JP2002104192A - Electronic railroad crossing control device - Google Patents

Electronic railroad crossing control device

Info

Publication number
JP2002104192A
JP2002104192A JP2000292831A JP2000292831A JP2002104192A JP 2002104192 A JP2002104192 A JP 2002104192A JP 2000292831 A JP2000292831 A JP 2000292831A JP 2000292831 A JP2000292831 A JP 2000292831A JP 2002104192 A JP2002104192 A JP 2002104192A
Authority
JP
Japan
Prior art keywords
alarm
controller
route
abnormal
control device
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
JP2000292831A
Other languages
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
Tetsuo Fukuda
哲夫 福田
Masahiko Saito
匡彦 斉藤
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Nippon Signal Co Ltd
Original Assignee
Nippon Signal Co Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Nippon Signal Co Ltd filed Critical Nippon Signal Co Ltd
Priority to JP2000292831A priority Critical patent/JP2002104192A/en
Publication of JP2002104192A publication Critical patent/JP2002104192A/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

Links

Landscapes

  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To enhance a safety and an availability factor by carrying out a dual system control using a train detection sensor having no damage detection function. SOLUTION: When a train 34 is passed on a starting control element 12 and a pick up on ground 16, is passed through a railroad crossing 32 and is passed on a terminal control element 14, a detection signal is inputted to an input circuit 180 of a controller 18. A logic part 182 of the controller 18 carries out a signal-processing and processes a normal route by an alarm. The logic part 182 of the controller 18 carries out an alarm-processing of a back-up route by the pick up on ground 16 and the terminal control element 14. An incoincidence judgment logic part 184 judges whether or not the normal route and the alarm processing of the back-up route are incoincident with each other. If they are incoincident, the logic part 182 judges that any abnormality is a cause. In the case where it is judged that the normal route is only abnormal, it is left and the alarm processing is carried out by the back-up route. In the case where it is judged that the back-up route is only abnormal, it is left and the alarm processing is carried out by the normal route. In the case where it is judged that both routes are abnormal, it becomes system down.

Description

【発明の詳細な説明】DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

【0001】[0001]

【発明の属する技術分野】本発明は、電子踏切制御装置
に係り、更に詳しくは、列車の通過を検出する踏切制御
子からの入力信号と踏切制御子をバックアップするAT
S等からの入力信号とに基づいて警報機や遮断機などの
踏切保安機器の制御を行う制御手段を備えた電子踏切制
御装置に関する。
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to an electronic level crossing control device, and more particularly, to an input signal from a level crossing controller for detecting passage of a train and an AT for backing up the level crossing controller.
The present invention relates to an electronic level crossing control device including control means for controlling a level crossing safety device such as an alarm or a breaker based on an input signal from an S or the like.

【0002】[0002]

【従来の技術】従来より、駅中間区間の踏切に設けられ
た警報機や遮断機などの踏切保安機器を制御するものと
して電子踏切制御装置などが用いられている。この電子
踏切制御装置は、例えば、踏切の一定距離手前と踏切を
過ぎた辺りに、踏切制御子である開始用制御子と終止用
制御子とが設置され、列車が各制御子を通過する際に検
出信号を出力し、制御器がこの信号を取り込んで所定の
タイミングで踏切の遮断機や警報機の動作を制御するこ
とにより、踏切の安全を確保していた。しかし、従来の
電子踏切制御装置は、上記した踏切制御子が故障した場
合に備えて、例えばATS(Automatic Train Stop:自
動列車停止装置)の地上子などを開始用制御子の近くに
併設したため、開始用制御子が故障しても地上子で列車
を検出することによりバックアップを行っていた。
2. Description of the Related Art Conventionally, an electronic level crossing control device or the like has been used to control a level crossing security device such as an alarm or a breaker provided at a level crossing in an intermediate section of a station. In this electronic level crossing control device, for example, a starting controller and a ending controller, which are railroad crossing controllers, are installed at a certain distance before a railroad crossing and around a railroad crossing, and when a train passes through each controller. The controller takes in the detection signal and controls the operation of the crossing breaker and the alarm at a predetermined timing to secure the safety of the crossing. However, in the conventional electronic level crossing control device, in order to prepare for a case in which the above-mentioned level crossing control device fails, for example, an ATS (Automatic Train Stop: automatic train stop device) ground device or the like is provided near the start control device. Even if the start controller failed, the backup was performed by detecting the train on the ground.

【0003】[0003]

【発明が解決しようとする課題】しかしながら、このよ
うな従来の電子踏切制御装置にあっては、上記制御器に
対して踏切制御子による検知条件とATS地上子などの
バックアップ条件とが直列に挿入されていたため、何れ
かの検知条件が落下のまま故障してしまうと、チャタリ
ングやあおりにより踏切全体が警報持続、または故障検
知により連続警報となるという問題があった。本発明
は、上記事情に鑑みてなされたものであり、故障検知機
能を持っていない列車検知センサを使用して二重系の制
御を行うことが可能であり、保安度の向上と稼動率の向
上を図ることができる電子踏切制御装置を提供すること
を目的としている。
However, in such a conventional electronic level crossing control device, a detection condition by a level crossing controller and a backup condition such as an ATS grounding element are inserted in series with the controller. Therefore, if any one of the detection conditions causes a failure while falling, there is a problem that the entire railroad crossing is continuously warned due to chattering or tilting, or a continuous warning is provided due to failure detection. The present invention has been made in view of the above circumstances, and it is possible to control a dual system using a train detection sensor that does not have a failure detection function, thereby improving security and operating rate. An object is to provide an electronic level crossing control device that can be improved.

【0004】[0004]

【課題を解決するための手段】本発明は、踏切の前後に
配置され、列車の通過を検出する踏切制御子からの入力
信号と、その踏切制御子をバックアップするATS等か
らの入力信号とに基づいて警報機や遮断機などの踏切保
安機器の制御を行う制御手段を有する電子踏切制御装置
において、前記制御手段には、前記踏切制御子の入力信
号に基づく通常経路の警報処理と、前記ATS等の入力
信号に基づくバックアップ経路の警報処理の結果が不一
致か否かを判定する不一致判定手段と、前記不一致判定
手段により通常経路とバックアップ経路の警報処理結果
が不一致と判定された場合、何れの経路の警報処理に異
常があるかを判定する異常判定手段と、前記異常判定手
段により異常があると判定された側の経路を切り離す切
離手段と、を備えていることを特徴としている。これに
よれば、列車の通過を検出する踏切制御子からの入力信
号と、踏切制御子をバックアップするATS等からの入
力信号とに基づいて警報機や遮断機などの踏切保安機器
の制御を行う制御手段を有していて、その制御手段の不
一致判定手段により踏切制御子の入力信号に基づく通常
経路の警報処理と、ATS等の入力信号に基づくバック
アップ経路の警報処理の結果が不一致か否かを判定し、
不一致と判定した場合は、異常判定手段により何れの経
路の警報処理に異常があるかを判定し、異常があると判
定された側の経路を切離手段により切り離すようにす
る。このため、故障検知機能を持っていないATSの地
上子などのような列車検知センサを使って二重系の制御
が可能となり、保安度を向上させることができると共
に、稼動率の向上を図ることができる。
According to the present invention, an input signal from a railroad crossing controller disposed before and after a railroad crossing and detecting passage of a train, and an input signal from an ATS or the like for backing up the railroad crossing controller are provided. An electronic level crossing control device having control means for controlling a level crossing safety device such as a warning device or a circuit breaker based on the input signal of the level crossing controller, the control device includes: A mismatch determination unit that determines whether the result of the alarm processing of the backup path based on an input signal such as the input signal is inconsistent, and when the alarm processing result of the normal path and the backup path is determined to be inconsistent by the mismatch determination means, An abnormality determining unit that determines whether there is an abnormality in the route alarm process, and a disconnecting unit that disconnects the path on the side determined to be abnormal by the abnormality determining unit. It is characterized in that there. According to this, on the basis of an input signal from a railroad crossing controller that detects the passage of a train and an input signal from an ATS or the like that backs up the railroad crossing controller, control of a railroad crossing safety device such as an alarm or a circuit breaker is performed. Control means for determining whether or not the result of the warning processing of the normal path based on the input signal of the railroad crossing controller and the result of the warning processing of the backup path based on the input signal of the ATS or the like are inconsistent. Is determined,
When it is determined that they do not match, the abnormality determining means determines which of the routes has an abnormality in the alarm processing, and the separating side determines that the route on which the abnormality has been determined is separated by the separating means. For this reason, it is possible to control the dual system using a train detection sensor such as an ATS ground sensor that does not have a failure detection function, and it is possible to improve security and improve the operation rate. Can be.

【0005】[0005]

【発明の実施の形態】以下、本発明の一実施の形態を図
面に基づいて詳細に説明する。図1は、本実施の形態に
係る電子踏切制御装置10の概略構成を説明する図であ
る。図1における電子踏切制御装置10は、駅中間区間
の踏切32に設けられた踏切保安機器20を制御するた
め、踏切制御子として踏切32よりも一定距離手前の線
路30に設けられた開始用制御子12と、踏切32を過
ぎた辺りに設けられた終止用制御子14、開始用制御子
12の近辺に設けられたATSの地上子16、および制
御手段としての制御器18などで構成されており、列車
34が線路30上を移動するのに伴って制御器18が踏
切32に設置された警報機や遮断機などの踏切保安機器
20の制御が行われる。また、制御器18は、ここで
は、踏切制御子や地上子16からの信号を入力したり切
離手段としての入力回路180、異常判定手段としての
論理部182、不一致判定手段としての不一致判定論理
部184、および出力回路186などにより構成されて
いる。本実施の形態に係る電子踏切制御装置の特徴的な
構成は、故障検知機能を持っていない地上子のような列
車検知センサで二重系を構成し、2つの警報処理結果が
不一致であることを不一致判定論理部184で判定し
て、論理部182を使って異常のある方を判定し、異常
があると判定された側の経路を入力回路180を用いて
切り離すようにした点である。図2は、簡略化した図1
の構成図に2つの経路を示した図である。図2に示すよ
うに、開始用制御子12と終止用制御子14とにより、
通常経路が構成され、ATSの地上子26と終止用制
御子14とにより、バックアップ経路が構成されてい
る。制御器18は、開始用制御子12、終止用制御子1
4、および地上子26から入力される信号に基づいてそ
れぞれ警報処理を行い、その2つの警報処理()の
結果が不一致か否かを判定する。図3は、図2の制御器
18で不一致とされ何れかの警報処理を異常と判定した
場合の組み合わせを示した図であり、図4は、本実施の
形態に係る電子踏切制御装置の動作を説明するフローチ
ャートである。
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS An embodiment of the present invention will be described below in detail with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a schematic configuration of an electronic level crossing control device 10 according to the present embodiment. The electronic railroad crossing control device 10 in FIG. 1 controls the railroad crossing safety device 20 provided at the railroad crossing 32 in the middle section of the station, so that the start control provided on the line 30 that is a certain distance before the railroad crossing 32 as a railroad crossing controller. And an ATS grounding element 16 provided in the vicinity of the starting control 12 and a controller 18 as a control means. As the train 34 moves on the track 30, the controller 18 controls the level crossing security devices 20 such as alarms and circuit breakers installed at the level crossings 32. In addition, here, the controller 18 inputs a signal from a railroad crossing controller or a ground child 16 or an input circuit 180 as a disconnecting unit, a logic unit 182 as an abnormality determining unit, and a mismatch determining logic as a mismatch determining unit. It comprises a unit 184, an output circuit 186, and the like. The characteristic configuration of the electronic level crossing control device according to the present embodiment is that a train detection sensor such as a ground sensor that does not have a failure detection function forms a dual system, and two alarm processing results do not match. Is determined by the mismatch determination logic unit 184, the logic unit 182 is used to determine which one is abnormal, and the path on the side determined to be abnormal is separated using the input circuit 180. FIG. 2 is a simplified diagram of FIG.
FIG. 3 is a diagram showing two paths in the configuration diagram of FIG. As shown in FIG. 2, the start controller 12 and the end controller 14
A normal path is configured, and a backup path is configured by the ATS ground element 26 and the termination controller 14. The controller 18 includes a start controller 12 and an end controller 1
4, and an alarm process is performed based on the signal input from the ground terminal 26, and it is determined whether or not the results of the two alarm processes () are inconsistent. FIG. 3 is a diagram showing a combination in a case where the controller 18 in FIG. 2 determines that there is a mismatch and one of the alarm processes is abnormal, and FIG. 4 shows an operation of the electronic level crossing control device according to the present embodiment. It is a flowchart explaining.

【0006】次に、本実施の形態の動作を図4に従って
説明する。まず、図1に示す列車34が線路30を図の
右方向に走行して、踏切制御子の開始用制御子12と地
上子16の上を通過すると、制御器18の入力回路18
0に開始用制御子12と地上子16からそれぞれ検出信
号が入力される。また、列車34が踏切32を過ぎて終
止用制御子14の上を通過すると、終止用制御子14か
ら入力回路180に検出信号が入力される。このとき、
制御器18の論理部182は、これらの信号処理を行い
(ステップS100)、開始用制御子12と終止用制御
子14によるの通常経路の警報処理が行われる(ステ
ップS102)。また、これと並行して、制御器18の
論理部182は、地上子16と終止用制御子14による
のバックアップ経路の警報処理が行われる(ステップ
S104)。次いで、不一致判定論理部184では、
通常経路の警報処理とバックアップ経路の警報処理と
が不一致であるか否かを判定する(ステップS10
6)。ここで、不一致と判定されるのは、開始用制御子
12が短絡していたり、地上子16が壊れてしまうなど
何れか一方の故障(空振り、または不正落下)により発
生する。ステップS106で不一致と判定された場合
は、論理部182によりとの何れの異常が原因で不
一致となったかを判定する(ステップS108)。その
正常/異常を判定する場合の組み合わせとしては、図3
に示すような5種類を一例としてあげることができる。
つまり、が正常シーケンスで警報停止となり、が無
警報の場合は、の経路の検知条件の空振りとして、異
常と判定される。また、が無警報で、が正常シーケ
ンスで警報停止となった場合は、を異常と判定する。
さらに、が正常シーケンスで警報停止となり、が警
報持続の場合は、の経路が不正落下で異常と判定され
る。また、が警報持続で、が正常シーケンスで警報
停止となった場合は、を異常と判定する。また、も
も無警報の場合は、本発明以外の機能を使って故障判
定を行うようにする。
Next, the operation of this embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. First, when the train 34 shown in FIG. 1 travels on the track 30 to the right in the figure and passes over the control element 12 for starting the level crossing controller and the ground element 16, the input circuit 18 of the controller 18 is turned on.
At 0, the detection signals are input from the start controller 12 and the ground controller 16, respectively. In addition, when the train 34 passes over the end control 14 after passing the railroad crossing 32, a detection signal is input from the end control 14 to the input circuit 180. At this time,
The logic unit 182 of the controller 18 performs these signal processings (step S100), and performs a warning process on the normal path by the start controller 12 and the end controller 14 (step S102). In parallel with this, the logic unit 182 of the controller 18 performs a warning process of the backup path by the ground controller 16 and the termination controller 14 (step S104). Next, the mismatch determination logic unit 184
It is determined whether or not the normal path alarm processing and the backup path alarm processing do not match (step S10).
6). Here, it is determined that there is a mismatch due to any one of the failures (missing or illegal fall) such as the start controller 12 being short-circuited or the grounding element 16 being broken. If it is determined in step S106 that there is a mismatch, the logic unit 182 determines which of the above and the mismatch has caused the mismatch (step S108). FIG. 3 shows a combination for judging the normality / abnormality.
The following five types can be given as examples.
In other words, when the alarm is stopped in the normal sequence and no alarm is issued, it is determined that there is an abnormality because the detection condition of the route is missed. If no alarm has been issued and an alarm has been stopped in a normal sequence, it is determined that is abnormal.
Further, when the alarm stops in the normal sequence and the alarm continues, it is determined that the path is abnormal due to illegal drop. If the alarm continues for a while and the alarm stops in a normal sequence, it is determined that is abnormal. If there is no alarm, a failure determination is made using a function other than the present invention.

【0007】ステップS108では、上記のようにの
みが異常と判定された場合は、の通常経路の切り離し
が行われ(ステップS110)、それ以降はのバック
アップ経路のみを使って警報処理が行われる(ステップ
S112)。また、ステップS108では、上記のよう
にのみが異常と判定された場合は、のバックアップ
経路の切り離しが行われ(ステップS114)、それ以
降はの通常経路のみを使って警報処理が行われる(ス
テップS116)。さらに、ステップS108では、
との両方が異常と判定された場合は、の何れの経
路も切り離さざるを得ず、システムダウンとなる(ステ
ップS118)。再びステップS106に戻って、と
の結果が一致している場合は、ステップS120に移
行し、ここで上記ステップS108と同様に論理部18
2によりとの正常/異常判定が行われる。ステップ
S120で正常と判定された場合は、正常な警報出力が
行われる(ステップS122)。また、ステップS12
0で異常と判定された場合、例えば、上記図3でも
も無警報のような場合には、他の機能を使って故障判定
を行うようにする(ステップS124)。以上説明した
ように、本実施の形態によれば、故障検知機能を持って
いないATSの地上子などのような列車検知センサを使
用するだけで、バックアップ可能な二重系の制御が容易
に行えるようになったため、踏切における保安度を向上
させることができる。また、本実施の形態によれば、従
来のように二重系の何れか一方が異常であっても踏切全
体が警報持続となったり、故障検出理論により不正落下
や空振り検知による連続警報とはならず、異常が発生し
た経路を切り離し、正常な経路を用いて警報処理を継続
することができるため、電子踏切制御装置の稼動率をよ
り向上させることができる。なお、本実施の形態では、
バックアップ経路に故障検知機能を持っていないATS
の地上子を用いた例で説明したが、必ずしもこれに限定
されるものではない。例えば、車輪検知器や短小軌道回
路などを用いることができる。
In step S108, when it is determined that only the above is abnormal, the normal route is disconnected (step S110), and thereafter, an alarm process is performed using only the backup route (step S110). Step S112). In step S108, if it is determined that only the above is abnormal, the backup path is disconnected (step S114), and thereafter, the alarm process is performed using only the normal path (step S108). S116). Further, in step S108,
If both are determined to be abnormal, it is inevitable to disconnect any of the paths, and the system goes down (step S118). Returning to step S106 again, if the result is the same, the process proceeds to step S120, where the logic unit 18 is executed in the same manner as step S108.
2, the normal / abnormal judgment is made. If it is determined in step S120 that it is normal, a normal alarm output is performed (step S122). Step S12
If it is determined to be abnormal at 0, for example, if there is no alarm in FIG. 3 as well, a failure determination is made using another function (step S124). As described above, according to the present embodiment, backup control of a dual system that can be backed up can be easily performed only by using a train detection sensor such as an ATS ground carrier that does not have a failure detection function. As a result, it is possible to improve the security at the level crossing. Further, according to the present embodiment, as in the related art, even if one of the dual systems is abnormal, the entire railroad crossing is maintained with an alarm, or the fault detection theory is based on a continuous alarm by detecting an improper fall or a missed swing. Instead, the path in which the abnormality has occurred can be separated, and the alarm processing can be continued using the normal path, so that the operation rate of the electronic level crossing control device can be further improved. In the present embodiment,
ATS without a failure detection function on the backup path
However, the present invention is not limited to this. For example, a wheel detector, a short orbit circuit, or the like can be used.

【0008】[0008]

【発明の効果】以上説明したように、本発明によれば、
列車の通過を検出する踏切制御子からの入力信号と、踏
切制御子をバックアップするATS等からの入力信号と
に基づいて警報機や遮断機などの踏切保安機器の制御を
行う制御手段を有していて、その制御手段の不一致判定
手段により踏切制御子の入力信号に基づく通常経路の警
報処理と、ATS等の入力信号に基づくバックアップ経
路の警報処理の結果が不一致か否かを判定し、不一致と
判定した場合は、異常判定手段により何れの経路の警報
処理に異常があるかを判定し、異常があると判定された
側の経路を切離手段により切り離すようにする。これに
より、故障検知機能を持っていないATSの地上子など
のような列車検知センサを使って二重系の制御が可能と
なり、保安度を向上させることができると共に、稼動率
の向上を図ることができる。
As described above, according to the present invention,
Control means for controlling a level crossing safety device such as an alarm or a breaker based on an input signal from a level crossing controller for detecting passage of a train and an input signal from an ATS or the like for backing up the level crossing controller. The discrepancy judging means of the control means judges whether or not the result of the alarm processing of the normal path based on the input signal of the railroad crossing controller and the result of the alarm processing of the backup path based on the input signal such as ATS are inconsistent. If it is determined, the abnormality determination means determines which of the routes has an abnormality in the alarm processing, and the path on the side determined to have the abnormality is separated by the separating means. As a result, it is possible to control the dual system using a train detection sensor such as an ATS ground sensor that does not have a failure detection function, and it is possible to improve security and improve the operation rate. Can be.

【図面の簡単な説明】[Brief description of the drawings]

【図1】本実施の形態に係る電子踏切制御装置の概略構
成を説明する図である。
FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a schematic configuration of an electronic level crossing control device according to an embodiment.

【図2】簡略化した図1の構成図に2つの経路を示した
図である。
FIG. 2 is a diagram showing two paths in the simplified configuration diagram of FIG. 1;

【図3】図2の制御器で不一致とされ何れかの警報処理
を異常と判定した場合の組み合わせを示した図である。
FIG. 3 is a diagram showing a combination in a case where a mismatch is made by the controller in FIG. 2 and one of the alarm processes is determined to be abnormal;

【図4】本実施の形態に係る電子踏切制御装置の動作を
説明するフローチャートである。
FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating the operation of the electronic level crossing control device according to the present embodiment.

【符号の説明】 10 電子踏切制御装置、 12 開始用制御子、 14 終止用制御子、 16 地上子、 18 制御器、 20 踏切保安機器、 30 線路、 32 踏切、 34 列車、 180 入力回路、 182 論理部、 184 不一致判定論理部、 186 出力回路。[Description of Signs] 10 electronic level crossing control device, 12 start control, 14 end control, 16 ground control, 18 controller, 20 level crossing security equipment, 30 lines, 32 level crossing, 34 train, 180 input circuit, 182 Logic section, 184 mismatch judgment logic section, 186 output circuit.

Claims (1)

【特許請求の範囲】[Claims] 【請求項1】 踏切の前後に配置され、列車の通過を検
出する踏切制御子からの入力信号と、その踏切制御子を
バックアップするATS等からの入力信号とに基づいて
警報機や遮断機などの踏切保安機器の制御を行う制御手
段を有する電子踏切制御装置において、 前記制御手段には、前記踏切制御子の入力信号に基づく
通常経路の警報処理と、前記ATS等の入力信号に基づ
くバックアップ経路の警報処理の結果が不一致か否かを
判定する不一致判定手段と、 前記不一致判定手段により通常経路とバックアップ経路
の警報処理結果が不一致と判定された場合、何れの経路
の警報処理に異常があるかを判定する異常判定手段と、 前記異常判定手段により異常があると判定された側の経
路を切り離す切離手段と、 を備えていることを特徴とする電子踏切制御装置。
1. An alarm device or a circuit breaker based on an input signal from a railroad crossing controller for detecting the passage of a train and an input signal from an ATS or the like for backing up the railroad crossing controller. An electronic level crossing control device having control means for controlling a level crossing safety device, wherein the control means includes an alarm process for a normal route based on an input signal of the level crossing controller, and a backup route based on an input signal such as the ATS. A mismatch determining means for determining whether or not the result of the alarm processing is not consistent; and if the result of the alarm processing of the normal path and the backup path is determined to be inconsistent by the mismatch determining means, there is an abnormality in the alarm processing of any of the paths. Abnormality determination means for determining whether or not there is an abnormality, and disconnection means for separating the path on the side determined to be abnormal by the abnormality determination means. Child crossing control device.
JP2000292831A 2000-09-26 2000-09-26 Electronic railroad crossing control device Pending JP2002104192A (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP2000292831A JP2002104192A (en) 2000-09-26 2000-09-26 Electronic railroad crossing control device

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP2000292831A JP2002104192A (en) 2000-09-26 2000-09-26 Electronic railroad crossing control device

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
JP2002104192A true JP2002104192A (en) 2002-04-10

Family

ID=18775712

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
JP2000292831A Pending JP2002104192A (en) 2000-09-26 2000-09-26 Electronic railroad crossing control device

Country Status (1)

Country Link
JP (1) JP2002104192A (en)

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2006327290A (en) * 2005-05-24 2006-12-07 Nippon Signal Co Ltd:The Train detection device and crossing control device
JP2007015645A (en) * 2005-07-11 2007-01-25 East Japan Railway Co Detecting device for train passage at railroad crossing
JP2007223465A (en) * 2006-02-23 2007-09-06 Hokkaido Railway Co Train detection device and train detection system

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JPH01123771U (en) * 1988-01-20 1989-08-23
JPH11278276A (en) * 1998-03-31 1999-10-12 West Japan Railway Co Crossing controller
JPH11310133A (en) * 1998-04-30 1999-11-09 Sankosha Kk Trouble detecting device of train detecting device

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JPH01123771U (en) * 1988-01-20 1989-08-23
JPH11278276A (en) * 1998-03-31 1999-10-12 West Japan Railway Co Crossing controller
JPH11310133A (en) * 1998-04-30 1999-11-09 Sankosha Kk Trouble detecting device of train detecting device

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2006327290A (en) * 2005-05-24 2006-12-07 Nippon Signal Co Ltd:The Train detection device and crossing control device
JP2007015645A (en) * 2005-07-11 2007-01-25 East Japan Railway Co Detecting device for train passage at railroad crossing
JP2007223465A (en) * 2006-02-23 2007-09-06 Hokkaido Railway Co Train detection device and train detection system

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
JPH11313438A (en) Fault protection device for power distribution system
US4117463A (en) Circuit fault detection apparatus for railroad track circuit redundant connections
CN106338168A (en) Control method and system for refrigerating unit
JP2002104192A (en) Electronic railroad crossing control device
JP3539536B2 (en) Fire alarm system
JP3640828B2 (en) Repeater and network using the same
JP2012039734A (en) Protection relay system of multi-terminal transmission system
JP2600524B2 (en) Elevator remote monitoring device
JP3839797B2 (en) Substation operation control device
JP2005065424A (en) Automatic monitoring circuit for protective relay system
JPH10241086A (en) Short-circuit detecting method in monitoring system for disaster prevention, monitoring method for disaster prevention using the same and monitoring system for disaster prevention
JP2520113B2 (en) Track abnormality monitoring system
CN113173110B (en) Double-flow system vehicle non-electric area switching failure emergency system
JP2620249B2 (en) Multiplex communication system of sequence controller
JPH04200223A (en) Protective relay unit
JP3470466B2 (en) Isolator and alarm system
JPS6180303A (en) Switching control system of duplex system
JPH05236639A (en) Compensator for transmission line
JPH0329086A (en) Disaster prevention system
JPS62160826A (en) Transmitter of set standby system
JPH04127819A (en) Protective relay
JP2986267B2 (en) Digital relay device
JPS63161810A (en) Protective relay
JPH07202858A (en) Backup system on occurrence of line fault
JPH0687448A (en) Movable body controlling transmitter

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
A621 Written request for application examination

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A621

Effective date: 20070627

A131 Notification of reasons for refusal

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A131

Effective date: 20100518

A977 Report on retrieval

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A971007

Effective date: 20100520

A521 Written amendment

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A523

Effective date: 20100716

A131 Notification of reasons for refusal

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A131

Effective date: 20100914

A02 Decision of refusal

Free format text: JAPANESE INTERMEDIATE CODE: A02

Effective date: 20110201