JP5633984B1 - Unauthorized transaction prevention device, method, and program - Google Patents

Abstract

[PROBLEMS] To prevent illegal transactions with a simple mechanism. A fraudulent transaction preventing apparatus 1 for preventing fraudulent transactions by an access terminal connected to the Internet, wherein a control unit 11 includes unique device information of access terminals 3a to 3n registered at the time of first connection and subsequent times. The device information of the access terminal acquired at the time of connection is compared, and the transaction is controlled according to the comparison result. The control unit 11 transmits a short mail in which the URL of an answer screen for confirming the intention to execute the transaction is embedded to the person who performs the transaction, and executes the transaction by determining the content of the response screen, or interrupts the transaction. To do. [Selection] Figure 1

Description

  The present invention relates to a fraudulent transaction prevention apparatus, method, and program.

  In recent years, so-called “Internet banking”, which can receive various bank services via a computer network such as the Internet, has become widespread.

  For example, as shown in Patent Document 1, Internet banking is an additional service for customers who have ordinary accounts, and in addition to account transactions at ordinary tellers and ATMs (Automated Teller Machines), these are equivalent. Is realized on the Internet. A user who has applied for Internet banking can connect his / her terminal and a financial institution server via the Internet and receive various information services including balance inquiry, deposit / withdrawal details, and transfer / transfer.

JP 2001-350918 A

  By the way, recently, the damage of unauthorized access to the Internet banking and unauthorized remittance has been increasing. Most of them are accessed from personal computers related to viruses that trigger fraudulent remittance, and there are many cases of fraudulent pop-ups displayed on legitimate bank sites to steal IDs and passwords. When the ID or password is stolen, there is a risk that the deposit and savings may be illegally taken by impersonation. Therefore, a countermeasure for this is desired.

  The present invention has been made to solve the above-described problems, and an object of the present invention is to provide a fraudulent transaction prevention apparatus, method, and program capable of preventing fraudulent transactions with a simple mechanism.

  In order to solve the above-described problems, the present invention is an unauthorized transaction prevention apparatus for preventing unauthorized transactions by an access terminal connected to the Internet, and the unique device information of the access terminal registered at the first connection and the next and subsequent times A control unit that compares device information of the access terminal acquired at the time of connection and controls transactions according to the comparison result.

  In the present invention, the control unit transmits a short mail in which a URL of an answer screen for confirming the intention to execute the transaction is embedded to the person who performs the transaction, determines the content of writing on the answer screen, and It is characterized by executing or interrupting a transaction.

  The unauthorized transaction prevention method of the present invention is an unauthorized transaction prevention method for preventing an unauthorized transaction by an access terminal connected to the Internet, and the device information unique to the access terminal registered at the first connection and the subsequent connection Comparing device information of the access terminal acquired at times and controlling a transaction according to the comparison result.

  In addition, the program of the present invention allows a computer to make a transaction according to a procedure for comparing device information unique to an access terminal registered at the first connection with device information of the access terminal acquired at the next and subsequent connections, and the comparison result. And a control procedure is executed.

  According to the present invention, it is possible to provide a fraudulent transaction prevention apparatus, method, and program that can prevent fraudulent transactions with a simple mechanism.

It is a figure which shows an example of a system configuration at the time of applying the fraudulent transaction apparatus of embodiment of this invention to an internet banking system. It is a block diagram which shows the structure of the unauthorized transaction prevention apparatus of embodiment of this invention. It is a flowchart which shows operation | movement of the unauthorized transaction prevention apparatus of embodiment of this invention. It is a figure which shows an example of the screen structure of the unauthorized transaction prevention apparatus of embodiment of this invention. It is a figure which shows an example of the screen structure of the unauthorized transaction prevention apparatus of the modification of this invention. It is the figure which showed an example of the reason display transmitted from an exchange in tabular form. It is a figure which shows an example of the data structure of telephone number usage log | history DB of FIG. It is a figure which shows an example of the data structure of the pattern TBL of FIG.

  DETAILED DESCRIPTION Hereinafter, embodiments for carrying out the present invention (hereinafter simply referred to as embodiments) will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. Note that the same number is assigned to the same element throughout the description of the embodiment.

(Configuration of the embodiment)
FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a system configuration when an unauthorized transaction preventing apparatus 1 of the present embodiment is applied to an Internet banking system. As shown in FIG. 1, the fraudulent transaction prevention apparatus 1 of this embodiment is connected to an IP (Internet Protocol) network 10 together with an Internet banking system 2.

  The Internet banking system 2 includes a banking server 21 disclosed on the Internet and a banking business processing server 22 that is not disclosed on the Internet. The banking server 21 and the business processing server 22 are connected to a contract information DB 23 that has already made an Internet banking contract and holds a login ID and password for that purpose. The business processing server 22 is also connected to a bank account system 24 so that a customer information DB 25 connected to the account system 24 can be referred to.

  Here, the customer is a user who has a transaction account and has been issued a bank passbook or cash card by a bank. The IP network 10 is connected to an unspecified number of access terminals 3a to 3n including users who can access the Internet banking system 2. The access terminals 3a to 3n are a smart phone, a mobile phone terminal having an Internet connection environment, a PC, a bank CD machine, or the like. The access terminals 3a to 3n are also connected to a public network 20 or an ISDN (Integrated Service Digital Network) network 30 for a telephone number usage status investigation described later.

  The fraudulent transaction prevention apparatus 1 according to the present embodiment includes a system bus on which a control unit 11, a storage unit 12, a communication unit 13, and an input / output unit 14 are mounted with a plurality of lines for address, data, and control. 15 is commonly connected.

  The control unit 11 compares the unique device information of the access terminals 3a to 3n registered at the first connection with the device information of the access terminals 3a to 3n acquired at the next and subsequent connections, and controls the transaction according to the comparison result. To do. In addition, the control unit 11 transmits a short mail embedded with a URL (Uniform Resource Locator) of a response screen for confirming the intention of executing the transaction to the person who performs the transaction, and determines the content of writing on the response screen. The transaction may be executed or interrupted.

  The storage unit 12 is mounted with a semiconductor memory such as a DRAM, SRAM, or flash, for example, a telephone number history information database (DB), a pattern table (TBL), which will be described later, and a unique registration device for the access terminals 3a to 3n. Information is temporarily stored. The communication unit 13 controls a communication interface with the IP network 10, the public network 20, and the ISDN network 30, and the input / output unit 14 is a keyboard and a display that control a man machine with the control unit 11. The input / output unit 14 issues commands and inputs data to the control unit 11, or outputs information generated by the control unit 11.

  As shown in detail in FIG. 2, the control unit 11 includes communication network interface units 111 and 112, a device information registration unit 113, a request acquisition unit 114, a device information determination unit 115, and a message exchange control unit 116. And a transaction processing unit 117. The communication network interface unit 111 is an interface unit that performs communication with the IP network 10 based on, for example, TCP / IP (Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol), and the communication network interface unit 112 includes the public network 20 or It is an interface unit that communicates with the ISDN network 30.

  The device information registration unit 113 has a function of registering device information acquired from the access terminals 3a to 3n at the first access of Internet banking, and the registered device information is stored in the storage unit 12 (DB: Database). The information is temporarily stored and output to the device information determination unit 115. The device information is, for example, a MAC (Physical Address: Media Access Control Address) address unique to the access terminals 3a to 3n. At this time, the device information determination unit 115 determines whether the access terminal (for example, 13a) from which the remittance request is generated. When it is determined that it is not device information of the user's own access terminal 13a, the transaction processing unit 117 is controlled so as to interrupt the remittance process by transfer.

  When receiving a remittance processing request by transfer from the access terminals 3a to 3n, the request acquisition unit 114 captures the request and collects device information from the requested access terminals 3a to 3n and outputs the device information to the device information determination unit 115. . When the request acquisition unit 114 captures the remittance processing request from the access terminals 3a to 3n, the message exchange control unit 116, under the control of the device information determination unit 115, accesses the access terminals 3a to 3 having the regular account owner's telephone number. A short message in which the URL of the answer screen for confirming the will of the person in response to the request for remittance is embedded is transmitted to 3n, and the remittance process by transfer is controlled by determining the contents of writing on the answer screen.

  The transaction processing unit 117 performs remittance in response to a remittance processing request issued from any of the access terminals 3a to 3n under the control of the device information determination unit 115 via the communication network interface unit 111. The actual transfer is processed in cooperation with the Internet banking system 2.

(Operation of the embodiment)
Hereinafter, the basic operation of the control unit 11 of the unauthorized transaction preventing apparatus 1 shown in FIG. 1 will be described with reference to the flowchart of FIG. 3.

  First, the control unit 11 performs registration processing of device information of the acquired access terminals 3a to 3n when Internet banking is used for the first time (step S101 “YES”) (step S109). The device information here is information (MAC address) unique to the accessed access terminals 3a to 3n. When the device information registration unit 113 receives the initial access request via the IP network 10, the device information registration unit 113 collects device information of the corresponding access terminals 3 a to 3 n and stores the device information in a predetermined area of the storage unit 12.

  The request acquisition unit 114 constantly monitors transaction requests (transfers) by transfer issued by the access terminals 3a to 3n, and determines the presence or absence of the request coming via the communication network interface unit 111 (step S102). ). If it is determined that there is a transaction request (step S102 “YES”), the request acquisition unit 114 further determines whether it is due to Internet banking. If the request is based on Internet banking, the request acquisition unit 114 collects device information from the requested access terminals 3a to 3n together with the request and outputs the device information to the device information determination unit 115 (step S103).

  The device information determination unit 115 refers to a predetermined area of the storage unit 12 and determines whether the device information is registered device information already registered by the device information registration unit 113 (step S104). If the device information is already registered (step S104 “YES”), the device information determination unit 115 controls the transaction processing unit 117 to execute a remittance process by a normal transaction by transfer (step S107).

  On the other hand, when the device information is unregistered (step S104 “NO”), the device information determination unit 115 activates the message exchange control unit 116, and the message exchange control unit 116 confirms that the registered regular account owner is registered. A short message addressed to the telephone number and embedded with the URL of the answer screen for confirming the will of the person is generated and transmitted (step S105).

  Here, the URL is a button switch for guiding YES / NO on the bank homepage with a single touch in order to confirm that the transaction is an instruction of the authorized account holder. For example, as shown in Fig. 4 (a), send a short email to the account owner's mobile phone such as "Is the transfer right now? If there are no mistakes, please click the URL below" In addition, as shown in FIG. 4 (b), on the bank homepage transfer screen displayed on the input / output unit 14 of the access terminals 3a to 3n, “Now, a confirmation email is displayed on your mobile phone. If the transfer is the person, please respond within 1 minute. " This short email also serves as a check for fraudulent transactions. It should be noted that, for example, “XX bank. Money ZZZZ has just been transferred from your account number YYYYY. There is no mistake. You may substitute a voice response by telephone such as “Please call us at ○○○○”.

  Subsequently, if there is a click response within 1 minute (confirmation response by the user) (step S106 “YES”), the device information determination unit 115 controls the transaction processing unit 117 to execute normal transaction processing by transfer. However, if there is no confirmation response by the user (step S106 “NO”), the remittance process by transfer is interrupted or the account cannot be withdrawn (step S108).

  FIG. 4C illustrates a bank homepage transfer screen displayed on the input / output unit 14 of the requested access terminals 3a to 3n when there is no confirmation response within one minute. Here, "Your transfer has been interrupted. Please call us as soon as possible" is displayed.

  As described above, according to the fraudulent transaction prevention apparatus 1 of the present embodiment, the remittance process is not executed unless the automatically acquired device information matches that at the time of registration. Therefore, fraudulent remittance can be prevented with a simple mechanism in Internet banking. In addition, when the above fraud is performed, the process is temporarily interrupted, and if the access terminals 3a to 3n are mobile phones, the message in characters is confirmed. If the bank CD terminal is used, the message is confirmed by voice or characters. As soon as the willingness of remittance is instructed by the person, a predetermined transfer procedure is started. In this case, since the spoofer does not have the telephone number of the account owner, the fraudulent acts can be prevented beforehand.

(Modification)
In addition, according to the above-described fraudulent transaction preventing apparatus 1 of the present embodiment, only the case where it is applied to Internet banking is illustrated, but it may be applied to an application in Internet shopping or the like. In this case, the control unit 11 monitors the product application via the Internet, registers the device information at the first application, compares it with the device information acquired at the next application, executes the application process when they match, and does not match In the case of, send a confirmation short email to the registered phone number of the account holder. If there is no confirmation response by clicking on the account owner within a predetermined time, the application process is interrupted.

  FIGS. 5A, 5B, and 5C show screen configuration examples of the unauthorized transaction preventing apparatus 1 according to the above-described modification. As shown in FIG. 5 (a), the control unit 11 sends a short mail to the person's mobile phone such as "Is the application right now? If there are no mistakes, please click the following URL". As shown in FIG. 5 (b), on the bank homepage transfer screen displayed on the input / output unit 14 of the access terminals 3a to 3n, “Now, a confirmation email is displayed on your mobile phone. If the application is for yourself, please respond within one minute. " FIG. 5C illustrates a bank homepage transfer screen displayed on the input / output unit 14 of the requested access terminals 3a to 3n when there is no confirmation response within one minute. Here, “Your application has been suspended. Please call us as soon as possible” is displayed.

  According to the above-described modification, the device information is registered at the time of the initial application. However, since the number of access terminals 3a to 3n to be used is not limited to one, there is a possibility of using, for example, PC or smart It is preferable to register in advance one or more access terminals 3a to 3n such as a phone. In this case, the control unit 11 registers the device information of the access terminals 3a to 3n that have been accessed within a certain period from the initial access, and thereafter accesses the access terminals 3a to 3n that have never been used in the past. On the other hand, it may be determined that the application is fraudulent and processing for interrupting the application may be executed. This is the same when applied to the above-described Internet banking of the present embodiment.

(Effect of embodiment)
As described above, according to the fraudulent transaction prevention apparatus 1 of the present embodiment, when the access terminal 3a to 3n that is the request source is not the device information of the user's own access terminal, the remittance process by transfer or the sale by application By restricting etc., unauthorized transactions can be prevented with a simple mechanism. In addition, when the above fraud is performed, the registered person is confirmed by a short mail and a predetermined transaction is started as soon as the intention of the person is confirmed. If it is impersonated at this time, since it does not have the telephone number of the person, these fraudulent acts can be prevented.

  The present invention is effective in preventing spoofing in various transactions such as various applications deployed on Internet sites such as banks, credit companies, mail order companies, airlines, etc., merchandise sales, financial transactions, public organization certificate requests, etc. Applicable to.

  In the above-described fraudulent transaction preventing apparatus 1 according to the present embodiment, when transmitting a confirmation short mail, the control unit 11 determines in advance whether or not the destination telephone number is currently valid. Allow sending only to For this reason, erroneous transmission and transmission errors are avoided as much as possible, and a short message can be transmitted accurately. Moreover, according to the unauthorized transaction preventing apparatus 1 of the present embodiment, for example, it becomes a three-month intermittent number with a fixed telephone, and thereafter used by a third party, or with a mobile phone for six months. If it is intermittent and then repeated by a third party for more than a year, sending a short mail addressed to the currently valid phone number is prohibited except for rental phones such as prepaid phones. By doing so, it is effective from the viewpoint of preventing information leakage as well as complying with the law (law concerning the appropriateness of transmission of specific e-mail (specific e-mail law)). Each carrier is not allowed to rent a phone number to a third party for 3 consecutive months on a landline phone or 6 months on a mobile phone when the phone is cancelled. In this case, the rules are limited to the same holder. Therefore, in the meantime, if the missing numbers continue, and if it is subsequently determined that they exist, it can be determined that the third party is using them.

  Whether the telephone number is valid or not is determined by the control unit 11 collecting JT-Q931 (Layer 3) information using a call control message with a calling side exchange (not shown). . The control unit 11 obtains an effective nationwide telephone number that changes every moment, including a telephone number that is not listed in the telephone directory, by automatic calling via the ISDN network 30, and reason identification information that indicates the usage status of the telephone number, and transfer The destination telephone number is stored in a predetermined area of the storage unit 12 as a telephone number use history information database together with the survey date. The control unit 11 determines whether or not the designated telephone number is currently valid based on the most recent telephone number usage history information accumulated in the telephone number usage history information DB, for example, for two months. Here, the designated telephone number is a registered telephone number possessed by a legitimate account holder.

  FIG. 6 shows a typical example of reason identification information (reason display) returned from an exchange not shown when a telephone number is transmitted on the ISDN network 30. The reason indication from the switch follows the basic call control procedure for circuit-switched calls defined in JT-Q931 by the TTC (Telephone and Telephone Technical Committee) standard based on CCITT (International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee) recommendation. NTT publishes a reason display in technical data of INS (Information Network System) net service. The control unit 11 collects JT-Q931 (Layer 3) information using a call control message with the exchange. The reason display from the exchange includes “001: missing number”, “016: normal”, “022: subscriber number change”, “028: invalid number”, and the like. At the same time, the survey date, time, and the like are accumulated and stored as a telephone number use history information DB in a DB assigned to a predetermined area on the storage unit 200.

  In addition to “in-use telephone number” and “unused telephone number”, the reason display from the switchboard is broadly classified as “A: a telephone number that can be removed even if it is in use”, “B: unused. Even if it is a phone number (telephone number during message guidance for relocation), (telephone number during message guidance for contact) "," C: phone number during message guidance for wrong number message ", (guidance for messages not currently used) Phone number) ”,“ D: phone number that has been used this time from an unused phone number in the previous survey ”, and the like. The collected “telephone number”, “reason display”, “year / month / day”, “time”, and the like at the time of the collected investigation are stored in the telephone number use history information DB, and the control unit 11 performs this process periodically. Or it can construct | assemble as telephone number use log | history information DB by performing at any time.

  FIG. 7 illustrates the data structure of the telephone number use history information DB. According to FIG. 7, (a) shows the result of the investigation of the telephone number “a” of the carrier A that exists (valid) in the investigations from the past to the present. (B) is the result of the investigation of the telephone number “b” of the carrier B that exists in the past and is in the relocation state (the relocation destination telephone number is “09063782475”) in the latest investigation on June 22, 2011. (C) is a survey result of the telephone number “c” of the carrier C that is “existing” in the past and sandwiches the “relocation” (the telephone number of the relocation destination is “080515157195”) and is currently missing. (D) is the result of the investigation of the telephone number “d” of the carrier D that has existed in the past but is currently missing. (E) is the result of the investigation of the telephone number “e” of the carrier E that has actually existed and missing numbers in the past and has existed for the past several months.

  Here, the case of FIG.7 (e) is illustrated, For example, the short mail created with respect to the contract user (access terminal 3a-3n) which existed (valid) before February 2010 and was registered into the system is shown. A supplementary explanation will be given for transmission. In this case, the access terminals 3a to 3n have been invalidated for 6 months or more from April 4, 2010, have existed since December 29, 2010, and are valid again. This means that the owners of the access terminals 3a to 3n have been changed. Therefore, the transmission of short mail should be prohibited. However, if it is judged only based on the most recent usage history about two months ago or the current usage status, a short mail is erroneously transmitted. However, as described above, such erroneous transmission of mail can be avoided by referring to the history of the past several years. However, if it is a contract user (user terminal 50) registered after December 29, 2010, transmission of a short mail is permitted.

  In addition, according to the “Act on the Appropriate Transmission of Specified E-mails (Specified E-mail Law)” established in 2002 and revised on June 6, 2008, e-mail without prior consent from the recipient All transmissions become spam and violate the law, and there is a risk of incidents such as information leaks. On the other hand, by referring to the history of the past few years by the above phone number history survey, it is temporarily prohibited to send a short mail addressed to a phone number that is invalid for more than 6 months and is currently valid on a mobile phone. Therefore, it is effective from the viewpoint of information leakage prevention as well as compliance with the above laws. Each carrier is not allowed to rent a phone number to a third party for 3 consecutive months on a landline phone or 6 months on a mobile phone when the phone is cancelled. In this case, the rules are limited to the same holder. Therefore, in the meantime, if the missing numbers continue, and if it is subsequently determined that they exist, it can be determined that the third party is using them.

  The fraudulent transaction preventing apparatus 1 of the present embodiment further reads the telephone number history information from the telephone number usage history information DB, and connects to the exchange not shown in the figure with the transmission capability of either voice or unrestricted digital information. The call response information based on the call is determined with reference to the call response information based on the call, and the call response information collected by the call based on the determined condition of the current call is transmitted to the telecommunications carrier and the telephone number. Analyzes based on call response information that is pre-patterned for each group and terminal, whether the phone number is valid, and if the phone number by the number portability service is used It also has the function of determining the nearest telecommunications carrier.

  An example of the data structure of the pattern table used for this purpose is shown in FIG. 8. Specifically, the determination result 10a at the time of (a) current call and (b) at the previous call, the call Each data item of the condition 10b and the call response information 10c is assigned and stored. Here, as a determination result 10a, a telecommunications carrier (A / B / C / D), a determination status (real / missing number / relocation / removal, etc.), a learning flag indicating whether or not a re-call (retry) is required (currently issued) Learning only as a call (prohibited: 0, allowed: 1)). In addition, as the telecommunications carrier A, for example, NTT Docomo (registered trademark), B, for example, e-mobile company (registered trademark), as C, for example, Softbank (registered trademark), as D, for example, KDDI (registered trademark) is assumed. Further, the call condition 10b includes a telephone number pattern and a call setting pattern, and the call response information 10c includes “response message”, “generation source”, “reason display value”, “new telephone number”, “billing result” "including.

  The unauthorized transaction preventing apparatus 1 of the present embodiment may be connected to an exchange prepared for each telecommunications carrier via an exchange provided between dedicated lines of telecommunications companies not shown. Although not shown in the figure, line connection is also made via a switch to a general public line switch for fixed telephones such as NTT (registered trademark) and a PHS switch such as air edge (registered trademark). The fraudulent transaction preventing apparatus 1 according to the present embodiment collects data of a large number of subscriber telephone numbers regularly or collectively at any specified time, and all telephone numbers existing in the country in the telephone number usage history information DB. Store information. In other words, the telephone number distributed to the communication company approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is stored in the telephone number use history information DB, and the telephone numbers allocated to fixed telephones, mobile phone terminals, PHS terminals, etc. are valid (in use). / Investigate the most recent telecommunications carrier when using invalid (not used) and number portability services. These latest survey results are reflected in the telephone number use history information DB.

  The fraudulent transaction prevention apparatus 1 according to the present embodiment performs a periodic survey such as once a month or once every two months. The contents to be investigated are “communication capability”, “response message” in accordance with the description of JT-Q931 “ISDN user / network interface layer 3” of TTC standard published by NTT East as a result of telephone number transmission on a digital telephone line, The call response information consisting of “reason display” and “generation source” is collected through the exchange, and immediately after the collection, the telephone line is immediately disconnected. Therefore, there is no telephone conversation with the other party of the telephone number, and the telephone ring is not ringed. All the telephone numbers stored in the telephone number use history information DB are investigated, and the call response information including the reason display is found corresponding to each telephone number. Number (new telephone number) "etc. can be recorded in the telephone number use history information DB by a predetermined procedure. Further, by periodically conducting this investigation and accumulating the telephone number change information, the telephone number usage history in the telephone number usage history information DB is enhanced.

  The applicant has found that there is a difference between the call answering information for each telecommunications carrier or a specific telephone number group, and there is a certain rule regarding the mobile phone number. In addition, when calling was repeated for all terminal models sold by each telecommunications carrier, it was also found that there was a difference in the call response information for each terminal model. It has also been found that there is a certain rule in the call response information when a call is made with the transmission capability set to “unrestricted” and when a call is made with “voice” set.

  From this, the applicant repeatedly made a call by experiment, collected response signals for telecommunications carrier judgment, and patterned them. Specifically, when the transmission capability is set to “unlimited” for the first call, “voice” is set for the second call, and the first call response information and the second call response information at this time are Patterned. Here, the reason why the transmission capability is set to “unrestricted” in the first call is because the terminal does not ring or does not receive a call. If the ringing and the incoming call rate are ignored, even if the call is “unlimited” after “voice”, patterning is possible, so that the same effect is naturally obtained.

  In some cases, the same effect can be obtained by making a call by selecting “voice” as the transmission capability and patterning the call response information. The call at this time is only once. For example, when the telephone number pattern is 0806271XXXX and the call response information is “response message: disconnection, generation source: RN, reason display: temporary failure”, the telephone number is valid (“real”) and the telecommunications business The person is limited to Company D. For example, when the call response information is “response message: disconnection, generation source: TN, reason display: no partner route”, the telephone number is valid and the telecommunications carrier is limited to company A. In addition, when the call response information is “response message: disconnection, generation source: TN, reason display: no subscriber”, the telephone number is valid (“real”), and the latest telecommunications carrier is limited to company D Is done. Further, when the call response information is “response message: disconnection, generation source: RN, reason display: other service or optional unavailable class”, the telephone number is invalid (“removal convenience”) and the latest telecommunication The company is limited to Company A. In this way, the applicant constructed a pattern table by patterning the above rules from millions of experiments.

  The above-described accumulation of telephone number usage histories, telephone number usage status surveys, and transmission of short mails are disclosed in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2013, filed on April 6, 2012 by the applicant and published on May 23, 2013. -102414 and JP 2012-129869 filed on Dec. 16, 2010 and published on Jul. 5, 2012.

  As mentioned above, although preferred embodiment of this invention was explained in full detail, it cannot be overemphasized that the technical scope of this invention is not limited to the range as described in the said embodiment. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications or improvements can be added to the above-described embodiments. Further, it is apparent from the scope of the claims that the embodiments added with such changes or improvements can be included in the technical scope of the present invention.

  DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 ... Unauthorized transaction prevention apparatus, 2 ... Internet banking system, 3a-3n ... Access terminal, 10 ... IP network, 11 ... Control part, 12 ... Memory | storage part, 13 ... Communication part, 14 ... Input / output part, 15 ... System bus 20 ... Public network, 21 ... Internet banking server, 22 ... Business processing server, 23 ... Contract information DB, 24 ... Account system, 25 ... Customer information DB, 30 ... ISDN network, 111, 112 ... Communication network interface unit, 113 ... Device information registration unit, 114 ... Request acquisition unit, 115 ... Device information determination unit, 116 ... Message exchange control unit, 117 ... Transaction processing unit

Claims (3)

An unauthorized transaction prevention device for preventing unauthorized transactions by an access terminal connected to the Internet,
A control unit that performs registration processing of device-specific device information acquired at the time of initial connection in a predetermined area of the storage unit;
A device information determination unit that refers to a predetermined area of the storage unit and determines whether or not the device information of the access terminal acquired at the time of subsequent connection is the registered device information;
When the device information determination unit determines that the device information of the access terminal is unregistered , the transaction is executed when there is no change in the owner of the registered telephone number for the mobile phone of the person who performs the transaction. Message exchange in which a short mail in which the URL of the answer screen for confirming the will is embedded is transmitted and that the confirmation mail is transmitted to the mobile phone of the person performing the transaction on the screen displayed on the access terminal A control unit,
The controller suspends the transaction when there is no confirmation response of the intention confirmation within a predetermined time, and displays that the transaction is suspended on a screen displayed on the access terminal. Transaction prevention device. An unauthorized transaction prevention method for preventing unauthorized transactions by an access terminal connected to the Internet,
A step of performing registration processing in a predetermined area with device information unique to the access terminal acquired at the time of first connection;
Determining whether or not the device information of the access terminal acquired at the next or subsequent connection is registered device information that is already registered with reference to the predetermined area;
If it is determined in the determining step that the device information of the access terminal is unregistered , the transaction is executed if there is no change in the owner of the registered telephone number for the mobile phone of the person who performs the transaction. Sending a short email in which the URL of an answer screen for intention confirmation is embedded, and displaying on the screen displayed on the access terminal that the confirmation email has been sent to the mobile phone of the person performing the transaction;
A step of suspending the transaction when there is no confirmation response of the intention confirmation within a predetermined time, and displaying that the transaction is suspended on a screen displayed on the access terminal. Transaction prevention method. On the computer,
A step of the unique device information of the luer access terminal is acquired during initial connection performs registration processing in a predetermined area,
A procedure for referring to the predetermined area and determining whether or not the device information of the access terminal acquired at the time of subsequent connection is the registered device information;
If the device information of the access terminal at the determined procedure is determined to be unregistered, taken of the person performing the argument phone transactions executed if there is no change of the owner of the phone number already registered for A procedure for sending a short email in which the URL of an answer screen for intention confirmation is embedded, and for displaying on the screen displayed on the access terminal that the confirmation email has been sent to the mobile phone of the person performing the transaction;
A program for interrupting the transaction and displaying on the screen displayed on the access terminal that the transaction has been interrupted when there is no confirmation response of the intention confirmation within a predetermined time .

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