block 3 measures the position parameters of the aircraft controls: + aircraft control knobs, engine control knobs, rudder pedals, landing gear release knobs, flaps, etc.

 In block 13, the reserves of time until the parameters of the movement of the aircraft reach the specified limits are calculated: height, speed, overload, angle of attack, etc.

где A_гр - заданные граничные значения параметра А;
A' - скорость изменения параметра А (в случае, если А' не измеряется, она вычисляется в блоке по измеряемым параметрам).The time reserve is calculated by the formula:

where A _gr - the specified boundary values of the parameter A;
A 'is the rate of change of parameter A (in case A' is not measured, it is calculated in the block according to the measured parameters).

где H_оп - значение опасной высоты,
H_т - измеренное значение высоты,
V_y - вертикальная скорость.For example, for flight altitude

where H _op - the value of the dangerous height,
H _t - the measured value of the height,
V _y - vertical speed.

 Block 14 stores reference values of a number of parameters of the position and movement of the aircraft, such as altitude, speed, roll angle, etc.

 For example: for the roll, the reference values are: (Г0, Г1) = [0.30] deg., (Г1, Г2) = [30.45] deg., (Г3, Г4) = [45.70,] deg.

 for height (Н0, Н1) = [0,100] m, (H1, H2) = [100,600] m.

 In block 15, the current value of the parameter from block 1 is compared with its reference value from block 14 and the current reference value is generated, which enters block 16, where it is stored.

For example: at 30 degrees. >> 0 deg. tech.op is equal to (G0, G1);
at 100 <Н <600 Ntek.op is equal to (Н1, Н2).

 Block 17 stores reference values of a number of parameters of the technical condition of the manned aircraft.

 For example, for engines, the following signals are used as reference values: 1st engine off (D1), 2nd engine off (D2), etc.

 In block 18, a comparison is made of the technical state parameters from block 2 with the reference values from block 17 and the formation of the current reference values that enter block 19.

 For example, when the 1st motor is turned off, the current reference value (Dtec reference) is equal to D1.

 Block 20 stores reference values of the position parameters of the controls of the manned aircraft.

 In block 21, the measured position parameters of the controls of the manned aircraft from block 3 are compared with their reference values from block 20 and the current reference values of the parameters of the position of the controls of the manned aircraft are generated, which are received in block 22, where they are stored. For example, if the chassis is retracted, the current reference value of the chassis is W1.

 Block 23 stores reference values of the time reserves.

 For example, for the reserve of time in height (Tn), the reference values are: (Tn0, Tn1) = [0.1] s, (Tn1, Tn2) = (1.3) s (Tn2, Tn3) = (3.5) sec

In block 24, the current values of the time reserves are compared with the reference values and the current reference values of the time reserves are formed. For example, for the flight altitude, if the current value of the reserve time and altitude are less than 5 seconds and more than 3 seconds, then it is written as:
Tn tech.op = (Tn2, Tn3).

 In block 25, the current reference values of the time reserves of the motion parameters of the manned aircraft are stored.

 Block 26 stores the parameters characterizing the dangerous factors of the "crew - manned aircraft" system.

A hazardous factor is such a combination of reference values of the state parameters of a manned aircraft that represents a certain control complexity (danger). For example, the flight altitude is less than six hundred meters, and the landing gear is retracted, and one engine fails, then this dangerous factor has the form:
OF1- (N1N2, D1Sh1)
where H1H2 is the reference height value corresponding to the interval 100 <H <600;
D1 - reference value of the state of the engine corresponding to the shutdown of the left engine,
Ш1 - reference value of the state of the chassis corresponding to the position of the chassis removed.

If the engine control knob is not set to stop when you climb and turn off one engine, this is also a dangerous factor:
OF2 = (Н1Н2, Ш1, Д1, РД11),
where RD11 is the reference value of the position of the ORE of the 1st engine, corresponding to any position of the ORE, except for the stop position.

If during the climb, the height is less than 600 meters, the chassis is retracted and the vertical speed is less than the required climb speed, or it is the reduction speed (V _y <0), then this is also a dangerous factor:
OF3 = (Н1Н2, V _yo , Ш1)
where V _yo is the reference value of the vertical velocity corresponding to the interval V _y <V _yo .

If there is an effect of all these factors, then the current flight situation (TPN1) has the form:
TPS1- (H1H2, Sh1, D1, RD11, V _yo ).

 In block 27, the current reference values of the parameters coming from blocks 16,19,22,25 are compared with the parameters characterizing the dangerous factors and stored in block 22, and the parameters characterizing the current dangerous factors are highlighted.

 In this example, these are OF1, OF2, OFZ. The specified parameters (current hazardous factors) are received in the storage unit 28, where they are stored.

The memory unit 29 stores a priori values of the probabilities of crew error. For the climb stage, the indicated value determined by the expert is equal to
Rno.

 The memory unit 30 also stores the values of the conditional probabilities of the crew error determined by experts under the action of each dangerous factor of the crew-manned aircraft system, provided the truth (Re / n) or falsity (Re / n) hypotheses about the possibility of a crew error.

 For the hazards considered in the example, these probabilities are summarized in table 1.

 Calculator 31 calculates the posterior probability of crew error in a flight situation characterized by current hazard factors using the Bayes formula.

The following calculations are performed:
- primary ranking of current hazards by calculating the difference
ΔP ⁱ = P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{i}}{\text{e / n}}$ -P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{i}}{\text{e / nen}}$ ; (1)
where i is the number of the hazard factor.

где i=1-N - номер в приоритетной последовательности, P_н/е ^o=P_но.For the considered example, the priority sequence has the form:
OF3, OF1, OF2 (P3>P1>P2);
- calculation of the posterior probability of crew error for each current hazard in a priority sequence, and the posterior probability at the current step is used as a priori at the next:

where i = 1-N is the number in the priority sequence, P _{n / e} ^o = P _but .

 For the considered example, Rn / e2> Rn / e1> Rn / e3.

The value of the posterior probability of crew error at the Nth step (i = N), where N is equal to the number of hazardous factors, characterizes the probability of crew error in a given flight situation, and an indicator of control complexity, for the considered example
Pn / e = Pn / e2.

From block 31 are issued:
- in block 34 - an indicator of the complexity of management (1st exit);
in block 35 - the values of the posterior probability of crew error for each current hazard in the initial ranking sequence (2nd exit).

 The memory unit 32 stores threshold values for increments of the probability of crew error (U32-1, U32-2, U32-3, U32-4) and their corresponding levels (U32-11, U32-21, U32-31, U32-41 ) that enter block 34.

The memory unit 33 stores commands for all dangerous factors. For these dangerous factors, the teams have the following form:
for the first dangerous factor, the team is missing,
for the second hazard factor - ORE TO STOP,
for the third hazard - STOP REDUCING.

 From block 33 to block 35 commands are issued corresponding to significant hazardous factors, the numbers of which are received in block 33 from block 35.

In block 34, a threshold value is generated for the increment of the probability of crew error (P n2), which enters block 35 in the form of a step function of the magnitude of the control complexity indicator received from the first output of block 31 (Table 2), and the value of "steps" set from the output of block 32:
Pn 2 = U32-i with Pn / e <U32-i1, where i = 1-4. (3)
In block 35, the formation of teams entering block 4. is carried out. The following calculations are carried out:
- secondary ranking of current hazardous factors by calculating and storing the increment of the probability of crew error for each current hazardous factor by signals from the second output of block 31, in the form:
▽ P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{i}}{\text{n / e}}$ = P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{i}}{\text{n / e}}$ -P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{j}}{\text{n / e}}$ (4)
where i is the number of the current hazard;
j is the number of the previous hazard factor determined by (formula (1),
for the first priority hazard factor, the increment value is calculated with respect to the a priori value of the probability of crew error:
▽ P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{i}}{\text{n / e}}$ = P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{i}}{\text{n / e}}$ -P _but ;
where i is the number of the first dangerous factor in priority.

For this example, Pi are given in table. 1. The priority sequence according to the results of the secondary ranking is: OFZ, OF1, OF2,
since ▽ P3> ▽ P1> ▽ P2, since Pn / e <U30-31, then Pn2-U30-3;
- the identification of the numbers of significant hazardous factors is carried out by comparing the obtained increments of the probability of crew error for each hazardous factor (▽ P _{n / e} ) with the threshold value (Рн2) from block 34, for significant hazardous factors, the increment of the probability of crew error must exceed the specified threshold value , the indicated numbers of hazardous factors (2nd output of block 35) are issued in block 33.

 In this example, the third dangerous factor (OFZ) is significant.

▽ P ₃ = ▽ P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{3}}{\text{n / e}}$ > P _n2 .
- the formation of teams for issuance to block 4 is carried out by organizing a sequence of commands received from block 33, the priority of which is determined by the results of the secondary ranking.

 In this example, this is the command corresponding to the third dangerous factor: “stop the decline”.

From block 35 are issued:
- into blocks 4.40 of the control command in the secondary ranking sequence (1st exit);
- in block 33, the numbers of hazardous factors for which the increment in the probability of crew error exceeds the threshold level (2nd exit).

In block 36, the values of the restrictions on the parameters of the motion of the airplane’s controls are stored, for example, longitudinal N _X and vertical N _y overloads, angle of attack, flight speed, etc. The indicated values of restrictions are ordered in accordance with the dangerous factors characterizing the technical condition of the aircraft, so that the dangerous factor characterizing a certain technical condition corresponds to the restriction caused by it. For example, longitudinal overload limitations correspond to engine failure, hydraulic system malfunctions correspond to limits of angle of attack and maximum speed, etc.

 In block 37, the numbers of the current hazardous factors are compared with the numbers of the restriction values corresponding to the hazardous factors characterizing the technical condition of the aircraft, and in block 38, the numbers of the restriction values corresponding to the current hazardous factors characterizing the technical state of the airplane are issued.

 In block 38, the values of the restrictions corresponding to the current hazardous factors characterizing the technical condition of the aircraft are stored.

 In block 39, the motion control commands of the manned aircraft are stored.

 In block 40, the movement control commands of the manned aircraft from block 39 are compared with the first command from block 35. If the first command from block 35 matches one of the commands stored in block 39, it goes to block 41, where it is stored.

 In the example under consideration, this is the “stop descent” command corresponding to the “dangerous altitude withdrawal” automatic control mode.

In block 11, the conditions for switching on the automatic control mode are set, which is set from block 41. The conditions for switching on for the automatic control mode "withdrawal from a dangerous height" have the form:
H _SW = H _op + T • H;
where H _SW - the height of the automatic control mode "withdrawal from a dangerous height";
H is the approach speed;
H _op - dangerous altitude, set depending on the flight mode from block 1;
T is the lead time, set depending on the flight mode and current restrictions from block 38.

 In block 12, the airplane control signals are generated in the longitudinal and lateral channels, as well as the power plant control signals received by the autopilot 5, in accordance with the control mode from block 41 and the restrictions from block 38.

In this example, this is a longitudinal motion control signal in the form of stabilization of a given pitch:
U = i ₁ • (ϑ ₃ -ϑ),
where i ₁ is a coefficient depending on the flight mode from block 1;
ϑ ₃ - given pitch depending on the current restrictions from block 38;
ϑ - current pitch,
and a control signal of the traction machine in the form of stabilization of a given speed;
U = i ₂ • (V _ass -V),
where i ₂ is a coefficient depending on the flight mode from block 1;
V _ass - a given speed depending on the current restrictions from block 38;
V is the current speed.

 The semi-natural modeling of the proposed system as applied to a light aircraft (40 t) at the stages of climb, route flight, orbital maneuvering under the conditions of single and group failures showed the possibility of reducing the accident rate due to crew errors by 1.5-2 times.

Claims (1)

 A safety system for the flight of a manned aircraft, comprising a meter for the position and movement of the manned aircraft, a meter for the technical condition of the manned aircraft, a meter for the parameters of the controls of the manned aircraft, indicators and alarms, an autopilot, a unit for determining current hazardous factors, connected in series the inputs of which are connected to a meter measuring the position and movement of the saws of a controlled aircraft, a measuring instrument of the technical condition of the manned flying vehicle, a measuring instrument of the position parameters of the controls of the manned aircraft, a control complexity indicator and a control command generator, the second input of which is connected to the second output of the control complexity indicator, and the output - with indicators and signaling , characterized in that the shaper of current restrictions of the motion parameters is introduced into it, form spruce of automatic control modes, driver of automatic control response conditions and driver of control signals, the inputs of which are connected to the driver of the current restrictions of the motion parameters, driver of automatic control modes, driver of the automatic control response conditions and measuring device of the position and movement parameters of the manned aircraft, and the output with autopilot moreover, the input of the driver of the current restrictions of the motion parameters is connected to the block the formation of current hazardous factors, and the output is with a conditioner of automatic control operation, the other inputs of which are connected to a conditioner of automatic control and a measurer of the position and movement of the manned aircraft, the input of the conditioner of automatic control is connected to the conditioner of control commands, and the current conditioner movement parameters made with the possibility of taking into account the technical condition of the manned aircraft, f rmirovatel conditions triggering automatic control and driver control signals are configured to prevent release movement parameters manned aircraft restrictions and technical state of the account of the manned aircraft.

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