KR20210086998A - The one-way-ring/two-way-ring network QRN KEY distribution way adopted to hybrid-quantum channel and The hybrid quantum communication unit and The hybrid quantum communication closure net system distributing different kinds of key - Google Patents

Abstract

In an Alice/Bob QRN server, an Alice/Bob generates, as a seed, a random quantum random number generated by an Alice/Bob quantum random number generator (QRNG) and generates a quantum symmetric key of a half mirror effect symmetric cryptographic algorithm through a cryptographic operation. A random quantum random number generated by an eve QRNG is used as a seed to generate an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm asymmetric cryptographic algorithm eve quantum private key. The new quantum random number is generated and the cryptographic operation is performed to generate the eve quantum public key. According to the present invention, communication costs are minimized.

Description

ONE-WAY-RING/TWO-WAY-RING NETWORK QRN KEY distribution method applied to HYBRID-QUANTUM CHANNEL and hybrid quantum communication system terminal and heterogeneous network QRN KEY distribution Hybrid quantum communication closed network system {The one-way-ring/two- way-ring network QRN KEY distribution way adopted to hybrid-quantum channel and The hybrid quantum communication unit and The hybrid quantum communication closure net system distributing different kinds of key}

term definition,

The QRN (Quantum Random Number) KEY distribution technology used in the present invention is "a quantum random number generated by a 2.5 mm × 2.5 mm (5 mm × 5 mm) QRNG (Quantum Random Number Generator) chip developed by IDQ and SK Telecom as a source. 'QUANTUM' includes the meaning of 'QRN (Quantum Random Number)' to generate a key.

That is, quantum communication such as PRN (Pseudo Random Number), an unpredictable natural (true) random number TRN (True Random Number), IDQ using quantum (photon) as a source by conventional known random number program There has been a random number generator that generates QRN (Quantum Random Number) developed in the field.

QUANTUM of the present invention includes the meaning of QRN (Quantum Random Number), and QKD (Quantum Key Distribution) specifically includes the meaning of QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution).

If it is described in detail as 'QRN KEY', which generates a KEY using QRN (Quantum Random Number) generated by a QRNG (Quantum Random Number Generator) chip, the meaning of QRN (Quantum Random Number) KEY is included.

'QUANTUM KEY = QRN(Quantum Random Number) KEY = Quantum Random Number Key'

Hereinafter, a Quantum Random Number (QRN) KEY, which is a quantum random number key, is denoted as a QRN KEY.

The Quantum Random Number Edge Server is an edge server (EDGE SEVER) installed in a local terminal and is a QRN (Quantum Random Number) edge server that generates a key by generating a quantum random number.

QRN (Quantum Random Number) generated by QRN (Quantum Random Number) generated by Chip QRN (Quantum Random Number) using KEY QRN using quantum random number encryption key between Alice and Bob at two points (Quantum Random Number) SERVER is hereinafter referred to as QRN SERVER.

The present invention is differentiated from the prior art by a Quantum Random Number Key Distribution (QKD) including a QRN (Quantum Random Number) KEY generation technology as main features.

In particular, it has major novelty and inventive step for One-Way-Ring/Two-Way-Ring Network QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution).

As a transitional quantum communication system, it is a hybrid quantum communication network system that combines a quantum communication network and a classical communication network. It is a response to the Evil Twin attack on Wi-Fi access points (APs) using unlicensed frequencies, etc., and the closure of local governments (private companies), etc. It is a One-Way-Ring/Two-Way-Ring Network QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution) technology related to wireless self-communication network construction.

In one embodiment, a 2.5 mm × 2.5 mm (5 mm × 5 mm) QRNG (Quantum Random Number Generator) chip developed by IDQ and SK Telecom is applied.

It features a QRN (Quantum Random Number) KEY Encrypt TLS (Transport Layer Security protocol) MODULE based on a physical PUF (eFUSE)-TRNG (QRNG) SoC chip of 6×6 mm or less.

An embodiment of applying the technology to disconnect the eFUSE circuit after extracting the PIN data of the PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) chip using the semiconductor process deviation. In this technology, eFUSE, a concept in a narrow sense, and PUF, a concept in light, are the same concept.

In addition, as an embodiment of the implementation of a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF), an Internet Protocol Address (IP address) and log information (ID/Password) are generated between an Access Controller (AC) and an Access Point (AP) with a Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG). Number Generator) generates a quantum random number as a seed, and the NFC-PUF input in NFC (Near Field Communication) is replaced with OTP (One Time Password) or a physical PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) that is replaced during regular monthly inspections. ) is characterized.

In addition, generating a quantum random number through a QRNG (Quantum Random Number Generator) chip is a narrowly defined TRNG (True Random Number Generator) concept, and a narrowly defined QRNG is the same concept as a broadly defined TRNG.

A Man in the Middle (MitM) attack is one in which an attacker secretly intercepts communications between two parties in order to eavesdrop or modify moving traffic. Attackers can use MitM attacks to steal login credentials or personal information, spy on victims, disrupt communication, or destroy data.

MitM can be prevented with encryption, but this attack is very difficult to detect because an attacker will either divert traffic to a phishing site designed to appear legitimate, or will acquire or log the traffic and then deliver it to its intended destination.

In addition, with the advent of quantum computers, general encryption methods are no longer a countermeasure.

The quantum data of the present invention will be able to fundamentally block the MitM attack based on the theory that copying is impossible.

However, as in the present invention, in a state where transitional quantum communication and non-quantum communication are configured as a hybrid system, the Evil Twin attack pretends to be a normal Wi-Fi access point (AP), but the hacker completely controls all information transmitted by the user. It can be monitored, collected and manipulated.

In the present invention, a quantum random number edge server, a TLS (Transport Layer Security protocol) encryption protocol device to strengthen the response to MitM attacks in the hybrid (classic) quantum communication section, is implemented in quantum cryptography based on a physical QRNG SoC chip. do it with

The present invention is an important feature of the QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution) technology of the QRN (Quantum Random Number) KEY in the hybrid quantum communication network using the licensed frequency ISP operator network and the unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network in the wireless communication section.

It is related to crime prevention CCTV, broadcasting device, automatic control, switchboard, solar power generation, smart phone, industrial portable terminal, CLOUD SERVER, G-Cloue, broadcasting, worker safety equipment to which the Industrial Safety and Health Act applies.

Known Republic of Korea Patent Publication No. 10-1918976 (application date 2017.03.28)

The known 'cloud security system' is,

The terminal pseudo-random number generator inside the quantum terminal and the cloud pseudo-random number generator inside the cloud server are composed of a microprocessor, and the pseudo-random number of the terminal pseudo-random number generator and the pseudo-random number of the cloud pseudo-random number generator are the same by the program-input pseudo-random number program. The quantum terminal is composed of a terminal pseudo random number generator, a terminal quantum random number generator, a security authentication switch, and a terminal OTP memory, and the terminal quantum random number generator is a terminal random number source generator, terminal quantum detection diode, terminal quantum random pulse generator, terminal and a quantum random number control unit, wherein the terminal random number source generator emits quantum particles, the terminal quantum detection diode detects quantum particles generated from the terminal random number source generator, and the terminal quantum random pulse generator detects the terminal quantum. A quantum particle event is detected from the diode to generate a random pulse corresponding to the detection of the quantum particle, and the terminal quantum random number control unit is composed of a microprocessor, and is a terminal quantum random number as a random random number source generated through the terminal quantum random pulse generator. However, when the cloud server accesses the quantum terminal, the terminal pseudo-random number generator generates a pseudo-random number by a program, generates a symmetric encryption key, and transmits it to the terminal quantum random number control unit of the terminal quantum random number generator, and the terminal quantum random number control unit receives the symmetric encryption key, generates a terminal asymmetric encryption key through the terminal quantum random number, stores the symmetric encryption key and the terminal asymmetric encryption key in the terminal OTP memory, and transmits the terminal asymmetric encryption key to the cloud server, and transmits the terminal asymmetric encryption key to the cloud server inside the cloud server. The pseudo-random number generator generates a pseudo-random number by a program, generates a symmetric encryption key, generates a cloud symmetric encryption key encrypted with the terminal asymmetric encryption key, and transmits it to the terminal quantum random number control unit inside the quantum terminal, and the terminal quantum random number control unit is the cloud The cloud symmetric encryption key received from the server is decrypted with the terminal asymmetric encryption key stored in the terminal OTP memory, and if it matches the symmetric encryption key stored in the OTP memory, the security authentication switch is turned on and connected to the login network, Delete the terminal asymmetric encryption key in the terminal OTP memory and log out (Log-o ut), the security authentication switch is OFF, and it is a cloud security system, characterized in that it blocks the network.

Announced iTWIN USB (https://youtu.be/UWj-weu_CXs).

In the VPN implemented by S / W or H / W method,

Although the S/W method is costly and simple to use, there is a problem in that it is vulnerable to attacks by hackers. Although the H/W method is relatively strong against attacks by hackers, it has a problem of high cost and large volume.

Taking advantage of the above advantages and disadvantages, iTWIN is equipped with AES 256bit encryption software on a pair of USBs, and enables encrypted communication between only a pair of iTWINs anywhere in the world.

As a major feature, the conventional S/W method was weak in security (ID/PW), and the H/W method was fixedly used in a designated place, but iTWIN applies the 3CH authentication platform method to exchange IP 1:1 It has a feature that provides VPN communication.

However, it was slow and the general users were more curious about the design and use it than paying $100 to use it. (Currently out of business and out of service)

Announced 'Crime-prevention CCTV monitoring device with enhanced physical redundant network separation security and its control method'

In the physical network separation,

This is a technology that corrects errors in the state of the physical structure in which one of the physical input/output lines of the I/O ports of the 1st and 2nd motherboards is forcibly cut off. It is a method of transmitting images to a mobile phone in one direction only, using a data input/output cable One of them is physically cut off, so it is impossible to hack.

PCT/SG2012/000118 (2012.04.04)

A method for remote access to data stored on a host system from a remote system via a data link, the method comprising the steps of: connecting a first module and a second module to the host system, the first module initially being connected to and associated with the second module; storing validation password data for verifying the identity of the first module on the second module; and upon connecting the removed first module to the remote system to establish a secure communication channel between said first and second modules across said data link to access said data, the host system having the second module connected thereto, entering a user password for generating user password data for verification by the second module based on the stored validation password data.

10-2012-0042383 (2012.04.24)

The local server is a local server for controlling a surveillance camera and transmitting image data to a personal portable terminal, and is configured including a first main board and a second main board; the first main board includes a first hard disk, a first LAN card, and an internal network LAN port; the second main board is configured to include a second LAN card, an external network LAN port, and a circuit breaker, and is connected and connected to the personal portable terminal through the wireless network network of the ISP operator through the external network LAN port; The video data line output from the surveillance camera is branched through the distributor, and one line is uploaded to the first main board through the internal network LAN port, and the video data is stored in the first hard disk; The other line is connected to the second main board through the breaker, but the contact of the breaker is blocked, and the output image data of the surveillance camera cannot be uploaded to the second main board; When a dangerous event signal occurs in the measuring unit composed of any one or more of a temperature sensor, fire receiver, intrusion detection sensor, PLC control panel, and automatic control panel when the contact point of the circuit breaker is blocked, the blocking contact of the circuit breaker is converted to a connection contact and the monitoring camera A crime prevention CCTV monitoring device with enhanced physical dual network separation security, characterized in that after uploading the output image data to the second main board, the image data is transmitted to a personal portable terminal through a wireless network.

10-2012-0089227 (2012.08.16)

In the security authentication terminal device for performing intelligent communication,

a secret key module for providing, to the security authentication terminal device, a secret key for transmitting a public key for the security authentication terminal device to communicate using a public key encryption method to an external device using a secret key encryption method; a private key module for providing a private key for generating the public key to the secure authentication terminal device; A serial number storage unit for storing the serial number of the security authentication terminal device; And the serial number is stored in the serial number storage unit, after the secret key is extracted to the outside of the security authentication terminal device, the secret key is the A security authentication terminal device comprising a fuse unit for blocking a connection path to an interface extracted to the outside of the security authentication terminal device, wherein at least one of the private key module and the private key module includes a PUF (Physical unclonable Functions). .

10-2015-0096606(2015.07.07)

In the SoC that includes the main CPU that executes the CPU code inside and the JTAG debugger is connected to the outside,

It includes a security enable circuit that generates a disconnect signal according to the hardware pin setting in the SoC, which is pre-built at the time of manufacturing the SoC, and a debug interface circuit that receives the disconnect signal and cuts the connection between the JTAG debugger and the SoC by hardware. SoC with security function characterized by.

PCT/EP2016/076200 (2016.10.31)

A method for generating random numbers based on an optical process of quantum nature, the method comprising: emitting photons from a light source; absorbing, by a photon sensor having a plurality of pixels, the photons emitted from the light source; calculating minimum entropy levels for the respective plurality of pixels of the photon sensor; associating one of a plurality of extractors with at least one of the plurality of pixels based on the calculated minimum entropy level of the at least one pixel; and generating, by the extractor associated with the at least one pixel, a number of high-entropy bits for generating a random number.

A cryptographic key used in a symmetric cryptographic algorithm is called a 'symmetric key', and the fact that a symmetric key uses one key for encryption and decryption is already common in the art to which this invention belongs. It is a technical fact of common tolerance for those with knowledge (hereinafter referred to as 'common engineer').

In addition, in the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm, there is a key pair called a 'private key' and a 'public key' mathematically corresponding to the private key, and performs encryption with the public key, The fact that decryption is performed with the corresponding private key is a technical fact well known to those skilled in the art.

In addition, RSA encryption is representative of the above equation, and various methods such as a hash function (a fixed-length hash function) and an operator (exclusive OR (EX-OR)) are known.

In the present invention, the key generation between the private key and the public key key pair of the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm is RSA, a hash function <(HASH(DATA1)+(TRN) | DATA2>, Various well-known methods such as functional expressions and operators are applied. (The '+' operator symbol means the exclusive OR (EX-OR) operator symbol.)

For example,

In the hash function <(HASH(DATA1)+(TRN))) DATA2>, HASH(DATA1) generates a private key that formats DATA1 as a fixed-length hash function, and then converts a natural random number (TRN) as a random number seed. It is a one-way hash function that encrypts DATA2 after generating a public key by performing an EX-OR operation.

The one-way hash function is a one-way transfer function. After Alice transmits the hash function <(HASH(DATA1)+(TRN))> to Bob, Bob encrypts DATA2 and the hash function <(HASH(DATA1)+(TRN)) When DATA2> is retransmitted to Alice, if Alice knows the private key hash function <HASH(DATA1)> and the one-time OTP natural random number TRN, it is a hash function that can decrypt DATA2.

1. Application number (date): PCT/SG2012/000118(2012.04.04) / Title of invention: METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR FORMING A VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK / Applicant: ITWIN PTE LTD, etc. 2. Application No. (date): 10-2012-0042383 (2012.04.24) / Title of invention: Crime prevention CCTV monitoring device with enhanced physical dual network separation security and its control method / Applicant: Robotier, etc. 3. Application number (date): 10-2012-0089227 (2012.08.16) / Title of invention: Device and method for device-to-device security authentication based on PUF in IoT communication / Applicant: ICTK Co., Ltd. 4. Application number (date): 10-2015-0096606 (2015.07.07) / Title of invention: SoC with security function and security method of SoC / Applicant: EWBM Co., Ltd. 5. Application No. (Date): PCT/EP2016/076200 (2016.10.31) / Title of Invention: METHOD AND DEVICE FOR OPTICS BASED QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION / Applicant: ID QUANTIQUE

The goal is to establish a quantum communication network in response to cyber terror attacks using quantum computers, but it is practically difficult to build all networks using quantum communication networks. Therefore, QUANTUM Communication Channel and Non-QUANTUM Communication Channel ) as a hybrid-QUANTUM Communication Channel, one-Way-Ring/Two-Way-Ring Network QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution) technology with the goal of strengthening security and minimizing communication charges.

In particular, the main task of the present technology is to solve the problem of providing a physical security measure against a fire sale in which a non-quantum communication channel is hacked.

A device that generates a password by itself by a new technology called PUF in the field of IoT communication and uses it for authentication, so that the device performs security authentication at a reliable level to identify each other and check whether it is a legitimate entity. and methods are provided.

In addition, as a physical device that implements the PUF function, the quantum random number edge server and Alice QRN SERVER use an NFC card (sticker) that physically generates a pair of identical pseudo-random numbers.

In particular, the quantum communication and quantum communication channel, which are characterized by random selection measurement of quantum coherence and pulse arrival time on a dedicated line connected by optical cable, and qubits composed of non-empty pulse positions, to defend against coherence attacks with decoi-PULSE DEBUGGER. It is a quantum communication system that strengthens security through QRN KEY (QRN (Quantum Random Number) KEY) authentication of data in the ISP (Internet Service Provider) rental network that does not form.

When secure communication using encryption/decryption is applied to devices or systems that perform IoT communication, a security authentication apparatus and method that are strong against physical attacks or unauthorized access to the security authentication system of the device are provided.

By systematically applying hybrid-QUANTUM G-Cloud technology between QUANTUM Channel and non-QUANTUM Channel, quantum (super) for shadow terminals where it is difficult to apply quantum communication. It is the only alternative to solve cryptographic security problems such as ARIA and AES against brute force cracking of computers.

For example,

When one crime prevention CCTV is built, a construction cost of about 15,000 won and a leased line (fixed IP) rent of 88 thousand won per month are incurred.

For safe communication in the crime prevention system, if the BB84 quantum communication network is built at the present time, at least 500 million or more costs are incurred, so in reality, the hybrid-QUANTUM G-Cloud communication technology of the present invention is applied rather than a quantum communication network. do.

as a detailed task

1. It solves the problem of CCTV surveillance cameras for crime prevention operated in the blind-proof black box type due to the burden of communication cost.

2. Minimize communication costs by constructing a closed wireless self-network using unlicensed frequencies.

3. Reinforce security by applying hybrid-QUANTUM G-Cloud technology.

The task of building an IoT network with minimal communication cost is to apply the highest security technology among the existing security systems.

QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution) licensed frequency and QRN (Quantum Random Number) that transmits QRN (Quantum Random Number) KEY by applying the LTE security technology of the telecommunication service provider at a minimum cost (LPWAN/month: 1,000 won ~ MMS/5,500 won) ) Apply the unlicensed frequency heterogeneous network technology that transmits large-capacity data encrypted with KEY.

When building a LoRA(TM) own network, communication costs are not incurred, but initial investment costs such as network operation and facility costs occur, and the security technology of security facilities dedicated to telecommunication service providers is not applied.

When using the LoRA (AL) rental network of the ISP operator, the monthly cost is about KRW 1,000, but the MMS fee is KRW 5,500, the rental network KRW 22,000, and the private rental network (fixed IP for crime prevention) KRW 88,000 is the lowest cost compared to the cost. Establish a closed wireless communication network with unlicensed frequency that can solve the problems of box-type CCTV surveillance cameras for crime prevention.

In addition, PIN from PUF chip through process deviation that occurs in semiconductor manufacturing process related to generation and distribution of security key using PUF (Physycally Unclonable Function) Chip or physical pseudo-random number-generating NFC card (sticker) and QRNG (Quantum Random Number Generator) Chip (Personal Identification Number) Data is extracted and a private key (private key, decryption key) is generated using a fixed-length hash function, a format function, etc., and the private key (private key, decryption key) is generated through a random quantum random number generated through QRNG. ), a terminal equipped with a PUF (or NFC) chip based on key generation and distribution technology that can generate a public key (encryption key) through encryption with an EX-OR operator, an encryption function, etc. and vice versa. It is a new technology that combines ISP operator's wireless network QRN (Quantum Random Number) KEY authentication QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution) technology and closed wireless self-network large data transmission technology.

One-Way-Ring Network and Two-Way-Ring Network QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution) applied to hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL is the first new technology without prior art and is the best hybrid-QUANTUM security technology currently available at minimal cost.

QRN (Quantum Random Number) SERVER is hereinafter referred to as QRN SERVER.

When Bob QRN SERVER receives terminal device-generated data encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key from the 2-channel radio repeater,

transmitted to Alice QRN SERVER through any one of the non-QUANTUM CHANNEL and QUANTUM CHANNEL wired networks;

Alice QRN SERVER receives terminal device-generated data encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key from any one or more of the wired network network and the wireless network network of a licensed frequency carrier, and decrypts it with the Alice QUANTUM private key to enhance security. Improve communication speed and reduce communication charges. It is an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm featuring a hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL One-Way-Ring Network.

The hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL One-Way-Ring Network is a QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution) technology in which QRN KEY is transmitted unidirectionally, and has the following features.

QKD authentication path: Quantum random number edge server → QUANTUM AC → Communication modem → Communication operator wireless network → Alice QRN SERVER → Wired self-network (hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL) → Bob QRN SERVER → Unlicensed frequency wireless repeater → Wireless self-network → Communication modem → Quantum random number edge server

Massive data transmission: Quantum random number edge server → QUANTUM AC → Communication modem → Wireless self-network → Unlicensed frequency wireless repeater → Bob QRN SERVER → Hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL → Alice QRN SERVER

The hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL Two-Way-Ring Network is a symmetric cryptographic algorithm characterized by a shared state that affects each other by 50% in QRN KEY generation, such as quantum coherence in hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL. .

Alice/Bob HALF QRN KEY (Quantum Random Number): Quantum Random Number Edge Server ↔ QUANTUM AC ↔ Communication Modem ↔ Communication Operator Wireless Network ↔ Alice QRN SERVER

*Large data transmission: Quantum random number edge server → Communication modem → Wireless self-network → Unlicensed frequency wireless repeater → Bob QRN SERVER → Hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL → Alice QRN SERVER

It is a QRN KEY QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution) technology that transmits a private (symmetric) key with high security through a telecommunication service provider network and transmits large data encrypted with a public key through an unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network AP.

The 5G wireless network has no problem in transmitting UHD-level video data captured by 8K surveillance cameras, but data charges were inevitably high due to the burden of data traffic. Resolves the problem of weak security when transmitting.

It generates a private key (private key, decryption key) through a PUF (NFC) chip or PIN data (PRNG), and transmits the OTP QRN KEY encrypted through a QRNG (TRNG) chip through a redundant network. Quantum encryption OTP private key (private key, decryption key) of small data is transmitted through high ISP operator LTE network or Internet of Small Thing (IoST) such as LoRA (NB-IoT), and large amount of image data Quantum encryption OTP is encrypted with the public key and transmitted through the unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network AP, and then transmitted through one of the wired (local government CCTV) self-network among QUANTUM CHANNEL, non-QUANTUM CHANNEL, and hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL

Hybrid-QUANTUM Communication using CCTV wired private network (including fixed IP rental network) for crime prevention as a method of establishing a closed wireless self-network for the public interest for the purpose of establishing a smart city of a local government without a specific telecommunication business license. Channel) is a quantum communication wireless self-network construction technology.

In the wireless communication section, the biggest feature of the present invention is the QRN KEY QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution) technology using the licensed frequency ISP operator network and the unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network. When applied to a type of self-network, local governments can build a smart quantum city wireless self-network that minimizes communication charges.

(For reference. ISP operators are not generating revenue through data charges, but rather profit from service platform activation through smart city hybrid network construction, and local government Back Haul construction and A larger business model occurs in the OPEN-API platform server construction.)

1 to 5 are simplified diagrams of an embodiment of the present invention;
6 is an example of TLS MODULE equipped with IDQ QRNG Chip

As a differentiating feature of the invention, the present invention is a separate technical field from LTE-LAA frequency bundling technology that transmits data by tying up LTE licensed bands and unlicensed bands including Wi-Fi frequencies.

The prior art is a technique for selecting a frequency according to traffic in data transmission,

The QRN KEY of this technology is a licensed band, and the data is a quantum random number edge server with AC (Access Controller) that selects an unlicensed band frequency.

Purpose and effectively, the application of unlicensed frequency auxiliary to manage base station traffic from the telecom operator's point of view is differentiated from the heterogeneous network application technology to enhance security in using unlicensed frequency from the user's point of view.

In the field of industrial use, the present invention is a field of constructing a closed wireless self-network with enhanced security of local governments (individuals).

In the task to be solved, the present invention aims to solve the task for minimizing communication (data) cost with QRN KEY distribution technology to which QRNG Chip is applied to enhance security in a hybrid quantum communication network.

In conclusion, unlike the conventional technology that selects either the Licensed Band or the Unlicensed Band for data to be transmitted in any form, such as Multiplexing Mode, Diversity Mode, etc., the present invention provides the security of any one of 3G, 4G, and 5G service providers Licensed Band. The QRN KEY is transmitted through the channel, and the data to be transmitted is transmitted through the Unlicensed Band closed wireless self-network. From a differentiated start that clearly separates heterogeneous networks, 'purpose' 'background' task' 'means' 'effect' change the

The QRN KEY generated by the key generation algorithm applied to the present invention consists of three pieces.

The same symmetric key (SYMMETRIC KEY) of the symmetric cryptographic algorithm stored between Alice QRN SERVER and the quantum random number edge server, and the asymmetric private key (PRIVATE KEY) and asymmetric public key generated by the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm A PUBLIC KEY consists of three types: a symmetric key, a private key, and a public key.

A symmetric key is generated from a random number seed generated through QRNG (Quantum Random Number Generator) and then used as a data communication encryption/decryption key.

The private key generated from the PUF (Physycally Unclonable Function) PIN data as a seed and the public key pair generated by encrypting the private key with the quantum random number seed generated through QRNG is an OTP (One Time Password) login ( Log In) A one-time password created for the purpose of connecting to a network.

For example, a private key is generated from PUF PIN data as a seed, and a public key is generated by encrypting it with a quantum random number beta-OR (EX-OR) encryption operator. Then, the data encrypted with the public key is the private key and the quantum If you know the random number and the encryption operator (EX-OR), you can decrypt it by performing the reverse operation.

In the present invention, the quantum random number for key generation is stored in its own memory and used for decryption, and it is decrypted using the same encryption operator, function expression, and hash function between Alice and Bob.

A wired quantum network consisting of non-QUANTUM CHANNEL, QUANTUM CHANNEL, and hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL, not a QRN KEY QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution) technology between Alice and Bob, and wired/wireless for a single QRN KEY on Eve in 5G wireless network It is a QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution) technology between heterogeneous manganese and licensed/unlicensed frequency wireless communication networks. It is an important feature of technology for minimizing data charges while maximizing security.

In other words, there is an important difference in minimizing data communication charges by minimizing data transmission of video data captured by UHD cameras through the 5G wireless network of telecommunication service providers.

In particular, rather than the conventional QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution) that exchanges QRN KEY between Alice and Bob through one channel (single wired optical network, single frequency wireless communication network), licensed/unlicensed radio frequency and wired/wireless heterogeneous networks It features a One Way Ring Network in which the Eve QRN KEY is transmitted in the RING method only in one direction in the network.

That is, the data transmission path is characterized as follows.

Quantum random number edge server ⇒ 5G communication modem ⇒ 5G wireless network network ⇒ Alice non-QRN SERVER ⇒ Wired quantum communication network ⇒ Bob non-QRN SERVER ⇒ QUANTUM 5G AP ⇒ 5G communication modem ⇒ Quantum random number edge server ⇒ 5G communication modem ⇒ QUANTUM 5G AP ⇒ Bob non-QRN SERVER ⇒ Wired quantum communication network ⇒ Alice non-QRN SERVER

conventional,

It features a heterogeneous QRN KEY distribution hybrid quantum communication closed network system that minimizes communication charges through differentiation from 'Alice non-QRN SERVER ⇔ Wired quantum communication network ⇔ Bob non-QRN SERVER'.

In the conventional quantum security communication, the QRN KEY transmission method is a technology that solves the problem of the limitation of the exclusive line and the transmission distance, and quantum mechanics is applied through TIWIN USB to which TRNG (QRNG) that mutually authenticates the physically unique PUF is applied. It is a certified invention.

In particular, in order to solve the conventional problem of hacking with a quantum computer when Alice VPN and Bob VPN communicate encrypted on the ISP operator network where a quantum communication channel is not formed, PUF's Unique TRNG (QRNG) One Time Password quantum Decoy-Quantum Certificate technology using communication quantum coherence is applied.

In addition, the e-FUSE SoC (System on Chip) technology solves the problem that the PUF itself cannot be modified and copied, but forgery is possible when the PUF chip itself is mounted and modulated on another terminal (board).

In detail,

The Alice main controller (MCU) inside the Alice quantum security USB combines the Bob PIN data stored in the Alice PUF memory (PUF M/M) with the Alice e-FUSE ID (IDentity Address) with the Bob public key received through Alice VPN. ) Send the encrypted Alice KEY to Bob VPN inside Bob quantum security USB through Alice VPN.

Bob's main controller (MCU) inside Bob's quantum security USB combines the Alice PIN data stored in the Bob PUF memory (PUF M/M) with the Bob e-FUSE ID (IDentity Address) with the Alice public key received through Bob VPN. ) The encrypted Bob KEY is sent to Alice VPN inside Alice quantum security USB through Bob VPN.

When the Alice main controller (MCU) inside the Alice quantum security USB decrypts the Alice QUANTUM public key encrypted Bob KEY with the Alice private key,

Since the Alice Security CPU generated Alice private key by combining the Bob e-FUSE ID and the beta-OR (EX-OR) with the Alice PIN data, it is possible to decrypt the Alice PIN data and the SOC's own Bob e-FUSE ID. If any one of them does not match, decryption becomes impossible.

The private key is commonly used as a private key, decryption key, and PRIVATE KEY, and the public key is commonly used as an encryption key and PUBLIC KEY.

A cryptographic key used in a symmetric cryptographic algorithm is called a 'symmetric key', and the fact that a symmetric key uses one key for encryption and decryption is already common in the art to which this invention belongs. It is a technical fact common to those with knowledge (hereinafter referred to as 'common engineer').

For example, when Alice and Bob share a symmetric key and Alice encrypts data with the symmetric key and transmits it to Bob, Bob decrypts it with the same symmetric key.

In addition, in an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm, a 'private key' and a key pair called 'public key' mathematically corresponding to this private key exist, and encryption is performed with the public key, The fact that decryption is performed with the corresponding private key is a technical fact well known to those skilled in the art.

Looking at the technical facts (key generation method and encryption/decryption method) disclosed in the above general knowledge and description of the invention, it refers to a key pair consisting of a 'public key' and a 'private key' of the asymmetric key encryption algorithm. The technical or mathematical correlation between the 'public key' and the 'private key' is applied to those of ordinary skill in the art, such as the predefined beta-OR (EX-OR) between Alic and Bob, a fixed-length hash function, and AES encryption. Therefore, the present invention is not limited to the claims, but for the purpose of understanding the invention, beta-OR (EX-OR) will be described as a representative example.

That is, in the technical or mathematical correlation and decryption between the 'public key' and the 'private key', various well-known technologies such as beta OR (EX-OR) or well-known operators and equations can be applied.

For example, PIN (Personal Identification Number) data from the PUF chip through process deviations that occur in the semiconductor manufacturing process related to the generation and distribution of security keys using an ultra-small Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) Chip and a Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) Chip extract and generate a private key (private key, decryption key, PRIVATE KEY) as a random number seed.

In addition to generating a private key using the PIN (Personal Identification Number) data supplied from the PUF Chip as a seed, an unpredictable random quantum (natural) random number is used as a seed to generate a private key and program It is possible to generate a private key by using the generated pseudo-random number as a seed.

The private key generated by the above method is a beta OR of PIN (Personal Identification Number) data, a quantum random number generated through QRNG, a natural random number generated through TRNG, and a random number seed generated through PRNG with the private key. (EX-OR) to generate a public key (encryption key, PUBLIC KEY), and if you know the formula beta OR (EX-OR) and the random number seed, use the private key (PRIVATE KEY, private key) The fact that encrypted data can be decrypted with a public key (PUBLIC KEY) is a claim that a well-known and common technical fact is applied to a person having ordinary knowledge in the technical field to which this invention belongs (hereinafter referred to as a 'technical person') not limited to

A public key (PUBLIC KEY) is generated by encrypting the private key (PRIVATE KEY, private key) through a random quantum random number generated through QRNG.

When the data measured by the sensor is encrypted with the public key (PUBLIC KEY, encryption key), the data measured by the original sensor can be restored through the private key (PRIVATE KEY, decryption key).

"Private key=private key=decryption key=PRIVATE KEY" and "public key=encryption key=PUBLIC KEY" have the same concept.

In one embodiment,

A terminal unit comprising a surveillance camera, a TRNG natural random number generator, a quantum random number edge server, and a wireless communication modem; and

Consisting of Bob non-QRN SERVER including QUANTUM 5G AP; and Alice non-QRN SERVER connected to wired and wireless networks, the quantum random number edge server extracts Eve PIN DATA from the internal eFUSE Chip. encrypting with a hash function (HASH) to generate an Eve private key <HASH (Eve PIN DATA)>; Eve PIN data (Eve PIN DATA) and Eve private key <HASH (Eve PIN DATA)> are stored in the quantum random number edge server and Alice QRN SERVER; The quantum random number edge server receives the natural random number (TRN) from the TRNG natural random number generator, encrypts the Eve private key <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)> with the natural random number (TRN), and encrypts the Eve public key <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)+ (TRN)>; The wireless communication modem receives the Eve public key <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)+(TRN)> and the hash function (HASH) from the quantum random number edge server; The wireless communication modem transmits the hash function <(HASH(Eve PIN DATA)+(TRN))|(HASH)> encrypted with the Eve public key to the Alice non-QRN SERVER through the wireless network; Alice non-QRN SERVER receives the hash function <(HASH(Eve PIN DATA)+(TRN))|(HASH)> encrypted with the Eve public key through the wireless network, and receives the Eve private key <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)> Decrypt with ; When the Eve private key <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)> is decrypted with the decrypted hash function (HASH) and it matches the Eve PIN data (Eve PIN DATA) stored in the Alice non-QRN SERVER, Alice non-QRN SERVER sends Eve Eve PIN data encrypted with the public key <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)+(TRN)|(Eve PIN DATA)> is transmitted to Bob QRN SERVER through a wired network; Bob non-QRN SERVER transmits Eve PIN data encrypted with Eve public key <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)+(TRN)|(Eve PIN DATA)> to the wireless communication modem through QUANTUM 5G AP; The wireless communication modem transmits Eve PIN data <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)+(TRN)|(Eve PIN DATA)> encrypted with the Eve public key to the quantum random number edge server; Quantum random number edge server decrypts Eve PIN data <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)+(TRN)|(Eve PIN DATA)> encrypted with Eve public key with Eve private key <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)> and stores Eve PIN data ( Eve PIN DATA), the video data <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)+(TRN)|(video data)> encrypted with the Eve public key is transmitted to the wireless communication modem; The wireless communication modem transmits video data <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)+(TRN)|(video data)> encrypted with the Eve public key to Bob non-QRN SERVER through QUANTUM 5G AP; Bob non-QRN SERVER transmits video data <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)+(TRN)|(video data)> encrypted with Eve public key to Alice non-QRN SERVER through a wired network; Alice non-QRN SERVER receives video data <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)+(TRN)|(video data)> encrypted with the Eve public key from the wired network network and decrypts it with the Eve private key <HASH(Eve PIN DATA)> do.

In one embodiment,

QUANTUM Communication Channel

Alice QRN SERVER and Bob QRN SERVER are connected to a network that forms a quantum communication channel.

Alice QRN SERVER receives a random quantum random number generated from Alice QRNG, generates a QRN KEY, and sends it to Alice QKD and Alice MASTER SERVER.

Alice QKD transmits the QRN KEY to Bob QKD through a quantum communication channel.

Bob QRN SERVER receives QRN KEY from Bob QKD and sends it to Bob MASTER SERVER.

Non-QUANTUM Communication Channel

Alice MASTER SERVER and Bob MASTER SERVER are connected to a network that does not form a quantum communication channel.

The quantum security terminal consists of MCU, QRNG, PUF, VPN, memory, and network network breaker, and is divided into Alice quantum security terminal and Bob quantum security terminal.

Alice PIN data is extracted from the Alice PUF inside the Alice quantum secure terminal and stored in Bob's memory inside the Bob quantum secure terminal.

The Bob PIN data is extracted from the Bob PUF inside the Bob quantum secure terminal and stored in Alice's memory inside the Alice quantum secure terminal.

The Alice MCU inside the Alice quantum security terminal extracts the Alice PIN data from the Alice PUF to generate the Alice private key.

*

*Alice QRNG generates random quantum random number and sends it to Alice MCU.

Alice MCU generates the Alice public key by performing an EX-OR encryption operation on the Alice private key using the random quantum random number as a seed.

Bob MCU inside Bob's quantum security terminal extracts Bob PIN data from Bob PUF to generate Bob's private key.

*

*Bob QRNG generates random quantum random number and sends it to Bob MCU.

*Bob MCU generates Bob public key by performing EX-OR encryption operation on Bob private key using the random quantum random number as a seed.

When the Alice MCU inside the Alice quantum security terminal transmits the Alice public key to Bob VPN through the Alice VPN, the Bob MCU inside the Bob quantum security terminal receives the Alice public key from the Bob VPN.

When Bob MCU inside Bob quantum security terminal sends Bob public key to Alice VPN through Bob VPN, Alice MCU inside Alice quantum security terminal receives Bob public key from Alice VPN.

The Alice MCU inside the Alice quantum security terminal encrypts the Bob PIN data stored in Alice's memory with the Bob public key received through the Alice VPN and transmits it to the Bob VPN inside the Bob quantum security terminal through the Alice VPN.

Bob MCU inside Bob's quantum security terminal encrypts the Alice PIN data stored in Bob's memory with the Alice public key received through Bob VPN and transmits it to Alice VPN inside the Alice quantum security terminal through Bob VPN.

The Alice MCU inside the Alice quantum security terminal matches the Alice PIN data obtained by decrypting the Alice PIN data encrypted with the Alice public key with the Alice private key and the Alice PIN data extracted from the Alice PUF, and Bob MCU inside the Bob quantum security terminal If the Bob PIN data encrypted with the Bob public key and the Bob PIN data decrypted with the Bob private key match the Bob PIN data extracted from the Bob PUF, the Alice MASTER SERVER connected to the Alice quantum security terminal and the Bob MASTER SERVER connected to the Bob quantum security terminal are identical. Connect the network network breaker in between.

In one embodiment,

e-FUSE extracts and program the PIN data from the physically unique hardware pin (PIN) generated during the semiconductor manufacturing process to give an ID, and short circuit the e-FUSE pin to prevent re-extraction. Gives a unique ID of the chip (System On Chip).

The PUF Chip can extract PIN data from which the unique physically unique hardware pin (PIN) that occurs during the semiconductor manufacturing process is extracted. Re-extraction is possible.

In data encryption/decryption,

The data encrypted with the Alice KEY that is encrypted by combining with the Alice e-FUSE ID in the Bob PIN data stored in the Alice PUF memory is secured by the Bob security CPU by generating the Bob private key combined with the Alice e-FUSE ID in the Bob PIN data. It is decrypted with Bob's private key stored in the OTP memory.

In one embodiment,

Alice and Bob are composed of two sets, and the same system is configured with additional (two sets of four) and two-way communication is possible in the same principle. However, it is common for two-way communication in the reverse direction to be possible according to the same principle. As a method, some are omitted from the detailed description.

In addition, when a two-way communication modem is applied, two-way communication is possible between Alice and Bob.

Security (PUF-QRNG TIWIN) USB consists of Alice quantum security USB and Bob quantum security USB as a set, and the structure and function are the same.

According to the delivery direction of the Quantum Random Number Key Certificate (QC), the debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) inside the secure (PUF-QRNG TIWIN) USB works only on the receiver, but it is structurally the same as it is the same secure (PUF-QRNG TIWIN) USB. explain in detail

In addition, if the quantum communication channel is two-way communication with two channels, the debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) is also a TIWIN USB that works the same in the two secure (PUF-QRNG TIWIN)USB.

Aice VPN and Bob VPN inside a pair of secure (PUF-QRNG TIWIN)USB have a feature that allows communication only between a pair of secure (PUF-QRNG TIWIN)USB.

Quantum Random Number Generator QRNG (Quantum Random Number Generator) passes a photon through a half mirror, detects it through single-photon detectors, and monitors the modulation and duplication of the quantum.

It reads random numbers via Quantum-APPLIANCE, saves them to a file or displays them on the screen, and accesses the quantum random number generator QRNG via Libraries.

It is an encryption platform that implements security policies through Quantum-PLATFORM, monitors and signs QC (Quantum Random Number Certificate), distributes it to cryptographic generators, and plays the role of a certification authority that accepts QC-DEBUGGER.

Quantum Random Number Key Distribution (QKD) is an encryption key distributor that is composed of a transmitter Alice QKD and a receiver Bob QKD and is connected through an optical cable dedicated line. The transmitter QKD-A (ALICE) emits a laser beam, and the receiver QKD-B (BOB) ), an external single-photon detector is applied.

The OTP (One Time Password) authentication security generated by the physical object authentication PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) Chip of the present invention and QRNG (Quantum Random Number Generator) that generates natural random numbers provides the highest security that cannot be hacked even with a quantum computer. have

By extracting PIN (Personal Identification Number) data from the PUF chip through process deviations that occur in the semiconductor manufacturing process in relation to the generation and distribution of security keys using an ultra-small PUF (Physycally Unclonable Function) Chip and QRNG (Quantum Random Number Generator) Chip, A private key is generated, and a public key is generated by encrypting the private key through a random quantum random number generated through QRNG.

When the data measured by the sensor is encrypted with the public key, the data measured by the original sensor can be restored through the private key.

In performing IoT communication between devices, the device performing intelligent communication may generate and hold a secure PIN or password by itself, thereby performing knowledge-based authentication.

For such knowledge-based authentication, the device may include physical unclonable functions (PUFs) that generate a unique, random PIN while being robust against external security attacks.

According to an embodiment, the PUF generates a PIN that can be used as an authentication key for knowledge-based authentication. This PIN may be a random digital value generated by process variations that occur during the PUF manufacturing process.

In addition, the PIN may be a time-invariant digital value whose value is not changed according to the surrounding environment after being generated once. Since such a PIN is not exposed to the outside, according to an embodiment, it is possible to prevent a security threat to the authentication system of the device.

In case the device performs IoT communication with another device through the communication interface, the authenticator may receive the PIN generated by the PUF and perform knowledge-based authentication.

In the security authentication according to an embodiment, the device may include a private key module and a private key module. Here, at least one of the private key module and the private key module may include a PUF.

According to an embodiment, each of the private key module and the private key module has its own PUF, and each PUF has a secret key and a private key from the physical characteristics themselves. Hereinafter, since such a private key and/or a private key is also expressed as a PIN, the PIN may be understood as a concept including, without excluding any, such as a private key and a private key used for device security authentication.

The PUF is a circuit that generates different function values even when manufactured with the same design drawing using characteristic deviations caused by process variations. In some embodiments, a PIN of an IoT device is generated and provided. Strictly, it can be seen that the PIN is generated using the digital value itself, not the digital value itself generated by the physical characteristics of the PUF.

For example, a value given from an external trusted source may be used as a seed, and a result value obtained by encrypting the original digital value generated by the PUF may be used as the PIN.

In this process, according to an embodiment _{, a method of putting the digital value V PUF} provided by the PUF into the seed and the hash function is used. Therefore, the finally used PIN value may be Hash (V _PUF || Seed).

According to this embodiment, when the private key is leaked through any path, the PIN can be easily changed by changing only the seed value, so that safety and convenience can be improved.

However, the generation of such a PIN value is only some embodiments, and the embodiments include both a case in which a digital value generated by the PUF itself is used as a PIN and a case in which a value obtained by separately processing the PUF is used as a PIN. Hereinafter, even if the process of generating a new PIN by processing the digital value generated by the PUF is not mentioned individually, the contents should be understood including all of these embodiments.

On the other hand, since the PUF has an unpredictable random value, it can be used to determine the PIN of the device, and by using this, it is possible to prevent a PIN leak problem that may occur when externally generated and injected and stored in the memory.

In addition, since the PUF has the feature that it is physically impossible to copy, the possibility that the PIN number of the device is leaked or copied can also be eliminated.

In addition, the PIN value generated by the PUF has excellent randomness, and in embodiments, a value generated once is reliable and does not change with time.

According to an embodiment, in the serial number storage unit, a serial number is stored as a unique value of a device provided by a factory in the manufacturing process of the device, and the unique serial number of the device from the factory is I/O It is input to the device through the interface, and the secret key is extracted from the secret key module to the factory or outside with management authority only for the first time - it does not have to be once according to the policy, but can be designated once for security maintenance - can be

And, according to an embodiment, the PUF chip can be replaced by an e-FUSE with an e-FUSE that extracts a disconnect signal according to the hardware pin setting of the ENABLE circuit generated in the SOC (System On Chip) manufacturing process. have. In this embodiment, the fuse unit physically blocks the connection between the secret key module and the I/O interface after the first extraction of the secret key, which is irreversible.

Then, only the first-time extracted secret key only needs to be safely managed by the subject having the management authority, and it is impossible to newly extract the secret key of the device after the fuse is cut off. This is because the secret key module is implemented by PUF and cannot be physically copied, and it is impossible or very difficult to extract the secret key by various reverse engineering including power analysis attacks.

According to an embodiment, the device includes a private key module that generates a private key to be used in a public key encryption/decryption communication method, and the private key module may provide a private key by a PUF separate from the private key module. .

The private key generated and provided by this private key module is physically isolated from the outside and is not extracted from the device manufacturing to distribution and use. Of course, for the same reason as the private key module described above, it is impossible to artificially leak the private key by a physical attack.

Therefore, external leakage of the private key provided by the private key module does not occur, enabling device authentication through a PIN generated by the device itself in M2M.

According to an embodiment, using the private key generated by the private key module, the public key generator generates a public key to be used by the device in the public key encryption/decryption communication method, and stores it in the public key storage unit. do. The public key storage unit is a means for storing the generated public key, and according to an embodiment, may be a non-volatile memory.

Of course, the public key storage unit is a configuration that can be employed optionally, and in another embodiment, it is also possible to read the public key generated by the public key generation unit whenever authentication is required without the public key storage unit.

The encryption/decryption processor may be understood as a Crypto-coprocessor that performs normal data encryption and decryption, and the configuration for sending and receiving actual encrypted data to and from the outside in a communication network is a communication interface.

According to an embodiment, it is confirmed that the first-time extracted secret key is a legitimate entity when exchanging a public key with a certification authority (CA), which is a management subject having a legitimate authority to perform secure communication with the device. used only as a means to

That is, although it is the first time, the previously extracted secret key is not directly used for encryption/decryption, but the secret key is used only in the process of sending the public key to the outside using the secret key encryption method, thereby ensuring double security. Therefore, the private key used for actual device authentication is never exposed to the outside.

Hereinafter, the process of manufacturing a device in a factory, the process of distributing or distributing the device, the process of exchanging a public key using a secret key communication method while actually being used, and the process of actually communicating the device by verifying the validity of each other with the CA or other devices The process to be performed will be described in detail below.

First, differences adopted in the embodiments for PUF implementation will be described in comparison with conventional PUF implementations, and then described as an example of a specific implementation.

A Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) may provide an unpredictable digital value. Although individual PUFs are given an exact manufacturing process and are manufactured in the same process, the digital values provided by the individual PUFs are different.

Accordingly, PUF may be referred to as a POWF (Physical One-Way Function practically impossible to be duplicated) that cannot be duplicated, or may also be referred to as a PRF (Physical Random Function).

This PUF may be used to generate an encryption key for security and/or authentication. For example, PUF may be used to provide a unique key to distinguish devices from one another.

Conventionally, in order to implement such a PUF, a coated PUF has been implemented using randomly doped particles in the top layer of the IC, and is generally applied to hardware chips such as latches. Recent butterfly PUFs, which can be implemented in FPGAs, have also been implemented using process variations inside CMOS devices used.

However, in order to be reliable so that the application that utilizes PUF for PIN generation can be commercialized, the physical replication impossibility of the PUF circuit itself, the randomness of the generated PIN value, and the once generated PIN value must not change over time. All time invariance must be guaranteed.

However, since most of the conventional PUF circuits did not guarantee at least one of randomness and time invariance of values that must be satisfied as PUF or PRF at a high level, it was difficult to commercialize them.

The PUF used in the embodiments can be generated at a very low unit cost in a semiconductor manufacturing process while ensuring time invariance and randomness at a very reliable level by solving these conventional problems.

According to an embodiment, in order to simultaneously satisfy the randomness and time-invariance of the PIN generated by the PUF, a random value is generated by using the randomness caused by the short circuit between nodes existing in the semiconductor process.

The PUF according to an embodiment is a size smaller than the design rule, that is, whether the size of a contact or a via used to electrically connect between conductive layers in a semiconductor chip is clearly connected in a process. , so that the short circuit is determined randomly. That is, a random PIN value is generated by intentionally violating a design rule.

Since this new PUF circuit is composed of a very simple short circuit, there is no additional circuit or process in the process, and no special measuring device is required, so it can be easily implemented. And because the characteristics of the process are used, the stability can be satisfied while maintaining the randomness of the values.

In the manufacturing process of the semiconductor chip, in particular, the via (or enable circuit) generated during the SOC (System On Chip) manufacturing process of the present invention extracts the hardware pin setting of e-FUSE as PIN data to generate a private key, , the public key obtained by encrypting the private key with a random random number (QRNG) is decrypted with the private key (PIN data).

Characterized by the SOC (System On Chip) of the present invention, the disconnection signal generated according to the hardware pin setting (via) in the SOC is extracted as PIN data, but is extracted by giving a unique ID to the e-FUSE (electrical-FUSE) do it with

PUF itself cannot be forged or altered, but after removing the PUF chip, it can be mounted on another board (terminal) so that the terminal (board) equipped with the PUF can be tampered with, including a Security ENABLE circuit with e-FUSE and PUF integrated. It is characterized by the first technology developed in the form of SOC Chip.

In particular, even if the booting SOC and PUF are separated through the e-FUSE-equipped SOC, even if the unique physical authentication of the PUF is forged or forged, the boot-ROM program authentication of the e-FUSE-equipped SOC must be mutually authenticated. It features a Security CPU (Security CPU) and One-Time Programmable (OTP) e-FUSE featuring bootable Security ENABLE circuitry.

In one embodiment,

Alice quantum security USB is Alice Boot-ROM, Alice Main Controller (MCU), Alice System Storage (System M/M; System MEMORY), Alice VPN (Virtual Private Network) connected to Alice System Bus , Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Alice I/O Port, Alice Serial Peripheral Interface Controller (SPI Controller), Alice True Random Number Generator (TRNG), Alice Secure CPU (Security CPU; Security Central Processing Unit), Alice Security OTP Memory (Security OTP M/M; Security One Time Password MEMORY), Alice PUF Memory (PUF M/M; Phisycally Unclonable Function MEMORY), Alice e-FUSE, Alice PUF It is composed of Chip (Physically Unclonable Function Chip).

Alice main controller (MCU) consists of Alice Boot-ROM, Alice System Storage (System M/M), Alice VPN (Virtual Private Network), Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) connected to Alice System Bus. , Alice I/O Port, and Alice Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller) are controlled.

Alice Security CPU (Security CPU) is Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Alice I/O Device (I/O Port), Alice Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller), Alice Pure Random Number Generator (TRNG), Alice Secure OTP Memory (Security) OTP M/M), Alice PUF memory (PUF M/M), Alice e-FUSE, and Alice PUF Chip.

The Alice system storage device (System M/M) stores programs and data necessary for the Alice main controller (MCU).

The Alice Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller) is connected to the Alice I/O Device (I/O Port) and controls the Alice I/O Device (I/O Port) according to the control command of the Alice Main Controller (MCU) to turn on the network connection. /OFF control.

Alice Boot-ROM stores programs and data necessary for booting Alice main controller (MCU).

Alice VPN performs 1:1 encrypted communication between Bob VPN inside Bob quantum secure USB connected to the network.

Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) receives a quantum random number key certificate (QC; decoy Qantum Certificate) through the Alice input/output device (I/O Port) and, depending on whether it is authenticated, through the Alice input/output device (I/O Port) through the network network ON/OFF control.

The Alice input/output device (I/O Port) is a switch connected to the network network, and it controls the network network ON/OFF and transmits the data received through the network network to the Alice main controller (MCU) through the Alice system bus.

Alice Security CPU (Security CPU) extracts Alice PIN data from Alice PUF Chip and stores it in Bob PUF memory (PUF M/M).

Alice Security CPU sends Alice PIN data to Alice main controller (MCU).

The Alice security CPU (Security CPU) generates the Alice private key combined with the Bob e-FUSE ID (IDentity Address) in the Alice PIN data and stores it in the Alice security OTP memory (Security OTP M/M).

The Alice Security CPU encrypts the Alice private key with the random number generated by the Alice pure random number generator (TRNG), generates the Alice public key, and transmits it to the Alice main controller (MCU).

Bob quantum security USB is Bob Boot-ROM (Boot-ROM) connected by Bob System Bus, Bob Main Controller (MCU), Bob System Storage (System M/M; System MEMORY), Bob VPN (Virtual Private Network) , Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Bob I/O Port, Bob Serial Peripheral Interface Controller (SPI Controller), Bob True Random Number Generator (TRNG), Bob Secure CPU (Security CPU; Security Central Processing Unit), Bob Security OTP Memory (Security OTP M/M; Security One Time Password MEMORY), Bob PUF Memory (PUF M/M; Phisycally Unclonable Function MEMORY), Bob e-FUSE, Bob PUF It is composed of Chip (Physically Unclonable Function Chip).

Bob's main control unit (MCU) is connected to Bob's System Bus (Boot-ROM), Bob's System Storage (System M/M), Bob's Virtual Private Network (VPN), and Bob's Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER). , Bob I/O Port, and Bob Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller).

Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) includes Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Bob I/O Port, Bob Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller), Bob Pure Random Number Generator (TRNG), and Bob Secure OTP Memory (Security). OTP M/M), Bob PUF memory (PUF M/M), Bob e-FUSE, and Bob PUF Chip.

Bob's system storage (System M/M) stores programs and data necessary for Bob's main control unit (MCU).

Bob Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller) is connected to Bob I/O Port and controls Bob I/O Port according to the control command of Bob's main controller (MCU) to turn on the network connection. /OFF control.

Bob Boot-ROM stores programs and data necessary for booting Bob's main control unit (MCU).

Bob VPN performs 1:1 encrypted communication between Alice VPN inside Alice quantum secure USB connected to the network.

Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) receives QuantumCertificate (QC) through Bob input/output device (I/O Port) and turns on/off the network network through Bob input/output device (I/O Port) depending on whether or not it is authenticated. OFF control.

Bob I/O Port is a switch connected to the network network, and controls the network network ON/OFF and transmits the data received through the network network to the Bob main controller (MCU) through the Bob system bus.

Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) extracts Bob PIN data from Bob PUF Chip and stores it in Alice PUF memory (PUF M/M).

Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) sends Bob PIN data to Bob main control unit (MCU).

Bob security CPU (Security CPU) generates Bob private key combined with Alice e-FUSE ID (IDentity Address) in the Bob PIN data, and stores it in Bob's security OTP memory (Security OTP M/M).

The Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) encrypts the Bob private key with the random number generated by the Bob pure random number generator (TRNG), generates the Bob public key, and transmits it to the Bob main controller (MCU).

(QUANTUM Communication Channel)

A Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) is composed of an Alice Quantum Random Number Generator (Alice QRNG) in the transmitter and Bob QRNG in the Receiver for generating random quantum random numbers.

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) consists of an Alice quantum key distributor (QKD) of a transmitter including a laser and a Bob quantum key distributor (QKD) of a receiver including a single photon detector.

Aliec Quantum Random Number Key Platform (Quantum Platform) generates a quantum random number key certificate (QC; QuantumCertificate) with the quantum random number generated by Alice QRNG and transmits it through the Alice Quantum Key Distributor (QKD). It is composed of (Quantum Platform) and Bob Quantum Random Number Key Platform (Quantum Platform) that receives and stores QuantumCertificate (QC) through Bob Quantum Key Distributor (QKD).

Random quantum random numbers generated from a transmitting set Alice QRNG are transmitted to the Aliec Quantum Random Number Key Platform.

Aliec quantum random number key platform (Quantum Platform) receives the quantum random number, generates a quantum random number key certificate (QC), and transmits it to the integrated control server and Alice quantum key distributor (QKD).

Alice Quantum Key Distributor (QKD) transmits a Quantum Random Number Key Certificate (QC) to Bob Quantum Key Distributor (QKD) through a QUANTUM Communication Channel connected by an optical cable.

A receiving set Bob quantum key distributor (QKD) receives the quantum random number key certificate (QC) and stores it in Bob quantum random number key platform (Quantum Platform).

(Non-QUANTUM Communication Channel)

Alice Quantum Secure USB and Bob Quantum Secure USB are connected to ISP (Internet Service Provider) operator network that does not form a quantum communication channel.

The Alice main controller (MCU) inside the Alice quantum security USB boots through the Alice Boot-ROM connected to the Alice system bus, and according to the program stored in the Alice system storage device (System M/M), Alice Controls the serial peripheral interface (SPI Controller) to control the network network ON/OFF through the Alice I/O device (I/O Port), and the Alice public key received through the Alice Security CPU (Security CPU) to Bob through Alice VPN Send to Bob VPN inside quantum secure USB.

Bob's Quantum Security USB's main controller (MCU) boots through Bob's Boot-ROM connected to Bob's System Bus, and according to the program stored in Bob's System Storage (System M/M), Bob By controlling the serial peripheral interface (SPI Controller), the network network ON/OFF is controlled through Bob I/O Port, and the Bob public key received through Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) is transferred to Alice through Bob VPN. Transfer to Alice VPN inside quantum secure USB.

Alice main controller (MCU) inside Alice quantum security USB <Combined with Alice e-FUSE ID (IDentity Address) to Bob PIN data stored in Alice PUF memory (PUF M/M)> with Bob public key received through Alice VPN and send the encrypted Alice KEY to Bob VPN inside Bob quantum security USB through Alice VPN.

Bob's main controller (MCU) inside Bob's quantum security USB is Alice's public key received through Bob VPN <Combined with Bob e-FUSE ID (IDentity Address) to Alice PIN data stored in Bob PUF memory (PUF M/M)> and send the encrypted Bob KEY to Alice VPN inside Alice quantum security USB through Bob VPN.

The Alice main controller (MCU) inside the Alice quantum security USB matches the Alice PIN data obtained by decrypting the Bob KEY encrypted with the Alice public key with the Alice private key, the Alice PIN data extracted from the Alice PUF Chip, and the Alice e-FUSE ID (IDentity Address). and Bob's main controller (MCU) inside Bob's quantum security USB decrypts Alice KEY encrypted with Bob public key with Bob's private key, Bob PIN data, and Bob PIN data extracted from Bob PUF Chip, and Bob e-FUSE ID (IDentity Address) If , the integrated control server connected to the Alice quantum security USB and the local server connected to the Bob quantum security USB connect the I/O port ON contact control to connect the network network login (LOG In), and the integrated control server is inside the CPTED TOWER. Receives the captured video of the surveillance camera through the local server.

Alice main controller (MCU) inside Alice quantum security USB receives quantum random number key certificate (QC) from integrated control server, encrypts it with Bob public key, and sends it to Bob VPN inside Bob quantum security USB through Alice VPN.

Bob's main controller (MCU) inside the Bob Quantum Security USB decrypts the quantum random number key certificate (QC) encrypted with the Bob public key received through Bob VPN with the Bob private key to decrypt the quantum random number key certificate (QC).

The local server transmits the quantum random number key certificate (QC) stored in the Bob Quantum Platform to the Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) inside the Bob Quantum Secure USB.

Bob's quantum security Bob's main control unit (MCU) inside the USB transmits the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from the integrated control server to the Bob debugger (QC-DEBUGGER).

Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) switches the I/O port to OFF if the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from Alice’s quantum security USB and the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from the local server do not match. Control and block the network connection between the integrated control server and the local server.

In one embodiment,

The integrated control server to which Alice's quantum security terminal is connected and the local server to which Bob's quantum security terminal is connected are connected to the network.

The quantum security terminal consists of MCU, TRNG, PUF, VPN, memory, and network network breaker, and is divided into Alice quantum security terminal and Bob quantum security terminal.

Alice PIN data is extracted from the Alice PUF inside the Alice quantum secure terminal and stored in Bob's memory inside the Bob quantum secure terminal.

The Bob PIN data is extracted from the Bob PUF inside the Bob quantum secure terminal and stored in Alice's memory inside the Alice quantum secure terminal.

The Alice MCU inside the Alice quantum security terminal extracts the Alice PIN data from the Alice PUF to generate the Alice private key.

Alice TRNG generates a random natural random number and sends it to Alice MCU.

Alice MCU generates Alice public key by encrypting Alice private key with the random natural random number.

Bob MCU inside Bob's quantum security terminal extracts Bob PIN data from Bob PUF to generate Bob's private key.

Bob TRNG generates a random natural random number and sends it to Bob MCU.

Bob MCU generates Bob public key by encrypting Bob private key with the random natural random number.

When the Alice MCU inside the Alice quantum security terminal transmits the Alice public key to Bob VPN through the Alice VPN, the Bob MCU inside the Bob quantum security terminal receives the Alice public key from the Bob VPN.

When Bob MCU inside Bob quantum security terminal sends Bob public key to Alice VPN through Bob VPN, Alice MCU inside Alice quantum security terminal receives Bob public key from Alice VPN.

The Alice MCU inside the Alice quantum security terminal encrypts the Bob PIN data stored in Alice's memory with the Bob public key received through the Alice VPN and transmits it to the Bob VPN inside the Bob quantum security terminal through the Alice VPN.

Bob MCU inside Bob's quantum security terminal encrypts the Alice PIN data stored in Bob's memory with the Alice public key received through Bob VPN and transmits it to Alice VPN inside the Alice quantum security terminal through Bob VPN.

The Alice MCU inside the Alice quantum security terminal matches the Alice PIN data encrypted with the Alice public key and the Alice PIN data decrypted with the Alice private key and the Alice PIN data extracted from the Alice PUF, and the Bob MCU inside the Bob quantum security terminal If the Bob PIN data encrypted with Bob's public key is decrypted with the Bob's private key and the Bob PIN data extracted from Bob PUF match, it is transmitted between the integrated control server connected to the Alice quantum security terminal and the local server connected to the Bob quantum security terminal. I/O Port is controlled by ON contact to connect network network login (LOG In).

In one embodiment,

The UHD surveillance camera consists of an optical unit, a driving unit, a main control unit, an image security processing unit, an image analysis unit, a network security processing unit, and an input/output unit.

The terminal unit includes a sensor unit 46, an AMI 47, one or more switchboards 48, a switchboard priority changer 49, one or more broadcast devices 50, a broadcast device priority changer 51, an LED horizontal / It consists of a security light 52, a dimmer 53, and a terminal SECURITY ENGINE 54, and the optical unit includes a filter unit 10, a filter driving motor 11, a zoom lens 12, a zoom motor 13, and a variable focus lens. 14 , a focus motor 15 , and a focus lens 16 .

The driving unit is composed of a motor driving drive 17 , a driving unit memory 18 , a driving unit control unit 19 , an RS-485 20 , a manual operation unit 21 , and a remote control unit 22 .

The main control unit is TRNG(23), System Memory(24), PUF-PIN Memory(25), Security CPU(26), MCU(Machine Control Unit)(27), PUF Chip(28), Security OTP Memory(30), It is composed of a Boot-ROM 31 and a Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) Controller 32 .

The image security processing unit is composed of an image sensor unit (33), 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE (34), Quantum Entanglement (36), and Decoy Pulse (37).

The image analysis unit is composed of an image analysis module 38 , an object recognition module 39 , and a number recognition module 40 .

The network security processing unit is composed of DEBUGGER (41), QUANTUM BLOCK CHAIN (42), and 1:N BLOCK CHAIN (43).

Quantum communication unit: Bob non-QRN SERVER(55), Bob QRN SERVER(56), Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB(57), Non-QUANTUM CHANNEL(58), QUANTUM CHANNEL(59), Hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL(60) , Master QRN SERVER (61), Alice non-QRN SERVER (62), Alice QRN SERVER (63), QUANTUM SECURITY ENGINE (64), Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65), and LPWAN communication modem (66). .

The filter unit 10 is composed of any one or more of an infrared filter, an ultraviolet filter, and an anti-reflective coating filter.

One of the infrared filter, the ultraviolet filter, and the anti-reflection coating filter is selected by driving the filter driving motor 11 .

By driving the zoom motor 13 for driving the zoom lens 12, the zoom lens magnification is varied.

The focus focus is changed through the focus motor 15 for driving the variable focus lens 14 and the focus lens 16 .

The driving unit control unit 19 programmed by the input data input from RS-485 20 or the manual operation unit 21 or the remote control unit 22 transmits the input data to the driving unit memory 18 and the motor driving drive 17 . By controlling the filter driving motor 11 , the zoom motor 13 , and the focus motor 15 , the optical signal is collected and transmitted to the imaging sensor unit 33 .

The image sensor inside the imaging sensor unit 33 transmits image data converted from an optical signal into an electrical signal to the 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE 34 and the image analysis module 38 .

The image analysis module 38 receives the image data and extracts the object through the object recognition module 39. In the case of a vehicle, the vehicle license plate is converted into text through the number recognition module 40 among object data and object data. It is transmitted to the security processing unit QUANTUM BLOCK CHAIN (42).

The QUANTUM BLOCK CHAIN 42 compares the wanted vehicle vehicle number data received from the 1:N BLOCK CHAIN 43 connected to the block chain and generates a wanted vehicle event if it is the wanted vehicle.

The network security processing unit DEBUGGER 41 verifies a boot error when the main control unit Boot-ROM 31 first boots.

Sensing data collected from the sensor unit 46, measurement data measured from the AMI 47, switchboard status information data collected from one or more switchboards 48, audio/video data collected from one or more broadcasting devices 50, The LPWAN communication modem 66 collects the point/off data collected from the LED street/security light 52 and transmits it to the terminal SECURITY ENGINE 54 .

The terminal SECURITY ENGINE 54 transmits measurement data, switchboard status information data, audio/video data, and on/off data to Bob non-QRN SERVER 55, and Bob non-QRN SERVER 55 sends Alice non-QRN SERVER (62), Alice QRN SERVER (63), Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65) by receiving the switchboard priority changer control data or broadcasting device priority changer control data or dimmer control data from any one of the terminal unit It is transmitted to the internal terminal SECURITY ENGINE (54).

The terminal SECURITY ENGINE 54 receives the switchboard priority changer control data from the Bob non-QRN SERVER 55 and transmits it to the switchboard priority changer 49 through the LPWAN communication modem 66 and switches the priority of the broadcasting device Receives the control data and transmits it to the broadcasting device priority changer 51, receives the dimmer control data and transmits it to the dimmer 53, and operates the switchboard priority changer 49 according to the switchboard priority changer control data One or more switchboards 48 are selected and operated by controlling ON/OFF, and one or more broadcasting devices 50 are selected by ON/OFF control of the priority changer 51 of the broadcasting device according to the control data of the priority changer of the broadcasting device. to selectively broadcast, and dimming control the brightness of the LED street/security light 52 through the dimmer 53 according to the dimmer control data.

Main controller MCU(27) is TRNG(23), System Memory(24), PUF-PIN Memory(25), Security CPU(26), MCU(27), PUF Chip(28), Security OTP Memory(30), Boot-ROM 31 and SPI Controller 32 are controlled.

The System Memory 24 is a System Memory in which the main control unit MCU 27 operating OS program is stored.

The MCU 27 controls the Security CPU 26 to extract PIN (Personal Identification Number) data from the hardware pin of the PUF Chip 28 to the PUF-PIN Memory 25 and the Alice non-QRN SERVER 62. Save.

The MCU 27 generates and receives a natural random number by controlling the TRNG 23 and transmits it to the Security CPU 26 .

Security CPU 26 generates a private key with PIN (Personal Identification Number) data stored in PUF-PIN Memory 25 and encrypts the private key with the natural random number generated through the TRNG 23 to generate a public key. It is stored in the Security OTP Memory (30).

Bob non-QRN SERVER 55 receives PIN (Personal Identification Number) data encrypted with a public key from Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 through Non-QUANTUM CHANNEL 58 and transmits it to MCU 27 through the input/output unit do.

When the MCU 27 decrypts the private key and matches the PIN (Personal Identification Number) data stored in the PUF-PIN Memory 25, it boots the Boot-ROM 31 and controls the SPI Controller 32 to control the UHD surveillance camera. and Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 and login (LOG In) network are connected.

The SPI Controller 32 is a serial peripheral interface (SPI Controller; Serial Peripheral Interface Controller) data communication bus that transmits control data of the MCU 27 to each unit, and the SPI Controller 32 is controlled by the MCU 27 ), boot the Boot-ROM 31 or switch the Network Switch to ON contact to log in/connect the network network.

Alice QRN SERVER (63) and Bob QRN SERVER (56) are connected to QUANTUM CHANNEL (59).

QUANTUM SECURITY ENGINE (64) generates a QRN KEY from either BB84 or COW (Coherent One Way) and transmits it to Alice QRN SERVER (63).

Alice QRN SERVER (63) sends the QRN KEY to Bob QRN SERVER (56) through QUANTUM CHANNEL (59).

The Bob QRN SERVER 56 transmits to the Quantum Entanglement 36 through the input/output unit via the Bob non-QRN SERVER 55 .

The Quantum Entanglement 36 transmits the QRN KEY generated by the Coherent One Way (COW) generation method to the image SECURITY ENGINE 35 .

Image SECURITY ENGINE (35) is verified with Decoy Pulse (37) and in the case of quantum entanglement, it receives image data from 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE (34), encrypts image data with QRN KEY, and then through input/output unit Bob non-QRN SERVER It is transmitted to Bob QRN SERVER (56) via (55).

Bob QRN SERVER (56) transmits the image data encrypted with the QRN KEY to Alice QRN SERVER (63) through QUANTUM CHANNEL (59).

Alice QRN SERVER (63) decrypts the image data encrypted with the QRN KEY with the QRN KEY received from the SECURITY ENGINE (64).

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65) and Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) are hybrid- consisting of a non-quantum communication channel (Non-QUANTUM Communication Channel (58)) and a quantum communication channel (QUANTUM Communication Channel (59)). connected to QUANTUM CHANNEL (60).

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 is Alice Boot-ROM connected to Alice System Bus, Alice Master Controller (MCU), Alice System Storage Device (System M/M; System MEMORY), and Alice VPN (Virtual Private Network), Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Alice I/O Device (I/O Port), Alice Serial Peripheral Interface Controller (SPI Controller), Alice True Random Number Generator (TRNG; True Random Number Generator) ), Alice Security CPU (Security Central Processing Unit), Alice Security OTP Memory (Security OTP M/M; Security One Time Password MEMORY), Alice PUF Memory (PUF M/M; Phisycally Unclonable Function MEMORY), Alice PUF It is composed of Chip (Physically Unclonable Function Chip).

Alice main controller (MCU) consists of Alice Boot-ROM, Alice System Storage (System M/M), Alice VPN (Virtual Private Network), Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) connected to Alice System Bus. , Alice I/O Port, and Alice Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller) are controlled.

Alice Security CPU (Security CPU) is Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Alice I/O Device (I/O Port), Alice Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller), Alice Pure Random Number Generator (TRNG), Alice Secure OTP Memory (Security) OTP M/M), Alice PUF memory (PUF M/M), and Alice PUF Chip.

The Alice system storage device (System M/M) stores programs and data necessary for the Alice main controller (MCU).

The Alice Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller) is connected to the Alice I/O Device (I/O Port) and controls the Alice I/O Device (I/O Port) according to the control command of the Alice Main Controller (MCU) to turn on the network connection. /OFF control.

Alice Boot-ROM stores programs and data necessary for booting Alice main controller (MCU).

Alice VPN performs 1:1 encrypted communication between Bob VPN inside Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57 connected to the network.

Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) receives a quantum random number key certificate (QC; decoy Qantum Certificate) through the Alice input/output device (I/O Port) and, depending on whether it is authenticated, through the Alice input/output device (I/O Port) through the network network ON/OFF control.

The Alice input/output device (I/O Port) is a switch connected to the network network, and it controls the network network ON/OFF and transmits the data received through the network network to the Alice main controller (MCU) through the Alice system bus.

Alice Security CPU (Security CPU) extracts Alice PIN data from Alice PUF Chip and stores it in Bob PUF memory (PUF M/M).

Alice Security CPU sends Alice PIN data to Alice main controller (MCU).

The Alice security CPU (Security CPU) generates the Alice private key from the Alice PIN data and stores it in the Alice security OTP memory (Security OTP M/M).

The Alice Security CPU encrypts the Alice private key with the random number generated by the Alice pure random number generator (TRNG), generates the Alice public key, and transmits it to the Alice main controller (MCU).

Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) is connected to Bob's System Bus (Boot-ROM), Bob's Master Controller (MCU), Bob's System Storage (System M/M; System MEMORY), and Bob VPN (Virtual Private Network), Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Bob I/O Port, Bob Serial Peripheral Interface Controller (SPI Controller), Bob True Random Number Generator (TRNG) ), Bob Security CPU (Security Central Processing Unit), Bob Security OTP M/M (Security One Time Password MEMORY), Bob PUF Memory (PUF M/M; Phisycally Unclonable Function MEMORY), Bob PUF It is composed of Chip (Physically Unclonable Function Chip).

Bob main controller (MCU) is connected to Bob's System Bus (Boot-ROM), Bob's System Storage (System M/M), Bob's Virtual Private Network (VPN), and Bob's Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER). , Bob I/O Port, and Bob Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller).

Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) includes Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Bob I/O Port, Bob Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller), Bob Pure Random Number Generator (TRNG), and Bob Secure OTP Memory (Security). OTP M/M), Bob PUF memory (PUF M/M), and Bob PUF Chip.

Bob's system storage (System M/M) stores programs and data necessary for Bob's main control unit (MCU).

Bob Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller) is connected to Bob I/O Port and controls Bob I/O Port according to the control command of Bob's main controller (MCU) to turn on the network connection. /OFF control.

Bob Boot-ROM stores programs and data necessary for booting Bob's main control unit (MCU).

Bob VPN performs 1:1 encrypted communication between Alice VPN inside Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 connected to the network.

Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) receives a Quantum RandomNumber Certificate (QC) through Bob's I/O Port and turns on the network through Bob's I/O Port depending on whether or not it is authenticated. /OFF control.

Bob I/O Port is a switch connected to the network network, and controls the network network ON/OFF and transmits the data received through the network network to the Bob main controller (MCU) through the Bob system bus.

Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) extracts Bob PIN data from Bob PUF Chip and stores it in Alice PUF memory (PUF M/M).

Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) sends Bob PIN data to Bob main control unit (MCU).

Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) generates Bob private key with the Bob PIN data and stores it in Bob's security OTP memory (Security OTP M/M).

The Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) encrypts the Bob private key with the random number generated by the Bob pure random number generator (TRNG), generates the Bob public key, and transmits it to the Bob main controller (MCU).

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 and Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57 are connected to a QUANTUM Communication Channel among the Hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNELs 60 .

A Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) is composed of an Alice Quantum Random Number Generator (Alice QRNG) in the transmitter and Bob QRNG in the Receiver for generating random quantum random numbers.

Quantum RandomNumber Key Distribution (QKD) consists of Alice Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) of the transmitter including a laser and Bob Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) of the receiver including a single photon detector.

Aliec Quantum Random Number Key Platform (Quantum Platform) generates a Quantum RandomNumber Certificate (QC) with quantum random numbers generated by Alice QRNG and sends Aliec Quantum Random Number Key through Alice Quantum Key Distributor (QKD) It consists of a platform (Quantum Platform) and Bob Quantum Platform (Quantum Platform) that receives and stores a Quantum Random Number Certificate (QC) through Bob Quantum Key Distributor (QKD).

Random quantum random numbers generated from a transmitting set Alice QRNG are transmitted to the Aliec Quantum Random Number Key Platform.

Aliec quantum random number key platform (Quantum Platform) receives the quantum random number, generates a quantum random number key certificate (QC), and transmits it to Alice Master Server (Alice MASTER SERVER) and Alice quantum key distributor (QKD).

Alice Quantum Key Distributor (QKD) transmits a Quantum Random Number Key Certificate (QC) to Bob Quantum Key Distributor (QKD) through a QUANTUM Communication Channel connected by an optical cable.

A receiving set Bob quantum key distributor (QKD) receives the quantum random number key certificate (QC) and stores it in Bob quantum random number key platform (Quantum Platform).

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65) and Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) are connected to an ISP (Internet Service Provider) operator network that does not form a quantum communication channel, and inside Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65) Alice's main controller (MCU) boots through the Alice boot-ROM connected to the Alice system bus, and according to the program stored in the Alice system storage device (System M/M), the Alice serial peripheral interface ( SPI Controller) to control the network network ON/OFF through the Alice I/O device (I/O Port), and the Alice public key received through the Alice Security CPU (Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB) through Alice VPN (57) to the internal Bob VPN.

Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB(57) inside Bob's main controller (MCU) boots through Bob's Boot-ROM connected to Bob's System Bus, and stores it in Bob's system storage (System M/M). According to the stored program, it controls the Bob serial peripheral interface (SPI Controller) to control the network ON/OFF through the Bob input/output device (I/O port), and the Bob public key received through the Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) is Send to Alice VPN inside Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 via Bob VPN.

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 inside Alice main controller (MCU) uses the Alice KEY that encrypted the Bob PIN data stored in the Alice PUF memory (PUF M/M) with the Bob public key received through the Alice VPN, and the Alice VPN. Through Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57, it is transmitted to Bob VPN inside.

Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) Bob main controller (MCU) inside the Bob VPN, the Bob KEY that encrypted the Alice PIN data stored in the Bob PUF memory (PUF M/M) with the Alice public key received through Bob VPN. Through Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65, it is transmitted to Alice VPN inside.

Alice PUF-QRNG The Alice main controller (MCU) inside the TWIN USB 65 matches the Alice PIN data obtained by decrypting the Bob KEY encrypted with the Alice public key with the Alice private key and the Alice PIN data extracted from the Alice PUF Chip, and Bob PUF-QRNG When the Bob PIN data obtained by decrypting the Alice KEY encrypted with the Bob public key with the Bob private key and the Bob PIN data extracted from the Bob PUF Chip match, the Bob main controller (MCU) inside the TWIN USB 57 generates the Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB ( 65) connected to the Alice master server (Alice MASTER SERVER) and the Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) connected to the Bob master server (Bob MASTER SERVER) connected to the network network login (LOG In).

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 inside Alice main control unit (MCU) receives the quantum random number key certificate (QC) from the Alice master server (Alice MASTER SERVER), encrypts it with Bob public key, and then through Alice VPN, Bob PUF- Send to Bob VPN inside QRNG TWIN USB(57).

Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) inside Bob main controller (MCU) decrypts the quantum random number key certificate (QC) encrypted with Bob public key received through Bob VPN with Bob private key to generate a quantum random number key certificate (QC). Decrypt

Bob MASTER SERVER transmits the quantum random number key certificate (QC) stored in the Bob quantum random number key platform to the Bob debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) inside the Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57.

Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57, Bob's main controller (MCU) transmits the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from Alice Master Server (Alice MASTER SERVER) to Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER).

Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) does not match the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65) and the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from the Bob master server (Bob MASTER SERVER). If not, the I/O port is controlled as an OFF contact to block the network connection between the Alice master server and the Bob master server.

In one embodiment,

The terminal unit includes a sensor unit 46 , an AMI 47 , a switchboard 48 , a QUANTUM 5G AP 49 , a broadcasting device 50 , an emergency bell 51 , an LED street/security light 52 , a dimmer 53 . , is composed of a terminal SINGLE USB 54.

The SINGLE USB 54 can be replaced with a SINGLE MODULE in the form of a PCI Board.

The AMI 47 is an AMI 47 that receives commercial power, measures power usage, and transmits power usage through a Low Power Wide Area Network (LPWAN) communication modem.

the switchboard 48 is a switchboard 48 that supplies power to the LED street/security lights 52 via the AMI 47;

The LED street/security light 52 is a dimmer 53, QUANTUM 5G AP 49, a broadcast device 50, and an emergency bell 51 attached to or attached to the inside to receive power.

Broadcasting device 50 is a broadcasting device 50 that the terminal SINGLE USB 54 receives and broadcasts broadcasting data from any one of Master QRN SERVER 61 or Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 or Alice QRN SERVER 63 )to be.

When the emergency bell 51 operates, the emergency bell operation event is transmitted to either Master QRN SERVER 61 or Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 or Alice QRN SERVER 63 via the terminal SINGLE USB 54 ( 51).

The sensor unit 46 transmits data measured through the sensor to either the Master QRN SERVER 61 or the Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 or the Alice QRN SERVER 63 via the terminal SINGLE USB 54. The sensor unit (46).

The dimmer 53 is a dimmer 53 that adjusts the brightness of the LED street/security light 52 according to whether or not a human object is detected through the UHD surveillance camera image analysis unit.

QUANTUM 5G AP (49) receives the captured image data of the UHD surveillance camera and transmits it to either Master QRN SERVER (61) or Alice non-QRN SERVER (62) or Alice QRN SERVER (63) through a 5G wireless network base station. QUANTUM 5G AP 49.

Terminal SINGLE USB 54 and Master QRN SERVER 61 and Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 and Alice QRN SERVER 63 store the same symmetric key of a symmetric cryptographic algorithm, and broadcast data, It encrypts/decrypts emergency bell operation event data, data measured through sensors, measurement data, sensor status information data, audio/video data, point/off data, surveillance camera control data, broadcasting device control data, and dimmer control data.

UHD surveillance camera is a UHD level crime prevention CCTV surveillance camera and consists of an optical part, a driving part, a main controller, an image security processing part, an image analysis part, a network security processing part, and an input/output part.

The optical unit includes a filter unit 10 , a filter driving motor 11 , a zoom lens 12 , a zoom motor 13 , a variable focus lens 14 , a focus motor 15 , and a focus lens 16 .

The driving unit is composed of a motor driving drive 17 , a driving unit memory 18 , a driving unit control unit 19 , an RS-485 20 , a manual operation unit 21 , and a remote control unit 22 .

The main control unit is TRNG(23), System Memory(24), PUF-PIN Memory(25), Security CPU(26), MCU(Machine Control Unit)(27), PUF Chip(28), Security OTP Memory(30), It is composed of a Boot-ROM 31 and a Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) Controller 32 .

The image security processing unit is composed of an image sensor unit (33), 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE (34), Quantum Entanglement (36), and Decoy Pulse (37).

The image analysis unit is composed of an image analysis module 38 , an object recognition module 39 , and a number recognition module 40 .

The network security processing unit is composed of DEBUGGER (41), QUANTUM BLOCK CHAIN (42), and 1:N BLOCK CHAIN (43).

The quantum communication unit is Bob non-QRN SERVER(55), Bob QRN SERVER(56), Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB(57), non-QUANTUM CHANNEL(58), QUANTUM CHANNEL(59), hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL(60) , Master QRN SERVER (61), Alice non-QRN SERVER (62), Alice QRN SERVER (63), QUANTUM SECURITY ENGINE (64), Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65), and LPWAN communication modem (66). .

A specific coupling relationship between the components will be described in detail below.

The filter unit 10 is composed of any one or more of an infrared filter, an ultraviolet filter, and an anti-reflective coating filter.

One of the infrared filter, the ultraviolet filter, and the anti-reflection coating filter is selected by driving the filter driving motor 11 .

By driving the zoom motor 13 for driving the zoom lens 12, the zoom lens magnification is varied.

The focus focus is changed through the focus motor 15 for driving the variable focus lens 14 and the focus lens 16 .

The driving unit control unit 19 programmed by the input data input from RS-485 20 or the manual operation unit 21 or the remote control unit 22 transmits the input data to the driving unit memory 18 and the motor driving drive 17 . By controlling the filter driving motor 11 , the zoom motor 13 , and the focus motor 15 , the optical signal is collected and transmitted to the imaging sensor unit 33 .

The image sensor inside the imaging sensor unit 33 transmits image data converted from an optical signal into an electrical signal to the 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE 34 and the image analysis module 38 .

The image analysis module 38 receives the image data and extracts the object through the object recognition module 39. In the case of a vehicle, the vehicle license plate is converted into text through the number recognition module 40 among object data and object data. It is transmitted to the security processing unit QUANTUM BLOCK CHAIN (42).

The QUANTUM BLOCK CHAIN 42 compares the wanted vehicle vehicle number data received from the 1:N BLOCK CHAIN 43 connected to the block chain and generates a wanted vehicle event if it is the wanted vehicle.

The network security processing unit DEBUGGER 41 verifies a boot error when the main control unit Boot-ROM 31 first boots.

Sensing data collected from the sensor unit 46, measurement data measured from the AMI 47, switchboard status information data collected from one or more switchboards 48, audio/video data collected from one or more broadcasting devices 50, The LPWAN communication modem 66 collects the point/off data collected from the LED street/security light 52 and transmits it to the terminal SINGLE USB 54 .

The terminal SINGLE USB 54 transmits measurement data, sensor state information data, audio/video data, and on/off data to Bob non-QRN SERVER 55 and Bob non-QRN SERVER 55 to Alice non-QRN SERVER (62), Alice QRN SERVER (63), Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65) by receiving UHD surveillance camera control data or broadcasting device control data or dimmer control data from any one of the terminal internal terminal SINGLE USB (54) send to

The terminal SINGLE USB 54 receives the UHD surveillance camera control data from the Bob non-QRN SERVER 55 .

The LPWAN communication modem (66) communicates data with the LPWAN terminal, and the main control unit MCU (27) is the TRNG (23), System Memory (24), PUF-PIN Memory (25), Security CPU (26), MCU (27). , PUF Chip 28 , Security OTP Memory 30 , Boot-ROM 31 , and SPI Controller 32 .

The System Memory 24 is a System Memory in which the main control unit MCU 27 operating OS program is stored.

The MCU 27 controls the Security CPU 26 to extract PIN (Personal Identification Number) data from the hardware pin of the PUF Chip 28 to the PUF-PIN Memory 25 and the Alice non-QRN SERVER 62. Save.

The MCU 27 generates and receives a natural random number by controlling the TRNG 23 and transmits it to the Security CPU 26 .

Security CPU 26 formats PIN (Personal Identification Number) data stored in PUF-PIN Memory 25 with a fixed-length format function as a random number seed to form an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm PRIVATE KEY) and then perform an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm by encrypting an asymmetric private key (PRIVATE KEY) and a beta-OR (EX-OR) with the natural random number seed generated through the TRNG (23). A public key (PUBLIC KEY) is generated and stored in the Security OTP Memory (30) and Alice non-QRN SERVER (62).

Bob non-QRN SERVER (55) receives PIN (Personal Identification Number) data encrypted with public key from Alice non-QRN SERVER (62) through non-QUANTUM CHANNEL (58) and then to MCU 27 through input/output unit. send.

When the MCU 27 decrypts the private key and matches the PIN (Personal Identification Number) data stored in the PUF-PIN Memory 25, it boots the Boot-ROM 31 and controls the SPI Controller 32 to control the UHD surveillance camera. and Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 and login (LOG In) network to receive video data from 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE 34 and transmit it to Alice non-QRN SERVER 62.

The specific coupling relationship between QUANTUM CHANNEL will be described in detail below.

Alice QRN SERVER (63) and Bob QRN SERVER (56) are connected to QUANTUM CHANNEL (59).

QUANTUM SECURITY ENGINE (64) generates a QRN KEY from either BB84 or COW (Coherent One Way) and transmits it to Alice QRN SERVER (63).

Alice QRN SERVER (63) sends the QRN KEY to Bob QRN SERVER (56) through QUANTUM CHANNEL (59).

The Bob QRN SERVER 56 transmits to the Quantum Entanglement 36 through the input/output unit via the Bob non-QRN SERVER 55 .

The Quantum Entanglement 36 transmits the QRN KEY generated by the Coherent One Way (COW) generation method to the image SECURITY ENGINE 35 .

Image SECURITY ENGINE (35) is verified with Decoy Pulse (37) and in the case of quantum entanglement, it receives image data from 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE (34), encrypts image data with QRN KEY, and then through input/output unit Bob non-QRN SERVER It is transmitted to Bob QRN SERVER (56) via (55).

Bob QRN SERVER (56) transmits the image data encrypted with the QRN KEY to Alice QRN SERVER (63) through QUANTUM CHANNEL (59).

Alice QRN SERVER (63) decrypts the image data encrypted with the QRN KEY with the QRN KEY received from the SECURITY ENGINE (64).

The specific binding relationship between hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL will be described in detail.

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65) and Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) are hybrid- consisting of a Non-QUANTUM Communication Channel (58) and a quantum communication channel (QUANTUM Communication Channel (59)). connected to QUANTUM CHANNEL (60).

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 is Alice Boot-ROM connected to Alice System Bus, Alice Master Controller (MCU), Alice System Storage Device (System M/M; System MEMORY), and Alice VPN (Virtual Private Network), Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Alice I/O Device (I/O Port), Alice Serial Peripheral Interface Controller (SPI Controller), Alice True Random Number Generator (TRNG; True Random Number Generator) ), Alice Security CPU (Security Central Processing Unit), Alice Security OTP Memory (Security OTP M/M; Security One Time Password MEMORY), Alice PUF Memory (PUF M/M; Phisycally Unclonable Function MEMORY), Alice PUF It is composed of Chip (Physically Unclonable Function Chip).

Alice main controller (MCU) consists of Alice Boot-ROM, Alice System Storage (System M/M), Alice VPN (Virtual Private Network), Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) connected to Alice System Bus. , Alice I/O Port, and Alice Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller) are controlled.

Alice Security CPU (Security CPU) is Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Alice I/O Device (I/O Port), Alice Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller), Alice Pure Random Number Generator (TRNG), Alice Secure OTP Memory (Security) OTP M/M), Alice PUF memory (PUF M/M), and Alice PUF Chip.

The Alice system storage device (System M/M) stores programs and data necessary for the Alice main controller (MCU).

The Alice Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller) is connected to the Alice I/O Device (I/O Port) and controls the Alice I/O Device (I/O Port) according to the control command of the Alice Main Controller (MCU) to turn on the network connection. /OFF control.

Alice Boot-ROM stores programs and data necessary for booting Alice main controller (MCU).

Alice VPN performs 1:1 encrypted communication between Bob VPN inside Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57 connected to the network.

Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) receives a quantum random number key certificate (QC; decoy Qantum Certificate) through the Alice input/output device (I/O Port) and, depending on whether it is authenticated, through the Alice input/output device (I/O Port) through the network network ON/OFF control.

The Alice input/output device (I/O Port) is a switch connected to the network network, and it controls the network network ON/OFF and transmits the data received through the network network to the Alice main controller (MCU) through the Alice system bus.

Alice Security CPU (Security CPU) extracts Alice PIN data from Alice PUF Chip and stores it in Bob PUF memory (PUF M/M).

Alice Security CPU sends Alice PIN data to Alice main controller (MCU).

The Alice security CPU generates the Alice private key using the Alice PIN data as a random number seed and stores it in the Alice security OTP memory (Security OTP M/M).

The Alice security CPU (Security CPU) is a natural random number seed generated from the Alice pure random number generator (TRNG), and after generating the Alice public key by performing an EX-OR encryption operation with the Alice private key, the Alice main controller ( to the MCU).

Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) is connected to Bob's System Bus (Boot-ROM), Bob's Master Controller (MCU), Bob's System Storage (System M/M; System MEMORY), and Bob VPN (Virtual Private Network), Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Bob I/O Port, Bob Serial Peripheral Interface Controller (SPI Controller), Bob True Random Number Generator (TRNG) ), Bob Security CPU (Security Central Processing Unit), Bob Security OTP M/M (Security One Time Password MEMORY), Bob PUF Memory (PUF M/M; Phisycally Unclonable Function MEMORY), Bob PUF It is composed of Chip (Physically Unclonable Function Chip).

Bob main controller (MCU) is connected to Bob's System Bus (Boot-ROM), Bob's System Storage (System M/M), Bob's Virtual Private Network (VPN), and Bob's Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER). , Bob I/O Port, and Bob Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller).

Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) includes Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Bob I/O Port, Bob Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller), Bob Pure Random Number Generator (TRNG), and Bob Secure OTP Memory (Security). OTP M/M), Bob PUF memory (PUF M/M), and Bob PUF Chip.

Bob's system storage (System M/M) stores programs and data necessary for Bob's main control unit (MCU).

Bob Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller) is connected to Bob I/O Port and controls Bob I/O Port according to the control command of Bob's main controller (MCU) to turn on the network connection. /OFF control.

Bob Boot-ROM stores programs and data necessary for booting Bob's main control unit (MCU).

Bob VPN performs 1:1 encrypted communication between Alice VPN inside Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 connected to the network.

Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) receives a Quantum RandomNumber Certificate (QC) through Bob's I/O Port and turns on the network through Bob's I/O Port depending on whether or not it is authenticated. /OFF control.

Bob I/O Port is a switch connected to the network network, and controls the network network ON/OFF and transmits the data received through the network network to the Bob main controller (MCU) through the Bob system bus.

Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) extracts Bob PIN data from Bob PUF Chip and stores it in Alice PUF memory (PUF M/M).

Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) sends Bob PIN data to Bob main control unit (MCU).

The Bob security CPU (Security CPU) generates the Bob private key using the Bob PIN data as a random number seed, and stores it in the Bob security OTP memory (Security OTP M/M).

Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) is a natural random number seed generated from Bob's pure random number generator (TRNG). After generating Bob's public key by performing an EX-OR encryption operation with Bob's private key, the Bob main controller ( to the MCU).

The specific coupling relationship in the QUANTUM Communication Channel among hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL will be described in detail.

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 and Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57 are connected to a QUANTUM Communication Channel among hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNELs 60 .

Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) is composed of Alice QRNG of the transmitter and Bob QRNG of the receiver that generate random quantum random numbers.

Quantum RandomNumber Key Distribution (QKD) consists of Alice Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) of the transmitter including a laser and Bob Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) of the receiver including a single photon detector.

Quantum Random Number Key Platform (Quantum Platform) generates a Quantum RandomNumber Certificate (QC) with quantum random numbers generated by Alice QRNG and sends Aliec Quantum Random Number Key through Alice Quantum Key Distributor (QKD) It consists of a platform (Quantum Platform) and Bob Quantum Platform (Quantum Platform) that receives and stores a Quantum Random Number Certificate (QC) through Bob Quantum Key Distributor (QKD).

Random quantum random numbers generated from a transmitting set Alice QRNG are transmitted to the Aliec quantum random number key platform (Quantum Platform).

Aliec quantum random number key platform (Quantum Platform) receives the quantum random number, generates a quantum random number key certificate (QC), and transmits it to Alice Master Server (Alice MASTER SERVER) and Alice quantum key distributor (QKD).

Alice quantum key distributor (QKD) transmits a quantum random number key certificate (QC) to Bob quantum key distributor (QKD) through a quantum communication channel connected by an optical cable (QUANTUM Communication Channel);

A receiving set Bob quantum key distributor (QKD) receives the quantum random number key certificate (QC) and stores it in Bob quantum random number key platform (Quantum Platform).

The specific coupling relationship in the non-QUANTUM Communication Channel among hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL will be described in detail.

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 and Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57 are connected to an Internet Service Provider (ISP) operator network that does not form a quantum communication channel.

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 inside Alice main controller (MCU) boots through Alice Boot-ROM connected to Alice System Bus, and is stored in Alice system storage device (System M/M). According to the stored program, it controls the Alice serial peripheral interface (SPI Controller) to control the network network ON/OFF through the Alice input/output device (I/O Port), and the Alice public key received through the Alice security CPU (Security CPU) Send to Bob VPN inside Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57 through Alice VPN.

Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB(57) inside Bob's main controller (MCU) boots through Bob's Boot-ROM connected to Bob's System Bus, and stores it in Bob's system storage (System M/M). According to the stored program, it controls the Bob serial peripheral interface (SPI Controller) to control the network ON/OFF through the Bob input/output device (I/O port), and the Bob public key received through the Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) is Send to Alice VPN inside Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 via Bob VPN.

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 inside Alice main controller (MCU) uses the Alice KEY that encrypted the Bob PIN data stored in the Alice PUF memory (PUF M/M) with the Bob public key received through the Alice VPN, and the Alice VPN. Through Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57, it is transmitted to Bob VPN inside.

Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) Bob main controller (MCU) inside the Bob VPN, the Bob KEY that encrypted the Alice PIN data stored in the Bob PUF memory (PUF M/M) with the Alice public key received through Bob VPN. Through Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65, it is transmitted to Alice VPN inside.

The Alice main controller (MCU) inside the Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 matches the Alice PIN data obtained by decrypting the Bob KEY encrypted with the Alice public key with the Alice private key and the Alice PIN data extracted from the Alice PUF Chip, and the Bob PUF- When the Bob PIN data obtained by decrypting the Alice KEY encrypted with the Bob public key and the Bob private key matches the Bob PIN data extracted from the Bob PUF Chip, the Bob main control unit (MCU) inside the QRNG TWIN USB 57, Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB A network login (LOG In) is connected between the Alice master server (Alice MASTER SERVER) connected to (65) and the Bob master server (Bob MASTER SERVER) connected to the Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57).

In the network login (LOG In) connection state, the Alice main controller (MCU) inside the Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 receives the quantum random number key certificate (QC) from the Alice MASTER SERVER and discloses Bob. After encryption with the key, it is transmitted to Bob VPN inside Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57 through Alice VPN.

Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) inside Bob main controller (MCU) decrypts the quantum random number key certificate (QC) encrypted with Bob public key received through Bob VPN with Bob private key to generate a quantum random number key certificate (QC). Decrypt

Bob MASTER SERVER transmits the quantum random number key certificate (QC) stored in the Bob quantum random number key platform to the Bob debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) inside the Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57.

Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57, Bob's main controller (MCU) transmits the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from Alice Master Server (Alice MASTER SERVER) to Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER).

Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) does not match the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65) and the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from the Bob master server (Bob MASTER SERVER). A hybrid including a switchboard, a broadcasting device, a street/security light, and a CCTV surveillance camera terminal for crime prevention, characterized in that it blocks the network connection between the Alice master server and the Bob master server by controlling the I/O port as an OFF contact if not. quantum communication network.

In one embodiment,

As a major component, the quantum random number edge server is composed of a quantum random number generator.

The autonomous vehicle is composed of a surveillance camera and a 5G communication modem.

In addition, it is composed of QUANTUM 5G AP (Access Point) and Alice QRN SERVER and Bob QRN SERVER.

It is mainly composed of quantum random number edge server, autonomous vehicle, QUANTUM 5G AP (Access Point), Alice QRN SERVER, and Bob QRN SERVER.

In the network configuration, the wired quantum network is composed of any one of QUANTUM CHANNEL, non-QUANTUM CHANNEL, and hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL. In addition, the 5G wireless network network is additionally configured as a redundant duplex network.

QKD (Quantum Random Number Key) that selectively connects wired quantum network self-network and ISP operator 5G wireless network network and encrypts/decrypts with QRN KEY (private key/public key) generated using PUF or QRNG SoC Chip according to data characteristics Distribution) The TLS (Transport Layer Security) system will be described in detail below with its main features.

The core component, quantum random number edge server (QUANTUM encrypt Transport Layer Security protocol DEVICE), is Eve quantum random number generator, 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE, Boot Mode S/W (SWITCH), JTAG Connector, USB Connector, ETHERNET Connector, RESET S/ It is composed of W(SWITCH), LED, and I/O Pin Header.

In addition, the 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE inside the quantum random number edge server is characterized by including System Memory, PUF-PIN Memory, Security CPU, MCU, eve-PUF Chip, Security OTP Memory, Boot-ROM, and SPI Controller.

The Eve quantum random number generator, which is a core component, is composed of a random number source generator, quantum detection diode, quantum random pulse generator, quantum random number control unit, and input/output unit.

Detailed components and detailed coupling relationships will be described in detail below.

The random number source generator emits quantum particles from any one or more of LED (Light-Emitting Diode), LD (Laser Diode), radioactive isotopes, transistor noise, and thermal noise.

The quantum detection diode detects quantum particles generated from the random number source generator.

The quantum random pulse generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode and generates a random pulse corresponding to the detection of the quantum particle.

The quantum random number control unit generates a quantum random number from a random pulse random number source generated through the quantum random pulse generator and transmits it to the 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE internal Security CPU.

Boot Mode S/W (SWITCH) is Boot Mode S/W (S/W) that boots the Boot-ROM through the SPI Controller inside 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE, receives the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key, and transmits it to the 5G communication modem. SWITCH).

JTAG Connector is a JTAG (Joint Test Action Group) connector that transmits output data or receives input data in a serial communication method for digital input/output.

ETHERNET Connector is an input/output port for ETHERNET communication with an autonomous vehicle.

RESET S/W (SWITCH) is RESET S/W (SWITCH) for initializing the quantum random number edge server;

It consists of a power supply indicator LED and an I/O Pin Header and USB Connector that communicates with each part of the quantum random number edge server.

The relationship between components and systems will be described in detail with a focus on the network network.

It consists of a surveillance camera mounted inside an autonomous vehicle, a quantum random number edge server, a 5G communication modem, and a QUANTUM 5G AP and Bob QRN SERVER installed on the road outside the autonomous vehicle, QUANTUM CHANNEL, non-QUANTUM CHANNEL, hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL It is composed of an Alice QRN SERVER connected to a wired quantum network and 5G wireless network consisting of any one of them.

5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE's internal MCU controls System Memory, PUF-PIN Memory, Security CPU, eve-PUF Chip, Security OTP Memory, Boot-ROM, and SPI Controller.

System Memory is the system memory in which the MCU operating OS program is stored.

MCU controls the Security CPU to extract Eve PIN data from the hardware pin of the eve-PUF Chip and stores it in PUF-PIN Memory and Alice QRN SERVER. Then, the Eve PIN data is formatted as a random number seed and encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM private key. (PRIVATE KEY) is created.

The format function generates an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm PRIVATE KEY using various well-known methods such as a fixed-length hash function and a function expression.

MCU receives quantum random number from Eve quantum random number generator and sends it to Security CPU.

Security CPU generates Eve QUANTUM public key (PUBLIC KEY) by performing beta-OR (EX-OR) encryption operation on the Eve QUANTUM private key stored in PUF-PIN Memory with the quantum random number seed, and the quantum random number seed ( Seed) and Eve QUANTUM public key are stored in Security OTP Memory and Eve QUANTUM public key (PUBLIC KEY) is transmitted to 5G communication modem.

The beta-OR (EX-OR) cryptographic operation uses a variety of well-known methods such as operators (EX-OR, EX-AND, etc.), fixed-length hash functions, and function expressions. KEY) is created.

The 5G communication modem transmits to Alice QRN SERVER through the 5G base station inside the 5G wireless network.

Alice QRN SERVER is configured by including Alice Quantum Random Number Generator and Alice PUF Chip inside.

Alice QRN SERVER extracts Alice PIN data from the hardware pin of Alice PUF Chip, stores it in a quantum random number edge server, and encrypts the Alice PIN data with a random number seed to generate the Alice QUANTUM private key.

Alice QUANTUM public key (PUBLIC KEY) is generated by performing beta-OR (EX-OR) encryption operation with the quantum random number seed that generated quantum random number from Alice quantum random number generator and Alice QUANTUM private key.

The beta-OR (EX-OR) cryptographic operation uses a variety of well-known methods such as operators (EX-OR, EX-AND, etc.), fixed-length hash functions, and function expressions. KEY) is created.

Alice QRN SERVER encrypts the Eve PIN data and Alice QUANTUM public key stored inside the Eve QUANTUM public key received through the 5G wireless network and retransmits it to the quantum random number edge server through the 5G wireless network.

Quantum random number edge server internal MCU performs Eve PIN data encrypted with Eve QUANTUM public key and Alice QUANTUM public key with Eve QUANTUM private key with quantum random number seed stored in Security OTP Memory and beta OR (EX-OR) decryption Decrypt and generate Alice QUANTUM public key and Eve PIN data.

If the decrypted Eve PIN data and the Eve PIN data extracted from the eve-PUF chip match, the MCU boots the Boot-ROM through the SPI Controller and encrypts the video data captured by the surveillance camera with the Alice QUANTUM public key to encrypt the 5G communication modem. send to

The 5G communication modem transmits the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key to the QUANTUM 5G AP through the 5G LAN (Local Area Network) cell network that can communicate. However, if communication with the QUANTUM 5G AP is not possible, the 5G wireless network 5G base station send to

When Bob QRN SERVER receives surveillance camera video data encrypted with Alice QUANTUM public key from QUANTUM 5G AP, it is sent to Alice QRN SERVER through a wired quantum network consisting of any one of QUANTUM CHANNEL, non-QUANTUM CHANNEL, and hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL. send.

Alice QRN SERVER receives SMART QUANTUM G-Cloud autonomy using QUANTUM 5G AP that receives video data from surveillance cameras encrypted with Alice QUANTUM public key and decrypts it with Alice QUANTUM private key from any one or more of wired quantum network and 5G wireless network. Driving car 5G is the autonomous network of local governments.

In one embodiment,

The autonomous vehicle is composed of a quantum random number edge server, a surveillance camera, and a communication modem.

An unlicensed frequency radio repeater (Access Point), Alice QRN SERVER, and Bob QRN SERVER are configured outside the autonomous vehicle.

It features a QKD (Quantum Random Number Key Distribution) TLS (Transport Layer Security) system that selectively connects wired and wireless private networks and telecommunication operator wireless networks to encrypt/decrypt communication with QRN KEY.

As the main component,

It consists of a surveillance camera mounted inside an autonomous vehicle, a quantum random number edge server, and a communication modem.

It consists of an unlicensed frequency radio repeater installed outside the autonomous vehicle, Bob QRN SERVER.

The network is composed of the Alice QRN SERVER connected to the wired/wireless network consisting of the wired and wireless private network and the telecommunication operator's wireless network.

Quantum random number edge server consists of Eve quantum random number generator and QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE.

Quantum random number Edge server's internal Eve quantum random number generator generates quantum random numbers and sends them to QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE's internal Security CPU.

QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE consists of System Memory, PUF-PIN Memory, Security CPU, MCU, eve-PUF Chip, Security OTP Memory, Boot-ROM, and SPI Controller.

QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE's internal MCU controls System Memory, PUF-PIN Memory, Security CPU, eve-PUF Chip, Security OTP Memory, Boot-ROM, and SPI Controller.

System Memory is the system memory in which the MCU operating OS program is stored.

The MCU controls the Security CPU to extract Eve PIN data from the hardware pin of the eve-PUF Chip, stores it in PUF-PIN Memory and Alice QRN SERVER, and then creates the Eve QUANTUM private key as a random number seed with the Eve PIN data.

MCU receives quantum random number from Eve quantum random number generator and sends it to Security CPU.

The Security CPU encrypts the Eve QUANTUM private key stored in the PUF-PIN Memory with the quantum random number seed to generate the Eve QUANTUM public key, stores the Eve QUANTUM public key in the Security OTP Memory, and communicates the Eve QUANTUM public key. send to the modem.

The communication modem transmits the Eve QUANTUM public key to the Alice QRN SERVER through the wireless base station inside the wireless network of the operator.

Alice QRN SERVER is configured by including Alice Quantum Random Number Generator and Alice PUF Chip inside.

Alice QRN SERVER extracts Alice PIN data from hardware pin of Alice PUF Chip, stores it in quantum random number edge server, generates Alice QUANTUM private key as a random number seed, and generates quantum random number from Alice quantum random number generator. The Alice QUANTUM private key is encrypted with the generated quantum random number seed to generate the Alice QUANTUM public key.

Alice QRN SERVER encrypts the Eve PIN data and Alice QUANTUM public key stored inside the Eve QUANTUM public key received through the wireless network network of the telecommunication service provider and retransmits it to the quantum random number edge server through the wireless network network of the telecommunication service provider, and the quantum random number edge server The internal MCU decrypts the Eve PIN data encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM public key and the Alice QUANTUM public key with the Eve QUANTUM private key to decrypt and generate the Alice QUANTUM public key and Eve PIN data, and the decrypted generated Eve PIN data and eve-PUF Chip If it matches the Eve PIN data extracted from

The MCU boots the Boot-ROM through the SPI Controller, encrypts the video data captured by the surveillance camera with the Alice QUANTUM public key, and sends it to the communication modem.

The communication modem transmits the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key to the unlicensed frequency radio repeater that can communicate, but if communication with the unlicensed frequency radio repeater is impossible, it is transmitted to the wireless base station of the telecommunication service provider's wireless network.

When Bob QRN SERVER receives the surveillance camera video data encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key from the unlicensed frequency radio repeater, it transmits it to Alice QRN SERVER through the wired network;

Alice QRN SERVER receives video data from the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key from one or more of the wired network and the wireless network and decrypts it with the Alice QUANTUM private key SMART QUANTUM G-Cloud autonomous driving using a wireless repeater. Autonomous self-network.

In one embodiment,

It is basically composed of quantum random number edge server, surveillance camera, communication modem, unlicensed frequency wireless repeater (Access Point), Alice QRN SERVER, and Bob QRN SERVER.

Quantum random number edge server consists of Eve quantum random number generator and QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE.

Quantum random number Edge server's internal Eve quantum random number generator generates quantum random numbers and sends them to QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE's internal Security CPU.

QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE consists of System Memory, PUF-PIN Memory, Security CPU, MCU, eve-PUF Chip, Security OTP Memory, Boot-ROM, and SPI Controller.

QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE's internal MCU controls System Memory, PUF-PIN Memory, Security CPU, eve-PUF Chip, Security OTP Memory, Boot-ROM, and SPI Controller.

System Memory is the system memory in which the MCU operating OS program is stored.

MCU controls the Security CPU to extract Eve PIN data from the hardware pin of the eve-PUF Chip, stores it in PUF-PIN Memory and Alice QRN SERVER, and generates the Eve QUANTUM private key with the Eve PIN data as a seed.

MCU receives quantum random number from Eve quantum random number generator and sends it to Security CPU.

The Security CPU generates an Eve QUANTUM public key by encrypting the Eve QUANTUM private key stored in the PUF-PIN memory with the quantum random number, stores the Eve QUANTUM public key in the Security OTP Memory, and transmits it to the communication modem.

The communication modem transmits the Eve QUANTUM public key to the Alice QRN SERVER through the wireless network of the communication service provider.

Alice QRN SERVER is composed of Alice Quantum Random Number Generator and Alice PUF Chip inside, Alice QRN SERVER extracts Alice PIN data from hardware pin of Alice PUF Chip, stores it in quantum random number edge server, and seed Alice PIN data ( Seed) to generate an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm Alice QUANTUM private key, and convert the Alice QUANTUM private key to the quantum random number generated by the quantum random number from Alice quantum random number generator as a known asymmetric cryptographic algorithm. Generate the Alice QUANTUM public key by cryptographic operation.

Alice QRN SERVER encrypts the Eve PIN data and Alice QUANTUM public key stored inside the Eve QUANTUM public key received through the wireless network of the telecommunication service provider and retransmits it to the quantum random number edge server through the wireless network of the telecommunication service provider.

Quantum random number edge server internal MCU decrypts the Eve PIN data encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM public key and the Alice QUANTUM public key with the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm Eve QUANTUM private key to decrypt and generate the Alice QUANTUM public key and Eve PIN data. .

If the decrypted Eve PIN data and the Eve PIN data extracted from the eve-PUF chip match, the MCU boots the Boot-ROM through the SPI Controller, encrypts the video data captured by the surveillance camera with the Alice QUANTUM public key, and sends it to the communication modem. send.

The communication modem transmits the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key to the Bob QRN SERVER through the wireless repeater of the unlicensed frequency of the wireless private network. It is sent to Alice QRN SERVER.

When Bob QRN SERVER receives the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key from the unlicensed frequency radio repeater, it transmits it to the Alice QRN SERVER through the wire network.

Alice QRN SERVER receives the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key from one or more of the wired self-network and the wireless network of the telecommunication service provider and decrypts it with the Alice QUANTUM private key SMART QUANTUM G-Cloud self-service using an unlicensed frequency radio repeater. it's a net

In one embodiment,

It is composed of quantum random number edge server, surveillance camera, communication modem, unlicensed frequency wireless repeater (Access Point), Alice QRN SERVER, and Bob QRN SERVER.

Quantum random number edge server consists of Eve quantum random number generator and QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE.

Quantum random number Edge server's internal Eve quantum random number generator generates quantum random numbers and sends them to QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE's internal Security CPU.

QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE consists of System Memory, NFC Memory, Security CPU, MCU, eve-NFC Chip, Security OTP Memory, Boot-ROM, and SPI Controller.

QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE's internal MCU controls System Memory, NFC Memory, Security CPU, eve-NFC Chip, Security OTP Memory, Boot-ROM, and SPI Controller.

System Memory is the system memory in which the MCU operating OS program is stored.

MCU controls Security CPU to extract Eve NFC data from eve-NFC Chip (or eve-NFC card, eve-NFC sticker) and store it in Alice QRN SERVER as NFC Memory and random number seed, then seed Eve NFC data random number to generate the Eve QUANTUM private key.

MCU receives quantum random number from Eve quantum random number generator and sends it to Security CPU.

The Security CPU generates an Eve QUANTUM public key by encrypting the Eve QUANTUM private key stored in the NFC Memory with the quantum random number, stores the Eve QUANTUM public key in the Security OTP Memory, and transmits it to the communication modem.

The communication modem transmits the Eve QUANTUM public key to the Alice QRN SERVER through the wireless network of the communication service provider.

Alice QRN SERVER is composed of Alice quantum random number generator and Alice NFC Chip inside.

Alice QRN SERVER extracts Alice NFC data from Alice NFC Chip, stores it in quantum random number edge server, generates Alice QUANTUM private key from Alice NFC data, and then generates quantum random number from Alice quantum random number generator Alice QUANTUM private key to generate the Alice QUANTUM public key by cryptographic operation.

Alice QRN SERVER encrypts the Eve NFC data and Alice QUANTUM public key stored inside the Eve QUANTUM public key received through the wireless network of the telecommunication service provider and retransmits it to the quantum random number edge server through the wireless network of the telecommunication service provider.

The internal MCU of the quantum random number edge server decrypts the Eve NFC data encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM public key and the Alice QUANTUM public key with the Eve QUANTUM private key to decrypt and generate the Alice QUANTUM public key and Eve NFC data.

If the decryption-generated Eve NFC data and the Eve NFC data extracted from the eve-NFC Chip match, the MCU boots the Boot-ROM through the SPI Controller, encrypts the video data captured by the surveillance camera with the Alice QUANTUM public key, and sends it to the communication modem. send.

The communication modem transmits the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key to the Bob QRN SERVER through the wireless repeater of the unlicensed frequency of the wireless private network. It is sent to Alice QRN SERVER.

When Bob QRN SERVER receives the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key from the unlicensed frequency radio repeater, it transmits it to the Alice QRN SERVER through the wire network.

Alice QRN SERVER receives the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key from one or more of the wired self-network and the wireless network of the telecommunication service provider and decrypts it with the Alice QUANTUM private key SMART QUANTUM G-Cloud self-service using an unlicensed frequency radio repeater. it's a net

In one embodiment,

It is basically composed of a terminal unit, an unlicensed frequency radio repeater (Access Point), Alice QRN SERVER, and Bob QRN SERVER.

The terminal unit is configured including a quantum random number edge server, a self-wired network communication modem and a communication service provider communication modem in detail.

The terminal quantum random number edge server is connected to Alice QRN SERVER through the telecommunication carrier's communication modem through the telecommunication carrier's wireless network.

In addition, the quantum random number edge server is networked with Alice QRN SERVER connected through its own wired network through Bob QRN SERVER connected to the unlicensed frequency radio repeater through its own wireless network communication modem.

Telecommunication service provider wireless network: Quantum random number edge server ↔ Telecommunication carrier communication modem ↔ Licensed frequency carrier wireless network ↔ Alice QRN SERVER

Own wired/wireless network: Quantum random number edge server ↔ Own wireless network communication modem ↔ Unlicensed frequency wireless repeater ↔ Own wireless network (unlicensed frequency closed wireless self network) ↔ Bob QRN SERVER ↔ Own wired network (QUANTUM CHANNEL, non-QUANTUM CHANNEL, A wired network consisting of any one of hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL) ↔ Alice QRN SERVER

Quantum random number edge server consists of Eve quantum random number generator and QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE.

Quantum random number Edge server's internal Eve quantum random number generator generates quantum random numbers and sends them to QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE's internal Security CPU.

QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE consists of System Memory, PUF-PIN Memory, Security CPU, MCU, eve-PUF, Security OTP Memory, Network Switch, and SPI Controller.

QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE's internal MCU controls System Memory, PUF-PIN Memory, Security CPU, eve-PUF, Security OTP Memory, Network Switch, and SPI Controller.

System Memory is the system memory in which the MCU operating OS program is stored.

MCU controls Security CPU to extract Eve PIN data from eve-PUF, stores it in PUF-PIN Memory and Alice QRN SERVER, and creates Eve QUANTUM private key with Eve PIN data as a random number seed.

MCU receives quantum random number from Eve quantum random number generator and sends it to Security CPU.

The Security CPU encrypts the Eve QUANTUM private key stored in the PUF-PIN Memory with the quantum random number seed to generate the Eve QUANTUM public key, stores the Eve QUANTUM public key in the Security OTP Memory, and communicates the Eve QUANTUM public key. It is transmitted to the operator's communication modem.

The communication operator's communication modem transmits the Eve QUANTUM public key to the Alice QRN SERVER through the communication operator's wireless network.

Alice QRN SERVER is configured by including Alice quantum random number generator and Alice PUF inside.

Alice QRN SERVER extracts Alice PIN data from Alice PUF, stores it in the quantum random number edge server, generates the Alice QUANTUM private key with the Alice PIN data as a random number seed, and generates a quantum random number from the Alice quantum random number generator. The Alice QUANTUM private key is encrypted with the seed to generate the Alice QUANTUM public key.

Alice QRN SERVER encrypts the Eve PIN data and Alice QUANTUM public key stored inside with the Eve QUANTUM public key received through the wireless network of the telecommunication service provider and retransmits it to the quantum random number edge server through the wireless network of the telecommunication service provider. The Eve PIN data and Alice QUANTUM public key stored inside are encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM public key received through the network and transmitted to the Bob QRN SERVER through their own wired network. When transmitted, the quantum random number edge server receives it through its own wireless network communication modem.

The quantum random number edge server receives Eve PIN data and Alice QUANTUM public key encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM public key from either the wireless network of the telecommunication service provider or its own wired network, decrypts the Eve QUANTUM private key, and decrypts the Alice QUANTUM public key and Eve PIN data Generation and Decryption If the generated Eve PIN data matches the Eve PIN data extracted from eve-PUF,

The MCU gradually turns the Network Switch ON through the SPI Controller, encrypts the data with the Alice QUANTUM public key, and transmits it to its own wireless network communication modem and communication operator communication modem.

The self-wired network communication modem transmits data encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key to a wireless repeater that can communicate with an unlicensed frequency.

When Bob QRN SERVER receives data encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key from the unlicensed frequency radio repeater, it transmits it to Alice QRN SERVER through its own wired network.

Alice QRN SERVER is a SMART QUANTUM G-Cloud own network using an unlicensed frequency radio repeater that receives data encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key and decrypts it with the Alice QUANTUM private key from one or more of its own wired network and wireless network of a telecommunication service provider.

In one embodiment,

Surveillance Camera (Closed Circuit Camera, or Security Surveillance Camera, Security Surveillance Camera, Surveillance Camera), Quantum Random Number Edge Server, Alice QRN SERVER, Bob QRN SERVER, 2-channel Wireless Repeater (Access Point), Network Separation Server, Quantum Smart It consists of phone, NFC Tag, police-APP, SK Telecom's telecom operator's LoRA wireless network (communication operator's wireless network), SK Telecom's quantum random number key authentication server, and wired/wireless self-network.

Alice QRN SERVER generates the first quantum random number through the Alice Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) inside, and generates a QUANTUM symmetric key of a symmetric cryptographic algorithm to create a quantum random number edge server PUF-PIN Memory And by storing in Alice QRN SERVER, and after network network login (Log In) between the quantum random number edge server and Alice QRN SERVER, the video data captured by the surveillance camera (surveillance camera) is encrypted/decrypted data communication with the QUANTUM symmetric key.

(Integrated Crime Prevention Center)

Alice QRN SERVER inside the integrated crime prevention center is connected to SK Telecom's quantum random number key authentication server through any one of SK Telecom's 3G, 4G, 5G, and LoRA wireless networks.

The network separation server inside the integrated crime prevention center consists of an internal network main board and an external network main board. The internal network main board receives video data from Alice QRN SERVER and transmits only the video data in one direction to the external network main board.

(School Zone Control)

The closed enclosure consists of a remote locking device and a door open sensor, and the closed enclosure door door open sensor detection data is transmitted to Alice QRN SERVER through Bob QRN SERVER, and Alice QRN SERVER controls the remote locking device. to remotely control the opening of the closed enclosure.

It is composed of Bob QRN SERVER, CC certified VPN, and 2-channel wireless repeater (Access Point) inside the enclosed enclosure. Bob QRN SERVER is non-QUANTUM CHANNEL, BB84 QUANTUM CHANNEL, PUF-QRNG TWIN USB through CC certified VPN. It is connected to Alice QRN SERVER through any one of the wired networks among hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNELs.

(School zone terminal)

The terminal is composed of a closed circuit camera, a multi-communication modem, and a quantum random number edge server.

A surveillance camera is a surveillance camera equipped with either a PUF-TRNG SoC (System on Chip) or an eFUSE-TRNG SoC (System on Chip) security chip.

The quantum random number edge server controls the surveillance camera. The quantum random number edge server selectively selects the unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network or the licensed frequency SK Telecom carrier LoRA wireless network through QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) in data transmission/reception,

Quantum random number edge server controls QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) to connect with Bob QRN SERVER through two-channel wireless repeater (Access Point) connected to unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network through unlicensed frequency modem among multi-communication modems, or The random number edge server controls QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) and connects to Alice QRN SERVER through SK Telecom quantum random number key authentication server authentication connected to the licensed frequency SK Telecom carrier LoRA wireless network through the licensed frequency modem among the multi-communication modems. .

(System Combine - Log In)

The quantum random number edge server consists of QUANTUM AC (Access Controller), Eve quantum random number generator, and Encrypt TLS (Transport Layer Security protocol) MODULE.

Encrypt TLS MODULE consists of System Memory, PUF-PIN Memory, Security CPU, Main Control Unit (MCU), eve-NFC Chip, NFC Reader, Security OTP Memory, Boot-ROM, and SPI Controller.

Quantum Random Number Edge Server Internal Eve Quantum Random Number Generator generates quantum random number and transmits it to Encrypt TLS MODULE internal Security CPU.

Encrypt TLS MODULE Internal MCU controls System Memory, PUF-PIN Memory, Security CPU, eve-NFC Chip, NFC Reader, Security OTP Memory, Boot-ROM, SPI Controller.

System Memory is the system memory in which the MCU operating OS program is stored.

The MCU controls the Security CPU and the NFC Reader receives the Eve PIN data stored in the eve-NFC Chip through contactless near field communication, stores it in the PUF-PIN memory, and then converts the Eve PIN data as a random number seed. Asymmetric cryptographic algorithm Eve QUANTUM Generates a private key (PRIVATE KEY).

The eve-NFC Chip is one of the physical PUF (Physical Unclonable Function) that is replaced every month (or weekly, frequently) during the monthly maintenance service inspection. Input the Eve PIN data through the NFC Writer and send the Eve PIN data to Alice QRN SERVER. Save.

MCU receives quantum random number from Eve quantum random number generator and sends it to Security CPU.

Security CPU performs beta-OR (EX-OR) encryption operation of the Eve QUANTUM private key stored in PUF-PIN Memory with the quantum random number seed. OTP (One Time Password) asymmetric cryptographic algorithm Eve QUANTUM A public key (PUBLIC KEY) is generated, the Eve QUANTUM public key is stored in the Security OTP (One Time Password) memory, and the Eve QUANTUM public key is transmitted to the QUANTUM AC (Access Controller).

QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) transmits the Eve QUANTUM public key to Alice QRN SERVER through SK Telecom quantum random number key authentication server authentication connected to the licensed frequency SK Telecom carrier LoRA wireless network through the licensed frequency modem among the multi-communication modems.

Alice QRN SERVER is configured by including Alice Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) and Alice Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) inside.

The Alice QRN SERVER generates Alice PIN data with the Alice pseudo-random number seed created through the Alice pseudo-random number generator, stores it in the quantum random number edge server, and stores the Alice PIN data generated as the Alice pseudo-random number seed as a random number seed ( Seed) to generate the Alice QUANTUM private key, and the EX-OR encryption operation of the Alice QUANTUM private key with the quantum random number seed that generated the quantum random number from the Alice quantum random number generator to obtain the Alice QUANTUM public key. create

Alice QRN SERVER encrypts the Eve PIN data stored inside and the Alice QUANTUM public key with the Eve QUANTUM public key received through the SK Telecom carrier LoRA wireless network network to encrypt the licensed frequency with the SK Telecom carrier LoRA wireless network or wired network network and unlicensed. It retransmits to the quantum random number edge server through the frequency closed wireless self-network, and the quantum random number edge server internal MCU decrypts the Eve PIN data encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM public key and the Alice QUANTUM public key with the Eve QUANTUM private key. When the Eve PIN data is decrypted and generated, and the decrypted Eve PIN data and the Eve PIN data extracted from the eve-NFC Chip match,

MCU boots Boot-ROM through SPI Controller and controls QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) to control Bob through 2-channel wireless repeater (Access Point) connected to unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network through unlicensed frequency modem among multi-communication modems Connect QRN SERVER and network login (Log In).

(System Combine - DATA Transmission)

QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) transmits the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key through the 2-channel wireless repeater to the Bob QRN SERVER that is logged in to the network. It is transmitted to Alice QRN SERVER through any one of the 3G, 4G, or 5G wireless network of SK Telecom's licensed frequency through licensed frequency modem among communication modems.

When Bob QRN SERVER receives video data from the surveillance camera encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key from the 2-channel wireless repeater, it goes to Alice QRN SERVER through one of the wired networks of non-QUANTUM CHANNEL, BB84 QUANTUM CHANNEL, and hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL. send.

Alice QRN SERVER receives the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key from one or more of the wired network and the wireless network and decrypts it with the QUANTUM symmetric key. (Symmetric-key algorithm applied)

(How to combine key component systems)

QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) inside the quantum random number edge server uses the Alice QUANTUM public key, and the multi-communication modem is a wireless network through any one of SK Telecom’s 3G licensed frequency modem, 4G licensed frequency modem, 5G licensed frequency modem, and LoRA modem. It transmits to Alice QRN SERVER over the network, and transmits the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key to the 2-channel wireless repeater through the unlicensed frequency modem, which has the fastest communication speed among low frequency or high frequency that can be communicated.

The 2-channel radio repeater is capable of dual transmission and reception of 2.4GHz Low Frequency and 5GHz High Frequency. It selects Low Frequency or High Frequency as the data transmission frequency according to the communication environment according to obstacles. Before data transmission, QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) and 2 The channel radio repeater conducts Low Frequency and High Frequency PING tests to select a frequency with a fast response speed and encrypts and transmits large-capacity image data with the QUANTUM symmetric key to enhance security and reduce communication charges. Hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL One- It features a Way-Ring Network.

(Quantum smartphone service for police work)

It is composed of a QRNG SoChip quantum random number generator mounted inside a quantum smartphone (Samsung Electronics Galsxy, etc.) to which the police-app for police work authenticated by the SK Telecom quantum random number key authentication server is uploaded, and an NFC tag pseudo random number generator on the outside.

NFC Tag pseudo random number generator stores OTP (One Time Password) pseudo random number through NFC Writer and stores the same OTP (One Time Password) pseudo random number in Alice QRN SERVER.

When the quantum smartphone connects to the external network main board in Alice QRN SERVER,

The Alice QRN SERVER generates Alice PIN data with the Alice pseudo-random number seed generated through the Alice pseudo-random number generator, generates the Alice QUANTUM private key with the Alice PIN data as the random number seed, and uses the Alice quantum random number generator. When the Alice QUANTUM private key is subjected to beta-OR (EX-OR) encryption operation with the quantum random number seed generated from the quantum random number, the Alice QUANTUM public key is generated, and the Alice QUANTUM public key is transmitted to the quantum smartphone, The quantum smartphone encrypts and retransmits the OTP (One Time Password) pseudo-random number generated by tagging the NFC Tag to the quantum smartphone NFC chip with the Alice QUANTUM public key.

Alice QRN SERVER decrypts the OTP (One Time Password) pseudo-random number encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key with the QUANTUM private key, and if it matches the stored OTP (One Time Password) pseudo-random number, the video data captured by the surveillance camera is transferred to the internal network main of the network separation server. The image data is transmitted to the external network main board through the board, and the quantum smartphone connects to the external network main board and logs in the OTP (One Time Password) pseudo-random number as the one-time password with the quantum smartphone MAC Address as the ID. It is a heterogeneous network QRN KEY distribution hybrid quantum communication closed self-network system, characterized in that it receives

In one embodiment,

Terminal SERVER, quantum random number edge server, Alice QRN SERVER, Bob QRN SERVER, 2-channel wireless repeater (Access Point), licensed frequency carrier wireless network, unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network, wired self-network, Alice QRN SERVER generates the first quantum random number through Alice Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) inside and generates QUANTUM symmetric key of symmetric cryptographic algorithm, PUF-PIN Memory inside quantum random number edge server and Alice It is characterized in that the image data is encrypted/decrypted data communication with the QUANTUM symmetric key after logging in to the network network between the quantum random number edge server and Alice QRN SERVER by storing it in the QRN SERVER.

Alice QRN SERVER is connected to a quantum random number edge server and a wireless network through a wireless network of a licensed frequency carrier.

Also, Alice QRN SERVER connects to Bob QRN SERVER and wired network through any one of the 3 non-QUANTUM CHANNEL or BB84 QUANTUM CHANNEL or hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL via PUF-QRNG TWIN USB via CC-certified VPN. do.

The quantum random number edge server is connected to the Bob QRN SERVER and the wireless network through the closed wireless self-network of the unlicensed frequency through the 2-channel wireless repeater (Access Point).

Quantum random number edge server selectively selects unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network or licensed frequency carrier wireless network network through QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) in data transmission/reception,

Quantum random number edge server controls QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) to connect with Bob QRN SERVER through a 2-channel wireless repeater (Access Point) connected to unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network through unlicensed frequency modem among multi-communication modems, or The random number edge server controls QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) and is connected to Alice QRN SERVER through a licensed frequency communication operator wireless network through a licensed frequency modem among multi-communication modems.

The system coupling relationship between the above components will be described.

The quantum random number edge server consists of QUANTUM AC (Access Controller), Eve quantum random number generator, and Encrypt TLS (Transport Layer Security protocol) MODULE.

Encrypt TLS MODULE consists of System Memory, PUF-PIN Memory, Security CPU, MCU (Main Control Unit), eve-NFC Chip, NFC Reader, Security OTP Memory, SPI Controller, and Network Switch.

Quantum Random Number Edge Server Internal Eve Quantum Random Number Generator generates quantum random number and transmits it to Encrypt TLS MODULE internal Security CPU.

Encrypt TLS MODULE Internal MCU controls System Memory, PUF-PIN Memory, Security CPU, eve-NFC Chip, NFC Reader, Security OTP Memory, SPI Controller, and Network Switch.

System Memory is the system memory in which the MCU operating OS program is stored.

The MCU controls the Security CPU and the NFC Reader receives the Eve PIN data stored in the eve-NFC Chip through contactless near field communication, stores it in the PUF-PIN memory, and then converts the Eve PIN data as a random number seed. Asymmetric cryptographic algorithm Eve QUANTUM Generates a private key (PRIVATE KEY).

Input Eve PIN data to eve-NFC Chip through NFC Writer and save to Alice QRN SERVER.

MCU receives from Eve quantum random number generator and performs beta OR (EX-OR) encryption operation on quantum random number seed stored in Security CPU and Eve QUANTUM private key stored in PUF-PIN memory to achieve OTP (One Time Password) asymmetry Asymmetric cryptographic algorithm Generates Eve QUANTUM public key (PUBLIC KEY), stores Eve QUANTUM public key in Security OTP (One Time Password) memory, and transmits Eve QUANTUM public key to QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) .

QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) transmits Eve QUANTUM public key to Alice QRN SERVER through licensed frequency communication operator wireless network through licensed frequency modem among multi communication modems.

Alice QRN SERVER is configured by including Alice Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) and Alice Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) inside.

Alice QRN SERVER generates Alice PIN data through Alice pseudo-random number generator, stores it in quantum random number edge server, generates Alice QUANTUM private key as a random number seed, and generates quantum random number from Alice quantum random number generator. With the generated quantum random number seed, the Alice QUANTUM private key is subjected to an EX-OR encryption operation to generate the Alice QUANTUM public key.

Alice QRN SERVER encrypts the Eve PIN data and Alice QUANTUM public key stored inside the Eve QUANTUM public key received through the licensed frequency carrier wireless network network to encrypt the licensed frequency carrier wireless network or wired self-network and unlicensed frequency closed radio. It is retransmitted to the quantum random number edge server through any one of its own networks.

The internal MCU of the quantum random number edge server decrypts the Eve PIN data encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM public key and the Alice QUANTUM public key with the Eve QUANTUM private key to decrypt and generate the Alice QUANTUM public key and Eve PIN data.

When the decrypted Eve PIN data and the Eve PIN data extracted from the eve-NFC chip match, the MCU switches the Network Switch ON contact and controls the QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) through the SPI Controller to obtain a license among multi-communication modems. Connecting to Bob QRN SERVER and network network login (Log In) through a 2-channel wireless repeater (Access Point) connected to an unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network through a frequency modem;

QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) transmits the data generated by the terminal SERVER encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key through a 2-channel wireless repeater to the Bob QRN SERVER logged in to the network,

The data generated by the terminal SERVER encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key is transmitted to a two-channel radio repeater through either a low frequency channel or a high frequency channel that can be communicated through an unlicensed frequency modem, and the two-channel radio repeater sets the transmission frequency to Low Frequency or Select one of the High Frequency and transmit the encrypted data generated by the terminal server with the QUANTUM symmetric key.

If communication with the 2-channel wireless repeater is impossible, it is transmitted to Alice QRN SERVER through the licensed frequency communication operator's wireless network through the licensed frequency modem among the multi-communication modems.

When Bob QRN SERVER receives the data generated by the terminal SERVER encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key from the 2-channel wireless repeater, Alice QRN SERVER passes through any one of the non-QUANTUM CHANNEL, BB84 QUANTUM CHANNEL, and hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL wired networks. send to

Alice QRN SERVER receives data generated by the terminal SERVER encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key from one or more of the wired self-network and the wireless network, and decrypts it with the QUANTUM symmetric key to enhance security. Hybrid-QUANTUM improves communication speed and reduces communication charges It is a heterogeneous network QRN KEY distribution hybrid quantum communication closed self-network system featuring CHANNEL One-Way-Ring Network.

In one embodiment,

It is composed of quantum random number edge server, DUAL MODEM, 2-channel wireless repeater, Alice QRN SERVER, and Bob QRN SERVER.

Quantum random number edge server is composed of Eve quantum random number generator, it generates Eve quantum random number for the first time with Eve quantum random number generator and generates Eve QUANTUM private key with Eve quantum random number as a seed. Quantum random number edge server is Eve quantum random number generator Generates Eve QUANTUM public key by regenerating quantum random number with Eve QUANTUM private key and cryptographic operation with random number seed.

DUAL MODEM transmits the Eve QUANTUM public key to Alice QRN SERVER through the first network (communicator wireless network or telecommunication operator wired network).

Alice QRN SERVER is configured including the Alice quantum random number generator, and first generates Alice quantum random numbers with the Alice quantum random number generator, and generates the Alice QUANTUM private key with the Alice quantum random number as a seed.

Alice QRN SERVER generates an Alice QUANTUM public key by regenerating a quantum random number with an Alice quantum random number generator and performing an encryption operation with the Alice QUANTUM private key as a random number seed.

Alice QRN SERVER transmits the Alice QUANTUM public key to the quantum random number edge server through the first network.

The quantum random number edge server encrypts the Eve quantum random number with the Alice QUANTUM public key and transmits it to the Alice QRN SERVER through the first network.

Alice QRN SERVER encrypts Alice quantum random number with the Eve QUANTUM public key and transmits it to the quantum random number edge server through the first network.

The Quantum Random Number Edge Server decrypts Alice's quantum random number encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM public key with the Eve QUANTUM private key, and then performs an encryption operation with the Eve quantum random number stored in the internal memory to generate the QUANTUM symmetric key.

Alice QRN SERVER decrypts the Eve quantum random number encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key with the Alice QUANTUM private key, and then performs an encryption operation with the Alice quantum random number stored in the internal memory to generate the QUANTUM symmetric key.

Quantum random number edge server transmits encrypted data by encrypting internal data with QUANTUM symmetric key to DUAL MODEM.

DUAL MODEM transmits the encrypted data encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key to the Bob QRN SERVER through the second network wireless self-network (local government wireless self-network, unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network) unlicensed frequency radio repeater.

When Bob QRN SERVER receives the encrypted data encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key from the 2-channel wireless repeater, it transmits it to Alice QRN SERVER through the second network wired self-network.

The second network is a network in which an unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network and a wired self-network are combined before and after Bob QRN SERVER.

As an example, the second network is composed of 'quantum random number edge server-unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network-Bob QRN SERVER-wired self-network-Alice QRN SERVER'.

Alice QRN SERVER is a heterogeneous QRN KEY distribution hybrid quantum communication closed self-network system featuring a Two-Way-Ring Network that receives encrypted data encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key from the second network wire network and decrypts it with the QUANTUM symmetric key. .

In one embodiment,

It is composed of quantum random number edge server, DUAL MODEM, 2-channel wireless repeater, Alice QRN SERVER, and Bob QRN SERVER.

Quantum random number edge server is composed of Eve quantum random number generator, and it generates basic-Eve quantum random number for generating asymmetric cryptographic algorithm PRIVATE KEY with Eve quantum random number generator and stores it in internal memory. Store and generate an Eve QUANTUM private key with a basic-Eve quantum random number as a seed.

Quantum random number edge server is an Eve quantum random number generator that generates a new new-Eve quantum random number to generate an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm public key (PUBLIC KEY) and uses the Eve QUANTUM private key and cryptographic operation (known as a seed) EX-OR, EX-AND, operator, operation function, etc.) to generate the Eve QUANTUM public key.

DUAL MODEM transmits the Eve QUANTUM public key to Alice QRN SERVER through either the telecom operator's wired or wireless network.

In the same way as above, Alice QRN SERVER is configured including Alice quantum random number generator, generates basic-Alice quantum random number with Alice quantum random number generator, stores it in internal memory, and uses basic-Alice quantum random number as a seed to obtain Alice QUANTUM private key create

Alice QRN SERVER generates a new new-Alice quantum random number from the Alice quantum random number generator and performs cryptographic operation with the Alice QUANTUM private key as a seed to generate the Alice QUANTUM public key.

Alice QRN SERVER transmits the Alice QUANTUM public key to the quantum random number edge server through either the wired or wireless network of the telecommunication service provider.

The quantum random number edge server encrypts the basic-Eve quantum random number with the Alice QUANTUM public key and transmits it to the Alice QRN SERVER through either the telecommunication operator's wired or wireless network.

Alice QRN SERVER encrypts the basic-Alice quantum random number with the Eve QUANTUM public key and transmits it to the quantum random number edge server through the wireless network of the telecommunication service provider.

The quantum random number edge server decrypts the basic-Alice quantum random number encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM private key and the Eve QUANTUM public key, and then performs an encryption operation with the basic-Eve quantum random number stored in the internal memory to generate a symmetric cryptographic algorithm QUANTUM symmetric key. .

Alice QRN SERVER decrypts the basic-Eve quantum random number encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key with the Alice QUANTUM private key, and performs an encryption operation with the basic-Alice quantum random number stored in the internal memory to obtain the symmetric cryptographic algorithm QUANTUM symmetric key as described above. create

That is, the quantum random number edge server and Alice QRN SERVER generate the same QUANTUM symmetric key using the same encryption operator for the same basic-Alice quantum random number and basic-Eve quantum random number, respectively.

The internal data (data measured by sensors, etc.) generated by the quantum random number edge server is encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key, and the encrypted data is transmitted to the DUAL MODEM.

DUAL MODEM transmits the encrypted data encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key to Bob QRN SERVER through the wireless self-network unlicensed frequency wireless repeater.

When Bob QRN SERVER receives the encrypted data encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key from the 2-channel wireless repeater, it transmits it to the Alice QRN SERVER through the wire network.

Alice QRN SERVER is a heterogeneous QRN KEY distribution hybrid quantum communication closed self-network system featuring a Two-Way-Ring Network that receives encrypted data encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key from the wired network and decrypts it with the QUANTUM symmetric key.

In one embodiment,

The eve-NFC Chip is one of the Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) that are replaced during regular inspection, and the Eve PIN data generation stage that inputs Eve PIN data through NFC Writer and stores it in Alice QRN SERVER.

Alice QRN SERVER (including the step of generating Eve PIN data) generates Alice PIN data through the Alice pseudo-random number generator and stores the Alice PIN data in the quantum random number edge server.

The QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE inside the quantum random number edge server (including the step of generating Alice PIN data) receives the Eve PIN data stored in the eve-NFC Chip through the non-contact Near Field Communication and the NFC Reader receives the PUF-PIN Memory The Eve QUANTUM private key generation step to generate the Eve QUANTUM private key as a random number seed after saving the Eve PIN data.

The Eve quantum random number generator inside the quantum random number edge server (including the Eve QUANTUM private key generation step) generates a quantum random number and uses the Eve QUANTUM private key as the quantum random number seed to perform a beta-OR (EX-OR) encryption operation. OTP (One Time Password) Eve QUANTUM public key generation step to generate Eve QUANTUM public key.

QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) inside the quantum random number edge server (including the step of generating the Eve QUANTUM public key) sends the Eve QUANTUM public key through the licensed frequency modem among the multi-communication modems through the licensed frequency SK Telecom carrier LoRA wireless network network. Eve QUANTUM public key transmission step to send to QRN SERVER.

(Including Eve QUANTUM public key transmission step) Alice QRN SERVER generates Alice PIN data through Alice pseudo-random number generator, and Alice QUANTUM private key generation step generates Alice QUANTUM private key with Alice PIN data as a random number seed. .

Alice QRN SERVER (including the step of generating the Alice QUANTUM private key) is a quantum random number seed that generates a quantum random number through the Alice quantum random number generator. Alice QUANTUM public key generation step to generate QUANTUM public key.

The Alice QRN SERVER (including the step of generating the Alice QUANTUM public key) is the QUANTUM CA (Certification Authority) that encrypts the Eve PIN data and Alice QUANTUM public key stored inside the Eve QUANTUM public key received through the LoRA wireless network of SK Telecom telecom operator. certificate) to the Bob QRN SERVER through any one of the non-QUANTUM CHANNEL or BB84 QUANTUM CHANNEL or hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL via PUF-QRNG TWIN USB wired networks.

The Bob QRN SERVER (including the wired network transmission step) uses the Eve QUANTUM public key and QUANTUM CA, which encrypted the Eve PIN data stored inside the Eve QUANTUM public key and the Alice QUANTUM public key, through a 2-channel wireless repeater (Access Point) to 2.4GHz Low Frequency. QUANTUM AC transmission step of transmitting quantum random number edge server internal QUANTUM AC (QUANTUM Access Controller).

The quantum random number edge server (including the QUANTUM AC transmission step) decrypts the Eve PIN data encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM public key and QUANTUM CA that encrypted the Alice QUANTUM public key with the Eve QUANTUM private key to decrypt the Alice QUANTUM public key and Eve PIN data decryption step.

When the quantum random number edge server (including the decryption step) matches the Eve PIN data generated in the decryption step and the Eve PIN data extracted from the eve-NFC Chip after extracting the Eve PIN data extracted from the eve-NFC Chip , The video data transmission preparation step of encrypting the video data captured by the surveillance camera with the Alice QUANTUM public key and transmitting it to the QUANTUM AC (Access Controller).

Perform QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) and High Frequency PING tests (including video data transmission preparation stage) to select a frequency with a fast response speed and transmit the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key to a 2-channel wireless repeater video data transmission step.

When Bob QRN SERVER (including the video data transmission step) receives the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key from the 2-channel wireless repeater, any one of non-QUANTUM CHANNEL, BB84 QUANTUM CHANNEL, and hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL Video data receiving step to be transmitted to Alice QRN SERVER through the wired network of

Alice QRN SERVER (including the image data receiving step) receives the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key and decrypts the video data with the Alice QUANTUM private key. A video data decryption step characterized by a One-Way-Ring Network.

When the quantum smartphone connects to the external network mainboard to the Alice QRN SERVER (including the image data decryption step), the Alice QRN SERVER regenerates the Alice PIN data through the Alice pseudo-random number generator, and seed the Alice PIN data as a random number. ) to regenerate the Alice QUANTUM private key with the Alice QUANTUM private key regeneration step.

(Including the step of regenerating the Alice QUANTUM private key) With a new quantum random number seed that generated a new quantum random number from the Alice quantum random number generator, EX-OR encryption operation of the Alice QUANTUM private key is performed to create a new Alice New Alice QUANTUM public key generation step to generate QUANTUM public key.

When the new Alice QUANTUM public key is transmitted to the quantum smartphone (including the step of generating the new Alice QUANTUM public key), the quantum smartphone tags the NFC Tag with the new Alice QUANTUM public key to the quantum smartphone NFC chip and generates OTP (One Time Password) OTP transmission step of retransmitting the pseudo-random number by encrypting it.

(Including the OTP transmission step) Alice QRN SERVER decrypts the OTP (One Time Password) pseudo-random number encrypted with the new Alice QUANTUM public key with the QUANTUM private key. If it matches the stored OTP (One Time Password) pseudo-random number, the surveillance camera shoots Video export preparation stage in which the video data is transmitted to the external network main board through the internal network main board of the network separation server.

The quantum smartphone (including the image export preparation step) receives the image data by accessing the external network main board and logging in the OTP (One Time Password) pseudo-random number with the quantum smartphone MAC Address as the ID as the One-Time Password. One-Way-Ring/Two-Way-Ring Network QRN KEY distribution method applied to hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL, characterized in that

In one embodiment,

The eve-NFC Chip is one of the Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) that are replaced during regular inspection, and the Eve PIN data generation stage that inputs Eve PIN data through NFC Writer and stores it in Alice QRN SERVER.

Alice QRN SERVER generates Alice PIN data through the Alice pseudo-random number generator and stores the Alice PIN data in the quantum random number edge server.

The QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE inside the quantum random number edge server receives the Eve PIN data stored in the eve-NFC Chip through contactless near field communication, and the NFC Reader receives it and stores it in the PUF-PIN memory and then sends the Eve PIN data to the random number seed. ) to generate the Eve QUANTUM private key, the Eve QUANTUM private key generation step.

Quantum random number Edge server internal Eve quantum random number generator generates quantum random numbers and performs beta-OR (EX-OR) encryption operation of Eve QUANTUM private key with the quantum random number seed to generate OTP (One Time Password) Eve QUANTUM public key. Eve QUANTUM public key generation step.

QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) inside the quantum random number edge server transmits the Eve QUANTUM public key to Alice QRN SERVER through the licensed frequency modem of the multi-communication modem through the licensed frequency SK Telecom carrier LoRA wireless network. .

Alice QRN SERVER generates Alice PIN data through Alice pseudo-random number generator and generates Alice QUANTUM private key with Alice PIN data as a random number seed. Alice QUANTUM private key generation step.

Alice QRN SERVER generates an Alice QUANTUM public key that generates an Alice QUANTUM public key by performing an EX-OR encryption operation on the Alice QUANTUM private key with a quantum random number seed that generates a quantum random number through the Alice quantum random number generator. step.

Alice QRN SERVER transfers the Eve PIN data stored inside the Eve QUANTUM public key received through the SK Telecom carrier LoRA wireless network network and the QUANTUM CA (Certification Authority certificate) that encrypted the Alice QUANTUM public key to non-QUANTUM CHANNEL or BB84 QUANTUM CHANNEL. Or a wired network transmission step of transmitting to Bob QRN SERVER via any one wired network of hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL via PUF-QRNG TWIN USB.

Bob QRN SERVER uses QUANTUM CA that encrypted Eve PIN data and Alice QUANTUM public key stored inside with Eve QUANTUM public key through a 2-channel wireless repeater (Access Point) with 2.4GHz Low Frequency Quantum Random Number Edge Server Internal QUANTUM AC (QUANTUM ACcess) QUANTUM AC transmission step to the controller).

The quantum random number edge server decrypts the Eve PIN data encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM public key and the QUANTUM CA that encrypted the Alice QUANTUM public key with the Eve QUANTUM private key to decrypt the Alice QUANTUM public key and Eve PIN data.

After extracting the Eve PIN data extracted from the eve-NFC Chip, the quantum random number edge server matches the Eve PIN data generated in the decryption step with the Eve PIN data extracted from the eve-NFC Chip, the surveillance camera with the Alice QUANTUM public key Image data transmission preparation step of encrypting captured image data and transmitting it to QUANTUM AC (Access Controller).

A video data transmission step of selecting a frequency with a fast response speed by performing QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) and High Frequency PING tests and transmitting the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key to a 2-channel wireless repeater.

When Bob QRN SERVER receives the video data from the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key from the 2-channel wireless repeater, the Alice QRN SERVER uses one of the wired networks of non-QUANTUM CHANNEL, BB84 QUANTUM CHANNEL, and hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL. Video data receiving step to be transmitted to

Alice QRN SERVER receives the video data captured by the surveillance camera encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key and decrypts the video data with the Alice QUANTUM private key. A video data decryption step characterized by a One-Way-Ring Network.

When the quantum smartphone connects to the external network mainboard of the Alice QRN SERVER, the Alice QRN SERVER regenerates the Alice PIN data through the Alice pseudo-random number generator, and regenerates the Alice QUANTUM private key with the Alice PIN data as a random number seed. Step to regenerate Alice QUANTUM private key.

Create a new Alice QUANTUM public key that generates a new Alice QUANTUM public key by performing an EX-OR encryption operation on the Alice QUANTUM private key with a new quantum random number seed that generates a new quantum random number from the Alice quantum random number generator step.

When the new Alice QUANTUM public key is transmitted to the quantum smartphone, the quantum smartphone encrypts and retransmits the OTP (One Time Password) pseudo-random number generated by tagging the NFC Tag to the quantum smartphone NFC chip with the new Alice QUANTUM public key. OTP transmission step.

Alice QRN SERVER decrypts the OTP (One Time Password) pseudo-random number encrypted with the new Alice QUANTUM public key with the QUANTUM private key, and if it matches the stored OTP (One Time Password) pseudo-random number, the video data captured by the surveillance camera is transferred to the internal network of the network separation server. The video export preparation stage, which is transmitted to the external network main board through the main board.

HYBRID characterized in that the quantum smartphone connects to the external network main board and receives the image data by logging in the OTP (One Time Password) pseudo-random number as the quantum smartphone MAC Address as the ID as the One-Time Password. - ONE-WAY-RING/TWO-WAY-RING NETWORK QRN KEY distribution method applied to QUANTUM CHANNEL.

In one embodiment,

Alice/Bob QRN SERVER generates a random quantum random number by Alice/Bob through the Alice/Bob Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) inside, and uses the Half Mirror Effect Symmetric Cryptographic Algorithm through encryption operation. Characterized in generating a QUANTUM symmetric key,

Quantum random number generator (QRNG) generates a random number seed early-QRN (Quantum Random Number) for generating QUANTUM symmetric key of symmetric key algorithm and QUANTUM private key (PRIVATE KEY) of asymmetric cryptographic algorithm ), a random number seed for generating basic-QRN (Quantum Random Number) and a QUANTUM public key (PUBLIC KEY) pair, a random number seed for generating new-QRN (Quantum Random Number) new-QRN creation stage.

Alice QRN SERVER connects to a quantum random number edge server through a network network of a telecommunication service provider, and Alice QRN SERVER connects to a non-QUANTUM CHANNEL or QUANTUM CHANNEL wired self-network through a Bob QRN SERVER connected to a closed radio. The network connection step of connecting the quantum random number edge server and the network through the own network.

The quantum random number edge server is composed of QUANTUM AC and Eve quantum random number generator, and the quantum random number edge server connects any one or more of unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network or telecommunication service provider network through QUANTUM AC (Access Controller) inside. Optionally, the quantum random number edge server controls QUANTUM AC and connects with Bob QRN SERVER through a 2-channel wireless repeater (Access Point) connected to an unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network through an unlicensed frequency modem among multi-communication modems or The quantum random number edge server controls QUANTUM AC and connects to Alice QRN SERVER through the operator's network through the operator's modem among the multi-communication modems.

Quantum random number edge server generates basic-QRN random number from Eve quantum random number generator and generates asymmetric key encryption algorithm Eve QUANTUM private key with random number seed Eve QUANTUM private key generation step.

Quantum random number edge server generates new-QRN random number from Eve quantum random number generator and encrypts Eve QUANTUM private key and new-QRN random number seed to generate asymmetric key encryption algorithm OTP (One Time Password) Eve QUANTUM public key to QUANTUM Transmits to AC, and QUANTUM AC transmits the Eve QUANTUM public key to Alice QRN SERVER through the operator's network as a operator modem among multi-communication modems.

Alice QRN SERVER is configured with Alice quantum random number generator inside, Alice QRN SERVER receives basic-QRN from Alice quantum random number generator and generates asymmetric key cryptographic algorithm Alice QUANTUM private key with random number seed Alice QUANTUM private key creation stage.

Alice QRN SERVER receives new-QRN random number from Alice quantum random number generator and encrypts Alice QUANTUM private key and new-QRN random number seed to generate asymmetric key encryption algorithm OTP (One Time Password) Alice QUANTUM public key Alice QUANTUM public key generation.

A key exchange step in which the Alice QRN SERVER and the quantum random number edge server exchange the Alice QUANTUM public key and the Eve QUANTUM public key by transmitting the Alice QUANTUM public key through the network of the telecommunication service provider.

The quantum random number edge server receives the early-Eve QRN from the Eve quantum random number generator, encrypts the early-Eve QRN with the Alice QUANTUM public key, and transmits it to the Alice QRN SERVER through the network of the telecommunication service provider, and the Alice QRN SERVER is the Alice quantum random number generator Transmission step of receiving early-Alice QRN from , encrypting early-Alice QRN with Eve QUANTUM public key, and transmitting it to quantum random number edge server through network of telecommunication service providers.

The quantum random number edge server decrypts the early-Alice QRN encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM public key with the Eve QUANTUM private key and performs an encryption operation with the early-Eve QRN to generate the QUANTUM symmetric key of the symmetric key algorithm, and the Alice QRN SERVER uses the Alice QUANTUM private key for Alice A symmetric key generation step of generating the QUANTUM symmetric key of the symmetric key algorithm by decrypting the early-Eve QRN encrypted with the QUANTUM public key and performing the same encryption operation as the early-Alice QRN.

Alice QRN SERVER encrypts the log information of the quantum random number edge server with the QUATUM symmetric key and transmits it to Bob QRN SERVER through the wired self-network. Bob QRN SERVER encrypts the quantum random number edge with the QUATUM symmetric key through the unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network The log information of the server is transmitted to the quantum random number edge server, and the quantum random number edge server decrypts the log information of the quantum random number edge server encrypted with the QUATUM symmetric key with the QUANTUM symmetric key. Login step to connect Bob QRN SERVER and network network login (Log In) through a 2-channel wireless repeater (Access Point) connected to an unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network through an unlicensed frequency modem among modems.

QUANTUM AC transmits surveillance camera video data encrypted with QUANTUM symmetric key through a two-channel wireless repeater to Bob QRN SERVER through a closed wireless self-network with unlicensed frequency that is logged in to the network network, and Bob QRN SERVER is a surveillance camera. The captured video data is transmitted to Alice QRN SERVER through any one of non-QUANTUM CHANNEL, QUANTUM CHANNEL, and hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL wired self-network, and Alice QRN SERVER encrypts the captured video with QUANTUM symmetric key from the wired self-network. TWO-WAY-RING NETWORK QRN KEY distribution method applied to HYBRID-QUANTUM CHANNEL featuring a hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL Two-Way-Ring Network that receives data and decrypts it with a QUANTUM symmetric key.

In one embodiment,

QRN SERVER features QKD (Quantum RandomNumber Key Distribution) that exchanges the random quantum random number generated through the internal quantum random number generator to generate QUANTUM symmetric key, QUANTUM private key, and QUANTUM public key as seeds.

The quantum random number generator generates an early-QRN random number to generate a QUANTUM symmetric key, and a basic-QRN random number to generate a QUANTUM private key and a new-QRN random number to generate a QUANTUM public key.

The quantum random number edge server is composed of QUANTUM AC and Eve quantum random number generator, and the quantum random number edge server selectively selects either the first network or the second network through QUANTUM AC inside, The edge server controls QUANTUM AC and connects to the first network between the quantum random number edge server and Alice QRN SERVER, which is connected to the quantum random number edge server through the first network network, or the quantum random number edge server controls QUANTUM AC to the second network A network connection step of connecting to a second network between Alice QRN SERVER, which is connected to Alice QRN SERVER through a network, and a quantum random number edge server.

Quantum random number edge server generates basic-QRN from Eve quantum random number generator and generates Eve QUANTUM private key with random number seed Eve QUANTUM private key generation step.

Quantum random number edge server generates new-QRN from Eve quantum random number generator and encrypts Eve QUANTUM private key and new-QRN random number seed to generate Eve QUANTUM public key and transmits to QUANTUM AC.

The QUANTUM AC transmits the Eve QUANTUM public key to the Alice QRN SERVER connected to the first network in the Alice QRN SERVER transmission step.

Alice QRN SERVER is configured with Alice quantum random number generator inside, Alice QRN SERVER generates basic-QRN from Alice quantum random number generator to generate Alice QUANTUM private key as a random number seed, and Alice QRN SERVER creates Alice quantum random number Alice QUANTUM public key generation step of generating a new-QRN from the generator and encrypting the Alice QUANTUM private key and the new-QRN random number seed to generate the Alice QUANTUM public key.

Alice QRN SERVER sends the Alice QUANTUM public key to the quantum random number edge server through the first network, and the quantum random number edge server receives the early-Eve QRN from the Eve quantum random number generator and generates the early-Eve QRN with the Alice QUANTUM public key. Encrypted and transmitted to Alice QRN SERVER through the first network, Alice QRN SERVER receives early-Alice QRN from Alice quantum random number generator, encrypts early-Alice QRN with Eve QUANTUM public key, and performs quantum through the first network Quantum random number edge server transmission step to send to random number edge server.

The quantum random number edge server decrypts the early-Alice QRN encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM public key with the Eve QUANTUM private key and performs encryption operations with the early-Eve QRN to generate the QUANTUM symmetric key, and the Alice QRN SERVER encrypts with the Alice QUANTUM public key with the Alice QUANTUM private key. QUANTUM symmetric key generation step to generate QUANTUM symmetric key by encrypting early-Alice QRN after decrypting the early-Eve QRN.

A hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL Two-Way characterized in that the quantum random number edge server transmits internal data encrypted with the QUATUM symmetric key to Alice QRN SERVER, and Alice QRN SERVER receives the internal data encrypted with the QUATUM symmetric key and decrypts it with the QUANTUM symmetric key -TWO-WAY-RING NETWORK QRN KEY distribution method applied to HYBRID-QUANTUM CHANNEL featuring Ring Network.

In one embodiment,

*Alice QRN SERVER is connected to the wireless network of a licensed frequency carrier, and Alice QRN SERVER is connected to Bob QRN SERVER through a non-QUANTUM CHANNEL wired network network, and Bob QRN SERVER is connected to a quantum network through a 2-channel wireless repeater. The random number edge server and the unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network are connected,

Quantum random number edge server selectively selects unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network or licensed frequency communication operator wireless network network through QUANTUM AC in data transmission/reception, and quantum random number edge server controls QUANTUM AC for multi-communication Among modems, unlicensed frequency is connected to Bob QRN SERVER through a two-channel wireless repeater connected to a closed wireless self-network through the unlicensed frequency modem, or quantum random number edge server controls QUANTUM AC to communicate licensed frequency through licensed frequency modem among multi-communication modems Network network selection step of selectively connecting the connection with Alice QRN SERVER through the operator's wireless network.

Quantum random number Edge server's internal Eve quantum random number generator generates quantum random number and transmits it to Encrypt TLS MODULE, Encrypt TLS MODULE uses contactless near field communication from NFC card When Eve PIN data is received, saves Eve PIN data Eve QUANTUM private key generation step to generate asymmetric key cryptographic algorithm Eve QUANTUM private key as a random number seed

After inputting Eve PIN data to the NFC card through the NFC Writer, it is stored in Alice QRN SERVER, and the Encrypt TLS MODULE receives the quantum random number from the Eve quantum random number generator and encrypts the Eve QUANTUM private key with the quantum random number seed. OTP (One Time Password) asymmetric key encryption algorithm generates and stores the Eve QUANTUM public key and transmits the Eve QUANTUM public key to QUANTUM AC;

QUANTUM AC transmits Eve QUANTUM public key to Alice QRN SERVER through licensed frequency communication operator wireless network network through licensed frequency modem among multi communication modems Eve QUANTUM public key generation step.

Alice QRN SERVER is composed of Alice pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) and Alice quantum random number generator (QRNG) inside. Alice QRN SERVER generates Alice PIN data through Alice pseudo-random number generator and stores it in the quantum random number edge server and Alice QUANTUM private key generation step of generating the Alice QUANTUM private key using the Alice PIN data as a random number seed.

Alice QUANTUM public key generation step of generating the Alice QUANTUM public key by encrypting the Alice QUANTUM private key with the quantum random number seed that generated the quantum random number from the Alice quantum random number generator.

Alice QRN SERVER encrypts the Eve PIN data and Alice QUANTUM public key stored inside the Eve QUANTUM public key received through the wireless network network of the licensed frequency communication service provider, and the licensed frequency communication service provider wireless network or wired network network and the unlicensed frequency closed wireless network A retransmission step of retransmitting the quantum random number to the edge server through its own network.

The quantum random number edge server decrypts the Eve PIN data encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM public key and the Alice QUANTUM public key with the Eve QUANTUM private key to decrypt and generate the Alice QUANTUM public key and Eve PIN data.

When the Eve PIN data decoded in the decryption step and the Eve PIN data stored inside match match, the quantum random number edge server controls QUANTUM AC and connects to the unlicensed frequency closed wireless self-network through the unlicensed frequency modem among the multi-communication modems. Login step to connect Bob QRN SERVER and network network login (Log In) through the channel wireless repeater.

QUANTUM AC transmits the terminal device generated data encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key to the Bob QRN SERVER that is logged in to the network network through the 2-channel wireless repeater, and transmits the terminal device generated data encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key to the unlicensed frequency modem. Unlicensed frequency data transmission step of transmitting to a 2-channel wireless repeater through

When Bob QRN SERVER receives the terminal device-generated image data encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key from the 2-channel wireless repeater, it transmits to the Alice QRN SERVER through the non-QUANTUM CHANNEL wired network network.

Alice QRN SERVER receives terminal device-generated data encrypted with the Alice QUANTUM public key and decrypts it with the Alice QUANTUM private key to enhance security, improve communication speed and reduce communication charges. HYBRID- featuring hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL One-Way-Ring Network TWO-WAY-RING NETWORK QRN KEY distribution method applied to QUANTUM CHANNEL.

In one embodiment,

The quantum random number edge server is composed of the Eve quantum random number generator, and the Eve QUANTUM private key generation step of generating the Eve quantum random number for the first time with the Eve quantum random number generator and using the Eve quantum random number as the seed to generate the Eve QUANTUM private key.

Quantum random number edge server generates Eve QUANTUM public key that generates Eve QUANTUM public key by regenerating quantum random number with Eve quantum random number generator and performing encryption operation with Eve QUANTUM private key as random number seed.

DUAL MODEM transmits Eve QUANTUM public key to Alice QRN SERVER through the first network, Eve QUANTUM public key transmission step.

The Alice QRN SERVER is configured to include an Alice quantum random number generator, and the Alice QUANTUM private key is generated by first generating an Alice quantum random number with the Alice quantum random number generator and using the Alice quantum random number as a seed to generate the Alice QUANTUM private key.

Alice QRN SERVER generates an Alice QUANTUM public key that generates an Alice QUANTUM public key by regenerating a quantum random number with an Alice quantum random number generator and performing an encryption operation with the Alice QUANTUM private key as a random number seed.

Alice QRN SERVER transmits the Alice QUANTUM public key to the quantum random number edge server through the first network. Alice QUANTUM public key transmission step.

The quantum random number edge server encrypts the Eve quantum random number with the Alice QUANTUM public key and transmits it to the Alice QRN SERVER through the first network, and the Alice QRN SERVER encrypts the Alice quantum random number with the Eve QUANTUM public key and sends the quantum random number through the first network Quantum random number exchange step sent to the edge server.

The quantum random number edge server decrypts the Alice quantum random number encrypted with the Eve QUANTUM public key with the Eve QUANTUM private key and performs an encryption operation with the Eve quantum random number stored in the internal memory to generate the QUANTUM symmetric key. A QUANTUM symmetric key generation step of generating the same QUANTUM symmetric key by decrypting the Eve quantum random number encrypted with the public key and performing an encryption operation with the Alice quantum random number stored in the internal memory.

When the quantum random number edge server transmits the encrypted data encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key to the DUAL MODEM, the DUAL MODEM transmits the encrypted data encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key to the Alice QRN SERVER through the second network.

Alice QRN SERVER receives the encrypted data encrypted with the QUANTUM symmetric key from the second network and decrypts it with the QUANTUM symmetric key. RING NETWORK QRN KEY distribution method.

10. Filter unit
11. Filter drive motor
12. Zoom Lens
13. Zoom Motor
14. Varifocal Lens
15. Focus Motor
16. Focus Lens
17. Motor drive drive
18. M/M
19. CPU
20. RS-485
21. Manual control panel
22. Remote control unit
23. TRNG
24. System M/M
25. PUF-PIN M/M
26. Security CPU
27. MCU
28. PUF Chip
29. e-FUSE
30. Security OTP M/M
31. Boot-ROM
32. SPI Controller
33. Image sensor unit
34. 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE
35. Video SECURITY ENGINE
36. Quantum Entanglement
37. Decoy Pulse
38. Image analysis module
39. Object Recognition Module
40. Number recognition module
41. DEBUGGER
42. QUANTUM BLOCK CHAIN
43. 1:N BLOCK CHAIN
44. BNC connector
45. RJ-45 connector
46. Sensor unit
47. AMI
48. switchboard
49. QUANTUM 5G Access Point (AP)
50. Broadcasting device
51. Emergency Bell
52. Street/security light
53. Dimmer
54. Terminal SINGLE USB
55. Bob non-QRN SERVER
56. Bob QRN SERVER
57. Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB
58. non-QUANTUM CHANNEL
59. QUANTUM CHANNEL
60. hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL
61. Master QRN SERVER
62. Alice non-QRN SERVER
63. Alice QRN SERVER
64. QUANTUM SECURITY ENGINE
65. Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB
66. LPWAN communication modem

Claims (2)

The terminal switchboard 48 includes a sensor unit 46 , an AMI 47 , a QUANTUM 5G AP 49 , a broadcasting device 50 , an emergency bell 51 , a dimmer 53 , and a terminal SINGLE USB 54 . composed by
The AMI 47 inside the switchboard 48 is an AMI 47 that receives commercial power, measures the power usage, and transmits the power usage through the LPWAN communication modem;
The switchboard 48 supplies power to the LED street/security light 52 via the AMI 47 therein;
The broadcasting device 50 inside the switchboard 48 receives the broadcasting data from either the Master QRN SERVER 61 or the Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 or the Alice QRN SERVER 63, and the terminal SINGLE USB 54 receives it. a broadcasting device 50 for broadcasting;
The switchboard 48 transmits the emergency bell operation event when the emergency bell 51 operates to either the Master QRN SERVER 61 or the Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 or the Alice QRN SERVER 63 via the terminal SINGLE USB 54. an emergency bell 51 to transmit;
The sensor unit 46 inside the switchboard 48 transmits the data measured through the sensor to either the Master QRN SERVER 61 or the Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 or the Alice QRN SERVER 63 to the terminal SINGLE USB 54. a sensor unit 46 that transmits through;
The dimmer 53 inside the switchboard 48 is a dimmer 53 that adjusts the brightness of the LED street/security light 52 according to whether or not a human object is detected through the UHD surveillance camera image analysis unit;
QUANTUM 5G AP (49) receives the captured image data of the UHD surveillance camera and transmits it to either Master QRN SERVER (61) or Alice non-QRN SERVER (62) or Alice QRN SERVER (63) through a 5G wireless network base station. QUANTUM 5G AP 49;

UHD Surveillance Camera is a UHD level crime prevention CCTV surveillance camera and consists of an optical unit, a driving unit, a main control unit, an image security processing unit, an image analysis unit, a network security processing unit, and an input/output unit.
The optical unit includes a filter unit 10 , a filter driving motor 11 , a zoom lens 12 , a zoom motor 13 , a variable focus lens 14 , a focus motor 15 , and a focus lens 16 ;
The driving unit is composed of a motor driving drive 17 , a driving unit memory 18 , a driving unit control unit 19 , an RS-485 20 , a manual operation unit 21 , and a remote control unit 22 ;
The main control unit is TRNG(23), System Memory(24), PUF-PIN Memory(25), Security CPU(26), MCU(Machine Control Unit)(27), PUF Chip(28), Security OTP Memory(30), It is composed of a Boot-ROM 31 and a Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) Controller 32;
The image security processing unit is composed of an image sensor unit (33), 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE (34), Quantum Entanglement (36), and Decoy Pulse (37);
The image analysis unit is composed of an image analysis module 38 , an object recognition module 39 , and a number recognition module 40 ;
The network security processing unit is composed of DEBUGGER (41), QUANTUM BLOCK CHAIN (42), and 1:N BLOCK CHAIN (43);

The quantum communication unit is Bob non-QRN SERVER(55), Bob QRN SERVER(56), Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB(57), non-QUANTUM CHANNEL(58), QUANTUM CHANNEL(59), hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL(60) , Master QRN SERVER(61), Alice non-QRN SERVER(62), Alice QRN SERVER(63), QUANTUM SECURITY ENGINE(64), Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB(65), LPWAN communication modem(66) ,

The filter unit 10 is composed of any one or more of an infrared filter, an ultraviolet filter, and an anti-reflective coating filter;
selecting one of the infrared filter, the ultraviolet filter, and the anti-reflection coating filter by driving the filter driving motor 11;
driving the zoom motor 13 for driving the zoom lens 12 to vary the zoom lens magnification;
a variable focus lens 14 and a focus motor 15 for driving the focus lens 16 to vary the focus focus;
The driving unit control unit 19 programmed by the input data input from RS-485 20 or the manual operation unit 21 or the remote control unit 22 transmits the input data to the driving unit memory 18 and the motor driving drive 17 . control to drive the filter driving motor 11 , the zoom motor 13 , and the focus motor 15 to collect optical signals and transmit them to the image pickup sensor unit 33 ;
The image sensor inside the image sensor unit 33 transmits the image data converted from the optical signal into an electric signal to the 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE 34 and the image analysis module 38;
The image analysis module 38 receives the image data and extracts the object through the object recognition module 39. In the case of a vehicle, the vehicle license plate is converted into text through the number recognition module 40 among object data and object data. transmitted to the security processing unit QUANTUM BLOCK CHAIN (42);
QUANTUM BLOCK CHAIN 42 compares wanted vehicle license plate number data received from 1:N BLOCK CHAIN 43 connected to BLOCK CHAIN and generates a wanted vehicle event if it is a wanted vehicle;
The network security processing unit DEBUGGER 41 verifies a boot error when the main control unit Boot-ROM 31 first boots;

Sensing data collected from the sensor unit 46, measurement data measured from the AMI 47, switchboard status information data collected from one or more switchboards 48, audio/video data collected from one or more broadcasting devices 50, The LPWAN communication modem 66 collects the point/off data collected from the LED street/security light 52 and transmits it to the terminal SINGLE USB 54;
The terminal SINGLE USB 54 transmits measurement data, sensor status information data, audio/video data, and on/off data to the Bob non-QRN SERVER 55; and
Bob non-QRN SERVER (55) from any one of Alice non-QRN SERVER (62), Alice QRN SERVER (63), Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65) UHD surveillance camera control data or broadcasting device control data or dimmer receiving the control data and transmitting it to the terminal internal terminal SINGLE USB 54;
Terminal SINGLE USB 54 receives UHD surveillance camera control data from Bob non-QRN SERVER 55;
The LPWAN communication modem 66 performs data communication with the LPWAN terminal;
Main controller MCU(27) is TRNG(23), System Memory(24), PUF-PIN Memory(25), Security CPU(26), MCU(27), PUF Chip(28), Security OTP Memory(30), Controls the Boot-ROM 31 and the SPI Controller 32;
The System Memory 24 is a System Memory in which the main control unit MCU 27 operating OS program is stored;
The MCU 27 controls the Security CPU 26 to extract PIN (Personal Identification Number) data from the hardware pin of the PUF Chip 28 to the PUF-PIN Memory 25 and the Alice non-QRN SERVER 62. store;
the MCU 27 controls the TRNG 23 to generate and receive a natural random number and transmit it to the Security CPU 26;
Security CPU 26 generates a private key by formatting PIN (Personal Identification Number) data stored in PUF-PIN Memory 25 with a fixed-length format function as a random number seed, and then generated through the TRNG 23. A public key is generated by performing an EX-OR encryption operation with a private key using a natural random number seed and stored in the Security OTP Memory 30 and Alice non-QRN SERVER 62;

Bob non-QRN SERVER (55) receives PIN (Personal Identification Number) data encrypted with public key from Alice non-QRN SERVER (62) through non-QUANTUM CHANNEL (58) and then to MCU 27 through input/output unit. transmit;
When the MCU 27 decrypts the private key and matches the PIN (Personal Identification Number) data stored in the PUF-PIN Memory 25, it boots the Boot-ROM 31 and controls the SPI Controller 32 to control the UHD surveillance camera. and Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 and login (LOG In) network to receive video data from 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE 34 and transmit it to Alice non-QRN SERVER 62;

Alice QRN SERVER (63) and Bob QRN SERVER (56) are connected to QUANTUM CHANNEL (59),
QUANTUM SECURITY ENGINE 64 generates a QRN KEY from either BB84 or COW (Coherent One Way) and sends it to Alice QRN SERVER 63;
Alice QRN SERVER 63 sends the QRN KEY to Bob QRN SERVER 56 via QUANTUM CHANNEL 59;
Bob QRN SERVER (56) transmits to Quantum Entanglement (36) through the input/output unit via Bob non-QRN SERVER (55);
Quantum Entanglement 36 transmits the QRN KEY generated by the Coherent One Way (COW) generation method to the image SECURITY ENGINE 35;
Image SECURITY ENGINE (35) is verified with Decoy Pulse (37) and in the case of quantum entanglement, it receives image data from 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE (34), encrypts image data with QRN KEY, and through input/output unit, Bob non-QRN SERVER via (55) to Bob QRN SERVER (56);
Bob QRN SERVER (56) transmits the image data encrypted with the QRN KEY to Alice QRN SERVER (63) through QUANTUM CHANNEL (59);
Alice QRN SERVER (63) decrypts the image data encrypted with the QRN KEY with the QRN KEY received from the SECURITY ENGINE (64);

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65) and Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) are hybrid- consisting of a Non-QUANTUM Communication Channel (58) and a quantum communication channel (QUANTUM Communication Channel (59)). connected to QUANTUM CHANNEL (60),
Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 is Alice Boot-ROM connected to Alice System Bus, Alice Master Controller (MCU), Alice System Storage Device (System M/M; System MEMORY), and Alice VPN (Virtual Private Network), Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Alice I/O Device (I/O Port), Alice Serial Peripheral Interface Controller (SPI Controller), Alice True Random Number Generator (TRNG; True Random Number Generator) ), Alice Security CPU (Security Central Processing Unit), Alice Security OTP Memory (Security OTP M/M; Security One Time Password MEMORY), Alice PUF Memory (PUF M/M; Phisycally Unclonable Function MEMORY), Alice PUF It is composed of Chip (Physically Unclonable Function Chip),
Alice main controller (MCU) consists of Alice Boot-ROM, Alice System Storage (System M/M), Alice VPN (Virtual Private Network), Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) connected to Alice System Bus. , controlling Alice I/O Port, Alice Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller);
Alice Security CPU (Security CPU) is Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Alice I/O Device (I/O Port), Alice Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller), Alice Pure Random Number Generator (TRNG), Alice Secure OTP Memory (Security) OTP M/M), Alice PUF memory (PUF M/M), and Alice PUF Chip;
Alice system storage (System M/M) stores programs and data necessary for Alice main control unit (MCU);
The Alice Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller) is connected to the Alice I/O Device (I/O Port) and controls the Alice I/O Device (I/O Port) according to the control command of the Alice Main Controller (MCU) to turn on the network connection. /OFF control;
Alice Boot-ROM stores programs and data necessary for booting of Alice Main Control Unit (MCU);
Alice VPN performs 1:1 encrypted communication between Bob VPN inside Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57 connected to the network;
Alice Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) receives a quantum random number key certificate (QC; decoy Qantum Certificate) through the Alice input/output device (I/O Port) and, depending on whether it is authenticated, through the Alice input/output device (I/O Port) through the network network ON/OFF control;
Alice input/output device (I/O Port) is a switch connected to the network network, and transmits the network network ON/OFF control and data received through the network network to the Alice main controller (MCU) through the Alice system bus;
Alice Security CPU (Security CPU) extracts Alice PIN data from Alice PUF Chip and stores it in Bob PUF memory (PUF M/M);
Alice Security CPU sends Alice PIN data to Alice Main Control Unit (MCU);
Alice secure CPU (Security CPU) generates Alice private key with the Alice PIN data and stores it in Alice secure OTP memory (Security OTP M/M);
The Alice Security CPU encrypts the Alice private key with the random number generated by the Alice pure random number generator (TRNG), generates the Alice public key, and transmits it to the Alice main controller (MCU);

Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) is connected to Bob's System Bus (Boot-ROM), Bob's Master Controller (MCU), Bob's System Storage (System M/M; System MEMORY), and Bob VPN (Virtual Private Network), Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Bob I/O Port, Bob Serial Peripheral Interface Controller (SPI Controller), Bob True Random Number Generator (TRNG) ), Bob Security CPU (Security Central Processing Unit), Bob Security OTP M/M (Security One Time Password MEMORY), Bob PUF Memory (PUF M/M; Phisycally Unclonable Function MEMORY), Bob PUF It is composed of Chip (Physically Unclonable Function Chip),
Bob main controller (MCU) is connected to Bob's System Bus (Boot-ROM), Bob's System Storage (System M/M), Bob's Virtual Private Network (VPN), and Bob's Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER). , control Bob I/O Port, Bob Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller);
Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) includes Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER), Bob I/O Port, Bob Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller), Bob Pure Random Number Generator (TRNG), and Bob Secure OTP Memory (Security). OTP M/M), Bob PUF memory (PUF M/M), and Bob PUF Chip;
Bob's system storage (System M/M) stores programs and data necessary for Bob's main control unit (MCU);
Bob Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI Controller) is connected to Bob I/O Port and controls Bob I/O Port according to the control command of Bob's main controller (MCU) to turn on the network connection. /OFF control;
Bob Boot-ROM stores programs and data necessary for booting Bob's main control unit (MCU);
Bob VPN performs 1:1 encrypted communication between Alice VPN inside Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 connected to the network;
Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) receives a Quantum RandomNumber Certificate (QC) through Bob's I/O Port and turns on the network through Bob's I/O Port depending on whether or not it is authenticated. /OFF control;
Bob input/output device (I/O Port) is a switch connected to the network network and transmits the network network ON/OFF control and data received through the network network to the Bob main control unit (MCU) through the Bob system bus (System Bus);
Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) extracts Bob PIN data from Bob PUF Chip and stores it in Alice PUF memory (PUF M/M);
Bob Security CPU sends Bob PIN data to Bob main control unit (MCU);
Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) generates Bob private key with the Bob PIN data and stores it in Bob Security OTP memory (Security OTP M/M);
The Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) encrypts the Bob private key with the random number generated by the Bob pure random number generator (TRNG), generates the Bob public key, and transmits it to the Bob main controller (MCU);

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65) and Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) are connected to a QUANTUM Communication Channel among hybrid-QUANTUM CHANNEL (60),
Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) is composed of Alice QRNG of the transmitter and Bob QRNG of the receiver that generate random quantum random numbers;
Quantum RandomNumber Key Distribution (QKD) is composed of Alice Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) of the transmitter including a laser and Bob Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) of the receiver including a single photon detector;
Aliec Quantum Random Number Key Platform (Quantum Platform) generates a Quantum RandomNumber Certificate (QC) with quantum random numbers generated by Alice QRNG and sends Aliec Quantum Random Number Key through Alice Quantum Key Distributor (QKD) It consists of a platform (Quantum Platform) and a Bob Quantum Random Number Key Platform (Quantum Platform) that receives and stores a Quantum Random Number Certificate (QC) through a Bob Quantum Key Distributor (QKD);
Random quantum random numbers generated by a transmitting set Alice Quantum Random Number Generator (Alice QRNG) are transmitted to the Aliec Quantum Random Number Key Platform;
Aliec quantum random number key platform (Quantum Platform) receives the quantum random number, generates a quantum random number key certificate (QC) and transmits it to Alice Master Server (Alice MASTER SERVER) and Alice Quantum Key Distributor (QKD);
Alice quantum key distributor (QKD) transmits a quantum random number key certificate (QC) to Bob quantum key distributor (QKD) through a quantum communication channel connected by an optical cable (QUANTUM Communication Channel);
A receiving set Bob quantum key distributor (QKD) receives the quantum random number key certificate (QC) and stored in Bob quantum random number key platform (Quantum Platform);

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65) and Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) are connected to an ISP (Internet Service Provider) operator network that does not form a quantum communication channel,
Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 inside Alice main controller (MCU) boots through Alice Boot-ROM connected to Alice System Bus, and is stored in Alice system storage device (System M/M). According to the stored program, it controls the Alice serial peripheral interface (SPI Controller) to control the network network ON/OFF through the Alice input/output device (I/O Port), and the Alice public key received through the Alice security CPU (Security CPU) Send to Bob VPN inside Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57 via Alice VPN;
Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB(57) inside Bob's main controller (MCU) boots through Bob's Boot-ROM connected to Bob's System Bus, and stores it in Bob's system storage (System M/M). According to the stored program, it controls the Bob serial peripheral interface (SPI Controller) to control the network ON/OFF through the Bob input/output device (I/O port), and the Bob public key received through the Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) is Send to Alice VPN inside Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 via Bob VPN;

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 inside Alice main controller (MCU) uses the Alice KEY that encrypted the Bob PIN data stored in the Alice PUF memory (PUF M/M) with the Bob public key received through the Alice VPN, and the Alice VPN. to Bob VPN inside Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57 through;
Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) Bob main controller (MCU) inside the Bob VPN, the Bob KEY that encrypted the Alice PIN data stored in the Bob PUF memory (PUF M/M) with the Alice public key received through Bob VPN. through Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 to Alice VPN inside;

The Alice main controller (MCU) inside the Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 matches the Alice PIN data obtained by decrypting the Bob KEY encrypted with the Alice public key with the Alice private key and the Alice PIN data extracted from the Alice PUF Chip; and
Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) Bob main controller (MCU) inside the Bob PIN data decrypted from Alice KEY encrypted with Bob public key with Bob private key and Bob PIN data extracted from Bob PUF Chip match;

A network login (LOG In) is connected between the Alice Master Server (Alice MASTER SERVER) connected to the Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65) and the Bob Master Server (Bob MASTER SERVER) connected to the Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57). ;

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 65 inside Alice main control unit (MCU) receives the quantum random number key certificate (QC) from the Alice master server (Alice MASTER SERVER), encrypts it with Bob public key, and then through Alice VPN, Bob PUF- Send to Bob VPN inside QRNG TWIN USB 57;
Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (57) inside Bob main controller (MCU) decrypts the quantum random number key certificate (QC) encrypted with Bob public key received through Bob VPN with Bob private key to generate a quantum random number key certificate (QC). decrypt;

Bob MASTER SERVER transmits the quantum random number key certificate (QC) stored in the Bob Quantum Platform to the Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) inside the Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57;
Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN USB 57, Bob's main control unit (MCU) sends the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from Alice Master Server (Alice MASTER SERVER) to Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER);
Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) does not match the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN USB (65) and the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from the Bob master server (Bob MASTER SERVER). If not, a hybrid quantum communication system terminal including a switchboard terminal, characterized in that by controlling the I/O port OFF contact to block the network connection between the Alice master server and the Bob master server.
The terminal switchboard 48 includes a sensor unit 46, an AMI 47, a QUANTUM 5G AP 49, a broadcasting device 50, an emergency bell 51, a dimmer 53, and a terminal SINGLE MODULE. ,
The AMI 47 inside the switchboard 48 is an AMI 47 that receives commercial power, measures the power usage, and transmits the power usage through the LPWAN communication modem;
The switchboard 48 supplies power to the LED street/security light 52 via the AMI 47 therein;
The broadcasting device 50 inside the switchboard 48 receives broadcast data from either the Master QRN SERVER 61 or the Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 or the Alice QRN SERVER 63, and the terminal SINGLE MODULE receives and broadcasts broadcasting. device 50;
The switchboard 48 transmits an emergency bell operation event to either the Master QRN SERVER 61 or Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 or Alice QRN SERVER 63 when the emergency bell 51 operates through the terminal SINGLE MODULE. Bell 51;
The sensor unit 46 inside the switchboard 48 transmits the data measured through the sensor to either the Master QRN SERVER 61 or the Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 or the Alice QRN SERVER 63 through the terminal SINGLE MODULE. is a sensor unit 46;
The dimmer 53 inside the switchboard 48 is a dimmer 53 that adjusts the brightness of the LED street/security light 52 according to whether or not a human object is detected through the surveillance camera image analysis unit;
QUANTUM 5G AP (49) receives the video data captured by the surveillance camera and transmits it to either Master QRN SERVER (61) or Alice non-QRN SERVER (62) or Alice QRN SERVER (63) through a 5G wireless network base station. 5G AP 49;

The surveillance camera is a UHD level crime prevention CCTV surveillance camera and consists of an optical unit, a driving unit, a main control unit, an image security processing unit, an image analysis unit, a network security processing unit, and an input/output unit
The optical unit includes a filter unit 10 , a filter driving motor 11 , a zoom lens 12 , a zoom motor 13 , a variable focus lens 14 , a focus motor 15 , and a focus lens 16 ;
The driving unit is composed of a motor driving drive 17 , a driving unit memory 18 , a driving unit control unit 19 , an RS-485 20 , a manual operation unit 21 , and a remote control unit 22 ;
The main control unit is TRNG(23), System Memory(24), PUF-PIN Memory(25), Security CPU(26), MCU(Machine Control Unit)(27), PUF Chip(28), Security OTP Memory(30), It is composed of a Boot-ROM 31 and a Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) Controller 32;
The image security processing unit is composed of an image sensor unit (33), 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE (34), Quantum Entanglement (36), and Decoy Pulse (37);
The image analysis unit is composed of an image analysis module 38 , an object recognition module 39 , and a number recognition module 40 ;
The network security processing unit is composed of DEBUGGER (41), QUANTUM BLOCK CHAIN (42), and 1:N BLOCK CHAIN (43);

The filter unit 10 is composed of any one or more of an infrared filter, an ultraviolet filter, and an anti-reflective coating filter;
selecting one of the infrared filter, the ultraviolet filter, and the anti-reflection coating filter by driving the filter driving motor 11;
driving the zoom motor 13 for driving the zoom lens 12 to vary the zoom lens magnification;
a variable focus lens 14 and a focus motor 15 for driving the focus lens 16 to vary the focus focus;
The driving unit control unit 19 programmed by the input data input from RS-485 20 or the manual operation unit 21 or the remote control unit 22 transmits the input data to the driving unit memory 18 and the motor driving drive 17 . control to drive the filter driving motor 11 , the zoom motor 13 , and the focus motor 15 to collect optical signals and transmit them to the image pickup sensor unit 33 ;
The image sensor inside the image sensor unit 33 transmits the image data converted from the optical signal into an electric signal to the 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE 34 and the image analysis module 38;
The image analysis module 38 receives the image data and extracts the object through the object recognition module 39. In the case of a vehicle, the vehicle license plate is converted into text through the number recognition module 40 among object data and object data. transmitted to the security processing unit QUANTUM BLOCK CHAIN (42);
QUANTUM BLOCK CHAIN 42 compares wanted vehicle license plate number data received from 1:N BLOCK CHAIN 43 connected to BLOCK CHAIN and generates a wanted vehicle event if it is a wanted vehicle;
The network security processing unit DEBUGGER 41 verifies a boot error when the main control unit Boot-ROM 31 first boots;

Sensing data collected from the sensor unit 46, measurement data measured from the AMI 47, switchboard status information data collected from one or more switchboards 48, audio/video data collected from one or more broadcasting devices 50, The LPWAN communication modem 66 collects the point/off data collected from the LED street/security light 52 and transmits it to the terminal SINGLE MODULE;
The terminal SINGLE MODULE transmits measurement data, sensor status information data, audio/video data, and on/off data to Bob non-QRN SERVER (55); and
Bob non-QRN SERVER (55) receives surveillance camera control data or broadcasting device control data or dimmer control data from any one of Alice non-QRN SERVER (62), Alice QRN SERVER (63), and Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE. to transmit to the terminal internal terminal SINGLE MODULE;
The terminal SINGLE MODULE receives surveillance camera control data from Bob non-QRN SERVER (55);
The LPWAN communication modem 66 performs data communication with the LPWAN terminal;
Main controller MCU(27) is TRNG(23), System Memory(24), PUF-PIN Memory(25), Security CPU(26), MCU(27), PUF Chip(28), Security OTP Memory(30), Controls the Boot-ROM 31 and the SPI Controller 32;
The System Memory 24 is a System Memory in which the main control unit MCU 27 operating OS program is stored;
The MCU 27 controls the Security CPU 26 to extract PIN (Personal Identification Number) data from the hardware pin of the PUF Chip 28 to the PUF-PIN Memory 25 and the Alice non-QRN SERVER 62. store;
the MCU 27 controls the TRNG 23 to generate and receive a natural random number and transmit it to the Security CPU 26;
Security CPU 26 generates a private key by formatting PIN (Personal Identification Number) data stored in PUF-PIN Memory 25 with a fixed-length format function as a random number seed, and then generated through the TRNG 23. A public key is generated by performing an EX-OR encryption operation with a private key using a natural random number seed and stored in the Security OTP Memory 30 and Alice non-QRN SERVER 62;

Bob non-QRN SERVER (55) receives PIN (Personal Identification Number) data encrypted with public key from Alice non-QRN SERVER (62) through non-QUANTUM CHANNEL (58) and then to MCU 27 through input/output unit. transmit;
When the MCU 27 decrypts the private key and matches the PIN (Personal Identification Number) data stored in the PUF-PIN Memory 25, it boots the Boot-ROM 31 and controls the SPI Controller 32 to communicate with the surveillance camera. Receive video data from 5G QUANTUM JUMP ENGINE 34 by connecting Alice non-QRN SERVER 62 and a login (LOG In) network and transmit it to Alice non-QRN SERVER 62;

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE and Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE are connected to the ISP (Internet Service Provider) operator network that does not form a quantum communication channel,
The Alice main controller (MCU) inside the Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE boots through the Alice Boot-ROM connected to the Alice system bus, and accesses the program stored in the Alice system storage device (System M/M). Accordingly, by controlling the Alice serial peripheral interface (SPI Controller), the network network ON/OFF is controlled through the Alice input/output device (I/O Port), and the Alice public key received through the Alice security CPU (Security CPU) is transferred to Alice VPN. to Bob VPN inside Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE 57;
Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE (57) Bob main controller (MCU) inside the Bob boot ROM (Boot-ROM) connected to the Bob system bus (System Bus), and to the Bob system storage (System M/M) According to the stored program, it controls the Bob serial peripheral interface (SPI Controller) to control the network ON/OFF through the Bob I/O device (I/O Port), and the Bob public key received through the Bob Security CPU (Security CPU) is Send to Alice VPN inside Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE via Bob VPN;

Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE The Alice main controller (MCU) inside the Alice VPN uses the Bob public key received through Alice VPN to encrypt the Bob PIN data stored in the Alice PUF memory (PUF M/M), and returns the Alice KEY to Bob PUF through Alice VPN. - send to Bob VPN inside QRNG TWIN MODULE 57;
Bob's main controller (MCU) inside Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE(57) uses Alice's public key received through Bob VPN to send the encrypted Alice PIN data stored in Bob PUF memory (PUF M/M) to Bob VPN. through Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE to Alice VPN inside;

The Alice main controller (MCU) inside the Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE matches the Alice PIN data obtained by decrypting the Bob KEY encrypted with the Alice public key with the Alice private key and the Alice PIN data extracted from the Alice PUF Chip; and
The Bob main controller (MCU) inside the Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE (57) matches the Bob PIN data obtained by decrypting the Alice KEY encrypted with the Bob public key with the Bob private key and the Bob PIN data extracted from the Bob PUF Chip;

network login (LOG In) connection between the Alice master server (Alice MASTER SERVER) connected to the Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE and the Bob master server (Bob MASTER SERVER) connected to the Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE (57);

The Alice main controller (MCU) inside the Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE receives the quantum random number key certificate (QC) from the Alice master server (Alice MASTER SERVER), encrypts it with the Bob public key, and then through the Alice VPN to the Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE. (57) to the internal Bob VPN;
Bob's main controller (MCU) inside Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE (57) decrypts the quantum random number key certificate (QC) encrypted with Bob public key received through Bob VPN with Bob's private key to generate a quantum random number key certificate (QC). decrypt;

Bob MASTER SERVER transmits the quantum random number key certificate (QC) stored in the Bob Quantum Platform to the Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) inside the Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE 57;
Bob PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE 57, the internal Bob main controller (MCU) transmits the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from the Alice master server (Alice MASTER SERVER) to the Bob debugger (QC-DEBUGGER);
Bob Debugger (QC-DEBUGGER) does not match the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from Alice PUF-QRNG TWIN MODULE and the quantum random number key certificate (QC) received from the Bob master server (Bob MASTER SERVER). A hybrid quantum communication system terminal including a switchboard terminal, characterized in that /O Port is controlled by OFF contact control to block the network connection between the Alice master server and the Bob master server.

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