JP4350678B2 - Financial transaction processing equipment - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to an apparatus for preventing unauthorized use of a transaction account, and more particularly to an apparatus for preventing the loss of funds from a transaction account designated as a transfer destination in a so-called transfer fraud case or the like.

  For bank transfer fraud cases, we use so-called oleore fraud cases that use cash to transfer cash into deposit accounts, etc. in the name of traffic accidents, etc. For example, there is a fictitious billing fraud in which cash is transferred to a deposit account or the like by sending a document that charges a fee based on a fictitious fact to an unspecified number of people. According to statistics from January to November 2004, there are data on the number of nationwide damage (recognition) 23,000 and total damage (achieved) exceeding 25 billion yen (as of November 2004). In the case of my scam, the criminals skillfully pretend to be relatives, etc., and engage in fraudulent activities, so that the party who receives the call is upset and loses calmness. Transfer money and take damage.

  There are two ways to prevent the damages of wire fraud: one is to prevent the transfer person from transferring money, and the other is to prevent the payee from transferring funds from the bank account. Regarding the former method, it is well known to display a warning screen for wire fraud on the ATM screen when making a transfer with ATM, but the warning screen is displayed unconditionally when the transfer operation is performed, and the transfer is restricted. It does not do so, so a great deterrent effect cannot be expected.

On the other hand, in Patent Document 1, fraudulent information such as theft of transaction media such as cash cards and bankbooks and inappropriate use of transaction accounts is managed in association with each account, and installed at a financial institution's window or ATM corner. Even when a surveillance camera is operated in a time-plus format (a method that records one still image every few seconds or minutes in addition to a video), Disclosed is a method for improving the number of recorded frames of a surveillance camera that captures the area where the drawer is being performed, increasing the photographing magnification by zooming, or increasing the number of surveillance cameras that monitor the corresponding surveillance area. Yes. As a result, it is possible to capture the details of the illicit user's personality, etc. in more detail and vividly, which will be an effective document for subsequent investigations.
JP 2004-104572 A

  However, the method of Patent Document 1 is an effective measure after the criminal withdraws the money obtained by the transfer fraud, and cannot prevent the money from being given to the criminal. In addition, when associating fraud information with an account, it is necessary for the operator to input the fact that has occurred, and there is a problem that the processing cannot be automated.

  The present invention has been made in view of the above-mentioned problems, and the problem is that it is possible to prevent money from being transferred to the criminals of wire fraud, and by providing a predetermined judgment standard, the processing can be automated. It is to provide a possible account fraud prevention device.

  In most cases, victims of wire fraud will only transfer to the specified account once (no transfers in the past or in the future). The account used for wire fraud is generally an account in the name of another person. The present invention pays attention to such a tendency and automatically determines whether or not the transfer destination account is an unauthorized use account and restricts the transfer of funds.

  In other words, the account fraud prevention device according to the present invention includes a receiving means for accepting a transfer from a transfer person to a payee, and a new transfer that the transfer destination has not made in the past when the accepting means accepts the transfer. When the first determination unit that determines whether or not the transfer is made and the transfer unit transmits the transfer information when the transfer unit receives the transfer, and the first determination unit determines that the transfer destination is a new transfer destination, Sending means for adding identification information indicating that it is a new transfer destination to the transfer information, transmitting means for receiving, receiving means for receiving the transfer information, collecting the transfer information received by the receiving means, and based on the identification information A second determination unit that determines whether or not the account is an unauthorized use account, and a restriction unit that restricts withdrawal from the bank account when the second determination unit determines that the account is an unauthorized use account And be prepared And wherein the Rukoto.

The first determination means can determine whether or not it is a new transfer destination by referring to the transfer history of the transfer person recorded in the database. In addition, the second determination means uses fraudulently based on the ratio between the total amount of transfer with identification information added and the balance of the account, or the ratio between the number of transfers with identification information added and the total number of transfers. Whether it is an account or not may be determined, or may be determined based on the total amount of transfer to which identification information is added or the number of transfers to which identification information is added.

  On the other hand, the restricting means may prohibit the withdrawal of cash by the automatic teller machine and output a message to accept payment at the window for the account determined by the second determining means as an unauthorized use account. desirable. However, if the automatic teller machine of the bank that handles the transfer account is compatible with biometric authentication, the restricting means will limit the withdrawal from the account because the account can only be used by the person himself / herself. There is no need.

  According to the apparatus of the present invention configured as described above, it is automatically determined whether or not the transfer destination account may be a fraudulent account when accepting the transfer, and there is a possibility of a fraudulent account. In some cases, the transfer of funds from the account can be restricted. In addition, if you are led from the automated teller machine to the counter, the counter at the counter confirms the identity of the customer who came to the drawer. The possibility is very high that the withdrawal can be refused, and even if this account is used as a transfer fraud destination, money can be prevented from being handed over to the criminal.

DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS Hereinafter, an embodiment of an account fraud prevention device according to the present invention will be described based on the drawings.
First, an outline of a bank network system that is an account fraud prevention device according to the present embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. As shown in FIG. 1, the bank network system is configured by connecting a plurality of bank systems to each other via a financial settlement network N.

  In the example of FIG. 1, bank A financial institution information system 10 and bank F financial institution information system 20 are connected to a financial settlement network N. The A bank financial institution information system 10 includes a central system including an A bank server system 11 and an account database (DB) 12 connected to the system and managing information of individual accounts of the A bank. On the other hand, an automatic teller machine (ATM) 14 of branch B, branch C, branch D connected via the bank network 13 or the like is provided.

  Similarly, the F bank financial institution information system 20 includes a server system 21, an account DB 22, a bank network 23, and an ATM 24. In FIG. 1, the X bank and the Y bank are also connected to the financial settlement network N, but only the server systems 31 and 41 are shown for the sake of simplicity of explanation.

  FIG. 2 shows the block diagram of FIG. 1 in more detail. The server system and ATM are provided with processing units that perform various functions, but only the parts related to the invention will be described here. As shown in FIG. 2, the bank A server system 11 manages a host transfer processing unit 11a for managing remittances addressed to its main branch or an account of another financial institution, and cash withdrawal from the account. A host payment processing unit 11b, and a host tabulation processing unit 11c for tabulating and managing information of each account or transfer person. On the other hand, ATM14 is provided with the ATM transfer process part 14a which manages the transfer from ATM, and the ATM payment process part 14b which manages the withdrawal from ATM. The bank network 13 is connected to a terminal 15 for an operator to access data. This terminal may be a so-called headquarter-type terminal in which a management department is placed, or may be a branch terminal located in each branch. The terminal 15 is provided with a terminal aggregation processing unit 15a for aggregating information of each account or transfer person. The system on the bank F side is similarly configured.

  Next, on the premise of the above system configuration, the operation of the account fraud prevention device of the embodiment will be described. The apparatus of the embodiment has a function of preventing transfer determined to be due to a transfer fraud as a first stage, and from an account (illegal use account) where there was a transfer determined to be due to a transfer fraud as a second stage. The function of preventing the movement of funds. Hereinafter, the operation of the transfer process including the first-stage transfer prevention function will be described with reference to FIGS.

  When the transfer transaction is completed within A bank (when the transfer source account or ATM and the transfer destination account are both from A bank), the transfer processing unit 14a in the ATM 14 and the A bank server system 11 The processing is completed with the host transfer processing unit 11a. Further, when the transfer transaction is also related to F bank, after the transfer processing in the transfer processing unit 14a in the ATM 14 and the host transfer processing unit 11a in the A bank server system 11 is completed, the transfer processing unit 14a in the A bank server system 11 A transfer message is notified from the host transfer processing unit 11a to the host transfer processing unit 21a in the F bank server system 21 and processed. Note that “look account” and “look account number” used in the following description refer to a transfer destination account and the account number for the first time as seen from the transfer person in a transaction to be transferred from the transfer person to the payee. Also, in the flowcharts of FIGS. 3 to 9, the operation of the transfer person (indicated by a broken line frame) and the function of the ATM transfer processing unit 14 a (indicated by the frame of practice) are described on the left side, and the A bank server system is illustrated on the right side. 11 shows the function of the host transfer processing unit 11a in the system 11. The apparatus for preventing unauthorized use of an account according to the invention is realized by a combination of these systems.

  In many cases, a transfer request due to a transfer fraud requires transfer using an ATM. Therefore, the transfer person who has determined that it is necessary to transfer money in response to a request from the claimant performs a transfer transaction using the ATM 14 (S001). An initial screen as shown in FIG. 19 is displayed on the touch panel display of the ATM 14. The transfer person presses the “transfer” part and then selects either card transfer (transfer from the account using a cash card) or cash transfer on the transfer method selection screen (FIG. 20) that is displayed. (S002).

  The program of the ATM transfer processing unit 14a waits for the transfer person's transfer button and transfer method selection button to be pressed, and when the button is pressed, the device itself uses an ATM with biometric authentication (an IC card in which biometric features such as fingerprints are registered). Then, it is checked whether or not the ATM is capable of verifying the identity (S003). In the case of ATM with biometric authentication (S004, Yes), a message for reading biometric information is displayed to the transfer person, an action for reading biometric information is performed, the biometric information is read, and the read data is characterized. (S005). Then, the read and characterized data is compared with the characterized data stored in the card (S006). If they match (S007, Yes), the process proceeds to S009. If they do not match (S007, No), a message indicating that the person cannot be determined is displayed (S008), and the transfer operation is terminated.

  If the device itself is not an ATM with biometric authentication (S004, No), or if it is an ATM with biometric authentication and the characteristics match (S007, Yes), the ATM transfer processing unit 14a uses the password for entering the password. The input screen is displayed (S009). When the transfer person inputs the password (S010), the ATM transfer processing unit 14a transmits a validity inquiry request message to the bank A server system 11 in order to check the validity of the password entered by the transfer person. (S011). The server system 11 receives the input code number validity inquiry request message, and checks the validity of the input code number (S012).

  If the entered password is valid, the ATM transfer processing unit 14a checks the transfer method (S013 in FIG. 4). It should be noted that the description in the case where the entered password is not valid will be omitted here. When the transfer method is cash transfer (S014, Yes), the ATM transfer processing unit 14a displays a message as shown in FIG. 21 to guide the card transfer (S015). Generally, a transfer person who has an account uses a card transfer, and a transfer person who does not have an account uses a cash transfer. However, there are some customers who withdraw their cash once and transfer it even though there is an account in the bank operating the ATM. However, in order to prevent bank transfer fraud, it is desirable to use a card transfer that can refer to account history information and transferer personal information. Therefore, for such customers, without displaying cash, display a message indicating that it can be transferred directly from a cash card account (card transfer possible) and an inquiry as to whether or not to switch to card transfer, Wait for the transferor's selection. In response to an inquiry as to whether or not to switch to card transfer, the transfer person selects either one with a button (S016).

  When a transfer person is selected, the ATM transfer processing unit 14a checks whether or not there is a change in the transfer person's transfer method (S017). If cash transfer is to be continued (S018, Yes), a transfer screen display requesting input of a transfer destination account number, a transfer amount, a transfer reason, etc. is issued. When there is no account at this bank and cash transfer is made, it is unknown whether or not the transfer account is an account at first glance, and personal information such as the gender and generation of the transfer person, so that it is input manually (S019).

  When card transfer is selected from the beginning (S014, No), and after cash transfer is selected and changed to card transfer (S018, No), the card is read and the account is read from the card reading information. The number is extracted, and the attribute (gender / generation) of the transfer person is referred to the server system 11 (S020). The server system 11 extracts the attribute (gender / generation) of the transfer person with reference to the account information, and returns the result to the ATM 14 (S021).

  The ATM transfer processing unit 14a refers to the investigation result of the server system 11 and acquires transfer person attribute (gender / generation) information (S022). Then, sex and generation data are extracted from the transfer person attribute, and the input value is protected by reflecting (automatically inputting) it on the input item of gender / generation on the transfer screen to be displayed subsequently. At the time of cash transfer, since transfer person data cannot be extracted, automatic input is not performed. Then, the ATM transfer processing unit 14a instructs the transfer screen display for requesting input of the transfer destination account number, transfer amount, transfer reason, etc. (FIG. 5, S024). The input items are displayed as shown in FIG. 23, for example. When the cursor moves to each item, a pull-down menu as shown in the figure is displayed, and the transfer person selects and inputs the transfer request name from the list displayed in the pull-down menu.

  Here, the order of the items displayed in the pull-down menu is set to the sex of the transfer person so that the input can be made smoothly when inputting "7. Transfer request name" and "9. Transfer requester attribute" on the transfer screen. , Change by age. In other words, the victims of oleore fraud tend to be more likely to be subject to fictitious billing scams, while the middle-aged men are more likely to be subject to loan insurance fraud, whereas the majority of women are middle-aged women. . Therefore, the order of items displayed in the pull-down menu is changed based on gender and generation.

  First, check the sex of the transfer person (S025), if it is female (S026, Yes), check the generation of the transfer person (S027), if it is between 40 and 70 (S028, Yes), The order of items displayed in the pull-down menu of “transfer request name” and “transfer requester attribute” is set to the oleo fraud (depression) pattern (S029). If you are not a woman (S026., No), or if you are a woman but you are not in your 40s to 70s (S028, No), perform a gender / generation check (S030). (S031, Yes), set to a fictitious bill fraud (depression) pattern (S032), otherwise (S031, No), set to a loan insurance fraud (depression) pattern (S033). An example of the contents of each item displayed in the pull-down menu is shown in FIG. FIG. 23 shows a pull-down menu of “transfer request name” in the oleo fraud (depression) pattern.

  At the time of cash transfer selection, since it is not entered at S026, it corresponds to other than women, and since it is not entered at S031, it corresponds to other than men in the 20s to 30s, and loan insurance fraud (depression) The pattern is set (S033).

  Next, the ATM transfer processing unit 14a displays a transfer screen as shown in FIG. 25 (S034). The transfer person inputs the transfer account number (transfer bank / subject / account number), transfer amount, transfer reason, etc. on the transfer screen displayed on the ATM touch display (S035). The transfer person presses a confirmation button on the transfer screen for input confirmation and completion (S36).

  Next, it is checked whether or not the items of “3. Transfer account look”, “4. Transferee gender”, “5. Transferee generation”, and “6. Contact method” are entered on the transfer screen (S037). ). These items are indispensable items for all the transfer persons, and when there is a leakage (S038, No), the process returns to S035 to prompt the input.

  If all items 3 to 6 are entered (S038, Yes), the sex and generation of the transfer person are checked (S039). If the woman is in the 40s to 70s (S040, Yes), “7. “Nominal transfer request”, “8. Transfer urgency”, “9. Request requester attribute”, “10. Fact confirmation, etc.” is an essential item, check whether these are entered (S041), and enter all If already completed (S042, Yes), the process proceeds to S047.

  If the transfer person is not a woman in their 40s to 70s (S040, No), check the sex and generation of the transfer person (S043). (S044, Yes), “7. Transfer request name”, “8. Transfer urgency”, “9. Request requester attribute”, “10. Then, it is checked whether or not these have been input (S045). If all have been input (S046, Yes), the process proceeds to S047.

  If items 7 to 10 are indispensable items but there is an input omission (S042, S046, No), the process returns to S035 to prompt the input. In S047, the value of the uninput item is regarded as “0” (0 is automatically set) (S047). FIG. 25 is an example of an input completion screen in the case of card transfer at this time.

  Next, the ATM transfer processing unit 14a transmits an inquiry message to the host in order to inquire about the transfer destination account (S048). An example of the transmission message transmitted at this time is shown in FIG. When receiving the transmission message, the host transfer processing unit 11a of the server system 11 checks whether or not the transfer destination account is its own bank account (S049). If it is not the bank account itself (S050, No), it makes a transfer account information inquiry request to the host of the other bank via the financial settlement network (S051), and the bank account information (payee name / biometric account ) Is received and acquired (FIG. 7, S052). When the bank account is the bank account (S050, Yes), the bank account information of the bank is examined and the bank account information (recipient name / biometric account) is acquired (S053).

  Regardless of whether the transfer destination is another bank or own bank, the host transfer processing unit 11a acquires the account information and then checks the type of transfer message (S054). In the case of cash transfer (S055, Yes), the process proceeds to S059. In the case of card transfer (S055, No), the account number at the time of transfer and the transfer destination account number are extracted from the transfer message, and whether the account number at the transfer time and the transfer destination account number exist is transferred to the logging DB It is checked whether it is an account at first glance by referring to the history (S056). A format example of the transfer logging DB is shown in FIG. If the transfer account is a seeming account (S057, Yes), “1” is set in the seeming account identification information in the reply message to record that it is a seeming account (S058).

  Subsequently, the host transfer processing unit 11a analyzes the information of the transfer person and the transfer destination account, and returns the analysis result (S059). Details of the analysis processing will be described later based on the flowcharts of FIGS. An example of a reply message is shown in FIG. Whether or not the transfer destination is an account at first glance is notified by the first account identification information of the reply message.

  Upon receipt of the reply message, the ATM transfer processing unit 14a displays the transfer destination (transfer destination financial institution name, branch name, subject / account number, recipient name, biometrics account hidden) and requester (requester name, contact information) on the transfer screen. ), Amount (transfer amount, fee, total amount) and analysis result message are displayed. At this time, the analysis result code is recorded in order to set the analysis result code in the reply message in the attention transmission information in a later process. In addition, when “1” is referenced with reference to the look-up account identification in the reply message, “1” is automatically entered in the “3. recognize.

  The ATM transfer processing unit 14a checks the transfer execution button press control unit in the reply message (S061). If the confirmation button pressing control unit is “1” (S062, No), the “confirmation button” on the transfer screen is hidden and invalidated as shown in FIG. 27 (S063).

  The transfer person selects transfer (pressing the confirmation button) or not (pressing the cancel button) (S064). When the confirmation button is invalidated, the transfer person has only an option to press the cancel button. If the cancel button is pressed (S066, No), the process jumps to S098 in FIG. 9, the card or the like is ejected, and the process is terminated. The ATM transfer processing unit 14a checks that the transfer person has pressed the button (S065), and if the confirmation button is pressed (S066, Yes), creates a transfer message (S067), and the transfer account appears as an account at first glance. It is checked whether or not (S068). If it is an account at first glance (S069, Yes), it refers to the acquired transfer destination information and checks whether the transfer destination account is a biometric authentication account (S070). If it looks like an account, there is a possibility of wire fraud. However, even if it is an account at first glance, if it is a biometric account, only the person can withdraw it, so there is little possibility of wire fraud. Therefore, if it is not an account at first glance (S069, No), or if it is a biometric authentication account even if it appears at first glance (S071, Yes), transfer without adding attention transmission information (monitoring information) to the transfer message. Send a message (S073), and if it is an account that is not a biometric account at first glance, it is judged that there is a possibility of transfer fraud, and a notice message (monitoring information) is added to the transfer message and sent ( S072, S073). When sending a transfer message, the analysis result code recorded previously is also set. An example of the transfer message is shown in FIG. Moreover, the conditions for adding attention transmission information (monitoring information) to the transfer message are shown in FIG.

  Receiving the transfer message, the host transfer processing unit 11a extracts necessary items from the transfer message and records them in the transfer logging DB. However, recording is possible only in the case of card transfer. When the transfer method is cash transfer, there is no account information related to the transfer person, so no recording is performed in the transfer logging DB. Subsequently, the host transfer processing unit 11a extracts and checks the transfer destination bank from the transfer message (S075). If the bank of the transfer destination account is its own bank (S076, Yes), the process proceeds to S080. . When the transfer destination is an account of another bank (S076, No), a transfer message is transmitted to another bank host via the financial settlement network N (S077). After transmitting the transfer message, the server system of the other bank that has received the message starts processing from S078, and in S079, the other bank server system receives the transfer message.

  The processing after S080 includes the explanation of the function of the server system of the bank when the transfer destination is an account of the bank, and the function of the server system of the other bank when the transfer destination is an account of the other bank. It has become. In S080, the received transfer message is checked. If attention transfer information is included in the transfer message (S081, Yes), it is checked whether the relevant transfer destination account information already has monitoring information (S082). If there is no monitoring information (S083, No), a monitoring information section area is generated in the corresponding account information (S084). Or you may stick the link information to monitoring information in applicable account information.

  The monitoring information is defined as shown in FIG. 31, for example. The account number in FIG. 31 is an account unique number. The presence or absence of biometric authentication in the account attribute information indicates whether or not the main account is a biometric authentication account. The account balance represents the balance of the account. The total amount of money transferred represents the number and amount of money transferred to this account. The total number of deposits represents the number and amount of all deposits made to the account. The total amount of withdrawals represents the number and amount of all withdrawals made to this account. The monitoring information link destination represents a link destination when the monitoring information main body is not held in the main account but held outside the main account. When the monitoring information body is held in this account, there is no monitoring information link destination area. The monitoring information identifier represents unique information indicating that it is an account monitoring information area at first glance. In addition, monitoring information generation date and time, final transfer account number, final transfer identifier (identifier of final apparent account transfer funds breakdown), final transfer amount (final apparent account transfer funds amount), analysis results in apparent account attention breakdown It includes the code (the code used to alert the transfer person, expressed by the codes B1 to D3), the number of cases (displays the cumulative number of cases), the amount (the cumulative amount of money), the cumulative total, and the total.

  Also, at first glance, the identifier in the account transfer fund breakdown is an identifier representing male 20s or younger (M20) to female 80s or older (F80), the number represents the cumulative number, and the amount represents the cumulative amount. In addition, the transfer meter is the cumulative total transferred as an apparent account, the pay meter is the cumulative amount paid from the apparent account, and the balance is the balance managed as an apparent account, balance inquiry total, since the generation of the apparent account monitoring information, or Represents the cumulative total of balances since initialization.

  Since we do not want to continue to use small numbers that have been lost as a result of transactions, we will check the amount of monitoring information (S085), and if it is less than the predetermined amount (S086, Yes), monitoring information Only the part to be initialized is initialized (S087). The initialization condition is an example, and other various conditions may be provided for initialization. Further, information before initialization may be saved as a history if necessary. Subsequently, the host transfer processing unit 11a adds to the corresponding part of the in-account monitoring information with the corresponding part (number, amount) of the analysis result code of the monitoring information added to the transfer message, and adds with the identifier corresponding part (number, amount). (S088). At the same time, related transfer meters, balances, etc. are also recalculated. The processes of S082 to S088 are skipped when there is no attention transmission information (S081, No).

  Next, the host transfer processing unit 11a adds the transfer amount to the account balance of the transfer destination account (FIG. 9, S089). Then, it is checked whether or not the transfer message has been sent from another bank (S090), and if it is from another bank (S092, Yes), a transfer process end response is returned to the calling bank (S093). . When a transfer processing end notification from another bank is received (S094, S095), a transfer processing end notification is returned to the ATM (S093). When the transfer is completed within the bank, the processing of S093-S095 is skipped.

  Upon receipt of the transfer process end notification, the ATM transfer processing unit 14a outputs a transfer receipt to the transfer person (S097), and in the case of card transfer, the read card is discharged (S098) and the series of transfer processes is completed. To do. Thus, according to the apparatus of the embodiment, when the transfer destination is an account at first glance, if the confirmation button depression is invalidated by the analysis of the host transfer processing unit, the transfer from the ATM becomes impossible, and FIG. With the display as shown, trading at the window is recommended. At the counter, since the bank staff can ask the details of each transfer in detail, it is possible to more effectively prevent damages caused by wire fraud than using ATM.

  Next, the action at the time of deposit withdrawal including the function of preventing the transfer of funds from the account (the fraudulent use account) that has been determined to be a transfer fraud will be described with reference to FIGS. In the system of the embodiment, even if a victim transfers money by a transfer fraud, the criminal prevents the cash from being withdrawn from the account of the transfer destination, thereby trying to prevent the damage of the transfer fraud.

  When the deposit is withdrawn (received, paid), the recipient performs a receiving (paying) transaction from the ATM (S101). The recipient presses the “pay” button from the initial ATM screen as shown in FIG. 19 (S102). The payee inserts a cash card or a bankbook if necessary into the ATM, and the ATM payment processing unit 14a reads the card or bankbook (S103).

  The program of the ATM payment processing unit 14b checks whether the device itself is an ATM with biometric authentication (S104). In the case of ATM with biometric authentication (S105, Yes), a message for reading biometric information is displayed to the recipient, an action for reading biometric information is performed, the biometric information is read, and the read data is characterized. (S106). Then, the data characterized by reading is compared with the characteristic data stored in the card (S107). If they match (S108, Yes), the process proceeds to S110. If they do not match (S108, No), a message indicating that the person cannot be determined is displayed (S008), and the payment operation is terminated.

  If the device itself is not an ATM with biometric authentication (S105, No), or if it is an ATM with biometric authentication and the characteristics match (S108, Yes), the ATM payment processing unit 14b uses the password for entering the password. An input screen is displayed (S110). When the transfer person inputs the personal identification number (S111), the ATM payment processing unit 14b transmits a validity inquiry request message to the bank A server system 11 in order to check the validity of the personal identification number input by the transfer person. (S112). The server system 11 receives the input code number validity inquiry request message, and checks the validity of the input code number (S113).

  If the entered password is valid, the ATM payment processing unit 14b displays an amount input screen to request the amount input (S114). The recipient inputs the amount and presses the confirmation button (S115).

  The ATM payment processing unit 14b makes a payment request to the host payment processing unit 11b by inputting and confirming the amount (S116). The host payment processing unit 11b performs a payment check validity check (eg, insufficient balance, caution accident code is set, etc.), which is a predetermined check (S117). If the payment is rejected (S118, Yes), in order to display the corresponding error message, the fact is returned to the ATM (S119), and the ATM payment processing unit 14b displays the corresponding error message (S120). Exit.

  When it does not correspond to payment failure (S118, No), the host payment processing unit 11b checks whether or not the monitoring information exists in the corresponding account information (S121). If it does not exist (S122, No), since there is little possibility of an unauthorized use account, the process proceeds to FIG. 12 and payment is permitted. If the monitoring information exists (S122, Yes), a more detailed analysis is performed assuming that there is a possibility of an unauthorized use account. First, the host payment processing unit 11b checks whether or not the already-checked result of biometric authentication is OK (S122-1), and determines the result (S122-2). If ATM with biometric authentication is used (S105, Yes) and the read characterization data matches the stored characterization data in the card (S108, Yes), the determination in S122-2 is YES, in that case Since it can be confirmed that the operator is the account holder and the possibility of fraudulent use account is small even if there is monitoring information, the process proceeds to S129 in FIG. To do. On the other hand, if biometric authentication has not been performed (S105, No), the determination in S112-2 is No, and further the check after S123 is performed. That is, the host payment processing unit 11b checks the total number of transfers of the monitoring information (S123). When the number of transfers is one (S124, Yes), the possibility of an unauthorized use account is increased because there is only one transfer in the account at first glance. Then, subsequently, the balance of the corresponding account and the balance amount of the monitoring information are checked (S125). If they match (S123, Yes), it is determined that there is a high possibility of an unauthorized use account, and the process proceeds to S135 in FIG. 12 to prohibit payment from ATM.

  If the number of transfers is not one (S124, No), or if the number of transfers is one and the balance of the account balance and monitoring information does not match (S124, No, S126, No), the corresponding account balance and monitoring information Check the ratio of the balance amount (monitoring information balance amount ÷ corresponding account balance), or check the ratio of the total number of transfers and the total number of transfers for monitoring information (number of transfers for monitoring information ÷ total number of transfers) ( S127). If these ratios are equal to or higher than the predetermined ratio (S128, Yes), it is determined that there is a high possibility of fraudulent use account, and the process proceeds to S136 in FIG. 12, and payment from ATM is prohibited.

  Even if the monitoring information exists, if the determination in S128 is No without checking the above S123 to S128, it is determined that the possibility of fraudulent use account is low, and FIG. Proceed to S129 to enable payment from ATM. That is, in FIG. 12, before payment, the host payment processing unit 11b extracts necessary items, records them in the payment logging DB (S129), and adds the payment request amount to the payment amount item of the monitoring information (S130) (number of cases) +1, + payment request amount). Then subtract the payment request amount from the corresponding account balance. The total number of payments is the number of payments + 1 and the payment requesting amount (S131), and a payment permission message is returned to the ATM (S132).

  Upon receiving the payment permission message, the ATM payment processing unit 14b outputs a payment receipt according to the host instruction (S133), discharges cash, a cash card, a passbook, etc. (S134), and ends the ATM processing.

  On the other hand, if it is determined that the possibility of fraudulent use account is high in the above check of S123 to S128, first, if the number of transfers is 1 and the balance of the account balance and the monitoring information match, the host payment processing The part 11b sets "1" to the variable Z (S135), otherwise sets "2" to the variable Z (S136), sets "0" to the payment status category, and sets the value of the variable Z Is set in the non-payment reason code (S137). Then, necessary items of the corresponding payment transaction are extracted and recorded in the account payment logging DB at first glance (S138). In addition, without sending a payment permission message to the ATM, the payer is guided to perform a payment operation at the ATM with biometric authentication, or a guidance message display instruction to pay at the bank counter and a guide receipt with a serial number are output. Is instructed (S139). In response to this, the ATM displays a guidance message on the screen, outputs a guidance receipt with a serial number (S140), and the ATM processing ends.

  Subsequently, the host payment processing unit 11b obtains branch information from the amount payment request message, extracts all the manned terminals connected to the corresponding branch (S141), and selects all the manned terminals extracted from the bank counter or biometrics. A message is sent to the effect that an event leading to the authenticated ATM has occurred (S142), and the payment process is terminated (FIG. 13). As a result, a message is displayed on the manned sales office terminal (S143). Tellers at the window can know in advance that payments from accounts that are likely to be fraudulent accounts are rejected by the ATM and the recipient may come to the window for payment. .

  Next, the procedure at the window shown in the lower part of FIG. 13 will be described. The payee who is refused payment by ATM visits a window with a manned sales office terminal (S150). At the counter, the recipient presents a guide receipt with a serial number output by the ATM. The teller who has received the presentation performs an inquiry operation on the account payment logging DB at first glance based on the serial number key on the receipt print (S151). The manned terminal transmits an inquiry message to the server system 11 by an account payment logging DB inquiry operation at first glance (S152). The host payment processing unit 11b searches the account payment logging DB at first glance (S153), and returns the transaction history contents to the manned terminal (S154).

  The window terminal displays the transaction history content based on the returned content (S155). The teller confirms the transaction history contents, confirms the identity of the recipient, continues the requested payment transaction if the identity confirmation is OK, and handles according to a predetermined rule if the identity confirmation is NG. If the identity cannot be verified, there is a high possibility that the account of another person is illegally used, so that the payment can be refused, thereby preventing money from being transferred to the transfer fraud culprit.

  Next, details of the analysis processing executed in S059 of FIG. 7 will be described based on the flowcharts of FIGS. The host transfer processing unit 11a edits the recipient name from the acquired bank account information (S201), and edits whether the bank account is a biometric account from the acquired bank account information (S202). Further, it is checked from the acquired transfer account information whether the transfer account is a biometric authentication account (S203).

  As a result of the check in S203, if it is determined that the bank account is a biometric authentication account (S204, Yes), the bank account status is set to “A” (S205), and a visual check is performed after S213 Proceed to If it is not a biometric authentication account (S204, No), the presence or absence of monitoring information is checked (S206). If there is no monitoring information (S207, Yes), the transfer destination account status is set to “B” (S208), and the process proceeds to a visual check after S213. If there is monitoring information (S207, No), check the ratio of the apparent account balance and the account balance (look account balance ÷ account balance), or the ratio of the total account transfer count and the total transfer count (appearance account transfer) The total number divided by the total number of transfers is checked (S209). If these ratios are less than or equal to a predetermined rate (S210, Yes), the transfer destination account status is set to “C” (S211), and if it is greater than the predetermined rate, the transfer destination account status is set to “D” ( S212).

  After the transfer destination account status is set to any one of A to D, the host transfer processing unit 11a checks the look of the transfer destination account (S213). If the account is a non-look account (S214, Yes), the transferor status is set to “4” (S215). If it is an account at first glance (S214, No), the input contents such as the transfer request name, transfer urgency, transfer requester attribute, fact confirmation, etc. are checked (S216). When the values of these items are all “0” input (S217, Yes), the transfer person status is set to “3”. If all of them are not “0” input, input details such as transfer request name, transfer urgency, transfer requester attribute, fact confirmation, etc. are checked (S219). If some of these items are “0” input (S220, Yes, FIG. 15), the transferor status is set to “2”, and if not “0” input (S220, No), the transferor status Is set to “1”.

  After the transfer person status is set to any one of 1 to 4, the combination of the transfer destination account status and the transfer person status is checked (S223). The analysis matrix of the transfer person information and the transfer destination account monitoring information is shown in FIG. In the case of the combination A-1 (S224, Yes), in the case of the combination A-2 (S225, Yes), in the case of the combination C-3 (S226, Yes), the low-level alert message is edited (S235). . In the case of the combination B-1 (S227, Yes), in the case of the combination B-2 (S228, Yes), and in the case of the combination C-2 (S229, Yes), the medium level alert message is edited (S236). . In the case of the combination C-1 (S230, Yes) and in the case of the combination D-3 (S231, Yes), the high-level alert message is edited (S237). In the case of the combination D-1 (S232, Yes) and in the case of the combination D-2 (S233, Yes), the guidance message to the bank window is edited, and the confirmation button is disabled (S238, FIG. 16). ). In the case of other combinations, the alert message is not edited (S234). In any case, the recipient name, the biometric authentication account presence / absence edit character, the analysis result message, and the transfer execution button pressing control instruction data are edited and returned to the ATM (S239).

  As described above, it is possible to accurately determine the fraudulent use account by analyzing based on the visibility of the bank account, the presence or absence of monitoring information, the number and balance, the situation of the transfer person, etc. With regard to the determined account, payment by ATM is prohibited, and by confirming the identity as a response at the counter, payment can be refused depending on the case, and the occurrence of damage caused by wire fraud can be prevented.

  Next, the contents of the aggregation process in the special transaction will be described based on the flowcharts of FIGS. 17 and 18. The portion described here is an example of processing used for collecting, analyzing, and monitoring the monitoring information provided in the corresponding account. This processing is executed by, for example, the terminal total processing unit 15a in the headquarters terminal 15 and the host total processing unit 11c in the bank server system 11 shown in FIG.

  The host tabulation processing unit 11c starts the host tabulation processing program when the daily work starts (S301). This program executes two processes simultaneously when started. One process checks all accounts existing in the bank at regular time intervals (S302, S303), and collects the accounts in which monitoring information exists and the monitoring information in the collection DB (S304). This process is continued until the daily work is completed (S305, S306). The other process is an inquiry process for a request from the terminal. The host totalization processing unit 11c waits while checking the inquiry reception from the terminal (S307, S308). When the operator operates the terminal (S309), the terminal tabulation processing unit 15a transmits an inquiry message to the host tabulation processing unit 11c (S310).

  When there is an inquiry reception from the terminal (S308, Yes), the inquiry message is analyzed (S311). In this example, when an account with an apparent account balance of a predetermined ratio or more is inquired, the monitoring information collection DB is sequentially read (S314), the corresponding items are extracted from the sequentially read data, and the apparent account balance and the account balance are extracted. The ratio is calculated, and the numerical value is compared with the ratio data input by the operator (S315, FIG. 18). If the conditions are matched (S316, Yes), the matched data is accumulated in the temporary summary DB (S137), and it is checked whether the monitoring information collection DB has been read (S318). If reading is not completed (S319, No), the processing from S314 is repeated. When the reading is completed (S319, Yes), the data group that matches the reading condition is edited for the corresponding inquiry (S320).

  If the inquiry from the terminal is not an account whose account balance is not less than a predetermined ratio (S312, No), other inquiry processing is executed (S313). In either case, the edited data is returned as reference data to the terminal, and the processing from S307 in FIG. 17 is repeated. The terminal side displays the received inquiry data on the screen (S322), and ends the processing on the terminal side.

  By executing the special processing as described above, it is also possible to create a list of accounts that may have been used for wire fraud, so for example, the recipient can proceed to the payment procedure without going through the ATM. Even if you do, you can determine whether it is a high risk account by checking the account number, and if it is a high risk account, take measures such as strict identity verification As a result, money can be prevented from being transferred to the criminal of the transfer fraud.

(Appendix 1) Accepting means for accepting a transfer from the transfer person to the payee,
A first determination unit that determines whether or not the transfer destination is a new transfer destination that has not been transferred in the past when the receiving unit receives the transfer;
When the accepting unit accepts the transfer, the transfer information is transmitted. When the first determining unit determines that the transfer destination is a new transfer destination, the transfer information indicates that the transfer is a new transfer destination. Transmission means for adding identification information and transmitting;
Receiving means for receiving the transfer information;
Second determination means for collecting the transfer information received by the reception means and determining whether the transfer destination account is an unauthorized use account based on the identification information;
An account fraud prevention device, comprising: a restricting means for restricting withdrawal from the bank account when the second judging means determines that the account is fraudulent use.
(Additional remark 2) The said 1st determination means determines whether it is a new transfer destination by referring to the transfer history of the transfer person recorded on the database, The account fraudulent use of Additional remark 1 characterized by the above-mentioned Prevention device.
(Additional remark 3) The said 2nd determination means determines whether it is a fraudulent use account based on at least one of the total amount of the transfer and the number of transfers to which the said identification information was added. Account fraud prevention device of description.
(Additional remark 4) The said restriction | limiting means prohibits the cash withdrawal with an automatic teller machine about the account which the said 2nd determination means determined to be a fraudulent use account, and displays the message of accepting payment at a window The apparatus for preventing unauthorized use of an account as set forth in appendix 1, wherein the device is used for output.
(Supplementary note 5) The supplementary means 1 does not restrict withdrawal from an account when an automatic teller machine of a bank that handles the transfer destination account supports biometric authentication. Account fraud prevention device.
(Appendix 6)
An acceptance step for accepting a transfer from the transferor to the payee;
A first determination step of determining whether or not the transfer destination is a new transfer destination that has not been transferred in the past when the transfer is received in the reception step;
When the transfer is accepted in the accepting step, the transfer information is transmitted. When the transfer destination is determined to be a new transfer destination in the first determination step, the transfer information indicates that the transfer is a new transfer destination. A transmission step of adding identification information and transmitting;
A receiving step of receiving the transfer information;
A second determination step of collecting the transfer information received in the reception step and determining whether or not the transfer destination account is an unauthorized use account based on the identification information;
And a restricting step of restricting withdrawal from the bank account when the second determining step determines that the account is an unauthorized use account.
(Appendix 7) In the first determination step, it is determined whether or not the account is a new transfer destination by referring to the transfer history of the transfer person recorded in the database. Prevention method.
(Additional remark 8) In the said 2nd determination step, it is determined whether it is a fraudulent use account based on at least one of the total amount of the transfer to which the said identification information was added, and the number of transfers. The account fraud prevention method described.
(Supplementary note 9) In the restriction step, for the account determined to be fraudulent use account in the second determination step, the withdrawal of cash by the automatic teller machine is prohibited, and the message that the payment is accepted at the window The account fraud prevention method according to appendix 6, characterized in that:
(Supplementary note 10) The supplementary note 6 is characterized in that the restriction means does not restrict withdrawal from the account when the automatic teller machine of the bank handling the transfer destination account supports biometric authentication. Account fraud prevention method.
(Appendix 11) Accepting means for accepting a transfer from the transferor to the payee,
A database that manages the transfer history of the transfer person,
If the transfer destination is a new transfer destination that has not been transferred in the past based on the transfer information input when the receiving means has received the transfer and the history information collected from the database, the transfer A determination means for determining that there is a possibility of an unauthorized use account,
An account fraud prevention device, comprising: a restricting means for restricting a transfer by the accepting means when the judging means judges that there is a possibility that the transfer destination is an unauthorized use account.
(Additional remark 12) The said restriction | limiting means issues the warning of a different level based on the condition of the said transfer destination account, and the condition of a transfer person, The account unauthorized use prevention apparatus of Additional remark 11 characterized by the above-mentioned.
(Additional remark 13) The said restriction | limiting means prohibits the transfer with an automatic teller machine about the account which the said determination means determined to be an unauthorized use account, and outputs the message to the effect of accepting transfer at a window The account fraud prevention device according to appendix 11.
(Appendix 14) The fraudulent account according to appendix 11, wherein the restricting means does not restrict the transfer when the automatic teller machine of the bank handling the transfer destination account supports biometric authentication. Use prevention device.

It is a block diagram which shows an example of the bank network system to which the account fraud prevention device of this invention is applied. It is a block diagram which shows the detail of the bank network system shown in FIG. It is a flowchart (1/7) which shows the transfer process in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (2/7) which shows the transfer process in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (3/7) which shows the transfer process in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (4/7) which shows the transfer process in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (5/7) which shows the transfer process in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (6/7) which shows the transfer process in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (7/7) which shows the transfer process in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (1/4) which shows the payment process in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (2/4) which shows the payment process in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (3/4) which shows the payment process in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (4/4) which shows the payment process in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (1/3) which shows the analysis process of transfer person information and account information in the system to which the account fraud prevention apparatus of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (2/3) which shows the analysis process of transfer person information and account information in the system to which the account fraud prevention apparatus of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (3/3) which shows the analysis process of transfer person information and account information in the system to which the account fraud prevention apparatus of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (1/2) which shows the total process of the special transaction in the system to which the account fraud prevention apparatus of this invention was applied. It is a flowchart (2/2) which shows the total process of the special transaction in the system to which the account fraud prevention apparatus of this invention was applied. It is an example of a screen at the time of transaction start of ATM in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of the present invention is applied. It is an example of the screen of ATM transfer method selection in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of the present invention is applied. It is an example of the guidance screen to the card transfer of ATM in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of the present invention is applied. It is a format example of transfer logging DB in the system to which the account fraud prevention apparatus of this invention was applied. It is an example of input item display of ATM in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of the present invention is applied. It is an example of the table contents in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of the present invention is applied. It is an example of an ATM transfer screen (an input completion example in the case of card transfer) in a system to which the account fraud prevention device of the present invention is applied. It is an example of a transfer destination account inquiry transmission message in a system to which the account fraud prevention device of the present invention is applied. It is a transfer screen (example of confirmation screen) of ATM in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of the present invention is applied. It is an example of a reply message with respect to a transfer destination account information inquiry in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of the present invention is applied. It is an example of the transfer message | telegram in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of this invention was applied. It is a table | surface which shows the caution transmission information (monitoring information) addition conditions in the system to which the account unauthorized use prevention apparatus of this invention was applied. It is an example of an account information and monitoring information configuration diagram in a system to which the account fraud prevention device of the present invention is applied. It is a format example of payment logging DB in the system to which the account fraud prevention apparatus of this invention was applied. It is an example of an analysis matrix of the transfer person information and the monitoring information of the transfer destination account in the system to which the account fraud prevention device of the present invention is applied.

Explanation of symbols

10 Bank A financial institution information system 11 Bank A server system 11a Host transfer processing unit 11b Host payment processing unit 11c Host tabulation processing unit 12 Account DB
13 Bank Network 14 ATM
14a ATM transfer processing unit 14b ATM payment processing unit 15 Terminal 15a Terminal aggregation processing unit 20 F bank financial institution information system 31 X bank server system 41 Y bank server system

Claims (3)

A first accepting means for accepting information relating to the transfer from the transfer person to the financial institution account;
By referring to the transfer history of the transfer person stored in the database, whether the financial institution account of the transfer destination received by the first receiving means is a new transfer destination that has not been transferred in the past from the transfer person First determination means for determining
When the first determination means determines that the bank account of the transfer destination is a new transfer destination, a new transfer identification information addition for adding identification information indicating that it is a new transfer destination to the information related to the transfer Means,
Monitoring means for accumulating the number and total amount of information related to the transfer to which the identification information is added for each financial institution account, and storing it in a storage means;
Second accepting means for accepting information relating to the transfer of funds from the financial institution account;
The balance of the financial institution account of the fund transfer source of the total amount for the transfer to which the identification information stored in the storage unit is added with respect to the financial institution account of the fund transfer source accepted by the second accepting unit depending on whether the ratio is more than the predetermined ratio, a second determination means for determining whether or not the financial institution account is unauthorized account,
A financial transaction processing apparatus comprising:   Restriction means for prohibiting withdrawal of cash by an automatic teller machine and outputting a message to accept payment at the counter for the financial institution account determined by the second judging means as an unauthorized use account The financial transaction processing apparatus according to claim 1, further comprising:   3. The financial transaction according to claim 2, wherein the restriction means does not restrict withdrawal from an account when an automatic teller machine of a bank handling the transfer destination account supports biometric authentication. Processing equipment.