JP2024032462A - Safety control circuit for door open protection device - Google Patents

Abstract

[Problem] To increase the degree of freedom in replacing and customizing control system parts of a rope elevator. [Solution] It is formed on a single board so that it can be replaced and installed as an independent module that is separate from the control panel in which the normal operation control circuit is installed, and has one module for multiple inputs. a connection section, an output connection section, a safety control storage section storing a plurality of predetermined operational abnormality determination logic programs including a door open running determination logic program and data for each operation abnormality determination logic program; Processes the received signal to determine an abnormality according to the abnormality determination logic program, and based on the abnormality determination, a car stop command that cuts off the power supply to the motor electromagnetic contactor and the brake electromagnetic contactor connected to the power supply circuit. A safety control processing unit that creates and outputs a signal is included, and the safety control processing unit creates and outputs an abnormality signal corresponding to each type of abnormality determination when an abnormality determination is made. It was decided that [Selection diagram] Figure 1

Description

The present invention relates to a safety control circuit for a door-opening protection device for a rope elevator, and more specifically, it is formed separately from an elevator control panel provided with a normal operation control circuit and is handled as a separate product. The present invention relates to a safety control circuit for a door open protection device.

Currently, rope-type elevators are widely used as passenger and luggage elevators in various buildings and facilities. In a rope-type elevator, a wire rope that connects the car and a counterweight is hung on a sheave in a hanging style, and the frictional force (traction) between the rope and sheave is used to operate the electric elevator. This method uses a hoisting machine to efficiently raise and lower the machine. In addition, an increasing number of hoisting machines are designed to save energy by using an inverter control system that accelerates, decelerates, and stops the motor by variable control of the frequency of the supplied power.

Normally, to control the operation of an elevator, the operation control circuit issues control commands to the drive unit of the hoisting machine in response to signals generated by button operations on the operation button next to the landing door and on the wall operation panel inside the car. It is done by doing. That is, the operation control circuit controls the upward and downward movements of the car based on the detection outputs from sensors at predetermined locations, such as the detection of the position of the car and the opening/closing states of the car doors and landing doors. , stopping the car at a designated floor, and appropriately controlling the opening and closing of car doors and landing doors.

Furthermore, in recent years, it has become mandatory to install an Unintended Car Movement Protection (UCMP) device for newly installed elevators. This door open running protection device (hereinafter also referred to as UCMP) prevents accidents by preventing the car from moving before all the car doors and landing doors are closed due to a failure in the elevator drive or control unit. It is a safety device for The system is equipped with two mechanically independent brakes (dual brakes) and an independent safety control circuit separate from that for normal operation. This is a mechanism that immediately stops the hoist motor when it moves.

With this mechanism, even if one of the two brakes loses its braking force for some reason, the other brake can hold the car, and even if the normal operation control program malfunctions, , the car can be safely stopped using the UCMP control circuit. That is, the door-open running protection device is a device that provides dual safety for braking and control. In rope type elevators, a disc type or drum type double brake is employed as a constantly operating type double brake.

This door open protection device is equipped with a specific distance sensing device that detects when the car has moved more than a predetermined distance from a specified landing position (floor level). The system detects the running of the car with its door open based on the detection signal from the device and the detection signal of the open state of the car door or landing door, and immediately stops the car.

Specifically, during normal operation, the car door and landing door opening/closing devices can only operate when the car is within a certain vertical distance from the landing level of the stop floor, that is, within the so-called door zone. The car door and landing door opening/closing devices are controlled so as not to operate in any other position. A specific distance sensing device detects whether the car is within a certain distance range.

The specific distance sensing device is generally of a photoelectric type and includes a photodetector fixed to the car and a shielding member installed at a predetermined position on each floor. Usually, there are two sets on each floor, so that even if one of them has a problem, it can be dealt with. In this photoelectric specific distance sensing device, the vertical width of the shielding member corresponds to the door zone, and a signal is output according to the relative positional relationship of the photodetector with respect to the shielding member.

In a normal operation control circuit, according to a predetermined operation control program, signals from a specific distance sensing device are processed, and the position of the car is determined by detecting whether the car is within the door zone or has moved out of the door zone. . Based on the car position and the opening/closing states of the car door and landing door, the opening/closing of the car door and landing door for boarding and alighting, and the elevator movement of the car are controlled.

The safety control circuit of the door open running protection device also receives signals from the specific distance sensing device and signals from the car door and the landing door, and processes each signal according to a logic program for abnormality determination. When movement of the car out of the door zone is detected with at least one of the car door and the landing door open, it is determined that the car is traveling with the door open, and a predetermined process is executed (e.g. , Patent Document 1, Patent Document 2).

Note that in order to immediately stop the running of the car, first, the rotation of the motor that is the drive source of the hoist is stopped. That is, it is sufficient to cut off the power supply to the motor, but if the motor drive is controlled by an inverter, the power supply to the inverter is cut off. On the other hand, as a dual brake, a non-excitation type brake suitable for braking and holding in an emergency, that is, an electromagnetic brake that functions as a brake when power is cut off, is often used. Therefore, in the door open running protection device, if the double brake is of the non-excitation type, the power supply to the brake is also cut off at the same time as the power supply to the motor side is cut off when the door open running abnormality is determined. It is common that

Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 2012-126558 Patent No. 5741746

Note that the Door Opening Protection Device (UCMP) is subject to certification by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and cannot be actually installed in elevators unless it is certified by the Minister. This ministerial certification requires that all components of the UCMP be properly evaluated. For example, the same applies to the specifications of each component of the brake and specific distance sensing device, as well as the control panel and each detection program.

However, the elevator control circuit is generally placed as a control panel inside the control box, and the safety control circuit for UCMP is also provided on the same control panel along with the normal operation control circuit, and the control panel itself is is treated as an integrated product form. Therefore, manufacturers of hoisting machines, which are the main parts of elevators along with control panels, often obtain ministerial certification for control panels with built-in UCMP circuits. Therefore, if you change any of the parts installed in such a control panel, it may affect the performance of the main unit, or it may differ from the model number at the time of certification, such as replacing the inverter. In such cases, it was necessary to re-obtain ministerial certification for each control panel. This is a troublesome method that requires a lot of effort and cost, making it difficult to customize parts or develop partial improvements.

In view of the above-mentioned problems, an object of the present invention is to contribute to increasing the degree of freedom in replacing and customizing parts in the control system of rope elevators, and to make it easier to obtain and re-obtain certification from the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. An object of the present invention is to provide a safety control circuit for an open running protection device.

The safety control circuit for a door opening protection device according to the invention described in claim 1 is capable of raising and lowering a car using a hoisting machine equipped with a constantly operating electromagnetic double brake, and controlling the opening and closing of car doors and landing doors on each floor. In a safety control circuit for a door-opening protection device for a rope-type elevator in which opening and closing are controlled according to a predetermined operation control program,
A single module that can be replaced and installed on the control panel as an independent module separate from a control panel in which an operation control circuit for controlling operation according to the predetermined operation control program is installed. It is formed on the substrate of
The first module includes:
a plurality of input connection parts to which various signal input electric wires from the outside are connected; and a plurality of output connection parts to which various signal output electric wires to the outside are connected;
a safety control storage unit storing a plurality of predetermined operational abnormality determination logic programs and data for each operational abnormality determination logic program;
According to the operation abnormality determination logic program, a signal received from the input connection part through the input part is processed to determine an abnormality, and based on the abnormality determination, power is supplied to the motor of the hoisting machine. Create a car stop command signal that cuts off power supply to the motor electromagnetic contactor connected to the circuit and the brake electromagnetic contactor connected to the power supply circuit to the electromagnetic double brake, and generate the car stop command signal. a safety control arithmetic processing unit having a function of outputting from its output section;
The plurality of input connection parts include a connection part set to receive a signal indicating the opening/closing state of the car door and each landing door, and a connection part configured to sense when the car has moved a predetermined distance or more. a connection configured for receiving a signal from a specific distance sensing device;
The plurality of output connection parts each have a connection part set so that the car stop command signal is output to the motor electromagnetic contactor and the brake electromagnetic contactor,
A door open running determination logic program is included as one of the operation abnormality determination logic programs stored in the safety control storage unit,
The safety control arithmetic processing unit processes the signal from the specific distance sensing device and the signal indicating the open/closed status of the car door and all landing doors at predetermined fixed time intervals according to the door open running determination logic program. When it is detected that the car has traveled a certain distance or more with at least one of the car door and all the landing doors open, a door open running abnormality determination is made, and based on the door open running abnormality determination, Equipped with a function to create and output the car restraint command signal,
The safety control arithmetic processing unit further creates and outputs an abnormality signal corresponding to each type of abnormality determination including the door open running abnormality determination when an abnormality determination is made according to each operation abnormality determination logic program. The output connection section is characterized in that it has an abnormal signal output connection section configured to output the abnormal signal to the outside according to type.

A safety control circuit for a door-opening protection device according to a second aspect of the invention is a safety control circuit for a door-opening protection device according to the first aspect of the invention, in which the car control command is sent to the motor electromagnetic contactor. A connection part set for outputting a signal and a connection part set for outputting the car stop command signal to the brake electromagnetic contactor each include a connection part set for outputting the car stop command signal to the brake electromagnetic contactor. The present invention is characterized in that an electromagnetic contactor is provided that can directly control on/off the power supply to the brake magnetic contactor and the brake electromagnetic contactor.

A safety control circuit for a door-opening protection device according to the invention according to claim 3 is a safety control circuit for a door-opening protection device according to claim 1, in which the input connection portion is connected to the surrounding area of the car. has a connection part set for inputting a pulse signal from an encoder provided in the
The safety control storage unit stores an encoder signal processing program and encoder signal processing program data for processing the pulse signal,
The safety control arithmetic processing device counts the pulse signals received from the connection unit via the input unit according to the encoder signal processing program, and calculates the counted number and the data included in the encoder signal processing program data. The apparatus further includes a function of calculating the moving speed of the car based on the moving distance of the car per pulse or the moving distance of the car in units of the number of pulses equivalent to one rotation of the encoder. It is something.

A safety control circuit for a door-opening protection device according to the invention according to claim 4 is a safety control circuit for a door-opening protection device according to claim 1, in which the input connection portion is connected to the electromagnetic dual-side safety control circuit. It has a connection part set for inputting a signal from each brake operation sensing device of the heavy brake,
One of the operation abnormality determination logic programs stored in the safety control storage unit includes a brake abnormality determination logic program for the electromagnetic dual brake,
The safety control arithmetic processing unit processes signals from each brake operation sensing device received from the connection unit via the input unit at predetermined fixed time intervals according to the brake abnormality determination logic program, Further comprising a function of determining a brake abnormality when an abnormality is detected in at least one of the brakes, creating and outputting the car stop command signal based on the brake abnormality determination, and creating and outputting a brake abnormality signal. It is characterized by the presence of

The safety control circuit for the door-opening protection device according to the invention according to claim 5 is the safety control circuit for the door-opening protection device according to claim 1, which includes the following: It is further equipped with an indicator lamp to indicate the time for inspection and replacement when a predetermined number of years have passed since startup.
The safety control storage unit stores an inspection/replacement program for determining the timing of inspection/replacement of the safety control circuit,
The safety control arithmetic processing unit adds and measures the number of years that have passed since the activation of the safety control circuit according to the inspection/replacement program, and turns on the indicator lamp when the predetermined number of years has been reached. This device is characterized by further having a function of outputting a command signal.

A safety control circuit for a door-opening protection device according to the invention according to claim 6 is a safety control circuit for a door-opening protection device according to claim 5, wherein the indicator lamp includes an LED 7-segment indicator. and
The safety control arithmetic processing device is characterized in that it further has a function of causing the LED 7-segment display to display an additional number of years prior to a predetermined number of elapsed years.

The safety control circuit for the door-open running protection device according to the invention according to claim 7 is the safety control circuit for the door-open running protection device according to claim 1, which has an error display different from that for the operation control circuit. and monitoring means for monitoring the operation of at least the door open running determination logic program at predetermined regular time intervals,
The safety control arithmetic processing device outputs a signal indicating that at least the door open running determination logic program is operating normally at predetermined intervals,
The monitoring means determines that an error has occurred when the signal indicating normal operation is not notified after a certain period of time, and outputs a signal instructing the error display means to display an error based on the determination, and It is characterized by having a function of outputting a command signal to execute a predetermined abnormality process.

The safety control circuit for the door open running protection device according to the present invention is an independent module that is separate from the control panel in which the normal operation control circuit is installed, and is a single module that can be replaced and installed on the control panel. Because it is formed on a board, each board can be a single product, and distribution and exchange, as well as component changes and customization, can only be handled on the safety control circuit board side. It's easy. As a result, the influence from the operation control circuit side will not affect the operation control circuit, and re-obtaining ministerial certification due to parts changes will only be required by the relevant side, making both of these aspects easier than before. There is an effect. In addition, since the safety control circuit of the present invention is physically separate from the operation control circuit side, the operation of the operational abnormality determination logic program such as door-open running determination is not affected by the normal operation control program. Therefore, the possibility of malfunction in abnormality determination is reduced accordingly.

1 is a schematic circuit diagram illustrating a safety control circuit for a door opening protection device according to an embodiment of the present invention, which is incorporated into an elevator system; FIG. FIG. 2 is a switch circuit diagram of a car door switch and a landing door switch in the elevator system of FIG. Each figure shows a case where the landing door switch does not have a forced opening structure. FIG. 2 is a flowchart showing an operational process for determining abnormality in running with the door open by the safety control circuit in FIG. 1; FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing an operation processing process for canceling the car restraint after the door-open running abnormality determination in FIG. 3; FIG. 2 is a flowchart showing an operation processing process for determining an abnormality of a brake, a brake operation sensing device, or a RUN signal by the safety control circuit of FIG. 1; This is a modification of the elevator system incorporating the safety control circuit according to the embodiment of FIG. 1, and is a schematic circuit diagram when the car is of the upper and lower door type. 2 is a relative table illustrating the correspondence between types of abnormality determination and abnormality output signals in the safety control circuit of FIG. 1;

In the present invention, the rope elevator is operated in such a way that the raising and lowering of the car by a hoisting machine equipped with a constantly operating double brake and the opening and closing of the car doors and landing doors on each floor are controlled according to a predetermined operation control program. In the safety control circuit for the door open running protection device, as an independent module separate from the control panel in which the operation control circuit for controlling the operation according to the predetermined operation control program is installed. , is formed on a single board so that it can be replaced and installed on the control panel, and the one module has a plurality of input connection parts to which various signal input wires from the outside are connected, and an external a plurality of output connections to which various signal output wires are connected; a safety control storage section in which a plurality of predetermined operational abnormality determination logic programs and data for each operational abnormality determination logic program are stored; According to the operation abnormality determination logic program, a signal received from the input connection part through the input part is processed to determine an abnormality, and based on the abnormality determination, power is supplied to the motor of the hoisting machine. Create a car stop command signal that cuts off power supply to the motor electromagnetic contactor connected to the circuit and the brake electromagnetic contactor connected to the power supply circuit to the electromagnetic double brake, and generate the car stop command signal. This includes a safety control arithmetic processing device having a function of outputting from its output section. Therefore, the safety control circuit for the door-open running protection device of the present invention can take the form of a single product that can be replaced on a board-by-board basis.

In other words, the safety control circuit for the door-open running protection device of the present invention performs operational control on a plurality of abnormality determinations including the door-open running abnormality determination, which is a necessary element for safety control to stop the car based on the abnormal operation determination of the elevator. The safety control processing unit, which has the function of outputting car stop command signals based on each abnormality judgment without going through a circuit, and the safety control storage unit are connected to various external signal input wires. A plurality of input connection portions and a plurality of output connection portions to which various signal output wires to the outside are connected are collectively configured on the same substrate.

With the above configuration, the safety control circuit for the door open running protection device of the present invention can be installed in the elevator safety control system by simply installing the board into a control panel equipped with other circuits necessary for normal operation control. It is easy to construct. Therefore, this single board can be handled as an individual product form that is independent of the control panel in which the operation control circuit for normal operation is formed, and virtually each board can be distributed as a single product form. or exchange. Furthermore, the area related to safety control that determines abnormality for the door-open running protection device will be independently certified by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, separately from the normal operation control circuit. Therefore, since it is not affected by parts replacement or customization changes in the operation control circuit on the control panel side, re-obtaining ministerial certification can be done independently, making it easier than before. For example, if the inverter on the normal operation control circuit side is replaced with a different model, the safety control circuit for the door open protection device of the present invention will not be affected in any way and will not be subject to re-obtaining ministerial certification. No need to worry. This also applies when viewed from the control panel side to which it is attached. Therefore, a high degree of freedom is given to the design of the control panel to which the board on which the safety control circuit for the door-open running protection device of the present invention is formed is mounted.

Further, the safety control circuit for the door open running protection device of the present invention is physically separated from the operation control circuit as described above, and has a calculation processing device for the operation control circuit and a separate calculation processing device for safety control. As a result, the operation abnormality determination logic program including the door open running determination logic program is operated without going through the normal operation control circuit and without being affected by the normal operation control program. It becomes difficult to occur.

In addition, in the present invention, as a configuration for determining door open running abnormality, some of the plurality of input connection parts are configured to receive signals indicating the open/closed states of the car door and each landing door. Each of the connection parts is set as a connection part for inputting a signal from a specific distance sensing device that detects that the car has moved over a predetermined distance, and one of the plurality of output connection parts portions are respectively set as connection portions for outputting the car stop command signal to the motor electromagnetic contactor and the brake electromagnetic contactor.

Furthermore, the present invention is applicable to cases where the car door and the landing door are either of the sliding door type or the upper and lower door types. The upper and lower door type has a pair of upper and lower doors that open and close up and down as car doors, and a pair of upper and lower doors that open and close up and down as landing doors, so the number of doors to be monitored for opening and closing is twice that of the sliding door type. be. Therefore, in the upper and lower door type, the opening/closing switches installed for each door and the signals to be received from each switch are also twice as many. Therefore, the number of connection parts set to receive signals indicating the open/closed state from each switch is also greater than that of the sliding door type, so the input connection part of the present invention includes a connection part intended for the upper and lower door types. .

In the present invention, in addition to the door-open running abnormality determination, the safety control arithmetic unit uses a plurality of operational abnormality determination logic programs and data for each operational abnormality determination logic program stored in the safety control storage section. Various abnormality determinations necessary for safety control are performed. The safety control computing device of the present invention has a function of creating and outputting an abnormality signal corresponding to each type of abnormality determination including door-open running abnormality determination when an abnormality determination is made. Among the output connection parts, the signal has connection parts for outputting abnormal signals that are set to be output to the outside according to type. Therefore, in a control panel equipped with a board according to the invention. If wiring is connected to the connection part for outputting the abnormality signal, when various abnormality judgments are made, the abnormality signal can be received on the normal operation control circuit side and the occurrence of an abnormality can be confirmed, and the abnormality signal can be separately transmitted. It is also possible to use

It is not necessary to provide connection parts for all types of abnormal signal output for outputting abnormal signals by type, but it is possible to correspond to many types of abnormal signals by the number and combination of multiple abnormal signals. Can be done. For example, using five electromagnetic relays (first to fifth), more than 20 types of abnormalities can be determined in elevator safety control by a combination of predetermined ON signals of one or more of these relays. It can be made to correspond.

In the safety control circuit for the door open protection device according to the present invention, examples of specific elements constituting one module on one board include a dedicated CPU (Central Processing Unit) as a safety control arithmetic processing unit. Equipped with a dedicated ROM (Read Only Memory) and RAM (Random Access Memory) as a storage unit for safety control, an input unit for receiving each signal and inputting it to the CPU, and a signal input unit for receiving signals from the CPU. The main examples include those equipped with an output section that outputs. Further, the input section and output section for each signal are provided as an input side interface (I/F) circuit and an output side interface (I/F) circuit.

In addition, for each connection part for input and output, a screwless terminal block for the board is placed, for example, for input on the top of the board and for output on the bottom of the board, and a bar terminal for each input wire and each output wire. A configuration that allows one-touch wiring is simple and desirable.

In addition, when the target signal is an ON-OFF detection signal, the input connection part of the safety control arithmetic processing unit uses an electromagnetic relay to generate the safety control computation as an on signal or an off signal by opening and closing the coil contact. The configuration is such that the information is received by the input section of the processing device. For example, on/off signals from the car door switch and each landing door switch are received as signals indicating the open/closed state of the car door and each landing door, and it is determined whether the car has moved over a predetermined distance or not. It shall be received as an on/off signal from the sensing device.

Each signal input to the CPU via the input side interface (I/F) circuit is processed by the CPU, a control signal is created, and the control signal is outputted via the output side interface (I/F) circuit. Using the RAM as a work area, the CPU can process input signals and determine abnormal operation according to the logic program stored in the ROM and based on the data stored in the ROM.

Therefore, by storing a door-open running determination logic program and data for the logic program in the ROM, the CPU processes input signals using the data according to the door-open running determination logic program. An operation process for determining whether the car is traveling with the landing door open is activated to determine whether the car is traveling with the landing door open. The data for the logic program stored together with the door open running determination logic program includes various criteria, such as the value of a specific travel distance that is the standard for abnormality determination in response to a signal from a specific distance sensing device, and the door open running determination logic. This includes the cycle time of the signal processing operation of the program.

When the dual brakes of the hoisting machine in the present invention are non-excitation operated electromagnetic brakes, the safety control circuit of the present invention controls each electromagnetic brake based on the output of the car restraint command signal. When the power supply to the electromagnetic contactor (contactor) connected to the power supply circuit is stopped and demagnetized, the power supply to each electromagnetic brake is cut off, and each electromagnetic brake becomes de-energized. A braking force due to the spring biasing force acts on the brake rotating shaft, and the car is stopped. Additionally, when the electromagnetic contactor connected to the motor's power supply circuit is deenergized based on the output of the car stop command signal, the power supply to the motor is cut off and the motor is driven. stops and the car is stopped.

If the motor drive is controlled via an inverter, the power supply to the motor can be cut off either by cutting off the power supply upstream of the inverter or by cutting off the power between the inverter and the motor. It is. Therefore, by arranging electromagnetic contactors at both positions and controlling energization and demagnetization at the same time, the motor can be more reliably stopped in two systems when an abnormality is determined.

In addition, the connection part set to output the car stop command signal to the electromagnetic contactor for the motor, and the connection part set to output the car stop command signal to the electromagnetic contactor for the brake, respectively. By interposing an electromagnetic contactor (electromagnetic relay), it is possible to directly control on/off the power supply to the motor electromagnetic contactor and the brake electromagnetic contactor. As a result, power to the brake and motor can be cut off more quickly when an abnormality is determined.

Furthermore, in many elevator systems, a rotary encoder is provided around the car to monitor the speed of the car. For example, a car is raised and lowered along guide rails via guide rollers at the four corners of the car so that it does not swing left or right during travel.If a rotary encoder is attached to the rotating shaft of such guide rollers, The rotary encoder rotates in conjunction with the up and down movement of the car, and outputs a pulse signal according to the rotation speed. Since the speed of the car can be calculated based on the number of rotations per unit time by counting this pulse signal, in normal operation control, feedback control of the drive of the motor 25 by the inverter 20 is performed based on the detection result of the car speed. This allows the car to be smoothly accelerated, decelerated, or stopped.

The safety control circuit of the present invention may also be configured to receive such a pulse signal from the rotary encoder separately from the normal operation control circuit to detect the car speed. In this case, some of the input connections are set as connections for inputting pulse signals from the rotary encoder, and the safety control storage section stores encoder signals for processing the pulse signals. It is sufficient to store the processing program and data for the encoder signal processing program. The safety control processing unit counts the received pulse signals according to the encoder signal processing program, and calculates the number of counts and the moving distance of the car per pulse included in the data for the encoder signal processing program or the distance of the rotary encoder. The car speed is calculated based on the moving distance of the car in units of the number of pulses equivalent to one rotation. This car speed can also be used for speed monitoring to determine speed abnormalities. In addition, in conventional speed monitoring, the rotational speed of the motor was detected using the electrical output for motor drive control by the inverter in the operation control circuit, but the configuration of the present invention detects the rotational speed of the motor. There is no need to use the inverter signal for speed monitoring via such an operation control circuit.

Furthermore, the safety control circuit of the present invention also performs various abnormality determinations other than running with the door open. In this case, a plurality of operational abnormality determination logic programs for determining various abnormalities and data for the logic programs are stored in the safety control storage unit, and the configuration is such that signals necessary for the abnormality determination are input. If so, the safety control arithmetic processing unit processes the signal according to the abnormality determination logic program, makes an abnormality determination, and outputs an abnormality signal according to the type of abnormality determination, but at the same time performs processing according to the determination. It is also possible to output a command signal for execution.

For example, the abnormality determination performed in the safety control circuit of the present invention includes abnormality determination based on whether the car door and/or landing door are open, or double brake abnormality (which brake is malfunctioning). ), failure of the electromagnetic contactor in each electrical supply circuit to turn on (it remains open and does not turn off), an error in the coincidence of two specific distance sensing devices, an internal error in the CPU, RAM, and ROM, and an error in each input interface. , once-a-day test abnormality, watchdog timer (WDT) abnormality, car speed abnormality, speed monitoring device failure, etc.

If the corresponding operational abnormality determination logic program and data for the logic program, such as determination criteria, are stored in the safety control storage section, the safety control arithmetic processing unit can perform various abnormality determinations according to each program. Can be done. For example, in the case of a configuration in which a double brake abnormality determination is performed, a part of the input connection parts is a connection part set to receive signals from each brake operation sensing device of the double brake, A brake abnormality determination logic program for double braking may also be stored in the safety control storage unit as one of the operation abnormality determination logic programs, together with necessary data. In this case, the safety control arithmetic processing unit processes the signals from each brake operation sensing device at predetermined intervals according to the brake abnormality determination logic program, and when an abnormality is detected in at least one brake, , a brake abnormality determination is made and a car restraining command is output based on the brake abnormality determination.

Note that for safety reasons, it is stipulated that the elevator control circuit must be replaced every predetermined number of years. Since the safety control circuit for the door open running protection device of the present invention is independent of the control board on which the normal operation control circuit is formed, it can be independently replaced after a predetermined number of years. Therefore, it is preferable to provide a dedicated indicator lamp to indicate the time for inspection and replacement when a predetermined number of years have elapsed since activation after installation in the door open running protection device.

In this case, the safety control storage section stores an inspection/replacement program for determining when to inspect/replace the safety control circuit. Then, the safety control arithmetic processing unit adds and measures the number of years that have passed since the start of the safety control circuit according to the inspection/replacement program, and when a predetermined number of years has been reached, sends a command signal to turn on the indicator lamp. shall be output. Therefore, if the board replacement period is set to, for example, 10 years, the display will be displayed when 10 years have passed since startup, or if 15 years has been set, the display will be displayed when 15 years have passed since startup. The lamp will turn on.

In addition, this indicator lamp not only indicates the predetermined number of years that have elapsed as the time for replacement, but also warns you several years in advance, for example, if it is set to 10 years, it will notify you when 8 years or 9 years have passed. It can also be used to indicate. For example, this can be implemented by changing the lighting form from intermittent blinking to constant lighting, or by changing the display color.

Further, if an LED 7-segment display is provided as a display lamp, the predetermined number of additional years prior to the predetermined number of elapsed years can be displayed in numbers, making it easier to visually recognize. For example, if the setting is 10 years, the numbers can be displayed as 8, 9, and 10. Therefore, the administrator can prepare for the replacement of the safety control circuit board in a timely manner. Then, when the actual replacement time is reached, the safety control circuit of the present invention can be installed on a board-by-board basis by removing only the relevant board from the control panel and installing a new board without affecting other operation control circuits, etc. Replacement is a simple task.

Further, it is preferable that the safety control circuit of the present invention is provided with at least a dedicated error display means for indicating an error when the door opening running logic program does not operate normally. In this case, the safety control arithmetic processing unit is provided with a monitoring means for monitoring the operation of the door open running determination logic program at predetermined fixed time intervals, and the safety control arithmetic processing unit is configured to monitor the operation of the door open running determination logic program at predetermined fixed time intervals. A signal indicating normal operation is output, and the monitoring means determines that an error has occurred when the signal indicating normal operation is not notified after a certain period of time, and displays an error on the error display means based on the determination. At the same time, it outputs a command signal to execute a predetermined abnormality process, for example, a command signal to stop the car by cutting off the power supply.

As a monitoring means for detecting such errors, it is convenient to employ, for example, a WDT (watchdog timer). If the WDT is set to output a command to cut off the power to the electromagnetic contactor when it detects an abnormality in the processing operation of the door-open running determination logic program in the safety control arithmetic processing unit, the safety control circuit can Since the operating state is the same as when the door open running abnormality is determined, it is possible to practically put the elevator in a stopped state. Based on the error display, the manager can visually recognize the possibility that the door-open running protection device is malfunctioning, and can perform practical inspection work.

A schematic configuration diagram showing a safety control circuit for a door-open running protection device as an embodiment of the present invention is shown in FIG. 1 as an overall circuit diagram in a form that is incorporated into an elevator system. In the figure, an area 100 surrounded by a broken line indicates a related part that is controlled by the safety control circuit 10 of this embodiment. Note that detailed illustrations of parts related to normal operation control are omitted. Moreover, this embodiment illustrates a case where the car door and the landing door are of a sliding type.

In the elevator system incorporating the safety control circuit 10 according to the present embodiment, a car 1 and a counterweight 3 are connected by a main rope 2, and the main rope 2 is connected to a hoisting machine 7 as a lifting device for the car. The car 1 and the counterweight 3 are hung around a sheave 8 and a direction change pulley 4, and suspended in the hoistway in a hanging manner. As the sheave 8 of the hoist 7 is rotationally driven by the motor 25, the car 1 and the counterweight 3 travel in the vertical direction in the hoistway. The motor 25 is driven and controlled by an operation control circuit 201 for normal operation control via an inverter 20 connected to a power source 21.

In the operation control circuit 201, various input signals are processed according to a predetermined operation control program by a processing unit (CPU) 210 for normal operation control, and the output control signals control the normal operation of each drive unit. executed. Therefore, the inverter 20 controls the start, rotation speed, and stop of the motor 25 in accordance with the control signal output from the operation control circuit 201.

Further, in the hoisting machine 7, a first brake 9A and a second brake 9B constituting a constantly operating double brake as a braking device are arranged on the same axis as the rotation axis of the motor 25 and are mechanically independent from each other. It is arranged as follows. These first and second brakes (9A, 9B) are each connected to a power source 22 via a rectifier (23A, 23B).

In this embodiment, the first and second brakes (9A, 9B) are non-excitation operated electromagnetic disc brakes. An electromagnetic disc brake performs a braking operation by sandwiching and pressing a disc-shaped brake disc coaxially fixed to a motor rotating shaft with friction materials such as brake pads or linings on both sides. The braking operation and release operation are performed using the biasing force of the spring and the attractive force of the electromagnetic drive unit that resists this. In the non-excitation type, the braking state is achieved by the biasing force of the spring in the non-excitation state. This is what you get.

Brake release contactors (BR1, BR2) are arranged in each of the power supply circuit between the first brake 9A and the power supply 22 and the power supply circuit between the second brake 9B and the power supply 22. During normal operation by the operation control circuit 201, each brake release contactor (BR1, BR2) is energized and the coil contact is closed and power is supplied to each brake (9A, 9B), i.e. The brake release state is maintained. On the other hand, when the power supply to these brake release contactors (BR1, BR2) is stopped and they are de-energized, each coil contact is opened and the power supply to the first and second brakes (9A, 9B) is stopped. The first and second brakes (9A, 9B) are each in a non-excited state and perform a braking operation. A signal obtained by connecting these two brake release contactors (BR1, BR2) in series is input to the safety control circuit 10 as a RUN signal.

In addition, the call signal from the operation button of each floor landing, the call signal from the operation button inside car 1, the signal from the landing door switch HDS, the signal from the car door switch CDS, and the signal from the floor where car 1 is landing. Various signals such as signals from the first and second specific distance sensing devices (DZ1, DZ2) arranged in parallel are sent to the operation control circuit 201 via the input side interface circuit 202 to the arithmetic processing unit 210 for normal operation control. is input to. This arithmetic processing unit (CPU) 210 processes various input signals according to the operation control program, and determines the opening/closing status of the car door 5 and the landing door 6 as well as the door zone of which floor the car 1 is located. A motor drive control signal is created while determining whether or not the motor drive control signal is present, and is output to the inverter 20 via the output side interface circuit 203. The inverter 20 controls the motor drive according to these motor drive control signals, thereby controlling the up/down movement and stop of the car 1 to the floor indicated by each call signal, and when the car is stopped, the car door 5 and the landing area are controlled. The opening and closing of the door 6 is controlled.

The operation control circuit 201 for performing the above normal operation control is installed in the control panel 200.

On the other hand, the safety control circuit 10 for the door open running protection device according to this embodiment is formed on a single board as an independent module separate from the control panel 200, and can be replaced with the control panel 200. It can be installed and incorporated into the elevator system, and functions as a safety control circuit that makes various abnormality judgments, including door-open running abnormality judgment. That is, the safety control circuit 10 includes a necessary mechanism for stopping the running of the car 1 when at least the car 1 runs with the car door 5 or the landing door 6 open when the car 1 runs with the door open. It is installed independently of the operation control circuit 201.

The safety control circuit 10 of the present embodiment includes a safety control memory (ROM) 14 in which at least a door-open running judgment logic program and data for the ethics program are stored as one of the abnormality judgment logic programs, A safety control arithmetic processing unit (CPU) 11 that processes each signal according to a decision logic program to determine whether the door is running with the door open, and a safety control storage unit (RAM) 15 as a working main memory are mounted on the same board. There is. In addition, input connections set to receive various input signals are connected to the upper side of the board (corresponding to the left side when facing the page in the safety control circuit 10 in Figure 1), and the input connections set up to receive various input signals are connected to the lower side of the board (corresponding to the left side when facing the paper in the safety control circuit 10 in Figure 1). In the control circuit 10, a plurality of output connection sections each configured to output a signal from the safety control arithmetic processing unit (CPU) 11 to the outside are provided on the right side as viewed from the paper. The connection of various input wires and output wires to each connection part is done in one-touch manner using bar terminals to the screwless terminal block for the board as each connection part, which ensures maximum safety in the board form. The control circuit 10 can be easily incorporated into the elevator system.

The safety control circuit 10 of this embodiment has the board replaced every 10 years, and a 10-year inspection program for determining the timing of inspection and replacement 10 years after its startup is stored in the safety control memory. The data is stored in a ROM (ROM) 14. Furthermore, an indicator lamp 17 is provided which lights up to indicate that 10 years have passed. In this embodiment, the display lamp 17 is composed of a 7-segment LED display. Therefore, the safety control arithmetic processing unit 11 adds and measures the number of years that have passed since the activation of the safety control circuit 10 according to the program, and lights up and displays the number of years after 8 years, 9 years, and 10 years have passed. It was designed to output a command signal.

In addition, in the safety control circuit 10 according to this embodiment, the electric wires from the two first and second specific distance sensing devices (DZ1, DZ2) on each floor are connected at some of the input connection portions of the board. The signals (DZ1-1, DZ1-2, DZ2-1, DZ2-2) from the first and second specific distance sensing devices (DZ1, DZ2) are sent via the input side interface circuit 12 on the board. , are input to the safety control processing unit (CPU) 11 separately from the normal operation control circuit 201. In this embodiment, the signals (BKS1, BKS2) from each brake operation sensing device of the first and second brakes (9A, 9B) are also connected to a dedicated input connection separate from the input section of the normal operation control circuit 201. The signal is input from the input side interface circuit 12 to the safety control arithmetic processing unit (CPU) 11 .

Further, signals from the car door switch CDS and the landing door switch HDS are also input from a dedicated input connection section to the safety control arithmetic processing unit 11 via the input side interface circuit 12. In this embodiment, the CDR1 normally open contact signal CD1 and the CDR2 normally open contact signal CD2 are inputted via the car door switch 1 relay CDR1 and the car door switch 2 relay CDR2, respectively. Further, the HDR1 normally open contact signal HD1 and the HDR2 normally open contact signal HD2 are inputted via the landing door switch 1 relay HDR1 and the landing door switch 2 relay HDR2. Note that these relays (CDR1, CDR2, HDR1, HDR2) may be appropriately interposed when connecting the electric wires from the car door switch CDS and the landing door switch HDS to the board.

In this embodiment, as shown in FIG. 2(a), the car door switch CDS becomes an ON signal when the car door is closed, and the car door switch 1 relay CDR1 and the car door switch 2 relay CDR2 The output of is the on signal. When the car door is open, the car door switch CDS becomes an OFF signal, and the outputs from the car door switch 1 relay CDR1 and the car door switch 2 relay CDR2 become OFF signals. On the other hand, the landing door switch HDS is made up of all the landing door switches on each floor connected in series, and when all the landing doors are closed and all the landing door switches are on, the landing door switch HDS becomes an on signal, and the landing door switch HDS is turned on. The outputs from relay HDR1 for door switch 1 and relay HDR2 for landing door switch 2 are turned on signals. Also, if one of the landing doors is open and the landing door switch is off, the landing door switch HDS becomes an off signal, and outputs from relay HDR1 for landing door switch 1 and relay HDR2 for landing door switch 2 are turned off. shall be. Additionally, in new elevators, the car door switch and each floor landing door switch usually have an improved forced-opening structure to prevent welding or poor contact, but existing elevators do not have a forced-opening structure. It may not be compatible. In this case, safety is ensured by a double switch circuit as shown in FIG. 2(b).

Furthermore, in this elevator system, a first motor power cutoff contactor S1 is connected to a power supply circuit to the inverter 20 that drives and controls the motor 25, and a first motor power cutoff contactor S1 is connected to a power supply circuit between the inverter 20 and the motor 25. and a second motor power cutoff contactor S2, and a first brake power cutoff contactor BD1 connected upstream of the rectifier of the power supply circuit to the first and second brakes (9A, 9B). and a second brake power cutoff contactor BD2 are provided in series. In this embodiment, the first motor power cut-off contactor S1, the second motor power cut-off contactor S2, and the brake power cut-off contactors (BR1, BR2) are turned on and off by respective circuit boards provided on the board. It is configured to be directly controlled via relays (S1y, S2y, BDy).

Based on the car stop command signal outputted from the safety control processing unit (CPU) 11 of the safety control circuit 10 via the output side interface circuit 13, the first motor power cutoff contactor S1 relay S1y and the second Relay S2y for motor power cutoff contactor S2 and relay S3y for brake power cutoff contactor (BR1, BR2) are turned off, and energization to each contactor (S1, S2, BR1, BR2) is stopped and demagnetized. , the coil contacts of each contactor open and the power supply to the inverter 20 and motor 25 is cut off, causing the motor 25 to lose power, and at the same time, the power supply to the first and second brakes (9A, 9B) is also cut off. Then, each of them becomes a non-excited state and enters a braking operation state, and the rotation of the rotating shaft of the motor 25 is stopped. As a result, the running of the car 1 is stopped by the action of stopping the drive of the motor 25 and operating the first and second brakes (9A, 9B).

Furthermore, in this embodiment, each contactor (S1, S2, BD1, BD2) is equipped with a mirror contact function that guarantees that the auxiliary contact is off when the main contact is on. It is assumed that a mirror contact normally closed contact signal is output from each contactor (S1, S2, BD1, BD2). That is, the mirror contact normally closed contact signal S1B for S1, the mirror contact normally closed contact signal S2B for S2, and the mirror contact normally closed contact signal BD1B for BD1 and the mirror contact normally closed contact signal BD2B for BD2 are transmitted to the safety control circuit 10, respectively. The information is input to the safety control processing unit (CPU) 11 of the computer. Therefore, during normal operation, the mirror contact normally closed contact signals (S1B, S2B, BD1B, BD2B) from these contactors (S1, S2, BD1, BD2) are activated by the energization of each contactor. When in the on state, it is input as an off signal, but when the main (coil) contact is in the off state due to demagnetization of each contactor, it is input as an on signal.

Furthermore, a normally open contact signal RUN connected in series from brake release contactors (BR1, BR2) for the first and second brakes (9A, 9B), which are controlled to open and close by the normal operation control circuit 201, is separately provided for safety. Although the configuration is such that the signal is input to the control circuit 10, while the ON signal RUN is being input, it is indicated that the operation is in progress according to the normal operation control program. Further, a manual signal INS indicating that manual work is in progress and a test signal TEST indicating that a test is in progress are also input to the safety control circuit 10, respectively. While the manual operation signal INS and test signal TEST are being input, the door open running determination operation is not performed.

The safety control circuit 10 of this embodiment includes at least a monitoring means for monitoring whether the logic processing operation for determining whether the door is running with the door open or not is being performed normally using the door open running determination logic program. Specifically, a WDT (watchdog timer) 16 detects an end signal that is output every time the logical processing operation for determining whether the door is running is completed at a predetermined cycle time, and the WDT (watchdog timer) 16 detects a completion signal that is output every time the logical processing operation for determining whether the door is running is completed at a predetermined cycle time. If the end signal is not detected even after the completion of the process, an error signal corresponding to a car stop command signal is output as a processing operation abnormality. As a result, the safety control circuit 10 enters the same operating state as when the door-open running abnormality is determined, a power cutoff command is output, each contactor (S1, S2, BD1, BD2) is deenergized and demagnetized, and the coil contact is closed. Open. As a result, the power supply to the motor 25 and the first and second brakes (9A, 9B) is cut off, and the car 1 is stopped. The safety control circuit 10 of this embodiment includes an error display lamp 18 that lights up in response to an error signal from the WDT 16.

In the safety control circuit 10 having the above configuration, each component is formed as one module on a single board, but in this embodiment, the safety control circuit 10 is housed on a board with length and width of 90 mm x 210 mm. In addition, we were able to realize an extremely compact product form. Therefore, the safety control circuit is much smaller than, for example, a case where the safety control circuit is configured with a PLC (Programmable Logic Controller), and the area occupied by the control panel to which it is installed is also small. Therefore, on the control panel side, the control box can be smaller than the conventional one.

Below, the process of operation processing for determining door-open running abnormality by executing the door-open running determination logic program in the safety control circuit 10 according to the present embodiment will be explained along the flowchart of FIG. In this embodiment, for example, when the car door 5 is closed, the signals from the car door switch CDS (CD1, CD2) are on, and when the car door 5 is open, the signals from the car door switch CDS (CD1, CD2) are on. ) was set to off. When all the landing doors 6 are closed, the signals (HD1, HD2) from the landing door switch HDS are on, and when even one of all the landing doors 6 is open, the signal from the landing door switch HDS is turned on. (HD1, HD2) shows the case where the settings are turned off.

Furthermore, the signals from the first specific distance sensing device DZ1 (DZ1-1, DZ1-2) and the signals from the second specific distance sensing device DZ2 (DZ2-1, DZ2-2) are transmitted when the car floor surface is in the door zone. If it is within the door zone, it is an on signal, and when the car floor is outside the door zone and is more than a predetermined distance away from the reference surface, it is set to be an off signal.

As shown in the flowchart of FIG. 3, in the safety control arithmetic processing unit 11 of the safety control circuit 10 according to the present embodiment, when the operation process for determining door-open running abnormality is started according to the door-open running determination logic program, First, based on the input signal, check whether any of the signals from the car door switch CDS (CD1, CD2) and the signal from the landing door switch HDS (HD1, HD2) are off, that is, whether any door is turned off. It is determined whether it is in the open state (S101). Here, if there is no off signal and all the signals are on, the operation process for determining abnormality in running with the door open ends.

However, if at least one of the signals is off and it is determined that the car door 5 or the landing door 6 or both of the signal sources are in an open state, then the signal from the first specific distance sensing device DZ1 (DZ1 -1, DZ1-2) and the signal from the second specific distance sensing device DZ2 (DZ2-1, DZ2-2). 1 is detected to have moved a predetermined distance or more (S102).

Here, if the signals from both specific distance sensing devices (DZ1, DZ2) are both on, the operation process for determining whether the vehicle is running with the door open ends. However, if at least one of the signals is off and it is detected that car 1 has moved a certain distance or more, this means that car door 5 or landing door 6 is open and the car is running with the door open. An abnormality determination is made (S103).

Therefore, the safety control processing unit 11 outputs a car stop command signal (S104), and based on this, the relays (S1y, S2y) directly energize the two motor power cutoff contactors (S1, S2). These contactors (S1, S2) are turned off and demagnetized, the coil contacts are opened, the power supply to the motor 25 is cut off (S105), and the motor drive is brought to a halt (S106). At the same time, based on the car stop command signal, relay S3y directly turns off the electricity to the first and second brake power cutoff contactors (BD1, BD2), demagnetizes both collectors (BD1, BD2), and demagnetizes the coils. The contacts are opened, power supply to the first and second brakes (9A, 9B) is cut off (S107), and the first and second brakes (9A, 9B) enter a non-excitation operating state (S108). ). Note that in the non-excitation operating state of the first and second brakes (9A, 9B), signals (BKS1, BKS2) from the operation sensing devices of each brake are inputted to the safety control circuit 10 as on signals.

As described above, the car 1 is stopped by stopping the motor drive by cutting off the power to the motor 25 and/or stopping the motor 25 by cutting off the power to the brake side (S109), and the operation process for determining whether the door is running abnormally ends. becomes. Note that the abnormality operation process is always repeated at a predetermined cycle time while the elevator is in operation unless it is determined that the door-open running is abnormal. A completion signal is output every time the operation process for determining whether the door is running abnormally is completed within a certain cycle time, and this signal is detected by the WDT 16 as a monitoring means, thereby indicating that the operation process for determining whether the door is running normally is normal or not. Operation is monitored.

As described above, in the safety control circuit 10 for the door-open running prevention device according to the present embodiment, the car 1 is restrained based on the abnormality determination of the door-open running, regardless of the control signal outputted by the normal operation control circuit 201. can be done. Moreover, since the safety control circuit 10 is formed on a board that is physically independent and separate from the control panel 200 on which the normal operation control circuit 201 is formed, the operation control circuit 201 can control the operation. A logic program for determining an operational abnormality can be operated satisfactorily without being affected by the operation of the program.

Further, the car restrained state due to the above-described abnormality determination of door-open running is canceled in accordance with the cancellation program stored in the safety control storage unit 14 through the operation processing procedure shown in the flowchart of FIG. Here, the safety control circuit 10 of this embodiment is provided with a dedicated reset button (not shown).

The operation process for releasing the car restraint is performed after confirming that the car restraint command is being outputted in the safety control arithmetic processing unit 11 (S111). That is, when the car is in a stopped state, first, the elevator drive system is switched to manual operation (S112). Then, it is determined whether the manual signal INS is on (S113), and if the INS signal is on, it is determined that the switch to manual operation has been completed. Thereafter, necessary manual operation is performed to eliminate the cause of the abnormality (S114).

After the cause of the abnormality is eliminated, the reset button is pressed for a predetermined time (S115), and a reset signal RST is output. However, the safety control arithmetic processing unit 11 determines whether the reset signal is on for a predetermined time, for example, 2 seconds (S116). That is, in order to ensure a reset, the reset button must be pressed for two seconds or more. Therefore, if it is determined that the reset signal RST is on for 2 seconds, the safety control arithmetic processing unit 11 outputs an abnormality reset command (S117).

This abnormality reset command cancels the output of the motor power cutoff signal and the brake power cutoff signal (S118). As a result, the two motor power cutoff contactors (S1, S2) and the two brake power cutoff contactors (BD1, BD2) are energized again and are in an energized state, and each connector contact is closed. As a result, the S1 normally closed contact signal S1B, the S2 normally closed contact signal S2B, and the BD1 normally closed contact signal BD1B and the BD2 normally closed contact signal BD2B from each contactor (S1, S2, BD1, BD2) are turned on, respectively. Therefore, the safety control arithmetic processing unit 11 determines whether or not these signals (S1B, S2B, BD1B, BD2B) are all on (S119), and if it is determined that all of them are on, the car It is assumed that the restrained state has been released, and the release operation process is terminated.

In addition, in the above-mentioned operation processing step, when the door-open running abnormality determination is made (S103), the safety control arithmetic processing unit 11 outputs the door-open running abnormality signal (S110). This abnormal signal is output to the outside from a connection part set for abnormal signal output, but in this example, an abnormal signal is output for each type of abnormality determination via five relays. . That is, a type of abnormality determination was assigned to each of the plurality of types of signals generated by the number and combination of the five relay ON signals. For example, as shown in the relative table in Figure 7, various combinations of the first to fifth on signals (X20 to X24) are made to correspond to the signal types for the abnormality determinations by type (Y1 to Y26). .

Specifically, when the car door 5 and the landing door 6 are both open, the car door switch signals CD1 and CD2: OFF, the landing door switch HD1 and HD2: OFF, and the first and second specific distance sensing. The device signal DZ1-1,2/DZ2-1,2: at least one of them is off) is set as the abnormality determination Y1, and the output of only the abnormality signal X20 (first relay: on) is assigned. Abnormality determination Y2 is when the door is running with only the car door 5 open (car door switch signals CD1 and CD2: OFF, landing door switches HD1 and HD2: ON, and the first and second specific distance sensing device signals DZ1- 1,2・DZ2-1,2: At least one of them is off), and the output of only the abnormal signal X21 (second relay: on) is assigned. Abnormality determination Y3 is when the door is opened when only the landing door 6 is open (car door switch signals CD1 and CD2: on, landing door switch HD1 and HD2: off, and the first and second specific distance sensing device signals DZ1- 1,2・DZ2-1,2: At least one of them is off), and the combined output of abnormal signals X20 and X21 (first and second relays: on) is assigned.

In addition, test input to each motor power cutoff contactor (S1, S2) once a day, for example, when each coil power supply is turned off for 4 seconds, the mirror contact normally closed contact signal S1B for S1 is OFF. , the output of only the abnormality signal X22 (third relay: ON) was assigned as the abnormality determination Y4 of the ON failure of the motor power cutoff contactor S1, which does not turn ON while remaining closed due to fusion of the coil contact or the like. In addition, when the mirror contact normally closed contact signal S2B for S2 is OFF, the combined output of the abnormality signals X20 and X22 (first and third relays: ON) is determined as an abnormality determination Y5 of ON failure of the motor power cutoff contactor S2. Assigned.

In addition, test input is performed once a day for each brake power cutoff contactor (BD1, BD2), for example, when each coil power supply is turned off for 4 seconds, the mirror contact normally closed contact signal BD1B for BD1 is turned off. A combined output of abnormal signals X20, X21, and X22 (first, second, and third relays: ON) was assigned as an abnormality determination Y7 for an ON failure of the brake power cutoff contactor BD1. In addition, when the mirror contact normally closed contact signal BD2B for BD2 is off, the output of only the abnormality signal X23 (fourth relay: on) is assigned as an abnormality determination Y8 of an ON failure of the brake power cutoff contactor BD2.

Furthermore, an abnormality signal was also assigned to the abnormality determination regarding the RUN signal, which indicates that the vehicle is in normal operation by inputting an ON signal. That is, the ON failure of the RUN signal (brake motion sensing operation signals BKS1 and BKS2: ON, RUN signal: ON) is determined as an abnormality determination Y9, and the combined output of the abnormality signals X20 and X23 (1st and 4th relays: ON) is assigned. Further, an off-circuit failure that does not close (brake motion sensing operation signals BKS1 and BKS2: off, RUN signal: off) is determined as abnormality Y10, and a combined output of abnormality signals X21 and X23 (second and fourth relays: on) is assigned.

An abnormality signal was also assigned to a coincidence/mismatch abnormality that suggests a failure in either of the first specific distance sensing device DZ1 and the second specific distance sensing device DZ2. That is, when the first specific distance sensing device DZ1 is off while the second specific distance sensing device DZ2 is on, the inconsistency of the first specific distance sensing device DZ1 being off is determined as an abnormality determination Y11 and an abnormality signal X20. When the combined output of X21 and X23 (first, second, and fourth relays: on) is assigned, and the first specific distance sensing device DZ1 is on and the second specific distance sensing device DZ2 is off, A combined output of abnormal signals X22 and X23 (third and fourth relays: on) was assigned as an abnormality judgment Y12 for the second specific distance sensing device DZ2 side OFF mismatch.

Furthermore, an abnormality signal was assigned as follows for a coincidence/mismatch abnormality that suggests a failure of the first and second brakes (9A, 9B) or each brake operation sensing device. That is, when the first brake operation sensing device signal BKS1 is off while the second brake operation sensing device signal BKS2 is on, the abnormality determination Y13 is determined to indicate that the first brake operation sensing device is off and the abnormality signal X20 is determined. The combined output of In this case, a combination output of abnormal signals X21, X22, and X23 (second, third, and fourth relays: ON) is assigned as abnormality judgment Y14 for the second brake operation sensing device side OFF mismatch.

In this embodiment, five relay signals are used, so in addition to this, another combination of abnormal signals may be assigned for each abnormality determination for each necessary test conducted once a day. Can be done. For example, in this embodiment, the abnormality determination Y15 is assigned to the internal abnormality of the CPU, RAM, and ROM by the combined output of the abnormality signals X20, X21, X22, and X23 (first, second, third, and fourth relays: ON). Ta. In addition, abnormality judgment Y16 is set to abnormal signal X24 (fifth relay: ON) when the input interface of the car door switch signal is abnormal, and abnormality judgment Y17 is set to abnormal signal X20 and X24 (first and fifth relay: ON). The combination output makes the landing door switch signal input interface abnormal, and the abnormality judgment Y18 turns the input interface of the first specific distance sensing device signal DZ1 abnormal by the combined output of abnormal signals X21 and X24 (second and fifth relays: ON). The abnormality determination Y19 is assigned to the input interface abnormality of the second specific distance sensing device signal DZ2 by the combined output of the abnormality signals X20, X21, and X24 (first, second, and fifth relays: ON).

Furthermore, when detecting car speed using a rotary encoder as a speed sensing device and determining abnormal speed, abnormality determination Y20 is assigned to the combined output of abnormality signals X22 and X24 (3rd and 5th relays: on), and It is also possible to assign an off-failure of the speed sensing device due to an encoder abnormality as an abnormality determination Y21 by a combined output of abnormality signals X20, X22, and X24 (first, third, and fifth relays: on).

In addition, in order to cope with the case where the car doors and landing doors are upper and lower door types, the abnormality judgment Y22 is applied to abnormality signals X21, X22, and X24 (second, third, 5th relay: ON), and the abnormality judgment Y23 is assigned to the abnormality of the hall all-door monitoring system based on the hall upper door switch signal. It can also be assigned as a combination output (relay: on).

Additionally, when a test is normally performed once a day, if the test signal TEST does not turn on for more than 25 hours from the previous test, it is determined that the test is abnormal. Abnormality determination Y24 is assigned to the combined output of abnormality signals X23 and X24 (4th and 5th relays: on). Furthermore, regarding the watchdog timer (WDT) abnormality, abnormality determination Y25 is assigned by the combined output of abnormality signals X20, X23, and X24 (first, fourth, and fifth relays: on).

In the safety control circuit 10 according to the present embodiment, a logic program and data for the logic program are stored in the safety control storage unit (ROM) 14, and the logic program can be operated by the safety control arithmetic processing unit 11. For example, various abnormality determinations other than running with the door open can be similarly performed without going through the operation control circuit 201 and without being affected by the normal operation control program.

Here, an example of the operation processing process when determining an abnormality of the brake, the brake operation sensing device, or the RUN signal for the first brake 9A and the second brake 9B constituting a double brake is shown in the flowchart of FIG. I will explain along. In this abnormality determination, the safety control memory (ROM) 14 receives the signal BKS1 from the brake operation sensing device of the first brake 9A and the signal BKS2 from the brake operation sensing device of the second brake 9B. The input side interface circuit 12 is provided with an input section.

In this embodiment, these signals (BKS1, BKS2) are input to the safety control arithmetic processing unit 11 as ON signals when the brake is applied and as OFF signals when the brake is released. Then, according to the abnormality determination logic program for the brake or brake operation sensing device, these signals are processed in accordance with the operation procedure shown in the flowchart of FIG. 5 to perform operation processing for determining abnormality between the brake and the brake operation sensing device. be.

That is, first, after starting the test input, it is determined whether the signal BKS1 from the brake operation sensing device of the first brake 9A and the signal BKS2 from the brake operation sensing device of the second brake 9B match ( S121). Here, if it is determined that they do not match, it is determined whether a predetermined time has elapsed, for example, 2 seconds, since the mismatch was determined (S122), and when it is confirmed that 2 seconds have elapsed, which It is determined that either one of the brakes or one of the brake operation sensing devices is abnormal (S130). As a result of this abnormality determination, a motor power cutoff signal is output, the motor power cutoff contactors (S1, S2) are deenergized and both coil contacts are opened, and the power supply circuit to the inverter 20 and the inverter 20 and motor are 25 is cut off (S131). As a result, the motor 25 is stopped and the car is stopped (S132).

On the other hand, if the signal BKS1 and the signal BKS2 match, it is determined whether the RUN signal is on (S123). This is to serially input signals from the brake release connectors (BR1, BR2) for each of the first and second brakes (9A, 9B) controlled by the normal operation control circuit 201, When this RUN signal is on, both brakes are in a released state, indicating that the car 1 is in a normal operating state, and when at least one of the brakes is in a braking state, it becomes an off signal.

Therefore, after it is determined that the RUN signal is on, first, the signals (BKS1, BKS2) from each brake operation sensing device of the first and second brakes (9A, 9B) are sent within two seconds from the determination. ) is off (S126), and when it is determined that the signals (BKS1, BKS2) are off, the first and second brakes (9A, 9B) are in a released state, As a normal operating state, no abnormality is detected and the abnormality determination operation ends. However, if the RUN signal is on and the signals (BKS1, BKS2) are on, there is no consistency, so it is determined that the brake or brake operation sensing device or RUN signal is abnormal (S130), and the motor power is cut off. (S131), car control is performed (S132).

On the other hand, if it is determined that the RUN signal is not on, the power supply circuit to at least one of the brakes of the brake release connectors (BR1, BR2) is cut off, and a transition to the brake braking state is determined. However, within 2 seconds from this determination, it is determined whether the signal BKS1 from the brake operation sensing device of the first brake 9A is off (S124), and at the same time, the signal BKS1 from the brake operation sensing device of the second brake 9B is turned off. It is determined whether BKS2 is off (S125).

Therefore, when at least one of signal BKS1 and signal BKS2 is off, at least one of the brakes is in the braking state even though the RUN signal indicates that at least one of the brakes is in the braking state. Since the signal from the motion sensing device indicates that the brake is in the released state, it is determined that at least one of the brakes or the brake motion sensing device is abnormal, or that the RUN signal itself is abnormal (S130). . As a result of this abnormality determination, the motor power cutoff contactors (S1, S2) are deenergized, both coil contacts are opened, the motor power is cut off (S131), and the car is stopped (S132). If the car is stopped based on the abnormality determination described above, the abnormality determination operation processing between the brake and the brake operation sensing device is completed.

In addition, when it is determined that the brake or the brake operation sensing device or the RUN signal is present, the remaining race control calculation device 11 outputs an abnormality signal corresponding to the abnormality determination (S140). In this embodiment, as described above, it is possible to output to the outside as a combined output of the abnormal outputs (X20 to X24) corresponding to the abnormal signal.

As described above, if the safety control circuit of the present invention has the necessary operational abnormality determination logic program and data for the logic program, various necessary abnormality determinations can be performed without being affected by the normal operation control circuit. It is possible to perform without receiving That is, by detecting combinations of various signals and abnormalities in their consistency, it is possible to determine abnormalities such as on-failure of each contactor or abnormality of each input section, for example. It is possible to implement it exclusively in the safety control circuit.

In addition, in the embodiment shown in FIG. 1, the car door and the landing door are sliding doors, but the safety control circuit for the door open running protection device according to the present invention is applicable to the case where the car door and the landing door are sliding doors. It is similarly effective for upper and lower doors. For example, as shown in FIG. 6, the car 30 of the upper and lower door type is assembled into an elevator system with almost the same configuration as the sliding door shown in FIG. 1, except for the signal input sections from the switches of each car door and the landing door.

A general upper and lower door type car 30 includes a pair of car plate doors (35a, 35b) that can be moved up and down as car doors, and a pair of landing plate doors (36a, 36b) that can be moved up and down as landing doors. It is something. When the upper landing board door 36a is manually pulled upward, the lower landing board door 36b moves downward in conjunction with the landing board door 36a, and when the upper landing board door 36a is pulled down, the landing door moves downward. The landing board door 36b on the side moves upward in conjunction with the landing board door 36a above it, and the entrance/exit on the landing side is opened/closed by the vertical movement of these landing board doors (36a, 36b).

On the other hand, the car door has a pair of car plate doors (35a, 35b) arranged so as to be vertically slidable inside a frame attached to the front surface of the car 30. Normally, the front opening of the car 30 is closed in a closed state in which the lower end of the upper car plate door 35a and the upper end of the lower car plate door 35b abut against each other. When the upper car door 35a is manually pulled upward from the closed state, the lower car door 35b, which is linked to the car door 35a via a wire or the like, moves downward under its own weight, causing the upper and lower car doors to separate. , the opening of the car 30 becomes open.

In addition, for each car door (35a, 35b) and landing plate door (36a, 36b), an upper car door switch CDaS, a lower car door switch CDbS, an upper car door switch HDaS, and a lower landing door switch indicate the respective open/closed states. A switch HDbS is provided. Therefore, in this safety control circuit 10, a part of the input connection section on the board is set for connecting electric wires from each switch, and in the input side interface circuit 12 of the safety control arithmetic unit 11, each An input section for receiving signals from the switches (CDO, CD1/CD2, HDO, HD1/HD2) may be provided.

Here, it is assumed that the signals from these switches are input as off signals when the car door (35a, 35b) and the landing door (36a, 36b) are respectively fully open. Therefore, the safety control arithmetic processing unit 11 can determine whether the car door and the landing door are open or closed based on whether these input signals are turned on or off, and can be used to determine whether there is an abnormality in running with the door open.

As described above, the safety control circuit for the door opening protection device according to the present invention can be incorporated into any rope-type elevator system regardless of the type of door, and in any case, it can be incorporated into normal operation control. Various operational abnormality determinations can be performed satisfactorily without being affected. Furthermore, since the circuit board can be replaced on a board-by-board basis in a control panel in which a normal operation control circuit is installed, the replacement work at the set replacement period can be completed very easily.

1, 30: Car 2: Main rope 3: Counterweight 4: Direction change pulley 5: Car door 6: Landing door CDS: Car door switch HDS: Landing door switch 7: Hoisting machine 8: Sheave 9A: First Brake 9B: Second brake 10: Safety control circuit (for door open running protection device)
11: Safety control processing unit (CPU)
12: Input side interface circuit 13: Output side interface circuit 14: Safety control memory (ROM)
15: Safety control memory (RAM)
16:WDT (watchdog timer)
17: Display lamp 18: Error display lamp 20: Inverter 21, 22: Power supply 23A, 23B: Rectifier 25: Motor S1, S2: Contactor for motor power cutoff BD1, BD2: Contactor for brake power cutoff DZ1, DZ2: Specific distance sensing Device 35a: Upper car door 35b: Lower car door 36a: Upper landing door 36b: Lower landing door CDaS: Upper car door switch CDbS: Lower car door switch HDaS: Upper landing door switch HDbS: Lower landing door switch 100 : Area controlled by the safety control circuit 200: Control panel 201: Operation control circuit 202: Input side interface circuit 203: Output side interface circuit 210: Arithmetic processing unit (CPU) for normal operation control
BR1, BR2: Brake release contactor S1y, S2y, BDy: Relay

Claims (7)

A rope-type elevator door in which the raising and lowering of the car by a hoisting machine equipped with a constantly operating electromagnetic double brake and the opening and closing of the car doors and landing doors on each floor are controlled according to a predetermined operation control program. In the safety control circuit for the open running protection device,
A single module that can be replaced and installed on the control panel as an independent module separate from a control panel in which an operation control circuit for controlling operation according to the predetermined operation control program is installed. It is formed on the substrate of
The first module includes:
a plurality of input connection parts to which various signal input electric wires from the outside are connected; and a plurality of output connection parts to which various signal output electric wires to the outside are connected;
a safety control storage unit storing a plurality of predetermined operational abnormality determination logic programs and data for each operational abnormality determination logic program;
According to the operation abnormality determination logic program, a signal received from the input connection part through the input part is processed to determine an abnormality, and based on the abnormality determination, power is supplied to the motor of the hoisting machine. Create a car stop command signal that cuts off power supply to the motor electromagnetic contactor connected to the circuit and the brake electromagnetic contactor connected to the power supply circuit to the electromagnetic double brake, and generate the car stop command signal. a safety control arithmetic processing unit having a function of outputting from its output section;
The plurality of input connection parts include a connection part set to receive a signal indicating the opening/closing state of the car door and each landing door, and a connection part configured to sense when the car has moved a predetermined distance or more. a connection configured to receive a signal from a specific distance sensing device;
The plurality of output connection parts each have a connection part set so that the car stop command signal is output to the motor electromagnetic contactor and the brake electromagnetic contactor,
A door open running determination logic program is included as one of the operation abnormality determination logic programs stored in the safety control storage unit,
The safety control arithmetic processing unit processes the signal from the specific distance sensing device and the signal indicating the open/closed status of the car door and all landing doors at predetermined fixed time intervals according to the door open running determination logic program. When it is detected that the car has traveled a certain distance or more with at least one of the car door and all the landing doors open, a door open running abnormality determination is made, and based on the door open running abnormality determination, Equipped with a function to create and output the car restraint command signal,
The safety control arithmetic processing unit further creates and outputs an abnormality signal corresponding to each type of abnormality determination including the door open running abnormality determination when an abnormality determination is made according to each operation abnormality determination logic program. Safety control for a door open running protection device, wherein the output connection section has an abnormal signal output connection section configured to output the abnormal signal to the outside according to type. circuit. A connection part for outputting the car stop command signal to the motor electromagnetic contactor and a connection part for outputting the car stop command signal to the brake electromagnetic contactor each include a connection part for the motor to output the car stop command signal to the brake electromagnetic contactor. 2. The electromagnetic contactor according to claim 1, further comprising an electromagnetic contactor that can directly control on/off the power supply to the brake electromagnetic contactor and the brake electromagnetic contactor. Safety control circuit for door open protection device. The input connection part has a connection part through which a pulse signal from an encoder provided around the car is input,
The safety control storage unit stores an encoder signal processing program and encoder signal processing program data for processing the pulse signal,
The safety control arithmetic processing device counts the pulse signals received from the connection unit via the input unit according to the encoder signal processing program, and calculates the counted number and the data included in the encoder signal processing program data. The present invention further includes a function of calculating the moving speed of the car based on the moving distance of the car per pulse or the moving distance of the car in units of the number of pulses equivalent to one revolution of the encoder. A safety control circuit for a door open running protection device according to claim 1. The input connection part has a connection part set to receive a signal from each brake operation sensing device of the electromagnetic dual brake,
One of the operation abnormality determination logic programs stored in the safety control storage unit includes a brake abnormality determination logic program for the electromagnetic dual brake,
The safety control arithmetic processing unit processes signals from each brake operation sensing device received from the connection unit via the input unit at predetermined fixed time intervals according to the brake abnormality determination logic program, Further comprising a function of determining a brake abnormality when an abnormality is detected in at least one of the brakes, creating and outputting the car stop command signal based on the brake abnormality determination, and creating and outputting a brake abnormality signal. 2. The safety control circuit for a door open running protection device according to claim 1. Further comprising an indicator lamp for indicating the time for inspection and replacement when a predetermined number of years has elapsed since activation after implementation on the door open running protection device,
The safety control storage unit stores an inspection/replacement program for determining the timing of inspection/replacement of the safety control circuit,
The safety control arithmetic processing unit adds and measures the number of years that have passed since the activation of the safety control circuit according to the inspection/replacement program, and turns on the indicator lamp when the predetermined number of years has been reached. The safety control circuit for a door open running protection device according to claim 1, further comprising a function of outputting a command signal. The indicator lamp includes an LED 7 segment indicator,
6. The door open running protection according to claim 5, wherein the safety control arithmetic processing device further has a function of displaying on the LED 7 segment display an additional number of years prior to a predetermined number of elapsed years. Safety control circuit for equipment. comprising an error display means separate from that for the operation control circuit, and a monitoring means for monitoring the operation of at least the door-open running determination logic program at predetermined regular intervals;
The safety control arithmetic processing device outputs a signal indicating that at least the door open running determination logic program is operating normally at predetermined intervals,
The monitoring means determines that an error has occurred when the signal indicating normal operation is not notified after a certain period of time, and outputs a signal instructing the error display means to display an error based on the determination, and 2. The safety control circuit for a door-open running protection device according to claim 1, further comprising a function of outputting a command signal for executing predetermined abnormality processing.