JP2004086325A - Settlement terminal device with illegally altered detection function - Google Patents

Settlement terminal device with illegally altered detection function Download PDF

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Publication number
JP2004086325A
JP2004086325A JP2002243763A JP2002243763A JP2004086325A JP 2004086325 A JP2004086325 A JP 2004086325A JP 2002243763 A JP2002243763 A JP 2002243763A JP 2002243763 A JP2002243763 A JP 2002243763A JP 2004086325 A JP2004086325 A JP 2004086325A
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JP
Japan
Prior art keywords
wiring
terminal device
settlement terminal
detection means
magnetic card
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
JP2002243763A
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Japanese (ja)
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JP4190231B2 (en
Inventor
Manabu Matsumoto
松本 学
Munehiro Torii
鳥居 宗弘
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Panasonic Holdings Corp
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Matsushita Electric Industrial Co Ltd
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Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a settlement terminal device which can effectively detect illegal alteration by a method suitable for a device having a magnetic card reading mechanism. <P>SOLUTION: A card reading means 14 reading identification information which is magnetically recorded in the magnetic card, a wiring sheet 143 which surrounds at least a part of the periphery of the magnetic card reading means 14 and in which wiring is stretched, a tampering detection means 134 detecting tampering of a casing, a storage means holding confidential information, an illegal alteration detection means deleting confidential information kept in the storage means when wiring of the wiring sheet 143 is changed or the tampering detection means 134 detects the tampering of the casing, and a wiring board 13 on which the storage means and the illegal alteration detection means are arranged are disposed in the casing. In the settlement terminal device, the wiring sheet 143 is installed only in the magnetic card reading means 14 whose alteration is comparatively easy, and illegal alteration can effectively be prevented with a simple structure. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2004,JPO

Description

【0001】
【発明の属する技術分野】
本発明は、磁気カードに記録されたクレジット番号等を読み取ってオンライン決済を行う決済端末に関し、特に、クレジット番号等を不正取得するために決済端末に加えられる改造を検出できるようにしたものである。
【0002】
【従来の技術】
従来、クレジットカードを利用する決済では、クレジットカードに磁気記録されたクレジット番号を不正に読み取り、悪用する事故がしばしば発生している。図7に示すように、クレジットカード用の決済端末10は、カード差し込み用のスリット12を有している。ここにクレジットカードを差し込み、スリット12に沿ってクレジットカードを引き抜くと、クレジットカードの磁気記録部分が決済端末10内に設置された磁気ヘッドに接して動き、磁気記録部分に記録されたクレジット番号が磁気ヘッドで読み取られる。
読み取られたクレジット番号は、決済端末10の操作部から入力された支払額のデータとともに、ネットワークを介して、決済サーバに送られ、オンラインで決済処理が行われる。
【0003】
クレジット番号の不正読取りは、決済端末10の本体ケースを開け、この装置の中に磁気ヘッドが読み取ったデータを蓄積する記録装置を密かに設置して行われ、後日、この記録装置を決済端末10から取り出し、そこに記録されたクレジット番号が読み出される。
【0004】
こうした不正を防ぐため、従来の決済端末は、本体ケースが開封されたときにオフになるマイクロスイッチを備えており、不正者が本体ケースを開けてマイクロスイッチがオフになると、メモリに記憶された暗号化キーなどの機密データが消去され、決済サーバへの決済動作ができなくなるように構成されている。
ただ、これだけでは万全でなく、本体ケースを開けずに、例えばドリルなどで本体ケースに穴を開けて、そこから不正工作が行われる虞れがある。
【0005】
こうした手口に対抗するため、特開平11−353237号公報には、ケース内面に配線を張り巡らし、本体ケースにドリルなどで穴を開けたときに、この配線が断線し、それに伴って装置の機能を停止するように構成した電子取引装置が記載されている。
【0006】
【発明が解決しようとする課題】
しかし、複雑な形状を有し、且つ、広い面積を有するケース内面に配線を張り巡らす作業は、手間が掛かり、また、コストが嵩むと云う問題点がある。
【0007】
本発明は、こうした従来の問題点を解決するものであり、磁気カードの読み取り機構を持つ装置に適した方法で効果的に不正改造を検出することができる決済端末装置を提供することを目的としている。
【0008】
【課題を解決するための手段】
そこで、本発明の決済端末装置では、筺体内に、磁気カードに磁気記録された識別情報を読み取る磁気カード読取手段と、磁気カード読取手段の周囲の少なくとも一部を囲む、配線を張り巡らした配線シートと、筺体の開封を検出する開封検出手段と、情報を保持する記憶手段と、配線シートの配線に変化が生じたとき、または、開封検出手段が筺体の開封を検出したとき、記憶手段に保持された情報を消去する不正改造検出手段と、少なくとも記憶手段及び不正改造検出手段が配置された配線基板とを設けている。
このように、この決済端末装置では、改造が比較的容易な磁気カード読取手段にだけ配線シートを配置しており、簡単な構成で不正改造を効果的に防止することができる。
【0009】
【発明の実施の形態】
本発明の実施形態における決済端末は、従来(図7)と同様の外形を有し、表面側ケース15及び裏面側ケース16から成る本体ケース内には、図1に示すように、配線基板13と、本体ケースの周縁に配置された磁気カード読取部14とを備えている。
【0010】
磁気カード読取部14は、図2に示すように、磁気カードが通過するスリット141と、スリット141に臨む位置に配置された磁気ヘッド142とを有しており、磁気カード読取部14の磁気ヘッド142が配置された部分の左右両側及び下側は、穴が開けられたときにそれを検出する穿孔検出体143で覆われている。
【0011】
この穿孔検出体143は、図3に示すように、コの字型に折り曲げられた金属板144と、この金属板144の外側に貼付された可撓性プリント配線板(FPC)145とを備えている。FPC145は、連続する一本の導体が密に折り曲げられて配線されており、断線検出シートを構成している。
磁気ヘッド142から導出された信号線146の先端は、配線基板13に設けたソケット131に挿入される。
【0012】
また、このソケット131が配置された配線基板13の裏面には、決済端末の動作を制御するCPU132が装着されている。
また、配線基板13には、ケース開封を検出する開封検出スイッチ134を構成するため、導体133が一定距離だけ離れて配線されており、この導体133間を短絡する接触片151が、配線基板13の固定されたケース(ここでは、配線基板13が裏面側ケース16に固定されているものとする)とは別のケース(表面側ケース15)に弾性的に固定されている。表面側ケース15を開くと、表面側ケース15に固定された接触片151が上昇して導体133間は非接続となり、開封検出スイッチ134はオフとなる。また、表面側ケース15を閉じた状態では、接触片151が導体133間を接続し、開封検出スイッチ134はオンとなる。
【0013】
図4は、この決済端末における不正改造検出回路の構成を示している。この回路には、開封検出スイッチ134と、FPC145による断線検出シート(展開した状態を示している)の配線とが直列に接続し、また、開封検出スイッチ134のオフまたは断線検出シート145の配線の断線を検出してメモリ18の機密情報を消去する検出回路17が接続している。なお、検出回路17及びメモリ18は、図示していないが、配線基板13に設置されている。
【0014】
この決済端末の不正改造を企てる不正者が本体ケースを開けると、開封検出スイッチ134がオフとなり、検出回路17は、断線を検知してメモリ18の機密情報を消去する。そのため、決済端末の決済動作は停止される。また、不正者が、比較的改造の容易な磁気ヘッド142の不正改造を行うため、ドリルなどで磁気カード読取部14に穴を開けようとすると、FPC145の配線が断線し、検出回路17は、この断線を検知してメモリ18の機密情報を消去する。そのため、決済端末の決済動作は停止される。
【0015】
また、磁気ヘッド142の信号線146が接続するソケット131に不正工作を加えるため、決済端末の裏側からドリルなどで穴を開けようとすると、この決済端末の動作を制御するCPU132や配線基板13を破壊することになるため、決済端末の決済動作は停止される。
また、決済端末の操作部がある表側から穴を開けた場合には、その穴は容易に発見される。
【0016】
このように、この決済端末では、本体ケースを開けて不正工作が行われることは開封検出スイッチ134で防いでおり、また、磁気ヘッド部142への穿孔による不正工作は、磁気カード読取部14を断線検出シート145で覆うことにより防いでいる。
【0017】
配線基板13から信号を読み出すことは困難であり、そのため、本体ケースを開いて不正工作を行う改造さえ防いでいれば、配線基板13から信号が読み出される虞れは殆ど無い。一方、磁気ヘッド部に対する改造は比較的容易であるが、断線検出シート145で覆っているため、穿孔による不正工作を排除することができる。
このように、この決済端末では、磁気カードの読み取り機構を持つ決済端末に適した、簡単で効果的な手段により不正改造を防止することができる。
【0018】
なお、ここでは、FPCの断線検出シート145を金属板144に張り付け、この金属板144で磁気カード読取部14を覆っているが、磁気カード読取部14を断線検出シート145だけで覆うようにしても良い。ただ、金属板144を設ける方がドリル等の穿孔に対する抵抗力が強いため、不正改造を更にやりにくくすることができる。
【0019】
また、開封検出スイッチ134には、従来の装置のように、マイクロスイッチを用いても良い。
また、不正者は、図5に示すように、断線検出シート145を破壊する前に、断線検出シート145を短絡150する工作を行う可能性がある。このとき、検出回路17が断線だけを検知していると、不正工作を検出することができない。この場合、図5に示すように、検出回路として、抵抗値の変化を検出する抵抗検出回路171を配置すれば、断線検出シート145が短絡されたとき、不正改造検出回路の抵抗値の変化から不正工作を検出することができる。
また、不正改造検出回路に高周波信号を流し、人の指が断線検出シート145の配線に接触したときの静電容量の変化から生じる現象、例えば周波数の変化を検出して不正工作を検出するようにしても良い。
【0020】
また、図6に示すように、断線検出シート145に複数の配線147、148、149を設けたり、複数の開封検出スイッチ135、136、137を設けたりすることで、断線検出シートを短絡する不正工作や開封検出スイッチを短絡する不正工作をやりにくくすることができる。また、この場合、開封検出スイッチ135、136、137は、どれか一つを残してリフロー時に半田でブリッジしても良い。しかし、どれをブリッジするかは製造現場で決めるようにする。こうすると、どれが実際の開封検出スイッチになるかが不定であるため、開封検出スイッチを短絡しようとする不正者を惑わすことができる。
【0021】
【発明の効果】
以上の説明から明らかなように、本発明の決済端末は、磁気カードの読み取り機構を持つ装置に適した、簡単で効果的な手段で不正改造を防止することができる。この装置では、断線検出シートを、磁気ヘッドを覆う狭い部分にだけ用いているため、断線検出シートの設置作業が簡単であり、また、コストを低く抑えることができる。
【図面の簡単な説明】
【図1】本発明の実施形態における決済端末の内部構成を示す図
【図2】本発明の実施形態における決済端末の磁気カード読取部及び配線基板を示す図
【図3】本発明の実施形態における決済端末の穿孔検出体を示す図
【図4】本発明の実施形態における不正改造検出回路の構成を示す図
【図5】本発明の実施形態における抵抗検出回路を持つ不正改造検出回路を示す図
【図6】本発明の実施形態における複数の開封検出スイッチ及び断線検出配線を持つ不正改造検出回路を示す図
【図7】従来の決済端末を示す斜視図
【符号の説明】
10 決済端末
12 スリット
13 配線基板
14 磁気カード読取部
15 表面側ケース
16 裏面側ケース
17 検出回路
18 メモリ
131 ソケット
132 CPU
133 導体
134 開封検出スイッチ
135 開封検出スイッチ
136 開封検出スイッチ
137 開封検出スイッチ
141 スリット
142 磁気ヘッド
143 穿孔検出体
144 金属板
145 可撓性プリント配線板(断線検出シート)
146 信号線
147 断線検出シート配線
148 断線検出シート配線
149 断線検出シート配線
150 短絡
151 接触片
171 抵抗検出回路
[0001]
TECHNICAL FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates to a payment terminal that performs online payment by reading a credit number or the like recorded on a magnetic card, and in particular, is capable of detecting a modification applied to a payment terminal to illegally obtain a credit number or the like. .
[0002]
[Prior art]
2. Description of the Related Art Conventionally, in payment using a credit card, an accident has often occurred in which a credit number magnetically recorded on the credit card is illegally read and misused. As shown in FIG. 7, the payment terminal 10 for a credit card has a slit 12 for inserting a card. When the credit card is inserted here and the credit card is pulled out along the slit 12, the magnetic recording portion of the credit card moves in contact with the magnetic head installed in the settlement terminal 10, and the credit number recorded in the magnetic recording portion is displayed. Read by a magnetic head.
The read credit number is sent to the payment server via the network together with the payment amount data input from the operation unit of the payment terminal 10, and the payment processing is performed online.
[0003]
The unauthorized reading of the credit number is performed by opening the main body case of the settlement terminal 10 and secretly installing a recording device for storing the data read by the magnetic head in this device. And the credit number recorded there is read out.
[0004]
In order to prevent such fraud, the conventional payment terminal has a micro switch that is turned off when the main body case is opened, and when the fraudster opens the main body case and the micro switch is turned off, it is stored in memory. It is configured such that confidential data such as an encryption key is erased and a payment operation to the payment server cannot be performed.
However, this is not perfect, and there is a risk that a hole may be made in the main body case with a drill or the like without opening the main body case, and illegal work may be performed therefrom.
[0005]
In order to cope with such a technique, Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. H11-353237 discloses that when a wire is stretched around the inner surface of a case and a hole is drilled in a main body case, the wire is disconnected, and the function of the device is accordingly reduced. An electronic transaction device configured to stop the transaction is described.
[0006]
[Problems to be solved by the invention]
However, there is a problem that the work of laying the wiring around the inner surface of the case having a complicated shape and having a large area is troublesome and costly.
[0007]
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention has been made to solve the conventional problems, and has as its object to provide a payment terminal device capable of effectively detecting unauthorized modification by a method suitable for a device having a magnetic card reading mechanism. I have.
[0008]
[Means for Solving the Problems]
Therefore, in the settlement terminal device of the present invention, a magnetic card reading means for reading identification information magnetically recorded on a magnetic card, and a wiring line surrounding at least a part of the periphery of the magnetic card reading means are provided in the housing. Sheet, opening detection means for detecting the opening of the housing, storage means for holding information, and when a change occurs in the wiring of the wiring sheet, or when the opening detection means detects the opening of the housing, the storage means An unauthorized alteration detecting means for erasing held information and a wiring board on which at least a storage means and an unauthorized alteration detecting means are arranged are provided.
As described above, in this settlement terminal device, the wiring sheet is arranged only in the magnetic card reading means that is relatively easy to remodel, and illegal remodeling can be effectively prevented with a simple configuration.
[0009]
BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION
The payment terminal according to the embodiment of the present invention has the same outer shape as that of the related art (FIG. 7), and includes a wiring board 13 inside a main body case including a front case 15 and a back case 16 as shown in FIG. And a magnetic card reader 14 arranged on the periphery of the main body case.
[0010]
As shown in FIG. 2, the magnetic card reader 14 has a slit 141 through which a magnetic card passes, and a magnetic head 142 disposed at a position facing the slit 141. The left and right sides and the lower side of the portion where the 142 is arranged are covered with a perforation detector 143 that detects when a hole is made.
[0011]
As shown in FIG. 3, the perforation detection body 143 includes a metal plate 144 bent in a U-shape, and a flexible printed wiring board (FPC) 145 attached to the outside of the metal plate 144. ing. In the FPC 145, one continuous conductor is densely bent and wired, and constitutes a disconnection detection sheet.
The distal end of the signal line 146 derived from the magnetic head 142 is inserted into a socket 131 provided on the wiring board 13.
[0012]
A CPU 132 for controlling the operation of the payment terminal is mounted on the back surface of the wiring board 13 on which the socket 131 is arranged.
Further, in order to form an opening detection switch 134 for detecting the opening of the case, the conductor 133 is wired on the wiring board 13 at a fixed distance, and a contact piece 151 for short-circuiting between the conductors 133 is provided on the wiring board 13. (In this case, the wiring board 13 is fixed to the rear case 16) and is elastically fixed to another case (front case 15). When the front side case 15 is opened, the contact piece 151 fixed to the front side case 15 rises, the connection between the conductors 133 is disconnected, and the unsealing detection switch 134 is turned off. When the front case 15 is closed, the contact piece 151 connects between the conductors 133, and the unsealing detection switch 134 is turned on.
[0013]
FIG. 4 shows a configuration of an unauthorized alteration detection circuit in the payment terminal. In this circuit, the opening detection switch 134 and the wiring of the disconnection detection sheet (showing the developed state) by the FPC 145 are connected in series, and the OFF of the opening detection switch 134 or the wiring of the disconnection detection sheet 145 are connected. A detection circuit 17 for detecting disconnection and erasing confidential information in the memory 18 is connected. Although not shown, the detection circuit 17 and the memory 18 are provided on the wiring board 13.
[0014]
When an unauthorized person who intends to illicitly modify the payment terminal opens the main body case, the opening detection switch 134 is turned off, and the detection circuit 17 detects the disconnection and erases the confidential information in the memory 18. Therefore, the settlement operation of the settlement terminal is stopped. In addition, when a fraudulent person attempts to make a hole in the magnetic card reading unit 14 with a drill or the like in order to illegally remodel the magnetic head 142, which is relatively easy to remodel, the wiring of the FPC 145 is broken, and the detection circuit 17 This disconnection is detected and the confidential information in the memory 18 is deleted. Therefore, the settlement operation of the settlement terminal is stopped.
[0015]
In addition, in order to perform a tampering operation on the socket 131 to which the signal line 146 of the magnetic head 142 is connected, if a hole or the like is to be drilled from the back side of the settlement terminal, the CPU 132 and the wiring board 13 that control the operation of the settlement terminal are changed. The payment operation of the payment terminal is stopped because it is destroyed.
In addition, when a hole is made from the front side where the operation unit of the payment terminal is located, the hole is easily found.
[0016]
As described above, in this settlement terminal, the unauthorized operation by opening the main body case is prevented by the opening detection switch 134, and the unauthorized operation due to the perforation of the magnetic head unit 142 is performed by the magnetic card reading unit 14. This is prevented by covering with a disconnection detection sheet 145.
[0017]
It is difficult to read out the signal from the wiring board 13, and therefore, there is almost no possibility that the signal is read out from the wiring board 13 as long as the remodeling for opening the main body case and performing the illegal operation is prevented. On the other hand, although the remodeling of the magnetic head portion is relatively easy, since the magnetic head portion is covered with the disconnection detection sheet 145, unauthorized manipulation due to perforation can be eliminated.
Thus, in this payment terminal, unauthorized modification can be prevented by simple and effective means suitable for a payment terminal having a magnetic card reading mechanism.
[0018]
Here, the disconnection detection sheet 145 of the FPC is attached to the metal plate 144, and the magnetic card reader 14 is covered with the metal plate 144. However, the magnetic card reader 14 is covered with only the disconnection detection sheet 145. Is also good. However, since the provision of the metal plate 144 has a stronger resistance to perforation by a drill or the like, unauthorized modification can be made more difficult.
[0019]
Further, a micro switch may be used for the opening detection switch 134 as in a conventional device.
In addition, as shown in FIG. 5, there is a possibility that the wrongdoer performs a work of short-circuiting the disconnection detection sheet 145 before breaking the disconnection detection sheet 145. At this time, if the detection circuit 17 detects only the disconnection, the illegal operation cannot be detected. In this case, as shown in FIG. 5, if a resistance detection circuit 171 for detecting a change in the resistance value is arranged as a detection circuit, when the disconnection detection sheet 145 is short-circuited, the change in the resistance value of the unauthorized alteration detection circuit is detected. Unauthorized manipulation can be detected.
In addition, a high-frequency signal is supplied to the unauthorized alteration detection circuit, and a phenomenon caused by a change in capacitance when a human finger comes into contact with the wiring of the disconnection detection sheet 145, for example, a change in frequency is detected to detect unauthorized manipulation. You may do it.
[0020]
Also, as shown in FIG. 6, by providing a plurality of wirings 147, 148, 149 and a plurality of opening detection switches 135, 136, 137 on the disconnection detection sheet 145, an unauthorized connection that short-circuits the disconnection detection sheet is provided. It is possible to make it difficult to carry out unauthorized work such as short-circuiting a work or an opening detection switch. Further, in this case, the opening detection switches 135, 136, and 137 may be bridged by solder at the time of reflow while leaving one of them. However, it is up to the manufacturing site to decide which to bridge. In this case, since it is uncertain which one will be the actual opening detection switch, it is possible to confuse an unauthorized person trying to short-circuit the opening detection switch.
[0021]
【The invention's effect】
As is apparent from the above description, the payment terminal of the present invention can prevent unauthorized alteration by a simple and effective means suitable for an apparatus having a magnetic card reading mechanism. In this apparatus, since the disconnection detection sheet is used only in a narrow portion covering the magnetic head, the work of installing the disconnection detection sheet is simple, and the cost can be reduced.
[Brief description of the drawings]
FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an internal configuration of a payment terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a magnetic card reading unit and a wiring board of the payment terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 4 is a diagram showing a configuration of a tampering detection circuit according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 5 is a diagram showing a configuration of a tampering detection circuit according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 6 is a diagram showing a tampering detection circuit having a plurality of opening detection switches and disconnection detection wiring in the embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 7 is a perspective view showing a conventional payment terminal.
DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 10 Payment terminal 12 Slit 13 Wiring board 14 Magnetic card reading part 15 Front side case 16 Back side case 17 Detection circuit 18 Memory 131 Socket 132 CPU
133 conductor 134 opening detection switch 135 opening detection switch 136 opening detection switch 137 opening detection switch 141 slit 142 magnetic head 143 perforation detection body 144 metal plate 145 flexible printed wiring board (disconnection detection sheet)
146 Signal line 147 Disconnection detection sheet wiring 148 Disconnection detection sheet wiring 149 Disconnection detection sheet wiring 150 Short circuit 151 Contact piece 171 Resistance detection circuit

Claims (9)

筺体内に、
磁気カードに磁気記録された識別情報を読み取る磁気カード読取手段と、
前記磁気カード読取手段の周囲の少なくとも一部を囲む、配線を張り巡らした配線シートと、
前記筺体の開封を検出する開封検出手段と、
情報を保持する記憶手段と、
前記配線シートの配線に変化が生じたとき、または、前記開封検出手段が前記筺体の開封を検出したとき、前記記憶手段に保持された情報を消去する不正改造検出手段と、
少なくとも前記記憶手段及び不正改造検出手段が配置された配線基板と
を備えることを特徴とする決済端末装置。
Inside the housing,
Magnetic card reading means for reading identification information magnetically recorded on the magnetic card;
A wiring sheet that surrounds at least a part of the periphery of the magnetic card reading means and has a wiring line;
Opening detection means for detecting opening of the housing;
Storage means for holding information;
When a change occurs in the wiring of the wiring sheet, or when the unsealing detection unit detects the unsealing of the housing, an unauthorized tampering detection unit that erases information held in the storage unit,
A settlement terminal device comprising at least a wiring board on which the storage means and the unauthorized alteration detection means are arranged.
前記配線シートが、前記磁気カード読取手段の周囲の少なくとも一部を囲む金属板に貼付されていることを特徴とする請求項1に記載の決済端末装置。The settlement terminal device according to claim 1, wherein the wiring sheet is attached to a metal plate surrounding at least a part of a periphery of the magnetic card reading unit. 前記不正改造検出手段は、前記配線シートの配線が切断されたとき、または、前記開封検出手段が前記筺体の開封を検出したとき、前記記憶手段に保持された情報を消去することを特徴とする請求項1または2に記載の決済端末装置。The unauthorized alteration detection means erases information held in the storage means when the wiring of the wiring sheet is cut, or when the unsealing detection means detects opening of the housing. The settlement terminal device according to claim 1. 前記不正改造検出手段は、前記配線シートの抵抗値が変化したとき、または、前記開封検出手段が前記筺体の開封を検出したとき、前記記憶手段に保持された情報を消去することを特徴とする請求項1または2に記載の決済端末装置。The unauthorized alteration detection means erases information held in the storage means when the resistance value of the wiring sheet changes or when the unsealing detection means detects opening of the housing. The settlement terminal device according to claim 1. 前記配線シートの配線が、張り巡らした1本の導体で形成されていることを特徴とする請求項1から4のいずれかに記載の決済端末装置。The settlement terminal device according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein the wiring of the wiring sheet is formed of a single stretched conductor. 前記配線シートの配線が、張り巡らした複数本の導体で形成されていることを特徴とする請求項1から4のいずれかに記載の決済端末装置。The settlement terminal device according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein the wiring of the wiring sheet is formed of a plurality of conductors stretched. 前記開封検出手段は、複数の前記開封検出手段の中から任意に選択された1つの開封検出手段から成り、残りの前記開封検出手段は短絡されていることを特徴とする請求項1から6のいずれかに記載の決済端末装置。7. The method according to claim 1, wherein said opening detection means comprises one opening detection means arbitrarily selected from a plurality of said opening detection means, and the remaining opening detection means are short-circuited. The settlement terminal device according to any one of the above. 前記磁気カード読取手段が、前記筺体の操作面側で前記配線基板と電気接続していることを特徴とする請求項1から7のいずれかに記載の決済端末装置。The settlement terminal device according to any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the magnetic card reading means is electrically connected to the wiring board on an operation surface side of the housing. 前記配線基板の前記磁気カード読取手段と電気接続する位置の裏面にCPUが装着されていることを特徴とする請求項8に記載の決済端末装置。9. The settlement terminal device according to claim 8, wherein a CPU is mounted on a back surface of the wiring board at a position electrically connected to the magnetic card reading unit.
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JP2015147410A (en) * 2014-01-08 2015-08-20 セイコーエプソン株式会社 Fiscal printer
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JP2017117058A (en) * 2015-12-22 2017-06-29 パナソニックIpマネジメント株式会社 Transaction terminal device and security module
JP2019061394A (en) * 2017-09-26 2019-04-18 日本電産サンキョー株式会社 Card reader

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