NL2012492A - Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same. - Google Patents

Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same. Download PDF

Info

Publication number
NL2012492A
NL2012492A NL2012492A NL2012492A NL2012492A NL 2012492 A NL2012492 A NL 2012492A NL 2012492 A NL2012492 A NL 2012492A NL 2012492 A NL2012492 A NL 2012492A NL 2012492 A NL2012492 A NL 2012492A
Authority
NL
Netherlands
Prior art keywords
card
magnetic
slot
reader
sensor
Prior art date
Application number
NL2012492A
Other languages
Dutch (nl)
Other versions
NL2012492B1 (en
Inventor
Yesil Ismet
Devrim Kosal Alp
Celik Basar Cihat
Original Assignee
Tmd Holding B V
Kronik Elektronik Elektrik Ve Bilgisayar Sistemleri Sanayi Ticaret Ltd Sirketi
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Tmd Holding B V, Kronik Elektronik Elektrik Ve Bilgisayar Sistemleri Sanayi Ticaret Ltd Sirketi filed Critical Tmd Holding B V
Priority to NL2012492A priority Critical patent/NL2012492B1/en
Priority to PCT/NL2015/050182 priority patent/WO2015142179A1/en
Priority to ARP150100854A priority patent/AR100200A1/en
Publication of NL2012492A publication Critical patent/NL2012492A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of NL2012492B1 publication Critical patent/NL2012492B1/en

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K7/00—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
    • G06K7/08—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by means detecting the change of an electrostatic or magnetic field, e.g. by detecting change of capacitance between electrodes
    • G06K7/082—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by means detecting the change of an electrostatic or magnetic field, e.g. by detecting change of capacitance between electrodes using inductive or magnetic sensors
    • G06K7/087—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by means detecting the change of an electrostatic or magnetic field, e.g. by detecting change of capacitance between electrodes using inductive or magnetic sensors flux-sensitive, e.g. magnetic, detectors
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K13/00—Conveying record carriers from one station to another, e.g. from stack to punching mechanism
    • G06K13/02—Conveying record carriers from one station to another, e.g. from stack to punching mechanism the record carrier having longitudinal dimension comparable with transverse dimension, e.g. punched card
    • G06K13/08—Feeding or discharging cards

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Artificial Intelligence (AREA)
  • Computer Vision & Pattern Recognition (AREA)
  • Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)

Description

Title: Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same
Technical Field
The present invention relates to a method and device thereof for preventing card skimming in card processors such as ATMs or self-service terminals (SST) where operations are carried out with magnetic stripe cards. The present invention particularly relates to a method and device capable of providing real-time active protection for the manual card readers.
Background of Invention
In self-service terminals, information on the magnetic stripe card storing the user information can be read by automatic (motorized) or manual (DIP) readers. Motorized or manual use of card readers in the self-service terminals varies according to the country or region depending on the usage habits. For example, in the United States manual type (DIP) readers are used more widely.
In the SSTs such as ATMs, another card reader (skimming device/card skimmer) is placed by hiding thereof in front of the card entry slot of the ATM in order to obtain the data on the magnetic stripe cards in a fraudulent manner. Thus, the magnetic stripe card is first read by passing through this skimming device and then it is read by the actual reader by passing through the card reader of ATM, thus, card information is copied without being noticed by the user. User's PIN number can be recorded by means of a hidden camera or a fake keypad. Copied cards are created using the information on the cards and user's account can be accessed by the PIN number.
Manual card readers operate inherently different from the motorized readers. In the motorized card readers, when the card is fed by the user through the card entry slot, the card is automatically read by being taken into the card reader and again automatically fed out. In the DIP readers, the motion required for the card to be read is controlled by the user during the user directly pushing and/or pulling the card.
In motorized type readers, different solutions for preventing card skimming attacks are available. As disclosed in EP1782404, owned by the instant applicants, protection can be provided by generating jamming signals preventing the skimming device to operate when the magnetic stripe card is out of the card reader. Again in motorized type readers, solutions preventing suspicious transactions to be carried out by detecting foreign objects in front of the card reader entry and then disabling the reader are available.
Likewise, in the manual card readers, various applications for preventing the externally placed skimming device to achieve the objects thereof are also available. These solutions are based on the principle of detecting the attached skimming device using different sensing means. Various sensors such as ultrasonic/capacitive/inductive sensors can be used as sensing means. The present solution proposed also by the owners of the invention operates by detecting the presence of the skimming device using a capacitive sensor and then activating the jamming signal preventing the operation of the skimming device. Existing solutions, upon detection of the device, either disable the self-service terminal or enable the terminal to be disabled by preventing the operation of the card reader thereof through continuously generating jamming signals.
Basically, existing solutions are based on the principle of detecting the skimming device. Skimming devices designed in different shapes or having reduced sizes resulting from the advanced technology sometimes can not be detected by the current sensing systems. In this case, since the skimming device can not be detected, copying will occur. In the case of detecting skimming devices by means of existing solutions, self-service terminal will be disabled during the time that passes for dealing with the attack on said self-service terminal, this situation will reduce the customer satisfaction.
In the manual card readers, since the motion required for the card to be read is provided by the user, magnetic stripe reader head is provided at a point close to the surface of the card entry surface. Skimming devices are made in sizes as small as possible for remaining hidden and for not changing the current appearance. Again, skimming devices are generally installed immediately in front of the card entry slot. Thus, the actual reader head of the card reader and reader head of the skimming device are physically likely to be in close proximity. Any jamming field generated due to the magnetic stripe reader heads of the manual card reader and potential skimming device being physically in close proximity poses a risk of preventing the operation of the actual card reader.
In the magnetic stripe cards, information is encoded in 3 longitudinal tracks along the magnetic stripe. The manner of encoding the information on the card is determined by international standards (for example, as in the case of ISO/IEC 7811-6:2008 standard). These standards specify many different characteristics such as physical properties of the cards, magnetic strip dimensions, encoding techniques, information storage formats, etc..
Information on the magnetic stripes is stored by being encoded with the F2F encoding technique specified by ISO. Due to the encoding manner of the magnetic stripes, card information can be read starting from the beginning or end of the card. Because, a synchronization signal and some control characters are needed for the reading operation to start. These signals are provided at the beginning and end of the stripes.
To be able to fully read the information on the card, information on the entire stripe should be readable without interruption. For example, in case of having just the middle portion of the magnetic stripe, information decoding can not be performed due to lack of synchronization and control information. In case of having a particular field at the beginning or end of the magnetic stripe, only information decoding of the existing portions can be possible.
On the magnetic stripe cards used in the SSTs such as the ATMs where monetary transactions are carried out, 3 tracks are provided on the magnetic stripe thereof. Each of these tracks can be interpreted as different information fields. Again, as per ISO, customer's primary account number (PAN) is provided on Track 2. The other tracks vary depending on the application and different kinds of information such as user name can be found thereon. However, when performing transactions in the SSTs, information provided on Track 2 is important. Skimming devices generally just copy Track 2.
On Track 2, 37 numeric data characters and some control signals can be stored. The most important part of this 37 digits is the 16 digit primary account number encoded from the beginning of the stripe (16 is the general use, it can be more or less, maximum 19 digits is allowed). Fraud can be committed by making a copied card only using this information.
The most effective known application while providing protection against skimming devices is the one performed by emitting jamming signals to the location provided with the illegal reader. In this method, jamming field source generates an electromagnetic jamming signal in the vicinity of the card entry area and the magnetic reader head installed for the purpose of card skimming is prevented from reading the card by means of this generated signal. (See EP1782404 or WO 2012/060690 for further information).
Even a partial disruption of the information on the magnetic stripes when being read by the skimming device can prevent the information on the card to be fully read. Preferred is that the skimming equipment does not receive any information, however, copying will not be realized with incomplete information.
Since card reading operation in the motorized card readers is performed when the card is physically completely disposed inside the reader, operation of any externally installed skimming device can be prevented by generating jamming signals. When the card is physically outside, jamming signals prevent the operation of the skimming device. When the card is inside, jamming signals are stopped and actual card reader reads the card. The protective jamming signals are generated when the card is outside since outside or inside presence of the card can be directly or indirectly detected in the motorized card readers.
In manual card readers, the card is not completely taken into the card reader and reading operation carried out by the actual reader takes place when the card is passed on the reader by the force provided manually. In the manual card readers, actual reader head is positioned in close proximity to the card entry since the size thereof is inherently small and the motion required for the reading operation is carried out by the user. In the existing manual (DIP) readers, an effective protection against copying as in the case of motorized type readers can not be provided due to this structure thereof.
Arrangements based on detecting the presence of a shimming device by means of various sensors (capacitive/inductive/ultrasonic/infrared etc.) can not perform detection in all cases as well as cause the SST to be completely disabled for the sake of protection.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF INVENTION
The object of the present invention is to effectively prevent copying the magnetic stripe cards in the manual card readers.
The present invention, in accordance with the purpose thereof, relates to a method for preventing the magnetic card data to be copied by means of a skimming device in a card processor having a slot for feeding the magnetic card and a manual card reader, wherein the method comprises the following steps of: - generating jamming signals in the vicinity of the slot; - detecting contacting of the magnetic card fed through the slot with the reader of the manual card reader; - stopping the jamming signals; - reading of the magnetic card data by the manual card reader; - detecting the cessation of contact of the magnetic card with the card reader; and - generating jamming signals in the vicinity of the slot.
In another aspect, the present invention is intended to perform the aforementioned method steps for preventing the magnetic card data to be copied by a skimming device in the manual card reader (1).
In another aspect, the present invention relates to a card processor. The card processor comprises a slot for feeding a magnetic card therethrough, a manual card reader with a magnetic reader head and at least one anti-skimming device for preventing the magnetic card data to be copied by a skimming device. The manual card reader of the card processor according to the present invention comprises a card guiding projection extending outwardly from the magnetic reader head in the card entry direction.
The card processor according to the present invention further comprises at least one sensor communicating with the guiding projection. Said sensor is arranged to detect the contact of the magnetic card with the magnetic reader head. Further, the anti-skimming device of the card processor is arranged so as to be effective along the guiding projection and it preferably communicates with the guiding projection.
With the modification of the card entry and detection of the position of the card as in the present invention, jamming signals preventing the skimming device to operate can be generated during the card placement and retrieval operations until the card reaches the actual reader. Thus, generated jamming signals prevent the skimming device to obtain complete card information, whereas the actual reader can read the card information in a reliable manner.
DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES
Figure 1 is a top view of the card reader together with the card guiding projection.
Figure 2 is a perspective view of the card reader to together with the card guiding projection.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTS IN THE FIGURES
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INVENTION
The card processor according to the present invention comprises a manual magnetic card reader (1) known from the art. Here, "card processor" is a generic term, wherein it comprises any self-service terminal (SST) such as an ATM (Automated Teller Machine). A slot (3) for feeding the magnetic card therethrough is formed at the front portion of the card reader (1). The card reader (1) comprises a magnetic reader head (8) physically contacting the stripe on the card in the entry direction of the magnetic card to the card reader (1). A card guiding projection (4) extending outwardly from the magnetic reader head (8) is formed in the card entry direction of the card reader (1). Magnetic reader head (8) is disposed behind the card entry slot (3) by a certain distance thanks to the card guiding projection (4). The card guiding projection (4) can be integral to the card reader (1) as well as it can have a detachable configuration from the card reader (1).
As seen in Figure 1, a sensor (5) detecting the moment when the magnetic card reaches the magnetic reader head (8) communicates with the card guiding projection (4). The sensor (5) is preferably disposed inside a recess (6) formed on the card guiding projection (4). In addition to the sensor (5), a motion direction sensor (10) disposed spaced apart from said sensor (5) in the card motion direction can be optionally used. This motion direction sensor (10) can be disposed independently from the card guiding projection (4) at an appropriate location, for example, at the front portion of the card reader (1).
Thus, it can be possible to determine motion direction of the magnetic card as well as the moment when the card reaches the magnetic reader head (8). The sensors (5, 10) used according to the preferred embodiment of the present invention are infrared type sensors, wherein other sensor types known in the art can also be used.
The card processor according to the present invention further comprises an anti-skimming device (9). Such an anti-skimming device can be that of disclosed in EP1782404 or EP1067474 and this device preferably comprises a coil capable of emitting an electromagnetic field. The coil may have various forms, i.e. utilization of a coil in the form of a rod is preferred according to the preferred embodiment of the present invention. On the other hand, as disclosed in WO 2012/060690, the jamming electromagnetic field can be provided with a spatially varying characteristic by being emitted through a plurality of coils. By emission of the jamming signals through a plurality of sources, carrying out copying by the skimming device using two reader heads can be prevented.
As seen in Figure 1, the anti-skimming device (9) is associated with the card guiding projection (4) so as to be effective in the vicinity of the card entry slot (3). The anti-skimming device (9) is preferably disposed inside the recess (6) formed on the card guiding projection (4). Again, the electromagnetic field emitted from the anti-skimming device (9) also acts in the vicinity of the card guiding projection (4). Thus, the areas where skimming device can be installed are placed under the protection of the jamming signals. According to an embodiment of the present invention, jamming signals are continuously provided until the magnetic card contacts the magnetic reader head (8). When contact of the magnetic card with the magnetic reader head (8) is detected by the sensor (5), emission of the jamming signals is stopped. Thus, within the time that it takes for the card to physically reach the magnetic reader head (8), jamming signal prevents the skimming device from reading the card data.
The timing required for the generation of jamming signals is basically received from the sensor (5) or obtained by associating said sensor (5) with the motion direction sensor (10), however, jamming signal control timing can be applied in various ways according to the technical specifications of the card reader. For example, according to the technical specifications of the card reader (1), jamming signal field can be generated or removed immediately after or by a certain time after the contact information is received from the sensor (5) (or by means of associating the sensor (5) with the motion direction sensor (10)).
In the case of removing the magnetic card from the card processor (7), cessation of the card's contact with the magnetic reader head (8) is detected again by the sensor (5) and protection is provided by re-activating the jamming signals. (Again, immediately or with a certain delay signals can be activated) Thus, protection signals are disabled when the magnetic stripe card is in contact with the magnetic reader head (8) (card reader seamlessly reads the magnetic card as it should be) and all the other times jamming signals are activated.
The card guiding projection (4) can be configured so as to correspond only to the magnetic stripe portion of the card or it can also be configured so as to correspond to the magnetic stripe portion as well as the other portion without the stripe. The card guiding projection (4) comprises a slot portion allowing the card to enter into the card reader (1) on the front face thereof. In other words, it comprises a structure preventing the card skimming device to enter into the card guiding projection (4). According to the preferred embodiment of the present invention, the distance between the front face of the card guiding projection (4) and the magnetic reader head (8) may be 1 to 6 cm. A distance of approximately 4 cm can be advantageous since it is at a sufficient level to provide protection as well as it provides an ergonomically comfortable use. Because when a longitudinal jamming signal source (a rod-like signal source) is used, jamming electromagnetic field is effectively provided along the slot (3) as well as the card guiding projection (4).
Sensors (5) communicate with a control circuit so as to exchange signals and control of the jamming signals is carried out by means of the control circuit comprised in the card reader (1). This control can be alternatively carried out by means of an external control layer. Again, control circuit can preferably generate a variety of warnings in case of errors by continuously controlling the functional state of the sensors (5) and jamming signal sources. It can be again continuously controlled likewise in the attacks performed to prevent operation of the sensors.
Various sensors can also be used in the vicinity of the card entry slot (3) in addition to the active protection area provided by the present invention. For example, as disclosed in the documents WO 2008/057057 or EP1394728, a foreign device at the card entry area can be detected by means of various sensors. Sensors detecting the presence of foreign objects can communicate with the anti-skimming device (9) by means of a control circuit. Thus, jamming signals can be provided in the vicinity of the slot (3) just after the foreign object is detected or presence of the foreign object can be used for information purposes to generate alarms.
The present invention also relates to a plug and play manual card reader (1) that can be integrated into a card processor (7). This card reader (1) comprises a card guiding projection (4) and at least one sensor communicating with said card guiding projection (4) and arranged to detect the contact moment of the magnetic card with the magnetic reader head. The card reader (1) further comprises an anti-skimming device (9) optionally communicating with the guiding projection (4).
In another aspect, the present invention relates to a bezel (2) disposed in the card reader (1) slot (3). The bezel (2) comprises a card guiding projection (4) extending outwardly from the magnetic reader head (8) in the card entry direction of the card reader (1). As described above, an anti-skimming device (9) and a sensor (5) are disposed inside the card guiding projection (4). To implement the card reader (1) in the existing card processors, a separate (new) bezel comprising the same connection points with the existing bezel can be designed so as to provide the features according to the present invention and replaced therewith.

Claims (11)

1. Handmatige kaartleeseenheid (1), omvattende een gleuf (3) om een magnetische kaart doorheen te voeren, een magnetische leeskop (8) en tenminste een anti-skim apparaat (9) om pogingen tegen te gaan dat magnetische kaartgegevens door een skim apparaat worden gekopieerd, met het kenmerk dat de kaartleeseenheid voorts een uitstekend deel voor kaartgeleiding (4) omvat dat zich buitenwaarts van de magnetische leeskop (8) vandaan uitstrekt in een kaart ingangsrichting, en een sensor (5) die is ingericht om het contactmoment van de magnetische kaart met de magnetische leeskop (8) te detecteren, waarbij de sensor (5) communiceert met het uitstekend deel voor kaartgeleiding (4).A manual card reader (1), comprising a slot (3) for passing through a magnetic card, a magnetic read head (8) and at least one anti-skim device (9) to prevent attempts to displace magnetic card data through a skim device can be copied, characterized in that the card reader unit further comprises a card guide projection (4) extending outwardly from the magnetic read head (8) in a card input direction, and a sensor (5) adapted to the contact moment of the detect a magnetic card with the magnetic reading head (8), the sensor (5) communicating with the card guide projection (4). 2. Kaartleeseenheid volgens conclusie 1, met het kenmerk dat het tenminste ene anti-skim apparaat (9) communiceert met het uitstekend deel voor kaartgeleiding (4).The card reader according to claim 1, characterized in that the at least one anti-skim device (9) communicates with the card guide projection (4). 3. Kaartleeseenheid volgens conclusie 1, met het kenmerk dat deze een bewegingsrichting sensor (10) omvat die op afstand van de sensor (5) is geplaatst.The card reading unit according to claim 1, characterized in that it comprises a movement direction sensor (10) which is placed at a distance from the sensor (5). 4. Kaartleeseenheid volgens conclusie 3, met het kenmerk dat de sensors infrarood sensors zijn.The card reader according to claim 3, characterized in that the sensors are infrared sensors. 5. Kaartleeseenheid volgens conclusie 1, met het kenmerk dat de afstand tussen het voorvlak van het uitstekend deel voor kaartgeleiding (4) en de magnetische leeskop (8) 1 tot 6 cm is.The card reading unit according to claim 1, characterized in that the distance between the front face of the card guide projection (4) and the magnetic reading head (8) is 1 to 6 cm. 6. Kaartleeseenheid volgens conclusie 5, met het kenmerk dat de afstand tussen het voorvlak van het uitstekend deel voor kaartgeleiding (4) en de magnetische leeskop (8) 4 cm is.The card reading unit according to claim 5, characterized in that the distance between the front face of the card guide projection (4) and the magnetic reading head (8) is 4 cm. 7. Kaartleeseenheid volgens conclusie 3, met het kenmerk dat deze een regelschakeling omvat die communiceert met de sensor (5), waarbij de bewegingsrichting sensor (10) en tenminste een anti-skim apparaat (9) om signalen uit te wisselen.The card reading unit according to claim 3, characterized in that it comprises a control circuit that communicates with the sensor (5), the movement direction sensor (10) and at least one anti-skim device (9) for exchanging signals. 8. Kaartprocessor (7), omvattende een gleuf (3) om een magnetische kaart doorheen te voeren, een handmatige kaartleeseenheid (1) met een magnetische leeskop (8) en tenminste een anti-skim apparaat (9) om tegen te gaan dat magnetische kaartgegevens door een skim apparaat worden gekopieerd, met het kenmerk dat de kaartprocessor voorts een uitstekend deel voor kaartgeleiding (4) omvat dat zich buitenwaarts van de magnetische leeskop (8) vandaan uitstrekt in een kaart ingangsrichting, en een sensor (5) die is ingericht om het contactmoment van de magnetische kaart met de magnetische leeskop (8) te detecteren, waarbij de sensor (5) communiceert met het uitstekend deel voor kaartgeleiding (4).A card processor (7) comprising a slot (3) for passing through a magnetic card, a manual card reader (1) with a magnetic read head (8) and at least one anti-skim device (9) to prevent magnetic card data is copied by a skim device, characterized in that the card processor further comprises a protruding part for card guide (4) extending outwardly from the magnetic read head (8) in a card input direction, and a sensor (5) arranged to detect the contact moment of the magnetic card with the magnetic read head (8), the sensor (5) communicating with the card guide projection (4). 9. Werkwijze om pogingen tegen te gaan dat magnetische kaartgegevens door een skim apparaat worden gekopieerd in een kaartprocessor (7) met een gleuf (3) om een magnetische kaart doorheen te voeren, een handmatige kaartleeseenheid (1) en tenminste een anti-skim apparaat (9) om tegen te gaan dat magnetische kaartgegevens door een skim apparaat worden gekopieerd, met het kenmerk dat de werkwijze de volgende stappen omvat: - het genereren van stoorsignalen in de nabijheid van de gleuf (3); - het detecteren dat de magnetische kaart die door de gleuf (3) wordt gevoerd contact maakt met de leeseenheid (1) van de handmatige kaartleeseenheid; - het stoppen van de stoorsignalen; - het lezen van de magnetische kaartgegevens door de handmatige kaartleeseenheid (1); - het detecteren de beëindiging van het contact van de magnetische kaart met de kaartleeseenheid (1); en - het genereren van stoorsignalen in de nabijheid van de gleuf (3).A method of preventing attempts by magnetic card data to be copied by a skim device into a card processor (7) with a slot (3) for passing through a magnetic card, a manual card reader (1) and at least one anti-skim device (9) to prevent magnetic card data from being copied by a skim device, characterized in that the method comprises the following steps: - generating interference signals in the vicinity of the slot (3); - detecting that the magnetic card passed through the slot (3) makes contact with the reading unit (1) of the manual card reading unit; - stopping the interference signals; - reading the magnetic card data by the manual card reader (1); - detecting the termination of the contact of the magnetic card with the card reader (1); and - generating interference signals in the vicinity of the slot (3). 10. Werkwijze om pogingen tegen te gaan dat magnetische kaartgegevens door een skim apparaat worden gekopieerd in een handmatige kaartleeseenheid (1) met een gleuf (3) om een magnetische kaart doorheen te voeren, een magnetische leeskop (8) en tenminste een anti-skim apparaat (9) om tegen te gaan dat magnetische kaartgegevens door een skim apparaat worden gekopieerd, met het kenmerk dat de werkwijze de volgende stappen omvat: - het genereren van stoorsignalen in de nabijheid van de gleuf (3); - het detecteren dat de magnetische kaart die door de gleuf (3) wordt gevoerd contact maakt met de leeseenheid (1) van de handmatige kaartleeseenheid; - het stoppen van de stoorsignalen; - het lezen van de magnetische kaartgegevens door de handmatige kaartleeseenheid (1); - het detecteren van de beëindiging van het contact van de magnetische kaart met de kaartleeseenheid (1); en - het genereren van stoorsignalen in de nabijheid van de gleuf (3).A method to prevent attempts by magnetic card data from being copied by a skim device into a manual card reader (1) with a slot (3) to pass through a magnetic card, a magnetic read head (8) and at least one anti-skim device (9) for preventing magnetic card data from being copied by a skim device, characterized in that the method comprises the following steps: - generating interference signals in the vicinity of the slot (3); - detecting that the magnetic card passed through the slot (3) makes contact with the reading unit (1) of the manual card reading unit; - stopping the interference signals; - reading the magnetic card data by the manual card reader (1); - detecting the termination of the contact of the magnetic card with the card reader (1); and - generating interference signals in the vicinity of the slot (3). 11. Afgeschuind mondstuk (2) dat is opgesteld in een gleuf (3) van een handmatige kaartleeseenheid (1) met een magnetische leeskop (8), waarbij de gleuf (3) een magnetische kaart daardoorheen voert, met het kenmerk dat het mondstuk voorts een uitstekend deel voor kaartgeleiding (4) omvat dat zich buitenwaarts van de magnetische leeskop (8) vandaan uitstrekt in een kaart ingangsrichting, een sensor (5) die is ingericht om het contactmoment van de magnetische kaart met de magnetische leeskop (8) te detecteren, en tenminste een anti-skim apparaat (9) om pogingen tegen te gaan dat magnetische kaartgegevens door een skim apparaat worden gekopieerd, waarbij de sensor (5) communiceert met het uitstekend deel voor kaartgeleiding (4).A chamfered nozzle (2) disposed in a slot (3) of a manual card reader (1) with a magnetic read head (8), the slot (3) passing a magnetic card therethrough, characterized in that the nozzle further includes a protruding part for card guide (4) extending outwardly from the magnetic read head (8) in a card input direction, a sensor (5) adapted to detect the moment of contact of the magnetic card with the magnetic read head (8) , and at least one anti-skim device (9) to prevent attempts to copy magnetic card data through a skim device, the sensor (5) communicating with the card guide projection (4).
NL2012492A 2014-03-21 2014-03-21 Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same. NL2012492B1 (en)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
NL2012492A NL2012492B1 (en) 2014-03-21 2014-03-21 Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same.
PCT/NL2015/050182 WO2015142179A1 (en) 2014-03-21 2015-03-20 Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same
ARP150100854A AR100200A1 (en) 2014-03-21 2015-03-20 METHOD FOR PREVENT COPYING OF MAGNETIC CARDS IN MANUAL CARD PROCESSORS, AND DEVICE FOR IT

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
NL2012492A NL2012492B1 (en) 2014-03-21 2014-03-21 Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same.

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
NL2012492A true NL2012492A (en) 2015-12-10
NL2012492B1 NL2012492B1 (en) 2016-01-18

Family

ID=50792501

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
NL2012492A NL2012492B1 (en) 2014-03-21 2014-03-21 Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same.

Country Status (3)

Country Link
AR (1) AR100200A1 (en)
NL (1) NL2012492B1 (en)
WO (1) WO2015142179A1 (en)

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102005043317B3 (en) * 2005-09-12 2007-04-12 Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh Method and device for generating an electromagnetic protective field for a card reader
WO2013001937A1 (en) * 2011-06-29 2013-01-03 日本電産サンキョー株式会社 Card insertion unit and card reader
US20130299582A1 (en) * 2010-01-27 2013-11-14 Nidec Sankyo Corporation Card reader

Family Cites Families (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP3806271B2 (en) 1999-07-09 2006-08-09 日本電産サンキョー株式会社 Magnetic card transaction device
JP3884348B2 (en) 2002-08-02 2007-02-21 日立オムロンターミナルソリューションズ株式会社 Card reader
TR200401513A1 (en) 2004-06-24 2006-01-23 Kron�K Elektron�K Elektron�K Ve B�Lg�Sayar S�Stemler� Sanay� T�Caret L�M�Ted ��Rket� Magnetic card reading device.
WO2008057057A1 (en) 2006-11-10 2008-05-15 Cihat Celik Basar A state control sensor activating and/or deactivating an anti-fraud device and a magnetic card reader/writer for an sst or an atm
RU2013115276A (en) 2010-10-01 2014-11-20 Кроник Электрик Электроник Ве Билгисаяр Системлери Санайи Тикарет Лимитед Сиркети SELF-SERVICE TERMINAL, MODULE PREVENTING FRAUDENT COPY OF DATA FROM THE CARD, DEVICE FOR READING FROM THE CARD, EXTERNAL CAPACITY-RUNNING CAPITAL

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102005043317B3 (en) * 2005-09-12 2007-04-12 Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh Method and device for generating an electromagnetic protective field for a card reader
US20130299582A1 (en) * 2010-01-27 2013-11-14 Nidec Sankyo Corporation Card reader
WO2013001937A1 (en) * 2011-06-29 2013-01-03 日本電産サンキョー株式会社 Card insertion unit and card reader
EP2728515A1 (en) * 2011-06-29 2014-05-07 Nidec Sankyo Corporation Card insertion unit and card reader

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2015142179A1 (en) 2015-09-24
NL2012492B1 (en) 2016-01-18
AR100200A1 (en) 2016-09-21

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN101263507B (en) Method for producing an electromagnetic protection field for a card-reading device
US8584947B2 (en) Fraud prevention
US8915434B2 (en) Fraud prevention
US8496171B2 (en) Fraud prevention
US9734363B2 (en) Card reader
US7185806B2 (en) Financial and similar identification cards read by magnetic swipe card readers and methods relating thereto
CA2755435C (en) Card feed unit, read out unit, atm and method
CN108780510B (en) Reverse side recording card reader
US10152615B2 (en) Fraud prevention
KR20120128646A (en) Card reader
JP7149113B2 (en) Card reader and foreign object detection method
JP2009151762A (en) Card reader device and automatic teller machine
JP4857428B2 (en) Medium processing apparatus and control method thereof
JP2010170379A (en) Transaction processing apparatus
US8704633B2 (en) Fraud prevention
NL2012492B1 (en) Method for preventing copying of magnetic cards in manual card processors and device for same.
CN107369239A (en) Bank note magnetic buries safety line anti-counterfeiting detection apparatus and method entirely
JP6225273B2 (en) Card insertion / discharge unit, card processing apparatus and automatic transaction apparatus
JP7219557B2 (en) Card reader and foreign object detection method
JP2009181251A (en) Automatic teller machine
NL2016916B1 (en) A self service terminal and a method
KR20210081490A (en) Anti skimming device
JP2018055573A (en) Card processing apparatus and method of controlling card processing apparatus
WO2016009697A1 (en) Automatic transaction device
US20170263083A1 (en) Financial device and method of controlling financial device

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
MM Lapsed because of non-payment of the annual fee

Effective date: 20210401