KR102071406B1 - In-vehicle Devices and Authentication Systems - Google Patents

Abstract

An on-vehicle device, which is used in a host vehicle and has a first authentication unit that authenticates by code matching through wireless communication with an electronic key, and a method other than code matching through wireless communication used in the first authentication unit. In the case where the authentication is established in the second authentication unit that performs authentication with the first authentication unit and the authentication is not established in the second authentication unit, an unauthorized authentication using wireless communication is performed for the own vehicle. A notification instructing section for informing the personal portable device is provided.

Description

In-vehicle Devices and Authentication Systems

<Cross Reference of Related Application>

This application is based on the JP Patent application 2015-252252 of an application on December 24, 2015, and uses the content here.

The present disclosure relates to an on-vehicle device for performing authentication using wireless communication with a portable device carried by a user and an authentication system including the on-vehicle device.

Background Art Conventionally, an authentication system that enables vehicle control such as time-locking of a vehicle door, engine start, or the like has been known on the basis of code matching by wireless communication between a vehicle-mounted device and a portable device such as an electronic key. Since the distance range in which this wireless communication becomes possible is limited to the local area around a vehicle, authentication using wireless communication is normally possible only when a portable device is located in the vicinity of a vehicle.

However, in such an authentication system, there is a concern about a relay attack in which a malicious third party establishes authentication by indirectly realizing communication between the mobile device and the on-vehicle device using a repeater. In the relay attack, even though the regular user does not intend, authentication is established to enable vehicle control such as unlocking the vehicle door and starting the engine.

On the contrary, for example, Patent Document 1 changes the intensity of a request signal transmitted from an onboard device mounted on a vehicle (also referred to as a subject vehicle or a host vehicle) on the way. The technique which prevents a relay attack by responding only when detecting this change of intensity | strength is disclosed.

JP 2010-185186 A

However, in the technique disclosed in Patent Literature 1, even if the relay attack can be prevented, the user cannot recognize whether or not the relay attack has been performed for the host vehicle. If the user does not recognize that the relay attack is being performed on the own vehicle, the user cannot recognize that the own vehicle is the target of theft, and cannot prevent the crime against theft of the own vehicle.

It is an object of the present disclosure to provide an on-vehicle device and an authentication system that enable a user to recognize that illegal authentication using wireless communication has been performed for a host vehicle.

In order to achieve the above object, according to one aspect of the present disclosure, an on-vehicle device is a first authentication that authenticates by code matching through wireless communication between a mobile device used in a vehicle and used as an electronic key. An on-vehicle device having a part, which is authenticated by a second authentication part that performs authentication by a method other than code verification through wireless communication used in the first authentication part, and the first authentication part, but authenticated by the second authentication part. If this is not true, a notification instructing section is provided to notify the communication terminal of the user of the vehicle that unauthorized authentication using wireless communication has been performed on the vehicle.

Further, in order to achieve the above object, according to another aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication system is used for authentication by code matching through wireless communication between a portable device used as an electronic key and a vehicle, and used in a vehicle. An on-vehicle device having a first authentication unit configured to perform the authentication, wherein the authentication is established in the second authentication unit that authenticates by a method other than code verification through wireless communication used in the first authentication unit and the first authentication unit, And an on-vehicle device including a notification instructing unit for notifying the communication terminal of the user of the own vehicle that the unauthenticated authentication using wireless communication has been performed for the own vehicle when the authentication is not established in the second authentication unit.

If authentication is established by code matching through wireless communication used by the first authentication unit, but authentication is not established by the second authentication unit by any other method, authentication using wireless communication in the first authentication unit is denied. It can be said that it was established. Accordingly, the notification instructing unit can notify the communication terminal of the user of the host vehicle when the unauthorized authentication through wireless communication is performed for the host vehicle. In addition, since the communication terminal of the user of the own vehicle is notified that the unauthenticated authentication through wireless communication has been performed on the own vehicle, the user can recognize from the communication terminal that the unauthenticated authentication via wireless communication has been performed on the own vehicle.

The above and other objects, features and advantages of the present disclosure will become more apparent from the following detailed description with reference to the accompanying drawings.
1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a schematic configuration of an authentication system according to the first embodiment.
2 is a diagram illustrating an example of a schematic configuration of an electronic key.
3 is a diagram illustrating an example of a schematic configuration of an authentication ECU.
4 is a diagram illustrating an example of a schematic configuration of the master controller of the authentication ECU.
Fig. 5 is a flowchart showing an example of the flow of authentication related processing in the master controller of the authentication ECU.
6 is a diagram showing an example of the correspondence between the combination of the authentication results of the first authentication unit and the second authentication unit and the processing corresponding thereto.
7 is a diagram illustrating an example of a schematic configuration of an authentication system according to a second embodiment.
8 is a diagram illustrating an example of a schematic configuration of an authentication ECU of the second embodiment.
Fig. 9 is a flowchart showing an example of the flow of authentication related processing in the main controller of the authentication ECU of the second embodiment.
10 is a diagram illustrating an example of a schematic configuration of an authentication ECU of a modification.
11 is a diagram illustrating an example of a schematic configuration of an authentication ECU of another modification.

A plurality of embodiments and modifications for disclosure will be described with reference to the drawings. In addition, for convenience of description, the same code | symbol may be attached | subjected about the part which has the same function as the part shown in the drawing used for description until several embodiment, and a modification, and the description may be abbreviate | omitted. . About the part which attached | subjected the same code | symbol, the description in other embodiment and a modification can be referred.

(Embodiment 1)

<Schematic Configuration of Authentication System 1>

EMBODIMENT OF THE INVENTION Hereinafter, Embodiment 1 of this indication is demonstrated using drawing. The authentication system 1 shown in FIG. 1 includes an electronic key 2 and a personal portable device 3 (also referred to as a portable terminal) carried by a user, a sensor 5 used in a vehicle HV, and a DCM (Data). Communication module 6 and authentication ECU 7 are included. The configuration including at least the electronic key 2 and the authentication ECU 7 in this authentication system 1 corresponds to the authentication system. The vehicle HV is also referred to as a subject vehicle or host vehicle.

In the authentication system 1, biometric authentication is performed by biometric information of a user acquired by the sensor 5, and when biometric authentication is established, the unlocking of the door of the vehicle HV is permitted. In addition, when the code matching is performed between the electronic key 2 and the authentication ECU 7 by wireless communication, and authentication by code matching via wireless communication is established, and when biometric authentication is established, the vehicle In addition to the HV door-to-seagate, the vehicle HV is allowed to start. The electronic key 2 and the authentication ECU 7 will be described later in detail. In addition, "information" is used not only as an uncountable noun but also as an additive noun and is equivalent to an information item. One piece of information is equivalent to one item of information and a plurality of pieces of information.

The personal portable device 3 is a communication terminal carried or mounted by a user, and communicates with the DCM 6 via a public communication line network. Examples of the personal portable device 3 include a multifunctional mobile phone, a wearable communication terminal, and the like. In Embodiment 1, a case where the personal portable device 3 is a multifunctional mobile phone will be described as an example.

The sensor 5 is provided at the outer door handle 4 of the vehicle HV, and is a contact type biometric sensor that acquires biometric information from a user who holds the outer door handle 4. Examples of the sensor 5 include a touch emitting fingerprint sensor, a vein recognition sensor, and the like. In Embodiment 1, the sensor 5 is a touch emitting fingerprint sensor, and the biometric information acquired by the sensor 5 is fingerprint information. The case will be described as an example.

The sensor 5 may be provided in all the outer door handles 4 of the driver's seat door, the passenger seat door, the rear seat door, and the trunk room door of the vehicle HV, or may be installed in some of the outer door handles 4. You may also What is necessary is just to set it as the structure provided in the outer door handle 4 of a driver's seat, for example, when installing in the one outer door handle 4.

The DCM 6 is an in-vehicle communication module used for telematics service, and communicates with a personal mobile device through a public communication line network.

<Schematic Configuration of Electronic Key 2>

2, the schematic structure of the electronic key 2 is demonstrated. As shown in FIG. 2, the electronic key 2 is provided with the main controller 21 (also called main control circuit), the LF receiver 22, and the UHF transmitter 23. As shown in FIG. This electronic key 2 corresponds to a portable device.

The LF receiver 22 has an LF antenna provided in the outer door handle 4 and receives LF request signals transmitted from the authentication ECU 7 through this LF antenna. In addition, the LF receiver 22 is connected to the main controller 21, and outputs the request signal received by the LF antenna to the main controller 21.

The UHF transmitter 23 has a UHF antenna, and transmits a response signal in a radio wave of the UHF band to the authentication ECU 7 through the UHF antenna. The UHF transmitter 23 is connected to the main controller 21, and transmits the response signal output from the main controller 21 from the UHF antenna.

The master controller 21 includes a CPU, a volatile memory, a nonvolatile memory, I / O, and a bus connecting them, and executes various processes by executing a control program stored in the nonvolatile memory. For example, the master controller 21 executes response-related processing such as transmitting a response signal in response to the request signal transmitted from the authentication ECU 7.

In the main controller 21, a vehicle identification code for identifying the vehicle HV of the regular user is registered in the electrically rewritable nonvolatile memory. The master controller 21 performs code matching to determine whether the vehicle HV equipped with the authentication ECU 7 of the sender of the request signal received by the LF receiver 22 is a vehicle of a regular user. The code matching is performed between the vehicle identification code included in the request signal received from the authentication ECU 7 and the vehicle identification code registered in the nonvolatile memory of the main controller 21.

Then, when the code matching is established, the master controller 21 returns a response signal including the electronic key identification code for identifying the magnetic device. The electronic key identification code may be configured to read and use what is stored in the nonvolatile memory of the main controller 21.

<Schematic Configuration of Authentication ECU 7>

Subsequently, a schematic configuration of the authentication ECU 7 will be described with reference to FIG. 3. As shown in FIG. 3, the authentication ECU 7 is connected to the sensor 5, the DCM 6, the body ECU 8, and the power unit control ECU 9. As an example, the sensor 5, the DCM 6, the body ECU 8, the power unit control ECU 9, and the authentication ECU 7 may be connected by the in-vehicle LAN. This authentication ECU 7 corresponds to an on-vehicle device.

The body ECU 8 performs the time-locking of each vehicle door by outputting a drive signal for controlling the time-locking of each vehicle door of the vehicle HV to the door lock motor provided in each vehicle door. The body ECU 8 is also connected with a touch sensor provided on the outer door handle 4 of each vehicle door, and detects that the outer door handle of each vehicle door is in contact with the user.

The power unit control ECU 9 controls the driving drive source of the vehicle HV. Examples of the driving drive source include an engine and a motor. When the power unit control ECU 9 acquires the start permission signal of the travel drive source from the authentication ECU 7, the power unit control ECU 9 is set to a start standby state that can start the travel drive source. For example, a case where the driving drive source is an engine is taken as an engine start standby state in which a starter motor or the like can be started.

3, the authentication ECU 7 is provided with the main controller 71 (also called main control circuit), the LF transmitter 72, and the UHF receiver 73. As shown in FIG.

The LF transmitter 72 transmits a request signal for propagation of LF bands to the electronic key 2 through an LF antenna such as each vehicle door door antenna 10. The LF band is, for example, a frequency band of 30 Hz to 300 Hz. The range in which signals from the LF antennas can be transmitted by radio waves of the LF band corresponds to a short range wireless communication area capable of short range wireless communication. The request signal is a signal for requesting transmission of an electronic key identification code for code matching, and includes a vehicle identification code for identifying a vehicle HV. The door antenna 10 is installed on the door handle of the vehicle door of the vehicle HV.

The LF transmitter 72 may be configured to transmit a request signal for propagation of LF bands in an interior of a vehicle through an indoor antenna provided in the vehicle interior. However, for the sake of convenience, the first embodiment will be described only when the request signal is transmitted to the outside of the vehicle via the door antenna 10.

The UHF receiver 73 has the UHF antenna 11, and receives the response signal transmitted from the electronic key 2 by the radio wave of the UHF band by the UHF antenna 11. The UHF band is, for example, a frequency band of 300 MHz to 3 GHz. The response signal is a signal returned from the electronic key 2 with respect to the request signal transmitted from the authentication ECU 7.

The main controller 71 includes a volatile memory, a nonvolatile memory, I / O, and a bus connecting the same, and executes various processes by executing a control program stored in the nonvolatile memory. The master controller 71 executes processing related to authentication (hereinafter referred to as authentication related processing). The main control section 71 will be described in detail later. In addition, some or all of the functions executed by the main controller 71 may be configured in hardware by one or a plurality of ICs.

<Detailed Configuration of Main Controller 71>

As shown in FIG. 4, the master controller 71 integrates a transmission processing unit 711, a reception processing unit 712, a register 713, a first authentication unit 714, a second authentication unit 715, and authentication result. A part 716, a time unlocking permission part 717, a start permission part 718, and the notification instruction part 719 are provided.

The transmission processor 711 transmits the request signal including the vehicle identification code of the vehicle HV from the door antenna 10 via the LF transmitter 72. As an example, the request signal may be transmitted intermittently while the vehicle HV is parked. The vehicle identification code may be a device ID of the authentication ECU 7 mounted on the vehicle HV, or may be a vehicle ID of the vehicle HV. The vehicle identification code may be configured to read and use what is stored in the nonvolatile memory of the authentication ECU 7. The reception processing part 712 receives the response signal transmitted from the electronic key 2 by the radio wave of a UHF band in response to a request signal through the UHF receiver 73. FIG.

The register 713 is, for example, an electrically rewritable nonvolatile memory in which an electronic key identification code of the electronic key 2 of a regular user is registered among electronic key identification codes. In addition, the biometric information of the regular user is also registered. In the example of Embodiment 1, the fingerprint information (henceforth normal fingerprint information) acquired with the sensor 5 from the regular user is registered.

The first authentication unit 714 checks whether the electronic key 2 of the transmission source of the response signal received by the reception processing unit 712 is the electronic key 2 of the regular user. The code matching is performed between the electronic key identification code included in the response signal received from the electronic key 2 and the electronic key identification code registered in the register 713. And when both match, it is assumed that authentication by code matching through wireless communication is established. If the two do not match, authentication is not established.

The second authentication unit 715 performs fingerprint authentication to check whether the fingerprint information acquired by the sensor 5 matches with the normal fingerprint information. Fingerprint authentication is performed between the fingerprint information acquired by the sensor 5 and the normal fingerprint information registered in the register 713. And when both match, it is assumed that fingerprint authentication is established. If the two do not match, authentication is not established.

The authentication result integrating unit 716 integrates the authentication result in the first authentication unit 714 and the authentication result in the second authentication unit 715, so that the time lock permission unit 717, the start permission unit 718, It outputs to the notification instruction | indication part 719.

The time-clearing permission unit 717 sends a signal to the body ECU 8 to permit the time-locking of the vehicle door when either the first authentication unit 714 or the second authentication unit 715 is authenticated. . This city unlocking permission part 717 is corresponded in a unlocking permission part. When time unlocking of the vehicle door is permitted, the body ECU 8 starts energizing the touch sensor provided in the outer door handle 4 of the vehicle door, and enters a standby state capable of detecting the outer door handle operation by the user. . When the body ECU 8 detects that the user has touched the touch sensor, the body ECU 8 outputs a drive signal to the door lock motor to perform time locking of the vehicle door.

In the case where the sensor 5 is provided in each vehicle door of the vehicle HV, the vehicle door that performs the time-locking operation by the city-locking permit portion 717 is limited to the vehicle door that detects the outer door handle operation. Just do it. According to this, it becomes possible for the user to carry out time-locking only to the vehicle door which contacted the outer door handle 4.

In the case where the sensor 5 is provided only in the vehicle door of the driver's seat of the vehicle HV, the vehicle door that performs the city lock in the city lockper permit unit 717 may be any vehicle door of the vehicle HV. . Since the time-locking of all vehicle doors of the vehicle HV by contacting the outer door handle 4 of the vehicle door of the driver's seat is the same as that of the existing electronic key system, the user is familiar and convenient. Therefore, according to the above structure, it becomes possible to reduce cost by reducing the number which installs the sensor 5 in the vehicle HV, maintaining the convenience for a user favorable.

In addition, although the structure which performs the city lockpermit part 717 performs both of the city lockpermits was shown here, it is not necessarily limited to this. For example, the configuration may be performed by performing only visibility and release.

The start permission unit 718 transmits a start permission signal of the travel drive source to the power unit control ECU 9 when authentication is established in both the first authentication unit 714 and the second authentication unit 715. The power unit control ECU 9, which has acquired the start permission signal, sets the traveling drive source to the start standby state as described above. These city unlocking permission parts 717 and the start permission part 718 correspond to a permission part.

The notification instructing unit 719 is the authentication establishment in the first authentication unit 714, but when the authentication is not established in the second authentication unit 715, the unauthorized authentication using wireless communication is performed for the own vehicle, DCM (6) To the personal portable device 3.

<Authentication Related Processing in Main Controller 71>

Here, an example of the flow of the authentication related process in the main controller 71 of the authentication ECU 7 will be described using the flowchart of FIG. 5. The flowchart of FIG. 5 starts when the vehicle door of the vehicle HV is locked.

The flowchart described includes a plurality of sections (or referred to as steps), each section being represented by S1, for example. In addition, each section may be divided into a plurality of subsections, and a plurality of sections may be combined to form one section. Each section may be referred to as a device, or a unique name, and also with a structural modifier, for example an authentication section, as an authentication device, authenticator. In addition, the section is not only a section of software combined with a hardware unit (e.g., a computer), but also (ii) a section of hardware (e.g., an integrated circuit, a wiring logic circuit), the function of the associated device. It can be realized with or without. In addition, sections of hardware may be included inside the microcomputer.

First, in S1, when the 2nd authentication part 715 acquires fingerprint information through the sensor 5 (YES in S1), it transfers to S2. On the other hand, when fingerprint information is not acquired (NO in S1), the process of S1 is repeated. In S2, the second authentication unit 715 performs fingerprint authentication to check whether the fingerprint information acquired through the sensor 5 matches with the normal fingerprint information.

In S3, the transmission processing unit 711 transmits the request signal including the vehicle identification code from the door antenna 10 via the LF transmitter 72. In S4, when the reception processing part 712 can receive the response signal transmitted in response to the request signal from the electronic key 2 via the UHF receiver 73 (YES in S4), S5. Is implemented. On the other hand, in the case of not receiving (NO in S4), the process proceeds to S10.

In the process of S4, when the electronic key 2 does not exist within the communication range of the door antenna 10, or when the code matching of the vehicle identification code with the electronic key 2 is not established, the electronic key 2 You cannot receive the response signal.

The determination of whether or not the response signal has been received by the reception processing unit 712 may be performed according to whether or not the response has been received within a predetermined time after the request signal is transmitted. The predetermined time is a time longer than the time until the electronic key 2 which made the request signal transmits the response signal, and is a time which can be arbitrarily set. The reception processing unit 712 may determine that the response signal cannot be received when the response signal is not received even though the request signal is transmitted plural times, such as every 100 msec.

In S5, the first authentication unit 714 performs authentication by code matching between the electronic key identification code included in the response signal received by the reception processing unit 712 and the electronic key identification code registered in the register 713. Do it.

In S6, when authentication by code matching in the first authentication unit 714 is established (YES in S6), the process proceeds to S7. On the other hand, if authentication by code matching is not established (NO in S6), the process proceeds to S10.

In S7, when the fingerprint authentication in the second authentication unit 715 is established in S2 (YES in S7), the process proceeds to S8. On the other hand, if fingerprint authentication is not established (NO in S7), the process proceeds to S9.

In S8, the time lock permission unit 717 permits the release of the vehicle HV, and the start permission unit 718 permits the start of the vehicle HV, and ends the authentication related processing. In S9, it is assumed that an unauthorized authentication of a relay attack has been performed on the own vehicle, and the city lock setting permit unit 717 does not permit the release of the vehicle HV, and the start permit unit 718 does not permit the starting of the vehicle HV. . The notification instruction unit 719 also notifies the personal portable device 3 from the DCM 6 that unauthorized authentication using wireless communication has been performed for the host vehicle. Then, the authentication related processing ends.

In the personal portable device 3 that has been notified, the user is informed that the unauthorized authentication using the wireless communication has been performed on the own vehicle by performing display and / or voice output indicating that the unauthorized authentication using the wireless communication has been performed on the own vehicle. Make it aware. As an example of notification, if it is display, text display may be sufficient and icon display may be sufficient. If it is audio | voice output, reading of a text may be sufficient and output of a buzzer sound may be sufficient.

When the response signal is not received at S4, or when authentication by code matching is not established at S6, at S10, when fingerprint authentication is established at the second authentication unit 715 at S2 (YES at S10). ") Is shifted to S11. On the other hand, if fingerprint authentication is not established (NO in S10), the process proceeds to S12.

In S11, the time-clearing permission unit 717 permits the release of the vehicle HV, while the start permission unit 718 does not permit the start of the vehicle HV, and ends the authentication-related processing. In S12, the time unlocking permission unit 717 does not permit the unlocking of the vehicle HV, and the start permission unit 718 does not permit the starting of the vehicle HV, and ends the authentication-related processing.

Here, using FIG. 6, an example of the correspondence relationship between the combination of the code matching by the wireless communication in the 1st authentication part 714, the authentication result of fingerprint authentication in the 2nd authentication part 715, and the process corresponding to it is shown. Clean up.

As shown in Fig. 6, when both code matching and fingerprint authentication by wireless communication are established, both unlocking and starting of the vehicle HV are permitted. If code verification by wireless communication is established, but fingerprint authentication is not established, both unlocking and starting of the vehicle HV are not allowed, and unauthorized authentication using wireless communication is performed on the own vehicle 3. You are notified. Although code matching by wireless communication is not established, when fingerprint authentication is established, starting of the vehicle HV is not permitted, but unlocking is allowed. If both code matching and fingerprint authentication by wireless communication are incomplete, both unlocking and starting of the vehicle HV are denied.

<Arrangement of Embodiment 1>

When authentication is established by code matching through wireless communication in the first authentication unit 714, but fingerprint authentication is not established in the second authentication unit 715, wireless communication in the first authentication unit 714 is performed. It can be assumed that the authentication using the R2 is falsely established by a relay attack or the like. In contrast, according to the configuration of the first embodiment, when authentication is established by code matching through wireless communication in the first authentication unit 714, but fingerprint authentication is not established in the second authentication unit 715, The personal portable device 3 is notified that unauthorized authentication via wireless communication has been performed for the host vehicle. Therefore, the user can recognize from the personal portable device 3 that unauthorized authentication via wireless communication has been performed for the host vehicle. Therefore, the user can recognize that the vehicle HV is the target of theft, and for example, the anti-theft lock can be applied to the wheel of the vehicle HV, thereby enhancing the security against vehicle theft.

In addition, according to the structure of Embodiment 1, when authentication was not established by code matching through the wireless communication in the 1st authentication part 714, when fingerprint authentication is established in the 2nd authentication part 715, a vehicle is carried out. It does not permit the starting of the HV, but it does permit the release. According to this, when the regular user does not need to start the vehicle HV, when the cargo is loaded, it is possible to unlock the vehicle HV without the electronic key 2, thereby improving convenience.

According to the configuration of the first embodiment, the vehicle HV is started if both authentication by code matching through wireless communication in the first authentication unit 714 and fingerprint authentication in the second authentication unit 715 are not established. Since this is not allowed, the effect of anti-theft is increased by double authentication.

Moreover, since the sensor 5 is provided in the outer door handle 4 of the vehicle HV, the fingerprint authentication can be performed by the second authentication unit 715 even if the user performs the operation at the time of getting on. Therefore, it is not necessary to force the user an extra operation for authentication in the second authentication unit 715, and does not impair convenience.

(Embodiment 2)

In Embodiment 1, although the structure which attaches the sensor 5 to the outer door handle 4 was described, it is not necessarily limited to this. For example, it is good also as a structure (henceforth Embodiment 2) which attaches the sensor 5 to the start stop button 12. As shown in FIG.

<Schematic Configuration of Authentication System 1a, Authentication ECU 7a, and Main Controller 71a>

In the authentication system 1a of Embodiment 2, as shown in FIG. 7, the sensor 5 is provided in the start stop button 12 instead of installing in the outer door handle 4, and the authentication ECU 7 It is similar to the authentication system 1 of Embodiment 1 except for including the authentication ECU 7a instead. The authentication ECU 7a is different from the authentication ECU 7 of the first embodiment except that the main controller 71a (also referred to as a main control circuit) is provided instead of the main controller 71 as shown in FIG. 8. It is the same.

The main controller 71a is the same as the main controller 71 of the first embodiment except that the processing procedures of the authentication-related processing are different. The main controller 71a, like the main controller 71, has a transmission processor 711, a reception processor 712, a register 713, a first authentication unit 714, a second authentication unit 715, and an authentication result. The integrated part 716, the time unlocking permission part 717, the start permission part 718, and the notification instruction part 719 are provided.

The start stop button 12 is a button which a user operates in order to start the driving drive source of the vehicle HV, and is provided in the cabin. This start stop button 12 corresponds to a starting input unit. In the second embodiment, the sensor 5 acquires biometric information from the user who operated the start stop button 12. Also in Embodiment 2, the case where the sensor 5 is a contact light-type fingerprint sensor and the biometric information acquired by the sensor 5 is fingerprint information is demonstrated as an example.

In the LF transmitter 72 according to the second embodiment, the short-range wireless communication area includes the driver's seat of the vehicle HV. In addition, in Embodiment 2, the reason why the sensor 5 is attached to the start stop button 12 is the number of the required sensors 5 compared with the structure which installs the sensor 5 in the all vehicle doors of the vehicle HV. This can be reduced.

<Authentication Related Processes in the Main Controller 71a>

Here, an example of the flow of authentication related processing in the main controller 71a of the authentication ECU 7a will be described using the flowchart of FIG. 9. The flowchart of FIG. 9 starts when the start stop button 12 was operated after the vehicle door of the driver's seat of the vehicle HV is unlocked and the vehicle door is opened. For example, what is necessary is just to permit permission when the code matching by the wireless communication by the 1st authentication part 714 is established.

First, in S21, in the same manner as in S3, the transmission processing unit 711 transmits the request signal including the vehicle identification code. In S22, similarly to S4, when the reception processing unit 712 can receive the response signal (YES in S22), the process proceeds to S23. On the other hand, if no reception is made (NO in S22), the process proceeds to S33.

In S23, similarly to S5, the first authentication unit 714 performs authentication by code matching. In S24, when authentication by code matching in the first authentication unit 714 is established (YES in S24), the process proceeds to S25. On the other hand, if authentication by code matching is not established (NO in S24), the process proceeds to S33.

In addition, when it is set as the structure which allows unlocking by code matching by the wireless communication by the 1st authentication part 714, you may abbreviate | omit the process of S21-S24 and S33 mentioned later.

In S25, the main controller 71a enables power supply transition of the vehicle HV, and the process proceeds to S26. The power supply transfer here is a power supply transition from the power supply off of the vehicle HV to the accessory (i.e., ACC) power supply on and the ignition (i.e., IGN) on, and the permission of the start of the vehicle HV is excluded.

In S26, when the 2nd authentication part 715 acquires fingerprint information through the sensor 5 (YES in S26), it transfers to S27. On the other hand, when fingerprint information is not acquired (NO in S26), the process proceeds to S31. In S27, similarly to S2, the second authentication unit 715 performs fingerprint authentication.

In S28, when fingerprint authentication is established in the second authentication unit 715 (YES in S28), the process proceeds to S29. On the other hand, if fingerprint authentication is not established (NO in S28), the flow proceeds to S30.

In S29, the start permission unit 718 permits the start of the vehicle HV, and ends the authentication related process. In S30, it is assumed that unauthorized authentication, such as a relay attack, has been performed in the own vehicle, and the start permission unit 718 does not permit the vehicle HV to be started, and the notification indicating unit 719 performs illegal authentication using wireless communication. From the DCM 6, the personal portable device 3 is notified of what has been done. Then, the authentication related processing ends.

In S31 when the fingerprint information is not acquired in S26, the start permission unit 718 does not permit starting of the vehicle HV, and proceeds to S32. In S32, in the case of the end timing of authentication related processing (YES in S32), the authentication related processing ends. On the other hand, if it is not the end timing of the authentication related process (NO in S32), the process returns to S26 and the process is repeated. The end timing of the authentication-related processing here is, for example, when the user gets off from the vehicle HV. If the user gets off from the vehicle HV, the main controller 71a determines that the response of the electronic key 2 to the request signal transmitted from the indoor antenna of the vehicle HV is determined by the detection result of the seating sensor of the vehicle HV. do.

In S33, when the response signal is not received in S22 or when authentication by code matching is not established in S24, the start permission unit 718 does not allow the vehicle HV to start, and the authentication related processing ends.

In Embodiment 2, instead of providing the sensor 5 of Embodiment 1 to the outer door handle 4, the structure which attaches the sensor 5 to the start stop button 12 in a cabin is employ | adopted. Even when such a configuration is adopted, the same effects as those in the first embodiment can be obtained except for the fact that the vehicle HV can be unlocked without the electronic key 2.

In addition, since the sensor 5 is provided in the start stop button 12 of the vehicle HV, the fingerprint authentication can be performed by the second authentication unit 715 even if the user performs an operation at startup. Therefore, it is not necessary to force the user an extra operation for authentication in the second authentication unit 715, and does not impair convenience.

(Modification 1)

In the case of using a contact type biometric sensor as the sensor 5, if the member is in contact with the user when the user rides on or starts the vehicle HV, the sensor may be mounted on a member other than the outer door handle 4 and the start stop button 12. It is good also as a structure provided with (5).

(Modification 2)

The configuration using the contact type biometric sensor as the sensor 5 is not necessarily limited. For example, it is good also as a structure using a non-contact biometric sensor. As an example, what is necessary is just to use the non-contact fingerprint sensor and the vein recognition sensor. In addition, it is good also as a structure which uses as the sensor 5 the imaging device used by the apparatus which performs personal authentication from the picked-up image which picked up the user.

(Modification 3)

The authentication performed by the second authentication unit 715 may not necessarily be biometric authentication as long as authentication is performed by a method other than code matching through wireless communication used by the first authentication unit 714. For example, it may be authentication via wireless communication with the personal mobile device 3. As an example, when using Bluetooth (registered trademark) as the wireless communication standard, the second authentication unit 715 may be configured to authenticate by matching a PIN code used at the time of pairing. In the case where the second authentication unit 715 performs authentication via wireless communication with the personal portable device 3, the communication unit for mediating communication between the personal portable device 3 and the main controller 71 is performed. What is necessary is just to have the structure which the authentication ECU 7 further comprises.

Even if the authentication performed by the second authentication unit 715 is not biometric authentication, if the authentication is performed by a method other than code verification through wireless communication used by the first authentication unit 714, the same effects as those of the first embodiment can be obtained. Can be.

(Modification 4)

In addition, the display and / or audio output indicating that unauthorized authentication using wireless communication has been performed for the host vehicle, performed by the personal mobile device 3 that has been notified via the DCM 6 from the notification indicating unit 719, immediately after the notification. This may or may not be immediately after. As the configuration in the case of not immediately after, there is a configuration in which the personal portable device 3 receives the notification, and the user confirms the contents of the notification at an arbitrary timing.

(Modification 5)

In Embodiment 1 and Embodiment 2, although the structure which uses the personal portable device 3 called a multifunction mobile phone as a communication terminal was shown, it is not necessarily limited to the communication terminal which a user carries or mounts. For example, it is good also as a structure which uses the PC, home security terminal, etc. which are in a user's home as a communication terminal.

(Modification 6)

In the first and second embodiments, the notification indicating unit 719 notifies the personal portable device 3 from the DCM 6 that the unauthorized authentication using wireless communication has been performed. However, the present invention is not limited thereto. Do not. For example, when the user rides on the vehicle HV, the notification indicating unit 719b notifies and displays the display device 13 mounted on the host vehicle that the unauthorized authentication using wireless communication has been performed on the host vehicle (hereinafter, And modification 6).

EMBODIMENT OF THE INVENTION Hereinafter, the modification 6 of this indication is demonstrated using drawing. The authentication ECU 7b of the modification 6 is provided with the notification instruction | indication part 719b instead of the notification instruction | indication part 719, as shown in FIG. 10, and instead of notifying the portable apparatus 3 via DCM6. It is similar to the authentication ECU 7 of Embodiment 1 except for notifying the display device 13.

The display device 13 is a display device mounted on the vehicle HV. Examples of the display device 13 include a combination meter, a center information display (CID), a head-up display (HUD), and the like.

The notification instructing unit 719b has been authenticated in the first authentication unit 714, but when the authentication is not established in the second authentication unit 715, an illegal authentication using wireless communication is performed for the own vehicle. At the time of getting on the HV, the display device 13 is notified. Upon receiving the notification, the display device 13 causes the display device 13 to display that unauthorized authentication using wireless communication has been performed for the host vehicle.

What is necessary is just to make it the structure which the notification instruction part 719b judges from the signal of the vehicle door opening / closure obtained from the body ECU 8, the signal of the seating sensor, etc. at the time of the user's vehicle HV getting on.

According to the structure of the modification 6, a user can recognize that the unauthorized authentication via wireless communication was performed with respect to the own vehicle at the time of getting on to the vehicle HV. In addition, in the modification 6, it is good also as a structure which the notification instruction | indication part 719b also performs notification to the personal portable device 3 from DCM6.

(Modification 7)

In Embodiment 1 and 2, although the body ECU 8 which performs time-locking of the vehicle door was shown separately from the authentication ECUs 7 and 7a, the structure was shown, but it is not necessarily limited to this. For example, it is good also as a structure (henceforth modified example 7) in which the body ECU 8 which performs time unlocking of the vehicle door is integrated with the authentication ECUs 7 and 7a.

Hereinafter, modified example 7 of the present disclosure will be described with reference to the drawings. The authentication ECU 7c of the modification 7 is the same as the authentication ECU 7 of the first embodiment except that the time-locking operation unit 720 is provided as shown in FIG. 11.

The time-locking operation part 720 performs the same process as the body ECU 8 demonstrated in Embodiment 1, outputs a drive signal to the door lock motor 14, and performs the time-locking of the vehicle door. This time unlocking operation part 720 is corresponded to a unlocking operation part.

Although the present disclosure has been described based on the examples, it is understood that the present disclosure is not limited to the examples and structures. The present disclosure also includes various modifications and modifications within the equivalent range. In addition, various combinations and forms, and further, other combinations and forms including only one element, more, or less thereof, are also included in the scope and spirit of the present disclosure.

Claims (12)

Used in vehicles,
It is an on-vehicle device provided with the 1st authentication part 714 which authenticates by code matching through the wireless communication with the portable device 2 used as an electronic key,
A second authenticator 715 for authenticating by a method other than code verification through wireless communication used by the first authenticator;
When authentication is established in the first authentication unit, but authentication is not established in the second authentication unit, an illegal authentication using wireless communication is performed on the vehicle to the communication terminal 3 of the user of the vehicle. Notification instructing sections 719 and 719b to notify the user;
A start permission unit 718 for allowing start of the vehicle;
A unlocking permission unit 717 for allowing unlocking of the door of the vehicle;
The start permission unit does not permit the start of the vehicle unless authentication is established in both the first authentication unit and the second authentication unit.
The disengagement permission unit permits disengagement of the door of the vehicle when authentication is established in the second authentication unit even when authentication in the first authentication unit is not established,
The notification instructing unit 719b causes the display device 13 mounted on the vehicle to display that unauthorized authentication using wireless communication has been performed on the vehicle, when the user of the vehicle rides on the vehicle.
Onboard device. The method of claim 1,
And a disengagement operation unit (720) for disengaging the door of the vehicle. The method of claim 1,
The second on-board authentication unit performs authentication by biometric authentication. The method of claim 3,
The on-vehicle device, wherein the second authentication unit performs biometric authentication using the biometric information of the user acquired by the sensor (5) with which the user contacts. The method of claim 4,
And the second authentication unit performs biometric authentication using biometric information of the user acquired by the sensor provided on the outer door handle (4) of the vehicle. The method of claim 4,
And the second authentication unit performs biometric authentication using the biometric information of the user acquired by the sensor provided in the starting input unit (12) operated by the user to start the driving drive source of the vehicle. The method of claim 1,
And the notification instructing unit notifies the communication terminal carried or mounted to the user of the vehicle that an unauthorized authentication using wireless communication has been performed on the vehicle. The method of claim 1,
The notification instructing unit 719 notifies the communication terminal of the user of the vehicle via the on-vehicle communication module 6 used for the telematics service that unauthorized authentication using wireless communication has been performed on the vehicle. Device. delete A mobile device 2 used as an electronic key,
An on-vehicle device, which is used in a vehicle and has a first authentication unit 714 for authenticating by code matching through wireless communication with the portable device,
A second authenticator 715 for authenticating by a method other than code verification through wireless communication used by the first authenticator;
When authentication is established in the first authentication unit, but authentication is not established in the second authentication unit, an illegal authentication using wireless communication is performed on the vehicle to the communication terminal 3 of the user of the vehicle. Notification instructing sections 719 and 719b to notify the user;
A start permission unit 718 for allowing start of the vehicle;
A unlocking permission unit 717 for allowing unlocking of the door of the vehicle;
The start permission unit does not permit the start of the vehicle unless authentication is established in both the first authentication unit and the second authentication unit.
The disengagement permission unit permits disengagement of the door of the vehicle when authentication is established in the second authentication unit even when authentication in the first authentication unit is not established,
The notification instructing section 719b causes the display device 13 mounted on the vehicle to display that unauthorized authentication using wireless communication has been performed on the vehicle, when the user of the vehicle rides on the vehicle.
Authentication system comprising on-vehicle devices (7, 7a, 7b, 7c). delete delete

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