EP4295169A2 - Procédé de géolocalisation d'un récepteur - Google Patents

Procédé de géolocalisation d'un récepteur

Info

Publication number
EP4295169A2
EP4295169A2 EP22711899.9A EP22711899A EP4295169A2 EP 4295169 A2 EP4295169 A2 EP 4295169A2 EP 22711899 A EP22711899 A EP 22711899A EP 4295169 A2 EP4295169 A2 EP 4295169A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
geolocation
receiver
signals
transmitters
signal
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
EP22711899.9A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Bruno SANGLE-FERRIERE
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Marbeuf Conseil et Recherche SAS
Original Assignee
Marbeuf Conseil et Recherche SAS
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Marbeuf Conseil et Recherche SAS filed Critical Marbeuf Conseil et Recherche SAS
Publication of EP4295169A2 publication Critical patent/EP4295169A2/fr
Pending legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S5/00Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations
    • G01S5/02Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations using radio waves
    • G01S5/0205Details
    • G01S5/0226Transmitters
    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S5/00Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations
    • G01S5/02Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations using radio waves
    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S5/00Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations
    • G01S5/02Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations using radio waves
    • G01S5/06Position of source determined by co-ordinating a plurality of position lines defined by path-difference measurements
    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S5/00Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations
    • G01S5/02Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations using radio waves
    • G01S5/12Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations using radio waves by co-ordinating position lines of different shape, e.g. hyperbolic, circular, elliptical or radial
    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S5/00Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations
    • G01S5/02Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations using radio waves
    • G01S5/14Determining absolute distances from a plurality of spaced points of known location
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4015Transaction verification using location information
    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S2205/00Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations
    • G01S2205/01Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations specially adapted for specific applications
    • G01S2205/02Indoor

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method for geolocating a receiver.
  • the invention also relates to a receiver, a system and applications using one of such a method.
  • DCF radio-controlled clock systems broadcasting the time by long waves exist, such as in Japan emitting from Mount Otakadoya, Fukushima, in UK broadcasting from Anthom, Cumbria, France broadcasting from d'Allouis and many other countries.
  • these systems do not allow the geolocation of the receiver nor to know the exact time, the geolocation of the receiver not being defined, the time taken to signal to join that not being known.
  • a system called BOX NTP BiaTime makes it possible to certify an hour but requires a connection to a data network such as the Internet.
  • the SCP Time system makes it possible to certify a time but using two-way communication between the transmitter and the receiver of the time and therefore two-way means of communication, essentially by computer network, wired or not.
  • the invention aims to meet this need, and has as its object, according to a first of its aspects, by proposing a method for the geolocation of a receiver by measuring the reception times from a plurality of geolocation signals coming from a plurality of transmitters, the geolocation signals being transmitted on several different wavelengths, at least one geolocation signal being of frequency less than 1 Ghz.
  • the invention proves useful for applications requiring the certification of the position of the receiver, in particular in the context of secure transactions, licenses or rights, or even in the context of the tracking of goods or the synchronization of computer systems or any kind of clock, with the transmitter clock.
  • the method includes receiving additional electromagnetic signals.
  • the additional electromagnetic signals each include a digital signature.
  • Geolocation signals certification and information
  • the information signal may also include information indicating the time at which the following certification signal(s) must be emitted.
  • Geolocation signals can be integrated with information signals.
  • Geolocation signals can be transmitted on different wavelengths.
  • these geolocation signals can come from at least two different transmitters.
  • At least one geolocation signal is/are of frequency in the long wave range, in particular of frequency between 3 kHz and 300 kHz.
  • At least one of the geolocation signals and/or at least one of the certification signals may correspond to a GPS signal (Global Positioning System), in particular of frequency L1 or L2, corresponding to 1575.42 MHz and 1227.60 MHz , respectively.
  • GPS signal Global Positioning System
  • the geolocation method according to the invention can be implemented using any GPS system. A simple and effective method is then obtained which makes it possible to certify the receiver compatible with existing GPS systems.
  • at least one geolocation signal is of frequency belonging to the HF, VHF, UHF, FM or TV bands.
  • Fa FM band includes electromagnetic signals of frequency between 88 and 108 MHz approximately.
  • Fa VHF band includes electromagnetic signals of frequency between 30 MHz and 300 MHz.
  • Fa UHF band includes electromagnetic signals of frequency between 300 MHz to 3000 MHz.
  • Fa HF band includes electromagnetic signals of frequency between 3 MHz to 30 MHz.
  • Fa TV band includes electromagnetic signals of frequency between 30 and 3000 MHz.
  • the geolocation and/or certification signals may come from transmitters placed on a satellite, a flying object, or an object floating in the sky.
  • At least one of the transmitters can be terrestrial, in particular placed on a tower.
  • the geolocation and/or certification signals come from terrestrial transmitters, in particular from transmitters placed at altitude or at the top of buildings such as towers, or even under water for frequencies below 10MHz. Such an arrangement makes it possible to increase the precision of the geolocation and the measurement of the transmission speed.
  • This method may comprise, for at least one geolocation signal, transmitted by a transmitter of the plurality of transmitters, the steps consisting in:
  • a predefined action for fraudulent signal so as to perform at least one of the following actions: o Prevent the sending of at least one certification signal to certify the geolocation calculated with said fraudulent signal, o Have incorporated into the information signal accompanying the geolocation signal and to be emitted following the fraudulent geolocation signal, or into at least one of the certification signals, and preferably the first certification signal expected following the signal of fraudulent geolocation with a view to certification, information indicating that the fraudulent geolocation signal and/or that the information signal accompanying it is or are fraudulent, o Preventing or causing to be prevented, in particular by jamming, reception by the receiver , one of the certification signals, and preferably the first certification signal emitted following the fraudulent geolocation signal and expected by the receiver for certification.
  • the method may include, for at least one certification signal transmitted by a transmitter of the plurality of transmitters, the steps consisting in:
  • the control terminals are receivers of geolocation signals and, preferably, of certification signals, communicating or linked to transmitters of geolocation or certification signals and/or jamming stations.
  • Verification of the authenticity of a geolocation signal by each control terminal can be carried out by:
  • Data on the speed of transmission of electromagnetic waves between the transmitter and the places where the signal is likely to be used by the receiver can be sent, in particular in the information signals, to the control terminal(s), in particular minimum and maximum average transmission speeds, or meteorological data including in particular the atmospheric pressure, the temperature and the hygrometry of the spaces crossed by the geolocation or certification signal, then determining the range of transmission speeds according to these data possible.
  • the control terminals, or some of them can collect this data independently, for example by querying a computer server.
  • the procedure provides for the sending to a transmitting station or to a jamming station of information indicating the detection of fraudulent signals
  • a method making it possible to detect any malfunction in the sending of such information is preferably put in place, and being able for example to trigger, after possible verification that a signal which could have been detected as fraudulent has not been detected otherwise valid, the procedure provided for in the event of detection of a fraudulent message.
  • the verification of the signature is done for example by calculating the hash of said signal from which the signature attached to it has been removed beforehand, by decrypting the attached signature, itself composed of the encrypted hash and by comparing the calculated hash with the product of the signature decryption.
  • the verification of the authenticity of a geolocation signal or of a certification signal by a control terminal which is not fixed can be done by first calculating, using other geolocation signals, a position certified of said mobile terminal, then taking into account the uncertainty about its own position, verify the authenticity of the new geolocation signal or of a certification signal.
  • the predefined action may aim to prevent the sending by the sender of the certification signal following the fraudulent geolocation signal or following the erroneous certification signal or to prevent the reception by the receiver of this certification signal.
  • the predefined action for fraudulent signal may be the scrambling of the certification signal following the fraudulent or erroneous signal expected by the receiver to authenticate the geolocation using for example one or more scrambling stations associated or connected in a network.
  • Jamming may be restricted to a defined area by: i.
  • the position of the transmitter of the fraudulent geolocation signal calculated in particular by triangulation or trilateration at G using control terminals as well as by: ii.
  • iv. Consider the intersection of the two zones defined above in ii) and iii).
  • Jamming may occur over a larger area including the area identified above.
  • the minimum threshold can be predetermined for a transmitter of the plurality of transmitters, for a subgroup of these transmitters, or one of these transmitters, below which the receiver cannot use said certification signal to authenticate the signal of geolocation.
  • This threshold is advantageously attached to the message accompanying the geolocation signal or the certification signal to which it applies.
  • the malfunction of the control system may, for example, correspond to:
  • Each control terminal can calculate an area, called “non-control area", in which the inaccurate geolocation signal cannot be detected or in which the predefined action, in particular the jamming of the fraudulent signal, cannot be carried out .
  • Each control terminal can calculate an area, called “control area”, in which the fraudulent geolocation or certification signal can be detected and for which the predefined action, in particular the jamming of the fraudulent signal can be carried out.
  • the predefined action of self-control is preferably to attach to the geolocation signals, in particular by indicating in the information signals, information on their non-control zones and/or their control zones, in particular by indicating the coordinates of the centers of the zones as well as a parameter providing information on their extent, for example the radius.
  • the predefined self-monitoring action may correspond to attaching to one or more geolocation signals emitted by a transmitter, in particular in the information signal accompanying it, information to indicate that one or more control terminals is not connected to this transmitter.
  • the geolocation signals sent with wavelengths in the domain of the signals detected by the defective control terminal(s) preferably carry this information.
  • the control terminals can be arranged to calculate the position of a transmitter from the geolocation signals emitted by this transmitter:
  • the calculation of the position is performed only with geolocation signals whose authenticity, in particular the integrity of the associated data, in particular their digital signature has been verified, as described above.
  • the receiver has a clock synchronized to the transmitters and calculates its position by:
  • Ad -c2*dt'2 +dt'*(ci-C2)
  • the Cartesian equation of the third parabolic surface can therefore generate, for each hypothesis of the situation of the receiver with respect to the plane formed by the positions of the transmitters, a z-equation whose solution or solutions can be found by numerical techniques, in particular by dichotomy.
  • the relative position of the receiver is preferably first determined with respect to the plane of the three positions of the first three emitters, preferably chosen from among the triplets of transmitters whose transmitters are the least aligned, then the intersections of the three layers are determined with each of the two surfaces delimiting the fourth layer, said intersections making it possible to calculate two volumes reduced with respect to the preceding volume and to determine in which of said two volumes the receiver is located, and proceed so on for all the intersections of surfaces to finally have a minimum intersection volume.
  • This new precision on the clock, as well as the location of the receiver in a reduced volume then make it possible to make new geolocation calculations using the same measurements on the signals received but signal propagation speeds and a receiver clock more
  • the precision of the measurement of the time of arrival of the signal or the time of emission can nevertheless degrade the precision of the geolocation calculations.
  • the Doppler effect makes it possible to calculate the speed component of said receiver parallel to the connecting line, the transmitter located for example in in M1 and the receiver.
  • This component of the speed combined with the propagation speed of the signal around the receiver, and the time separating the reception of the signal from said receiver and the reception of the signal from the last receiver used makes it possible to calculate the time difference between the date of reception of the signal by the receiver if this one was where it is at the time of the receptions of the last signal, and the time at which the signal was emitted, and this for each transmitter other than the the latter being used for geolocation.
  • the calculation then described above for a stationary receiver can be used for calculating the geolocation;
  • the location of the receiver being determined, the use of data on its speed originating from the geolocation then makes it possible to calculate its speed in the three directions in space.
  • the direction and the standard of the speed of said transmitter are preferably indicated in the certification signal accompanying the geolocation signal.
  • the projection of the speed on each of the axes linking the receiver to the various transmitters deduced from the Doppler effect is then adjusted by removing the component on this axis of the speed of the transmitter at the time of transmission, before being used for the calculation of the speed of the receiver.
  • the receiver If the receiver is in accelerated motion, it can calculate using the Doppler effect the projection of the speed on the axis linking it to each of the transmitters on two series of successive signals and thus deduce the variation in speed over these axes and therefore the acceleration vector of the receiver.
  • This calculation is advantageously used to increase the precision of the calculation of the time difference mentioned above which can be re-performed, for example on the first series of signals by taking account of the acceleration calculated previously to determine an even more precise geolocation.
  • the calculation can also be carried out again on the second series of signals and thus allow a more precise second calculation of the acceleration.
  • the calculated precision advantageously makes it possible to resynchronize the clock of the receiver.
  • a register keeping the inaccuracy of this time can be entered, then a calculation depending in particular on the precision of the measuring devices advantageously makes it possible, when consulting said clock, to give an updated value of the precision of said clock, this time possibly being then be used again for a new geolocation if this accuracy is better than that relating to the times calculated by the methods mentioned above.
  • the meteorological data can give speeds of transmission of signals differences depending on the altitude, or the depth at which the receiver is located.
  • the receiver can then make different geolocation calculations by making several assumptions about the altitude or the depth at which it is located, these different assumptions grouping together different average transmission speed values until the intersections of the calculated slices overlap in a place compatible with the hypothesis on its depth or its altitude, then use the uncertainty on the depth or the altitude calculated for the receiver to examine, according to the recorded environment or the meteorological data, whether the different values of average speed of propagation of the signals to these different depths or altitudes vary sufficiently within the domain made up of the intersection of the slices to induce a difference in the calculation of said depth or altitude greater than the precision sought, and if this is the case redo new ones hypotheses of depth or altitude in this restricted space or alone can calculate the geolocation using the data corresponding to the estimated location; then possibly redo a final calculation using the propagation speed values for this location.
  • Lidar also makes it possible to determine the volumes or volumes occupied by air or vacuum and therefore to extrapolate transmission speeds within these volumes, in particular if transmission speed measurements are made on a surface crossing any concave sub-volume and perpendicular to the axis of propagation of the wave.
  • the refractive index often being variable as a function of the temperature, several measurements, at least two, should preferably be made at times when the temperature of said materials can be different, for example one in winter and one in summer.
  • These recordings are advantageously broadcast by local transmitters or alternatively, for example embedded with the receiver, or accessible through a server.
  • a receiver for geolocation may be noted in the certified recording of the geolocation, and the system can advantageously refuse to certify a geolocation in the basement or in a building with thick walls for which such measurements have not been made available to the receiver, or alternatively only certify the measurement by adding a special mention such as 'an unadjusted measurement', such a measurement being able all the same possibly to make it possible subsequently to find the place where said geolocation was carried out.
  • a geolocation calculation in a place for which such a recording is not available to the receiver can nevertheless use such data of propagation speeds measured for the places located between the transmitter and the receiver to adjust the calculation of the speed average transmission of the geolocation signal, for example by making the hypothesis on the unmeasured part of the space crossed, this hypothesis being for example that this space is composed of soil, or on the contrary composed of the same materials as those crossed by the wave to the location closest to the receiver where the precise measurements were made and use the same average transmission speed.
  • Access to the average propagation speed data is advantageously done by interrogating a server during which the location of which the uncertainty thereon is advantageously transmitted to said server.
  • the receiver can also have a map of the relief, the surface and the height of the buildings, and the thickness of the floors and walls as well as their composition, and possibly the depth of the water surfaces as well as the speeds of propagation. waves in these waters, in these soils at the different wavelengths likely to be received by said receiver.
  • the use of such a map can make it possible to improve the precision of the position by making it possible to take into account the disturbances as well as the modifications likely to be undergone by the electromagnetic signals along their path from their transmitter to the receiver.
  • the data necessary for establishing such a map can be provided by Lidar scanning the terrain, in particular during constructions.
  • the method may include the calculation, in addition to the position of the receiver, of time information indicating the time at which the geolocation and/or certification signals were received.
  • the method may comprise the calculation, in addition to the position of the receiver, of the speed of the receiver, the direction of said speed as well as its acceleration vector.
  • the method comprises the certification of the geolocation calculated using the geolocation signals.
  • This certification is preferably; is granted only after the reception of the predetermined number of information and certification signals within the predetermined times.
  • the said certification signals are signals of certification of the geolocation signal, in particular by verifying the identity or the position of the transmitter of the said certification signal as well as the time of its sending, in particular the date and its time as registered or referenced in the signals of certification and information,
  • the method may also comprise, before certifying the geolocation, the verification that at least one certification signal, preferably all the certification signals, has been received at times compatible with: i.
  • the distance between the receiver and the transmitter for example determined using the geolocation signal transmitted by the same transmitter, iii.
  • the time of transmission of the geolocation signal in particular its date and time of transmission, as recorded or indicated in the information signal accompanying the geolocation signal or in another certification signal, or iv. Meteorological or wave propagation speed data known by the receiver, these data being transmitted in the certification signal or accessible by means of a remote server.
  • the receiver with a view to certifying its position, can send a message to one or more control terminals making it possible to choose or determine one or more keys allowing the digital signature of the certification signal or signals.
  • the receiver preferably carries an encryption key, private or symmetric, or several single-use keys, allowing it to sign its own geolocation calculations.
  • the receiver software is preferably equipped with a system making it possible to check that its own update is not fraudulent, for example by verifying before authorizing said update that the version to be installed has been signed digitally by the publisher of said software or by the operator of the geolocation system.
  • the certification of the position of the receiver can be carried out using an encrypted hash, in particular using an asymmetric encryption whose private key is recorded in the transmitters.
  • an asymmetric encryption whose private key is recorded in the transmitters.
  • the position of the receiver, the calculated time and/or speed and other data used for their calculation as well as their digital signature(s) may be recorded in a storage unit.
  • these data are transmitted, in clear or encrypted form, to a remote server so that they are stored there, the position of the receiver and/or the time and/or the calculated speed being preferably recorded and/or transmitted with information relating to the precision with which this information has been calculated.
  • the transmission can be carried out, for example using a wired or wireless Internet network or by a network of the 4G or 5G type or by a network of the Lora or Sigfox type.
  • the certification signals are also used as information and geolocation signals.
  • the method may include the steps in which:
  • the receiver compares said first, second and third calculation
  • the receiver refuses the certification of the position
  • the receiver preferably checks that it can determine this same geolocation at least twice in a row but preferably three times in a row with the help of consecutive certification signals emitted by each of the same transmitters of the geolocation signals. If the receiver takes the acceleration into account for these calculations, it can omit taking this phenomenon into account for the calculation of the third geolocation so as not to have to use yet another following signal.
  • the receiver can be configured for:
  • Geolocation signals Receive electromagnetic signals from a plurality of transmitters and used to calculate the geolocation of the receiver, called “geolocation signals", at least one geolocation signal being of frequency less than 1 Ghz,
  • the receiver can be configured for:
  • the additional electromagnetic signals each include a digital signature.
  • the additional electromagnetic signals may include signals accompanying the geolocation signals, known as “information signals”.
  • the information signal accompanying a geolocation signal may comprise data relating to the position of the transmitter of said geolocation signal and/or comprising an identifier providing information on the position of the transmitter, the information signal preferably comprising temporal information on the date and time of emission of said geolocation signal.
  • the information signal may further comprise meteorological data providing information on the weather, in particular pressure, cloud cover, temperature, hygrometry of an area surrounding the transmitter, and/or speed data providing information on the speeds of propagation electromagnetic waves in directions and at distances where the geolocation signal is likely to be used.
  • meteorological data providing information on the weather, in particular pressure, cloud cover, temperature, hygrometry of an area surrounding the transmitter, and/or speed data providing information on the speeds of propagation electromagnetic waves in directions and at distances where the geolocation signal is likely to be used.
  • meteorological data can make it possible to take into account the disturbances likely to be suffered by the geolocation signals and/or the certification signals on their journey from their transmitter to the receiver. This can make it possible in particular to increase the precision of the geolocation calculation.
  • the information signal may also include information indicating the time at which the next certification signal must be transmitted.
  • the receiver preferably comprises:
  • a means of communication with a computer network which can be the one described above but which can also be a directional network only allowing the sending of data, such as a Sigfox or Laura network to transmit geolocation data, in particular its position
  • a means of storing data on environments in which the receiver is likely to be used in particular data relating to buildings, for example the thicknesses of partitions and walls thereof and/or in the basement, including data on the composition of the soil and the depth of rivers, seas, lakes as well as the salinity of the said places, these data being able to influence the speed of transmission of the signals for the places in which the said receiver is likely to be used; this data storage means can also be used to record the geolocations carried out and in particular during the course of said receiver, accompanied by time information and information on the speed and acceleration.
  • Calculation means for calculating the coordinates and speeds of the transmitter using the geolocation and/or certification signals, the data associated with the signals and the data available in the said receiver.
  • the receiver comprises a plurality of receiving antennas, for example three in number, in particular circular with magnetic induction, the antennas being preferably placed in orthogonal planes so as to be able to receive signals coming from all the directions of space.
  • the receiver may include a detection unit configured to detect the instant of reception of the signals transmitted by the transmitters, said unit preferably including an integrated circuit or an integrated sub-circuit, the circuit or the sub-circuit being preferably configured to operate at a frequency of 60 Ghz.
  • the circuit or the sub-circuit can be configured to record the amplitude of the electromagnetic signals received as a function of the time of the clock of the receiver, to allow, in particular an electronic or computer module, to deduce therefrom the instant of reception of the electromagnetic signals.
  • the determination of the instant of reception can be carried out for example by taking the average of the dates of peaks of the signal over for example 20 times the period of the signal corresponding.
  • a signal comprising 5 peaks at maximum power and 15 peaks at minimum powers could be dated with the average date of passage of the 5 peaks at maximum powers.
  • the determination of the moment of reception can be carried out by any other means, in particular by using artificial intelligence.
  • the receiver can be placed in any environment, in particular in an indoor environment, in particular inside a building.
  • the receiver can also be configured to receive meteorological data providing information on the weather in an area surrounding the transmitter, and/or on speed data providing information on the propagation speeds of the electromagnetic waves in directions and distances where the geolocation signals are likely to be used, in particular minimum and maximum average propagation speeds of the signals to reach the points of said zone surrounding the transmitter. These meteorological and/or speed data may be included in the information signal accompanying the geolocation signal.
  • the receiver is configured to interrogate a server providing information on the meteorological data or on the speed data, described above.
  • the receiver can be arranged to calculate, in addition to its position, time information indicating the time at which the geolocation and/or certification signals were received.
  • the receiver can be arranged to calculate in addition to its position, the speed of the receiver and/or of the transmitters and of the direction of said speed.
  • the receiver can be arranged to certify its calculated position and/or time, for example using a hash, in particular using asymmetric encryption, a private key of which is stored in the transmitters.
  • the receiver can be arranged to record the position of the calculated receiver and/or the calculated time in the storage means and/or to transmit these data, in clear or encrypted form, to a remote server so that the latter are stored there, the position of the receiver and/or the time and/or the calculated speed being preferably recorded and/or transmitted with information relating to the precision with which this information has been calculated.
  • the transmission can be carried out, for example using a wired or wireless Internet network or by a network of the 4G or 5G type or by a network of the Lora or Sigfox type or even by a satellite transmission, in particular desynchronized from the measurement of the location itself.
  • the receiver can be configured to receive at least one signal with a frequency below 1 Ghz, preferably in the long wave range, in particular with a frequency between 3 Khz and 300 Khz.
  • the receiver can be configured to receive geolocation and frequency certification signals between 30 Mhz and 3 Ghz, corresponding to wavelengths between 10 cm and 10 m.
  • the system may comprise: a) A plurality of transmitters, each arranged to emit electromagnetic signals used for geolocation, called “geolocation signals” and additional electromagnetic signals, b) At least one receiver arranged to receive the electromagnetic signals emitted by transmitters and configured for:
  • the system may include a control system as described above.
  • the control system comprises the control terminal or terminals.
  • the system may include one or more jamming stations.
  • the system can advantageously be arranged to deduce from its clock synchronized by a certified signal, the position, the speed and the certified acceleration, as well as, possibly from an accelerometer, the time, the position the speed and the acceleration at a time differ from the time of receipt of one of the geolocation signals, the calculated data or data then being able to be certified by said transmitter, their precision being nevertheless adjusted for the precision of the clock, and for the calculations of the position, speed and acceleration also from the precision of G accelerometer.
  • the system is preferably arranged to record, in particular by means of the receiver, the certified position of the calculated receiver and/or the calculated time in a storage unit of the system and/or to transmit this information, unencrypted or encrypted, to a remote server so that the latter are stored there, the position of the receiver and/or the time and/or the calculated speed and acceleration being preferably recorded and/or transmitted with information relating to the precision with which this information has been calculated as well as with information relating to the signals received having been used for their calculation.
  • transmitters having time synchronized clocks.
  • the clocks of the transmitters take into account the altitude and the speed at which they have traveled or have been located since their last synchronization to calculate the time, said calculation taking in particular into account the time lapse differentials d clocks according to their altitude, as described by the principle of general relativity.
  • At least two transmitters transmit geolocation and/or certification signals overlapping in time, the two transmitters each transmitting geolocation signals in different wavelengths.
  • the transmitters are arranged to transmit the geolocation signals with a predefined shift relative to a given time zone.
  • At least one transmitter can be arranged to transmit a signal in the long wave range, in particular at a frequency between 3 kHz and 300 kHz.
  • At least one of the transmitters can be arranged to transmit a geolocation signal with a frequency below lGHz.
  • At least one transmitter can be arranged to transmit a frequency signal belonging to the HF, VHF, UHF, FM or TV bands.
  • At least one transmitter being a GPS (Global Positioning System) transmitter, transmitting in particular geolocation signals of frequency L1 or L2, corresponding to 1575.42 MHz and 1227.60 MHz, respectively.
  • GPS Global Positioning System
  • At least one of the transmitters is terrestrial, for example placed on a tower, in particular at least one transmitter placed at altitude or on top of buildings such as towers.
  • the transmitters can be placed in satellites in geostationary orbit or in motion around the earth.
  • the invention also relates to a process for certifying a transaction or payment, in which the geolocation, or even the time of the transaction, is calculated by implementing the geolocation process according to the invention or using the receiver according to the invention or using the system according to the invention, and optionally the said geolocation and/or the geolocation of the co-signers is certified.
  • the invention also relates to a method for securing a transaction or a payment, comprising the steps consisting of: Calculate the geolocation of a receiver associated with a transaction or payment system by implementing the geolocation method according to the invention or by using the receiver according to the invention or by using the system according to the invention,
  • the geolocation calculation is not sufficiently precise with regard to a predefined geolocation precision if the calculation precision is greater than the predefined geolocation precision, for example lm if the transaction requires a single signatory or 5cm in coordinates horizontal and 50 cm in vertical coordinates if it requires more than one.
  • the invention also relates to a process for controlling a transaction or a payment, in which the transition or the payment is conditional on the possibility of geolocating the terminal allowing said transaction or said payment by implementing the process of geolocation certification according to the invention or using the receiver according to the invention or using the system according to the invention.
  • the invention also relates to a method for restricting the use of a license or a right by a user, in which:
  • the geolocation of the user, or even the time and/or the date at which G user requests access, is carried out, by implementing the geolocation method according to the invention, by using the receiver, or by using the system according to the invention,
  • the invention also relates to a method for restricting access to data readable by a device:
  • the invention also relates to a method for tracking a goods or vehicle journey in which one or more receivers periodically record the certified geolocation, or even the time and/or the date and/or the speed and/or the certified acceleration of the goods or of the vehicle by implementing the method, by using the receiver or the system according to the invention.
  • Another object of the invention is a method for tracking position where an alert signal is triggered when the receiver is detected outside or in a predefined zone, or leaves it or enters it, G alert being able to be sound, visual, or be the subject of a message sent for example by a Lora, Sigfox or 4G or 5G network.
  • Reverse a transaction including a payment transaction by means of payment on the basis of the recording of the date and time of said transaction, committed after a cancellation; the cancellation may eventually lead to the cancellation of subsequent transactions.
  • the invention also relates to a method for geolocating a stationary object using a mobile receiver according to the invention, said mobile receiver being geolocated by implementing the method according to the invention, method in which the receiver receives at different times in at least two different places geolocation signals from the stationary object, and calculates the position of the stationary object by implementing the method according to the invention, the method comprising in particular the display of the positions of the mobile receiver in these places, and the position of the stationary object on a map or a plan.
  • FIG 2 shows an example of a geolocation method according to the invention
  • Figure 3 is a block diagram illustrating various process example steps implementing the process of Figure 2
  • Figure 6 is a block diagram illustrating various exemplary process steps implementing the process of Figure 2.
  • the transmitters 20 each emit additional electromagnetic signals comprising data used to calculate the position and to authenticate this position.
  • the information signal 27 accompanying a geolocation signal 23 comprises data relating to the position of the transmitter of said geolocation signal and/or comprising an identifier providing information on the position of the transmitter, the information signal preferably comprising time information on the date and time of transmission of said geolocation signal.
  • the information signal 27 further comprises meteorological data providing information on the weather, in particular pressure, cloud cover, temperature, hygrometry of an area surrounding the transmitter, and/or speed data providing information on the speeds of propagation electromagnetic waves in directions and at distances where the geolocation signal is likely to be used.
  • meteorological and speed data are accessible from a remote server 40.
  • the certification and information signals each include a digital signature of the data transported.
  • the geolocation signals Prior to, or simultaneously or subsequently to step 101, the geolocation signals are analyzed in step 102 with a view to verifying their authenticity.
  • the system 1 can comprise a plurality of control terminals 30.
  • Verification of the authenticity of the geolocation signals by each control terminal 30 by verifying the digital signature of the information and certification signals, by calculating an average speed of transmission of the geolocation signals between their transmitters and the control terminal, and comparing said calculated average transmission rate with a range of possible transmission rates.
  • a predefined action for fraudulent signal at step 106 is triggered to prevent the issuer from sending the fraudulent certification signal. of a second certification signal following this fraudulent signal or the reception by the receiver of this second certification signal.
  • the predefined action is preferably the jamming of the second fraudulent certification signal.
  • the receiver receives a second certification signal in step 107 from each transmitter having transmitted the geolocation signal and the first certification signal.
  • the receiver can also calculate time information indicating the time at which the geolocation and/or certification signals were received.
  • the method also comprises in step 108 the calculation, in addition to the position of the receiver, of the speed of the receiver and of the direction of said speed.
  • the method comprises in step 109, the certification of the position of the receiver.
  • the receiver calculates its position a second and a third time using the first and second certification signals.
  • the calculation using the first certification signals following the geolocation signals is used to verify that these certification signals have not been jammed by a control terminal or a jamming station controlled by a control terminal.
  • the certification of the position of the receiver can be carried out using an encrypted hash using asymmetric encryption, a private key of which is stored in the transmitter 20.
  • Step 110 also includes certification of the calculated time and/or speed of the receiver, certification is preferably performed using an encrypted hash using asymmetric encryption, a private key of which is stored in the transmitters 20.
  • Step 111 includes recording the position of the receiver, the calculated time as well as information relating to the signals received having been used for their calculation.
  • the recording is made in a storage unit of the system, in particular of the receiver.
  • this information is transmitted to a remote server 40 so that it is stored there.
  • the position of the receiver and/or the time and/or the speed of the receiver are recorded and/or transmitted with information relating to the precision with which this information has been calculated.
  • This information can be recorded and/or transmitted with information relating to the geolocation signals received having been used for their calculation.
  • FIG. 3 An example of a method for securing a transaction according to the invention is illustrated in FIG. 3.
  • step 201 the position of a receiver associated with a transaction system is calculated, or even certified, by implementing the geolocation method described above, In the event of failure of the calculation of said position or of the certification of the position, the transaction is prevented in step 202 .
  • This method includes in step 301, the determination of the position of the user, or even the time at which the user requests access by implementing the geolocation method described above.
  • step 302 it is checked whether this position belongs to a list of authorized positions, or even whether said time is within a predetermined time slot.
  • step 303 If not, use of the license or right is prevented, which corresponds to step 303.
  • FIG. 5 There is illustrated in FIG. 5 a method for restricting access to data readable by a device according to the invention.
  • This method comprises at step 401, the geolocation, and optionally the certification of the geolocation, of a receiver associated with the device is carried out at the time at which access was requested by implementing the method geolocation described previously.
  • step 402 it is checked whether the geolocation belongs to a list of authorized positions or even whether said time is within a predetermined time slot, and
  • the geolocation of the transaction is carried out by implementing the geolocation method according to the invention and optionally the certification of this geolocation as well as that of the co-signers of the transaction,
  • the geolocation, or even the calculated transition time is compared with a geolocation, or even a transition time declared by the co-signers, and optionally, the geolocation of the co-signers of the transition is compared to a geo-location of the declared co-signers.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
  • Remote Sensing (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
  • Measurement Of Velocity Or Position Using Acoustic Or Ultrasonic Waves (AREA)
  • Arrangements For Transmission Of Measured Signals (AREA)
  • Geophysics And Detection Of Objects (AREA)
EP22711899.9A 2021-02-22 2022-02-21 Procédé de géolocalisation d'un récepteur Pending EP4295169A2 (fr)

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FR2101708A FR3120134A1 (fr) 2021-02-22 2021-02-22 Procédé de géolocalisation d’un récepteur
PCT/EP2022/054266 WO2022175528A2 (fr) 2021-02-22 2022-02-21 Procédé de géolocalisation d'un récepteur

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WO2022175528A3 (fr) 2022-11-24
FR3120134A1 (fr) 2022-08-26
US20220268874A1 (en) 2022-08-25
TW202240202A (zh) 2022-10-16
WO2022175528A2 (fr) 2022-08-25

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