WO2022175527A2 - Procédé de certification de la géolocalisation d'un récepteur - Google Patents
Procédé de certification de la géolocalisation d'un récepteur Download PDFInfo
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- WO2022175527A2 WO2022175527A2 PCT/EP2022/054264 EP2022054264W WO2022175527A2 WO 2022175527 A2 WO2022175527 A2 WO 2022175527A2 EP 2022054264 W EP2022054264 W EP 2022054264W WO 2022175527 A2 WO2022175527 A2 WO 2022175527A2
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- Prior art keywords
- geolocation
- certification
- signal
- signals
- receiver
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/63—Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S5/00—Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations
- G01S5/02—Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations using radio waves
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
- G06Q20/4015—Transaction verification using location information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/50—Network services
- H04L67/52—Network services specially adapted for the location of the user terminal
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
- H04W12/104—Location integrity, e.g. secure geotagging
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S5/00—Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations
- G01S5/0009—Transmission of position information to remote stations
- G01S5/0045—Transmission from base station to mobile station
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method for certifying the geolocation of a receiver.
- the invention also relates to a receiver, a system and applications using such a method.
- a system called BOX NTP BiaTime makes it possible to certify an hour but requires a connection to a data network such as the Internet.
- the SCP Time system makes it possible to certify a time but using two-way communication between the issuer and the time receiver and therefore two-way means of communication, essentially via a wired or unwired computer network.
- the invention aims to meet this need, and has as its object, according to a first of its aspects, a method for certifying the geolocation of a receiver, comprising, prior to said certification, the reception, in predetermined times, in addition geolocation signals emitted by a plurality of transmitters and used to calculate said geolocation, of a predetermined number of additional electromagnetic signals emitted by the same transmitters and comprising data used to authenticate the geolocation, the method comprising the determination of G authenticity of the geolocation based on the additional electromagnetic signals.
- the electromagnetic signals are transmitted at a fixed repetition frequency and therefore at predictable times of the clock of the transmitters and are received offset from each other spaced apart by known time intervals with an uncertainty which depends in particular on the distance to which the transmitter can be located from the receiver, of their maximum relative speed and of the maximum deviations in the speed of propagation of the signals in the media through which they pass, all these physical uncertainties making it possible to determine a time comprised between two dates of the clock of the receiver for signal reception.
- the signals can be emitted on predetermined dates or at frequencies predetermined but variable transmission schedules, these date or frequency calendars advantageously being able to be modified and communicated by any means of communication using preferably signed messages, or else alternatively any signal transmitted by a transmitter which may include the date of emission of the following signal or a lapse of time during which the following signal can be transmitted.
- the additional electromagnetic signals each include a digital signature.
- digital signature is meant a mechanism making it possible to guarantee the integrity of an electronic message and to authenticate its author, for example a hash of said message, encrypted by a cryptographic key such as the private key of a pair of asymmetric keys, or a key shared between the author and the recipient of said message such as a one-time key or even such a signature of said message after the latter has been mixed with a number known only to the author and of the recipient.
- the digital signature of a piece of data can be composed of the hash of the piece of data mixed with a secret number known during the verification of the said signature of the device performing this signature verification.
- “Geolocation” means the position of the receiver, in particular its coordinates in an absolute frame of reference or in a local frame of reference.
- the invention offers a simple, inexpensive and effective solution for certifying the geolocation of the receiver.
- additional certification signals in addition to the signals used to calculate the position of the receiver, the method makes it possible to reduce or even eliminate the sources of error and in particular makes it possible to prevent the use of fraudulent geolocation signals, such as will be described later.
- the invention proves useful for applications requiring the certification of the position of the receiver, in particular in the context of secure transactions, licenses or rights, or even in the context of the tracking of goods or the synchronization of computer systems or any kind of clock, with the transmitter clock.
- part of the additional electromagnetic signals accompany the geolocation signals and are called “information signals”.
- the information signal accompanying a geolocation signal comprises data relating to the position of the transmitter of said geolocation signal and/or an identifier providing information on the position of said transmitter, the information signal preferably comprising time information making it possible to 'identify the date and time of issue said geolocation signal.
- the information signal can be received before, after or simultaneously with the reception of the geolocation signal.
- part of the additional electromagnetic signals are received following the geolocation signals and are called “certification signals”.
- the method includes the reception by the receiver within a predetermined duration of a predefined number of certification signals consecutive to the geolocation signals used for the calculation of said geolocation.
- “Certification signal” means a verification signal to verify the authenticity and integrity of the electromagnetic signals used to calculate geolocation.
- the information signal may further comprise meteorological data providing information on the weather, in particular pressure, cloud cover, temperature, hygrometry of an area surrounding the transmitter, and/or speed data providing information on the speeds of propagation electromagnetic waves in directions and at distances where the geolocation signal is likely to be used.
- meteorological data providing information on the weather, in particular pressure, cloud cover, temperature, hygrometry of an area surrounding the transmitter, and/or speed data providing information on the speeds of propagation electromagnetic waves in directions and at distances where the geolocation signal is likely to be used.
- meteorological data can make it possible to take into account the disturbances likely to be suffered by the geolocation signals and/or the certification signals on their journey from their transmitter to the receiver. This information makes it possible in particular to increase the precision of the geolocation calculation.
- the information signal may also include information indicating the time at which the following certification signal(s) must be emitted.
- the certification and information signals may each include a digital signature of the data transported.
- the certification signals correspond to information signals.
- Geolocation signals can be integrated with information signals.
- the geolocation signal and the information signal can correspond to a single electromagnetic signal.
- the geolocation, information and certification signals can be transmitted at the same frequency, in particular repetition, fixed. However, the information signals can also be transmitted at different rates from those of the certification signals.
- the geolocation signal, the certification signal and the certification signals originating from the same transmitter may be transmitted at different frequencies.
- the method comprises the parallel transmission of several certification and/or information signals on different wavelengths, in particular close to the wavelength of the geolocation signal. This can make it possible to shorten the duration for sending said information and certification signals. This is particularly useful when the signal frequency is low or when the information or certification signals include a substantial volume of data.
- Geolocation signals can be transmitted on different wavelengths.
- these geolocation signals may come from at least two different transmitters at different frequencies and overlap in time.
- At least one geolocation signal can be of frequency less than 1 GHz, preferably in the long wave range, in particular of frequency between 3 KHz and 300 KHz.
- the geolocation and certification signals have a frequency between 30 MHz and 3 Ghz, corresponding to wavelengths between 10 cm and 10 m.
- the geolocation signals and the certification signals can each correspond to GPS (Global Positioning System) signals, in particular of frequency L1 or L2, corresponding to 1575.42 MHz and 1227.60 MHz, respectively.
- GPS Global Positioning System
- the certification method according to the invention can be implemented using any GPS system. A simple and effective method is then obtained which makes it possible to certify the receiver compatible with existing GPS systems.
- At least one geolocation signal is of frequency belonging to the HF, VHF, UHF, FM or TV bands.
- the FM band includes electromagnetic signals of frequency between 88 to 108 MHz approximately.
- the VHF band includes electromagnetic signals with frequencies between 30 MHz and 300 MHz.
- the UHF band includes electromagnetic signals of frequency between 300 MHz to 3000 MHz.
- the HF band includes electromagnetic signals of frequency between 3 MHz to 30 MHz.
- the TV band includes electromagnetic signals with frequencies between 30 and 3000 MHz.
- Geolocation and/or certification signals may come from transmitters placed on a satellite, a flying object, or an object floating in the sky.
- the geolocation signals can for example be transmitted by satellites in geostationary orbit or moving around the earth.
- At least one of the transmitters can be terrestrial, in particular placed on a tower.
- the geolocation and/or certification signals come from terrestrial transmitters, in particular from transmitters placed at altitude or at the top of buildings such as towers, or even under water for frequencies below 10MHz. Such an arrangement makes it possible to increase the precision, in particular vertical, of the geolocation and of the measurement of the transmission speed.
- the method may include, for at least one geolocation signal, transmitted by a transmitter of the plurality of transmitters, the steps consisting in:
- a predefined action for fraudulent signal so as to perform at least one of the following actions: o Prevent the sending of at least one certification signal used to certify the geolocation calculated with said fraudulent signal, o Have it incorporated into the information signal accompanying the geolocation signal and to be transmitted following the fraudulent geolocation signal, or at least one of the certification signals, and preferably the first certification signal expected following the fraudulent geolocation signal in for certification, information indicating that the fraudulent geolocation signal and/or that the information signal accompanying it is or are fraudulent, o Prevent or cause to be prevented, in particular by jamming, the reception by the receiver, of a certification signals, and preferably the first certification signal emitted following the signal fraudulent geolocation and expected by the receiver for certification.
- the method may include, for at least one certification signal transmitted by a transmitter of the plurality of transmitters, steps consisting of:
- a predefined action for erroneous certification signal so as to perform at least one of the following actions: o Prevent the sending, preferably by the issuer referenced by the erroneous certification signal, of at least one other certification signal to be emitted following the erroneous certification signal and used to certify the geolocation calculated using the fraudulent geolocation signal or that can be certified using the erroneous certification signal, o Have incorporated into at least one of the certification signals to be emitted following the erroneous certification signal, information indicating that the said erroneous certification signal cannot be used to certify the geolocation, o Preventing or causing to be prevented, in particular by jamming, reception by the receiver of at least one other certification signal necessary for the certification of the geolocations calculated using the geol signal fraudulent localization, or which can be certified using the erroneous message.
- the control terminals are receivers of geolocation signals and, preferably, of certification signals, communicating or linked to transmitters of geolocation or certification signals and/or jamming stations. Verification of the authenticity of a geolocation signal by each control terminal can be carried out by:
- Data on the speed of transmission of electromagnetic waves between the transmitter and the places where the signal is likely to be used by the receiver can be sent, in particular in the information signals, to the control terminal(s), in particular minimum and maximum average transmission speeds, or meteorological data including in particular the atmospheric pressure, the temperature and the hygrometry of the spaces crossed by the geolocation or certification signal, then determining the range of transmission speeds according to these data possible.
- the control terminals, or some of them can collect this data independently, for example by querying a computer server.
- the procedure provides for the sending to a transmitting station or to a jamming station of information indicating the detection of fraudulent signals
- a method making it possible to detect any malfunction in the sending of such information is preferably put in place, and being able for example to trigger, after possible verification that a signal which could have been detected as fraudulent has not been detected otherwise valid, the procedure provided for in the event of detection of a fraudulent message.
- the verification of the signature is done for example by calculating the hash of said signal from which the signature attached to it has been previously removed, by decrypting the attached signature, itself composed of the encrypted hash, and by comparing the calculated hash with the product signature decryption.
- the verification of the authenticity of a geolocation signal or of a certification signal by a control terminal which is not fixed can be done by first calculating, using other geolocation signals, a position certified of said mobile terminal, then taking into account the uncertainty about its own position, verify the authenticity of the new geolocation signal or of a certification signal.
- Control terminals verify the authenticity of a certification signal by
- the predefined action may aim to prevent the sender from sending the certification signal following the fraudulent geolocation signal or following the erroneous certification signal or to prevent the reception by the receiver of this certification signal.
- the predefined action for fraudulent signal can be the jamming of the certification signal following the fraudulent or erroneous signal expected by the receiver to authenticate the geolocation using for example one or more associated or connected jamming stations in network.
- Jamming may be restricted to a defined area by: i.
- the position of the transmitter of the fraudulent geolocation signal calculated in particular by triangulation or trilateration using the control terminals as well as by: ii.
- iv. Consider the intersection of the two zones defined above in ii) and iii).
- Jamming may occur over a larger area including the area identified above.
- the minimum threshold can be predetermined for a transmitter of the plurality of transmitters, for a subgroup of these transmitters, or one of these transmitters, below which the receiver cannot use said certification signal to authenticate the signal of geolocation.
- This threshold is advantageously attached to the message accompanying the geolocation signal or the certification signal to which it applies.
- control system means the assembly formed by the control terminals and the jamming stations.
- control system further comprises a self-checking system by which any malfunction of the control system gives rise to a predefined self-checking action.
- the malfunction of the control system may, for example, correspond to:
- Each control terminal can calculate an area, called “non-control area", in which the inaccurate geolocation signal cannot be detected or in which the predefined action, in particular the jamming of the fraudulent signal, cannot be carried out .
- Each control terminal can calculate an area, called “control area”, in which the fraudulent geolocation or certification signal can be detected and for which the predefined action, in particular the jamming of the fraudulent signal can be carried out.
- control terminals, jamming stations and transmitters are connected in a network; for example by a 4G, 5G network, internet, Lora, Sigfox or any other means of communication.
- the control terminals are preferably fixed and synchronized in time.
- Jamming stations can be combined with control terminals and make it possible to jam electromagnetic signals emitted by transmitters, in particular geolocation and/or certification signals.
- the predefined self-control action is preferably to attach to the geolocation signals, in particular by indicating in the information signals, information on their non-control zones and/or their control zones, in particular by indicating the coordinates of the centers of the zones as well as a parameter providing information on their extent, for example the radius.
- the predefined self-monitoring action may correspond to attaching to one or more geolocation signals emitted by a transmitter, in particular in the information signal accompanying it, information to indicate that one or more control terminals is not connected to this transmitter.
- the predefined self-checking action can attach to the geolocation signals, in particular in the information signals accompanying the geolocation signals, information on zones corresponding to zones of overlap of one or more zones non-control with control zones; some control terminals may be faulty while others are still valid, a signal located in both a control zone and a non-control zone is considered to be controlled by the receivers and therefore usable for the calculation and certification of a geolocation.
- the control terminals can be arranged to calculate the position of a transmitter from the geolocation signals emitted by this transmitter:
- the calculation of the position is performed only with geolocation signals whose authenticity, in particular the integrity of the associated data, in particular their digital signature has been verified, as described above.
- the receiver has a clock synchronized to the transmitters and calculates its position by:
- Ad can be recalculated using this new internal clock with which the time difference dt '1 between the date of dispatch of the geolocation signal in Mi as recorded in the information signal sent in Mi and its time of arrival observed with the new clock is zero.
- dt'2 this difference for the clock coming from M2 and dt' the difference between the clock of the transmitters and the new clock of the receiver.
- the receiver is therefore included in a slice delimited by two hyperbolic surfaces of revolution around the line linking Mi and M2, places of emission of the signals, the two hyperbolas being defined by the points Mi and M2 and a difference in length of the points of the hyperbolas at the two points Mi and M2 of C2*dt'2+/- 60 m.
- a lesser range of the signals makes it possible to reduce this uncertainty by the same amount; similarly, the presence in the signal of a minimum average speed and a maximum average speed of the signal to reach any point within its range also makes it possible to reduce the thickness of this slice. Finally, uncertainty can also be reduced by choosing signals from receivers with the lowest range.
- Slices are thus calculated for various pairs of transmitters, at least three if the altitude is not known but preferably from 4 non-coplanar transmitters, this characteristic of non-coplanarity being able to be deduced from the reading of the message accompanying each information signal, the latter making it possible to locate the transmitter of said signal.
- the fourth non-coplanar emitter in fact makes it possible to reduce the volume of intersections of the various slices or to choose the volume of intersection of the slices if this intersection gives two different volumes symmetrical with respect to the plane of the emitters and that no other index such as an external indication of the altitude of the receiver cannot be used to determine in which of the two volumes said receiver is located.
- This equation makes it possible to find for each z one or more values of t: Which is an equation that gives t 2 as a function of z and therefore x and y as a function of z.
- the possibility of finding 4 different values for a single value of z reflects the symmetry of the hyperbolic surfaces with respect to a plane perpendicular to their axis of symmetry as well as with respect to the plane made up of the positions of the three emitters.
- a verification of each of the solutions taking into account the sign of the difference di-d2 between the distances to the transmitters as well as the position of the receiver with respect to the plane of the transmitters makes it possible to find the unique intersection of the three surfaces.
- the calculation of the position can be continued for each of the two possibilities and the use of a geolocation signal emitted by a fourth non-coplanar transmitter to the first three, in particular after refining the calculated position, then makes it possible to determine said relative position of the receiver with respect to the plane formed from the positions of the first three transmitters.
- the Cartesian equation of the third parabolic surface can therefore generate, for each hypothesis of the situation of the receiver with respect to the plane formed by the positions of the transmitters, a z-equation whose solution or solutions can be found by numerical techniques, in particular by dichotomy.
- the relative position of the receiver is preferably first determined with respect to the plane determined by the positions of the first three emitters, preferably choosing from among the triplets d 'transmitters those whose transmitters are the least aligned, then the intersections of the three layers are determined with each of the two surfaces delimiting the fourth layer, the said intersections making it possible to calculate two volumes reduced with respect to the preceding volume and to determine in which of the said two volumes the receiver is located, and do so for all surface intersections to finally have a minimum intersection volume.
- the method of calculating the position of the receiver which has just been described can also be used for a location in two dimensions. In this particular case, the position of the receiver can be obtained by the intersection of a slice as described previously and of a plane formed by three transmitters.
- the calculation of the position of the receiver can include the steps consisting of:
- For at least three transmitters determine, for at least one couple M1 and M2 of its transmitters, a slice delimited by two hyperbolic surfaces of revolution around the line linking the transmitters M1 and M2, the two hyperbolas being defined by the position of the emitters M1 and M2 and a difference in length of the points of the hyperbolas at the two positions of the emitters M1 and M2,
- This new precision on the clock, as well as the location of the receiver in a reduced volume then make it possible to make new geolocation calculations using the same measurements on the signals received but signal propagation speeds and a receiver clock more
- the precision of the measurement of the time of arrival of the signal or the time of emission can nevertheless degrade the precision of the geolocation calculations.
- the Doppler effect makes it possible to calculate the speed component of said receiver parallel to the connecting line, for example the transmitter located at M1, and the receiver.
- This component of the speed combined with the propagation speed of the signal around the receiver, and the time separating the reception of the signal from said receiver and the subsequent reception of a signal from another transmitter makes it possible to calculate the time difference between the date of reception of the signal by the receiver if the latter was where it is at the time of reception of the last signal, and the time at which the signal was emitted, and this for each transmitter other than the last used for geolocation.
- the calculation then described above for a stationary receiver can be used for calculating the geolocation;
- the location of the receiver being determined, the use of data on its speed coming from geolocation then makes it possible to calculate its speed in the three directions of space.
- the direction and the standard of the speed of said transmitter are preferably indicated in the certification message accompanying the geolocation message.
- the projection of the speed on each of the axes linking the receiver to the various transmitters deduced from the Doppler effect is then adjusted by removing the component on this axis of the speed of the transmitter at the time of transmission, before being used for the calculation of the speed of the receiver.
- the receiver If the receiver is in accelerated motion, it can calculate using the Doppler effect the projection of the speed on the axis linking it to each of the transmitters on two series of successive signals and thus deduce the variation in speed over these axes and therefore the acceleration vector of the receiver.
- This calculation is used advantageously to increase the precision of the calculation of the time difference mentioned above which can be repeated, for example on the first series of signals by taking into account the acceleration calculated previously to determine an even more precise geolocation.
- the calculation can also be carried out again on the second series of signals and thus allow a second calculation of the more precise acceleration.
- This new acceleration then makes it possible to recalculate more precise velocities for the two series of signals then a more precise acceleration, and so on until the improvement in precision on the velocities and accelerations is no longer significant for the 'user.
- Resvchronization of the receiver clock The calculated precision advantageously makes it possible to resynchronize the clock of the receiver.
- a register keeping the inaccuracy of this time can be entered, then a calculation depending in particular on the precision of the measuring devices advantageously makes it possible, when consulting said clock, to give an updated value of the precision of said clock, this time possibly being then be used again for a new geolocation if this accuracy is better than that relating to the times calculated by the methods mentioned above.
- the meteorological data can give speeds of transmission of signals differences depending on the altitude, or the depth at which the receiver is located.
- the receiver can then make different geolocation calculations by making several assumptions about the altitude or the depth at which it is located, these different assumptions grouping together different average transmission speed values until the intersections of the calculated slices overlap in a place compatible with the hypothesis on its depth or its altitude, then use the uncertainty on the depth or the altitude calculated for the receiver to examine, according to the recorded environment or the meteorological data, whether the different values of average speed of propagation of the signals to these different depths or altitudes vary sufficiently within the domain made up of the intersection of the slices to induce a difference in the calculation of said depth or altitude greater than the precision sought, and if this is the case redo new ones hypotheses of depth or altitude in this restricted space or only calculate the geolocation using the data corresponding to the estimated location; then possibly redo a final calculation using the propagation speed values for this location.
- the average speed of propagation can be altered by materials whose refractive index is much higher than the index of air. Its measurement can thus be difficult, in particular because these are not always apparent. It is therefore possible to measure the average propagation speeds of the waves originating from one or more receivers in a volume and to record these measurements, preferably by also recording the precision of these data, in order to use them subsequently for precise geolocation.
- the location of the recorder can be made using geolocation terminals, for example temporary located in the room where the measurements are made or using any other technique of localization, for example using lidars, conventional measuring instruments.
- Lidar also makes it possible to determine the volumes or volumes occupied by air or vacuum and therefore to extrapolate transmission speeds within these volumes, in particular if transmission speed measurements are made.
- the refractive index often being variable according to the temperature, one will preferably make several measurements, at least two, at times when the temperature of said materials may be different, for example one in winter and one in summer.
- These recordings are advantageously broadcast by local transmitters or alternatively, for example embedded with the receiver, or accessible through a server.
- a receiver for geolocation may be noted in the certified recording of the geolocation, and the system can advantageously refuse to certify a geolocation in the basement or in a building with thick walls for which such measurements have not been made available to the receiver, or alternatively only certify the measurement by adding a special mention such as 'an unadjusted measurement', such a measurement being able all the same possibly to make it possible subsequently to find the place where said geolocation was carried out.
- a geolocation calculation in a place for which such a recording is not available to the receiver can nevertheless use such data of propagation speeds measured for the places located between the transmitter and the receiver to adjust the calculation of the speed average transmission of the geolocation signal, for example by making the hypothesis on the unmeasured part of the space crossed, this hypothesis being for example that this space is composed of soil, or on the contrary composed of the same materials as those crossed by the wave to the location closest to the receiver where the precise measurements were made and use the same average transmission speed.
- Access to the average propagation speed data is advantageously done by querying a server during which the location of which the uncertainty on it is advantageously transmitted to said server.
- the receiver can also have a map of the relief, the surface and the height of the buildings, and the thickness of the floors and walls as well as their composition, and possibly the depth of the water surfaces as well as the speeds of propagation. waves in these waters, in these soils at the different wavelengths likely to be received by said receiver.
- the use of such a map can improve the accuracy of the position by making it possible to take into account the disturbances as well as the modifications likely to be undergone by the electromagnetic signals along their path from their transmitter to the receiver.
- the data necessary for establishing such a map can be provided by Lidar scanning the terrain, in particular during construction.
- the method may include the calculation, in addition to the position of the receiver, of time information indicating the time at which the geolocation and/or certification signals were received.
- the method may comprise the calculation, in addition to the position of the receiver, of the speed of the receiver, the direction of said speed as well as its acceleration vector.
- the certification of the geolocation calculated using the geolocation signals is granted only after the reception of the predetermined number of information and certification signals within the predetermined times.
- the process may include at least one of the following actions:
- the said certification signals are certification signals of the geolocation signal, by verifying in particular the identity or the position of the issuer of the said certification signal as well as the time of its sending, in particular the date and its time as registered or referenced in the signals of certification and information,
- the method may further comprise, before certifying the geolocation, the verification that at least one certification signal, preferably all the certification signals, has been received at times compatible with: i.
- the distance between the receiver and the transmitter for example determined using the geolocation signal emitted by the same transmitter, iii.
- the time of transmission of the geolocation signal in particular its date and time of transmission, as recorded or indicated in the information signal accompanying the geolocation signal or in another certification signal, or iv. Meteorological or wave propagation speed data known by the receiver, such data being transmitted in the certification signal or accessible by means of a remote server.
- the receiver with a view to certifying its position, can send a message to one or more control terminals making it possible to choose or determine one or more keys allowing the digital signature of the certification signal or signals.
- the receiver preferably carries an encryption key, private or symmetric, or several single-use keys, allowing it to sign its own geolocation calculations.
- the receiver software is preferably equipped with a system making it possible to check that its own update is not fraudulent, for example by verifying before authorizing said update that the version to be installed has been signed digitally by the publisher of said software or by the operator of the geolocation system.
- the certification of the position of the receiver can be carried out using an encrypted hash, in particular using asymmetric encryption, a private key of which is stored in the transmitters.
- a digital signature composed of the hash of the data mixed with a secret number also known during the verification of said signature.
- the position of the receiver, the calculated time and/or speed and other data used for their calculation as well as their digital signature(s) may be recorded in a storage unit.
- these data are transmitted, in plain text or encrypted, to a remote server so that they are stored there, the position of the receiver and/or the time and/or the calculated speed being preferably recorded and/or transmitted with information relating to the precision with which this information was calculated.
- the transmission can be carried out, for example using a wired or wireless Internet network or by a network of the 4G or 5G type or by a network of the Lora or Sigfox type.
- the receiver can also be arranged to certify a position, time, speed or acceleration using a certified position and speed deduced from the signals received and various other instruments, in particular an internal clock, acceleration sensor and/or a gyroscope.
- the certification signals are also used as information and geolocation signals.
- the method may include the steps in which: - The receiver performs a first calculation of its position using the geolocation signals emitted by the transmitters,
- the receiver also performs at least a second and preferably a third calculation of its position using the certification signals following the geolocation signals used for the first calculation,
- the receiver refuses to certify the position calculated using the geolocation signals
- the receiver compares said first, second and third calculation
- the receiver refuses the certification of the position
- the receiver certifies the position obtained using geolocation signals.
- the receiver preferably checks that it can determine this same geolocation at least twice in a row but preferably three times in succession using consecutive certification signals transmitted by each of the same geolocation signal transmitters. If the receiver takes into account the acceleration for these calculations, it can omit to take this phenomenon into account for the calculation of the third geolocation so as not to have to use yet another next signal.
- the calculation of the geolocation carried out using the first geolocation signals is preferably used to give the spatial and temporal coordinates of the receiver, while the calculation using the following certification signals serves to verify that these certification signals have not been jammed by a control terminal or a jamming station, and the calculation using the third certification signals serving to verify that none of these said second certification signals have not been jammed as a result of a malfunction of the control system.
- Receiver Another object of the invention, independently or in combination with the foregoing, is a receiver, in particular for implementing the certification method as defined above.
- the receiver can be configured for:
- the additional electromagnetic signals each include a digital signature.
- the receiver is arranged to be able to decode the digital signatures of the additional electromagnetic signals.
- the additional electromagnetic signals may comprise signals received following the geolocation signals, called “certification signals”.
- the additional electromagnetic signals may include signals accompanying the geolocation signals, known as “information signals”.
- the information signal accompanying a geolocation signal may comprise data relating to the position of the transmitter of said geolocation signal and/or comprising an identifier providing information on the position of the transmitter, the information signal preferably comprising temporal information on the date and time of emission of said geolocation signal.
- the information signal may further comprise meteorological data providing information on the weather, in particular pressure, cloud cover, temperature, hygrometry of an area surrounding the transmitter, and/or speed data providing information on the speeds of propagation electromagnetic waves in directions and at distances where the geolocation signal is likely to be used.
- meteorological data provides information on the weather, in particular pressure, cloud cover, temperature, hygrometry of an area surrounding the transmitter, and/or speed data providing information on the speeds of propagation electromagnetic waves in directions and at distances where the geolocation signal is likely to be used.
- meteorological data can make it possible to take into account the disturbances liable to be suffered by the geolocation signals and/or the certification signals on their journey from their transmitter to the receiver. This can make it possible in particular to increase the accuracy of the geolocation calculation.
- the information signal may also include information indicating the time at which the next certification signal must be transmitted.
- the certification and information signals may each include a digital signature of the data transported.
- the receiver preferably comprises:
- a means of communication with a computer network which can be the one described above but which can also be a directional network only allowing the sending of data, such as a Sigfox or Laura network to transmit geolocation data, in particular its position ,
- a means of storing data on environments in which the receiver is likely to be used in particular data relating to buildings, for example the thicknesses of partitions and walls thereof and/or in the basement, including data on the composition of the soil and the depth of rivers, seas, lakes as well as the salinity of the said places, these data being able to influence the speed of transmission of the signals for the places in which the said receiver is likely to be used;
- this data storage means can also be used to record the geolocations carried out and in particular during the course of said receiver, accompanied by time information and information on speed and acceleration.
- Calculation means for calculating the coordinates and speeds of the transmitter using the geolocation and/or certification signals, the data associated with the signals and the data available in the said receiver.
- Certification means to verify digital signatures, create digital signatures and possibly encrypt and sign data.
- the receiver comprises a plurality of receiving antennas, for example three in number, in particular circular with magnetic induction, the antennas being preferably placed in orthogonal planes so as to be able to receive signals coming from all directions in space.
- the receiver may include a detection unit configured to detect the instant of reception of the signals transmitted by the transmitters, said unit preferably including an integrated circuit or an integrated sub-circuit, the circuit or the sub-circuit being preferably configured to operate at a frequency of 60 Ghz.
- the circuit or the sub-circuit can be configured to record the amplitude of the electromagnetic signals received as a function of the time of the clock of the receiver, to allow, in particular an electronic or computer module, to deduce therefrom the instant of reception of the electromagnetic signals.
- the determination of the instant of reception can be carried out for example by taking the average of the dates of peaks of the signal over for example 20 times the period of the corresponding signal. For example, a signal comprising 5 peaks at maximum power and 15 peaks at minimum powers can be dated with the average date of passage of the 5 peaks at maximum powers.
- the determination of the moment of reception can be carried out by any other means, in particular by using artificial intelligence.
- the receiver can be placed in any environment, in particular in an indoor environment, in particular inside a building.
- the receiver can also be configured to receive meteorological data providing information on the weather in an area surrounding the transmitter, and/or on speed data providing information on the propagation speeds of the electromagnetic waves in directions and distances where the geolocation signals are likely to be used, in particular minimum and maximum average propagation speeds of the signals to reach the points of said zone surrounding the transmitter. These meteorological and/or speed data may be included in the information signal accompanying the geolocation signal.
- the receiver is configured to interrogate a server providing information on the meteorological data or on the speed data, described above.
- the receiver can be arranged to calculate, in addition to its position, time information indicating the time at which the geolocation and/or certification signals were received.
- the receiver can be arranged to calculate in addition to its position, the speed of the receiver and/or of the transmitters and of the direction of said speed.
- the receiver can be arranged to certify its calculated position and/or time, for example using a hash, in particular using asymmetric encryption, a private key of which is stored in the transmitters.
- the receiver can be arranged to record the position of the calculated receiver and/or the calculated time in the storage means and/or to transmit these data, in clear or encrypted form, to a remote server so that the latter are stored there, the position of the receiver and/or the time and/or the calculated speed being preferably recorded and/or transmitted with information relating to the precision with which this information has been calculated.
- the transmission can be carried out, for example using a wired or wireless Internet network or by a network of the 4G or 5G type or by a network of the Lora or Sigfox type or even by a satellite transmission, in particular desynchronized from the measurement of the location itself.
- the receiver can be configured to receive at least one signal with a frequency below 1 GHz, preferably in the long wave range, in particular with a frequency between 3 KHz and 300 KHz.
- the receiver is configured to receive geolocation and frequency certification signals between 30 MHz and 3 Ghz, corresponding to wavelengths between 10 cm and 10 m.
- the receiver can also be configured to receive GPS (Global Positioning System) signals, in particular of frequency L1 or L2, corresponding to 1575.42 MHz and 1227.60 MHz, respectively.
- GPS Global Positioning System
- the invention also relates, independently or in combination with the foregoing, to a system, in particular for the implementation of the certification process as defined above.
- the system may comprise: a) A plurality of transmitters, each arranged to emit electromagnetic signals used for geolocation, called “geolocation signals" and additional electromagnetic signals, b) At least one receiver arranged to receive the electromagnetic signals emitted by transmitters and configured for: Determine the position of the receiver from the geolocation signals, and
- the system can be arranged for:
- the system can advantageously comprise at least at least one control terminal making it possible to verify the authenticity and the validity of the geolocation signals.
- the system may include a control system as described previously.
- the control system comprises the control terminal or terminals.
- the system may include one or more jamming stations.
- the system can advantageously be arranged to deduce from its clock synchronized by a certified signal, the position, the speed and the certified acceleration, as well as, possibly from an accelerometer, the time, the position the speed and the acceleration at a time differ from the time of receipt of one of the geolocation signals, the calculated data or data then being able to be certified by said transmitter, their precision being nevertheless adjusted for the precision of the clock, and for the calculations of the position, speed and acceleration, also the accuracy of G accelerometer.
- the system is preferably arranged to record, in particular by means of the receiver, the certified position of the calculated receiver and/or the calculated time in a storage unit of the system and/or to transmit this information, unencrypted or encrypted, to a remote server so that the latter are stored there, the position of the receiver and/or the time and/or the calculated speed and acceleration being preferably recorded and/or transmitted with information relating to the precision with which this information has been calculated as well as with information relating to the signals received having been used for their calculation.
- transmitters having time synchronized clocks.
- the clocks of the transmitters take into account the altitude and the speed at which they have traveled or have been located since their last synchronization to calculate the time, said calculation taking in particular into account the time lapse differentials d clocks according to their altitude, as described by the principle of general relativity.
- At least two transmitters emit geolocation and/or certification signals overlapping in time, the two transmitters each emitting geolocation signals in different wavelengths.
- the transmitters are arranged to transmit the geolocation signals with a predefined shift relative to a given time zone.
- At least one transmitter can be arranged to transmit a signal in the long wave range, in particular at a frequency between 3 kHz and 300 kHz.
- At least one of the transmitters can be arranged to transmit a geolocation signal with a frequency below lGHz.
- At least one transmitter can be arranged to transmit a frequency signal belonging to the HF, VHF, UHF, FM or TV bands.
- At least one transmitter can be arranged to transmit a frequency signal between 30 Mhz and 3 Ghz.
- At least one transmitter being a GPS (Global Positioning System) transmitter, transmitting in particular geolocation signals of frequency L1 or L2, corresponding to 1575.42 MHz and 1227.60 MHz, respectively.
- GPS Global Positioning System
- At least one of the transmitters is terrestrial, in particular at least one transmitter placed at altitude or on top of buildings such as towers. Such an arrangement makes it possible to increase the precision of the geolocation and the measurement of the transmission speed.
- At least one transmitter is arranged on a satellite, a flying object or an object floating in the sky, said transmitter preferably being arranged to transmit a signal at a frequency greater than 250 MHz.
- the transmitters can be placed in satellites in geostationary orbit or in motion around the earth.
- the transmitter(s) may be configured to transmit the geolocation signal directionally, said transmitter comprising a directional antenna, for example a dipole antenna and/or at least one director and/or reflector being placed in the path of the signal emitted by the transmitter so as to direct it in a predefined direction.
- Each transmitter can be configured to transmit, with the information signal or with at least one certification signal, data relating to the range of the transmitter as well as the minimum intensity of its signal when it is received, the zones of control and non-control that are within its reach, i.e. in the allow in which it can be received and used.
- the transmitters can each be arranged to transmit information relating to the change of their own position, speed, and acceleration, in particular periodically, to the receiver and/or to the control terminals, or even to a server to which the control terminals are connected.
- the invention also relates to a method for certifying a transaction or a payment, in which the geolocation, or even the time of the transaction or payment, is certified by implementing the method geolocation certification according to the invention or using the receiver according to the invention or using the system according to the invention, and optionally the certification of the geolocation of the signatories or co-signatories of the transaction or payment is carried out.
- the process for certifying a transaction or payment above may further include the steps of:
- the invention also relates to a method for securing a transaction or a payment, comprising the steps consisting of: To certify the geolocation of a receiver associated with a transaction or payment system by implementing the geolocation certification method of the invention or by using the receiver according to the invention or by using the system according to invention,
- the geolocation calculation is not sufficiently precise with regard to a predefined geolocation precision if the calculation precision is greater than the predefined geolocation precision, for example lm if the transaction requires a single signatory or 5cm in coordinates horizontal and 50 cm in vertical coordinates if it requires more than one.
- the invention also relates to a process for controlling a transaction or a payment, in which the transition or the payment is conditional on the possibility of geolocating the terminal allowing said transaction or said payment by implementing the process of geolocation certification according to the invention or using the receiver according to the invention or using the system according to the invention.
- the invention also relates to a process for restricting the use of a license or a right by a user, in which:
- the geolocation of the user, or even the time and/or the date at which the user requests access, is carried out, by implementing the certification method according to the invention, by using the receiver, or by using the system according to the invention,
- the invention also relates to a method for restricting access to data readable by a device:
- the geolocation of a receiver associated with the device is certified, or even the time and/or the date at which access was requested, by implementing the method according to the invention, or using the receiver or the system according to the invention,
- the invention also relates to a method for tracking a goods or vehicle journey in which one or more receivers periodically record the certified geolocation, or even the time and/or the date and/or the speed and/or the certified acceleration of the goods or of the vehicle by implementing the method, by using the receiver or the system according to the invention.
- the invention also relates to a method for tracking position where an alert signal is triggered when the receiver is detected outside or in a predefined zone, or leaves or enters it, the alert possibly being sound, visual, or be the subject of a message sent for example by a Lora, Sigfox or 4G or 5G network.
- the invention also relates to a method for geolocating a stationary object using a mobile receiver according to the invention, said mobile receiver being geolocated by implementing the method according to the invention, method in which the receiver receives at different times in at least two different places geolocation signals from the stationary object, and calculates the position of the stationary object by implementing the method according to the invention, the method comprising in particular the display of the positions of the mobile receiver in these places, and the position of the stationary object on a map or a plan.
- FIG 1 Figure 1 schematically and partially represents a system for implementing a geolocation certification method according to the invention
- FIG 2 shows an example of a certification process according to the invention
- FIG 3 is a block diagram illustrating different process example steps implementing the certification process of Figure 2,
- FIG 4 is a block diagram illustrating different process example steps implementing the certification process of Figure 2,
- FIG 5 is a block diagram illustrating various process example steps implementing the certification process of Figure 2, and
- FIG 6 is a block diagram illustrating various process example steps implementing the certification process of Figure 2.
- This system 1 comprises a receiver 10.
- the receiver 10 comprises a plurality of receiving antennas, for example three in number, in particular circular with magnetic induction, the antennas being preferably placed in orthogonal planes so as to be able to receive signals from all directions in space.
- the receiver 10 further comprises a detection unit configured to detect the reception time of the signals transmitted by the transmitters, said unit preferably comprising an integrated circuit or an integrated sub-circuit, the circuit or the sub-circuit being preferably configured to operate at a rate of 60 Ghz.
- the receiver 10 can be placed in any environment, in particular in an interior environment, in particular inside a building.
- system 1 also includes a plurality of transmitters 20.
- the transmitters 20 emit electromagnetic signals 23 used to calculate the position of the receiver 10, called “geolocation signals”.
- the transmitters 20 each emit additional electromagnetic signals comprising data used to authenticate the position of the receiver.
- the additional electromagnetic signals comprise signals 25 received following the geolocation signals, called “certification signals”.
- the additional electromagnetic signals include signals 27 accompanying the geolocation signals, known as “information signals”.
- the information signal 27 accompanying a geolocation signal 23 comprises data relating to the position of the transmitter of said geolocation signal and/or comprising an identifier providing information on the position of the transmitter, the information signal preferably comprising temporal information on the date and time of transmission of said geolocation signal.
- the information signal 27 further comprises meteorological data providing information on the weather, in particular pressure, cloud cover, temperature, hygrometry of an area surrounding the transmitter, and/or speed data providing information on the speeds of propagation of electromagnetic waves in directions and at distances where the geolocation signal is likely to be used.
- meteorological and speed data are accessible from a remote server 40.
- the information signal 26 further comprises information indicating the time at which the next certification signal must be transmitted.
- the certification and information signals each include a digital signature of the data transported.
- the transmitters 20 can be terrestrial. They are for example arranged at altitude or on top of buildings, in particular towers, and preferably at different altitudes.
- the transmitters 20 are placed on satellites in geostationary orbit or in motion around the earth.
- these transmitters 20 are able to directionally transmit the geolocation signals 23 and the certification signals 25.
- the transmitters 20 each comprise a directional antenna, for example a dipole antenna.
- the transmitters 20 each comprise a director and/or reflector being placed in the trajectory of the signal emitted by the transmitter so as to direct it in a predefined direction.
- Step 101 corresponds to the reception by the receiver 10 of geolocation signals 23 emitted by the transmitters 20.
- the geolocation signals Prior to, or simultaneously or subsequently to step 101, the geolocation signals are analyzed in step 102 with a view to verifying their authenticity.
- the system 1 comprises a plurality of control terminals 30.
- each control terminal 30 The verification of the authenticity of the geolocation signals by each control terminal 30 by verifying the digital signature of the information and certification signals, by calculating an average speed of transmission of the geolocation signals between their transmitters and the control terminal , and comparing said calculated average transmission rate with a range of possible transmission rates.
- the range of possible transmission speeds is determined taking into account the meteorological situation including in particular the atmospheric pressure, the temperature and the hygrometry of the spaces crossed by the signal between its transmitter and the control terminal.
- a predefined action for fraudulent signal is triggered at step 103 so as to prevent the sender from sending the fraudulent geolocation signal from a certification signal following this fraudulent signal or the reception by the receiver of this certification signal.
- the predefined action for fraudulent signal comprises the jamming, in particular via one or more jamming stations associated with the control terminal, of the certification signal expected by the receiver 10 for the certification of geolocation following receipt of the fraudulent geolocation signal.
- the jamming is restricted to an area Z defined by:
- the minimum threshold can be predetermined for a transmitter of the plurality of transmitters, for a group of these transmitters, or for all these transmitters, below which the receiver cannot use said certification signal to certify a geolocation.
- the receiver receives in step 104 a first certification signal 25 from each transmitter having transmitted the geolocation signals 23.
- the method may include a step 105 in which the authenticity of the certification signal is verified by the control terminals 30.
- a predefined action for fraudulent signal at step 106 is triggered to prevent the issuer from sending the fraudulent certification signal. of a second signal from certification following this fraudulent signal or the reception by the receiver of this second certification signal.
- the predefined action is preferably the jamming of the second fraudulent certification signal.
- the receiver receives a second certification signal in step 107 from each transmitter having transmitted the geolocation signal and the first certification signal.
- the receiver calculates its position in step 108 using the geolocation signals if that has not yet been calculated. In the example illustrated, the calculation of the position of the receiver 10 is done by trilateration.
- the receiver can also calculate time information indicating the time at which the geolocation and/or certification signals were received.
- the method also comprises in step 108 the calculation, in addition to the position of the receiver, of the speed of the receiver and of the direction of said speed.
- the receiver calculates its position a second and a third time using the first and second certification signals.
- the calculation using the first certification signals following the geolocation signals is used to verify that these certification signals have not been jammed by a control terminal or a jamming station controlled by a control terminal.
- the calculation using the second certification signals makes it possible to verify that the control system has not detected any anomaly in its operation during the possible jamming of the first certification signal.
- the receiver can certify in step 110 its position calculated in step 108 using the geolocation signals.
- the certification of the position of the receiver can be carried out using an encrypted hash using asymmetric encryption, a private key of which is stored in the transmitter 20.
- Step 110 also includes certification of the calculated time and/or speed of the receiver, the certification is preferably carried out using an encrypted hash using asymmetric encryption, a private key of which is stored in the transmitters 20.
- Step 111 includes recording the position of the receiver, the calculated time as well as information relating to the received signals having been used for their calculation.
- the recording is made in a storage unit of the system, in particular of the receiver.
- this information is transmitted to a remote server 40 so that it is stored there.
- the position of the receiver and/or the time and/or the speed of the receiver are recorded and/or transmitted with information relating to the precision with which this information has been calculated.
- This information can be recorded and/or transmitted with information relating to the geolocation signals received having been used for their calculation.
- FIG. 3 An example of a method for securing a transaction according to the invention is illustrated in FIG. 3.
- step 201 the position of a receiver associated with a transaction system is calculated and certified by implementing the certification method described above,
- step 202 In the event of failure of the calculation of said position or of the certification of the position, the transaction is prevented in step 202.
- This method includes in step 301, the determination of the certified position of the user, or even the time at which the user requests access by implementing the certification method described above.
- step 302 it is checked whether this position belongs to a list of authorized positions, or even whether said time is within a predetermined time slot.
- step 303 If not, use of the license or right is prevented, which corresponds to step 303.
- FIG. 5 a method for restricting access to data readable by an apparatus according to the invention.
- This method includes at step 401, the certification of the geolocation of a receiver associated with the device at the time at which access was requested by implementing the certification method described previously.
- step 402 it is checked whether the geolocation belongs to a list of authorized positions or even whether said time is within a predetermined time slot, and If not, access to the data is refused in step 403.
- step 501 certification of the geolocation of the transaction, or even of the time of the transaction, is carried out by implementing the geolocation certification method according to the invention and optionally certification of the geolocation of the co-signers of the transaction,
- step 502 the geolocation, or even the time of the calculated transition is compared with a geolocation, or even a transition time declared by the co-signers, and optionally the geo-location of the co-signers of the transition is compared with a geo-location declared co-signers.
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Abstract
Description
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Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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EP22711897.3A EP4295168A2 (fr) | 2021-02-22 | 2022-02-21 | Procédé de certification de la géolocalisation d'un récepteur |
CN202280015128.8A CN116917757A (zh) | 2021-02-22 | 2022-02-21 | 用于认证接收器的地理位置的方法 |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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FR2101709A FR3120130B1 (fr) | 2021-02-22 | 2021-02-22 | Procédé de certification de la géolocalisation d’un récepteur |
FRFR2101709 | 2021-02-22 |
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WO2022175527A2 true WO2022175527A2 (fr) | 2022-08-25 |
WO2022175527A3 WO2022175527A3 (fr) | 2022-11-24 |
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PCT/EP2022/054264 WO2022175527A2 (fr) | 2021-02-22 | 2022-02-21 | Procédé de certification de la géolocalisation d'un récepteur |
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US (1) | US20220272080A1 (fr) |
EP (1) | EP4295168A2 (fr) |
CN (1) | CN116917757A (fr) |
FR (1) | FR3120130B1 (fr) |
TW (1) | TW202240200A (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2022175527A2 (fr) |
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WO2020169542A1 (fr) | 2019-02-19 | 2020-08-27 | Sangle-Ferriere Bruno | Méthode cryptographique de vérification des données |
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US6457129B2 (en) * | 1998-03-31 | 2002-09-24 | Intel Corporation | Geographic location receiver based computer system security |
CA2477962C (fr) * | 2002-03-01 | 2013-07-16 | Enterasys Networks, Inc. | Reseau de donnees informes de la localisation |
US9060273B2 (en) * | 2012-03-22 | 2015-06-16 | Blackberry Limited | Authentication server and methods for granting tokens comprising location data |
US9535164B2 (en) * | 2013-10-10 | 2017-01-03 | Google Technology Holdings LLC | Systems and methods for location assistance with personal area network devices |
US10075807B2 (en) * | 2015-06-30 | 2018-09-11 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Ground-based location systems and methods |
US10430786B1 (en) * | 2015-10-21 | 2019-10-01 | Urayoan Camacho | Enhanced certificate authority |
WO2017100686A1 (fr) * | 2015-12-11 | 2017-06-15 | Patrocinium Systems, Llc | Systèmes et procédés de localisation basée sur une balise sécurisée |
US20170250986A1 (en) * | 2016-02-29 | 2017-08-31 | Nextnav, Llc | Systems and methods for controlling access to position information |
CA3013390A1 (fr) * | 2016-03-31 | 2017-10-05 | Eden SMITH | Systeme et procede de correlation de diverses donnees de position pour la securite des donnees |
US20180045531A1 (en) * | 2016-08-12 | 2018-02-15 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tracing vehicle paths |
WO2018191638A1 (fr) * | 2017-04-13 | 2018-10-18 | Equifax, Inc. | Détection basée sur l'emplacement d'utilisation non autorisée de fonctions d'environnement informatique interactif |
US11277747B2 (en) * | 2019-04-03 | 2022-03-15 | Google Llc | Base station location authentication |
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WO2020169542A1 (fr) | 2019-02-19 | 2020-08-27 | Sangle-Ferriere Bruno | Méthode cryptographique de vérification des données |
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FR3120130B1 (fr) | 2023-03-24 |
FR3120130A1 (fr) | 2022-08-26 |
WO2022175527A3 (fr) | 2022-11-24 |
CN116917757A (zh) | 2023-10-20 |
TW202240200A (zh) | 2022-10-16 |
US20220272080A1 (en) | 2022-08-25 |
EP4295168A2 (fr) | 2023-12-27 |
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