NL2012492A - Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same. - Google Patents
Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same. Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- NL2012492A NL2012492A NL2012492A NL2012492A NL2012492A NL 2012492 A NL2012492 A NL 2012492A NL 2012492 A NL2012492 A NL 2012492A NL 2012492 A NL2012492 A NL 2012492A NL 2012492 A NL2012492 A NL 2012492A
- Authority
- NL
- Netherlands
- Prior art keywords
- card
- magnetic
- slot
- reader
- sensor
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K7/00—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
- G06K7/08—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by means detecting the change of an electrostatic or magnetic field, e.g. by detecting change of capacitance between electrodes
- G06K7/082—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by means detecting the change of an electrostatic or magnetic field, e.g. by detecting change of capacitance between electrodes using inductive or magnetic sensors
- G06K7/087—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by means detecting the change of an electrostatic or magnetic field, e.g. by detecting change of capacitance between electrodes using inductive or magnetic sensors flux-sensitive, e.g. magnetic, detectors
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K13/00—Conveying record carriers from one station to another, e.g. from stack to punching mechanism
- G06K13/02—Conveying record carriers from one station to another, e.g. from stack to punching mechanism the record carrier having longitudinal dimension comparable with transverse dimension, e.g. punched card
- G06K13/08—Feeding or discharging cards
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Artificial Intelligence (AREA)
- Computer Vision & Pattern Recognition (AREA)
- Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)
Description
Title: Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same
Technical Field
The present invention relates to a method and device thereof for preventing card skimming in card processors such as ATMs or self-service terminals (SST) where operations are carried out with magnetic stripe cards. The present invention particularly relates to a method and device capable of providing real-time active protection for the manual card readers.
Background of Invention
In self-service terminals, information on the magnetic stripe card storing the user information can be read by automatic (motorized) or manual (DIP) readers. Motorized or manual use of card readers in the self-service terminals varies according to the country or region depending on the usage habits. For example, in the United States manual type (DIP) readers are used more widely.
In the SSTs such as ATMs, another card reader (skimming device/card skimmer) is placed by hiding thereof in front of the card entry slot of the ATM in order to obtain the data on the magnetic stripe cards in a fraudulent manner. Thus, the magnetic stripe card is first read by passing through this skimming device and then it is read by the actual reader by passing through the card reader of ATM, thus, card information is copied without being noticed by the user. User's PIN number can be recorded by means of a hidden camera or a fake keypad. Copied cards are created using the information on the cards and user's account can be accessed by the PIN number.
Manual card readers operate inherently different from the motorized readers. In the motorized card readers, when the card is fed by the user through the card entry slot, the card is automatically read by being taken into the card reader and again automatically fed out. In the DIP readers, the motion required for the card to be read is controlled by the user during the user directly pushing and/or pulling the card.
In motorized type readers, different solutions for preventing card skimming attacks are available. As disclosed in EP1782404, owned by the instant applicants, protection can be provided by generating jamming signals preventing the skimming device to operate when the magnetic stripe card is out of the card reader. Again in motorized type readers, solutions preventing suspicious transactions to be carried out by detecting foreign objects in front of the card reader entry and then disabling the reader are available.
Likewise, in the manual card readers, various applications for preventing the externally placed skimming device to achieve the objects thereof are also available. These solutions are based on the principle of detecting the attached skimming device using different sensing means. Various sensors such as ultrasonic/capacitive/inductive sensors can be used as sensing means. The present solution proposed also by the owners of the invention operates by detecting the presence of the skimming device using a capacitive sensor and then activating the jamming signal preventing the operation of the skimming device. Existing solutions, upon detection of the device, either disable the self-service terminal or enable the terminal to be disabled by preventing the operation of the card reader thereof through continuously generating jamming signals.
Basically, existing solutions are based on the principle of detecting the skimming device. Skimming devices designed in different shapes or having reduced sizes resulting from the advanced technology sometimes can not be detected by the current sensing systems. In this case, since the skimming device can not be detected, copying will occur. In the case of detecting skimming devices by means of existing solutions, self-service terminal will be disabled during the time that passes for dealing with the attack on said self-service terminal, this situation will reduce the customer satisfaction.
In the manual card readers, since the motion required for the card to be read is provided by the user, magnetic stripe reader head is provided at a point close to the surface of the card entry surface. Skimming devices are made in sizes as small as possible for remaining hidden and for not changing the current appearance. Again, skimming devices are generally installed immediately in front of the card entry slot. Thus, the actual reader head of the card reader and reader head of the skimming device are physically likely to be in close proximity. Any jamming field generated due to the magnetic stripe reader heads of the manual card reader and potential skimming device being physically in close proximity poses a risk of preventing the operation of the actual card reader.
In the magnetic stripe cards, information is encoded in 3 longitudinal tracks along the magnetic stripe. The manner of encoding the information on the card is determined by international standards (for example, as in the case of ISO/IEC 7811-6:2008 standard). These standards specify many different characteristics such as physical properties of the cards, magnetic strip dimensions, encoding techniques, information storage formats, etc..
Information on the magnetic stripes is stored by being encoded with the F2F encoding technique specified by ISO. Due to the encoding manner of the magnetic stripes, card information can be read starting from the beginning or end of the card. Because, a synchronization signal and some control characters are needed for the reading operation to start. These signals are provided at the beginning and end of the stripes.
To be able to fully read the information on the card, information on the entire stripe should be readable without interruption. For example, in case of having just the middle portion of the magnetic stripe, information decoding can not be performed due to lack of synchronization and control information. In case of having a particular field at the beginning or end of the magnetic stripe, only information decoding of the existing portions can be possible.
On the magnetic stripe cards used in the SSTs such as the ATMs where monetary transactions are carried out, 3 tracks are provided on the magnetic stripe thereof. Each of these tracks can be interpreted as different information fields. Again, as per ISO, customer's primary account number (PAN) is provided on Track 2. The other tracks vary depending on the application and different kinds of information such as user name can be found thereon. However, when performing transactions in the SSTs, information provided on Track 2 is important. Skimming devices generally just copy Track 2.
On Track 2, 37 numeric data characters and some control signals can be stored. The most important part of this 37 digits is the 16 digit primary account number encoded from the beginning of the stripe (16 is the general use, it can be more or less, maximum 19 digits is allowed). Fraud can be committed by making a copied card only using this information.
The most effective known application while providing protection against skimming devices is the one performed by emitting jamming signals to the location provided with the illegal reader. In this method, jamming field source generates an electromagnetic jamming signal in the vicinity of the card entry area and the magnetic reader head installed for the purpose of card skimming is prevented from reading the card by means of this generated signal. (See EP1782404 or WO 2012/060690 for further information).
Even a partial disruption of the information on the magnetic stripes when being read by the skimming device can prevent the information on the card to be fully read. Preferred is that the skimming equipment does not receive any information, however, copying will not be realized with incomplete information.
Since card reading operation in the motorized card readers is performed when the card is physically completely disposed inside the reader, operation of any externally installed skimming device can be prevented by generating jamming signals. When the card is physically outside, jamming signals prevent the operation of the skimming device. When the card is inside, jamming signals are stopped and actual card reader reads the card. The protective jamming signals are generated when the card is outside since outside or inside presence of the card can be directly or indirectly detected in the motorized card readers.
In manual card readers, the card is not completely taken into the card reader and reading operation carried out by the actual reader takes place when the card is passed on the reader by the force provided manually. In the manual card readers, actual reader head is positioned in close proximity to the card entry since the size thereof is inherently small and the motion required for the reading operation is carried out by the user. In the existing manual (DIP) readers, an effective protection against copying as in the case of motorized type readers can not be provided due to this structure thereof.
Arrangements based on detecting the presence of a shimming device by means of various sensors (capacitive/inductive/ultrasonic/infrared etc.) can not perform detection in all cases as well as cause the SST to be completely disabled for the sake of protection.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF INVENTION
The object of the present invention is to effectively prevent copying the magnetic stripe cards in the manual card readers.
The present invention, in accordance with the purpose thereof, relates to a method for preventing the magnetic card data to be copied by means of a skimming device in a card processor having a slot for feeding the magnetic card and a manual card reader, wherein the method comprises the following steps of: - generating jamming signals in the vicinity of the slot; - detecting contacting of the magnetic card fed through the slot with the reader of the manual card reader; - stopping the jamming signals; - reading of the magnetic card data by the manual card reader; - detecting the cessation of contact of the magnetic card with the card reader; and - generating jamming signals in the vicinity of the slot.
In another aspect, the present invention is intended to perform the aforementioned method steps for preventing the magnetic card data to be copied by a skimming device in the manual card reader (1).
In another aspect, the present invention relates to a card processor. The card processor comprises a slot for feeding a magnetic card therethrough, a manual card reader with a magnetic reader head and at least one anti-skimming device for preventing the magnetic card data to be copied by a skimming device. The manual card reader of the card processor according to the present invention comprises a card guiding projection extending outwardly from the magnetic reader head in the card entry direction.
The card processor according to the present invention further comprises at least one sensor communicating with the guiding projection. Said sensor is arranged to detect the contact of the magnetic card with the magnetic reader head. Further, the anti-skimming device of the card processor is arranged so as to be effective along the guiding projection and it preferably communicates with the guiding projection.
With the modification of the card entry and detection of the position of the card as in the present invention, jamming signals preventing the skimming device to operate can be generated during the card placement and retrieval operations until the card reaches the actual reader. Thus, generated jamming signals prevent the skimming device to obtain complete card information, whereas the actual reader can read the card information in a reliable manner.
DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES
Figure 1 is a top view of the card reader together with the card guiding projection.
Figure 2 is a perspective view of the card reader to together with the card guiding projection.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTS IN THE FIGURES
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INVENTION
The card processor according to the present invention comprises a manual magnetic card reader (1) known from the art. Here, "card processor" is a generic term, wherein it comprises any self-service terminal (SST) such as an ATM (Automated Teller Machine). A slot (3) for feeding the magnetic card therethrough is formed at the front portion of the card reader (1). The card reader (1) comprises a magnetic reader head (8) physically contacting the stripe on the card in the entry direction of the magnetic card to the card reader (1). A card guiding projection (4) extending outwardly from the magnetic reader head (8) is formed in the card entry direction of the card reader (1). Magnetic reader head (8) is disposed behind the card entry slot (3) by a certain distance thanks to the card guiding projection (4). The card guiding projection (4) can be integral to the card reader (1) as well as it can have a detachable configuration from the card reader (1).
As seen in Figure 1, a sensor (5) detecting the moment when the magnetic card reaches the magnetic reader head (8) communicates with the card guiding projection (4). The sensor (5) is preferably disposed inside a recess (6) formed on the card guiding projection (4). In addition to the sensor (5), a motion direction sensor (10) disposed spaced apart from said sensor (5) in the card motion direction can be optionally used. This motion direction sensor (10) can be disposed independently from the card guiding projection (4) at an appropriate location, for example, at the front portion of the card reader (1).
Thus, it can be possible to determine motion direction of the magnetic card as well as the moment when the card reaches the magnetic reader head (8). The sensors (5, 10) used according to the preferred embodiment of the present invention are infrared type sensors, wherein other sensor types known in the art can also be used.
The card processor according to the present invention further comprises an anti-skimming device (9). Such an anti-skimming device can be that of disclosed in EP1782404 or EP1067474 and this device preferably comprises a coil capable of emitting an electromagnetic field. The coil may have various forms, i.e. utilization of a coil in the form of a rod is preferred according to the preferred embodiment of the present invention. On the other hand, as disclosed in WO 2012/060690, the jamming electromagnetic field can be provided with a spatially varying characteristic by being emitted through a plurality of coils. By emission of the jamming signals through a plurality of sources, carrying out copying by the skimming device using two reader heads can be prevented.
As seen in Figure 1, the anti-skimming device (9) is associated with the card guiding projection (4) so as to be effective in the vicinity of the card entry slot (3). The anti-skimming device (9) is preferably disposed inside the recess (6) formed on the card guiding projection (4). Again, the electromagnetic field emitted from the anti-skimming device (9) also acts in the vicinity of the card guiding projection (4). Thus, the areas where skimming device can be installed are placed under the protection of the jamming signals. According to an embodiment of the present invention, jamming signals are continuously provided until the magnetic card contacts the magnetic reader head (8). When contact of the magnetic card with the magnetic reader head (8) is detected by the sensor (5), emission of the jamming signals is stopped. Thus, within the time that it takes for the card to physically reach the magnetic reader head (8), jamming signal prevents the skimming device from reading the card data.
The timing required for the generation of jamming signals is basically received from the sensor (5) or obtained by associating said sensor (5) with the motion direction sensor (10), however, jamming signal control timing can be applied in various ways according to the technical specifications of the card reader. For example, according to the technical specifications of the card reader (1), jamming signal field can be generated or removed immediately after or by a certain time after the contact information is received from the sensor (5) (or by means of associating the sensor (5) with the motion direction sensor (10)).
In the case of removing the magnetic card from the card processor (7), cessation of the card's contact with the magnetic reader head (8) is detected again by the sensor (5) and protection is provided by re-activating the jamming signals. (Again, immediately or with a certain delay signals can be activated) Thus, protection signals are disabled when the magnetic stripe card is in contact with the magnetic reader head (8) (card reader seamlessly reads the magnetic card as it should be) and all the other times jamming signals are activated.
The card guiding projection (4) can be configured so as to correspond only to the magnetic stripe portion of the card or it can also be configured so as to correspond to the magnetic stripe portion as well as the other portion without the stripe. The card guiding projection (4) comprises a slot portion allowing the card to enter into the card reader (1) on the front face thereof. In other words, it comprises a structure preventing the card skimming device to enter into the card guiding projection (4). According to the preferred embodiment of the present invention, the distance between the front face of the card guiding projection (4) and the magnetic reader head (8) may be 1 to 6 cm. A distance of approximately 4 cm can be advantageous since it is at a sufficient level to provide protection as well as it provides an ergonomically comfortable use. Because when a longitudinal jamming signal source (a rod-like signal source) is used, jamming electromagnetic field is effectively provided along the slot (3) as well as the card guiding projection (4).
Sensors (5) communicate with a control circuit so as to exchange signals and control of the jamming signals is carried out by means of the control circuit comprised in the card reader (1). This control can be alternatively carried out by means of an external control layer. Again, control circuit can preferably generate a variety of warnings in case of errors by continuously controlling the functional state of the sensors (5) and jamming signal sources. It can be again continuously controlled likewise in the attacks performed to prevent operation of the sensors.
Various sensors can also be used in the vicinity of the card entry slot (3) in addition to the active protection area provided by the present invention. For example, as disclosed in the documents WO 2008/057057 or EP1394728, a foreign device at the card entry area can be detected by means of various sensors. Sensors detecting the presence of foreign objects can communicate with the anti-skimming device (9) by means of a control circuit. Thus, jamming signals can be provided in the vicinity of the slot (3) just after the foreign object is detected or presence of the foreign object can be used for information purposes to generate alarms.
The present invention also relates to a plug and play manual card reader (1) that can be integrated into a card processor (7). This card reader (1) comprises a card guiding projection (4) and at least one sensor communicating with said card guiding projection (4) and arranged to detect the contact moment of the magnetic card with the magnetic reader head. The card reader (1) further comprises an anti-skimming device (9) optionally communicating with the guiding projection (4).
In another aspect, the present invention relates to a bezel (2) disposed in the card reader (1) slot (3). The bezel (2) comprises a card guiding projection (4) extending outwardly from the magnetic reader head (8) in the card entry direction of the card reader (1). As described above, an anti-skimming device (9) and a sensor (5) are disposed inside the card guiding projection (4). To implement the card reader (1) in the existing card processors, a separate (new) bezel comprising the same connection points with the existing bezel can be designed so as to provide the features according to the present invention and replaced therewith.
Claims (11)
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
NL2012492A NL2012492B1 (en) | 2014-03-21 | 2014-03-21 | Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same. |
PCT/NL2015/050182 WO2015142179A1 (en) | 2014-03-21 | 2015-03-20 | Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same |
ARP150100854A AR100200A1 (en) | 2014-03-21 | 2015-03-20 | METHOD FOR PREVENT COPYING OF MAGNETIC CARDS IN MANUAL CARD PROCESSORS, AND DEVICE FOR IT |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
NL2012492A NL2012492B1 (en) | 2014-03-21 | 2014-03-21 | Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same. |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
NL2012492A true NL2012492A (en) | 2015-12-10 |
NL2012492B1 NL2012492B1 (en) | 2016-01-18 |
Family
ID=50792501
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
NL2012492A NL2012492B1 (en) | 2014-03-21 | 2014-03-21 | Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same. |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
AR (1) | AR100200A1 (en) |
NL (1) | NL2012492B1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2015142179A1 (en) |
Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102005043317B3 (en) * | 2005-09-12 | 2007-04-12 | Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh | Method and device for generating an electromagnetic protective field for a card reader |
WO2013001937A1 (en) * | 2011-06-29 | 2013-01-03 | 日本電産サンキョー株式会社 | Card insertion unit and card reader |
US20130299582A1 (en) * | 2010-01-27 | 2013-11-14 | Nidec Sankyo Corporation | Card reader |
Family Cites Families (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP3806271B2 (en) | 1999-07-09 | 2006-08-09 | 日本電産サンキョー株式会社 | Magnetic card transaction device |
JP3884348B2 (en) | 2002-08-02 | 2007-02-21 | 日立オムロンターミナルソリューションズ株式会社 | Card reader |
TR200401513A1 (en) | 2004-06-24 | 2006-01-23 | Kron�K Elektron�K Elektron�K Ve B�Lg�Sayar S�Stemler� Sanay� T�Caret L�M�Ted ��Rket� | Magnetic card reading device. |
WO2008057057A1 (en) | 2006-11-10 | 2008-05-15 | Cihat Celik Basar | A state control sensor activating and/or deactivating an anti-fraud device and a magnetic card reader/writer for an sst or an atm |
RU2013115276A (en) | 2010-10-01 | 2014-11-20 | Кроник Электрик Электроник Ве Билгисаяр Системлери Санайи Тикарет Лимитед Сиркети | SELF-SERVICE TERMINAL, MODULE PREVENTING FRAUDENT COPY OF DATA FROM THE CARD, DEVICE FOR READING FROM THE CARD, EXTERNAL CAPACITY-RUNNING CAPITAL |
-
2014
- 2014-03-21 NL NL2012492A patent/NL2012492B1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
-
2015
- 2015-03-20 WO PCT/NL2015/050182 patent/WO2015142179A1/en active Application Filing
- 2015-03-20 AR ARP150100854A patent/AR100200A1/en unknown
Patent Citations (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102005043317B3 (en) * | 2005-09-12 | 2007-04-12 | Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh | Method and device for generating an electromagnetic protective field for a card reader |
US20130299582A1 (en) * | 2010-01-27 | 2013-11-14 | Nidec Sankyo Corporation | Card reader |
WO2013001937A1 (en) * | 2011-06-29 | 2013-01-03 | 日本電産サンキョー株式会社 | Card insertion unit and card reader |
EP2728515A1 (en) * | 2011-06-29 | 2014-05-07 | Nidec Sankyo Corporation | Card insertion unit and card reader |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
WO2015142179A1 (en) | 2015-09-24 |
NL2012492B1 (en) | 2016-01-18 |
AR100200A1 (en) | 2016-09-21 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
CN101263507B (en) | Method for producing an electromagnetic protection field for a card-reading device | |
US8584947B2 (en) | Fraud prevention | |
US8915434B2 (en) | Fraud prevention | |
US8496171B2 (en) | Fraud prevention | |
US9734363B2 (en) | Card reader | |
US7185806B2 (en) | Financial and similar identification cards read by magnetic swipe card readers and methods relating thereto | |
CA2755435C (en) | Card feed unit, read out unit, atm and method | |
CN108780510B (en) | Reverse side recording card reader | |
US10152615B2 (en) | Fraud prevention | |
KR20120128646A (en) | Card reader | |
JP7149113B2 (en) | Card reader and foreign object detection method | |
JP2009151762A (en) | Card reader device and automatic teller machine | |
JP4857428B2 (en) | Medium processing apparatus and control method thereof | |
JP2010170379A (en) | Transaction processing apparatus | |
US8704633B2 (en) | Fraud prevention | |
NL2012492B1 (en) | Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same. | |
CN107369239A (en) | Bank note magnetic buries safety line anti-counterfeiting detection apparatus and method entirely | |
JP6225273B2 (en) | Card insertion / discharge unit, card processing apparatus and automatic transaction apparatus | |
JP7219557B2 (en) | Card reader and foreign object detection method | |
JP2009181251A (en) | Automatic teller machine | |
NL2016916B1 (en) | A self service terminal and a method | |
KR20210081490A (en) | Anti skimming device | |
JP2018055573A (en) | Card processing apparatus and method of controlling card processing apparatus | |
WO2016009697A1 (en) | Automatic transaction device | |
US20170263083A1 (en) | Financial device and method of controlling financial device |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
MM | Lapsed because of non-payment of the annual fee |
Effective date: 20210401 |