JPS6346656B2 - - Google Patents

Description

[Detailed description of the invention]

The present invention relates to a method for detecting faulty equipment in a system, and in particular, accumulates status changes from the system in charge and adjacent systems, and determines from this status change whether the faulty equipment exists in the system in charge, the upper power supply system, or both. Regarding the detection method. Conventionally, faulty equipment in a power system is detected by determining whether the power outage is due to an accident in a particular system, based on operating information of protective relays, trippers, and disconnectors, and operating information of no-voltage detection relays in the system in charge. If it is not this system, then the adjacent system is the upper power system, so predict that the power outage is due to an accident there, and confirm by making a telephone call from the system in charge to the adjacent system. It took a lot of time to recover from the accident because it was necessary to determine whether the accident was an accident in the upper power supply system, an accident in the upper power supply system, or a combination of both. In addition, since faulty equipment is detected only by the protection range data of activated protective relays or the trip information of the cut-off circuit breaker as described above, if a malfunction or malfunction of the cut-off switch occurs, This results in incorrect detection. Furthermore, since the protection range of an activated protection relay varies depending on the open/closed state of the switch within the range, it takes a long time to determine the protection range. Furthermore, when the responsible system experiences a power outage due to an accident in the upper power supply system, or when the responsible system experiences a power outage due to a duplicate accident between the upper power supply system and the responsible system, the cause of the power outage cannot be immediately determined. The present invention addresses the above-mentioned conventional problems and the need for faster and more reliable recovery operations in the event of an accident in order to ensure a more stable supply of power as power system equipment becomes larger and more complex. In view of this, we provide a method that accurately and quickly determines which equipment has an accident, and also accurately and quickly distinguishes between accidents within the monitoring range of the power system monitoring system (the system in charge) and accidents in the upper power system that is not in charge. It is intended to. An embodiment of the present invention will be described below with reference to the attached drawings. The present invention provides protection relay operation information within the responsible system,
Operation information of breaker, UVR (no voltage detection relay)
The system is characterized by inputting operational information of the system and UVR of the upper power supply system by appropriate means, and using that information to detect equipment failures or accidents. FIG. 11 shows a system configuration when the method of the present invention is applied to a computer system that monitors power systems and substation equipment. In Figure 11
CB1 to CB4 represent the power line disconnectors of the upper power supply system (power system close to the power source), CB5 to CB9 represent the power line disconnectors of the system in charge, UVR represents the no-voltage detection relay, and l represents the power transmission line. . Grid disconnectors CB1 to CB9
on/off status of switchgear and protection relays and UVR
The operating status (monitoring information) of the is transmitted from the telecontrollers 1 to 4 to the computer systems 7 and 8 via the input devices 5 and 6 at regular intervals as digital information (for example, "1" when it is on, "1" when it is off). 0" respectively. Only the operation information of the UVR is taken in from the computer system 7 that monitors the upper power supply system to the computer system 8 on the side of the system in charge. Note that the system in charge in FIG.
Pilot wire relay as shown in figure 0
There are equipment such as PWRy, bus protector relay BPR, and directional ground fault relay DGR, and their operation information is captured and monitored. In the system configured as described above, detection and determination of accidental equipment is performed according to the flow shown in FIG. In step S1 in Fig. ₁ , changes in conditions over a certain period of time from the system in charge and adjacent systems that occur at the time of an accident, such as information on the operation of protection relays, trip switches, and disconnectors from the system in charge, and information on combinations thereof ( (hereinafter referred to as trip order), operational information of no-voltage detection relays, and changes in operational information of no-voltage detection relays from adjacent systems.
Next, in step _S2 , it is determined whether or not the protection relay of the system in charge is operating, and if yes, in step _S3 , it is determined whether or not the UVR of the upper power supply system is operating. If there is no UVR operation, it is considered as (1) an accident in the responsible system (Step S ₄ ), and if there is UVR operation, it is considered as (3) a duplicate accident between the responsible system and the upper power system (Step S ₅ ). be considered. If it is determined that there is no protection relay operation in the system in charge (step S ₂ ), the operation of the UVR of the upper power supply system is determined in step S ₆ , and if yes, (2) It is assumed that there is an accident in the power supply system (step S ₇ ), and if there is no accident, it is determined that there is no accident (step S ₈ ). Next, detect the accident equipment according to the flow shown in Figure 1.
An example of a processing section and a data section for executing the determination will be explained with reference to FIG. 12. In Figure 12, 2
Reference numeral 1 denotes a state change detection unit that checks monitoring information sent from the telecontrollers 1 to 4 shown in FIG. 11 at regular intervals and detects differences from the previous state. The condition change detection unit 21 sends the position where there is a difference (switches, protection relays, and UVRs expressed by names or numbers) to the next processing unit, the upper system/system determination unit 22, and also to the online data unit 23. Update its status. This state is used as the previous state in the next cycle's check. The upper/in-charge system determining unit 22 uses the first position sent as a trigger to accumulate state change positions for a certain period of time, for example, 10 seconds (step S 1 in FIG. ₁ ). After a certain period of time, each position is checked to see if there is a protection relay and UVR in the upper power supply system.
Protection relay data section 24 and UVR data section 2
5 (steps in Figure 1)
_S2 , _S3 , _S6 ). All the protection relays of the responsible power system are registered in the protection relay data section 24.
All UVRs of the responsible power system and the upper power system are registered in the UVR data section 25. As a result of the judgment (steps S ₂ , S ₃ ) in the upper and responsible system determining section 22, if the protection relay of the responsible system is activated, all status change positions are transferred to the next processing section, the responsible system failure equipment determining section 26 ( Send to step _S4 ). As a result of the judgment (steps S ₂ , S ₆ ) in the upper/responsible system determining unit 22, if there is an operation of the UVR in the upper power system, the position is sent to the upper power system failure determining unit 27 (step S ₇ ). As a result of the judgment (steps S ₂ and S ₃ ) in the judgment section 22, if both the protection relay and the UVR operate, it is recognized that there is a duplicate accident in both the upper and responsible systems, and both the judgment sections 26 and 27 (Step _S5 ). The above processing corresponds to the broken line portion in FIG. Next, the fault equipment determination unit 26 in charge of the system uses the online data unit 2 to determine the position that has been sent.
3. Protection relay data section 24, CB data section 28,
While referring to the information in the trip order data section 29, the accident confirmation and the faulty equipment are determined as follows (steps S ₄ and S ₅ ). First, extract the protection relay and disconnector CB from the sent position.
An activated protective relay and an open disconnector
Using the CB (tripped CB) as a key, search the trip order data and extract the accident equipment. Trip order data is data that combines a protection relay, the equipment it protects, and the CB to be tripped, and is set in advance, for example, as shown in Table 1 below.

[Table] Then, in Table 1, search the "Protection relay that operated" column and the "CB where the protection relay trips" column one by one, and identify the equipment in the row that matches the protected relay and CB that has changed status as the accident equipment. . At that time, if there is a specification in the "LS status" column, the corresponding information will be sent from the online data department 23.
Read the LS ON/OFF information and select the accident equipment that matches the condition. Detected accidental equipment is output to a data file or CRT printer for outputting accidental equipment. In addition, in the upper power supply system fault determination section 27,
When a UVR is sent, it is recognized as an accident in the upper power supply system and a message to that effect is output. Here, since there is no monitoring information other than UVR, no judgment is made regarding the equipment involved in the accident. The processing of the determination units 26 and 27 corresponds to the broken line portion in FIG. Next, (1) an accident in the responsible system, (2) an accident in the upper power system, and (3) a duplicate accident between the responsible system and the upper power system will be explained using specific examples. (1) If the accident is in the responsible system If the data accumulated within a certain period of time (for example, 10 seconds) is only for the responsible system, it is considered as an accident in the responsible system, and the following faulty equipment detection process is performed. . In this case, if there are excesses or deficiencies in the conditions determined based on the operating information of the protection relay, trip switch, disconnector, non-voltage detection relay, etc., detection may be disabled for the purpose of preventing false detection. Accident confirmation The trip order, which is the combination information of the protective relay and trip or disconnection assumed for the target system, is open, and the trip or disconnection is in an open state. At least 1 vessel
Check that there is one. This prevents false detection of an accident even if the disconnector malfunctions. Furthermore, if a direction protection relay (current differential, phase comparison, data transfer method, etc.) is used, it is possible to further improve detection accuracy by checking the redundancy of related terminals. Judgment of equipment in an accident All equipment within the protection range of the activated protection relay is considered to be equipment in an accident. However, although the protection range of the protection relay is stored in advance as data, it changes depending on the open/closed state of the switch within the protection range, so the actual protection range can be calculated based on the open/close data of the switch within the protection range. It is determined automatically. Specific examples thereof will be explained below using FIGS. 2 to 7. In Figure 2, the pilot wire relay
If PWRy operates, it is considered an accident on the power transmission line 1, and in this case, the relay Ry:equipment corresponds to 1:n.
Further, in FIG. 3, if the bus protector relay (referred to as BPR) operates, it is determined that an accident has occurred in bus L and bank B, and in this case, the relay:equipment corresponds to 1:n. Also, in Figure 4,
If the directional distance relay DZ ₁ R operates, the equipment that is considered to be in an accident will change depending on the status of the switches LS ₁ and LS ₂ , as described below. For example, 1) If switch LS ₁ is OFF, the power line
l ₁ accident, 2) Switch LS ₁ is ON, switch LS _{2 is} ON.
3) If switch LS ₁ and LS ₂ are both ON, it is considered an accident on power line l ₁ and bank B.
It is determined that the accident occurred at l ₁ , l ₂ and bank B, respectively. Also, in Figure 5, the bus protector relay
If BPR operates, switch LS ₁ ,
Depending on the status of LS ₁₁ and LS ₁₂ , equipment that is considered to be in an accident changes as follows. For example, 1) Switch LS ₁₁ is
ON, if switch LS ₁₂ is OFF, it will be considered as an accident to bus L (A) and the power line, and 2) switch LS ₁₁ is OFF,
If switch LS ₁₂ is ON, it is determined that there is an accident with the Otsu bus (Otsu) and the power transmission line. Here CB ₁ is the cutter. In Figure 6, if only the direction and distance relay DZR used as the backup protection relay Ry operates, it is difficult to determine where the accident point is, so the protection range of the backup protection Ry (within the dotted line in the figure) All equipment involved is considered as accident equipment. The Naoshiya disconnector CB ₁ is normally closed, but the Naoshiya disconnector CB 1 is
CB ₂ is open in advance. Also, in Figure 7, the directional ground fault relay at substation A
If the DGR operates and fails, the ground fault overcurrent relay DCGR will operate. In this case, the relevant busbar and all banks and power transmission lines connected to it (indicated by dotted lines in the figure) are determined to be faulty equipment. (2) In the case of an accident in the upper power supply system: There is no protective relay operation information of the system in charge or information on the condition of the disconnector in the status change data accumulated within a certain period of time (for example, 10 seconds), and systematic
If there is UVR operation information and UVR operation information related to the system in charge, it is determined that the adjacent system is the upper power system and the accident occurred there. In this case, as in the case of an accident in the system in charge, if there is an excess or deficiency in the situation, detection may be made undetectable to prevent false detection. A specific example of this case will be explained with reference to FIG. In the figure, the operation of the no-voltage detection relay (UVR) of substation A in the adjacent system, which is considered to be the upper power supply system,
If there is a UVR operation at your B substation, it is determined that there is a fault in the upper power system. (3) In the case of a redundant accident between the responsible system and the upper power system If the state change data accumulated within a certain period of time (for example, 10 seconds) includes (a) protective relay operation information within the responsible system, and (b) ) If there is UVR operation information for the upper power supply system and UVR operation information for the responsible system, for the former (a), focus only on the responsible system and apply the method for when the fault is in the responsible system (1). Detect the equipment, and for the latter (b), focus only on UVR information and apply the method (2) for when the fault is in the upper power system to detect an accident in the adjacent system that is considered to be the upper power system. . In addition, if the accident occurred within the responsible system,
UVR condition changes may be deleted from the UVR operation information in (b). A specific example will be explained with reference to FIGS. 9 and 10. In Figure 9, the UVR of substation A and the UVR of substation B operate in the adjacent system, which is considered to be the upper power supply system, and at the same time, the direction distance relay DZR of substation A operates.
If it operates, it is determined that the fault is in the upper power supply system and the local power transmission line _L2 . In addition, in Figure 10, if the SSR operates at substation B, and then the UVR at substation A and the UVR at substation B operate due to a fault in the upper power supply system, an accident occurs in the local power transmission line _l3 . This is determined to be a fault in the upper power supply system. As mentioned above, protection relay, disconnector CB, UVR
Since the faulty equipment is determined based on the operating state of the switch and the ON/OFF state of the switch LS, the number of false determinations is reduced and accurate determinations can be made. Furthermore, if trip order data such as that shown in Table 1 is used, it is possible to quickly determine which equipment has an accident. As explained above, the system accident equipment detection method according to the present invention accumulates the status changes from the responsible system and adjacent systems that occur at the time of an accident over a certain period of time, and detects an accident in the responsible system based on the status change. The system detects faulty equipment in a wide-area system by determining whether the accident occurred in the upper power system, the adjacent power system is considered to be the upper power system, or a duplicate accident in both systems. Can be done quickly. In addition, if the combination information (trip order) of protective relays and trip/disconnectors from the grid is used as a status indicator, reliability can be improved because faulty equipment can be detected by checking the operation of the trip/disconnectors. will improve. Furthermore, since the system in charge is linked to the system adjacent to it, the protection range of the protection relay in the own system and the adjacent system can be determined at high speed. Further, it is possible to quickly and accurately distinguish and determine faults in the upper power supply system and the system in charge. Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish and judge overlapping accidents between the upper power supply system and the system in charge.

[Brief explanation of drawings]

Figure 1 is a flow diagram showing the principle of the system of the present invention, Figures 2 to 7 are schematic diagrams of an example in the case of an accident in the responsible system when the system of the present invention is applied, and Figure 8 is a flowchart showing the principle of the system of the present invention. is a schematic diagram of an embodiment in the case of an accident in the upper power supply system when the method of the present invention is applied, and FIGS. This is a schematic diagram of an embodiment in the case of an accident, and FIG. 11 is a system configuration diagram when the present invention is applied to a computer system that monitors power systems and substation equipment. FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing an example of a processing unit and a data unit for executing the process. 1 to 4...Telecommunication equipment, 7, 8...Computer system.

Claims (1)

[Claims] 1 In a fault equipment detection method in a wide-area system, changes over a certain period of time in the operating information of protective relays, trip switches, and disconnectors from the system in charge that occur at the time of an accident, combination information of these, and operating information of no-voltage detection relays are used. Changes over a certain period of time, and changes over a certain period of time in the operation information of no-voltage detection relays from systems adjacent to and connected to the system in charge, are accumulated, and based on the changes in each of the operation information, it is determined whether the fault is in the system in charge or in the adjacent system. A system accident equipment detection method characterized by determining and detecting whether the system is considered to be an upper power supply system and the accident is in the upper power supply system, or whether it is a duplicate accident in the responsible system and the system considered to be the upper power supply system. .