JP7022821B2 - Product traceability Anti-counterfeiting methods and equipment - Google Patents

Description

<Cross-reference of related applications>
This application claims the priority of Chinese Patent Application No. 2017109374964, entitled "Traceability of Logistics with Encryption / Radio Frequency Identification Technology and Genuine Guarantee Method of Packaging" filed on September 30, 2017. Here, the entire contents are incorporated into the present application by reference.

The present invention relates to the field of physical distribution technology, and particularly to the traceability of goods, anti-counterfeiting methods and devices.

In the online consumption process, such as making a proxy purchase and shopping at an overseas site via the Internet, when a consumer makes a purchase from a strange store, it is difficult for the consumer to identify the authenticity of the product when receiving the product. There are various reasons. For example, when a consumer orders a product by electronic means, it is difficult to ensure that the purchased product was shipped from the place of origin, the product is lost in the transportation process, and it becomes difficult to grasp the transportation information. In many cases.

Currently, shopping at an overseas site through the Internet is nothing but "a fake turns into a genuine product at an overseas site through the Internet." Taking cosmetics as an example, through a second-hand goods trading platform, purchase a large number of empty bottles of big brand cosmetics and forge international Takkyubin (registered trademark) invoices and purchase receipts to obtain logistics information and origins. After achieving the purpose of "attaching a foil that is an overseas product" by counterfeiting, it will be put up on each sales platform as a genuine product purchased on behalf of the customer.

In the conventional technology, scanning is performed only at each distribution stage, the invoice is identified, and then the distribution information is notified to the consumer, but the consumer cannot grasp the specific actual state in the middle of the product.

In view of this, it is necessary to provide a product traceability counterfeit prevention method and device for the problem that it is difficult to grasp the actual state of the product in the transportation process in the conventional logistics technology.

Product traceability Anti-counterfeiting methods include the following steps:

At the shipping stage, the product information is written in the electronic tag, the first encryption key is obtained, the product information is encrypted by the first encryption key, and the electronic tag is installed on or in the parcel for packaging the product. At the same time, an opening prevention device is installed, and the opening prevention device destroys the electronic tag when the parcel is opened.

At the distribution transportation stage, the distribution information is written in the electronic tag, the second encryption key is acquired, and the distribution information is encrypted by the second encryption key.

At the receiving stage, the decryption key is acquired, the target information in the electronic tag is read by the decryption key, the traceability is verified for the product based on the target information, and the decryption keys are the first encryption key and the first encryption key, respectively. 2 Matching with the encryption key, the target information includes product information or distribution information,

If the electronic tag is destroyed, it is determined that the traceability of the product has failed.

According to the above-mentioned product traceability anti-counterfeiting method, product information is written in an electronic tag at the shipping stage, the product information is encrypted using the first encryption key, and the distribution information is stored in the electronic tag at the distribution transportation stage. Information in the electronic tag because it is written and the distribution information is encrypted using the second encryption key, and the product information and the distribution information are encrypted by the encryption key corresponds to the setting of read / write authority. Is generally difficult to forge, ensures the accuracy of the information, and at the receiving stage, the information in the electronic tag is read using the decryption key that matches the encryption key, and the target information is acquired for the product. By verifying traceability and encrypting / decrypting product information and distribution information with a matching key, information forgery should be avoided, and the authenticity of the product and the truthful and complete state of the product in the transportation process should be ensured. Also, if the parcel is opened in the middle, the opening prevention device will destroy the electronic tag, and by using the opening prevention device to ensure the integrity of the electronic tag, the products in the package will be replaced. It is possible to prevent the encryption.

In one embodiment, the opening prevention device is equipped with a mechanical opening prevention device, the mechanical opening prevention device is installed at the opening of the parcel packaging the product, and the electronic tag is located inside the mechanical opening prevention device. If the opening of the parcel is opened, the mechanical anti-opening device destroys the electronic tag.

In one embodiment, the mechanical opening prevention device comprises an inner lid, an outer lid and a fixing stopper.

An annular cutting groove and an electronic tag are installed on the upper end surface of the inner lid, the tip of the electronic tag is located inside the annular cutting groove, and the antenna of the electronic tag extends across the annular cutting groove to the periphery of the inner lid. , Fixing teeth are installed on the lower end surface of the inner lid, and a guide mechanism that engages with each other is installed on the lower part of the inner lid and the fixing plug so that the fixing plug rotates along the first direction with respect to the inner lid. , The outer lid is installed outside the inner lid, the cutter is fixed to the lower end surface of the outer lid, the cutter is located in the annular cutting groove, and at least one of the inner lid and the outer lid is screwed into the fixing plug and connected. The closure.

In one embodiment, a first limiting mechanism and a second limiting mechanism are installed between the inner lid and the outer lid, and the first limiting mechanism causes the inner lid to rotate along the first direction with respect to the outer lid. The second limiting mechanism partially prevents the inner lid from rotating along the second direction with respect to the outer lid, and the force applied to the inner or outer lid along the second direction is the initial value. If larger, the inner lid rotates along the second direction with respect to the outer lid.

In one embodiment, there are a plurality of second encryption keys, the physical distribution transportation stage is divided into a plurality of substages, and the plurality of second encryption keys each have a one-to-one correspondence with the plurality of substages.

At each sub-stage, the physical distribution information corresponding to the electronic tag is written, the corresponding second encryption key is acquired, and the corresponding physical distribution information is encrypted by the corresponding second encryption key.

In one embodiment, the product traceability anti-counterfeiting method further comprises the following steps:

At the shipping stage, obtain the first encryption key from the blockchain server, upload the product packaging information to the blockchain server, and

At the logistics transportation stage, obtain the second encryption key from the blockchain server and

At the receiving stage, the decryption key and the product packaging information are acquired from the blockchain server, the product packaging information is used to compare with the actual product packaging, and the comparison result is used to perform traceability verification on the product.

In one embodiment, the product packaging information includes a video slice of the product packaging, the video slice packing the product, sealing the product, writing data to an electronic tag, or taking a picture when inspecting the data. It is characterized by being.

In one embodiment, the product traceability anti-counterfeiting method further comprises the following steps:

At the logistics transportation stage, the logistics information is uploaded to the blockchain server, and the logistics information includes whether or not the electronic tag has been destroyed.

Product traceability The anti-counterfeiting device is equipped with the above electronic tag.

According to the above-mentioned product traceability anti-counterfeiting device, an electronic tag is installed on or inside a parcel for packaging the product, and at the shipping stage, the product information is written on the electronic tag and the first encryption key is used. The product information is encrypted, the distribution information is written in the electronic tag at the distribution transportation stage, the distribution information is encrypted using the second encryption key, and the product information and the distribution information are encrypted by the encryption key. Since this corresponds to the setting of read / write authority, the information in the electronic tag is generally difficult to be forged, the accuracy of the information is ensured, and the decryption key that matches the encryption key is used at the receiving stage. By reading the information in the electronic tag, acquiring the target information, verifying the traceability of the product, and encrypting / decrypting the product information and distribution information with the matching key, information forgery can be avoided and the product can be decrypted. Traceability Truth and truthfulness in the process of transporting goods can be ensured.

In one embodiment, the product traceability anti-counterfeiting device is further equipped with a writing device and a reading device.

At the shipping stage, the writing device writes the product information in the electronic tag, obtains the first encryption key, and encrypts the product information with the first encryption key.

At the distribution transportation stage, the writing device writes the distribution information in the electronic tag, acquires the second encryption key, and encrypts the distribution information with the second encryption key.

At the receiving stage, the reading device acquires the decryption key, reads the target information in the electronic tag with the decryption key, verifies the traceability of the product based on the target information, and each decryption key is the first encryption. Matching with the key and the second encryption key, the target information includes product information or distribution information.

In one embodiment, the product traceability anti-counterfeiting device further comprises an anti-opening device, which destroys the electronic tag when the parcel is opened.

In one embodiment, the opening prevention device is equipped with a mechanical opening prevention device, the mechanical opening prevention device is installed at the opening of the parcel packaging the product, and the electronic tag is located inside the mechanical opening prevention device. If the opening of the parcel is opened, the mechanical anti-opening device destroys the electronic tag.

In one embodiment, the mechanical opening prevention device comprises an inner lid, an outer lid and a fixing stopper.

An annular cutting groove and an electronic tag are installed on the upper end surface of the inner lid, the tip of the electronic tag is located inside the annular cutting groove, and the antenna of the electronic tag extends across the annular cutting groove to the periphery of the inner lid. , Fixing teeth are installed on the lower end surface of the inner lid, and a guide mechanism that engages with each other is installed on the lower part of the inner lid and the fixing plug so that the fixing plug rotates along the first direction with respect to the inner lid. , The outer lid is installed outside the inner lid, the cutter is fixed to the lower end surface of the outer lid, the cutter is located in the annular cutting groove, and at least one of the inner lid and the outer lid is screwed into the fixing plug and connected. The closure.

In one embodiment, a first limiting mechanism and a second limiting mechanism are installed between the inner lid and the outer lid, and the first limiting mechanism causes the inner lid to rotate along the first direction with respect to the outer lid. The second limiting mechanism partially prevents the inner lid from rotating along the second direction with respect to the outer lid, and the force applied to the inner or outer lid along the second direction is the initial value. If larger, the inner lid rotates along the second direction with respect to the outer lid.

In one embodiment, the product traceability anti-counterfeiting device is further equipped with a snap lock device, the snap lock device is installed on or in the parcel wrapping the product, connected to a pulse generator, and the parcel is opened. At the same time, the snap lock device is opened and the snap lock device triggers the pulse generator.

It is a schematic diagram of the application scene of the traceability forgery prevention method of the product in one Example of this invention. It is a flowchart of the traceability forgery prevention method of the product in one Embodiment of this invention. It is a schematic diagram of the architecture diagram of the AES module in one Example of this invention. It is a schematic diagram of the architecture of the data path in one Example of this invention. It is a schematic diagram of the encryption process of the authentication server in one Embodiment of this invention. It is a schematic diagram of the decryption process of the authentication tag in one Embodiment of this invention. It is a schematic diagram of the encryption process of the authentication tag in one Embodiment of this invention. It is a schematic diagram of the decryption process of the authentication server in one Embodiment of this invention. It is an architectural principle diagram of the AES module in one Embodiment of this invention. It is a schematic vertical sectional view of the mechanical opening prevention device in one Embodiment of this invention. It is a cross-sectional schematic diagram of the mechanical opening prevention device in one Embodiment of this invention. It is a partial cross-sectional schematic diagram of the mechanical opening prevention device in one Embodiment of this invention. It is a structural schematic diagram of the traceability anti-counterfeiting apparatus of goods in one Example of this invention. It is a structural schematic diagram of the traceability anti-counterfeiting apparatus of a product in another embodiment of this invention. It is a structural schematic diagram of the traceability anti-counterfeiting apparatus of goods in another embodiment of this invention. It is a structural schematic diagram of the traceability anti-counterfeiting apparatus of goods in the further embodiment of this invention. It is a schematic diagram of the sealed packaging process of the product parcel in one embodiment of the present invention. It is a schematic diagram of the shipping and transportation process of a product parcel in one embodiment of the present invention. It is a schematic diagram of the transport exception handling process of a product parcel in one embodiment of the present invention. It is a schematic diagram of the goods receiving process in one Example of this invention.

In order to more clearly explain the object, technical proposal and advantages of the present invention, the present invention will be described in more detail by way of examples with reference to the drawings below. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are for interpreting the invention and not for limiting the scope of protection of the invention. Further, for convenience of explanation, the drawings show only the parts related to the present invention, not the entire contents.

It should be explained that the term "first \ second" relating to the embodiments of the present invention is only for distinguishing similar objects and does not represent a particular order for objects, but is understood. As such, the "first \ second" may exchange a particular order or order, if allowed. It should be understood that the objects distinguished by "first \ second" are exchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments of the invention described herein can be performed in an order other than that shown or described herein. May be done.

The product traceability anti-counterfeiting method according to the present application may be applied to the application environment shown in FIG. The sender writes the product information in the electronic tag, obtains the first encryption key, encrypts the product information with the first encryption key, and the carrier writes the distribution information in the electronic tag, and the second encryption. Obtain the key, encrypt the distribution information with the second encryption key, the consignee obtains the decryption key, read the target information in the electronic tag with the decryption key, and traceability to the product based on the target information. After verifying the authenticity, an anti-opening device is installed, and the anti-opening device destroys the electronic tag when the parcel is opened. A dedicated reader / writer can read and write to the electronic tag in combination with the key.

FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a product traceability counterfeit prevention method according to an embodiment of the present invention, and the product traceability counterfeit prevention method according to the embodiment includes the following steps.

In step S110, at the shipping stage, the product information is written in the electronic tag, the first encryption key is acquired, the product information is encrypted by the first encryption key, and the electronic tag is on the parcel or parcel for packaging the product. Along with being installed inside, an opening prevention device is also installed, and the opening prevention device destroys the electronic tag when the parcel is opened.

In this step, the electronic tag may be placed on or in the bill of materials, which simplifies the mounting process of the electronic tag when placed on the bill of materials and protects the electronic tag when placed in the bill of materials. Therefore, it is possible to prevent the electronic tag from being damaged, and the product information is mainly the product production BOM (Bill of Materials) information, shipping time information, identification code, and shipping location GPS (Global Positioning System). , Global Positioning System) The role of the opening prevention device, including positioning information, is to avoid opening the parcel, and if it is opened, destroy the electronic tag and invalidate the electronic tag.

In step S120, in the physical distribution transportation stage, the physical distribution information is written in the electronic tag, the second encryption key is acquired, and the physical distribution information is encrypted by the second encryption key.

In this step, the physical distribution information mainly includes the receipt time of the goods, the receipt address, the inspection status, the relay transportation time, the recipient code, and the like.

In step S130, at the receiving stage, the decryption key is acquired, the target information in the electronic tag is read by the decryption key, the traceability verification is performed on the product based on the target information, and the decryption key is each the first encryption. When the key and the second encryption key are matched and the target information includes the product information or the distribution information and the electronic tag is destroyed, it is determined that the traceability of the product has failed.

In this step, the decryption key matches the first encryption key and the second encryption key, and the decryption key can decrypt and read the encrypted product information or distribution information in the electronic tag, and electronically. When the tag is destroyed, the information in it is not read, and the packaging of the product is opened in the middle, so it can be determined that the traceability of the product has failed.

In this embodiment, the product information is written in the electronic tag at the shipping stage, the product information is encrypted using the first encryption key, and the physical distribution information is written in the electronic tag at the physical distribution transportation stage, and the second encryption is performed. Logistics information is encrypted using the encryption key. Since the fact that the product information and the distribution information are encrypted by the encryption key corresponds to the setting of the read / write authority, the information in the electronic tag is generally difficult to be forged, and the accuracy of the information is ensured. At the receiving stage, the information in the electronic tag is read using the decryption key that matches the encryption key, the target information is acquired, and the traceability of the product is verified. By encrypting and decrypting product information and distribution information with a matching key, it is possible to avoid information forgery, ensure the authenticity of the product and the true and complete state of the product in the transportation process, and also. If the parcel is opened in the middle, the opening prevention device will destroy the electronic tag, and by using the opening prevention device to ensure the completeness of the electronic tag, it is possible to prevent the products in the package from being replaced. be able to.

Further, the encryption key and the decryption key may be provided in advance by the technical service provider. Generates several key pairs based on AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), where each key pair contains a public key B, a private key A, and a key N belonging to A, with the secret key A being the first. Assign the key N to the sender as the encryption key, the key N to the carrier as the second encryption key, and the private key B to the consignee as the decryption key.

When there are a plurality of transportation contractors, a plurality of consecutive keys N, N + 1 ... N + X belonging to A are generated, a plurality of consecutive keys N, N + 1 ... N + X are assigned to each transportation contractor, and each distribution information is encrypted. May be used to do so.

Further, the electronic tag may be an RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) electronic tag, and several blocks (block areas) are set in the RFID electronic tag, and each of them writes product information or physical distribution information. The product information and physical distribution information written in the RFID electronic tag are read only in combination with the corresponding key.

The RFID electronic tag has an analog front end and an AES module, the AES module has a controller, a RAM module and a data path, a submodule is built in the data path, and the submodule is a quarter MixColumns (column mixing conversion). Only the operation is performed and is shown in FIGS. 3 and 4.

The RFID electronic tag authentication process involves an authentication server, an authentication reader and an authentication tag (ie, RFID electronic tag). As shown in FIG. 5-a, the encryption unit of the authentication server includes an XOR execution unit 201. The XOR execution unit 201 executes an XOR operation on the 0 to 15 bits of the confirmation data 203 and the output key 205 to be encrypted by the bit cell for generating the encryption confirmation data 207. The encryption confirmation data 207 is transmitted to the authentication reader together with the input key (InputKey_RN), and the confirmation data 207 and the input key (InputKey_RN) transmitted to the authentication reader are generated as one message and transmitted to the authentication tag. ..

As shown in FIG. 5-b, the decryption unit of the authentication tag (that is, the RFID electronic tag) includes the XOR execution unit 211. The XOR execution unit 211 executes an XOR operation on the encryption confirmation data 213 included in the 0 to 15 bits of the output key 215 and the Sec_Aut instruction message, and the unit 217 is used to generate the decryption confirmation data. In such a case, the output key 215 uses the input key (ImportKey_RN) included in the Sec_Autth instruction message and the AES key included in the authentication memory by the key processor of the authentication tag.

As shown in FIG. 5-c, the authentication tag encryption unit includes an XOR execution unit 221. The XOR execution unit 221 executes XOR on the 16 to 31 bits of the confirmation data 223 to be encrypted and the output key 225, and executes the XOR operation bit by bit to generate the encryption confirmation data 227. In such a case, the confirmation data 223 to be encrypted may be the confirmation data 217 decrypted from the decryption unit of the authentication tag. Therefore, the XOR execution unit 221 generates the encrypted confirmation data 227 by re-encrypting the decrypted confirmation data 217.

The encryption confirmation data 227 consists of a Sec_aut response message and is transmitted to the authentication reader. The confirmation data 227 transmitted to the authentication reader is transmitted to the authentication server.

As shown in FIG. 5-d, the decryption unit of the authentication server includes an XOR execution unit 231. The XOR execution unit 231 executes the XOR operation on the 16 to 31 bits of the encryption confirmation data 233 and the output key 235 to generate the decrypted confirmation data 237 in bit units.

After that, the authentication server verifies the authenticity of the authentication tag by comparing the confirmation data 203 generated in the authentication server with the decryption confirmation data 237 received from the authentication reader.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram of the configuration of an RFID authentication system having an authentication function. The RFID authentication system includes an authentication server 301, an authentication reader 321 and an authentication tag 331, and the authentication server 301 includes a key database 302, a key processor 303, a confirmation data generator 304, an encryption unit 305, a tag authentication unit 306, and a decryption unit. 307 is provided.

When the authentication information is received from the authentication reader 321, the key processor 303 determines the AES key based on the authentication information. Here, the authentication information includes an electronic product code (EPC) and a SecParam. That is, the key processor 303 determines the AES key corresponding to the SecParam AES key index in the key database 302.

After that, the key processor 303 generates an output key using the AES key and the input key (InputKey_RN) randomly generated in the authentication server 301. In such a case, the input key (InputKey_RN) may be a public key.

The confirmation data generation device 304 generates confirmation data having a predetermined length, and the encryption unit 305 encrypts the confirmation data. After that, the confirmation data generation device 304 transmits the input key and the encryption confirmation data to the authentication reading device 321. Here, the encryption unit 305 executes exclusive OR (XOR) on the confirmation data and the output key for encrypting the confirmation data.

When the encrypted acknowledgment data is received from the authentication reader 321, the tag authentication unit 306 decrypts the acknowledgment data encrypted by the decryption unit 307, and the acknowledgment data and the decrypted acknowledgment data are decrypted. By comparing with, the authenticity of the authentication tag 331 is verified, that is, if the confirmation data and the decrypted acknowledgment data are the same, the authentication reader 321 authenticates the authentication tag 331 and thus. The tag authentication unit 305 verifies that the authentication tag 331 is genuine and indicates that the authentication tag 331 is produced by a legitimate producer. Conversely, if the verification data and the decrypted acknowledgment data are different, the authentication reader 321 does not authenticate the authentication tag 331, and therefore the tag authentication unit 305 verifies that the authentication tag 331 is unreliable and the authentication tag. Indicates that 331 is not produced by a legitimate producer. After that, the tag authentication unit 305 may transmit the authentication result to the authentication reader 321. Here, the decryption unit 307 may execute XOR on the encrypted acknowledgment data and the output key for decrypting the encrypted acknowledgment data.

Therefore, the encryption unit 305 executes XOR on the input data by the output key, and the decryption unit 307 executes XOR using the output input data to decrypt the input data. The input data is encrypted by the above method, and therefore, the encryption unit 305 and the decryption unit 307 may have the same structure.

The authentication reading device 321 may further include an authentication information transmission unit 323 and a confirmation information transmission unit 325.

When the authentication information transmission unit 323 receives the authentication information from the authentication tag 331, a part of the authentication information is transmitted. Here, the authentication information includes protocol control (PC), extended protocol control (XPC), EPC and one SecParam.

In such a case, the authentication information transmission unit 323 may receive the PC, XPC, EPC, and SecParam transmitted after the ST bit of the XPC is identified as T by the authentication tag 331.

The authentication information transmission unit 323 first receives the PC, XPC, and EPC from the authentication information, and the authentication information transmission unit 323 determines that the XPC is identified as "1" by the ST bit of the authentication information transmission unit 323. After that, the authentication information transmission unit 323 may receive the SecParam from the authentication tag 331 by using the Get_SecParam instruction and the response message.

In addition, at the receiving stage, after the consignee receives the parcel, it may first check whether the parcel is physically damaged, and if it is physically damaged, the receipt may be refused directly, that is, the traceability of the goods. If it fails, the assigned public key is used to read the product information or physical distribution information on the RFID electronic tag, and after confirmation, sign the receipt.

In one embodiment, the opening prevention device is equipped with a mechanical opening prevention device, the mechanical opening prevention device is installed at the opening of the parcel packaging the product, and the electronic tag is located inside the mechanical opening prevention device. If the opening of the parcel is opened, the mechanical anti-opening device destroys the electronic tag.

In this embodiment, a mechanical open prevention device is installed at the opening of the parcel of the packaged product, an electronic tag is installed in the package, and at the same time the parcel is opened, the mechanical open prevention device destroys the electronic tag. At this time, because the electronic tag was destroyed, the information in it could not be read normally, indicating that the package of the product was opened by an unknown person at the shipping or distribution stage, and the product was damaged. Alternatively, it may be determined that the traceability verification of the product has failed at the time of receipt due to the risk of replacement, and the product is replaced by using an open prevention device to prevent the product from being opened by another person before receipt. It is possible to reduce the possibility of being killed.

Specifically, during the actual application, when the consignee receives the goods, the information on the electronic tag may be read by using the above-mentioned reading device, and if the information can be read normally, the goods are opened after the sealed packaging. It may indicate that nothing has happened, otherwise it may indicate that the goods have been opened, refuse to receive the goods, and hold the sender or contractor liable, and may be mechanical. The location of the anti-opening device is the normal opening of the parcel packaging the goods, and usually the goods are placed in or out of the parcel through the opening and the parcel is opened elsewhere. If so, it may indicate that the parcel has been opened by violence and refuse to receive the goods.

In one embodiment, the mechanical opening prevention device comprises an inner lid, an outer lid and a fixing stopper.

An annular cutting groove and an electronic tag are installed on the upper end surface of the inner lid, the tip of the electronic tag is located inside the annular cutting groove, and the antenna of the electronic tag extends across the annular cutting groove to the periphery of the inner lid. , Fixing teeth are installed on the lower end surface of the inner lid, and a guide mechanism that engages with each other is installed on the lower part of the inner lid and the fixing plug so that the fixing plug rotates along the first direction with respect to the inner lid. , The outer lid is installed outside the inner lid, the cutter is fixed to the lower end surface of the outer lid, the cutter is located in the annular cutting groove, and at least one of the inner lid and the outer lid is screwed into the fixing plug and connected. The closure.

In this embodiment, the mechanical opening prevention device is provided with an inner lid, an outer lid and a fixing plug, an annular cutting groove and an electronic tag are installed on the upper end surface of the inner lid, and the outer lid is installed outside the inner lid. When the cutter is fixed to the lower end surface of the lid, the inner lid or outer lid is screwed into the fixing plug, and the antenna of the electronic tag around the inner lid is cut during rotation to operate the mechanical opening prevention device. It may be realized to destroy the electronic tag.

In one embodiment, a first limiting mechanism and a second limiting mechanism are installed between the inner lid and the outer lid, and the first limiting mechanism causes the inner lid to rotate along the first direction with respect to the outer lid. The second limiting mechanism partially prevents the inner lid from rotating along the second direction with respect to the outer lid, and the force applied to the inner or outer lid along the second direction is the initial value. If larger, the inner lid rotates along the second direction with respect to the outer lid.

In this embodiment, a first limiting mechanism and a second limiting mechanism are installed between the inner lid and the outer lid to limit the rotation range of the inner lid, and the inner lid is moved in the second direction with respect to the outer lid only. It can only be rotated along and applied with an appropriate force to prevent the mechanical opening prevention device from being opened by vibration.

Specifically, the structure of the mechanical opening prevention device includes an inner lid 2, an outer lid 1, and a fixing plug 3 as shown in FIGS. 7 and 8.

An annular cutting groove 25 and an RFID electronic tag 4 are installed on the upper end surface of the inner lid 2, the chip 41 of the RFID electronic tag is located inside the annular cutting groove 25, and the antenna 42 of the RFID electronic tag straddles the annular cutting groove 25. A fixing tooth 5 for fixing the package sealing port 34 is installed on the lower end surface of the inner lid 2 and is engaged with the lower portion of the inner lid 2 and the fixing plug. A guide mechanism is installed, and the fixing plug 3 is only allowed to rotate in the first direction (clockwise or counterclockwise, clockwise in this embodiment) with respect to the inner lid 2. As shown, the guide mechanism comprises an inner lid rotation guide tooth 21 and a fixing stopper rotation guide tooth 31 installed in the opposite direction, and in the embodiment, the fixing stopper rotation guide tooth 31 can rotate counterclockwise, but the clock When rotating in a clockwise direction, the inner lid rotation guide tooth 21 and the fixing stopper rotation guide tooth 31 are locked to each other.

When the outer lid 1 is installed outside the inner lid, the cutter 11 is fixed to the lower end surface of the outer lid 1, the cutter 11 is located in the annular cutting groove 25, and the outer lid 1 rotates, the cutter 11 is annularly cut. By making a circular motion in the groove 25 and disconnecting the antenna of the RFID electronic tag, the purpose of destroying the RFID electronic tag and preventing it from operating normally is realized. A first limiting mechanism and a second limiting mechanism are installed between the inner lid 2 and the outer lid 1, and the first limiting mechanism completely ensures that the inner lid 2 rotates along the first direction with respect to the outer lid 1. The second limiting mechanism partially prevents the inner lid 2 from rotating with respect to the outer lid 1 along the second direction (clockwise or counterclockwise, counterclockwise in this embodiment). Then, the inner lid 2 rotates along the second direction with respect to the outer lid 1 only when the force applied to the inner lid or the outer lid along the second direction is larger than the threshold value.

The first limiting mechanism includes a first protruding block 23 on the outer peripheral side of the inner lid 2 and a second protruding block 14 installed in close contact with the first protruding block 23 on the inner peripheral side of the outer lid 1. The protruding block 14 is located in the counterclockwise direction of the first protruding block 23. In another embodiment, the outer lid 1 is further provided with a fourth protruding block 15, the fourth protruding block is located in the clockwise direction of the first protruding block 23, and its role is similar to that of the second limiting mechanism. Achieve partial restrictions.

The second limiting mechanism includes some concave grooves 24 installed on the outer peripheral side of the inner lid 2 and a third protruding block 13 locked in the concave grooves 24 installed on the inner peripheral side of the outer lid 1. , The number of concave grooves 24 is 6, and the outer lid 1 is uniformly installed on the peripheral portion of the inner lid 2, the outer lid 1 has a certain elasticity, and the outer lid is rotated clockwise or counterclockwise, and the force is applied. When a certain value is reached, the third protruding block 13 separates from the concave groove 24 and realizes relative rotation between the outer lid 1 and the inner lid 2. Further, when the third protruding block 13 intersects with the antenna 42 of the RFID electronic tag in the vertical direction and the third protruding block 13 rotates to the position of the antenna 42, the third protruding block 13 pushes out the antenna and causes secondary destruction. Realize.

At least one of the inner lid 2 and the outer lid 1 is screwed and connected to the fixing plug. The fixing plug 3 and the inner lid 2 are connected by screws 22 and screws 33, and the fixing plug 3 and the outer lid 1 are connected by screws 12 and screws 32.

Hereinafter, a method of using the mechanical opening prevention device including the sealing and packaging process and the opening process will be described.

Sealed packaging process

In step A1, the inner lid and the outer lid are integrally combined, the inner lid is pushed into the outer lid by utilizing the elasticity of the outer lid, and the inner lid is restricted by the second limiting mechanism to prevent the inner lid from falling off.

In step A2, the package sealing port is aligned with the fixed tooth and placed on the inner lid, and the packaging sealing port is provided with a tongue portion extending from the bag opening of the packaging bag or the sealing port of the packaging box.

In step A3, the fixing stopper is screwed along the first direction to the bottom of the inner lid and the outer lid to realize sealed packaging of the packaging sealing port.

Opening process

In step B1, the outer lid is rotated along the second direction, and the fixing plug and the inner lid are relatively fixed by the action of the guide mechanism.

In step B2, the force is gradually increased, and when the threshold value is reached, the outer lid rotates along the inner lid and the cutter moves in the annular cutting groove.

In step B3, after the cutter comes into contact with the antenna of the RFID electronic tag, the antenna is cut off.

In one embodiment, there are a plurality of second encryption keys, the physical distribution transportation stage is divided into a plurality of substages, and the plurality of second encryption keys each have a one-to-one correspondence with the plurality of substages.

At each sub-stage, the physical distribution information corresponding to the electronic tag is written, the corresponding second encryption key is acquired, and the corresponding physical distribution information is encrypted by the corresponding second encryption key.

In this embodiment, a plurality of transportation contractors may be in charge of physical distribution transportation in each of the physical distribution transportation stages, and each transportation contractor is in the transportation sub-stage when undertaking the transportation of goods, and all of them are in each sub-stage. The corresponding logistics information may be written in an electronic tag and encrypted with the corresponding second encryption key, and making the logistics transportation information of each contractor independent of each other is the classification and demarcation of subsequent transportation responsibilities. Useful for.

In one embodiment, the product traceability anti-counterfeiting method further comprises the following steps:

At the shipping stage, the first encryption key is acquired from the blockchain server, and the product packaging information is uploaded to the blockchain server.

At the distribution transportation stage, the second encryption key is acquired from the blockchain server.

At the receiving stage, the decryption key and the product packaging information are acquired from the blockchain server, the product packaging information is used to compare with the actual product packaging, and the comparison result is used to perform traceability verification on the product.

In this embodiment, data is stored and called in combination with a blockchain server. The blockchain ensures that the service request cannot be tampered with during transmission by an asymmetrically encrypted digital signature, and the public notice mechanism ensures that the data on each node has a matching memory. For the stored data recording, ensure that the stored data recording cannot be modified by the node self-check function and the multi-node real-time data check function, and secure the first encryption key, second encryption key and encryption. The decryption key may be specified by the sender and stored in advance on the blockchain server, ensuring that the key cannot be modified, enhancing the confidentiality and completeness of the information, and further packaging the product at the shipping stage. Information may be uploaded and used by the recipient to compare packaging information upon receipt and further verify the product.

It should be explained that the blockchain has a node self-check function, the blockchain uses the blockchain structure to store data records, and some modifications of the records destroy the integrity of the blockchain structure. You can quickly check and recover data from other nodes. In addition, each bookkeeping node in the blockchain has its private key, and each block header contains the signature of the private key of this node, and any modification of data in the block is checked by the signature.

The blockchain also has a multi-node real-time data check function, which could allow a malicious user to modify all the data in the ledger chain if the node's private key is stolen, and the blockchain is multi-node. It provides a real-time data comparison mechanism between nodes, and can immediately detect the situation where the ledger data of a node has been tampered with.

User information in the blockchain and the blockchain address are separated. The related user information cannot be obtained from the recorded memory of each node. Multiple protections such as authority control, access authentication, and encrypted storage are stored in the user information. A user with higher transaction confidentiality may further select a transaction-unrelated mechanism, where each transaction of the same user is matched to a different address on the blockchain, thereby multiple multiple transactions of one user from the transaction ledger. Ensure that the relevance of the transaction cannot be obtained.

In the key management method of the blockchain, the key locker and the user account request function are provided to ensure the security of the key. The key locker uses the user information to encrypt the key and store it separately on multiple different nodes, does not access the key locker in the normal service process, and after the user key is lost, the key is authenticated by authenticating the user information. You may get it back. Account request realizes the function to operate the trust account by the request account and regain the account, the operation of all request accounts in the blockchain is recorded independently in the blockchain, and the frequency limit for the operation of the request account is strict. And it has an independent risk management policy and can strictly control the operation risk of the request account.

In one embodiment, the product packaging information includes a video slice of the product packaging, the video slice packing the product, sealing the product, writing data to an electronic tag, or taking a picture when inspecting the data. Is.

In this embodiment, the product packaging information includes a video slice for packaging the product, and the video slice may correctly indicate the packaging process of the product or may be used for auxiliary verification of the product.

Specifically, product packaging is performed on the packaging table assembly line, an image system is installed on the packaging table, and the functions of recording, retrospective, and comparison of the packaging process are controlled.

A video camera is attached to the packaging table, and when you actually operate it, when you complete the key-off operation (operations such as completing boxing, sealing packaging, writing data, inspecting data, etc.), high-definition video Trigger the camera's finder operation, record an image, then generate a video slice and store it in the blockchain server.

In addition, the video slice may be further marked with location, environment, time, and data anti-counterfeiting watermark to perform auxiliary verification, and at the receiving stage, the video slice is acquired by the blockchain server to assist the product. Perform verification.

In one embodiment, the product traceability anti-counterfeiting method further comprises the following steps:

At the logistics transportation stage, the logistics information is uploaded to the blockchain server, and the logistics information includes whether or not the electronic tag has been destroyed.

In this embodiment, even if the transportation contractor reads the information of the electronic tag at the distribution stage, determines whether the electronic tag has been destroyed, and uploads the distribution information to the blockchain server as a part of the distribution information. Often, physical distribution information may be recorded to prevent falsification, and product verification failures may be traceable based on physical distribution information so that when verifying a product at the receiving stage, the relevant responsible person is confirmed.

According to the above-mentioned product traceability anti-counterfeiting method, the embodiment of the present invention further provides the product traceability anti-counterfeiting device, and the embodiment of the product traceability anti-counterfeiting device will be described in detail below.

FIG. 10 is a structural schematic diagram of the traceability anti-counterfeiting device of the product of one embodiment. The product traceability anti-counterfeiting device in the embodiment includes the electronic tag 200.

In this embodiment, the electronic tag 200 is installed on or in the parcel for packaging the product, and at the shipping stage, the product information is written in the electronic tag 200 and the product information is stored using the first encryption key. Encrypt. At the physical distribution transportation stage, the physical distribution information is written in the electronic tag 200, and the physical distribution information is encrypted by using the second encryption key. Since the fact that the product information and the distribution information are encrypted by the encryption key corresponds to the setting of the read / write authority, the information in the electronic tag 200 is generally difficult to be forged, and the accuracy of the information is ensured. At the receiving stage, the information in the electronic tag 200 is read by using the decryption key matching the encryption key, the target information is acquired, and the traceability of the product is verified. By encrypting and decrypting product information and distribution information with a matching key, it is possible to avoid information forgery, ensure the authenticity of the product and the true and complete state of the product in the transportation process, and also. If the parcel is opened in the middle, the opening prevention device will destroy the electronic tag, and by using the opening prevention device to ensure the completeness of the electronic tag, it is possible to prevent the products in the package from being replaced. be able to.

In one embodiment, as shown in FIG. 11, the product traceability anti-counterfeiting device further includes a writing device 300 and a reading device 400.

At the shipping stage, the writing device 300 writes the product information in the electronic tag 200, acquires the first encryption key, and encrypts the product information with the first encryption key.

In the physical distribution transportation stage, the writing device 300 writes the physical distribution information in the electronic tag 200, acquires the second encryption key, and encrypts the physical distribution information by the second encryption key.

At the receiving stage, the reading device 400 acquires the decryption key, reads the target information in the electronic tag 200 with the decryption key, verifies the traceability of the product based on the target information, and each of the decryption keys is the first encryption. Matching with the encryption key and the second encryption key, the target information includes product information or distribution information.

Specifically, when the writing device 300 and the reading device 400 execute the operation, the processing may be performed in combination with the server, and the specific process is as shown above.

In one embodiment, as shown in FIG. 12, the product traceability anti-counterfeiting device further comprises an opening prevention device 500, which destroys the electronic tag 200 when the parcel is opened.

In one embodiment, as shown in FIG. 13, the opening prevention device 500 includes a mechanical opening prevention device 510, and the mechanical opening prevention device 510 is installed at an opening of a parcel packaging a product, and an electronic tag 200 is provided. Is located within the mechanical opening prevention device 510, and when the opening of the parcel is opened, the mechanical opening prevention device 510 destroys the electronic tag 200.

In one embodiment, the mechanical opening prevention device comprises an inner lid, an outer lid and a fixing stopper.

An annular cutting groove and an electronic tag are installed on the upper end surface of the inner lid, the tip of the electronic tag is located inside the annular cutting groove, and the antenna of the electronic tag extends across the annular cutting groove to the periphery of the inner lid. , Fixing teeth are installed on the lower end surface of the inner lid, and a guide mechanism that engages with each other is installed on the lower part of the inner lid and the fixing plug so that the fixing plug rotates along the first direction with respect to the inner lid. , The outer lid is installed outside the inner lid, the cutter is fixed to the lower end surface of the outer lid, the cutter is located in the annular cutting groove, and at least one of the inner lid and the outer lid is screwed into the fixing plug and connected. The closure.

In one embodiment, a first limiting mechanism and a second limiting mechanism are installed between the inner lid and the outer lid, and the first limiting mechanism causes the inner lid to rotate along the first direction with respect to the outer lid. The second limiting mechanism partially prevents the inner lid from rotating along the second direction with respect to the outer lid, and the force applied to the inner or outer lid along the second direction is the initial value. If larger, the inner lid rotates along the second direction with respect to the outer lid.

The product traceability anti-counterfeiting device of the embodiment of the present invention corresponds to the above-mentioned product traceability anti-counterfeiting method, and the technical features and its beneficial effects described in the examples of the above-mentioned product traceability anti-counterfeiting method are all commercial products. Traceability Applies to the examples of anti-counterfeiting devices.

In one embodiment, the traceability anti-counterfeiting method of goods may be applied to a physical distribution transportation scene.

After registering the sealed packaged product on the ledger server manufactured by blockchain technology, when issuing a shipping order, the blockchain issues a shipping statement to the designated carrier link, and each carrier issues its own block. In addition to confirming receipt and continuous shipping in the chain ledger, it will be considered as a packaged product of the technical unit. At the same time, the AES continuous key is authenticated by the blockchain server and sequentially transmitted to the link, for example, after the first contractor authenticates the identity by the blockchain, the order key N held by the blockchain server is transmitted. Use the key to perform a write operation once, and after the operation, the blockchain server transfers the authorized transportation contract responsibility, seals and saves this key, abolishes it, and goes to the next link. Power continuous key N + 1 is transmitted.

Every time the transportation contractor is replaced in the transportation route, a writing operation is performed on the RFID chip using the stage key N + X possessed by the transportation contractor, and the recipient information of the transportation contractor (for example, identification number, GPS information) is performed. , Receiving operator, license plate number, time, etc.) is written in the specified Block, the operation is written in the blockchain server ledger, the responsibility is allowed to occur, the blockchain bookkeeping contract mechanism is formed, and the ledger. Is synchronized with upstream / downstream data.

When the parcel is delivered to the final consignee, the consignee receives the shipping statement and consignee key B from the sender's blockchain server, but uses the consignee's card reader to identify himself at the time of new registration. In combination with a terminal bundling with, the encrypted data in the RFID chip may be read and decrypted, and all information of the sender and each carrier information may be read from the terminal. If the information is confirmed to be correct, the actual temporary key B, key A and the contractor continuous key N, N + 1 ... N + X will expire at the same time after the customer performs the receiving operation, and will be marked as expired in the system and limited. It cannot be used again within the specified deadline, and these keys will be erased after the revocation traceability period.

In the past, inevitably, both the contractor and the final consignee at each stage inspect the packaging for completeness to determine whether to receive the parcel goods according to traditional rules, if the packaging is complete. Furthermore, if the unbroken chip is read and the packaging is destroyed, the responsibility for transporting and storing the parcel goods will be pursued without reading the chip.

The chip is protected by the external packaging and its protective device in transit, and the damage to the chip means that the packaging has been destroyed, the chip protection device has been violently destroyed, or the packaging has been opened prematurely. It means that any situation occurs, which means that the contractor should be liable for any damages to the packaged goods or the contractor's liability, but the system carries it. Limit contract liability to current shipping contractors. The next contractor refuses to receive the goods, marks the parcel goods on the blockchain as the responsibility of the current contractor and promulgates them to the upstream / downstream links, at which time the shipper grasps the anomaly situation. , The parcel goods are exceptionally processed to clarify the responsible person, and the final consignee does not receive the parcel goods that have been damaged or opened.

Such a rule ensures the end-to-end integrity of the technical unit in which the parcel goods are in AES encryption protection as one blockchain bookkeeping and protection of RFID technology protection equipment, and the parcel goods are replaced in the middle. Make it impossible, avoid counterfeiting along the way, and pinpoint the ultimate responsible person for the parcel product.

Logically, each parcel is technically sealed and packaged, making it a directional IoT offline mobile technology unit that cannot be imitated, data cannot be modified, and this technology unit is the blockchain bookkeeping mechanism. By transferring responsibility, the parcel maintenance responsibility is transmitted and changed along with the registration in the route of the technical unit, and a blockchain contract is made.

When specifically applied, as shown in FIG. 14, in process 1, if there is a corresponding e-commerce order, the sender generates a sorting list (BOM) based on the e-commerce order (CO). , Complete BOM picking and boxing. If there is no order for electronic commerce, packaging is performed based on the production BOM information of the producer, the contents of the shipping packaged product BOM, and the like. The data format is determined by the technical service provider and the sender, and must include the sender's valid identity identification information, packaging flow work line production information, BOM, geographic information, etc., and the sender is unique. Random information such as greetings, random gifts, etc. may be defined in, and cannot be changed after these information are registered in the blockchain ledger server arranged by the technical service provider together with the image snapshot information of the sealed package. This information is also synchronized with the blockchain server of the third-party virtual transportation contractor, and both cannot be changed after registration, and the data is synchronized with the client terminal and cannot be changed (synchronization in the blockchain is encrypted / double translation). Unreadable information that cannot be changed at the same time and is unreadable by others except the sender and consignee).

In step 2, based on the data generated by the BOM production packaging, the packet generated in the previous step is combined with the image snapshot data to form a composite packet, which is newly registered and stored in the blockchain server.

In process 3, the key A is generated by using the BOM boxing completion signal as a trigger, combined with the packet generated in the previous process, the main part of the packet is transcribed into an encrypted compression code, and the key A specifies in the system. Encapsulates and writes the RAM Block designated block in the RFID chip owned by the original sender.

Design a more durable logistics packaging box, such as PE / PP plastic or wooden box, attach an RFID chip and a battery with an opening prevention device to the packaging sealing area, and a snap lock device for the normally closed circuit in the alarm circuit. make. Once the box has been opened, unless violence destroys the box and causes irreparable loss, it will thoroughly destroy the RAM portion of the RFID when the snaplock device is opened, chip and circuit board. And will not be damaged. Whether it's a box or a broken chip, both software or physical, the ability to handle anomalous situations immediately and lock the responsibility stage is the completeness of a technically sealed parcel. Ensuring the reliability of sex and process.

As shown in FIG. 15, by connecting to an electronic commerce system, an information terminal of the last user indicated by an order number is acquired at the time of shipping, technical bundling is performed, and information such as a recipient's address or a network communication method is performed. Also got.

The shipping process was initiated by the owner of the technically sealed parcel at this time, which may be the manufacturer or trader.

At this time, they have (1) parcels bundling with e-commerce user orders.

They also have (2) technically hermetically sealed parcels that satisfy the needs of the end user indicated by the order number.

At this time, in the case of situation (1), since the consignee's terminal is technically bundled, the system sends a disposable cryptanalysis key B to the consignee terminal by the blockchain server, and the key B is a pairing key. It can only be used to decrypt the technical sealed packaging unit that contains a specific customer-ordered item pointed to by A.

In the case of situation (2), the terminal bundling activation program is first executed, then the process described above is performed, and this specific technically sealed parcel is used as a legitimate recipient bundling terminal. And form an end-to-end closed-loop connection.

At the same time that the system sends Key B and bundles with the recipient terminal, the sender server sends the continuous key N belonging to Key A to the first contractor, and the blockchain server issues a shipping statement.

If the first carrier reads the count value of the RFID chip as a technical sealed packaging unit parcel and both technical and physical verifications are normal, then the first carrier has Key N. The receipt information is written in the block specified in the system indicated by Key N of the RFID chip, and after the writing is verified, the blockchain server assigned to the first transportation contractor (bundling with the identity of the first transportation contractor). The SAAS server) sends a receipt confirmation notice to the sender blockchain server, which is process 1 in FIG.

When the first contractor transfers the parcel, it sends a shipping statement to the sender (process 2 in FIG. 15), triggers process 3 (see FIG. 15), and the sender server sends the next Key N + 1 to the second. It is sent to the contractor, the second carrier repeats the operation of the first contractor, and after success, it enters process 4 (see FIG. 15) and sends the receipt confirmation to the first contractor. When the current parcel maintenance responsibility status of the 1st and 2nd Contractor Servers changes, it triggers Process 5 and both register the status change in the Shipper Server.

This mechanism runs later until the Xth carrier is responsible for delivering to the consignee as the final contractor, with the last carrier shipping to the consignee and issuing a shipping statement to the shipper server. Until then, the maintenance responsibility status change and process data during this period are all registered and data synchronized with each transportation contractor and sender server at all distribution links. Key N-N + X in the process has a specified number of uses and expiration date, can issue an alarm in advance before the expiration date, and is marked as abnormal in the next data synchronization after the number of uses is used up.

As shown in FIG. 16, after each carrier receives the parcel, assuming that the current contractor is Y, Y first checks to see if the parcel is physically damaged and then physically. If damaged, refuse to receive directly, otherwise read the marking bit on the RFID chip to determine if the technically sealed packaging is complete, determine if it has been tampered with, and everything If it is normal, the receipt is registered, and if not, an abnormal statement is issued and exception handling is started.

The exception handling notifies the previous carrier Y-1 server of the abnormal state, notifies Y-1 that the receipt of this parcel has been refused, and at the same time notifies the sender server.

The maintenance liability is then limited to the contractor Y-1 and the sender sends a protocol compensation claim to Y-1 informing him that the technically sealed packaging unit will expire. Furthermore, after determining that the technical unit is reliably physically or technically damaged (eg, a small probability event such as chip breakage occurs), the shipper abolishes key B of the technical sealed packaging unit. Then, the bundling between Key B and the consignee new registration terminal is released.

Further processing may be returned by the customer or re-shipped by the sender.

As shown in FIG. 17, the final contractor X is responsible for delivering to the consignee, and the specific shipper receives the goods and finally determines the integrity of the goods when starting the shipment. If it is normal to read the card on the mobile terminal, a shipping statement is issued and the statement is sent to the sender's server by the server of the contractor X. At this time, the sender server transmits the registered data image together with the bundling technology unit to the legitimate consignee bundling terminal. At this time, the terminal data is complete and the pre-transmitted data does not include a description of the image, for example the packaging color of the lot.

Prior to that, the sender server sent the technical unit information sealed and packaged in the registered blockchain together with Key B to the legitimate consignee bundling terminal.

When the consignee receives it, the receipt confirmation operation is as follows.

(1) The consignee started the APP or computer program (both by a bundling terminal) and read and received the RFID data in the technical sealed packaging unit parcel with Key B held by NFC or a dedicated card reader. Compare with the data.

(2) Further, the image image data may be displayed for visual comparison.

(3) Operate in APP or client and confirm receipt.

After the consignee receives it, all KeyA, B, N-N + X will be abolished, and the chip will be locked and prohibited. At this time, the chip has already been destroyed.

The packaging is photographed by the video camera attached to the packaging workbench and the packaging workbench software, and if the camera can capture the image of the product, it is verified at the time of receipt. This greatly increases the difficulty and cost of duplication, lacks economic efficiency in duplication work, and does not have mass duplication capacity. It is also possible for a logistics contractor on the way to recall the original image of the goods sealed and packaged via a legitimate interface, which is applied in terms of liability demarcation and goods search.

The packaging stand software system may mark the location, environment, time, and watermark of identity when composing with a video camera, taking "fingerprint" evidence of the image, and other auxiliary verification packaging other than RFID encryption. It is one of the means.

The technical features of the embodiments described above may be arbitrarily combined, and for the sake of brevity, all possible combinations of the technical features of the above embodiments will not be described, but are consistent. To the extent, any combination of these technical features should be considered within the scope of this specification.

As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, all or part of the steps to implement the above embodiment may be programmatically completed by instructing the relevant hardware. The program may be stored in a readable storage medium. The program, at run time, includes the steps described in the above method. The storage medium includes a ROM / RAM, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, and the like.

Some data encryption, data protection steps in the above embodiment may be implemented by AES, RSA, blockchain, the remaining internationally recognized constant encryption algorithms and the remaining post-demonstration constant class blockchain ( For example, it may be protected by a hyperbolic function) technique.

Although the examples described above have described a part of the embodiments of the present invention, the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but is not intended to limit the scope of the invention. It should be noted that a person skilled in the art can make various modifications and improvements without departing from the spirit of the present invention, all of which belong to the scope of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the patent of the present invention should conform to the scope of claims.

Claims (13)

Traceability A method for preventing counterfeiting of products used in writing devices, reading devices, and blockchain servers to prevent counterfeiting.
At the shipping stage, the writing device writes the product information in the electronic tag, acquires the first encryption key, encrypts the product information with the first encryption key, and the electronic tag wraps the product. Along with being installed on or in the parcel, an anti-opening device is further installed, wherein the anti-opening device is a step of destroying the electronic tag when the parcel is opened.
In the physical distribution transportation stage, the writing device writes the physical distribution information in the electronic tag, acquires the second encryption key, encrypts the physical distribution information by the second encryption key, and makes some electronic tags. A step in which a block area is set and used to write the product information and the distribution information, respectively, and the product information and the distribution information written in the electronic tag are read only in combination with the corresponding key .
At the receiving stage, the reading device acquires the decryption key, reads the target information in the electronic tag by the decryption key, verifies the traceability of the product based on the target information, and the decryption key is the first. A step of matching the 1 encryption key and the 2nd encryption key, and the target information including the product information and the distribution information.
Including a step of determining that the traceability of the product has failed when the electronic tag is destroyed.
There are a plurality of the second encryption keys, the distribution transportation stage is divided into a plurality of substages, and the plurality of second encryption keys each have a one-to-one correspondence with the plurality of substages. One encryption key, a plurality of second encryption keys are a key pair generated based on an advanced encryption standard, and a plurality of second encryption keys depend on the first encryption key.
At each sub-stage, the physical distribution information corresponding to the electronic tag is written, the corresponding second encryption key is acquired, and the corresponding physical distribution information is encrypted by the corresponding second encryption key.
In the physical distribution transportation stage, the blockchain server corresponding to the shipping stage transmits the second encryption key N to the blockchain server corresponding to the Nth physical distribution transportation sub-stage, and encrypts the second encryption key N in the Nth physical distribution transportation sub-stage. Later, when the blockchain server corresponding to the Nth physical distribution transportation sub-stage sends a receipt notification to the blockchain server corresponding to the shipping stage and moves from the Nth physical distribution transportation sub-stage to the N + 1 physical distribution transportation sub-stage. In addition, the blockchain server corresponding to the Nth physical distribution transportation sub-stage sends a shipping statement to the blockchain server corresponding to the shipping stage, and the blockchain server corresponding to the shipping stage uses the second encryption key N + 1. Sent to the blockchain server corresponding to the N + 1th logistics transportation substage, where N is a positive integer.
In the physical distribution transportation sub-stage, the marking bit in the electronic tag is read, and if the marking bit is abnormal, the blockchain server corresponding to the current physical distribution transportation sub-stage issues an abnormality statement, and the block corresponding to the previous physical distribution transportation sub-stage. Send to the chain server and the blockchain server corresponding to the shipping stage, and limit the maintenance responsibility to the previous logistics transportation sub-stage.
Product traceability anti-counterfeiting method. The opening prevention device comprises a mechanical opening prevention device, the mechanical opening prevention device is installed at an opening of a parcel packaging a product, and the electronic tag is located in the mechanical opening prevention device. The product traceability anti-counterfeiting method according to claim 1, wherein the mechanical opening prevention device destroys the electronic tag when the opening of the parcel is opened. The mechanical opening prevention device includes an inner lid, an outer lid and a fixing stopper.
An annular cutting groove and the electronic tag are installed on the upper end surface of the inner lid, the tip of the electronic tag is located inside the annular cutting groove, and the antenna of the electronic tag straddles the annular cutting groove of the inner lid. Fixing teeth are installed on the lower end surface of the inner lid extending to the peripheral portion, and the fixing plug is attached to the lower portion of the inner lid and the fixing plug so that the fixing plug rotates along the first direction with respect to the inner lid. A guide mechanism that engages with each other is installed, the outer lid is installed outside the inner lid, a cutter is fixed to the lower end surface of the outer lid, the cutter is located in the annular cutting groove, and the said. The product traceability anti-counterfeiting method according to claim 2, wherein at least one of the inner lid and the outer lid is screwed and connected to the fixing stopper. A first limiting mechanism and a second limiting mechanism are installed between the inner lid and the outer lid, and the first limiting mechanism is such that the inner lid rotates along the first direction with respect to the outer lid. The second limiting mechanism partially prevents the inner lid from rotating along the second direction with respect to the outer lid, and the inner lid or the outer lid along the second direction. The product traceability anti-counterfeiting method according to claim 3, wherein when the applied force is larger than the initial value, the inner lid rotates with respect to the outer lid along the second direction. In addition,
In the shipping stage, a step of acquiring the first encryption key from the blockchain server corresponding to the shipping stage and uploading the product packaging information to the blockchain server corresponding to the shipping stage .
In the logistics transportation stage, the step of acquiring the second encryption key from the blockchain server corresponding to the shipping stage, and
At the receiving stage, the decryption key and the product packaging information are acquired from the blockchain server corresponding to the shipping stage, and the product packaging information is used to compare with the actual product packaging, and the comparison result is for the product. Including the steps used to perform traceability verification,
The parcel includes a directional IoT offline mobile technology unit, which is characterized by transmitting and changing the parcel maintenance responsibility on the blockchain by registration on the route to form a blockchain contract. The traceability counterfeit prevention method for the product according to any one of items 1 to 4 . The product packaging information includes a video slice of the product packaging, and the video slice is for packing the product, sealing the product, writing data on an electronic tag, or taking a picture when inspecting the data. The product traceability counterfeit prevention method according to claim 5 , wherein the product is characterized by the above-mentioned. In addition,
The traceability of the product according to claim 5 , which comprises a step of uploading the physical distribution information to the blockchain server in the physical distribution transportation stage, wherein the physical distribution information includes whether or not the electronic tag is destroyed. Method. A product traceability anti-counterfeiting device comprising the electronic tag according to any one of claims 1 to 7 . Furthermore, it is equipped with a writing device and a reading device.
At the shipping stage, the writing device writes the product information in the electronic tag, acquires the first encryption key, and encrypts the product information with the first encryption key.
In the physical distribution transportation stage, the writing device writes the physical distribution information in the electronic tag, acquires the second encryption key, and encrypts the physical distribution information with the second encryption key.
At the receiving stage, the decryption key of the reading device is acquired, the target information in the electronic tag is read by the decryption key, the traceability verification is performed on the product based on the target information, and the decryption key is the first. The product traceability anti-counterfeiting device according to claim 8 , wherein the target information includes the product information and the distribution information, which matches the encryption key and the second encryption key. The product traceability anti-counterfeiting device according to claim 8 , further comprising an opening prevention device, wherein the opening prevention device destroys the electronic tag when the parcel is opened. The opening prevention device comprises a mechanical opening prevention device, the mechanical opening prevention device is installed at an opening of a parcel packaging a product, and the electronic tag is located in the mechanical opening prevention device. The product traceability anti-counterfeiting device according to claim 8 , wherein the mechanical opening prevention device destroys the electronic tag when the opening of the parcel is opened. The mechanical opening prevention device includes an inner lid, an outer lid and a fixing stopper.
An annular cutting groove and the electronic tag are installed on the upper end surface of the inner lid, the tip of the electronic tag is located inside the annular cutting groove, and the antenna of the electronic tag straddles the annular cutting groove of the inner lid. Fixing teeth are installed on the lower end surface of the inner lid extending to the peripheral portion, and the fixing plug is attached to the lower portion of the inner lid and the fixing plug so that the fixing plug rotates along the first direction with respect to the inner lid. A guide mechanism that engages with each other is installed, the outer lid is installed outside the inner lid, a cutter is fixed to the lower end surface of the outer lid, the cutter is located in the annular cutting groove, and the said. The product traceability anti-counterfeiting device according to claim 11 , wherein at least one of the inner lid and the outer lid is screwed and connected to the fixing stopper. A first limiting mechanism and a second limiting mechanism are installed between the inner lid and the outer lid, and the first limiting mechanism is such that the inner lid rotates along the first direction with respect to the outer lid. The second limiting mechanism partially prevents the inner lid from rotating along the second direction with respect to the outer lid, and the inner lid or the outer lid along the second direction. The product traceability anti-counterfeiting device according to claim 12 , wherein when the applied force is larger than the initial value, the inner lid rotates with respect to the outer lid in the second direction.

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