JP4876156B2 - Electronic device, game machine, main control board, peripheral board, authentication method and authentication program - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to an electronic device, a gaming machine, a main control board, a peripheral board, an authentication method, and an authentication program that include a plurality of boards and authenticate communication between these boards.

  Conventionally, in an electronic apparatus having a plurality of substrates, various techniques have been proposed for preventing fraud on these substrates. As an electronic device provided with a plurality of substrates, for example, there is a pachinko gaming machine. The pachinko gaming machine includes a main control board that controls the operation of the entire electronic device, and a controlled board (peripheral part) that operates each part of the electronic device. The main control board outputs a control signal including a control command to the peripheral part, and the other peripheral parts have a function of executing an operation according to the control signal transmitted from the main control board.

  Examples of frauds with respect to the main control board include a method of replacing a regular main control board with an illegal control board, or altering a program code that defines processing performed by the main control board. In order to prevent such fraud, for example, a technique has been proposed in which program data recorded in a ROM mounted on the main control board is checked by a ROM checker to prevent illegal exchange of the ROM ( For example, see the following Patent Document 1.)

JP 11-333108 A

  However, according to the technique disclosed in Patent Document 1 described above, although falsification of program data can be detected, it is possible to prevent an unauthorized control board from being connected between a regular main control board and a controlled board. Can not. For this reason, there is a problem that the controlled substrate performs unauthorized control by the control signal output from the unauthorized control substrate.

  Here, a fraud prevention technique according to the prior art will be described with reference to FIGS. 17 and 18. FIG. 17 is an explanatory diagram showing an outline of a fraud prevention technique according to the prior art. FIG. 18 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of inserting an unauthorized control board. As shown in FIG. 17, the regular main control board 1701 outputs a regular control signal RS to the peripheral board 1702 to control the operation of the peripheral board 1702. A regular main control board 1701 is provided with an inspection port 1703. The program data recorded in the ROM or the like provided inside the regular main control board 1701 is inspected from the inspection port 1703 to inspect whether the regular main control board 1701 is fraudulent.

  However, as shown in FIG. 18, an unauthorized control board 1801 may be inserted between the regular main control board 1701 and the peripheral board 1702. The unauthorized control board 1801 discards or ignores the regular control signal RS output from the regular main control board 1701 and outputs the unauthorized control signal FS to the peripheral board 1702 instead. Here, the peripheral board 1702 cannot determine whether the input signal is the normal control signal RS or the illegal control signal FS. For this reason, there is a problem that the peripheral board 1702 operates in accordance with an unauthorized control signal FS.

  Further, since the inspection port 1703 is provided only on the regular main control board 1701, even if the inspection using the inspection port 1703 is performed, the inspection result for the process in the regular main control board 1701 is returned. . For this reason, there is a problem that even if an inspection using the inspection port 1703 is performed, unauthorized control by the unauthorized control board 1801 cannot be detected.

  In order to solve the above-described problems caused by the prior art, the present invention prevents an unauthorized control board from being connected between a regular main control board and a peripheral portion, and can be applied to electronic devices such as pachinko machines. An object is to provide an electronic device, a gaming machine, a main control board, a peripheral board, an authentication method, and an authentication program that can prevent fraud.

  In order to solve the above-described problems and achieve the object, an electronic device according to the invention of claim 1 includes a main control unit and a peripheral unit that performs predetermined processing based on a control command transmitted by the main control unit. The main control unit includes: data storage means for storing predetermined data; and an amount of the data used to generate a calculation value transmitted together with an operation test value of the main control unit (hereinafter referred to as “the amount of data”). The data storage means is divided into the data amount, and the divided data is subjected to a binary operation satisfying the combining law for each of the divided data. The operation value generation means for generating the operation value for the number of the data (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”) and the operation check value of the main control unit are output along with the transmission of the control command. A synchronization code generating means for generating a synchronization code including packet information, a time measuring means for measuring a free run independently of other means, and information on the time measured from the time measuring means at a specified timing. A relative time code generating means for generating the included relative time code, and a transmission means for transmitting the calculation value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code for the number of divisions to the peripheral portion, the peripheral portion being Receiving means for receiving the calculated value for the number of divisions, the relative time code, and the synchronization code, a calculation result obtained by performing the binary operation on the calculated values for the number of divisions, and the data storage Determining means for determining whether or not the values obtained by performing the binary operation on all the data in the means (hereinafter referred to as “expected values”) match; Operation authentication means for authenticating the operation order of the main control section using the difference of the packet information included in the network, and authenticating the operation order of the main control section using the relative time code, and the operation authentication means And a command authenticating unit that authenticates a control command transmitted by the main control unit when both the authentication using the synchronization code and the authentication using the relative time code are established. The generation unit determines the type of the packet information used for generation of the synchronization code based on the number of divisions, and the operation authentication unit is determined by the determination unit to match the calculated value and the expected value. In this case, the type of the packet information is specified based on the number of the operation values that are the targets of the binary operation, and authentication using the synchronization code is performed. And features.

  According to the first aspect of the present invention, the main control unit determines the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code based on the number of data divisions in the data storage means. Since the number of divisions is a value known only by the main control unit, the unauthorized analyst cannot specify the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code. Thereby, when an unauthorized control unit is inserted between the main control unit and the peripheral unit, it is possible to detect fraud by checking the synchronization code.

  According to the first aspect of the present invention, the amount of data used for generating the calculation value is determined instead of determining the number of divisions itself. For this reason, the possibility that the number of divisions is illegally stolen can be reduced.

  Furthermore, according to the invention of claim 1, the peripheral unit authenticates the operation order of the main control unit using two types of codes, a synchronization code and a relative time code. By performing authentication processing twice using two types of codes, it is possible to improve the strength of authentication and prevent unauthorized processing by an unauthorized control command. Further, by authenticating the operation sequence of the main control unit, the continuity of the operation of the main control unit can be authenticated, and for example, an unauthorized control unit equipped with a signal switching circuit or the like can be detected.

  An electronic device according to a second aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to the first aspect, wherein the synchronization code generation means includes the packet information continuously output with the transmission of the control command, and the control. The synchronization code is generated using any one of the packet information output at predetermined intervals with the transmission of the command.

  According to the second aspect of the present invention, it is possible to generate a synchronization code using packet information having different correlations.

  According to a third aspect of the present invention, in the electronic device according to the first or second aspect, the determining unit determines the data amount for each of the calculated values, and the calculated value generating unit includes: The calculation value is generated using the data corresponding to the data amount determined for each calculation value.

  According to the third aspect of the present invention, the amount of data can be determined every time each calculation value is generated. Thereby, compared with the case where the data amount is determined in advance, the possibility that the number of divisions is illegally stolen can be further reduced.

  The electronic device according to a fourth aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to third aspects, wherein the transmission means transmits the calculated value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code to the control command. And is transmitted to the peripheral portion.

  According to the fourth aspect of the present invention, an increase in communication load between the main control unit and the peripheral unit can be suppressed as compared with the case where the calculated value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code are transmitted alone. According to the invention of claim 4, compared to the case where the synchronization code or the relative time code is transmitted alone, the possibility that these data are extracted from the communication data and analyzed is reduced. it can.

  According to a fifth aspect of the present invention, in the electronic device according to the fourth aspect, at least one of the calculated value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code is at least a part of the control command. It is generated using.

  According to the invention of claim 5, it is possible to reduce the possibility that the generation method of the calculation value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code is analyzed or the data is reused.

  An electronic device according to a sixth aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to fifth aspects, wherein the main control unit sets the calculated value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code to a predetermined value. Further comprising an encryption means for encrypting by an encryption method, wherein the transmission means transmits the operation value, the synchronization code and the relative time code encrypted by the encryption means; The apparatus further comprises decryption means for decrypting the encrypted operation value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code by a decryption method corresponding to the encryption method, and the determination means and the operation authentication means include the decryption means The determination and the authentication are performed using the calculated value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code decoded by the conversion unit.

  According to the sixth aspect of the present invention, when an operation value, a synchronization code, or a relative time code is illegally stolen by an unauthorized analyst, the generation method of these data is analyzed, or these data are reused. The possibility of being reduced can be reduced.

  According to a seventh aspect of the present invention, in the electronic device according to the sixth aspect, the encryption unit changes the encryption method according to the number of divisions, and the decryption unit determines the determination. The decoding method is changed on the basis of the number of the operation values subjected to the binary operation when the operation result matches the expected value by means.

  According to the invention of claim 7, the fraud analyst cannot know the switching timing of the encryption method, and the generation method of the calculation value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code is analyzed, or these data are regenerated. The possibility of being used can be further reduced.

  An electronic device according to an eighth aspect of the invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to seventh aspects, wherein the synchronization code generation means is a remainder when the division number is divided by a specific value. And determining the type of the packet information based on the number of remainders obtained by dividing the number of the operation values by the specific value. .

  An electronic device according to a ninth aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to seventh aspects, wherein the synchronization code generating means is based on a difference between the previous division number and the current division number. The type of packet information is determined, and the operation authentication means determines the type of packet information based on a difference between the number of the calculated values at the previous authentication and the number of the calculated values at the current authentication. It is characterized by specifying.

  According to the eighth and ninth aspects of the present invention, when the type of packet information is determined, the arithmetic processing is performed on the number of divisions, so that the correspondence between the number of divisions and the packet information to be used becomes complicated. Accordingly, it is possible to transmit an authentication value that is more difficult to analyze by an unauthorized analyst.

  An electronic device according to a tenth aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to ninth aspects, wherein the data storage means stores program data used in the main control unit. To do.

  According to the tenth aspect of the present invention, it is possible to detect unauthorized rewriting of the program code recorded in the main control unit or unauthorized replacement of the data storage means of the main control unit.

  An electronic device according to an eleventh aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to tenth aspects, wherein the binary operation is an addition or exclusive OR operation.

  According to the eleventh aspect of the present invention, addition or exclusive OR operation can be switched and used as the binary operation used to generate the operation value.

  A gaming machine according to a twelfth aspect of the present invention includes the electronic device according to any one of the first to eleventh aspects, wherein the main control unit is a main control board, and the peripheral portion is a peripheral board. It is characterized by that.

  According to the twelfth aspect of the invention, the main control board determines the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code based on the number of data divisions in the data storage means. Since the number of divisions is a value known only by the main control board, the unauthorized analyst cannot specify the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code. As a result, when an illegal control board is inserted between the main control board and the peripheral board, the illegality can be detected by collating the synchronization code.

  According to the twelfth aspect of the invention, the amount of data used for generating the calculation value is determined instead of determining the division number itself. For this reason, the possibility that the number of divisions is illegally stolen can be reduced.

  According to the twelfth aspect of the invention, the peripheral board authenticates the operation sequence of the main control board using two types of codes, a synchronization code and a relative time code. By performing authentication processing twice using two types of codes, it is possible to improve the strength of authentication and prevent unauthorized processing by an unauthorized control command. Further, by authenticating the operation sequence of the main control board, it is possible to authenticate the continuity of the operation of the main control board. For example, an unauthorized control board equipped with a signal switching circuit or the like can be detected.

  A main control board according to a thirteenth aspect of the invention is a main control board that is mounted on an electronic device and transmits a control command for causing a peripheral board to perform a predetermined process, and is a data storage means for storing predetermined data. Determining means for determining the amount of data (hereinafter referred to as “data amount”) used to generate a calculation value transmitted together with the operation inspection value of the main control board; and the data in the data storage means An operation value that is divided into data amounts, performs binary operations on the divided data, each satisfying a coupling rule, and generates the operation values for the number of the divided data (hereinafter referred to as “division number”). Generation means, and as the operation inspection value of the main control board, synchronization code generation means for generating a synchronization code including packet information that is output along with transmission of the control command, A time measuring means for measuring the free run independently of the means, a relative time code generating means for generating a relative time code including information on the time measured from the time measuring means at a specified timing, and the division number Transmission means for transmitting the calculated value of minutes, the synchronization code and the relative time code to the peripheral board, and the synchronization code generation means divides the type of the packet information used for generation of the synchronization code into the division It is determined based on the number.

  According to the thirteenth aspect of the invention, the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code is determined based on the number of data divisions in the data storage means. Since the number of divisions is a value known only by the main control board, the unauthorized analyst cannot specify the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code. As a result, when an illegal control board is inserted between the main control board and the peripheral board, the illegality can be detected by collating the synchronization code.

  According to the thirteenth aspect of the invention, the amount of data used for generating the calculation value is determined instead of determining the division number itself. For this reason, the possibility that the number of divisions is illegally stolen can be reduced.

  The peripheral board according to the invention of claim 14 is a peripheral board that is mounted on an electronic device and performs a predetermined process based on a control command transmitted by the main control board, and is transmitted by the main control board. Whether receiving means for receiving a plurality of calculation values, relative time code and synchronization code, a calculation result obtained by performing the binary operation on the plurality of calculation values, and an expected value of the calculation result And authenticating the operation order of the main control board using the difference between the packet information included in the synchronization code and authenticating the operation order of the main control board using the relative time code. And when the authentication using the synchronization code and the authentication using the relative time code are both established by the operation authentication unit and the operation authentication unit. Command authentication means for authenticating a control command transmitted by the board, wherein the operation authentication means is the target of the two-term operation when the determination means determines that the calculation result matches the expected value The type of the packet information is specified based on the number of the calculated values, and authentication using the synchronization code is performed.

  According to the fourteenth aspect of the present invention, the peripheral board authenticates the operation sequence of the main control board using two types of codes, a synchronization code and a relative time code. By performing authentication processing twice using two types of codes, it is possible to improve the strength of authentication and prevent unauthorized processing by an unauthorized control command. Further, by authenticating the operation sequence of the main control board, it is possible to authenticate the continuity of the operation of the main control board. For example, an unauthorized control board equipped with a signal switching circuit or the like can be detected.

  An authentication method according to a fifteenth aspect of the present invention is an authentication method in an electronic device comprising a main control unit and a peripheral unit that performs predetermined processing based on a control command transmitted by the main control unit. A determination step of determining an amount of the data (hereinafter referred to as “data amount”) used for generating a calculation value transmitted together with an operation test value of the main control unit in the main control unit; Divide predetermined stored data into the amount of data, perform binary operation satisfying the combining rule for each of the divided data, and the number of the divided data (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”) A calculation value generating step for generating the calculation value and a synchronization code including packet information output with transmission of the control command as the operation check value of the main control unit Relative time code that acquires timed time information at a predetermined timing and generates a relative time code including the timed time information from the synchronous code generation step and the timekeeping unit that time-freezes independently of other means A generation step, and a transmission step of transmitting the calculated value for the number of divisions, the synchronization code, and the relative time code to the peripheral part, wherein the calculated value for the number of divisions in the peripheral part, A reception step of receiving a relative time code and the synchronization code; and whether or not a calculation result obtained by performing the binary operation on the calculation value for the number of divisions matches an expected value of the calculation result. And determining the operation order of the main control unit using the difference between the packet information included in the synchronization code and determining the main control using the relative time code. Sent by the main control unit when both the authentication using the synchronization code and the authentication using the relative time code are established in the operation authentication step for authenticating the operation order of the units and the operation authentication step. A command authentication step for authenticating a control command, wherein in the synchronization code generation step, a type of the packet information used for generation of the synchronization code is determined based on the division number, and in the operation authentication step, the determination The type of the packet information is specified based on the number of the arithmetic values subjected to the binary operation when it is determined in the step that the arithmetic value and the expected value match, and the synchronization code is used. It is characterized by performing authentication.

  According to the fifteenth aspect of the present invention, the main control unit determines the type of packet information used for generation of the synchronization code based on the number of data divisions in the data storage means. Since the number of divisions is a value known only by the main control unit, the unauthorized analyst cannot specify the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code. Thereby, when an unauthorized control unit is inserted between the main control unit and the peripheral unit, it is possible to detect fraud by checking the synchronization code.

  According to the fifteenth aspect of the present invention, the amount of data used for generating the calculation value is determined instead of determining the number of divisions. For this reason, the possibility that the number of divisions is illegally stolen can be reduced.

  According to the fifteenth aspect of the present invention, the peripheral unit authenticates the operation order of the main control unit using two types of codes, a synchronization code and a relative time code. By performing authentication processing twice using two types of codes, it is possible to improve the strength of authentication and prevent unauthorized processing by an unauthorized control command. Further, by authenticating the operation sequence of the main control unit, the continuity of the operation of the main control unit can be authenticated, and for example, an unauthorized control unit equipped with a signal switching circuit or the like can be detected.

  An authentication program according to claim 16 causes a computer to execute the authentication method according to claim 15.

  According to the sixteenth aspect of the present invention, the computer can execute the authentication method according to the fifteenth aspect.

  According to the electronic device, the gaming machine, the main control board, the peripheral board, the authentication method, and the authentication program according to the present invention, it is possible to prevent an unauthorized control board from being connected between the regular main control board and the peripheral part. Thus, fraud to electronic devices such as pachinko machines can be prevented.

It is a front view which shows an example of the game board of the pachinko game machine of this invention. It is a block diagram which shows the internal structure of the control part of a pachinko game machine. It is a block diagram which shows the functional structure of a main control board and a peripheral board | substrate. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the control process of the production | presentation control part by the main control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the control process of the production | presentation control part by the main control part. It is a time chart which shows the transmission timing of a jackpot related command. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the symbol variation process by an effect control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the process at the time of the big hit by an effect control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the lamp control process at the time of the symbol variation by a lamp control part. It is explanatory drawing which shows typically the data format of the control signal which a main control part outputs. It is explanatory drawing which shows typically the production | generation method of the individual authentication data (individual test value) in a main control part. It is explanatory drawing which shows typically the selection method of the packet information in a main control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the transmission process of the control signal by a main control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the authentication process of the main control part by a peripheral part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the collation process of the calculated value and expected value by a peripheral part. It is a sequence diagram which shows an example of the flow of data between control parts. It is explanatory drawing which shows the outline | summary of the fraud prevention technique by a prior art. It is explanatory drawing which shows the example of insertion of an unauthorized control board.

(Embodiment)
Referring to the accompanying drawings, control signals between a pachinko gaming machine having the function of an electronic device according to the present invention and a plurality of boards (main control board and peripheral board) mounted on the pachinko gaming machine will be described below. A preferred embodiment of an authentication method and an authentication program for authenticating an included control command will be described in detail.

(Basic configuration of pachinko machine)
FIG. 1 is a front view showing an example of a game board of a pachinko gaming machine according to the present invention. A game ball launched by driving a launching unit (see FIG. 2) arranged at a lower position of the game board 101 ascends between the rails 102a and 102b and reaches an upper position of the game board 101, and then the game area 103 Fall inside. A plurality of nails (not shown) are provided in the game area 103, and a game ball is dropped in various directions, and a windmill or a prize opening that changes the fall direction of the game ball is placed in the middle of the fall. Is arranged.

  A symbol display unit 104 is arranged at the center of the game area 103 of the game board 101. As the symbol display unit 104, for example, a liquid crystal display (LCD) is used. The symbol display unit 104 is not limited to the LCD, and a CRT or the like can also be used. Below the symbol display unit 104, a start winning port 105 for starting winning is arranged. Winning gates 106 are arranged on the left and right of the symbol display unit 104, respectively.

  The winning gate 106 is provided to detect the passing of the game ball and perform a lottery to open the start winning opening 105 for a predetermined time. A normal winning opening 107 is disposed on the side of the symbol display unit 104 or below. When a game ball wins the normal winning opening 107, the number of winning balls (for example, 10) at the time of the normal winning is paid out. At the bottom of the game area 103, there is provided a collection port 108 for collecting game balls that have not won any winning ports.

  The symbol display unit 104 described above starts a variation in the display of a plurality of symbols when a game ball is won at a specific winning opening (at the time of starting winning), and the symbol stops after a predetermined time. When the specific symbols (for example, “777”) are aligned at the time of the stop, a big hit state is obtained. In the big hit state, the big winning opening 109 located below repeats opening for a predetermined period for a predetermined round (for example, 15 rounds), and pays out the number of winning balls corresponding to the winning game balls.

  FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the internal configuration of the control unit of the pachinko gaming machine. The control unit 200 includes a plurality of control units. In the example of illustration, it has the main control part 201 and the peripheral part (The effect control part 202, the prize ball control part 203). The main control unit 201 controls basic operations related to the game of the pachinko gaming machine. The production control unit 202 controls the production operation during the game. The prize ball control unit 203 controls the number of prize balls to be paid out.

  Based on the program data stored in the ROM 212, the main control unit 201 executes a CPU 211 that performs basic processing as the game content progresses, a RAM 213 that functions as a data work area when the CPU 211 performs arithmetic processing, and each detection unit 221- An interface (I / F) 214 that receives various data from the H.224 and transmits various data to the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 is configured. The main control unit 201 realizes its function by, for example, a so-called main control board.

  On the input side of the main control unit 201, a start winning port detection unit 221 that detects a winning ball that has won a winning winning port 105, a gate detection unit 222 that detects a game ball that has passed through the winning gate 106, and a normal win An ordinary winning opening detection unit 223 that detects a game ball won in the mouth 107 and a large winning opening detection unit 224 that detects a winning ball won in the big winning opening 109 are connected via the I / F 214. These detection units can be configured using proximity switches or the like.

  A prize winning opening / closing part 231 is connected to the output side of the main control part 201, and the opening / closing of the prize winning opening / closing part 231 is controlled. The special prize opening / closing unit 231 has a function of opening the special prize opening 109 for a certain period of time when a big hit is made, and is configured using a solenoid or the like. This jackpot is programmed in advance to occur with a predetermined probability (for example, 1/300, etc.) based on the generated random number (random number for jackpot determination).

  The effect control unit 202 receives control signals including various control commands from the main control unit 201, and executes program data stored in the ROM 242 based on these commands to perform effect control during the game. The effect control unit 202 includes a CPU 241 that executes effect processing, a RAM 243 that functions as a data work area during the calculation processing of the CPU 241, a VRAM 244 that writes image data to be displayed on the symbol display unit 104, and various types from the main control unit 201. An interface (I / F) 245 for receiving data and transmitting various data to the lamp control unit 251 and the voice control unit 252 is provided. The effect control unit 202 realizes its function by, for example, a so-called effect board. In addition, the above-described symbol display unit (LCD) 104, lamp control unit 251, and voice control unit 252 are connected to the output side of the effect control unit 202 via the I / F 245. The lamp control unit 251 controls lighting of the lamp 261. The voice control unit 252 controls voice output from the speaker 262.

  The winning ball control unit 203 receives control signals including various control commands from the main control unit 201, and executes program data stored in the ROM 282 based on these commands to perform winning ball control. The prize ball control unit 203 includes a CPU 281 that executes prize ball control processing, a RAM 283 that functions as a data work area when the CPU 281 performs arithmetic processing, and various data reception and emission units 292 from the main control unit 201. An interface (I / F) 284 that transmits and receives various data is provided. The prize ball control unit 203 realizes its function by, for example, a so-called prize ball substrate.

  The winning ball control unit 203 performs control for paying out the number of winning balls at the time of winning a prize to the connected paying unit 291. In addition, an operation of launching a game ball with respect to the launch unit 292 is detected, and the launch of the game ball is controlled. The payout unit 291 includes a motor for paying out a predetermined number from the game ball storage unit. The winning ball control unit 203 controls the paying unit 291 to pay out the number of winning balls corresponding to the game balls won in each winning port (start winning port 105, normal winning port 107, large winning port 109). Do it.

  The launcher 292 launches a game ball for a game, and includes a sensor that detects a game operation by the player, a solenoid that launches the game ball, and the like. When the prize ball control unit 203 detects a game operation by the sensor of the launch unit 292, the game ball 103 is intermittently fired by driving a solenoid or the like in response to the detected game operation, and the game area 103 of the game board 101 is played. A game ball is sent out.

  The main control unit 201, the effect control unit 202, and the prize ball control unit 203 configured as described above are provided on different printed circuit boards (main control board, effect board, and prize ball board). For example, the prize ball control unit 203 can be provided on the same printed circuit board as the main control unit 201.

(Functional configuration of main control board and peripheral board)
FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of a main control board (main control unit) and peripheral boards (effect control unit, prize ball control unit). First, a functional configuration of the main control board 310 having a function as the main control unit 201 will be described. As shown in FIG. 3, the main control board 310 is a functional unit that transmits a control command for operating the peripheral board 320, and includes a data storage unit 311, a determination unit 312, a calculation value generation unit 313, and a synchronization code generation unit. 314, a relative time code generation unit 315, a timer unit 316, an encryption unit 317, and a transmission unit 318.

  The data storage unit 311 stores predetermined data. The predetermined data is program data used in the main control board 310, for example. As the data storage unit 311, for example, a part of the ROM 212 (see FIG. 2) of the main control unit 201 can be used. Note that the data stored in the data storage unit 311 is fixed data that is not rewritten or erased.

  The determination unit 312 determines an amount of data (hereinafter referred to as “data amount”) used to generate a calculation value transmitted together with a synchronization code and a relative time code (operation authentication value) described later. The determination unit 312 determines, for example, a value generated by a random number generation circuit or a random number generation program as a data amount, refers to a value generated in other processing of the main control board 310 at a predetermined timing, and determines the value. Is determined as the amount of data.

  The calculation value generation unit 313 divides the data in the data storage unit 311 into the data amount determined by the determination unit 312, performs a binary operation that satisfies the combining law for each of the divided data, and generates the divided data The calculation value for the number (hereinafter referred to as “the number of divisions”) is generated.

  The binary operation satisfying the combining rule is, for example, addition or exclusive OR operation. The calculation value generation unit 313 performs addition or exclusive OR operation on each of the divided data to generate calculation values for the number of divisions. The binary calculation used by the calculation value generation unit 313 to generate the calculation value is hereinafter referred to as “calculation for generating a calculation value”. The calculation value generation unit 313 uses all data stored in the data storage unit 311 without duplication when generating calculation values. Specifically, for example, the amount of data determined by the determination unit 312 is sequentially read from the head of the address in the data storage unit 311 to generate a calculation value.

  Here, the calculated value is transmitted in a synchronization code generation unit 314, which will be described later, to transmit which type of packet information is used to generate the synchronization code. More specifically, the synchronization code generation unit 314, which will be described later, determines the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code based on the number of divisions (the number of calculation values). The main control board 310 transmits the calculated value to the peripheral board 320 instead of the division number itself. The peripheral board 320 specifies the number of divisions by performing a predetermined calculation (calculation for generating a calculation value) on the calculation value, and specifies the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code. As a result, an unauthorized control board or the like cannot specify which packet information is used to generate the synchronization code, and thus can prevent the synchronization code from being generated illegally.

  Note that this calculated value can also be used as an authentication value used for authenticating the individual of the main control unit 201 (that is, the main control board 310). This is because the data in which the operation value is stored in the data storage unit 311 is fixed data that is not rewritten or erased. Further, authenticating the individual means that the main control board 310 is physically (hardware-like) authenticated, and means that the main control board 310 is not replaced with an unauthorized control board. To do. Since the calculation value is generated based on the fixed data stored in the main control board 310, it is very difficult to forge the calculation value with an unauthorized control board. Therefore, when the individual authentication based on the calculated value fails, it can be detected that control by an unauthorized control board is about to be performed.

  The synchronization code generation unit 314 generates a synchronization code including packet information that is output along with transmission of the control command. The synchronization code is information for confirming that transmission of a control command by the main control board 310 is continuously executed. Further, the packet information may be set at an arbitrary interval, for example, a predetermined time interval, a predetermined clock number interval, or an instruction execution number interval in accordance with the operation of the main control board 310, such as generation of a control command of the main control board 310. Is output at the output timing set to.

  The synchronization code is divided into two types of synchronization code A and synchronization code B according to the generation procedure. Specifically, the synchronization code A including the packet information output at every interval as the operation inspection value of the main control board 310 and the synchronization code B including the packet information output continuously as the operation inspection value. There is.

・ Synchronization code A
Therefore, the synchronization code A is generated using packet information output at a predetermined output timing (hereinafter referred to as “intermittent packet information”). As described above, the packet information used for generating the synchronization code is not limited to the operation related to the generation of the control command, and may be information that can authenticate that the main control board 310 is operating continuously. That's fine. Since the packet information is output at arbitrary intervals, when packet information at successive output timings is compared, the packet information has a change amount such as a time difference between each predetermined interval and an instruction execution quantity. There is a correlation.

  Therefore, the operation authentication unit 324 described later authenticates the continuity of the operation of the main control board 310 by obtaining the correlation between the plurality of packet information. As the synchronization code A, values acquired as packet information may be used as they are, or values obtained by performing a predetermined operation on these values may be used.

  The synchronization code A may be generated including packet information output at predetermined intervals set in advance as an operation inspection value of the main control board 310 at a timing before the output processing of the control command. Thus, the synchronization code A is a synchronization code corresponding to the timing set by the user of the main control board 310 (not the player, for example, an administrator or a trader who mounts the main control board 310 in the gaming machine). Can be generated. With such a configuration, the synchronization code can be made information that is more difficult for a third party to analyze.

・ Synchronization code B
On the other hand, the synchronization code B is output at an output timing set at a continuous interval, for example, a predetermined time interval, a predetermined clock number interval, or an instruction execution number interval in accordance with the operation of the main control board 310. This information includes packet information (hereinafter referred to as “continuous packet information”). As with the synchronization code A, the packet information used for generating the synchronization code B is not limited to the operation related to the generation of the control command, and can authenticate that the main control board 310 is operating continuously. Any information is sufficient. Since the packet information is output at successive timings, it has a correlation at a predetermined interval.

  Therefore, the operation authentication unit 324 described later authenticates the continuity of the operation of the main control board 310 by obtaining the correlation between the plurality of packet information. As the synchronization code B, values acquired as packet information may be used as they are, or values obtained by performing a predetermined operation on these values may be used.

  Further, the synchronization code B may be generated including packet information output at predetermined intervals set in advance as an operation inspection value of the main control board 310 at a timing before the output processing of the control command. Thus, the synchronization code B is a synchronization code according to the timing set by the user of the main control board 310 (not a player, for example, an administrator or a trader who mounts the main control board 310 in a gaming machine). Can be generated. With such a configuration, the synchronization code can be made information that is more difficult for a third party to analyze.

  In this way, by referring to the synchronization code when a predetermined control command is output, it is possible to easily determine whether or not the operation being executed on the main control board 310 is continuously performed. Can do. Accordingly, it is possible to take a countermeasure against fraud by the unauthorized control board 18001 as described in FIG. Specifically, if it cannot be determined that the operation sequence authenticated by the synchronization code is a continuous operation, it is determined that the control command is transmitted from an unauthorized control board other than the control command transmitted from the main control board 310. And unauthorized control can be detected.

  Here, the synchronization code generation unit 314 determines the type of packet information used for generation of the synchronization code based on the number of operation values (number of divisions) generated by the operation value generation unit 313. That is, the synchronization code generation unit 314 changes whether the synchronization code A is generated using intermittent packet information or the synchronization code B is generated using continuous packet information based on the number of divisions. As a method for determining the type of the synchronous packet information, for example, a method of determining packet information to be selected for each division number, such as intermittent packets in the case of the division number 2 and continuous packets in the case of the division number 3. There is. Also, for example, when the number of divisions is an even number, the type of packet information to be used for generation of the synchronization code is determined, and when the number of divisions is an odd number, the type of synchronization code currently used is continuously used. is there. Further, the packet information may be determined based on values obtained by performing various calculations on the number of divisions.

  As another method, either intermittent packet information or continuous packet information may be selected based on the remainder when the number of divisions is divided by a specific value. Further, as another method, for example, either intermittent packet information or continuous packet information may be selected based on the difference between the previous division number and the current division number.

  The relative time code generation unit 315 generates a relative time code including information on the time measured from the time measuring unit 316 described later at the designated timing. The relative time code is information for confirming that the transmission of the control command by the main control board 310 is continuously executed. Specifically, for example, a certain reference value is set from the timekeeping information, and is expressed by a difference value from this reference value, a cumulative value, or the like. The relative time code may include information set based on the timing information as it is, or may include a value obtained by performing a predetermined calculation on the information.

  In this manner, by referring to the relative time code when a predetermined control command is output, it is simply determined whether or not the operation being executed on the main control board 310 is continuously performed. be able to. Therefore, it is possible to take measures against fraudulent acts by the unauthorized control board 1801 as described in FIG. Specifically, if it is not determined that the operation sequence authenticated by the relative time code is a continuous operation, there is a possibility that an unauthorized control command is transmitted from an unauthorized control board other than the main control board 310. It can be judged.

  The timing unit 316 counts free run independently of other means. The timing, the number of digits, and the display method are arbitrary. The acquisition timing of the time information from the timer unit 316 is not fixed on the time axis. For example, if you set the timing information to be acquired using the timing of the event that should be a prize ball as a trigger, you cannot know when the prize ball event will occur, so the timing to acquire time information cannot be specified on the time axis .

  Further, the function of the time measuring unit 316 is a simple function of starting time measurement with the start of gaming operation such as power-on or resetting. In the case of the timekeeping unit 316, when starting timekeeping, for example, it is not necessary to provide an initialization processing function for the purpose of fixing or setting an initial value such as reset processing and clear processing. In addition, after the start of timing, the timing information may be output with a specific event that occurs at random as a trigger, such as when an event to be awarded has occurred. Therefore, it can be realized with a very simple configuration and has a feature that the processing load is light.

  The encryption unit 317 encrypts the operation value, the synchronization code, and the operation code by a predetermined encryption method. The encryption method by the encryption unit 317 is arbitrary, but when a plurality of encryption methods can be used in the encryption unit 317, the encryption method may be changed based on the number of divisions. For example, when two encryption methods can be used in the encryption unit 317, the first method is changed when the division number is an even number, and the second method is changed when the division number is an odd number. Further, the encryption unit 317 may encrypt the calculation value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code using a control command in a control signal described later.

  Note that when the calculation value is generated by the calculation value generation unit 313, a part or all of the synchronization code and the relative time code may be used. In this case, for example, one or all of the synchronization code and the relative time code are added to one of the divided data, and a binary operation is performed to generate a calculated value. Further, when the operation value is encrypted by the encryption unit 317, a part or all of the synchronization code and the relative time code may be used. Similarly, when the synchronization code and the relative time code are generated by the synchronization code generation unit 314 and the relative time code generation unit 315, some or all of the calculation values may be used. In addition, when the encryption unit 317 encrypts the synchronization code and the relative time code, some or all of the calculated values may be used.

  The transmission unit 318 transmits the calculated value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code to the peripheral board 320. The transmission unit 318 transmits the authentication data to the peripheral board 320 by adding the authentication data to a control signal transmitted from the main control board 310 to the peripheral board 320, for example.

  Next, a functional configuration of the peripheral board 320 having functions as peripheral portions such as the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 will be described. As illustrated in FIG. 3, the peripheral board 320 includes a reception unit 321, a decryption unit 322, a determination unit 323, an operation authentication unit 324, and a command authentication unit 325.

  The receiving unit 321 receives the calculation value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code transmitted by the main control board 310. The receiving unit 321 receives these data, for example, by receiving a control signal to which a calculation value, a synchronization code, and a relative time code are added.

  The decryption unit 322 decrypts the operation value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code by a decryption method corresponding to the encryption method by the encryption unit 317. When the encryption method by the encryption unit 317 is changed based on the number of divisions, the decryption unit 322 is the target of the binary operation when the calculation result matches the expected value in the calculation by the determination unit 323 described later. The decoding method is changed based on the number of calculated values.

  The determination unit 323 determines whether the result of the calculation value generation calculation performed on the calculation values for the number of divisions matches the expected value. The expected value of the calculation result is a value obtained by performing a calculation value generation calculation on all data in the data storage unit 311. Since the calculation value generation calculation satisfies the associative law, the expected value generated from all the data in the data storage unit 311 matches the value obtained by performing the same calculation on the calculation value generated from the divided data. Should do.

  When the calculated value is generated using a part or all of the synchronization code or the relative time code, the determination unit 323 determines whether the calculated value is a part or all of the synchronization code or the relative time code and the data storage unit 311. The above determination is performed using expected values generated using values obtained by performing calculations for calculation value generation for all data.

  The operation authentication unit 324 authenticates the operation order of the main control board 310 using the difference in the packet information included in the synchronization code, and authenticates the operation order of the main control board 310 using the relative time code. In other words, the operation authentication unit 324 performs two types of authentication: authentication using a synchronization code and authentication using a relative time code. Here, there are two types of synchronization codes: a synchronization code A generated using continuous packet information and a synchronization code B generated using intermittent packet information. Therefore, the operation authentication unit 324 uses the packet used to generate the synchronization code based on the number of operation values subjected to the binary operation when the determination unit 323 determines that the operation value matches the expected value. Identify the type of information and perform authentication using the synchronization code.

  “The number of operation values subjected to binary operation when the determination unit 323 determines that the operation value and the expected value match” is the number of divisions. Based on the number of divisions, the operation authentication unit 324 specifies which type of packet information is used to generate the synchronization code. Note that the method of specifying the type of packet information from the number of divisions corresponds to the method of changing packet information by the synchronization code generation unit 314 of the main control board 310. Then, authentication using a synchronization code is performed by a method corresponding to the specified packet information, and the operation order of the main control board 310 is authenticated.

  The command authentication unit 325 authenticates that the main control board 310 is outputting a correct control command when two types of authentication (authentication for the synchronization code and authentication for the relative time code) are established by the operation authentication unit 324. The peripheral board 320 performs processing based on the control command authenticated by the command authentication unit 325. If either one of the authentications fails, the command authentication unit 325 determines that an unauthorized control command (an unauthorized control signal) for performing unauthorized control is output from an unauthorized control board, and the control command Is discarded. Moreover, you may make it alert | report a fraud to a user simultaneously with discard of a control command.

(Basic operation of pachinko machines)
An example of the basic operation of the pachinko gaming machine having the above configuration will be described. The main control unit 201 outputs the winning status of the game ball for each winning port to the winning ball control unit 203 as a control command. The winning ball control unit 203 pays out the number of winning balls corresponding to the winning situation in accordance with the control command output from the main control unit 201.

  The main control unit 201 outputs a corresponding control command to the effect control unit 202 every time a game ball wins the start winning opening 105, and the effect control unit 202 displays the symbols on the symbol display unit 104 in a variable manner. Repeat to stop. When the occurrence of the big hit has been determined, the corresponding control command is output to the effect control unit 202, and the effect control unit 202 stops with a predetermined pattern aligned. At the same time, control for opening the special winning opening 109 is performed. The effect control unit 202 displays various effects on the symbol display unit 104 in addition to the symbol variation display during the jackpot occurrence period, during the reach until the jackpot occurrence, or at the time of reach notice. . In addition, a specific drive is performed for various types of accessories, and effects such as changing the display state of the lamp 261 are performed.

  When a big hit occurs, the big winning opening 109 is opened a plurality of times. One release is one round, for example, 15 rounds are repeatedly executed. The period of one round is set, for example, when 10 game balls are won or for a predetermined period (for example, 30 seconds). At this time, the winning ball control unit 203 pays out with, for example, 15 winning balls per winning game ball to the big winning opening 109. After the jackpot is over, the jackpot state is canceled and the normal gaming state is restored.

(Details of processing by each control unit)
Next, details of various processes performed by each control unit will be described. First, the control process of the effect control unit 202 by the main control unit 201 will be described. 4 and 5 are flowcharts showing the procedure of the control process of the effect control unit by the main control unit. 4 to 9, the correction data, the authentication data, and the accompanying data are not considered in order to clarify the control processing procedure of the effect control unit 202. That is, in the description of FIGS. 4 to 9, “transmit a command” means “transmit a control signal including data (control command data) indicating the command”, for example, correction data or authentication. The presence or absence of data and accompanying data (see FIG. 10) is not considered.

  4 and 5, the main control unit 201 first waits until the pachinko gaming machine is turned on (step S401: No loop). When the power of the pachinko gaming machine is turned on (step S401: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits a power-on command to peripheral parts such as the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 (step S402). ). When the power-on command is transmitted, the effect control unit 202 controls the lamp control unit 251, the sound control unit 252, and the symbol display unit 104 for effect control at the time of power-on (specifically, the lamp control unit 202). Control command to instruct the lighting of the LED, output of sound, display of the demonstration screen, etc.).

  Next, the main control unit 201 determines whether or not the number of undrawn winning prizes is 0 with reference to the data of the undrawn winning prizes recorded in the ROM 212 or the RAM 213 (step S403). The number of undrawn winning prizes is a number obtained by subtracting the number of times a lottery corresponding to the winning ball has been made (number of already drawn lots) from the number of winning balls detected at the start winning opening (number of winning prizes). When the number of undrawn winning prizes is 0 (step S403: Yes), the main control unit 201 measures the time elapsed since the demonstration was started (step S404).

  When a predetermined time elapses after the demonstration is started (step S405: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits a customer waiting demonstration command to the effect control unit 202 (step S406), and proceeds to step S407. If the predetermined time has not elapsed since the demonstration was started (step S405: No), the process proceeds to step S407 as it is. When the customer waiting demonstration command is transmitted in step S406, the effect control unit 202 transmits a control signal for the customer waiting demonstration to the lamp control unit 251, the voice control unit 252, and the symbol display unit 104. In step S403, when the number of undrawn winning prizes is not zero (step S403: No), the process proceeds to step S410.

  Next, the main control unit 201 determines whether or not a winning ball for the starting winning port is detected by the starting winning port detecting unit 221 (step S407). When a winning ball is detected at the start winning opening (step S407: Yes), the main control unit 201 clears the time that has been measured since the demonstration was started (step S408), and the number of undrawn winning prizes is reached. 1 is added (step S409). Subsequently, the main control unit 201 acquires a jackpot determination random number (step S410), subtracts 1 from the number of undrawn winning prizes (step S411), and proceeds to step S412 in FIG. If no winning ball for the start winning opening is detected in step S407 (step S407: No), the process returns to step S404 and the subsequent processing is continued.

  Next, the main control unit 201 determines whether or not the jackpot determination random number acquired in step S410 is a predetermined jackpot random number (step S412). When the jackpot determination random number is a jackpot random number (step S412: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits a jackpot reach command (symbol variation command) to the effect control unit 202 (step S413). The main control unit 201 waits until the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S414: No loop), and when the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S414: Yes), transmits a symbol stop command to the effect control unit 202 ( Step S415).

  Next, the main control unit 201 transmits a jackpot start command to the effect control unit 202 (step S416), and then sequentially transmits commands corresponding to the rounds during the jackpot (jackpot command) (step S417). Then, when transmission of the jackpot command for all rounds is completed, the main control unit 201 transmits a jackpot end command (step S418), and proceeds to step S422.

  On the other hand, if the jackpot determination random number is not a jackpot random number in step S412, the main control unit 201 transmits a shift reach command (design variation command) to the effect control unit 202 (step S419). . The main control unit 201 waits until the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S420: No loop), and when the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S420: Yes), transmits a symbol stop command to the effect control unit 202 ( Step S421).

  The main control unit 201 returns to step S403 in FIG. 4 and repeats the subsequent processing until the pachinko gaming machine is turned off (step S422: No). Then, when the power of the pachinko gaming machine is turned off (step S422: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits an end process command to the effect control unit 202 (step S423), and ends the process according to this flowchart. .

  FIG. 6 is a time chart showing the transmission timing of a jackpot related command (a jackpot reach command, a jackpot start command, a jackpot command, a jackpot end command). The jackpot reach command is transmitted more frequently and randomly than the actual jackpot occurs. The jackpot start command is transmitted only once when shifting to the jackpot state when a jackpot is actually generated. The jackpot command is continuously transmitted for each round after shifting to the jackpot state. The jackpot end command is transmitted only once when all rounds of the jackpot state are completed and the normal state is entered.

  Next, processing by the effect control unit 202 will be described. In the following, processing of the effect control unit 202 at the time of symbol variation (when a jackpot reach command (see step S413 in FIG. 5) or a loss reach command (see step S419 in FIG. 5) is received) and a jackpot time will be described. .

  FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the symbol variation process by the effect control unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 7, the effect control unit 202 first waits until a jackpot reach command (see step S413 in FIG. 5) or a miss reach command (see step S419 in FIG. 5), which is a symbol variation command. (Step S701: No loop). When the symbol variation command is received (step S701: Yes), the effect control unit 202 acquires a random effect selection random number (step S702), and selects a variation effect type based on the acquired random number (step S703). ). Then, the effect control unit 202 transmits an effect start command for each variable effect to the lamp control unit 251 and the sound control unit 252 (step S704).

  The effect control unit 202 determines whether or not the effect time of the variable effect has elapsed (step S705) and whether or not a symbol stop command (see steps S415 and S421 in FIG. 5) has been received from the main control unit 201. (Step S706). When the production time has elapsed (step S705: Yes), or when the symbol stop command has been received (step S706: Yes), the production control unit 202 sends a production stop command to the lamp control unit 251 and the audio control unit 252. Is transmitted (step S707). If the production time has not elapsed (step S705: No) and the symbol stop command has not been received (step S706: No), the process returns to step S705, and the subsequent processing is repeated.

  Next, the processing for the big hit of the effect control unit 202 will be described. FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the big hit processing by the effect control unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 8, the effect control unit 202 first waits until a jackpot start command (see step S416 in FIG. 5) is received from the main control unit 201 (step S801: No loop). When the jackpot start command is received (step S801: Yes), the effect control unit 202 transmits a jackpot start processing command to the lamp control unit 251 and the sound control unit 252 (step S802).

  Next, the effect control unit 202 waits until receiving a round jackpot command (see step S417 in FIG. 5) from the main control unit 201 (step S803: No loop). When the jackpot command is received (step S803: Yes), the effect control unit 202 transmits a round processing command corresponding to the received round jackpot command to the lamp control unit 251 and the sound control unit 252 (step S804). ).

  Subsequently, the effect control unit 202 waits until a jackpot end command (see step S418 in FIG. 5) is received from the main control unit 201 (step S805: No loop). When the jackpot end command is received (step S805: Yes), the effect control unit 202 transmits a jackpot end processing command to the lamp control unit 251 and the audio control unit 252 (step S806), and ends the processing according to this flowchart. To do.

  Subsequently, a lamp control process by the lamp control unit 251 will be described. Here, processing when a symbol variation command is received from the effect control unit 202 (during symbol variation) will be described. FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the lamp control process when the symbol is changed by the lamp control unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 9, the lamp control unit 251 first waits until an effect start command is received from the effect control unit 202 (step S901: No loop).

  When an effect start command is received from the effect control unit 202 (step S901: Yes), the lamp control unit 251 reads data prepared for each command (step S902) and executes a selection routine for each command (step S903). ), Ramp data is set (step S904). Then, the lamp control unit 251 outputs lamp data to the lamp 261 (step S905). Based on the lamp data output from the lamp control unit 251, the lamp 261 is turned on or off.

  Until the lamp control unit 251 receives an effect stop command from the effect control unit 202 (step S906: No), the lamp control unit 251 returns to step S905 and continues outputting the lamp data. When the production stop command is received (step S906: Yes), the lamp control unit 251 stops the output of the lamp data (step S907) and ends the processing according to this flowchart.

  Note that although the processing of the lamp control unit 251 is shown in FIG. 9, the sound control by the sound control unit 252 is almost the same as the processing of FIG. In the sound control process by the sound control unit 252, “ramp data” in steps S <b> 904, S <b> 905, and S <b> 907 in the process of FIG.

  As described above, peripheral units such as the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 perform various processes based on the control commands output by the main control unit 201. On the other hand, when the output source of the control command is not the regular main control unit 201, for example, when an unauthorized control board is connected between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit (see FIG. 15), The peripheral portion performs an illegal operation by an illegal control command output from an unauthorized control board.

  In order to prevent this, in the pachinko gaming machine according to the present embodiment, an authentication process is performed between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit. More specifically, authentication processing is performed with the peripheral unit as the authenticator and the main control unit 201 as the person to be authenticated, and the validity of the control signal transmitted from the main control unit 201 is authenticated. The authentication value (authentication data) used for this authentication process is generated based on data obtained by arbitrarily dividing the program data recorded in the main control unit 201. This authentication process detects fraud such as the main control unit 201 being replaced with an unauthorized control board or an unauthorized control board being attached between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral part. Fraud can be prevented.

  In the present embodiment, authentication data is added to control command data and transmitted. By adding the authentication data to the control command data, it is possible to suppress an increase in communication load between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit as compared with the case where the authentication data is transmitted alone. Further, by adding the authentication data to the control command data, it is possible to reduce the possibility that the authentication data is extracted from the communication data and analyzed as compared with the case where the authentication data is transmitted alone. The format of a control signal including authentication data and control command data will be described below.

(Control signal data format)
FIG. 10 is an explanatory diagram schematically showing a data format of a control signal output from the main control unit. FIG. 10 shows a normal control signal 1010 and a control signal with authentication data 1020 output from the main control unit 201.

  A normal control signal 1010 includes control command data 1001 and accompanying data 1002. The control command data 1001 is data unique to each command such as a reach command, a jackpot start command, a round command, and the like. The accompanying data 1002 is data accompanying the control command data 1001, and is data necessary for processing based on the control command data 1001, such as the number of winning game balls.

  On the other hand, the control signal with authentication data 1020 includes authentication data 1003 and a calculated value 1004 in addition to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002. The authentication data 1003 includes two types of authentication data, a synchronization code 1003a and a relative time code 1003b. The calculated value 1004 is a value for specifying the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code. Specifically, the calculated value 1004 is generated as follows.

(Calculation method generation method)
FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram schematically illustrating a method for generating a calculation value in the main control unit. The calculated value is generated using data recorded in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201 or the like. More specifically, after dividing data stored in a predetermined area of the ROM 212 into an arbitrary amount of data, a binary operation (semi-group operation) that satisfies the combining law for the data stored in each of the divided areas And a predetermined calculation (for example, encryption processing) is performed to calculate the inspection value. Examples of the semi-group operation include addition and exclusive OR operation. Whether or not the operation value 1004 is encrypted is arbitrary, but it is desirable to encrypt it from the viewpoint of preventing fraud.

  When the calculated value 1004 is encrypted, a control command to which the calculated value 1004 is added may be used. Further, when encrypting the calculated value 1004, a part or all of the synchronization code 1003a (or packet information) and the relative time code 1003b transmitted together with the calculated value may be used. In general, an unauthorized control unit attempts to cause an unauthorized operation to be performed by transmitting a control command different from that of the regular main control unit 201. When the calculated value 1004 is generated, the calculated value 1004 is reused by an unauthorized control unit by using the control command to which the calculated value 1004 is added, the synchronous code 1003a or the relative time code 1003b transmitted together. Even in such a case, the calculated value 1004 and the control command cannot be matched, and fraud can be detected.

  For example, every time one calculation value 1004 is generated, the main control unit 201 determines the amount of data (data amount) used for the generation. In this case, the main control unit 201 repeats the determination of the data amount and the generation of the calculated value 1004 until the calculated value 1004 is generated using all the data in the predetermined area of the ROM 212. Therefore, it is not known how many calculated values 1004 are generated (that is, how many divisions are to be made) until the calculated values 1004 are generated using all data in the predetermined area of the ROM 212.

  Instead of determining the amount of data every time one calculated value 1004 is generated, the amount of data used for generating the calculated value 1004 may be determined in advance. Further, the data amount used for generating all the calculation values 1004 may be made equal. In this case, the number of divisions can be predicted when the data amount is determined.

  The type of data used to calculate the calculated value 1004 is arbitrary, but for example, program data (instruction code or fixed data) recorded in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201 can be used. By using the program data recorded in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201, it is possible to detect unauthorized rewriting of the program code, unauthorized replacement of the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201, and the like.

  For example, the program data storage unit 1100 shown in FIG. 11 stores 12 pieces of data (0x01 to 0x09, 0x0A to 0x0C, and the data amount of one data is 1 byte). When the amount of data used to generate the calculation value 1004 is 4 bytes, 3 bytes, and 5 bytes, the program data storage unit 1100 includes, for example, a first block 1100a that includes 4 bytes of data, and a data that includes 3 bytes of data. Two blocks 1100b and a third block 1100c containing 5 bytes of data can be divided into three. That is, the number of divisions is 3. The main control unit 201 performs a semi-group operation on the data stored in each of these blocks to calculate a calculated value. The data amount described above is an example.

  For example, if the method using addition as the half-group operation is method A, 4-byte data 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04 stored in the first block 1100a is added to obtain the first operation value 0x0A. Similarly, 3 bytes of data 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 stored in the second block 1100b are added, and the second operation value 0x12 is obtained as 5 bytes of data 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A stored in the third block 1100c. , 0x0B, 0x0C are added to obtain the third operation value 0x32.

  For example, if the method using the exclusive OR operation as the semi-group operation is method B, the exclusive OR operation is performed on the 4-byte data 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04 stored in the first block 1100a. A first operation value 0x04 is obtained. Similarly, exclusive OR operation is performed on 3 bytes of data 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 stored in the second block 1100b, and the second operation value 0x04 is stored in the third block 1100c as 5 bytes of data 0x08. , 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, and 0x0C are subjected to exclusive OR operation to obtain third operation values 0x0C, respectively.

  Then, encryption processing is performed on the obtained calculated values to obtain calculated values 1004. In this encryption process, as described above, the encryption process may be performed including the control command data 1001, the accompanying data 1002, the synchronization code 1003a (or packet information), the relative time code 1003b, and the like. At this time, these data may be used as they are, or values obtained by performing operations such as operations using a hash function, parity check, cyclic redundancy check (CRC), and checksum on these data. May be used.

  On the other hand, the peripheral part as the authenticator holds the value obtained by performing the semi-group operation on the entire data stored in the program data storage part 1100 as an expected value. For example, the expected value in the case of method A is 0x4E, which is the sum of 0x01 to 0x0C. In addition, the expected value in the case of method B is 0x0C, which is an exclusive OR of 0x01 to 0x0C. In the peripheral portion, the same number of expected values as the number of calculation value generation methods by the main control unit 201 are held.

  The peripheral section extracts the calculated value 1004 from the received control signal with authentication data 1020, and collates the value obtained by performing the semi-group calculation on the calculated value 1004 with the expected value. Since the calculation value 1004 is generated using the half group calculation, if the same half group calculation is performed on all the calculation values 1004 generated from the divided program data, the half group calculation is performed on the entire program data. Should match the expected value. When the value obtained by performing the semi-group operation on the operation value 1004 matches the expected value, the peripheral portion is used for generating the synchronization code 1003a based on the number of operation values 1004 that are the objects of the operation at that time. Specify the type of packet information.

  The semi-group calculation process in the peripheral part corresponds to the process of combining the calculation values 1004 generated from the divided data, and is called “joining process”. In addition, the number of operation values 1004 used for the combining process when the expected value is matched is referred to as “number of connections”. The number of connections in the peripheral part and the number of divisions in the main control unit 201 are the same.

  Returning to the description of FIG. 10, the synchronization code 1003 a and the relative time code 1003 b are data for authenticating the operation sequence of the main control unit 201. Among these, the synchronization code 1003a is generated using either packet information (intermittent packet information) output at an arbitrary output timing or packet information (continuous packet information) output at continuous intervals. . Which packet information is used to generate the synchronization code 1003a is determined based on the number of divisions. A specific example of the packet information determination method will be described below.

(How to determine packet information)
FIG. 12 is an explanatory diagram schematically showing a packet determination selection method in the main control unit. As a method for selecting packet information based on the number of divisions, for example, a method as shown in FIG.

<Selection example 1: Number of divisions / remainder value of X>
In selection example 1, packet information used to generate synchronization code 1003a is selected based on a remainder value obtained by dividing a value determined as the number of divisions by specific value X. For example, if the specific value X = 4 and the number of divisions = 7, the remainder value = 3, and in the selection example 1 of FIG. 12, intermittent packet information is selected.

<Selection example 2: previous division number-absolute value of current division number>
In the selection example 2, packet information used for generating the synchronization code is selected based on the absolute value obtained by subtracting the previously determined number of divisions from the currently determined number of divisions. For example, if the previous number of divisions = 3 and the current number of divisions = 5, the absolute value | −2 | = 2, and in the selection example 2 in FIG. 12, continuous packet information is selected.

  In addition, for example, when the number of divisions is an even number, the type of packet information used for generating a synchronization code is changed, and when the number of divisions is an odd number, the type of packet information currently used is continuously used. There is.

  The synchronization code 1003a and the relative time code 1003b may be transmitted as they are or may be transmitted after being encrypted. At the time of encryption processing, encryption processing may be performed including data relating to control command data 1001 and accompanying data 1002 transmitted simultaneously with each code. The data related to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 includes the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 itself, operations on the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 using a hash function, a parity check, and a cyclic redundancy check (Cyclic Redundancy Check). : CRC), a value obtained by performing an operation such as a checksum.

  In general, an unauthorized control unit attempts to cause an unauthorized operation to be performed by transmitting a control command different from that of the regular main control unit 201. Therefore, if the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 are included, even if the synchronization code 1003a and the relative time code 1003b are reused by an unauthorized control unit, the control code 1003a and the relative time code 1003b and the control command Can not be matched, and fraud can be detected.

  The timing for outputting the control signal with authentication data 1020 is arbitrary. For example, the control signal with authentication data 1020 may be output every predetermined time, or the control signal with authentication data 1020 may be always output. Further, for example, when the control command data 1001 in the control signal is a specific type of command, the authentication data 1003 may be added.

  Furthermore, the arrangement of the control command data 1001, the accompanying data 1002, the authentication data 1003, and the calculated value 1004 is not limited to the order shown in FIG. 10, and for example, the authentication data 1003 and the calculated value 1004 are set to the head of the control signal, or the control command data Authentication data 1003 and a calculated value 1004 may be inserted between 1001 and accompanying data 1002.

(Control signal transmission / reception processing)
Subsequently, a control signal transmission / reception process performed between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit will be described. FIG. 13 is a flowchart illustrating a procedure of control signal transmission processing by the main control unit 201. In this flowchart, a process for determining the amount of data every time a calculation value is generated will be described. The main control unit 201 waits until the control command transmission timing is reached (step S1301: No loop), and when the control command transmission timing is reached (step S1301: Yes), determines the amount of data used to generate the operation value. (Step S1302). Next, the main control unit 201 reads the amount of program data determined in step S1302, performs a half-group operation on the read data, and further performs an encryption process to generate an operation value (step S1303).

  The main control unit 201 returns to step S1302 and repeats the subsequent processes until a calculation value is generated using all data in the program data storage unit 1100 (step S1304: No). Here, “using all the data in the program data storage unit 1100” means that all the data in the program data storage unit 1100 is used without duplication. The main control unit 201 reads out data in order from the top of the program data storage unit 1100, for example, and uses it to generate a calculation value. When generating the second and subsequent calculation values, the calculation value is generated by reading the data written in the area next to the program data used for generating the previous calculation value by the amount determined in step S1302. When generating the last calculated value, the data amount determined in step S1302 may be insufficient, but the main control unit 201 generates the calculated value using only the program data that can be acquired. The calculation value may be generated before the transmission timing of the control command.

  When the operation value is generated using all the data in the program data storage unit 1100 (step S1304: Yes), the main control unit 201 determines the synchronization code based on the number of operation values generated in step S1303, that is, the number of divisions. The type of packet information to be used for generating is determined (step S1305). Specifically, either intermittent packet information or continuous packet information is selected. Then, the determined packet information is acquired, and a synchronization code is generated based on the packet information (step S1306). Note that step S1305 and step S1306 are interchanged so that two synchronization codes are generated using both intermittent packet information and continuous packet information, and which synchronization code is used is determined later. May be. In addition, the main control unit 201 acquires time measurement information from the time measurement unit 316 (step S1307) and generates a relative time code (step S1308).

  Subsequently, the main control unit 201 adds the operation value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code (authentication data) to the control command data (step S1309), and transmits a control signal with authentication data to the peripheral unit (step S1310). . The control signal with authentication data may be transmitted continuously, or may be mixed with a normal control signal and transmitted. Further, the transmission order of the authentication data is also arbitrary. The main control unit 201 returns to step S1310 and repeats transmission of the control signal with authentication data until all calculated values and authentication data (calculated values and the like) are transmitted (step S1311: No). When all the authentication data is transmitted (step S1311: Yes), the process according to this flowchart is terminated.

  Next, an authentication process of the main control unit 201 by the peripheral unit will be described. FIG. 14 is a flowchart showing a procedure of authentication processing of the main control unit by the peripheral unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 14, the peripheral unit first waits until receiving a control signal with authentication data from the main control unit 201 (step S1401: No loop). When the control signal with authentication data is received from the main control unit 201 (step S1401: Yes), the peripheral unit performs a predetermined calculation (combination process) on the calculation value included in the received control signal with authentication data. (Step S1402), the number of divisions (number of connections) is specified (Step S1403). Details of the determination processing in steps S1402 and S1403 will be described in detail with reference to FIG.

  Subsequently, the peripheral unit specifies the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code based on the number of divisions (step S1404). Then, the authentication using the synchronization code is performed by the method corresponding to the packet information specified in step S1404 (step S1405). When the authentication using the synchronization code is established (step S1406: Yes), the peripheral unit performs the authentication using the relative time code (step S1407). Note that the order of authentication using a synchronization code and authentication using a relative time code may be interchanged.

  When the authentication using the relative time code is established (step S1408: Yes) and the authentication for both the synchronization code and the relative time code is established, the peripheral portion authenticates that the received control signal is a correct signal (step S1409). ), Processing based on the control command is performed (step S1410), and the processing according to this flowchart is terminated. On the other hand, when either the authentication using the synchronization code or the authentication using the relative time code has not been established (step S1406: No or step S1408: No), the peripheral unit uses the received control signal as an illegal control signal. Notification is made (step S1411), and the processing according to this flowchart is terminated.

  Next, determination processing (steps S1402 and S1403 in FIG. 14) by the peripheral part will be described. FIG. 15 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the collation process between the calculated value and the expected value by the peripheral part. In the flowchart of FIG. 15, the peripheral unit waits until receiving a calculation value (a control signal including a calculation value) (step S1501: No loop), and receives the calculation value (step S1501: Yes). The calculated value is stored in the calculated value memory (step S1502). If the calculated value is encrypted, it is decrypted as appropriate. Next, the peripheral part performs a semi-group operation (joining process) on all the operation values in the operation value memory (step S1503). If there is one inspection value in the calculation value memory, the process proceeds to step S1504 without performing the combining process.

  Then, the peripheral unit compares the operation result (combination result) with the held expected value, and determines whether or not the combined result and the expected value match (step S1504). When the combination result and the expected value match (step S1504: Yes), the peripheral unit specifies the number of calculation values that are calculation targets as the number of divisions (number of connections) (step S1505). Then, the data in the calculation value memory is erased (step S1506), and the processing according to this flowchart ends.

  On the other hand, if the combined result and the expected value do not match in step S1504 (step S1504: No), the peripheral unit returns to step S1501 until it receives a predetermined number or more of calculated values (step S1507: No), and the calculated value Repeat the receiving and combining process. When a predetermined number or more of calculation values are received (step S1507: Yes), the peripheral unit notifies the user that there is a possibility that some error has occurred (step S1508), and the processing according to this flowchart ends. Although the predetermined number is an arbitrary number, for example, it can be the number of data that can be stored in the program data storage unit 1100 (maximum number of divisions).

(Specific example of packet information selection processing)
Next, a specific example of the packet information selection process used to generate the synchronization code among the processes shown in FIGS. 13 to 15 will be described. FIG. 16 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of a data flow between control units. In FIG. 16, as a code selection example based on the number of divisions, a code to be used is selected according to selection example 1 (X = 3 in this example) shown in FIG. In FIG. 16, for convenience of explanation, the data amount used for generation of the calculation value is determined collectively. However, as shown in the flowchart of FIG. 13, the data amount is determined every time the calculation value is generated. Also good.

  First, the main control unit 201 determines the amount of data used for generating the calculation value by an arbitrary method. For example, if the total amount of data is 12 bytes, and the amount of data used to generate the operation value is 4 bytes, 3 bytes, and 5 bytes, respectively, three operation values are generated, and the number of divisions is 3 ( Step S1601). The main control unit 201 reads data of 4 bytes, 3 bytes, and 5 bytes in order from the top of the program data storage unit 1100, and generates three calculated values using each data (step S1602).

  Next, the main control unit 201 selects packet information used for generating a synchronization code based on the number of divisions (step S1603). Specifically, the number of divisions (in this case, “3”) is divided by the value of X (in this case, “3”), and packet information is selected by the remainder value. In this case, since the remainder obtained by dividing 3 by 3 is 0, the main control unit 201 selects intermittent packet information. The main control unit 201 generates a synchronization code using intermittent packet information and also generates a relative time code (step S1604). Then, the main control unit 201 transmits a control signal with authentication data including the calculated value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code to the peripheral unit (step S1605).

  Next, processing in the peripheral part will be described. The peripheral unit receives the control signal with authentication data transmitted from the main control unit 201 (step S1606). Then, the calculated value is extracted from the control signal with authentication data, the combined value is subjected to the combining process (step S1607), and the combined result is collated with the expected value. In this case, when the join processing is performed using three calculated values, it should match the expected value (number of joins = 3).

  The peripheral unit specifies the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code based on the number of connections (step S1608). Specifically, in this case, since the remainder obtained by dividing 3 which is the number of connections by 3 which is X is 0, it is determined that the packet information is intermittent packet information (see FIG. 12). Subsequently, the peripheral unit performs authentication using the synchronization code by a method corresponding to the specified packet information (step S1609) and performs authentication using the relative time code (step S1610). When both the authentication using the synchronization code and the authentication using the relative time code are established, the peripheral unit performs processing based on the control command in the control signal (step S1611). This is the flow of a series of switching processes.

  Turning to the description of the second process, the main control unit 201 again determines the amount of data to be used for generating the calculation value by an arbitrary method. For example, if the amount of data used to generate the calculation value is 4 bytes, 3 bytes, 2 bytes, and 3 bytes, respectively, four calculation values are generated, and the number of divisions is 4 (step S1612). The main control unit 201 reads data of 4 bytes, 3 bytes, 2 bytes, and 3 bytes in order from the top of the program data storage unit 1100, calculates four calculation values using each data, and performs further calculations. A calculated value is generated (step S1613).

  Further, the main control unit 201 selects packet information used for generating a synchronization code based on the number of divisions (step S1614). Specifically, the number of divisions (in this case “4”) is divided by the value of X (in this case “3”). Since the remainder value is 1, the main control unit 201 selects continuous packet information. The main control unit 201 generates a synchronization code using the continuous packet information and also generates a relative time code (step S1615). Then, the main control unit 201 transmits a control signal with authentication data including the calculated value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code to the peripheral unit (step S1616).

  Subsequently, the peripheral unit receives the control signal with authentication data transmitted from the main control unit 201 (step S1617), extracts the calculated value, and performs the coupling process (step S1618). In this case, when the join processing is performed using four calculated values, it should match the expected value (number of joins = 4). When the combined result matches the expected value, the peripheral unit specifies the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code based on the number of connections (step S1619). Specifically, in this case, since the remainder obtained by dividing 4 which is the number of connections by 3 which is X is 1, it is determined that the packet information is continuous packet information.

  Then, the peripheral part performs authentication using the synchronization code by a method corresponding to the specified packet information (step S1620) and performs authentication using the relative time code (step S1621). When both the authentication using the synchronization code and the authentication using the relative time code are established, the peripheral unit performs processing based on the control command in the control signal (step S1622). The above is a series of flows.

  As described above, in the main control board 310, the pachinko gaming machine according to the present embodiment determines the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code based on the number of data divisions in the data storage unit 311. Since the number of divisions is a value that only the main control board 310 knows, the fraud analyst cannot specify the type of packet information used for generating the synchronization code. As a result, when an unauthorized control board is inserted between the main control board 310 and the peripheral board 320, the fraud can be detected by checking the synchronization code.

  In addition, the pachinko gaming machine according to the present embodiment does not determine the number of divisions itself but determines the amount of data used to generate the calculation value. For this reason, the possibility that the number of divisions is illegally stolen can be reduced.

  Furthermore, the pachinko gaming machine according to the present embodiment authenticates the operation sequence of the main control board 310 using the two types of codes, the synchronization code and the relative time code, on the peripheral board 320. By performing authentication processing twice using two types of codes, it is possible to improve the strength of authentication and prevent unauthorized processing by an unauthorized control command. Further, by authenticating the operation sequence of the main control board 310, the continuity of the operation of the main control board 310 can be authenticated, and for example, an unauthorized control board equipped with a signal switching circuit or the like can be detected.

  The control method for the main control unit and the peripheral units described in the present embodiment can be realized by executing a program prepared in advance on a computer such as a personal computer or a workstation. This program is recorded on a computer-readable recording medium such as a hard disk, a flexible disk, a CD-ROM, an MO, and a DVD, and is executed by being read from the recording medium by the computer. The program may be a transmission medium that can be distributed via a network such as the Internet.

  As described above, the present invention is useful for an electronic device in which fraud to the control unit is concerned and a control board mounted on the electronic device, and in particular, a pachinko gaming machine, a slot gaming machine, and other various gaming machines. Suitable for

310 Main Control Board 311 Data Storage Unit 312 Determination Unit 313 Operation Value Generation Unit 314 Synchronous Code Generation Unit 315 Relative Time Code Generation Unit 316 Timekeeping Unit 317 Encryption Unit 318 Transmission Unit 320 Peripheral Board 321 Reception Unit 322 Decoding Unit 323 Judgment Unit 324 Operation authentication unit 325 Command authentication unit

Claims (16)

An electronic device comprising: a main control unit; and a peripheral unit that performs a predetermined process based on a control command transmitted by the main control unit,
The main control unit
Data storage means for storing predetermined data;
Determining means for determining an amount of the data (hereinafter referred to as “data amount”) used to generate a calculation value transmitted together with an operation inspection value of the main control unit;
Dividing the data in the data storage means into the amount of data, performing a binary operation satisfying a combining law on the divided data, respectively, and dividing the number of the data (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”) A calculated value generating means for generating the calculated value for minutes;
As the operation check value of the main control unit, synchronization code generating means for generating a synchronization code including packet information output with transmission of the control command,
A time measuring means for measuring the free run independently of other means;
A relative time code generating means for generating a relative time code including information on the time measured from the time measuring means at a specified timing;
Transmitting means for transmitting the calculated value for the number of divisions, the synchronization code, and the relative time code to the peripheral part,
The peripheral portion is
Receiving means for receiving the calculated value, the relative time code and the synchronization code for the number of divisions;
The result of performing the binary operation on the calculated values for the number of divisions, and the value obtained by performing the binary operation on all the data in the data storage means (hereinafter, “expected value”) Means for determining whether or not match,
Authenticating the operation order of the main control unit using the difference of the packet information included in the synchronization code, and authenticating the operation order of the main control unit using the relative time code;
Command authentication means for authenticating a control command transmitted by the main control unit when both the authentication using the synchronization code and the authentication using the relative time code are established by the operation authentication means. ,
The synchronization code generation means determines the type of the packet information used for generating the synchronization code based on the number of divisions,
The operation authentication unit specifies the type of the packet information based on the number of the operation values subjected to the binary operation when the determination unit determines that the operation value matches the expected value. And performing authentication using the synchronization code.   The synchronization code generation means is any one of the packet information that is output continuously with transmission of the control command and the packet information that is output at predetermined intervals with transmission of the control command. The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the synchronization code is generated by using a computer. The determining means determines the data amount for each of the calculation values,
The electronic apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the calculation value generation unit generates the calculation value using the data corresponding to the data amount determined for each calculation value.   4. The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the transmission unit adds the calculated value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code to the control command and transmits the control command to the peripheral unit. 5. machine.   The electronic apparatus according to claim 4, wherein at least one of the calculated value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code is generated using at least a part of the control command. The main control unit further includes encryption means for encrypting the calculated value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code by a predetermined encryption method, and the transmission means is encrypted by the encryption means. Send the computed value, the synchronization code and the relative time code;
The peripheral section further comprises decryption means for decrypting the encrypted operation value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code with a decryption method corresponding to the encryption method, and the determination means and the operation The authentication unit performs the determination and the authentication using the operation value, the synchronization code, and the relative time code decoded by the decoding unit. The electronic device as described in. The encryption means changes the encryption method according to the number of divisions,
The decoding means changes the decoding method based on the number of the operation values subjected to the binary operation when the operation result matches the expected value by the determination means. The electronic device according to claim 6. The synchronization code generation means determines the type of the packet information based on the number of remainders when the division number is divided by a specific value,
The operation authentication unit specifies the type of the packet information based on the number of remainders when the number of the calculated values is divided by the specific value. Electronic equipment. The synchronization code generation means determines the type of the packet information based on the difference between the previous division number and the current division number,
The operation authentication means identifies the type of the packet information based on a difference between the number of the calculated values at the previous authentication and the number of the calculated values at the current authentication. Electronic device as described in any one of -7.   The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the data storage unit stores program data used in the main control unit.   The electronic apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the binary operation is addition or exclusive OR operation.   A gaming machine comprising the electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the main control unit is a main control board, and the peripheral portion is a peripheral board. A main control board that is mounted on an electronic device and transmits a control command to perform a predetermined process on a peripheral board,
Data storage means for storing predetermined data;
Determining means for determining an amount of the data (hereinafter referred to as “data amount”) used to generate a calculation value transmitted together with an operation inspection value of the main control board;
Dividing the data in the data storage means into the amount of data, performing a binary operation satisfying a combining law on the divided data, respectively, and dividing the number of the data (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”) A calculated value generating means for generating the calculated value for minutes;
As the operation inspection value of the main control board, a synchronization code generating means for generating a synchronization code including packet information output with transmission of the control command;
A time measuring means for measuring the free run independently of other means;
A relative time code generating means for generating a relative time code including information on the time measured from the time measuring means at a specified timing;
Transmitting means for transmitting the calculated value for the number of divisions, the synchronization code, and the relative time code to the peripheral board,
The main control board, wherein the synchronization code generation means determines the type of the packet information used for generating the synchronization code based on the division number. A peripheral board that is mounted on an electronic device and performs a predetermined process based on a control command transmitted by the main control board,
Receiving means for receiving a plurality of operation values, a relative time code and a synchronization code transmitted by the main control board;
A determination means for determining whether or not an operation result obtained by performing the binary operation on the plurality of operation values matches an expected value of the operation result;
Authenticating the operation order of the main control board using the difference of the packet information included in the synchronization code, and authenticating the operation order of the main control board using the relative time code;
Command authentication means for authenticating a control command transmitted by the main control board when both the authentication using the synchronization code and the authentication using the relative time code are established by the operation authentication means. ,
The operation authentication means identifies the type of the packet information based on the number of the operation values subjected to the binary operation when the determination means determines that the operation result matches the expected value. Then, authentication using the synchronization code is performed. An authentication method in an electronic device comprising a main control unit and a peripheral unit that performs predetermined processing based on a control command transmitted by the main control unit,
In the main control unit,
A determination step of determining an amount of the data used to generate a calculation value transmitted together with an operation inspection value of the main control unit (hereinafter referred to as “data amount”);
The predetermined data stored in the main control unit is divided into the data amount, and a binary operation satisfying a coupling law is performed on each of the divided data, and the number of the divided data (hereinafter referred to as “divided”). A calculation value generation step for generating the calculation value for a number)
As the operation check value of the main control unit, a synchronization code generation step of generating a synchronization code including packet information output with transmission of the control command,
A relative time code generation step of acquiring time measurement time information at a predetermined timing and generating a relative time code including the time measurement time information from a time measurement unit that performs time measurement in free run independently of other means,
Transmitting the calculated value for the number of divisions, the synchronization code, and the relative time code to the peripheral part,
In the periphery,
A receiving step of receiving the calculated value for the number of divisions, the relative time code, and the synchronization code;
A determination step of determining whether a calculation result obtained by performing the two-term calculation on the calculation value for the number of divisions matches an expected value of the calculation result;
An operation authentication step of authenticating the operation order of the main control unit using the difference of the packet information included in the synchronization code, and authenticating the operation order of the main control unit using the relative time code;
A command authentication step for authenticating a control command transmitted by the main control unit when both the authentication using the synchronization code and the authentication using the relative time code are established in the operation authentication step. ,
In the synchronization code generation step, the type of the packet information used for generation of the synchronization code is determined based on the number of divisions,
In the operation authentication step, the type of the packet information is specified based on the number of the calculation values subjected to the binary calculation when the calculation value and the expected value are determined to match in the determination step. Then, authentication is performed using the synchronization code.   An authentication program for causing a computer to execute the authentication method according to claim 15.

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