IT201600121608A1 - AUTOMATIC CALCULATOR LEVELING SYSTEM - Google Patents

Description

"CALCULATOR AUTOMATIC LEVEL PASSAGE SYSTEM"

Sector of the invention

The present invention relates to an automatic computer-based level crossing system, hereinafter also abbreviated as PLAC. In particular, it concerns public level crossings with complete barriers, normally unattended and closed on the actual running of the trains.

The computer-based level crossing system according to the invention was conceived and developed to manage line level crossings equipped with entire barriers and automatically controlled by the train, on single-track lines, according to the standard UNI - 11117 Ed. 2009 This does not exclude its possibility of application also to double track lines.

Pre-existing technique

In the systems currently in operation, the closure of the barriers, controlled based on the actual running of the trains, allows both the downtime of road traffic to be optimized and the trains to run ahead of their schedule. The closing command of the barriers is carried out with command devices activated by the train and located in the open line, if the level crossing is protected with its own signal, or on the free way of the starting signals of the neighboring station if the level crossing it is protected by the starting signals themselves.

In any case, the distance of the control device from the level crossing and the free set-up of the starting signals are both directly linked to the maximum speed allowed in the section of the line concerned.

In the case of a train running at a lower speed than the maximum allowed speed, the stopping time of road traffic increases proportionally.

Electromechanical devices are provided for the command and release which require non-negligible maintenance costs and which often prove to be the cause of disservices.

The safety logic is ensured with relay logic.

As far as diagnostics are concerned, there are currently no advanced systems and the diagnostics itself is limited to local recordings and alarms transmitted via cable to neighboring stations.

In the event that the level crossing protection signals are not available free of charge, the train must carry out, on its own initiative or upon prescription, a specific run on sight on the level crossing unless the cases provided for by the Instruction for the service of Conduct of Locomotives (IPCL). Currently during the execution of the running on sight the driver has no possibility to know the status of the luminous protection devices on the road side while as regards the position of the barriers, the visual detection is conditioned by the position of the barriers with respect to the tracks and by the morphological characteristics of the level crossing.

In the current single-track automatic level crossing systems, whatever the entity operating the railway line, the protection of the level crossing, on the road side, complies with the provisions of article 44 of the New Highway Code, and in articles 185 and 186 of the Regulations for the execution and implementation of the new Highway Code.

On the railway side, the current automatic level crossing systems are interfaced and connected with each external entity, involving the system itself, by means of signaling cables; all the cables are conveyed to the command and control box and amarred to FS type terminal blocks.

In the case of entities located within the sentry box, the entities themselves are connected to the logic of level crossing through internal spinning.

The external bodies interfaced by signaling cables are:

- ExAut devices for inhibiting the command,

- warning signs pursuant to art. 53b R.S. (Signals Regulation);

- protection signs referred to in art. 53b R.S.

- directional control pedals of the arm type;

- non-directional release pedals with arms or, alternatively, release pedals of the electric fluid type (P70);

- control boxes for level crossing barriers;

- street side light signals;

- possible track circuit with fixed currents at 50Hz;

- any device for granting consent in case of breakdown of the barriers (Dis / MPL);

- signal or car (line) encoder for SST-SCMT (Ground Subsystem - Train Running Control System);

- signal transponder for SST SSC (Pipeline Subsystem);

- Central Apparatus of. neighboring station, for:

Alarm transmission;

Safety relationships.

The external bodies interfaced by internal spinning to the sentry box are:

- device for Chronological Recording of Events (RCE), where provided; - Maintenance panel for the electrical control of the barriers on site (for Maintenance Agents).

Presentation of the invention

the computer-based automatic level crossing system according to the present invention has been conceived in order to improve both technologically and operating performance for the purposes of impact on train and road traffic, and for integration with external systems such as the PAI -PL (Integrative Automatic Protection) and the SCMT (Train Running Control System).

The system guarantees, using a processor rather than a relay technology, the same performance in terms of safety and functionality of the systems currently in operation in the Italian territory, in compliance with and application of the principles dictated by ANSF (National Agency for the Safety of Railways), from what is contained in the UNI 11117 standard, and from what is contained in the editions in force of the Highway Code and its implementing and application regulations.

In addition to understanding the performance of current systems, the system according to the invention introduces features designed to improve the impact and intrusiveness with respect to rail and road traffic.

Based on fundamental concepts of simplification and standardization of engineering solutions, the system according to the invention is flexible, scalable and modular according to the characteristics of the level crossing or the complex of level crossings to be controlled.

The product is developed through the use of electronic technology that involves the use of both proprietary and commercial COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) hardware and software components.

The system according to the present invention is identical to the current systems as regards the street side. On the other hand, as far as the railway side is concerned, it interfaces both with entities used in current systems and with entities introduced in order to best enable the new functions.

The entities already currently used are:

- ExAut devices for inhibiting the command, located both in correspondence with the control pedal and near the Central Unit

- warning signs pursuant to art. 53b R.S .;

- protection signs referred to in art. 53b R.S.

- switchgear boxes for level crossing barriers;

- street side light signals;

- maintenance panel for the electrical control of each single level crossing from the central station and for the maintenance of the signals on the train side by means of a special lever in the event of work in the M45 regime (for Maintenance Agents);

- any device for granting consent in case of breakdown of the barriers (Dis / MPL);

- Central Apparatus of. neighboring station, for:

Alarm transmission;

Safety relationships.

The newly introduced entities are:

- For the closing command and for the calculation of the train speed, SIL0 electronic pedals of the Tekfer type

- For the release, SIL4 electronic pedals of the Tekfer type with attached cdb; - proprietary interface for the transmission of telegrams to the buoys of the SST SCMT system;

- degraded signal for running on sight at the level crossing;

- secure data processing system for managing relations with neighboring stations;

- interfacing with PAI-PL systems, where required;

- diagnostics and remote diagnostics system.

- Interfacing with INfill devices if required

The characteristics and methods of interfacing the entities described above are specified in the following chapters.

Below are the most significant advantages deriving from the use of a system according to the invention compared to the use of the systems currently in use. The system according to the invention is designed to better meet the needs of the road user and the railway manager. The achievement of the goal is mainly linked to the versatility, simplicity and technological innovation of the product itself, both in terms of quality / price ratio and interventions on existing infrastructures and maintenance.

In summary, explained below, the main advantages of the system.

- Finds application in all cases of systems, integrated with entire barriers, automatically controlled by the train provided for by the UNI 11117-2009 standard. - Compared to current systems, it allows to minimize road traffic disruption times by linking the closing actuation of the barriers to the actual speed of the train.

- It allows you to integrate security systems such as PAI-PL and auxiliary systems such as surveillance cameras, sound broadcasting systems, anti-intrusion systems, all of which can be diagnosed, into its functions.

- It allows to directly manage the SST-SCMT switched information points, directly transmitting the telegrams to the buoys through a proprietary interface. - It allows to increase the reliability of the command - release system, while reducing maintenance costs, as electronic pedals are provided, used for the command, for the release and for the calculation of the train speed.

- It allows you to reduce and facilitate design times, through the particular configurator, limiting the activity in choosing the type of crossing protection system and in introducing the typical parameters of each individual system.

- It allows the system to be upgraded with functions that may be required to increase its performance even in the presence of emergency situations such as running on sight in the event of lack of free access to the level crossing protection signals.

- It allows, through specific entity controllers located in any remote place, the exchange of requests and consents concessions as well as the transmission of alarms. - Allows the implementation of standard protocols for interfacing with external electronic systems (ACC, etc.).

- It allows to reduce the closing times of level crossings protected by neighboring stations. This functionality is being conceived (virtual signaling with the use of specific SCMT IPs).

- It allows, through configurable logic, to separate the interventions of the barrier control from consents from additional devices, such as, for example, Cs PAI-PL or any other devices attached to the crossing protection.

The system according to the invention, for any composition and characteristics of the line, does not require a particular design.

The drafting of the schematic plan for computer automatic level crossing (PS-PLAC) is of particular importance for the purposes of entering data in the configuration tool described below.

The PS-PLAC represents the only source from which to detect the data to be entered in the configuration tool.

For this reason, a specification has been defined for the drafting of the schematic plan which makes the drafting itself easier by not requiring particular knowledge on the PLAC system but only a specific knowledge of the symbols used in the railway networks relating to the schematic plans.

The PLAC system, as a generic application, includes a SW that contains the logics of all the protection systems included in the field of application.

The customization for a specific protection system and for a specific configuration of the system itself (number of level crossings, line speed, and anything else that can be obtained from the IS schematic plan and from the SST-SCMT line profile) takes place through a configuration tool having safety features such as to be used for a SIL4 application.

The SW of the PLAC configuration tool is installed on a portable PC dedicated exclusively to the instrument.

The man-machine interface is of the interactive type and in particular will present masks in which the operator will enter the required values in clear text or, where required, affixing visa marks, using the mouse.

All the data to be entered can be found in the PLAC schematic plan and the line profile of the SST-SCMT project.

The instrument, based on what has been progressively entered, will inhibit subsequent masks incompatible with the choices or data previously entered.

The tool will manage both the profiles enabled to use the tool (administrator, operator, verifier) and the progress of the revisions of each project.

The configuration tool then performs the function of creating the configuration file for parameterization and therefore the specialization of the generic SW for each specific application.

Each entity controller (CE) is assigned a particular code or hardware key (HW) that allows the system to recognize the exact location of each equipment in each basket of each system.

The above makes it possible to safely avoid commanding, for example, one entity rather than another.

The assignment of HW keys is managed by a special tool that also allows you not to double the HD keys and at the same time to trace the exact location of each CE throughout the territory for which the installation of PLAC systems is planned.

The PLAC system provides a basic project for a series of cabinets already designed and configured both mechanically and as a connection between the equipment they contain.

A modification to the basic design may be required in case, for example, additions of additional road signs or additional barriers are required.

The spaces for inserting the necessary equipment are still available in the basic cabinet.

The PLAC system in the basic versions can be pre-set up in the factory regardless of each single destination.

The above involves a standard set-up documentation and consequently an easier and safer HW verification procedure.

The PLAC system is able to transmit information on board according to the SST-SCMT standard in use on the Italian railway network (RFI) and compatible with the European ERTMS level 1 system, i.e. through buoys that transmit the relative information on board the train. the protection status of the level crossing, in addition to the other characteristics of the line.

The system, with regard to the system's own equipment, ensures an MTBF or mean time between failures of at least 100,000 hours.

The PLAC system requires significantly less maintenance than current systems.

For the diagnostic functions, the system architecture provides for the centralization of all information from the periphery at the level of the Central Unit. The information processed by the diagnostic system (SDM) can be consulted, in real time both locally via a dedicated PC, and in the SDM connected via ethernet network, both on a double telephone pair, on optical fiber and via GSM network and located in a neighboring station. . The SDM can be connected to a centralized diagnostic system of the RFI network.

The diagnostic system will record the vital events (RCE) on non-volatile memory also sent to the SDM and readable by extracting and reading a mass memory.

The PLAC system, through the diagnostic center, can safely carry out commands at each level crossing through a communication protocol developed in accordance with the requirements of RFI for interfacing its devices, dictated by the specific "RFI DTC DNS SS RT IS05 021 D - Standard Vital Protocol. Rev. D of 15/05/2011 ".

The performances of the PLAC system according to the invention are mentioned here.

The pedals provided for the closing control perform the directional control functions and are of the electronic type.

By installing an electronic pedal placed at a configurable distance, upstream of the control pedal, it is possible to calculate the speed of the train in transit.

This makes it possible to modulate the start time of the barrier closing maneuver in order to standardize the minimum time, calculated in the case of transit at the maximum speed allowed by the line, which passes from the actuation of the control pedal to the transit of the train on the passage to level.

This mechanism minimizes the stopping time of vehicular traffic, reducing the impact on the regularity of road traffic.

The use of electron pedals reduces maintenance costs and downtimes due to the use of electromechanical pedals, almost eliminating them. If a train accelerates immediately after engaging the control system, this involves a possible delay in the opening of the warning signal without compromising the safety of the system in any way.

This situation could arise in the event of a slowdown in correspondence with the control system.

If, on the other hand, a train must comply with the obligation to stop after engaging the control pedal but upstream of the point from which the warning signal visibility area begins, and then accelerate the journey again, a third pedal is provided to valley of the stop. The closing command of the passage or level crossings of the system is effective only if the speed calculated between the control pedal and the pedal upstream is such as to establish that the train is moving in order not to respect the stop.

In the event that the calculated speed is such as to determine that the train is about to respect the stop, the command is effective only after the train engages a third pedal placed downstream of the stop.

In all cases the ExAut device is located in correspondence with the control pedal.

The release device, ie reopening of the barriers following the transit of the train, is made through the use of electronic SIL4 pedals and integrated, where required for particular system characteristics, with a combined audio frequency track circuit.

In case of failure of the release device, emergency release means are provided, such as with a time device or through interfacing (in safety and via PLAC) to specific auxiliary release devices.

The release will therefore take place only when the whole train has left the crossing.

The PLAC system, due to its characteristics, and in particular for the connection via the network between the various entities that compose it, allows you to interface PAI-PL systems and to connect the alarm for the encumbrance of the crossing with the signals on the train side.

In particular cases, the Cs PAI-PL is included among the conditions for the free signal disposition.

The diagnostic alarm of the PAI-PL system is also transmitted to the remote diagnostic system of PLAC.

A closed-circuit tele vision system (CCTV) can be installed, for each road crossing, with cameras for visual surveillance of the level crossing area.

If installation is deemed necessary, the CCTV system is interfaced with the PLAC system.

The images taken are recorded locally and visible in the SDR via the SD (to be evaluated according to the transmission medium).

In particular, the images of all the PLAC systems connected to it may be visible in the remote diagnostic station by selecting the level crossing concerned via a dedicated interface.

A bidirectional remote sound system (STDS) can be installed for each road crossing, which allows direct or pre-recorded messages to be transmitted in the crossing area.

It is also possible to receive communications from the crossing area through appropriate high-sensitivity microphones.

Sound communications are audible in the diagnostic remote place in the SDR via the SD.

The record management system (RCE) records vital events on a dedicated file that can be read by saving the data on an external memory device.

In any case, all the data useful for diagnostic purposes are recorded on a local file. With regard to the running on sight management (GEMAV), in order to make it safer, in the event of the no-go-free provision of the signals on the train side, the system according to the invention proposes to provide a new signal that indicates to the driver the status efficiency of road side crossing protection.

It is obviously necessary to define in which cases the crossing on the road side can be considered protected (combinations of status of the barriers and road-side light signals).

Article 147, paragraph 2c of the Highway Code requires road users not to cross a level crossing when the light or acoustic signaling devices (road side signals) are in operation.

For the above, the SDPL could have the following aspects:

Off, which indicates that the level crossing is not protected on the road side;

Steady light indicating:

a) the road side signs are efficient but the barriers are not in the closed position,

b) the barriers are regularly closed but the road side signs are not efficient.

Flashing light indicating efficient road side signs and closed barriers.

The characteristics and the aspects of the aforementioned new signal will eventually be established by the competent bodies. Ultimately the new signal would take on the same meaning as the "blue" switch signal.

The GEMAV system consists of a 2oo2, dedicated and independent from the Central Unit, but logically connected to it, capable of supplying roadside signals in an emergency in the event of failure to freely provide the level crossing protection signals.

The GEMAV system is activated when the train occupies the track circuit (cdb) astride the level crossing, in this case suitably extended.

The reliability and redundancy of the command / release system allows the applicability of the proposed system in all types of level crossing protection and therefore also for level crossings protected by starting signals of a station or both neighboring stations being the system covered by cdb. The GEMAV system, in the event of failure to freely provide the level crossing protection signals or system degradation in the UC, manages, commanding and controlling their ignition.

Roadside signals making it possible to switch on the SDPL.

The GEMAV system will be powered by a separate power supply complex from that relating to the entire PLAC system.

The management of the maneuvering of the barriers in emergency remains difficult also for the power required to the separate power supply unit for the management of the GEMAV system.

For the definition of the GEMAV system it is necessary to identify and establish in which cases of failure in the PLAC system the functioning of the new signal can be ensured.

The system according to the present invention is physically structured as a system with several computers connected to each other through an ethernet network, in which a Central Unit (UC) manages the controllers of entities (CE). The system includes the following functional blocks:

- Central Unit (UC);

- Entity Controllers (CE);

- Transmission and communication system;

- Power supply system;

- Diagnostic system;

- Railway bodies.

Brief description of the figures

Figure 1 is a schematic block view that represents the architecture of the system according to the present invention;

Figure 2 is a schematic block view that represents the architecture of the Central Unit and the connections of the HW components according to the present invention;

Figure 3 shows a physical representation of a central unit of the Applicant on the left and an entity controller on the right; And

Figure 4 shows the block diagram of a generic entity controller.

As shown in figure 1, the system architecture provides a low network that connects a CU to the CEs belonging to the same system, and a high network, galvanically separated from the low network, which connects several CUs, one of which also manages the system. of diagnostics.

Input and output CEs are connected to the remote system, typically for line relationships, which can affect all or part of the connected sub-systems. A PC can be connected to the remote system, typically in the station, via RJ44 port, with centralized diagnostic functions.

Each PC with centralized diagnostic function can in turn be connected to a network capable of concentrating, in a predetermined place, a diagnostic system that can cover the entire railway network.

Each device typical of the PLAC system is assigned a unique code (HW key) that allows you to identify the exact location of each device in each basket of each system.

The electronic equipment that make up a specific PLAC system, Central Unit and Entity Controllers, are placed on a basket inside a sentry box, and powered at 24Vdc.

The railway bodies interfaced by the individual CEs are shown in table 1.

Table 1

Railway entities Description

interfaced by

each CE

(Entity Controller)

CE-MPL Electric switchboard management

for barriers from PL

CE-SEM Management of side light signals

road and train side

CE-CBO Buoys of switched type of the SST SCMT

CE-VDI Management of vital inputs

CE-VDO Management of vital outputs

Referring to Figure 2, the system security architecture is shown. It is based on the composite safety concept in which each safety-related function is performed by two physically independent units of type 2oo2, galvanically separated at the source. Hardware (HW) and software (SW) diversity is added to this independence.

The security architecture provides for the presence of point-to-point communication lines between the two channels both between the two channels of the central logic and between the two channels of each CE. Through these communication lines, the processing channels are synchronized in time and continuously check the consistency of the data processed by the two channels. In the case of diversity detection, both channels impose the outputs in the safety state.

Communication is done safely using appropriate message protection according to the CENELEC standards (European Committee for Electronic Standardization) of reference.

As shown in Figure 1, the Central Unit (UC) envisages a 2oo2 architecture with HW diversity built with commercial platforms (COTS) responding to certain characteristics identified in the design phase, and SW diversity, built, in the basic part, with commercial operating type COTS (Linux & FreeBSD) and in the specific part with proprietary applications. The two CPUs communicate with each other through a serial.

Figure 2 shows the architecture of the Central Unit and the connections of the HW components.

The Central Unit performs all those functions related to the system management logic. The functions required by the UC are listed below:

Time acquisition and site identification via GPS;

GSM network management to transmit / receive data on the VPN network;

Power acquisition and distribution;

Provision of DHCP and NTP services;

Storage of configuration data and SW applications;

Acquisition from the CE of the state of the railway bodies, with verification of congruence; Transmission of commands to the CEs, for the management of railway bodies, with verification of congruence;

Management, storage and transmission of diagnostic and time-stamped RCE data from the field through the CEs.

A physical representation of a central unit of the Applicant and, respectively, of an entity controller, is shown in Figure 3.

The entity controllers (CE), which have the task of interfacing the field entities (signals, switchgear boxes, track circuits, etc.), must be seen as input and output modules that do not implement railway logic functions, but that exclusively apply the commands received from the UC in safety to the entities, through a voter and return the controls / statuses of the railway entities.

Each EC is physically composed of several cards, some of which are physically identical for all types of bodies, while others are interface modules that have the task of controlling and controlling the status of specific railway bodies. In SW terms, the CE also provides for SW diversity.

The railway bodies are connected by signaling cables and connected according to the principle diagrams in force, according to pre-established standards. The newly introduced entities are connected via dedicated cables.

Figure 4 shows the block diagram of a generic entity controller.

The Communication and Control Entities (CCE) card receives the commands from the UC and transforms them into commands for the interface card (actuator). Similarly, the CCE receives information on the status of the railway body from the actuator and transforms it into control messages or alarms for the UC. Any failure contrary to safety involves the isolation of the Entity and the positioning of the controller in a predefined safety state. The status remains until the intervention of controlled external events (system maintenance or reset).

The communication between the UC and the CE takes place through an Ethernet network made of optical fiber. The CE that can be connected depends on the management capacity of the UC and not on the transmission line. The loop closure of the line allows bidirectional communication between the UC and the CE which allows to overcome the breakdown of the communication line.

An optional second communication network level is also provided for communication between the central unit and vital external systems, eg. static interlocking. This level is physically separate from the previous one and can be shared with other applications.

Physically, both networks can be made of optical fiber or telephone twisted pair plus MODEM.

There is also the possibility of using a VPN via GSM with which to connect multiple central units together. In this case, for the protection of communications, the use of a communication protocol compliant with CENELEC 50159-2 is envisaged, as the GSM network is an "open" transmission medium.

The system according to the invention requires a single 220/380 V power source for its UPS. The various voltages necessary for powering the electronic and yard devices provided by the system are derived from the UPS.

For the diagnostic functions, the system architecture provides for the centralization of all the information coming from the periphery at the Central Unit level, which can be consulted in real time both locally, via a dedicated PC, and in the Diagnostic System (SDM) located in a neighboring station, connected via ethernet network, on double telephone pair or GSM network.

The entities controlled by the system described above are connected by signaling cables and connected according to the principle diagrams in force.

Newly introduced entities are connected via dedicated cables.

The system according to the invention provides a software installed in the Central Unit that contains the logics for the management of the separate protection systems according to the protection mechanisms provided on the road side and train side. For all protection systems defined in the generic application, the logic is able to manage up to four level crossings present in a single system.

The SW developed in accordance with the CENELEC EN 50128 standard provides for two processes in diversity that work in parallel providing output only after positive comparison between the two units. The commands are processed by the CEs, who have the task of safely transmitting the command to the railway body, by powering the body itself.

The SW logic provides a sequence of operating states in which the level crossing system passes from the entrance of the train into the system itself up to the release. For each operating state, the software defines the conditions required to pass to the next state or to pass through error states (FSM - Finite State Machine).

The train control is carried out through the use of electronic directional pedals, while the release system consists of a track circuit with axle counters that extend across the road crossing. In addition to the main release device of the level crossing, the SW logic manages emergency release systems in the event of a breakdown of the railway bodies.

The customization for a specific system, type of road side and train side protection system, level crossing number and functionality requested by the customer, takes place through a configuration tool with safety features that can be used for a SIL4 application. .

Claims (6)

Claims 1. Computer-based automatic level crossing system (PLAC), comprising automatic devices for the actuation of the barrier closing command, warning signals, protection signals, switchgears for level crossing barriers, and road side light signals, for the transmission of telegrams to the buoys of the SST-SCMT (Ground Subsystem - Train Running Control System), for the management of the maintenance panel by the personnel for the electrical control from the central sentry box and for the maintenance by way of impeded signals on the train side, and a central apparatus of the neighboring station, for the transmission of alarms and safety reports, characterized by the fact that it also comprises a central unit (UCS1) connected, on the one hand, to a plurality of controllers of the body (CE) through its own low network and, on the other hand, through a high network to one or more other central units (UCS2 ... UCSn) of other PLAC systems with their plurality of contr ollori of institution (CE), the high network being connected according to an architecture of several PLAC systems to a central remote system unit (UCRS), which can safely send commands to the other systems, being in turn connected to a diagnostic system (SDM_1S) and therefore to a centralized diagnostic system (CSDMS) together with a plurality of other diagnostic systems of other remote central unit systems (SDM_nS). System according to claim 1, wherein the system is customized for a specific level of protection and for a specific configuration by means of a protection and configuration tool governed by proprietary application software. 3. System according to claim 1, in which the central unit and the related body controllers of each PLAC system include electronic equipment placed in a basket inside a sentry box, and powered at 24 Vdc. 4. System according to claim 1, in which the body controllers (CE) provide for the management of electric switchgear for level crossing barriers (CE-MPL), a management of street side and train side light signals (CE -SEM), switched type buoys of the trackside subsystem - train running control system (CE-CBO), a management of vital inputs (CE-VDI), and a management of vital outputs (CE-VDO). 5. System according to claim 1, further comprising the use of electronic pedals for the closing command and for calculating the speed of the train aimed at optimizing the closing times of the level crossing. 6. System according to claim 1, further comprising a device for controlling a degraded signal for the management of running on sight at the level crossing in the event of no free arrangement of the protection signals of the level crossing itself.