RU2541902C2 - Intelligent system of crew support - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: measurement equipment.

SUBSTANCE: intelligent crew support system (ICSS) relates to the field of onboard equipment, is designed for installation on aircrafts (AC) and may be used for functional diagnostics of technical condition of aviation equipment. The intelligent crew support system comprises sensors of condition of motors, fuel system, hydraulic system, power supply system, undercarriage activation and braking system, anti-icing system, fire safety system, air signals system (ASS), satellite navigation system (SNS), inertial navigation system (INS), radio altimeter (RA), instrumental landing system (ILS), wheel steering system (WSS), connected in parallel with board information collection system (BICS), information display system (IDS), emergency situations recognition unit (ESRU), takeoff roll monitoring system (TRMS), ground proximity system (GPS), hazardous angle-of-attack and overload points reaching warning system (HAAOPRWS), approach and landing monitoring system (ALMS) and wind shear warning system (WSWS).

EFFECT: increased safety of AC flight by reduction of emergency situation level.

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Description

The invention relates to the field of on-board equipment, is intended for installation on aircraft (LA) and can be used for functional diagnosis of the technical condition of aircraft equipment.

State of the art

Known automated highly intelligent flight safety system of the aircraft of the Russian Federation patent No. 2388663, V64D 47/00, 2009, Berestov L.M., Kharin E.G., Yakushev A.F. etc., which contains a full-time control system for the aircraft, connected to the sensors of the state of the on-board systems, a block for predicting the movement of the aircraft for time t °, connected with the output to the unit for determining catastrophic situations (CS), a calculator of motion parameters (VPD) of the aircraft, connected with the output with inputs a block for determining flight modes, a block for predicting the movement of an aircraft for time t °, a switch made by a threshold, a block for comparison, a block for returning to the initial flight mode associated with the VPD, a first expert system (ES) made with a block for determining the field modes a connected to the knowledge base (KB) according to the characteristics of the flight modes of the aircraft, the second ES made with a block for selecting the mathematical model of flight of the aircraft, connected to the KB according to the mathematical models of flight of the aircraft and VPD, the third ES made with the block for predicting the movement of the aircraft, determination unit CS connected to the control unit for critical parameter control and the control unit connected to the control unit in series with the motion prediction unit to prevent the control unit, a comparison unit, a unit for determining the moment of blocking of the standard control system of the aircraft, the fourth ES made with the control unit I, according to the conclusion from the CS connected to the BZ output by the type of control from the CS, the unit for determining approximation to operational limitations, connected to the BZ according to operational limitations, connected by its input to the output of the aircraft motion forecast block, and the BZ to control the prevention of exceeding the bounds with a unit for forming a hint to the crew, the second input of which is connected to a unit for determining approximation to operational limitations, and the output is with an indicator on the dashboard, reference characteristics and tolerances (ZECD), f adjuster of reference control actions (FEUV), generator of a predetermined control program (FZPU), generator of tolerance limits of predetermined reference characteristics (FGDZEH), distribution block, comparison unit, logical unit, digital map of terrain, information storage device, input connected to the output of the VPD, outputs which are connected to the digital terrain map block and the distribution block, the outputs of which are connected to the inputs of the ZEHD, FEUV, FZPU, FGDZEH, and their outputs are connected to the four inputs of the comparison block, the fifth input which is connected to the output of the digital terrain map block, and the output to the logic block, the outputs of which are connected to the input of the flight mode determination unit and the indicator input on the dashboard.

However, this system of implementing tips to the crew to prevent the adverse development of a special situation that could result in an accident requires a complex decision-making system and heuristic approaches to choose the optimal way to localize a special situation. The system does not significantly improve the flight safety level of an aircraft in case of special situations caused by failures of the aircraft system and components and erroneous crew actions.

There is a known support system for crew in dangerous situations RF patent №2128854, 6С05D 1/00, 1987, Berestov L.M., Kharin E.G., Yakushev A.F. etc., taken as a prototype, which contains a state sensor for engines, fuel system, hydraulic system, power supply system, helm control system, landing gear and braking system, life support system, anti-icing system, fire system, aircraft configuration state recognition unit, mode recognition unit flight, an analyzer of the state of flight and navigation equipment, an analyzer of the state of aircraft equipment, an emergency recognition unit, a state forecast unit, consisting of and related blocks of modeling the dynamics of the aircraft and the knowledge base (KB) of the development of emergency situations (AS), related to each other, the characteristics of the AS and the KB of preventing AC, a calculator for making decisions on preventing AC, an analyzer for correct actions to prevent AC, a calculator for making decisions about switching to automatic control, warning block about the violation of the correctness of actions.

However, this system does not allow increasing the flight safety level of an aircraft in case of special situations caused by a failure of the aircraft systems and components and erroneous crew actions due to the absence of systems on the aircraft that provide the crew with signals of approaching the maximum permissible flight values, which is a crew for the crew to perform corrective actions to prevent reaching critical flight mode.

The technical result to which the invention is directed is to increase flight safety by reducing the level of emergency situations caused by the human factor, functional failures and external influences.

Salient features

To achieve a technical result, an intelligent crew support system (ISPE), including sensors for the state of engines, fuel system, hydraulic system, power supply system, landing gear and braking system, anti-icing system, fire protection system, air signal system (AHS), satellite navigation system (SNA ), inertial navigation system (ANN), radio altimeter (RV), instrument landing system (PSP), steering control system (SSHU), connected in parallel with the airborne collection system information (SSBI), information display system (SDI), emergency recognition unit (BRAS), an additional take-off control system (SCR), a warning system about the dangerous proximity of the earth (SPOBZ), a warning system about reaching dangerous values of the angle of attack and overload (SPVOZ), control system for approach and landing (SKZP), warning system about getting into the wind shear (SPSV). At the same time, the SCR is able to determine, based on the measurement of the parameters of the signals of the airborne sensors, the values of longitudinal and normal overloads n _x , n _y , air V and instrument V _at speeds, pitch angles ϑ, distances S of the runway distance, taking into account the set constraints collected in SSBI, exceeding the measured and predetermined threshold values of V _ex.ogr , L _then , L _calculation in the form:

where L _calculation , L _then - the calculated value of the distance to achieve the separation speed of the aircraft from the surface of the runway and the threshold value of L _calculation ;

S is the distance traveled by the aircraft along the runway;

V _then V _pr - threshold value of airspeed and instrument speed;

n _{x pore} - the threshold value of the longitudinal overload;

, сигналов вертикальной перегрузки n_y и ее производной $${\stackrel{\cdot }{n}}_{\gamma }$$

и допустимых значений сигналов угла атаки α_доп, сигналов допустимых значений продольной перегрузки n_{х доп}, зависящих от числа Μ и веса ЛА, фильтрует сигналы угловой скорости ω_z, передаваемые в БРАС для формирования информации предупреждения о выходе на опасные углы атаки и перегрузки. После чего сигналы подаются в СОИ для индикации включения тревожной сигнализации. Система СКЗП выполнена с возможностью на основе измерения параметров сигналов бортовых датчиков отклонения в пространстве траектории ЛА, выдаваемых приемником курсоглиссадных радиомаяков, бортовой спутниковой навигационной системы (СНС), датчиком радиовысотомера Н_рв, датчиком барометрической высоты, датчиком воздушной скорости V, положения шасси и закрылков в БРАС, формирует сигналы принятия решений об условиях выхода за пределы допустимых отклонений, передаваемые в СОИ для индикации включения тревожной сигнализации, в директорные приборы и блок включения систем автоматического управления (САУ). Система СППСВ выполнена с возможностью на основе измерения параметров бортовых датчиков приборной скорости V_пp и ее производной, вертикальной скорости V_y приращения углов атаки Δα, определяет превышение измеренных и заданных значений при попадании ЛА в условия сдвига ветра, формировать в БРАС сигнал принятия решения о критичности условий попадания в сдвиг ветра, передавая их в СОИ для индикации включения тревожной сигнализации. Входы перечисленных систем вместе с первым входом БРАС соединены с выходами ССБИ. Выходы указанных систем соединены со вторыми входами БРАС, а выход его подключен к СОИ, установленной перед летчиком экипажа, взаимодействующего с СШУ. Кроме того, структура БРАС построена в виде двухуровневой системы, в которой на первом уровне распознавания реализуют контроль состояния ЛА и режимов работы его подсистем, а на втором уровне распознавания проводят контроль отказов, контроль за выполнением режимов полета, контроль критических значений параметров полета. Таким образом, ИСПЭ является управляющей системой с параллельной оценкой работоспособности бортового оборудования, работы экипажа, прогнозирования аварийных ситуаций, условий полета и выработки рекомендаций вывода из опасных ситуаций за пределом области эксплуатационных ограничений. ИСПЭ оценивает состояние всех систем ЛА.as well as the signals of the speed of climb or loss of altitude, which are fed to the BRAS to generate information about the quality of the take-off run and warning of danger and transmission to the SDI and indication of the alarm activation. The SPOBZ system is capable of determining, based on the measurement of the signal parameters of the onboard sensors, indicating the geographical location of the aircraft (LA), the altitude indicated by the radio altimeter N _rv , the geodetic altitude N _{g of the} satellite navigation system (SNA), the data of the vertical velocity meter V of _the aircraft, the receiver signal ε _r deviations from the electronic glide landing, an internal database of terrain and obstacles at airports - the minimum allowable height above the ground in extreme atmospheric conditions for transfer to the BRAS to form information about the conditions of decision proximity ground surface, after which data signals are in the SDI for indicating the alarm was activated. The HSS system is made with the possibility of measuring the parameters of the onboard sensors of the angle of attack α, angle of heel γ, normal overload n _y , angular pitch velocity ω _z ; determination of maximum permissible differences between hazardous and threshold values from the parameters of the signals of the angle of attack α and its derivative $$\stackrel{\cdot }{\alpha }$$

, signals of vertical overload n _y and its derivative $${\stackrel{\cdot }{n}}_{\gamma }$$

and permissible values of the signals of the angle of attack α _dop , signals of permissible values of the longitudinal overload n _{x dp} , depending on the number Μ and the weight of the aircraft, filters the angular velocity signals ω _z transmitted to the BRAS to generate warning information on reaching dangerous angles of attack and overload. Then the signals are sent to the SDI to indicate the inclusion of an alarm. The SKZP system is made with the possibility, based on the measurement of the parameters of the signals of the airborne deviation sensors in the space of the aircraft trajectory, issued by the receiver of the course-glide path beacons, the onboard satellite navigation system (HSS), the altimeter sensor H _rv , the barometric altitude sensor, the airspeed sensor V, the position of the landing gear and flaps in BRAS generates decision signals on the conditions for exceeding the limits of permissible deviations, transmitted to the SDI to indicate the inclusion of an alarm, in director devices and the block of inclusion of automatic control systems (ACS). The SPSVS system is capable of, based on the measurement of the parameters of the onboard sensors of the instrument speed V _p and its derivative, the vertical velocity V _{y of the} increment of the angle of attack Δα, determines the excess of the measured and predetermined values when the aircraft falls into the conditions of wind shear, to generate a critical decision signal in BRAS conditions of falling into the wind shear, passing them to the SDI to indicate the inclusion of an alarm. The inputs of these systems together with the first input of the BRAS are connected to the outputs of the SSBI. The outputs of these systems are connected to the second inputs of the BRAS, and its output is connected to the SDI installed in front of the pilot of the crew interacting with the secondary school. In addition, the structure of the BRAS is built in the form of a two-level system in which, at the first recognition level, the state of the aircraft and its subsystems are monitored, and at the second recognition level, failures are monitored, flight regimes are monitored, and flight parameter critical values are monitored. Thus, ISPE is a control system with a parallel assessment of the on-board equipment operability, crew work, emergency forecasting, flight conditions and development of recommendations on how to get out of dangerous situations outside the range of operational limitations. ISPE evaluates the status of all aircraft systems.

To clarify the invention in FIG. 1 is a structural diagram of an intelligent crew support system.

1 - engines

2 - fuel system

3 - hydraulic system

4 - power supply system

5 - chassis release and braking system

6 - anti-icing system

7 - fire system

8 - system of air signals (SHS)

9 - satellite navigation system (SNA)

10 - inertial navigation system (ANN)

11 - radio altimeter (RV)

12 - instrument landing system (PSP)

13 - steering control system (SSHU)

14 - on-board information collection system (SSBI)

15 - take-off control system (TFR)

16 - warning system about the dangerous proximity of the earth (DSS)

17 - warning system about reaching dangerous values of the angle of attack and overload (SPVOZ)

18 - control system of approach and landing (SKZP)

19 - warning system of getting into the wind shear (SPSV)

20 - emergency recognition unit (BRAS)

21 - information display system (SDI)

22 - crew pilot

The proposed intelligent crew support system includes status sensors for engine systems 1, fuel system 2, hydraulic system 3, power supply system 4, chassis exhaust and braking system 5, anti-icing system 6, fire protection system 7, air signal system (AHS) 8, satellite navigation system ( SNA) 9, inertial navigation system (ANS) 10, radio altimeter (PB) 11, instrument landing system (PSP) 12, steering control system (SSHU) 13 connected to the inputs of the on-board information collection system (SS) I) 14, the emergency recognition unit (BRAS) 20, the information display system (SDI) 21, the take-off control system (TFR) 15, the warning system about the dangerous proximity of the earth (SPOBZ) 16, the warning system about reaching dangerous values of the angle of attack and overload (SPVOZ) 17, the control system of approach and landing (SKZP) 18, the warning system of getting into the wind shear (SPSV) 19, their outputs are connected to the second inputs of BRAS 20, the first input of BRAS 20 is connected to the output of SSBI 14, and the BRAS 20 output is connected to the input of the SDI 21 installed in front of the pilot 22 Ipazha interacting with secondary school 13.

The system works as follows

The intelligent crew support system (ISPE) is based on knowledge that combines a theoretical understanding of the problem and a set of types of special situations, the recognition of which is proved by the practice of this subject area in the process of investigating aircraft accidents, incidents and using the results of automated express analysis of flight information to control crew actions and performance aircraft systems. ISPE is created by obtaining knowledge from experts and coding them in a form that can be used in modern calculators, as well as information from on-board equipment control systems.

The application of expert knowledge to formulate a strategy for solving a problem is the main feature of intelligent systems. The task is to develop approaches for identifying special situations that may arise in flight and timely prompting the crew about the necessary actions for their localization. Each decision is made on the basis of initial data, which is flight information, as a rule, indicated on the dashboards of the crew. The most important element of the solution is the assessment of the current special situation and the formation of a clue for the crew that clearly allows to counter this situation through the implementation of the recommendations received by the crew.

In relation to ISPE, this means solving the following problems:

- identification and analysis of deviations in the operation of the subsystem "aircraft-crew" affecting flight safety;

- development of automated methods for identifying special situations at the stage of their initial development, the intervention in the parry of which can prevent an accident;

- development of the contents of the hint to the crew to prevent the adverse development of a special situation that could result in an accident.

Analysis of statistics of flight accidents in aviation shows that a significant number of accidents are caused by errors in flight personnel, flight controllers and maintenance personnel with practically operational aircraft. This requires the installation on board the aircraft systems 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, providing the crew with signals about approaching the maximum permissible flight values. The maximum allowable parameter values generated in this ISPE system are compared with their current values, and, depending on the difference between them and its rate of change, warning signals are generated, which are the command for the crew to take corrective actions to prevent reaching the critical flight mode. In the process of making a decision and performing corrective actions, the crew has information on the current and maximum permissible values of the flight parameters. The aircraft is equipped with an take-off control system (15), a warning system about approaching dangerous values of the angle of attack and normal overload, instrument speed and M number (17), an alarm system for dangerous proximity of the earth (16), and a system for getting into a “dangerous” wind shear (19), approach and landing control system (18).

Despite the individual features of these systems, in each of them one or another parameter is compared with the corresponding threshold value, and if it is exceeded, a warning signal is issued, i.e. they represent control systems. Evaluations of the effectiveness of critical warning systems are the criteria for the probability of missing a dangerous situation and a false alarm system. The critical value of the parameter is the excess of a certain value with a probability close to unity, which will lead to an emergency situation (stall, overload of structural elements). Dangerous value - requiring extreme, emergency measures to prevent going beyond the critical value of a parameter. The threshold value is one at which the access alarm system must operate as intended. ISPE in normal flight conditions remains passive and monitors the state of the aircraft, the operation of engines, equipment and crew. If all the systems and units of the aircraft are operating normally and the piloting is carried out in such a way that the parameters of the aircraft’s motion beyond the critical values are not predicted, ISPE determines the normal execution of the mode.

In the event of an emergency (AS) ISPE evaluates information about the external and internal environment. When the forecast shows that the aircraft goes beyond operational limits, ISPE forms decisions and issues recommendations to minimize adverse effects (block 20). In ISPE, the behavior of the system “aircraft - avionics equipment (BO)” is simulated and a forecast is given of the development of events in flight on the SDI unit 21 displaying information about the state of the BO, the operation of the engines and parameters characterizing the behavior of the aircraft. If the crew takes the right actions or actions in the direction of the development of the specified situation, then ISPE does not interfere in the management of the aircraft, but gives recommendations and tips to the crew on piloting the aircraft. If there is no reaction, ISPE in exceptional cases generates the necessary corrective and control signals to the system to parry the dangerous situation and stabilize the flight of the aircraft.

In ISPE algorithms, the signs of AS occurrence are successively analyzed. Each of the signs with a certain reliability P _ACi determines the presence of such a situation. If the total reliability reaches a predetermined threshold value P _ACi > P _KP , then the presence of this situation is ascertained. After that, the flight conditions are analyzed (motion parameters: altitude, speed, angular position, etc., fuel balance, weather conditions, the presence of obstacles on the runway, the position of the rudders, landing gear and other aircraft components, etc.) and a recommendation is made to the crew - more tips high level. On-board information collection system (SSBI), block 14 - multiplex communication channel - a system in which signals are transmitted from the transmitter (blocks 1-13) to the receiver. It organizes the simultaneous transmission of several independent messages, each of which follows its own channel. On one line of the channel can be a lot of messages. These are duplex channels with simultaneous communication in the forward and reverse direction.

Communication channels with the departure and the recipient form the SSBI-14 system. Independent messages C ₁ -C _{13 of a} multi-channel communication system from (frequency multiplexing) N = 13 sources (senders) are sent to the inputs of the transmitters and there they are converted (modulation) into signals S ₁ ÷ S ₁₃ corresponding to these messages. The signals of all transmitters arrive on the communication line. With the communication line, a mixture of all N channels is fed to the inputs of the receivers, where the signals are separated by selectors, converted (demodulation) and given to the recipients. Receivers play transmitted messages.

The main purpose of the TFR (block 15) is to prevent flight accidents related to exceeding the available distances of the aerodrome flight strip due to the crew making erroneous decisions to interrupt or continue taking off or untimely detection by the crew of dangerous deviations of the take-off parameters from their nominal values. SKR 15, based on the measurement of take-off parameters, gives the crew a warning signal and command signals to interrupt or continue take-off if a dangerous deviation from its calculated value is entered into the system before the flight. The quality indicator is selected depending on the type of aircraft and its operating conditions: this is the difference between the measured longitudinal (n _x ) and its threshold value (n _{x pores} ) of overloads specified in the function of the instrument speed V _pr :

the difference between the measured value of the airspeed V (block 8) and its threshold value V _pores specified in the function of the distance S traveled along the runway:

the difference between the calculated value of the distance to achieve a given speed L _calculation , the estimated speed of separation of the aircraft from the surface of the runway (V _neg ) and its threshold value:

where L _calc = f (n _x , V _p , V, S, V _neg ) is the function of the measured values of the parameters of the take-off process, V _p is the ground speed. The longitudinal acceleration signal n _x is generated in the SCR using an overload sensor, the sensitive axis of which is directed along the aircraft’s construction axis and pitch angle sensor in accordance with the formula:

where n _x , ϑ are the signals of the sensors of the overload and pitch angle (in radians), respectively, g is the acceleration of gravity.

The signals of the ground speed and the distance traveled along the runway are obtained in the SCR using the serial signal of longitudinal acceleration, and then the signal of the ground speed.

The signal of longitudinal overload α _x contains significant interference caused by vibrations of the aircraft fuselage during take-off and having a wide range of frequencies; therefore, it is necessary to install a low-frequency blocking filter in the channel for measuring the low-frequency useful signal:

The determination of the true air speed V LA during take-off comes from the instrument speed sensor, which measures the difference between the total and static air pressures received by the air pressure receiver (LDPE) (block 8):

where Δ = 0.38 P _o / T _o - relative density of air; V _CR - instrument speed; ΔV _a - parameters connecting V with the measured values of the instrument speed.

The Earth Hazardous Earth Warning System (HSS) (block 16) of the aircraft is a means of improving flight safety, providing sound and visual alerts to crew members about the occurrence of such flight conditions, the development of which could lead to a collision with the earth or water surface.

The danger is determined by whether the characteristics of the aircraft at given distances from the obstacle and the approach speed prevent an unintentional collision with it. For the vast majority of cases of dangerous proximity to the ground, the problem is solved on the basis of information from a radio altimeter 10), an aircraft vertical speed meter, and a receiver of deviation signals from the radio landing landing glide path (block 12).

SPOBZ uses input signals from aircraft systems that determine the geographical location, spatial orientation, altitude, airspeed and glide path. These data are used in conjunction with internal databases of terrain, obstacles and airports to prevent potential aircraft flight paths intersecting with the terrain or obstacle. Having determined such a possibility, the SPOD system generates a visual and audible warning or emergency alarm.

The system generates alarms when there are deliberate deviations from the glide path below the flight altitude with flaps or landing gear in a non-stop configuration, gives tips about the angle of heel and height.

The system provides the determination of the minimum permissible height of flight above the terrain. This is an additional security feature that alerts the pilot to the possibility of premature descent, designed for inaccurate approaches and is based on the current location of the aircraft relative to the nearest runway.

The geometric height determined by the SNA (block 9) is the calculated pseudobarometric height, designed to eliminate height measurement errors caused by extreme temperature values, non-standard pressure conditions and incorrect altimeter setting. These properties ensure optimal alarm output and indication.

At a minimum, the system performs the basic functions of an alarm:

- the function of the front view of the terrain to prevent collisions, which covers insufficient headroom when flying over the terrain, the threat of a collision with the terrain;

- alarm function of premature decline;

- excessive vertical rate of decline V _y ;

- extreme speed of approaching the terrain;

- negative climb or loss of altitude after take-off;

- approaching the terrain during flight in a non-stop configuration;

- excessive deviation down from the glide path of the landing system;

- reduction of the aircraft to a height, relative to the elevation of the terrain or the nearest runway (voice prompt).

Operation mode

1 - excessive rate of decline;

2 - excessive approach speed to the ground;

3 - flight at an altitude of less than 200 m during approach with landing gear or flaps retracted;

4 - negative vertical speed when losing altitude on take-off to an altitude of less than 200 m;

5 - excessive deviation down from the radio landing glide path.

In operation mode 1 signaling occurs under the condition: n _pB ≤h _OP1 = F ₁ (V _y), mode 2: H _pB ≤h _OP2 = F ₂ (V _SBL) mode 3: H _pB ≤h _op = F ₃ (ε _g ), where ε _g is the angular deviation from the glide path; F ₁ (V _y ), F ₂ (V _sb ), F ₃ (ε _g ) are the dependences of the dangerous height on the vertical speed, on the speed of approach to the ground, on the deviation from the glide path.

To compensate for the delay in the signals of the derivative barometric altitude and to suppress interference caused by pressure distortions during its measurement of LDPE, the vertical speed is formed by combining barometric and inertial information:

- производная сигнала барометрической высоты; α_y - вертикальное ускорение в земных осях; p - оператор дифференцирования; k1 и k2 - параметры фильтра, выбираемые из условия минимума средней квадратической погрешности в сигнале V_y.Where

- derivative of the signal of barometric height; α _y - vertical acceleration in the earth's axes; p is the differentiation operator; k1 and k2 are the filter parameters selected from the condition of the minimum mean square error in the signal V _y .

An approach signal to the ground is generated by combining the derivative of the radio altimeter signal and the vertical speed signal. This is necessary for filtering the fluctuation component in the derivative of the signal of the radio altimeter, while ensuring virtually no delay in the signal C _sb during the aircraft’s own movement

- сигнал радиовысотомера (11), Τ - параметр фильтра, зависящий от режима полета.Where

- signal of the radio altimeter (11), Τ - filter parameter depending on the flight mode.

Each of the operating modes of the system is evaluated separately, because the maximum permissible height value is a function of various parameters, and therefore, the laws of the distribution of errors in the response of the system will be different.

The critical flight conditions defined in block 17 include:

- flight at large angles of attack with a possible hit of the aircraft in stall;

- the implementation of vigorous roll maneuvers with access to large angular velocities ω _z and a noticeable manifestation of the interaction of longitudinal and lateral movement.

Stalling is the spontaneous development of pitch, yaw and roll processes. Considering the physical nature of the stall phenomenon when the aircraft reaches supercritical angles of attack, several types can be distinguished:

- stall due to the loss of the bearing properties of the wing;

- stall type autorotation due to loss of damping of the roll;

- stall due to loss of lateral vibrational stability;

- stall due to lateral handling;

- Stall due to loss of track stability.

A factor leading to premature stall may be a pitch pickup due to the non-linearity of the moment characteristics of the aircraft in terms of angle of attack. The behavior of the aircraft at large angles of attack is often determined by a combination of several types.

If the permissible angles of attack are exceeded (α _extra less than α _sv ), an effective signaling is provided about approaching the limiting flight regimes. When an angle of attack signal is used, it is necessary to introduce an advance, since it is not so much the current angle of attack that is important as the timely forecast of its change. For this purpose, the angular velocity sensor ω _z transmitted through the filter is used. The current value of the anticipated angle of attack is compared with the permissible value α _add :

The warning system for reaching dangerous values of the angle of attack and normal overload (block 17) implements the following laws for triggering an alarm:

, w_ф2(ρ) - коэффициенты усиления и передаточные функции фильтров сигналов упреждения ( $$\stackrel{\cdot }{\alpha }$$

и $$\stackrel{\cdot }{n_y}$$

).where α _add , n _{y add} - the maximum allowable values of the angle of attack and normal overload; α _avg , n _avg - current values of the angle of attack and normal overload at which the alarm should be triggered; Δα, Δn _y is the static margin for the alarm; to _α , w _ф1 (p), k _n

, w _ф2 (ρ) - gain and transfer functions of the filters of signals of anticipation ( $$\stackrel{\cdot }{\alpha }$$

and $$\stackrel{\cdot }{n_y}$$

)

и

представляют собой разность между опасным и пороговым значениями параметров, которая учитывает суммарную погрешность формирования α_ср и n_уср и динамики их изменения. На указатель угла атаки и перегрузки выводятся текущие (α и n_y) и предельно допустимые (α_доп и n_{y доп}) значения угла атаки и нормальной перегрузки. Передаточные функции w_ф1(p) и w_ф2(p) выбираются и оцениваются из двух противоречивых требований: подавление помех в сигналах α и n_y и пропускания полезных составляющих. Поскольку предельно допустимые значения угла атаки, как правило, зависят от числа М, а n_{y доп} является функцией веса самолета, погрешность срабатывания сигнализаторов зависит от погрешностей вычисления аргументов этих функций, поэтому точность формирования этих параметров определяется в процессе испытаний.It should be noted that the amounts

and

represent the difference between the hazardous and threshold values of the parameters, which takes into account the total error in the formation of α _avg and n _avr and the dynamics of their change. The current (α and n _y ) and maximum permissible (α _additional and n _{y additional} ) values of the angle of attack and normal overload are displayed on the indicator of the angle of attack and overload. The transfer functions w _f1 (p) and w _f2 (p) are selected and evaluated from two conflicting requirements: suppression of interference in the signals α and n _y and transmission of useful components. Since the maximum permissible values of the angle of attack, as a rule, depend on the number M, and n _{y additional} is a function of the weight of the aircraft, the error in the operation of signaling devices depends on the errors in calculating the arguments of these functions, therefore, the accuracy of the formation of these parameters is determined during the test.

The approach and landing control system (block 12) receives information when approaching in conditions of limited visibility using ground directional radio beacons when electromagnetic fields are created that form a given flight path in space. Measurement of deviations of the aircraft from a given approach path using radio equipment is carried out in a goniometric coordinate system, where V ₁ and V ₂ are the projections of the aircraft’s velocity vector, normal to their lines connecting the aircraft with the SRM and the timing, respectively:

Given the smallness of the angles (θ + ε _g ) and (ψ + ε _l ), after the transformations we obtain the system of equations:

In the equations τ = D / V there is the remaining flight time to the corresponding beacon, provided that the aircraft moves at a constant speed equal to the speed at the considered time. The equations are the equations of the kinematics of the approach on the directional glide beacons. Variables τ ₁ and τ ₂ in time coefficients characterize the control loop of the aircraft guidance on the runway, which is a non-stationary dynamic system. The flight path is controlled either automatically with the help of an autopilot, or a working command of the trajectory control calculator, or by a pilot flying an airplane using a director’s instrument.

Warning signals are generated by the system when the current altitude is lower than the set minimum permissible values or when deviated down from the equivalent zone of the radio glide path (RTG) in excess of the set maximum permissible values. The system continues to issue warning signals until the cause of the warning is resolved.

The minimum allowable values of the flight altitude and the maximum allowable deviations down from the RTG are automatically calculated by the system during the flight based on the current values of the signals from the SNA airborne receiver, radio altimeter, barometric altitude sensor, airspeed sensor (or M number), airborne landing radio, and also depending from the position of the chassis and flaps.

The main external disturbances leading to dispersion of the flight path are wind disturbances and curvature of the course and glide path beacons. The intensity of these disturbances, estimated by the average wind speed, as well as the standard deviations of the gusts of wind and the curvature of the beacon fields, is a random factor.

The success of a landing approach is determined by the following requirements:

- deviations from the given approach path are such that the alarm about the achievement of the maximum deviations does not occur;

- the equipment health monitoring devices of the approach system do not turn off the equipment necessary to perform a safe approach;

- the flight speed during approach does not go beyond its own limits.

The crew warning system about getting into the wind shear (block 19) during piloting determines the change in time of the direction and speed of the wind in the airspace where the aircraft is located. In the meteorological aspect, the “shear” of the wind is a change in the speed and / or direction of the wind as a function of altitude or distance.

Since the airspeed and the angle of attack of the aircraft, and therefore the lifting force and drag, change with the rate of change of the speed and direction of the wind, the balance of forces acting on the plane is disturbed at the same rate. At the take-off and landing stages, with a limited margin of heading, an unexpected hit by the crew in the wind shear and the absence of obvious signs on the dashboard for its detection lead to flight accidents.

The most dangerous are changes in the longitudinal and vertical components of the wind. Changing the side component of the wind is less dangerous.

For an airplane flying at a constant airspeed in the longitudinal plane and falling into the wind shear, the relative change in the balance of forces along the path velocity vector is determined by:

, $$\stackrel{\cdot }{W_y}$$

- проекции скорости ветра на оси скоростной системы координат.where Ρ - thrust of the aircraft power plant; Q - drag; G is the weight of the aircraft; $$\stackrel{\cdot }{W_y}$$

, $$\stackrel{\cdot }{W_y}$$

- projections of wind speed on the axis of the velocity coordinate system.

Therefore, as a parameter characterizing the total effect of wind shear on an aircraft, it is determined:

where Δα _w is the increment of the angle of attack due to the component of the wind speed W _y .

The detection of wind shear on board the aircraft during the flight is reduced to indirect measurements of the individual components of this amount characterizing the wind shear.

The longitudinal component of wind speed can be determined:

where V _p and V are the modules of ground speed and airspeed, respectively.

The derivative of wind speed is determined without changing ground speed:

where n _x is the longitudinal overload in the associated axes; (n _x -ϑ) g is the approximate expression of the derivative of the ground speed of the aircraft (angle in radians), ϑ is the pitch angle.

The increment of the angle of attack due to the vertical component of the wind speed is determined by:

where θ = V _y / V _p ,

V _y is the vertical component of airspeed.

Thus, the total wind shear characteristic is determined on the basis of on-board measurements:

The crew warning system about getting into the wind shear compares the measured and calculated signals about the wind shear with its maximum permissible value.

The permissible value of wind shear depends on the energy capabilities of the aircraft and the power plant. Those. can under these conditions be created an excess of thrust sufficient to counter wind shear:

The maximum permissible value also depends on the flight parameters. If, when approaching, the actual instrumental speed exceeds a predetermined value, flight is allowed with a large wind shear, leading to a decrease in vertical speed. The dependence of the permissible values of wind shear on deviations from the landing glide path, a given vertical speed, is similar. The direction (sign) of the wind shear, i.e. tendency to increase or decrease in instrument speed.

, V_y показывает, что они, как правило, постоянны в процессах захода на посадку и взлете. Компенсация этих погрешностей обеспечивается с помощью изодромного звена Тр/(Тр+1), параметр Τ которого зависит от величины сигнала δ_∑ на входе системы.Analysis of measurement errors of the parameters n _x , α, $$\stackrel{\cdot }{V}$$

, V _y shows that they are usually constant in the processes of approach and take-off. Compensation of these errors is provided using the isodromic link Tr / (Tr + 1), the parameter Τ of which depends on the value of the signal δ _∑ at the input of the system.

The introduction of the isodromic link allows us to exclude from consideration small values of wind shear or measurement error.

The alarm command warning the crew arrives when the following conditions are met:

δ_пор зависит от типа самолета, величины и знака отклонений от заданных значений приборной и вертикальной скоростей, высоты и режима полета.Where

δ _then depends on the type of aircraft, the magnitude and sign of deviations from the set values of the instrument and vertical speeds, altitude and flight mode.

The signal to the indicator, providing the crew with the ability to counteract the influence of wind shear, is formed as follows:

where V _ass - set at the given flight mode value of the instrument speed; V _ol measured instrument speed.

Information redundancy of navigation and aerobatic systems provides high reliability of measurements of motion parameters. A particularly important link here is the means of displaying the flight-navigation situation on the pilot's dashboard (SOI-21), which create a flight information model for the pilot, i.e. along with reliability requirements, they are presented with the requirements of visibility, capacity and clarity of reproduction of the current situation to the pilot. The effectiveness of his actions, especially in critical situations, depends on this. The information integration and visibility of the indication are enhanced by the integration of information in this flight mode.

BRAS (20) a database-based control structure is a procedural program (PP), where the control is highly localized. The main control tool is a sequential order of instructions, such as: “If-then-do-do-repeat-bye”, which work with some of the parameters that describe this situation. The progress of the instruction is related to the data, small changes in the input data have little effect on the execution of the program. The control mechanism is “transparent”, and the information is dissolved in the procedures themselves and the provided data used.

The structure of the BRAS is constructed according to algorithms in the form of a two-level system in which the state of the aircraft and the operating modes of its subsystems are implemented at the first level, failure control, monitoring of the flight mode, and critical flight parameters are monitored.

In the process of operation, the BRAS (20) monitors the state of the aircraft, the operating modes of its power plant subsystems, the operation of equipment and flight parameters. At the same time, flight conditions are analyzed and corresponding informational messages are generated. Processing and analysis of information is carried out with minimal computational costs, in real time, in order to timely recognize a special situation and give the crew the necessary message about the required actions to counter the situation.

BRAS algorithms (20) are grouped into sections: failure control, control of the flight mode, critical values of flight parameters. The algorithms are implemented in the form of a two-level system, which determines the flight mode at the first level (take-off, take-off, initial climb, etc.), and then at the second level, in accordance with a specific flight mode, checks for special situations. The following are several algorithms that include those signs and parameters whose values are checked in this condition, as well as an information message that is displayed when the condition is met. The recognition algorithm for a special situation related to a failure is a logical rule for checking the corresponding signs (the occurrence of a certain situation).

1. Lack of power supply 27 V.

OS off ₁ = i ₂₇ , where i ₂₇ is the signal of lack of voltage on one of the DC bus 27 V.

Message: “No voltage 27 V”

2. Lack of power supply 36 V.

OS off ₂ = i ₃₆ , where i ₃₆ - signal of lack of voltage on one of the AC bus 27 V

Message: “No voltage 36 V”

3. Heating of the full pressure receiver (PPD) is not turned on (4).

OS off ₄ = ippd, where ippd is the signal that the PPD heating is not turned on.

Message: “Turn on the PPD heating”.

4. Engine failure (5).

OS _{open 5} = i dv. 1 V i open. dv. 2 V i off dv. 3, where i open. dv. - integral engine failure signal 1, 2, 3 (chips in oil, dangerous engine vibration, increased gas temperature at the engine outlet), V - logical "OR"

Message: "Engine Failure."

5. Failure of the hydraulic system (14).

OS _{open 14.} = i open hydr. syst., where i open. hydr. syst. - hydraulic failure signal.

Message: "Failure of the hydraulic system."

6. Non-use of fire extinguishing in case of fire in the engine nacelle (19)

OS _{rev 19} = i. MG ... ^ i fire extinguishing, where i fire extinguishing - fire extinguishing. “^” - logical “AND”

Message: “Fire in the engine nacelle. Turn on the fire. ”

Claims (1)

Intelligent crew support system (ISPE), including sensors for the state of engines, fuel system, hydraulic system, power supply system, landing gear and braking system, anti-icing system, fire alarm system, air signal system (AHS), satellite navigation system (SNA), inertial navigation system (ANN), radio altimeter (RV), instrument landing system (PSP), helm control system (SSHU), connected in parallel with the on-board information collection system (SSBI), display system information (SDI), an emergency recognition unit (BRAS), characterized in that an additional run-up control system (TFR), a warning system about the dangerous proximity of the earth (SPOD), a warning system about reaching the dangerous values of the angle of attack and overload (SPVOZ) are introduced , the approach control and landing control system (SKZP), the wind shear warning system (SPSV), while the SKR is made with the possibility of determining, based on the measurement of the parameters of the signals of the onboard sensors: longitudinal and normal overloads n_x, n_at, air V and instrument V_np speeds, pitch angles ϑ, distances S of the runway distance traveled, taking into account the specified restrictions collected in the SSBI, exceeding the measured and predetermined threshold values: V_heating, L_pore, L_pacch as:

where l_pasch L_pop - the estimated value of the distance to achieve the separation speed of the aircraft from the surface of the runway and the threshold value L_pacch;
S is the distance traveled by the aircraft along the runway;
V_nop.,V_np - threshold airspeed and instrument speed;
n_{x since} - threshold value of longitudinal overload; as well as the signals of the speed of climb or loss of altitude, which are supplied to the BRAS to generate information about the quality of the take-off and warning of danger and transmission to the SDI and indication of the alarm activation; SPOBZ system is made with the ability to determine, based on the measurement of the parameters of the signals of the airborne sensors, indicating the geographical location of the aircraft (LA), the height indicated by the radio altimeter N_pv, geodetic height N_g satellite navigation system (SNA), data of a vertical velocity meter V_y Aircraft, signal receiver ε_g deviations from the radio landing glide path, the internal database of terrain and obstacles at airports - the minimum value of the permissible height above ground in extreme atmospheric conditions for transmission to BRAS in order to generate decision-making information on the conditions of proximity of the earth's surface, after which information signals are sent to the SDI for indication of the inclusion of an alarm; the HSS system is capable of measuring the parameters of the on-board sensors of angles of attack α, roll angles γ, normal overload_at, pitch angular velocity ω_z, determination of maximum permissible differences between hazardous and threshold values from the parameters of the signals of the angle of attack α and its derivative $$\dot{\alpha }$$

, vertical overload signals n_at and its derivative $${\dot{n}}_y$$

 and acceptable values of the angle of attack signals α_additional, signals of permissible values of longitudinal overload n_{x additional}depending on the number Μ and the weight of the aircraft, filtering the angular velocity signals ω_ztransmitted to BRAS to generate warning information on reaching dangerous angles of attack and overload, after which the signals are sent to the SDI to indicate the inclusion of an alarm; SKZP system is made with the possibility, based on the measurement of the parameters of the signals of the airborne deviation sensors in the space of the aircraft trajectory, issued by the receiver of directional radio beacons, on-board satellite navigation system (SNA), the radio altimeter sensor N_pv, using a barometric altitude sensor, airspeed sensor V, the position of the landing gear and flaps in the BRAS, generate decision signals on the conditions for exceeding the tolerance limits, transmitted to the SDI to indicate the inclusion of an alarm, in director devices and the automatic control systems enable unit (ACS); SPSVS system is made with the possibility, based on the measurement of the parameters of the airborne instrument speed sensors_np and its derivative, vertical speed V_y increments of the angle of attack Δα determine the excess of the measured and set values when the aircraft falls into the conditions of wind shear, generate a decision signal in BRAS on the criticality of the conditions of falling into the wind shear, passing them to the SDI to indicate the inclusion of an alarm; the inputs of the listed systems together with the first BRAS input are connected to the SSBI outputs, the outputs of these systems are connected to the second BRAS inputs, and its output is connected to the SDI installed in front of the pilot of the crew interacting with the secondary school, in addition, the BRAS structure is built in the form of a two-level system, which, at the first recognition level, they monitor the state of the aircraft and the operating modes of its subsystems, and at the second recognition level, failures are monitored, flight modes are monitored, and critical values are checked ters flight.