EP3528216A1 - Dokument mit einem sicherheitselement und zugehöriges verfahren - Google Patents

Dokument mit einem sicherheitselement und zugehöriges verfahren Download PDF

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Publication number
EP3528216A1
EP3528216A1 EP19157723.8A EP19157723A EP3528216A1 EP 3528216 A1 EP3528216 A1 EP 3528216A1 EP 19157723 A EP19157723 A EP 19157723A EP 3528216 A1 EP3528216 A1 EP 3528216A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
document
layers
authentication data
layer
security element
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP19157723.8A
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English (en)
French (fr)
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EP3528216B1 (de
Inventor
Giuseppe Ghisa
Laura Luciani
Francesco Antonio INFORTUNA
Andrea GUMIERO
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Istituto Poligrafico E Zecca Dello Stato SpA
Original Assignee
Istituto Poligrafico E Zecca Dello Stato SpA
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Publication of EP3528216A1 publication Critical patent/EP3528216A1/de
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Classifications

    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B42BOOKBINDING; ALBUMS; FILES; SPECIAL PRINTED MATTER
    • B42DBOOKS; BOOK COVERS; LOOSE LEAVES; PRINTED MATTER CHARACTERISED BY IDENTIFICATION OR SECURITY FEATURES; PRINTED MATTER OF SPECIAL FORMAT OR STYLE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; DEVICES FOR USE THEREWITH AND NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; MOVABLE-STRIP WRITING OR READING APPARATUS
    • B42D25/00Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof
    • B42D25/40Manufacture
    • B42D25/45Associating two or more layers
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B42BOOKBINDING; ALBUMS; FILES; SPECIAL PRINTED MATTER
    • B42DBOOKS; BOOK COVERS; LOOSE LEAVES; PRINTED MATTER CHARACTERISED BY IDENTIFICATION OR SECURITY FEATURES; PRINTED MATTER OF SPECIAL FORMAT OR STYLE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; DEVICES FOR USE THEREWITH AND NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; MOVABLE-STRIP WRITING OR READING APPARATUS
    • B42D25/00Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B42BOOKBINDING; ALBUMS; FILES; SPECIAL PRINTED MATTER
    • B42DBOOKS; BOOK COVERS; LOOSE LEAVES; PRINTED MATTER CHARACTERISED BY IDENTIFICATION OR SECURITY FEATURES; PRINTED MATTER OF SPECIAL FORMAT OR STYLE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; DEVICES FOR USE THEREWITH AND NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; MOVABLE-STRIP WRITING OR READING APPARATUS
    • B42D25/00Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof
    • B42D25/20Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof characterised by a particular use or purpose
    • B42D25/29Securities; Bank notes
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B42BOOKBINDING; ALBUMS; FILES; SPECIAL PRINTED MATTER
    • B42DBOOKS; BOOK COVERS; LOOSE LEAVES; PRINTED MATTER CHARACTERISED BY IDENTIFICATION OR SECURITY FEATURES; PRINTED MATTER OF SPECIAL FORMAT OR STYLE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; DEVICES FOR USE THEREWITH AND NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; MOVABLE-STRIP WRITING OR READING APPARATUS
    • B42D25/00Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof
    • B42D25/30Identification or security features, e.g. for preventing forgery
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B42BOOKBINDING; ALBUMS; FILES; SPECIAL PRINTED MATTER
    • B42DBOOKS; BOOK COVERS; LOOSE LEAVES; PRINTED MATTER CHARACTERISED BY IDENTIFICATION OR SECURITY FEATURES; PRINTED MATTER OF SPECIAL FORMAT OR STYLE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; DEVICES FOR USE THEREWITH AND NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; MOVABLE-STRIP WRITING OR READING APPARATUS
    • B42D25/00Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof
    • B42D25/30Identification or security features, e.g. for preventing forgery
    • B42D25/328Diffraction gratings; Holograms
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07DHANDLING OF COINS OR VALUABLE PAPERS, e.g. TESTING, SORTING BY DENOMINATIONS, COUNTING, DISPENSING, CHANGING OR DEPOSITING
    • G07D7/00Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency
    • G07D7/06Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency using wave or particle radiation
    • G07D7/12Visible light, infrared or ultraviolet radiation
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07DHANDLING OF COINS OR VALUABLE PAPERS, e.g. TESTING, SORTING BY DENOMINATIONS, COUNTING, DISPENSING, CHANGING OR DEPOSITING
    • G07D7/00Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency
    • G07D7/20Testing patterns thereon
    • G07D7/202Testing patterns thereon using pattern matching
    • G07D7/207Matching patterns that are created by the interaction of two or more layers, e.g. moiré patterns
    • GPHYSICS
    • G09EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09FDISPLAYING; ADVERTISING; SIGNS; LABELS OR NAME-PLATES; SEALS
    • G09F3/00Labels, tag tickets, or similar identification or indication means; Seals; Postage or like stamps
    • G09F3/02Forms or constructions
    • G09F2003/0276Safety features, e.g. colour, prominent part, logo

Definitions

  • the present invention refers to a document apt to identify with certainty the holder and/or to allow a verification of the authenticity of the document itself.
  • the document may be made, for example, in the form of book, card or banknote.
  • the latter is preferably of the type in accordance with the standard ICAO 9303 (ISO 7810:2003).
  • the document is of the type having a customized security element that bears data selectively detectable by visual observation or by means of measurement or visual instruments.
  • US2008/0106091 discloses a security document provided with two optical elements, each of which is placed at a respective transparent window. At the moment of verification, the two transparent windows are superimposed one on the other, folding the document, and the two optical elements so superimposed produce an identification combination.
  • WO2017/092865 discloses a security element designed such as to show a first colour visually perceptible if observed in reflected light and a second colour visually perceptible if observed in transmitted light.
  • WO2016015130 declares an authentication document provided with a transparent window and of a security element at the latter.
  • the security element comprises an authentication data comprising two components reported respectively on the front and on the rear of the document and a register between them, in such a way that a visual inspection of the document allows to verify the integrity of the information.
  • WO 2011/020537 declares an identification document and the corresponding manufacture method, provided with an authentication element comprising two superimposed pictures.
  • EP 2 559 563 A1 declares how to realize a security document with a semitransparent intermediate layer bearing portions of an authentication data that is reassembled if observed in transmitted light.
  • the structure of the security element from the known solutions doesn't achieve a satisfying compromise between an adequate sophistication of security criteria and a simplicity in manufacturing techniques and/or document verification.
  • the reachable level of security is exclusively limited to protection/verification of the document authenticity, without the possibility to protect/verify even the authenticity of customized sensitive data associated and/or present thereon.
  • the performance of the security element of the known documents can be improved in terms of versatility and durability of materials used both for the element itself and for the whole document, also relating to the mainly portable use of the latter.
  • the technical problem posed and solved by the present invention is therefore that of providing a document provided with a security element, which allows to overcome one or more drawbacks above mentioned referring to the prior art.
  • the invention also refers to a method of making and verifying the authenticity of above said document according to claim 22 and 27, respectively.
  • the term "document” is to be intended in its broadest sense to include both recognition documents that bear data, for example, to prove the identity of the holder or to allow an authentication of the latter, either banknotes or, more generally, payment devices, without limitation either to the type of material used or to the format of the document itself.
  • authentication means for proving the origin of the document and/or of identifying the author/holder to which the document is assigned.
  • the document according to the invention provides a support element, or support, which incorporates a security element.
  • the latter comprises a plurality of superimposed layers that define two opposite faces of the security element.
  • two or more of such layers bear a corresponding component of an authentication data associated or associable with the support.
  • Such components are arranged according to a position of mutual register between each other.
  • the above said plurality of layers comprises at least one layer, which will be recalled as inferring layer, which indeed interfere with an electromagnetic wave that passes therethrough.
  • the interfering layer is configured in such a way that the components are all simultaneously detectable to form, or to compose, the authentication data exclusively when observed, or irradiated, from a same observation direction relating to only one of the opposite faces of the security element. In such observation, or irradiation, condition the security element allows to verify the congruity of the authentication data with a reference data.
  • the interfering layer is interposed between two of the components of the authentication data and/or between two layers each bearing a respective component of the authentication data.
  • the detection - in its entirely - of the authentication data is exclusively feasible from a single observation direction of the document which - as it will clearly appear from the description below - relates to transmitted radiation.
  • the authentication data is reconstructed thanks to the position of mutual register of the above-mentioned components.
  • the document is therefore hardly adjustable or unduly alterable, for example for the purpose of sabotage or tampering, providing a high level of inviolability of the structural integrity of the security element.
  • the document according to the invention is customizable in such a way that the authentication data contained in the security element coincides with one (or more) reference data, for example arranged on the support element.
  • This solution is particularly advantageous as it is possible to associate a reference data uniquely assigned to the document - such as for example a serial number, the reproduction of a face, personal data of the sensitive holder or information of the equivalent type - to the authentication data present in the security element. In this way, it is possible to provide an instrument that certifies both the authenticity of the document itself and the authenticity of sensitive information associated therewith.
  • the document of the invention is easy to be manufactured and easy to be operated during verification.
  • the components wherein the authentication data is decomposed are recorded on a corresponding layer of the security element according to a calibration function that allows to observe, or detect, the authentication data formed by two or more components having substantially the same intensity, in this way reducing possible uncertainties associated with the document verification operations.
  • the security element has high durability.
  • a document according to a preferred embodiment of the invention is overall denoted by the numerical reference 1.
  • the document 1 is a document made, for example, in form of book or card, and yet more preferably is of the type pursuant to the standard ICAO 9303 (ISO 7810:2003).
  • inventive concept of the present invention may be, for example, related to a document provided with pages, suitable for constituting different types of passports with a booklet of existing formats, but at the same time also applicable to a banknote.
  • the document is structurally defined by, or comprising of, a support 100 and is equipped with a security element 101 integrated in, or jointed to, the support itself.
  • the security element 101 comprises a plurality of layers respectively denoted by the references 10, 11 and 20, and defining a first external layer, an intermediate layer and a second external layer, respectively.
  • the security element 101 is integrated within the support 100 so that the overall configuration of the document 1 is as such as to define two planar dimensions predominant compared to a third one, with reference to three axes x, y and z mutually orthogonal to each other.
  • the support 100 and the security element 101 jointed thereto define a document in a card format.
  • the layers 10, 11 and 20 have same form and extension on card plane (x-y plane) and are superimposed along the direction parallel to the axis z which defines the thickness of the card and of the security element 101.
  • the two external layers 10 and 20 define two opposite faces, respectively A and B, of the security element 101 same.
  • each of the two opposite faces A and B of the security element 101 corresponds to a respective opposite face of the support 100.
  • the thickness of the security element 101 defined by the layers 10, 11 and 20 is substantially equal to the overall thickness of the support 100.
  • the opposite faces A and B of the security element 101 and the respective opposite faces of the support 100 jointly determine two opposite sides of the document 1 substantially without discontinuity.
  • the security element 101 is illustrated as having a perimetral profile defined by a closed curve, in particular oval, which borders a region with at least one symmetry axis inside thereof.
  • the plurality of layers 10, 11, 20 overall bears an authentication data denoted by the way of example by the abbreviation "OK", which comprises, i.e. is partitioned into, two or more components.
  • OK an authentication data denoted by the way of example by the abbreviation "OK"
  • two components denoted by or and K are provided.
  • the OK authentication data is intended to further be associated (or associable) to a reference data, i.e. a variable information, encodable or encoded, as for example a serial number, OCR codes, one-dimensional codes, two-dimensional codes, face reproduction, personal information of the holder of the document 1, or sensitive information of equivalent type.
  • a reference data i.e. a variable information, encodable or encoded, as for example a serial number, OCR codes, one-dimensional codes, two-dimensional codes, face reproduction, personal information of the holder of the document 1, or sensitive information of equivalent type.
  • Such OK authentication data is encoded within the document 1 by the security element 101.
  • the support 100 bears the reference data.
  • the reference data may otherwise be contained in remote devices functionally connected to or associable with (for example by wireless connections) the document 1.
  • Each of said two or more components indicates instead a respective portion wherein the OK authentication data has been decomposed.
  • the OK authentication data results to be complete, and thence consistent to the information expressed by the reference data, only when detectable as composed by all components that has been partitioned into.
  • the authentication data is overall contained within the plurality of layers of the security element 101, and, as mentioned, each of said layers bears a corresponding component.
  • an authentication data capable of being partitioned into a greater or minor number of components with respect to the number of layers that composes the security element 101 and/or provides more than one component for a same layer.
  • the OK authentication data has been partitioned into two components O, K and the security element 101 comprises the three superimposed layers 10, 11, 20.
  • the three layers 10, 11 and 20 are preferably contiguous and bound together.
  • coupling means are provided, configured to stably bind together the several layers that compose the plurality of layers of the security element 101.
  • the intermediate layer 11 is interposed between the first external layer 10 and the second external layer 20, in particular an interfering layer that acts on the electromagnetic wave R which passes through the security element 101, as illustrated hereinafter.
  • the components O, K are respectively contained by the first layer 10 and by the second layer 20 according to one their relating position of mutual register.
  • the two layers which bear the components of the authentication data can be later referred as "principal layers" for the sole purpose of identifying them.
  • the relative position of mutual register for the components indicates a relative alignment (as a non-limiting example, of spatial or frequency type) between the components such that a superimposition (again as a non-limiting example, of spatial type) of the latter according to a selective direction, or verse, of observation allows to rebuild correctly and completely the authentication data.
  • the coupling means previously mentioned gives the structure of the security element 101 more effectiveness and makes a - rigid - constraint among the layers that allows to keep the components in register, even when the document 1 is subjected to stress that makes it, for example, bend.
  • the relative position of the intermediate layer 11 with respect to the first layer 10 and the second layer 20 allows to define which are the layers associated to said "A Side” or "B Side” of the document 1, depending on the direction according to which the electromagnetic wave R incise and crosses the security element 101.
  • Each of said "A Side” and “B Side” of the document 1 can be associated, thence, even to observation direction, incidence or irradiation thereof, to which reference will be made by the term “in reflected radiation” or “in transmitted radiation” depending on the interaction between the interfering layer 11 and the electromagnetic wave R.
  • layers or surfaces of certain materials - often denoted by thin-film when their thickness is typically comparable to the wavelength of the incident radiation - have the properties of reflecting, transmitting and/or selectively absorbing an electromagnetic radiation that invests it, depending on its frequency and/or of the structural and chemical properties of the material.
  • reflected components of the radiation can be, for example, eliminated or totally reflected; it's possible to divide or combine radiations of different wavelengths or with different directions and more.
  • observation direction in transmitted radiation is associated with the radiation coming from the B Side of the document 1, in the current example.
  • an observation direction, or verse, "in reflected radiation” is established when the latter is observed from the same face whereon the security element 101 is hit by the electromagnetic wave R.
  • Such observation direction in reflected radiation is then associated with the radiation coming from the A Side of the document 1, still in the current example.
  • the interfering layer 11 is therefore configured in such a way that the two components O and K are both detectable to form the OK authentication data exclusively from an observation direction, in particular the observation direction in transmitted radiation, relating to one only - the B Side, in this example - of the two opposite faces of the document 1, and more in general of the security element 101 incorporated therein.
  • the interfering layer 11 partitions the electromagnetic wave R affecting the security element 101 into at least one transmitted component Rt associated with first wavelengths and into at least one reflected component R r associated with second wavelengths, as illustrated in Fig. 1B .
  • the reflected component R r of the wave R conveys the first component O of the OK authentication data contained by the first layer 10.
  • the reflected component Rr of the wave R involves an attenuated intensity of the signal associated with the first component O, contained by the first layer 10, with respect to the intensity of the signal associated with the second component K, coming from the second layer 20.
  • the calibration process of this example provides the image of figure 5A to be decomposed into two components, respectively shown in Figures 5B and 5C . It is to be noted that this example refers to a decomposition into components which makes use of a pattern 72 shown in figure 7 , associated with a specific example of one of the preferred decomposition mode of the authentication data, that will be after illustrated more in detail.
  • the two components of the greyscale image are thus transferred (o recorded) on a first layer 10 and on a second layer 20 of a security element devoid of the interfering layer 11 (step 740), and that will be used as a reference element for the calibration process.
  • the same components are also transferred (or recorded) on a first layer 10 and on a second layer 20 of a second security element 101 instead provided with an interfering layer 11 (step 750).
  • Said calibration curve is a function that takes into account the properties of the plurality of layers that compose the security element (for example, radiometric - or photometric - properties, such as thickness or material of the involved layers) and the information recording process, which, preferably making advantage of algorithms of the type disclosed by [1], [2], [3] and here incorporated by these references, allows to define the specific transfer modes of each component in the corresponding layers, in order for them to have intensity substantially equal when observed, or detected, from the observation direction in transmitted radiation.
  • the properties of the plurality of layers that compose the security element for example, radiometric - or photometric - properties, such as thickness or material of the involved layers
  • the information recording process which, preferably making advantage of algorithms of the type disclosed by [1], [2], [3] and here incorporated by these references, allows to define the specific transfer modes of each component in the corresponding layers, in order for them to have intensity substantially equal when observed, or detected, from the observation direction in transmitted radiation.
  • the OK authentication data matches one or more reference data prepared on the support 100.
  • the security element 101 although is preferably configured to allow a selective transparency to an electromagnetic wave within the visible spectrum, in alternative embodiments is configured to operate even with electromagnetic waves whose characteristics lay outside said wavelengths (or frequency) range.
  • the layers bearing the components wherein the authentication data has been decomposed may be made of materials suitable to be customized (or encoded).
  • the layers opposite to the interfering layer are preferably made of a plastic material transparent to visible radiation.
  • the phase of the layers bearing the components of the authentication data provides a recording of the latter in a corresponding layer by means of "additive” techniques, such as for example printing techniques, in particular inkjet, laser engraving or the like, and/or “subtractive” techniques, such as for example laser ablation techniques or analogous techniques, even combined together.
  • additive such as for example printing techniques, in particular inkjet, laser engraving or the like
  • subtractive such as for example laser ablation techniques or analogous techniques
  • the above-mentioned components of the authentication data are in the form of polarizable coating, in such a way that the authentication data detectable is a variable content data as a function of the polarization type obtained on said polarizable coating.
  • the components are in the form of photo-activatable pigments and may be contained in a corresponding layer, for example at a their thickness d and/or at a their interface surface S, as shown in figure 1B .
  • interface surface intends to denote a discontinuity zone, for example between two layers of the security element 101 that are identical but distinguished or between layers contiguous but qualitatively different.
  • the security element 101 even the interfering layer itself may bear a component of the authentication data. For this reason, in embodiments is enough for the security element 101 to be provided with at least two layers superimposed, each bearing a respective component of the authentication data.
  • the interfering layer 11 is preferably realized as a coating of the interface surface S of the layer 10 and/or layer 20.
  • such coating is of the thin-film type, preferably comprising metallic elements, metal oxides or other materials having similar properties.
  • the thin-fil type indicates that the coating thickness is substantially comparable to the wavelength of the incident radiation thereon, in particular - in case of document providing a detection within the visible radiation, such thickness may be comprised between 20 and 500 nm.
  • Multiple interfering layers may also be provided in a same security element.
  • the interfering layer is obtained by one or more deposition techniques, such as electrodeposition, sputtering, evaporation of metals or of metal oxides.
  • a preferred configuration of the document 1 is illustrated, in two separate phases of the production process, and provides a security element 101 comprising three superimposed layers, preferably made of plastic transparent material, and denoted by the references 30, 40 and 50.
  • the intermediate layer 40 among said three layers is coated on each of its interface surfaces S by a corresponding interfering layer 41, 42, preferably in the form of thin-film.
  • the optical density of the interfering layers 41 and 42 is comprised in the range 0.1 - 0.5.
  • each of said two interfering layers 41, 42 will be provided with a respective component of the two components O, K wherein an OK authentication data has been decomposed.
  • phase means of the layers which, preferably through one of the previously mentioned techniques and according to the register positioning mode already described, performs the recording of a first component on (or in) the interfering layer 41 and the recording of a second component K on (or in) the interfering layer 42, as indicated in Fig. 3 .
  • the intermediate layer 40 provided with the interfering layers 41, 42 containing the components O, K, and the remaining two layers 30, 50 are subsequently coupled together, preferably in such a way as to be contiguous and then rigidly bound - as visible in figure 3A - so as to ensure, at least during a verify phase of the document, the detection in perfect register of said two components O, K with each other.
  • FIG 4A is illustrated a further embodiment wherein the security element 101 comprises, similarly to the preceding example, three superimposed layers 30, 40 50.
  • the intermediate layer 40 among said three layers is coated on only one of the interface surfaces S by an interfering layer 41, preferably in the form of thin-film.
  • An authentication data F is decomposed into three components F1, F2, F3, and two of said three components - F1 and F2 - are respectively recorded on the interface surface Si of the interfering layer 41 and on the interface surface Sm of the intermediate layer 40, preferably though the above-mentioned additive techniques.
  • the remaining component F3 is instead recorded on the thickness of the intermediate layer 40, preferably through the laser engraving technique.
  • FIG 4B provides a security element 101 similar to that illustrated in figure 4A , which differs only due to a different distribution on the three components F1, F2, F3 wherein the authentication data F has been partitioned.
  • the second component F2 is recorded on the interface surface of the interfering layer 41 while the first F1 and the third F3 component are recorded (for example, through laser engraving) in the thickness of a respective 30, 50 external layers of the three layers 30, 40, 50 of the security element 101.
  • this configuration provides the interfering layer 41 to be provided with the respective component F2 prior to the coupling with the remaining layers 30, 40. Subsequently to said coupling, the remaining layers 30, 40 are provided with the respective components F1, F3.
  • such components are obtained by digitally processing the authentication data and, in this way, each of the algorithms disclosed, due to its specificity, better fit to a certain type of information (for example, alphanumeric characters, photographs, portraits, alphanumeric strings or other).
  • the procedure (shown below) of decomposing the authentication data into components is preferably used when the latter relates to images which depict a face 71 or alpha-numerical codes 81.
  • the authentication data is partitioned preferably into two components, following a predetermined pattern 70 using the aid of algorithms, for example filtering algorithms, preferably of the type disclosed in [4], here incorporated by this reference.
  • Said pattern is generated as a theme or recurring scheme 72, 82, preferably as a monochromatic bitmap file, in a regular and balanced way, multiplying and adding them to each other, according to a regular and ordered grid, identical basic modules (for example, composed of elementary geometric figures), pursuant to the translational symmetry rules (for example, operating vertical and horizontal translation).
  • a theme or recurring scheme 72, 82 preferably as a monochromatic bitmap file, in a regular and balanced way, multiplying and adding them to each other, according to a regular and ordered grid, identical basic modules (for example, composed of elementary geometric figures), pursuant to the translational symmetry rules (for example, operating vertical and horizontal translation).
  • each component (the components illustrated by the references 73, 74 when referring to the portrait 71, the components illustrated by the references 83, 84 when referring to the alpha-numerical code 81) is respectively generated using the portion of the authentication data corresponding to the white and the black ones of the pattern 72, 82.
  • the authentication data 91 is decomposed into two components 92, 93 according to a random pattern 90, even in this case making use of algorithms within reach of those skilled in the art, preferably of the type disclosed in [4].
  • the two components 92, 93 are generated respectively using the portion of the authentication data 91 corresponding to the white and the black of the pattern 90.
  • the pattern 90 is generated as a non-regular theme or scheme, preferably as a monochromatic bitmap file, juxtaposing, according to a disorderly and irregular grid, basic modules different one from each other, preferably following the randomness of a pseudo-random number generator [5], here incorporated by this reference.
  • Such decomposition method is preferably recommended for treatment of photos/images, as illustrated in figure 9 .
  • the authentication data 101, 111 is a string, preferably alpha-numerical string, whose elements are sorted following a specific criterion.
  • the elements of the string comprise alphabetic characters, and the authentication data is partitioned into two components. In a first case, the components are denoted by the references 102, 103 and in a second case the components are denoted by the references 112, 113.
  • the elements of the string of each component are regularly distributed among the two components 102, 103, whilst in the second case ( Figure 11 ) said elements are randomly distributed among the two components 112, 113, being compliant with the relative position of said sorting criterion among the elements.
  • the authentication data for example an image
  • the authentication data is partitioned into more than two components, preferably in three components, and wherein an interfering layer 11, 41, 42 bears at least one of said components.
  • the partition into three components is compliant with, for example, the following criterion:
  • the three components can be obtained considering their decomposition in compliance with, for example, models based on principles of additive synthesis (RGB) or subtractive synthesis (YMC).
  • RGB additive synthesis
  • YMC subtractive synthesis
  • the method can be partitioned into two main phases.
  • a preliminary phase overall denoted in the chart by the reference 127, of making the security element 101 and a phase subsequent to the latter with the authentication data.
  • the security element 101 is firstly necessary to provide a first layer 20 of material, preferably a plastic transparent material and comprising photo-activatable pigments.
  • the first layer 20 of the security element 101 is preferably a material having properties such as to be customized through laser engraving techniques.
  • an interfering layer 11 On an interface surface S of said first layer 20 is thus laid an interfering layer 11, preferably a thin-film, for example through one of the previously disclosed techniques (electrodeposition, sputtering or evaporation of metals or metal oxides).
  • the first layer 20 provided with the interfering layer 11 is coupled to a second layer 10, preferably in plastic transparent material.
  • the overall configuration of the three layers 10, 11, 20 is such that the interfering layer 11 is interposed between the first 20 and the second layer 10 and that, preferably, said three layers are contiguous and bound together, by coupling means suitable for the purpose.
  • the interfering layer has the property to be selectively transparent to an electromagnetic wave R which passes through the security element 101, in the described example preferably a wave within the visible spectrum.
  • the security element 101 should be now customized con the authentication data.
  • the authentication data relates to an image depicting the holder of the document 1. It is, however, clear that is possible to associate other types of information to the authentication data.
  • the customization phase provides the step 120 of an initial digitally providing of said image, in such a way that the latter can be processed.
  • the authentication data is a graphic format image 91, i.e. a digital data in a format that expresses an information intelligible for the human eye.
  • a graphic format image 91 i.e. a digital data in a format that expresses an information intelligible for the human eye.
  • an image may be downloaded from an image database 128, or even be digitally generated according to any modes available for those skilled in art and which, already known, will be no longer discussed.
  • a coding algorithm is selected for the authentication data, preferably pursuant to one of the methods (a, b, c, d) above disclosed.
  • the algorithm allows to partition the authentication data into more components and, in the current example, the algorithm which predicts the use of random grids will be taken into account.
  • a random pattern 90 is thus generated, at step 122, and preferably starting from a same theme/scheme for each document, choosing as a random generation seed a characteristic element of the document to be produced, as for example the number of the card itself.
  • a first component 92 containing the sole portions of the image corresponding to the white of the pattern is generated, referring to step 124a.
  • a second component 93 containing the sole portions of the image corresponding to the black of the pattern will be generated (step 124b).
  • a calibration of the intensity of the components is performed (as indicated at step 129), calculating a calibration curve to define the specific transfer modes of each component in the respective layers of the security element, in order for them to have intensity almost equal when detected from the observation direction in transmitted radiation of the security element.
  • the two components 92, 93 thus obtained are associated 125 to two separate layers of the security element 101.
  • the first layer 20 bears the first component 92 and the second layer 10 bears the second component 93, according to a position of mutual register.
  • the two components 92, 93 are recorded in the thickness of a respective layer 20, 10 through laser engraving techniques.
  • the document 1, and advantageously the support 100 is further customized by reference data of the card holder, such as, for example, the same image 91 used as authentication data.
  • the document 1 is thus ready to be used.
  • an electromagnetic wave R investing the document 1 is provided.
  • the security element 101 is thence observed 130 in reflected radiation, to detect the authentication data from one or both its opposite faces A, B.
  • the security element 101 is thence observed 131 in transmitted radiation to detect the authentication data in a complete form.
  • the completely detected authentication data is then compared 132 to a reference data. Their congruity is therefore verified and, in positive case 133, the document 1 results to be true. On the contrary, the document is counterfeit.
  • the reference data is prepared on the document 1 itself, preferably on the support 100, in such a way that the congruity of the latter to the authentication data allows to verify both the authenticity of document 1 itself and the authenticity of the sensitive information associated therewith.
  • the document 1 may even provide additional security elements that allow (any) congruity verifications 134 in addition to those associated with the authentication data according to the method previously disclosed.

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  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
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  • Manufacturing & Machinery (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
  • Document Processing Apparatus (AREA)
EP19157723.8A 2018-02-19 2019-02-18 Dokument mit einem sicherheitselement und zugehöriges verfahren Active EP3528216B1 (de)

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Cited By (1)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2596075A (en) * 2020-06-15 2021-12-22 Iq Structures Sro Composite security element

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0628408A1 (de) * 1993-06-08 1994-12-14 Dragisa Andric Sicherheitspapier mit Farbmarkierung
WO1997047478A1 (en) * 1996-06-14 1997-12-18 De La Rue International Limited Security device
EP1415828A1 (de) * 2002-10-30 2004-05-06 Xerox Corporation Fälschungssicheres Merkmal mit Linienmustern
US20080106091A1 (en) 2004-09-15 2008-05-08 Wayne Robert Tompkin Security Document With Transparent Windows
WO2011020537A1 (de) 2009-08-18 2011-02-24 Mühlbauer Ag Identifikationsdokument mit zwei sich überlagernden bildern
EP2559563A1 (de) 2011-08-18 2013-02-20 Polska Wytwornia Papierow Wartosciowych S.A. Sicherheitsdokument mit durchsichtigem Merkmal und Verfahren zu dessen Herstellung und Authentifizierung
WO2016015130A1 (en) 2014-07-30 2016-02-04 Canadian Bank Note Company, Limited Security document having a protected window and method for making the same
WO2017092865A1 (de) 2015-12-01 2017-06-08 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Sicherheitselement und mit demselben ausgestatteter datenträger

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EP0628408A1 (de) * 1993-06-08 1994-12-14 Dragisa Andric Sicherheitspapier mit Farbmarkierung
WO1997047478A1 (en) * 1996-06-14 1997-12-18 De La Rue International Limited Security device
EP1415828A1 (de) * 2002-10-30 2004-05-06 Xerox Corporation Fälschungssicheres Merkmal mit Linienmustern
US20080106091A1 (en) 2004-09-15 2008-05-08 Wayne Robert Tompkin Security Document With Transparent Windows
WO2011020537A1 (de) 2009-08-18 2011-02-24 Mühlbauer Ag Identifikationsdokument mit zwei sich überlagernden bildern
EP2559563A1 (de) 2011-08-18 2013-02-20 Polska Wytwornia Papierow Wartosciowych S.A. Sicherheitsdokument mit durchsichtigem Merkmal und Verfahren zu dessen Herstellung und Authentifizierung
WO2016015130A1 (en) 2014-07-30 2016-02-04 Canadian Bank Note Company, Limited Security document having a protected window and method for making the same
WO2017092865A1 (de) 2015-12-01 2017-06-08 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Sicherheitselement und mit demselben ausgestatteter datenträger

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A. MENEZES; P, VAN OORSCHOT; S. A. VANSTONE: "Handbook of Applied Cryptography", 1996, CRC PRESS
ACHARYA; RAY: "Image Processing: Principles and Applications", WILEY-INTERSCIENCE, 2005
MERSENNE TWISTER: "A 623 - Dimensionally Equidistributed Uniform Pseudo -Random Number Generator MAKOTO MATSUMOTO Keio University and the Max-Planck-Institut fur Mathematik and TAKUJI NISHIMURA Keio University", ACM TRANSACTIONS ON MODELING AND COMPUTER SIMULATION, vol. 8, no. 1, pages January 1998
RUSS: "The Image Processing Handbook", 2002, CRC

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2596075A (en) * 2020-06-15 2021-12-22 Iq Structures Sro Composite security element

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