JP6294530B2 - Shield for electronic devices - Google Patents

Description

Background Security products are commonly used in banking and financial applications. Some industry and government standards require a security barrier to be placed on computer components that encrypt and decrypt sensitive data. For example, when a personal identification number is input in an automatic teller machine, the input information may pass through a security barrier. The security barrier provides intrusion detection, thereby enabling implementation of countermeasures to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive data.

In the following detailed description, reference will be made to the following drawings.
FIG. 2 shows a perspective view of an exemplary shield provided around an electronic device, along with an enlarged cross-sectional view of an exemplary trace of the shield. FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating an example controller, an example memory, and an example shield. FIG. 5 is a partial view showing an exemplary trace before and after an external source forms a hole in the trace. FIG. 6 is a partial view showing an exemplary trace before and after an external source applies pressure to the trace. FIG. 6 is a cross-sectional view illustrating an exemplary shield provided on a printed circuit board. FIG. 3 is a cross-sectional view illustrating an exemplary shield and an exemplary metal shell provided on a printed circuit board. FIG. 3 is a cross-sectional view illustrating an exemplary shield and an exemplary metal shell provided on a printed circuit board. FIG. 6 is a partial cross-sectional view illustrating an exemplary shield provided at an edge of an exemplary metal shell. FIG. 6 is a partial perspective view of an exemplary shield provided at a corner of an exemplary metal shell. FIG. 5 illustrates an example active trace and an example decoy trace of an example shield provided over an example electronic device. FIG. 5 illustrates an example active trace and an example decoy trace of an example shield for an electronic device.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION Existing security barriers may be provided as a metal box surrounded by a thin flexible printed circuit board. The printed circuit board is folded around the metal box so that penetrations made by external sources through the printed circuit board can be detected. Such a structure is expensive to manufacture and dissipates the heat generated by the electronic components in the metal box because the material used for the sensing layer of the printed circuit board is not a good conductor of heat. It ’s difficult. Therefore, any processor in the metal box may be operated at a relatively slow speed because the processor cannot be cooled sufficiently. If an attempt is made to operate the processor at full speed, the processor may become inoperable due to excessive heat.

  Various embodiments disclosed herein address these issues by providing a shield that includes multiple traces, each trace including an inner conductive portion and an outer non-conductive portion. . In some embodiments, the trace may be generated using a three-dimensional printing technique. The shield is used to provide a security barrier for the electronic device. By using the three-dimensional printing technique, the shield can be generated at a lower cost than the conventional technique. A three-dimensional printer can use a conductive ink and a conductive plastic to create a shield, whereby the trace is configured to include a conductive plastic embedded in a non-conductive plastic. There is a case.

  Using 3D printing technology, the size and shape of the shield is not limited. Thus, the shield may have a shape that fits snugly to accommodate all components on the circuit board, or it has a shape that fits snugly around an object that has an arcuate or rounded surface. In some cases. In addition, an air passage can be created in the shield. The shield provides penetration protection. Because if someone tries to penetrate the shield, a contact may be made with at least one of the traces, thereby notifying that the shield has been tampered with Because.

  The shield may be made using a thermally conductive plastic. Thus, a thermal coupling can be formed between the shield and a heat generating electronic component such as a processor. The processor may generate a significant amount of heat, and thus the thermally conductive plastic of the shield may be used as a heat sink. This heat sink function of the shield makes it possible to operate the processor at high speed while preventing overheating.

  Thus, various exemplary embodiments disclosed herein provide a shield for providing a security barrier to an electronic device. The shield includes a plurality of traces, each trace including an inner conductive portion and an outer non-conductive portion. The traces may be generated using a three-dimensional printing technique so that each trace includes an electrically conductive plastic as the inner portion and an electrically non-conductive plastic as the outer portion. May be generated. The trace is configured such that the shield is shaped to surround the electronic device.

  According to this approach, the traces may be configured to form a pattern for detecting penetration of the shield by a source external to the shield. For example, the resistance value of the conductive portion of the trace changes in response to contact from a source external to the shield. If it is detected that a source outside the shield is attempting to penetrate the shield, the memory of the electronic device is erased.

  Referring now to the drawings, FIG. 1 shows a perspective view of an exemplary shield 100 provided around an electronic device 110 with an enlarged cross-sectional view of an exemplary trace 120 of the shield 100. The shield 100 may be any structure designed to surround or otherwise protect other objects. For example, the shield 100 may have a shape that surrounds the electronic device 110. In the embodiment of FIG. 1, the shield includes trace 120 and trace 130. Although shield 100 is described with reference to traces 120, 130, it is understood that shield 100 may include a greater number of traces.

  Traces 120, 130 may be generated using a three-dimensional printer. Each trace 120, 130 may be configured such that the electronic device 110 is surrounded by and contained within the trace 120, 130. A three-dimensional printer can generate a three-dimensional structure using various materials. In one exemplary embodiment, the trace 120 may be generated to have an inner portion 122 and an outer portion 124. The inner portion 122 may be generated using an electrically conductive ink, while the outer portion 124 may be generated using a different material, from different materials, from the inner portion 122. A non-conductive plastic cover formed around is produced. Similarly, the trace 130 is configured to have an electrically conductive inner portion and a non-conductive outer portion. As described below, each trace 120, 130 includes a terminal 126, 136 for connecting the trace to the controller.

  According to the three-dimensional printing technique, a degree of freedom in generating the shape of the shield 100 can be obtained. As shown in FIG. 1, the shield 100 is generated to surround a substantially box-shaped electronic device 110. However, as described below, the shield 100 can be used to provide a security barrier for any type of electronic device, or combination of devices, such as those provided on a printed circuit board. It may be generated to have a shape. The shield 100 may similarly be created to surround an object having a non-conventional shape, such as an object having a rounded or arcuate surface.

  As shown in FIG. 1, the traces 120, 130 are configured such that each of the traces 120, 130 forms a plurality of straight lines, and each trace 120, 130 is at a substantially 90 degree angle with the other trace. Is formed so as to surround the electronic device 110 in a pattern that intersects with the electronic device 110. This type of pattern is understood to be one of many patterns that can be used to obtain a shield 100 that surrounds the electronic device 110. For example, the traces 120, 130 may be configured to form a pattern of multiple curves or arcuate lines. In other examples, the traces 120, 130 may be configured such that each trace crosses over itself at least once. In yet another example, the traces 120, 130 may repeatedly overlap each other so as to obtain multiple layers of traces extending in different directions. Any pattern can be generated using three-dimensional printing techniques to generate any number of layers of traces. The actual pattern used to surround the electronic device 110 with the traces 120, 130 is not important enough to ensure that the electronic device 110 is substantially surrounded by the traces 120, 130. The pattern is selected such that an external source cannot penetrate the shield 100 from any penetration angle without contacting at least one of the traces 120, 130.

  FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating an example controller 200, an example memory 210, and an example shield 220. Controller 200 may be coupled to memory 210 and shield 220. The memory 210 may be included in the electronic device 110 and the traces of the shield 220 may be configured to form a pattern to surround the electronic device 110. In one exemplary embodiment, controller 200 may also be included in electronic device 110. Alternatively, the controller 200 may be provided outside the electronic device 110 so that the controller 200 is not housed in the shield 220.

  The controller 200 may be one or more central processing units (CPUs) and / or other hardware devices suitable for erasing the memory 210 when a shield penetration is detected. Good. Memory 210 may be any electronic, magnetic, optical, or other physical storage device that stores data. Accordingly, the memory 210 may be, for example, an electrically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM), a storage drive, an optical disk, or the like. As will be described in detail later, if the trace detects penetration of shield 220 from an external source, controller 200 erases memory 210 and prevents sensitive data from being accessed from memory 210.

  FIG. 3 is a partial view showing an exemplary trace of a shield before and after an external source forms a hole 310 in the trace. Trace 300 shows a portion of the shield before penetration, and trace 300 ′ shows the same portion of the shield after penetration that produced hole 310. Hole 310 may be formed by an external source digging a hole through the shield and attempting to drill a hole in the shield to access electronic device 110.

  The controller 200 may detect changes in the resistance values of the traces 300, 300 'caused by attempts to drill holes. The traces 300, 300 'may be made of a plastic having a resistance value that causes a change in resistance value that is easily detectable by penetration. In one example, the hole 310 may be large enough to cause damage to the inner conductive portion of the trace 310 ′, whereby the controller 200 detects the damage and in response, in response to the memory 210. Erase at least part of it. Thus, intruders attempting to penetrate the shield are prevented from accessing the memory 210.

  In other examples, the inner conductive portion of trace 300 may have a known resistance value per unit length. For example, if trace 300 has a length of 10 centimeters, a width of 1 centimeter, and a resistance value of 10 kΩ, digging hole 310 causes a decrease in resistance value of about 70 Ω in trace 310 ′. There is a case. The controller 200 may detect this decrease in resistance value. In response to such a decrease in resistance, the controller 200 may erase at least a portion of the memory 210, thereby preventing access to data on the memory 210.

  FIG. 4 is a partial view of an exemplary trace of a shield before and after an external source applies pressure to the trace. Trace 400 is shown in cross-section to show outer non-conductive portion 410 and inner conductive portion 420. Attempts to penetrate the shield may be made using very strong penetration forces. In such a case, some people use a pointed object 430, for example, to access or read at least a portion of the electronic device 110 that appears to be storing sensitive data, and the shield is Attempts may be made to drill through holes. For example, an intruder may attempt to physically remove the electronic device 110 before the controller 200 has an opportunity to erase the memory 210.

  The pointed object 430 can apply pressure to the trace 400, reducing the width of the trace 400 and deforming both the outer non-conductive portion 410 and the inner conductive portion 420. In response to the applied pressure, the inner conductive portion 420 may change its resistance value due to its own piezoelectric properties. A change in resistance value may be detected by the controller 200. In response to the change in resistance value, the controller 200 may erase at least a portion of the memory 210.

  FIG. 5 is a cross-sectional view illustrating an exemplary shield 500 provided on a printed circuit board 510. The shield 500 is shown by a cross hatch pattern. According to the three-dimensional printing technology, the shield 500 can be configured by printing the trace in a plurality of layers so that the shield 500 has an arbitrary three-dimensional shape.

  The shield 500 may be attached to the printed circuit board 510. An electronic device 520 is also provided on the printed circuit board 510. A thermally conductive material may be attached to the inside of the shield 500. For example, a thermal pad 530 may be provided between the electronic device 520 and the shield 500, and a thermal fin 540 may be provided on the shield 500. The shield 500 may further comprise an air hole 550, whereby air may be able to flow through the interior of the shield 500. A louver 560 may be provided on the inner surface of the air hole 550. The louver 560 may be formed with traces of the shield 500 using a three-dimensional printing technique.

  Air holes 550, thermal pads 530, and thermal fins 540 help dissipate heat by shield 500. As previously mentioned, shield 500 may include a thermally conductive material, which may allow heat generated by electronic device 520 to be dissipated by shield 500 through thermal pad 530. . The thermal fins 540 may dissipate excess heat from the shield 500 into the shield 500. According to the air hole 550, it is possible to allow cold air outside the shield 500 to pass through the inside of the shield 500 and then to the outside of the shield 500. In some cases, air holes 550 may provide exploration means for accessing sensitive data stored in electronic device 520.

  To prevent such intrusion, the shield 500 is configured such that access to the interior of the shield 500 cannot be easily obtained by the air holes 550. As shown in FIG. 5, the air holes 550 have a plurality of 90 degree angles, so in order to gain access to the interior of the shield 500, it is necessary to skillfully manipulate the exploration means in the vicinity . Using three-dimensional printing techniques, such air holes 550 can be easily created to facilitate the flow of air through the shield 500. According to such a configuration, it may be possible to prevent an intruder from inserting a thin wire into the shield 500 through the air hole 550.

  In order to further prohibit wire insertion into the shield 500, a louver 560 may be provided on the surface of the air hole 550. The louver 560 may be hinged using a three-dimensional printing technique. The hinged louver may capture the wire inserted into the air hole 550 and prevent the wire from entering the shield 500. The louver 560 may also capture a wire inserted through the air hole 550 and prevent the wire from being removed once the wire has been inserted through the air hole 550.

  So far, the shield has been described as including traces made of both conductive and non-conductive plastic materials. Depending on the environment, plastic alone may not provide sufficient protection from penetration and penetration into the shield. In some cases, in order to dissipate heat efficiently, higher thermal conductivity may be required in addition to the properties obtained by the shield. In order to obtain stronger mechanical protection and higher thermal conductivity, a metal shell may be provided over the plastic shield.

  FIG. 6 is a cross-sectional view illustrating an exemplary shield 630 and an exemplary metal shell 640 provided on the printed circuit board 600. The electronic device 610 may be provided on the printed circuit board 600. One thermal pad 620 may be provided between the electronic device 610 and the shield 630, and the other thermal pad 620 may be provided between the electronic device 610 and the metal shell 640. For improved security, the metal shell 640 may be attached to the printed circuit board 600 using bolts 660 and nuts 670, and to detect removal of the metal shell 640 from the printed circuit board 600. , Yet another layer of intruder detection may be provided using contacts (not shown).

  A shield 630 is provided in the metal shell 640. The shield 630 may be thermally coupled to the electronic device 610 using a thermally conductive material such as a thermal pad 620 or thermal grease (not shown). Metal shell 640 may be thermally coupled to shield 630 using a thermally conductive material such as thermal pad 620 or thermal grease (not shown). The metal shell 640 is also thermally coupled directly to the shield 630, as shown on the vertical sidewalls of the metal shell 640 and the shield 630. In the structure shown in FIG. 6, the presence of the metal shells 640, thermal fins 650, and thermal pads 620 improves cooling by thermal conductivity.

  FIG. 7 is a cross-sectional view illustrating an exemplary shield 710 and an exemplary metal shell 720 provided on the printed circuit board 700. A pressure sensitive material such as pressure pad 730 may be provided between shield 710 and metal shell 720. Each pressure pad 730 can apply a measurable amount of pressure to the shield 710 due to the piezoelectric properties of the traces of the shield 710, as described above with reference to FIG. If the metal shell 720 is removed, or if an attempt is made to remove the metal shell, the pressure applied to the shield 710 may change the resistance of the shield 710 trace. In response to this change in resistance caused by a change in pressure at the location where the pressure pad 730 is, the controller 200 may erase the memory 210.

  In the exemplary embodiment, pressure pad 730 may comprise an electrically conductive material. In this case, the pressure pad 730 may be configured as part of the metal shell 720. The electrically conductive properties of the pressure pad 730 allow a simple electrical connection to be made between the pressure pad 730, the metal shell 720, and the controller 200, thereby shorting the connection, Or in response to other damage, tampering with the metal shell can be detected.

  FIG. 8 is a partial cross-sectional view illustrating an exemplary shield 800 provided at an edge 820 of exemplary metal shell 810. In conventional security barriers where traces are provided on a flexible circuit board, there may be weak spots at the edges of the electronic device, so the security barrier may be prone to penetration at the edges. . This ease of penetration is due to the fact that the flexible circuit board does not have the ability to sufficiently cover the edge of the electronic device to prevent intrusion by an external source. For example, when the security barrier is folded at the edge, the trace on the flexible circuit board may break.

As shown in FIG. 8, the shield 800 is provided in a metal shell 810. Surface 830 is formed on shield 800 proximate edge 820. The surface 830 extends from the inner surface of the metal shell 810 at angles θ ₁ and θ ₂ . Such a structure creates a space along edge 820 between surface 830 and the inner surface of metal shell 810.

In FIG. 8, the edge 820 is formed at an angle of substantially 90 degrees where the two sides of the metal shell 810 meet. In this case, the values of the angles θ ₁ and θ ₂ may be in the range of 35 degrees to 55 degrees. According to this structure, the intrusion device entering from the edge 820 will contact the traces of the shield 800 substantially perpendicular to the surface 830, so that the surface 830 of the shield 800 is in contact with the metal shell 810. Intrusion into the shield 800 from the edge portion 820 of this can be prevented.

In other exemplary embodiments, the edge 820 may be provided at an angle other than 90 degrees, or may be rounded. By forming the surface 830 to be substantially perpendicular to the penetration line of the intrusion device from the edge 820 into the shield 800, the penetration from the edge 820 into the shield 800 at angles θ ₁ and θ ₂ is achieved. The value that most effectively prevents can be given. In some embodiments, the surface 830 may also be rounded to match the shape of the rounded edge. In FIG. 8, the shield 800 having the surface 830 has been described with reference to the metal shell 810. However, it is understood that the shield 800 may be formed to have a surface 830 without the metal shell 810 surrounding the shield 800. The configuration shown in FIG. 8 may be expanded to prevent penetration of intrusion devices at the corners of the metal shell, as shown in FIG.

  FIG. 9 is a partial perspective view illustrating an exemplary shield 910 provided at a corner 930 of an exemplary metal shell 900. One of the weakest points in the conventional security barrier is the corner of the security barrier. The corner is an area that is more difficult to detect penetration as it is notorious. This is because conventional flexible circuit board security barriers are generally folded near corners. By folding the flexible circuit board in multiple directions near the corners, the traces on the flexible board may break, so that the intrusion device is not detected at the corners without a security barrier. It may be possible to penetrate easily.

As shown in FIG. 9, the shield 910 may be configured such that the surface 920 of the shield 910 is proximate to the inner corner 930 of the metal shell 900. Surface 920 forms angles θ ₃ , θ _4, and θ ₅ between surface 920 and each inner surface of metal shell 900 proximate corner 930. In FIG. 9, each side of the metal shell 900 extends substantially perpendicular to the corner 930. In this case, the angles θ ₃ , θ ₄ and θ ₅ may be in the range of 35 degrees to 55 degrees. According to this structure, the intrusion device entering the corner 930 will come into contact with the trace from a direction substantially perpendicular to the shield 920, so that the surface 920 of the shield 910 is the corner of the metal shell 900. Intrusion from the shield 910 to the shield 910 can be prevented.

In other exemplary embodiments, the corners 930 may be formed by three sides of the metal shell 900, but the three sides may not be perpendicular to each other, i.e., the corners 930 are rounded. It may be tinged. In this case, by forming the surface 920 so as to be substantially perpendicular to the entry line of the intrusion device from the corner 930 to the shield 910, the angles θ ₃ , θ ₄ and θ ₅ are A value that most effectively prevents penetration into the shield 910 can be provided. In some embodiments, the surface 920 may also be rounded to match the shape of the rounded corners. In FIG. 9, the shield 910 having the surface 920 has been described with reference to the metal shell 900. However, it is understood that the shield 910 may be formed to have a surface 920 without the metal shell 900 surrounding the shield 910.

  Scanning techniques are often used to inspect printed circuit boards and electronic devices. For example, X-rays are commonly used to inspect integrated circuit solder welds and joints during circuit board manufacture. Using the same principle, an X-ray apparatus may be used to identify the location of a particular type of electronic device on a printed circuit board. For example, an intruder with an x-ray device may be able to identify a flash memory device that may store a security key or other sensitive information. Intruders may attempt to retrieve their security keys before the controller 200 gains the ability to detect security violations. This is because, in particular, the controller 200 may be provided on a different chip than the flash memory device.

  Shields as described above include traces made of two different types: conductive and non-conductive plastic. The trace is configured to prevent attacks by external sources that penetrate the shield. According to the characteristics of the plastic shield, detection by an external scanning device can also be prevented. Specifically, by using two different types of plastic to construct the trace, the use of scanning techniques may become impractical because the difference between the two materials is almost insensitive.

  FIG. 10 illustrates an example active trace 1010 and an example decoy trace 1020 of an example shield 1000 provided over an example electronic device 1030. In FIG. 10, active trace 1010 is shown as being provided in one layer and decoy trace 1020 is provided in a different layer, but many other layers of active trace 1010 and decoy trace 1020 are shown in FIG. It is understood that the shield 1000 may be provided.

  Current may flow through the active trace 1010, whereby the active trace 1010 is used to detect penetration into the shield 1000 by an external source. In the exemplary embodiment, the decoy trace 1020 may be configured to have an inner conductive portion so that the decoy trace 1020 has the ability to conduct current. In practice, however, no current may flow through the decoy trace 1020. Thus, the decoy trace 1020 may be configured to appear to be no different from the active trace 1010 visually or in some other form of inspection. Thus, an intruder with an X-ray device may attempt to detect the trace of shield 1000, but cannot distinguish between active trace 1010 and decoy trace 1020. In this case, since the active trace 1010 and the decoy trace 1020 appear to exhibit the same characteristics, a potential attacker may interpret the decoy trace 1020 as something to be avoided.

  In one exemplary embodiment, decoy trace 1020 is formed from a different material than active trace 1010. The material used to form the decoy trace 1020 may be better visible during x-ray inspection than the material used to form the active trace 1010. For example, the material used to form decoy trace 1020 may be formed using a type of plastic similar to the non-conductive portion of shield 1000, while active trace 1010 is an x-ray device. May be formed from a material that cannot be detected. In this way, the attacker can be directed to avoid penetration of the decoy trace 1020, and the attacker can be made to penetrate the undetected active trace 1010. Thus, an external source can be passed through the active trace 1010, thereby detecting the intrusion of the shield 1000.

  In other exemplary embodiments, to further confuse the intruder, the decoy trace 1020 is not configured to actually detect penetration of the shield 1000 by an external source, May be conducted. In other exemplary embodiments, current may be passed through active trace 1010 and decoy trace 1020 at different times. In this case, when there is no current flowing through active trace 1010, active trace 1010 may operate as a decoy trace. When there is no current flowing through active trace 1010, active trace 1010 may not detect penetration of shield 1000 by an external source. Similarly, decoy trace 1020 may operate as an active trace when no current is passed through decoy trace 1020. When current is flowing through the decoy trace 1020, the decoy trace 1020 may detect when an intrusion device penetrates the shield 1000. By frequently alternating traces through which current flows, potential intruders can determine which traces are acting as active traces and which traces are acting as decoy traces at any given time. It will not be easy to detect. Thus, an intruder's attempt to penetrate the shield 1000 can be further hindered.

  FIG. 11 shows an exemplary active trace and an exemplary decoy trace of an exemplary shield for an electronic device. Since three-dimensional printing techniques are not limited to creating traces in a plane, there are no restrictions on the specific shape of the traces that can be used to form a shield to provide a security barrier for electronic devices. As shown in FIG. 11, the active trace 1100 may have a shape like a straight line, and the decoy trace 1110 may have a shape like a helix surrounding the active trace 1100. As noted above, current may flow through active trace 1100 and current flow through decoy trace 1110 may be prevented. This structure can prevent an intruder's attempt to access the active trace 1100 because it is difficult for the intruder device to access the trace 1100 through the surrounding decoy trace 1110.

  In one exemplary embodiment, in order for the active trace 1100 to operate as a decoy trace, current is prevented from flowing through the active trace 1100 and to allow the decoy trace 1110 to operate as an active trace. In addition, current may flow through the decoy trace 1110. In this embodiment, the intruder can mistakenly assume that the linearly provided trace is the active trace, thereby allowing the intruder to delete the spiral 210 without erasing the memory 210. It can be misunderstood that the trace can be penetrated. However, since the decoy trace 1110 is actually carrying current, any attempt to penetrate this trace to access the inner trace will result in the memory 210 being erased.

  The above disclosure describes a number of exemplary embodiments of a shield that provides a security barrier to an electronic device. Thus, according to embodiments disclosed herein, it is possible to protect data stored in the memory of an electronic device by detecting intrusions from an external source.

Exemplary embodiments of the present invention are listed below.
1. A shield to provide a security barrier,
A plurality of traces, each trace comprising an electrically conductive inner portion and an electrically non-conductive outer portion;
The plurality of traces are generated using three-dimensional printing;
The plurality of traces are configured such that the shield has a shape surrounding the electronic device.
2. The shield of claim 1, wherein the inner portion comprises a conductive plastic.
3. The shield of claim 1, wherein the outer portion comprises a non-conductive plastic.
4). The shield of claim 1, wherein the plurality of traces are configured to form a pattern for detecting penetration of the shield from an external source to the shield.
5. The shield according to 1, wherein a resistance value of the conductive portion changes in response to contact from an external source to the shield.
6). The shield according to 1, wherein the plurality of traces define an air passage in the shield.
7). The shield of claim 6, further comprising a plurality of louvers extending into the air passage, wherein the louvers are generated using three-dimensional printing.
8). The shield according to 1, wherein the shield is thermally conductive.
9. A device for providing a security barrier comprising:
A shield including a plurality of traces, each trace including an inner portion and an outer portion, the inner portion including a conductive plastic, and the outer portion including a non-conductive plastic, the plurality of traces A plurality of traces configured such that the shield has a shape surrounding the electronic device;
And a metal shell surrounding the shield.
10. The apparatus of claim 9, further comprising a thermally conductive material provided between the metal shell and the shield.
11. The apparatus of claim 9, further comprising a pressure sensitive material provided between the metal shell and the shield.
12 The apparatus of claim 9, further comprising an electrically conductive material provided between the metal shell and the shield.
13. The metal shell includes an edge, from which two surfaces of the metal shell extend at an angle of substantially 90 degrees to each other, and a portion of the shield proximate to the edge is the metal The apparatus of claim 9, forming a surface that forms an angle with each of the two surfaces of the shell, wherein the angle is in a range of substantially 35 degrees to substantially 55 degrees.
14 The metal shell includes a corner, from which three surfaces of the metal shell extend at an angle of substantially 90 degrees with each other, and a portion of the shield proximate to the corner is the metal The apparatus of claim 9, having a surface that forms an angle with the three surfaces of the shell, wherein the angle is in a range of substantially 35 degrees to substantially 55 degrees.
15. An electronic device including a memory;
A shield including a plurality of traces, each trace including an inner portion of conductive plastic and an outer portion of non-conductive plastic, wherein the plurality of traces are configured such that the shield surrounds the electronic device. A system that includes a shield.
16. 16. The system according to 15, further comprising a plurality of decoy traces, wherein a first current is passed through the plurality of decoy traces and a second current is passed through the plurality of decoy traces.
17. The system of claim 16, wherein at least a portion of the trace has a spiral-like shape and at least a portion of the decoy trace extends along a centerline of the spiral.
18. The system of claim 16, wherein at least a portion of the decoy trace has a spiral-like shape, and at least a portion of the trace extends along a centerline of the spiral.
19. The system of claim 15, wherein the plurality of traces are coupled to the electronic device and the memory is erased in response to detection of a penetration by a source external to the shield.
20. 16. The system according to 15, wherein the plurality of traces are generated using three-dimensional printing.

Claims (9)

An electronic device including a memory;
A system including a plurality of active traces and a shield including a plurality of decoy traces,
Each of the plurality of active traces and the plurality of decoy traces includes an inner portion of conductive plastic and an outer portion of non-conductive plastic, wherein the plurality of active traces and plurality of decoy traces are the shield Is configured to surround the electronic device,
Current is passed through the plurality of active traces to detect penetration of the shield from a source external to the shield using the plurality of active traces;
The system wherein the plurality of decoy traces are not configured to actually detect penetration of the shield from a source external to the shield.   The system of claim 1, wherein the plurality of decoy traces are configured such that they appear to be no different from the plurality of active traces.   The material used to form the plurality of decoy traces is better visible when subjected to X-ray inspection than the material used to form the plurality of active traces. The system of claim 1, wherein:   The system according to claim 1, wherein no current is passed through the plurality of decoy traces.   The system of any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein current is passed through the plurality of decoy traces.   The system of claim 5, wherein current is passed at different times through the plurality of active traces and the plurality of decoy traces.   7. At least a portion of the active trace has a spiral-like shape, and at least a portion of the decoy trace extends along a centerline of the spiral. The system described in.   7. At least a portion of the decoy trace has a spiral-like shape, and at least a portion of the active trace extends along a centerline of the spiral. The system described in. 9. The plurality of active traces are coupled to the electronic device and the memory is erased in response to detection of a penetration by a source external to the shield. System.

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