JP2810277B2 - Accident determination device for electric railway power facilities - Google Patents

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to an electric power management system for supplying electric power to a train or a facility in a railway pipe, and to an accident judging device for judging whether accident information is caused by a train.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art The cause of failure based on accident information has been conventionally determined based on operation information of circuit breakers and protection relays of a substation taken from a remote monitoring control device. According to this, the location where the accident occurred can be estimated from the device or the interlocking relationship indicated by the accident information, and it is possible to judge whether there is a ground fault location or an accident facility.

[0003] However, in the case of a running train, the position is not fixed. Therefore, even if the accident is caused by the train, it cannot be distinguished from an abnormality of the ground equipment such as a substation, and the accident information of the conventional remote monitoring control device is not recognized. From this, it was not possible to judge the true cause of the failure, especially the accident caused by the train.

[0004]

However, when there is an abnormality in a train, the traveling of the train spreads over a wide range of accidents, and as a result, normal monitoring and control of power equipment such as continuous protection operation over a wide range. It may cause trouble.

[0005] It is an object of the present invention to provide an accident judging device in electric power equipment for electric railways, which quickly determines when equipment operation information is caused by a train. As a result, the running of the failed train can be stopped, and the spread of the accident can be prevented.

[0006]

The present invention is configured as follows to achieve the above object.

A first aspect of the present invention is an electric railway power facility having a plurality of substations for supplying power via a power line for each section, and an accident confirmation by re-inputting when a breaker of the substation operates. A remote monitoring control device (hereinafter referred to as a remote control) that determines the cause of an accident in conjunction with the remote control, Input means for inputting accident information including the name of the operating device, and a breaker other than that the breaker of the fault information is a breaker that cuts off the substation and the feeder, and is not protected and linked to the breaker. If the vessel is not operating, the accident information is output as a train accident possibility estimating means that outputs the possibility of an accident to the train, and if the possibility of the accident is output to the train, the accident is output. A circuit breaker in the same cable section as the information The accident information is read from the accident history file or checked before the operation time, and if there is an accident history in the section, the accident information is determined to be caused by the train and output, and It is characterized by comprising a train accident judging means for storing the accident information in the accident history file regardless of the judgment, and the accident history file for storing an operation time, a power line section, and an operating device name.

[0008] In a second aspect of the present invention, the train accident determining means includes:
When there is no accident history in the section, the accident information of the circuit breaker in the adjacent section in the reverse direction adjacent to the section in the direction opposite to the train traveling is read within the past predetermined time or read from the accident history file. And when there is an accident history, it is determined that the accident information is caused by a train.

The third invention checks the history information of the accident information in the section concerned, checks the history information of the adjacent section in the reverse direction in some cases, and judges that the cause is due to the train in some cases. Features.

[0010]

According to the first aspect of the present invention, first, it is estimated whether or not there is a possibility of an accident in the train based on the generated accident information based on the operation state of the breaker of the feeder cable which supplies power to the train through the trolley wire. Next, when there is an accident history within a predetermined period in the past in the key line section (of the operation breaker) of the possible operation information, it is determined that the operation information is based on the train. This is because after the first operation information is stored in the key line section, the operation breaker of the first operation information is re-input by the re-input command of the control center, so if the accident is caused by a train failure, it will be re-input. This is because operation information is generated.

According to the present invention, the first operation information and the second operation information upon re-insertion of the predetermined power line section are confirmed, and it is determined that the train passing through the power line section has an accident cause. Therefore, an accurate determination result can be obtained.

The second aspect of the present invention addresses a case in which a train with an abnormality is advanced and enters another cable section, and then is re-inserted. If there is a train accident, operation information is generated by re-entering from another section where the train has advanced. But,
Since history information has not yet been accumulated in this section, if history information is not found in the section, the accident history of the immediately preceding section, that is, the section adjacent in the direction opposite to the traveling direction, is checked. It can be determined that a train accident has occurred.

[0013] According to this, it is possible to cope with the movement of the accident point peculiar to the train, and the judgment of the train accident can be made before re-insertion, so that the early judgment of the train accident becomes possible.

[0014] In the third invention, after the double check by re-introduction of the first invention, the accident history of the previous section is checked, so that the abnormal train travels over two or more sections. In addition, a more accurate determination of a train accident can be made.

[0015]

DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS Embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings.

FIG. 1 shows a conceptual diagram of a power management system for an electric railway to which the present invention is applied. Here, only a power line system for supplying electric power to a train is shown. The remote monitoring control device 2 is a remote monitoring control device control station device (hereinafter abbreviated as a master station) 20.
And remote monitoring and control equipment controlled station equipment (hereinafter abbreviated as slave station)
21 to 2n, and are connected to each other by a communication line.
The master station 20 is connected to the control computer 3. The control computer 3 is a local area network (hereinafter, LAN)
) Is connected to the inference device 1 serving as the train accident determination device of the present invention. The control computer 3, master station 20, and inference apparatus 1 are located in a control center. Note that the inference apparatus 1 may be provided as one function of the control computer 3.

The slave station 21 is connected to the power circuit breakers 411 and 412, which are devices to be monitored and controlled in the substation 41, by signal lines (not shown), and is monitored and controlled by the control computer 3.
Hereinafter, the slave station 22 includes devices 421 and 422 in the substation 42,
The slave station 2n is connected to the devices 4n1 and 4n2 in the substation 4n, and operates in the same manner.

The feeder breaker 411 in the substation 41 is connected to the feeder 50, and the feeder breaker 412 is connected to the feeder 51. The other end of the feeder wire 51 is connected to a feeder breaker 421 in the substation 42, and another feeder breaker 422 in the substation is connected to the feeder wire 52 in an adjacent section. Similarly, the feeder breaker 4n0 in the substation 4n is connected to the feeder 5n-1.
In addition, the feeder breaker 4n2 is connected to the feeder wire 5n. The electric train 6 travels by receiving the supply of these electric wires. The power circuit breaker is connected to the power supply equipment of the substation on the opposite side connected to the power line, and is connected to the transmission line from the upper substation or the power station via the power receiving circuit breakers 410 to 41n and the like. You. The substation loads include ground facilities such as station facilities in addition to trains, and are each connected via circuit breakers (not shown). The control computer 3 also monitors and controls these load control devices through the remote monitoring control device 2.

The electric power to the train is transmitted from the substation via the power line,
The electric power is supplied through a trolley wire, which is divided into a plurality of electric wires, and the divided power supply unit is called a section. In ordinary work, the load varies depending on the train operation density and the passenger occupancy rate, and accordingly, it is required to efficiently operate facilities for supplying electric power in accordance with the load.

At the time of an automatic operation by a program stored in the control computer 3 or an operation by a commander, operation information such as inputting and releasing (blocking) of the device output from the control computer 3 is transmitted to the operation target device through the master station 20. The slave station, which is transmitted to a slave station of a certain substation and receives the operation signal, operates the operation target device in the own substation according to the content of the operation signal. On the other hand, the slave station collects state changes such as on, off, and third ranks due to the operation and protection operation of the controlled device in the installed substation from the operating device through a signal line, and as operation information through the communication line, the master station 20. Send to Here, the operation information of the equipment is obtained by encoding the name of the operation equipment, the name of the installation substation, the operation time, and the state after the operation (operation direction). The operation information is the name of the operation target equipment, the name of the installation substation. ,
The operation time and operation direction are coded.

As described above, in the normal monitoring and control, the device operation information is paired with the operation information. Therefore, by detecting a case where there is only one of the information, an abnormality in the vicinity of the device and its connection destination is detected. Can be found. If there is only operation information but no operation information, a failure of the target device or a failure of the communication line may be considered. If only the operation information of the device is not accompanied by the operation information, a failure accident at a portion related to the device is considered. When a failure occurs, the protection relay may operate depending on the cause and the operating device, and operation information of the protection relay is also generated. Further, information of the device operated by the protection interlock may be subsequently generated. These pieces of information are sequentially displayed on the display device of the control computer 3 and sent to the inference device 1.

FIG. 2 shows the configuration of the inference apparatus. Inference device 1
Are the main storage device 13 on the common bus 12 of the central processing unit 11,
It is configured by connecting an external storage device 14, a display input device 15 composed of a display, a keyboard, and a mouse, and a communication control device 16. These are connected to the control computer 3 via the LAN by the communication control device 16. As a result, the equipment operation information from the slave stations provided at each substation is input to the control computer, and the information necessary for the accident determination is input to the inference apparatus 1 from among them.

FIG. 3 shows a data flow diagram of the inference apparatus.
The central processing unit 11 includes an information receiving process 111, an inference process 1
12. It has the functions of the man-machine processing 113 and determines an accident while exchanging data with a database or a file in the external storage device 14. FIG. 4 shows the format of each of these databases and files.

First, when device operation information (may be an interrupt command) is detected from the communication processing device 16, the information receiving process 1 is started.
11 is activated, and collects the operation information of the devices that are linked to protection in a fixed time range (5 to 10 seconds) and stores the collected information in the failure information file 141. FIG. 5 shows a processing flow of the inference processing 112. The inference process 112 is started when the information reception process 111 ends. First, the failure information file 141 is collated with the equipment database 142 in which the connection state of the devices is described as frame data.
Create 44. Next, according to the inference rules created from the knowledge of past train accidents stored in the inference database 143, the possibility of a train abnormality is checked for the input operation information (step 5001).

If there is a possibility, the device further refers to the failure accident history file (step 5002), and checks whether there is history information for the device in the same section as the input operation information (step 5003). Is updated (step 5005), and a train accident is determined (step 5).
008) and outputs the result to the inference result output file 145.
(Step 5009).

If there is no history information in the same section in step 5003, it is checked whether there is history information in the adjacent section in the reverse direction (the adjacent section in the direction opposite to the train travel) (step 5003).
4) If yes, update the history data (step 500)
6), a train accident is determined (step 5008). According to this, it is possible to determine even if an apparent accident section moves one after another due to a phenomenon specific to a train accident. Step 50
If the determination at step 5008 follows steps 5004 and 5006 after 05, the determination of a train accident can be made more accurately.

If there is no history information in step 5004, it is stored as new history data in the accident history file 146 (step 5007). At this stage, only the history data is secured, and the determination of the train accident is not performed. However, in the power management system for electric railways, if there is operation (breaking) information of the circuit breaker, the circuit breaker is turned on again after a predetermined time (DC section: 30 seconds to 1 minute), and the operation information is generated again. If it does, it is determined that an accident has occurred. Therefore, the information accumulated in step 5007 is referred to as history data based on operation information by re-input, and in this case, a train accident is determined along the processing route in steps 5005 and 5008.

As a result of the inference, the man-machine process 113 is appropriately started, and the data of the inference result output file 145 is output to the display device 15.

Next, specific examples shown in FIGS. 6 to 9 will be described. In this example, the train 6 passing through the section 51
Of the cable 51, an overcurrent flows through the cable 51,
The power circuit breaker 412 of the substation 41 that supplies power to the substation 41 detects an overload and operates (cuts off). Subsequent to this, the power circuit breaker 421 of the substation 42 in which the protection interlock is specified.
Also works. Furthermore, the protection relays related before and after these operations also operate. Information on the operated devices is coded from the slave stations 21 and 22 together with the operation time and the like, the device name, the operation direction (open / close), and the like, and is transmitted to the master station 20 through the communication line as the device operation information. The master station 20 sends the received device operation information to the control computer 3 connected via the LAN. It is assumed that the computer 3 sends operation information of the circuit breaker to the inference apparatus 1.

FIG. 6 shows the failure group information file 141.
In the example, the occurrence time 15:00, the substation name 41, the operating device name 412, the operation direction 0 (interruption), and the substation name 42, the operation device name 421, and the operation direction 0 after one second are stored. . FIG. 7 shows an example of the equipment database 142, which stores the types of circuit breakers of the substation 41 and the substation 42, the power line section, the substations that are linked to protection, and the names of their devices.
It can be seen from the figure that the device 412 and the device 421 in the device operation information are in a protection-linked relationship. FIG. 8 shows the file 141
And an example of an inference knowledge base 144 created from the database 142. In accordance with the input device operation information, data necessary for inference is collected as failure information. In the figure, the reverse traveling adjacent section is a section adjacent to the section in which the device operation information is generated in the reverse direction of the train traveling, and is the section 50 in this example.

FIG. 9 shows an example of an inference rule for estimating the possibility of a train accident based on operation information (step 5001). Rule 1 is "execute rule 2 if the operating device is a circuit breaker." As shown in FIG. 6, since the operation information is the circuit breaker 412, the rule 2 "execute rule 3 if the protection interlocking device is operating" is executed. Since the keyed circuit breaker 421, which is a protection interlocking device of the keyed circuit breaker 412, is operating, the rule 3 "If there is no other operating device in the same substation, there is a possibility of a train failure" is executed. In the predetermined time range of the file creation in FIG. 6, there is no other operating device in the substation 41. Therefore, based on this inference, the operation information of the device 412 is "possible a train failure".
Is determined, and the process proceeds to step 5002 and subsequent steps.

If the history data of the device 412 is in the accident history file, the current operation information is due to the re-input, and it is immediately determined that the train accident continues (50).
08). By chance, the first operation information is that the faulty train is in section 5
0 and may have moved to the section 51 at the time of re-input. In this case, the accident history of the adjacent section 50 is checked. As a result, if the operation information of the circuit breaker 411 is stored, the failure cause is specific to the train as having moved in the section, and it can be determined that a train accident has occurred. In this case, a check may also be made for the section one immediately before. However, in this case, it is necessary to hold the data of the history information file for at least one section passage time of the train.

If the cause of the fault accident is a train, the required monitoring time (which is also the retention time of the history data) differs depending on the location of the fault that caused the fault. If there is a failure in the train pantograph, electric motor, or the like, an overload occurs immediately after the re-input and the circuit breaker operates again, so the re-input time is one measure. However, a failure such as an air conditioner may not be immediately affected by re-input. For this reason, a certain monitoring time (about several minutes to about 10 minutes) is provided after the circuit breaker is turned on to detect the re-operation of the circuit breaker, and if the above-described determination condition is satisfied within this monitoring time, the same train may be the cause. It can be treated as one failure accident.

However, if the monitoring time is made too long,
There is a possibility that two failure accidents due to different causes may be mistakenly regarded as the same, or an erroneous determination may occur due to accumulation of accidental malfunction information, so that an appropriate time must be set. For this reason, the monitoring time and the history data may be managed dually, or the history data exceeding the monitoring time based on the re-input time may be deleted from the accident history file and managed separately.

[0035]

According to the present invention, it is possible to automatically judge a train accident from accident information in electric railway power equipment, so that it is possible to prevent an accident from spreading due to running of an abnormal train.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a conceptual diagram of a power management system to which the present invention is applied.

FIG. 2 is a configuration diagram of an inference device.

FIG. 3 is a data flow diagram showing an embodiment of an inference apparatus serving as a core of the accident determination apparatus according to the present invention.

FIG. 4 is a data table showing each file structure provided in a storage device of the inference device.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a process of determining a train failure accident.

FIG. 6 is a table showing an example of a failure group information file.

FIG. 7 is a table showing an example of a facility database.

FIG. 8 is a table showing an example of an inference knowledge base.

FIG. 9 is a table showing an example of an inference rule in an inference database.

[Explanation of symbols]

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 ... Reasoning device, 2 ... Remote monitoring control device, 3 ... Control computer, 6 ... Train, 11 ... Central processing unit (CPU), 14 ...
External storage device, 15 display input device, 16 communication control device, 20 master station, 21-2n slave station, 41-4n substation, 51-5n key wire, 410-41n power receiving circuit breaker, 411 to 4n2: electric circuit breaker, 111: information reception processing means, 112: inference processing means, 113: man-machine processing means, 141: failure (operation) information file, 143 ...
Knowledge base for inference, 146: Failure accident history file.

──────────────────────────────────────────────────続 き Continuing on the front page (72) Inventor Yasuhiro Terada 5-2-1 Omikacho, Hitachi City, Ibaraki Prefecture Inside the Hitachi, Ltd. Omika Plant (72) Inventor Ichiro Deno 1-6-6 Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo No. 5 East Japan Railway Company (72) Inventor Seiichi Takahashi 1-6-5 Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo Inside East Japan Railway Company (56) References JP-A-4-344126 (JP, A) ( 58) Field surveyed (Int. Cl. ⁶ , DB name) H02J 13/00 301 H02J 3/00

Claims (3)

(57) [Claims] 1. An electric railway power system having a plurality of substations for supplying electric power via a power line for each section, and a remote monitoring control for confirming an accident by reconnecting when a breaker of the substation operates. Equipment (hereinafter referred to as a remote control), which determines the cause of an accident in conjunction with the remote control. Input means for inputting accident information including the accident information within a predetermined time range, and a key breaker other than the one in which the operating device of the accident information is a key breaker that cuts off the substation and the key line and that is linked to the key breaker with protection When the circuit breaker is not operating, the accident information is output to the train as a possibility of the cause of the accident, and a train accident possibility estimating means is output.If the possibility of the cause of the accident is output to the train, In the same key line section as the accident information, If the accident information of the breaker is before the operation time or is read from the accident history file and checked, if there is an accident history in the section, the accident information is determined to be caused by the train and output, And a train accident determining means for storing the accident information in the accident history file irrespective of the judgment; and an accident history file for storing operation time, power line section, and operation device name. Of accident determination in electric railway power equipment. 2. The train accident judging means, if there is no accident history in the section, the accident information of the circuit breaker in the adjacent section in the reverse direction adjacent to the section in the direction opposite to the traveling of the train. 2. The electric railway power according to claim 1, wherein whether the time is within a predetermined time is read from the accident history file and checked, and if there is an accident history, the accident information is determined to be caused by a train. Accident determination device in equipment. 3. The train accident judging means further includes, if there is an accident history in the section, the accident information of the circuit breaker in a reverse adjoining section adjacent to the section in a direction opposite to the train traveling in the past. Is read from the accident history file to check if it is within the predetermined time, and if there is also an accident history in the backward adjacent section, the accident information is determined to be caused by the train and output. The accident judging device in the electric railway power equipment according to claim 1, wherein