EP3501940A1 - Schienenfahrzeug, entsprechendes schienensystem und verfahren zur zusammensetzung des schienenfahrzeugs - Google Patents

Schienenfahrzeug, entsprechendes schienensystem und verfahren zur zusammensetzung des schienenfahrzeugs Download PDF

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Publication number
EP3501940A1
EP3501940A1 EP18214188.7A EP18214188A EP3501940A1 EP 3501940 A1 EP3501940 A1 EP 3501940A1 EP 18214188 A EP18214188 A EP 18214188A EP 3501940 A1 EP3501940 A1 EP 3501940A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
car
railway vehicle
control unit
electronic control
node
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
EP18214188.7A
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Francesco ZOLETTO
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Alstom Holdings SA
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Alstom Transport Technologies SAS
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Alstom Transport Technologies SAS filed Critical Alstom Transport Technologies SAS
Publication of EP3501940A1 publication Critical patent/EP3501940A1/de
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0054—Train integrity supervision, e.g. end-of-train [EOT] devices

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a rail vehicle comprising a plurality of cars including a head car defining a head end of the railway vehicle, and a set of guiding cars connected to the leading car, the set of cars to guide comprising a car at the tail end of the railway vehicle opposite the leading end, and a first rail vehicle integrity control system for controlling the attachment of each car of the set of cars to be guided to the head car, the first control system comprising a transmitter configured to emit a control signal, the transmitter being located in the car of the tail; an electronic control unit configured to receive the control signal and to control the stopping of the rail vehicle in the absence of reception of the control signal, the electronic control unit being located on board the head car; and a communication network for routing the control signal to the electronic control unit, said communication network comprising a plurality of network nodes, at least one of which is on board each car of the set of cars to be guided, the communication network being configured so that the control signal passes through at least one network node on board each car of the set of cars to be guided before reaching the electronic control
  • This integrity control of the railway vehicle consists in controlling the mechanical attachment of the cars constituting the railway vehicle to the leading car.
  • Such a solution does not, however, protect against interference with other railway vehicles running next to said railway vehicle, or against possible computer attacks against said network.
  • this solution does not allow rapid coupling of the various cars making up the rail vehicle, the connection of each module in the network being long and complicated.
  • An object of the invention is to enhance the safety of the integrity control system of a railway vehicle, in particular so as to avoid external interference and computer attacks. Other objectives are to minimize the cost of such a system, and to allow easy and fast coupling of cars of said railway vehicle.
  • the subject of the invention is a railway vehicle, of the aforementioned type, in which the control signal consists of an encrypted signal comprising an identification code, the electronic control unit being configured to decipher the signal of check in order to obtain the identification code
  • the rail system 10 illustrated on the Figure 1 comprises a computer server 11, a railway vehicle 12 and a railway infrastructure 14.
  • the computer server 11 includes a database.
  • the railway vehicle 12 comprises a plurality of cars 13 and a system 15 for checking the integrity of the railway vehicle 12.
  • the cars 13 are composed of a head car 16 defining a head end of the railway vehicle 12 and at least one, here a plurality, of cars of guide 18, including a tail car 20 located at a tail end of the railway vehicle 12.
  • the rail vehicle is a freight train.
  • the leading car 16 is then constituted by a locomotive and each car to guide 18 is constituted by a car.
  • the rail vehicle 12 is configured to circulate in both directions.
  • the tail car 20 is then also a locomotive capable of towing the other cars 13 constituting the railway vehicle 12.
  • Railway infrastructure 14 includes rails 22 and radio stations 24. Radios 24 are located on the side of rails 22.
  • the rail vehicle 12 is located on the rails 22 and is able to circulate on the rails 22.
  • control system 15 is configured to control the attachment of the or each car to guide 18, including the car tail 20, to the car head 16.
  • the control system 15 comprises a transmitter 26 , an electronic control unit 28 and a communication network 29.
  • the transmitter 26 is located in the car of tail 20. It is configured to emit a control signal.
  • the control signal is advantageously encrypted.
  • the electronic control unit 28 is located in the head car 16.
  • the electronic control unit 28 is advantageously an autonomous equipment that interfaces with control and signaling equipment of the railway vehicle 12.
  • the electronic control unit 28 is integrated directly into the control and / or signaling equipment of the railway vehicle 12.
  • the electronic control unit 28 is configured to cooperate with a vehicle braking device 12 and to automatically transmit braking commands to the braking device to limit the risks of breaking the integrity of the railway vehicle 12 .
  • the electronic control unit 28 is configured to receive the control signal and to control the stopping of the railway vehicle 12 in the absence of reception of the control signal.
  • the transmitter 26 is located in the head car 16 and the electronic control unit 18 is located in the car tail 20.
  • the communication network 29 is capable of conveying the control signal transmitted by the transmitter 26 to the electronic control unit 28.
  • it comprises a plurality of network nodes 30.
  • Each car 13 comprises at least one of these network nodes 30 and the communication network 29 is configured so that the control signal passes through at least one network node 30 on board each car 13 before to reach the electronic control unit 28.
  • Each car 13 advantageously has a multitude of network nodes 30 for redundancy of the network nodes 30.
  • the communication network 29 is still able to route the control signal.
  • the network nodes 30 are adapted to transmit the control signal transmitted by the transmitter 26 without decrypting or modifying it, the network nodes 30 not comprising an algorithm for decrypting the control signal.
  • the network nodes 30 can thus be formed by simple and standardized nodes, not requiring encryption and decryption devices.
  • the network nodes 30 also do not require a computer security system, the control signal passing encrypted in each network node 30. The cost of supply and installation of the network nodes 30 is therefore low.
  • the network nodes 30 being standardized, great flexibility in the composition of railway vehicles 12 is possible.
  • the transmitter 26, the control unit 28 and the network nodes 30 are electrically powered independently.
  • the communication network 29 does not depend on the power supply of the railway vehicle 12, which makes the communication network 29 more robust.
  • the addition of such a control system 15 to a non-equipped railway vehicle 12 is also simplified.
  • each car 13 advantageously contains, as illustrated in FIG. Figure 3 at least one photovoltaic cell 32 adapted to electrically power the elements which, from the transmitter 26, the control unit 28 and the network nodes 30, are on board said car 13.
  • each car 13 contains at least one vibration energy source 34 adapted to electrically power the elements which, among the transmitter 26, the control unit 28 and the network nodes 30, are on board said car 13.
  • the vibration energy source 34 converts the energy of the vibrations of the car 13 into electrical energy.
  • the vibration energy source 34 is for example a piezoelectric transducer.
  • the network nodes 30 advantageously comprise air nodes 36.
  • Each car 13 comprises at least one air node 36.
  • Each air node 36 is equipped with a wireless communication module and is adapted to communicate by air with the or each air node 36 located within a predetermined perimeter.
  • the use of a GPS system between the network nodes 30 and at least one satellite is therefore not necessary, the air nodes 36 communicating directly with each other.
  • the connection of the network nodes 30 is therefore ensured permanently, including during a passage of the railway vehicle 12 in a tunnel for example.
  • the predetermined perimeter generally has a spherical shape centered on the air node 36 and advantageously less than 30 m radius.
  • the predetermined perimeter generally has an ellipsoidal shape oriented in the direction of the railway vehicle 12 and / or an ellipsoidal shape oriented orthogonal to the direction of the railway vehicle 12.
  • At least one air node 36 preferably only one air node 36 is located at each interface with another car 13.
  • the wireless communication module of each air node 36 is compatible with the Zigbee or WiFi protocol or the Bluetooth standard.
  • Each overhead node 36 is configured to communicate with a mobile terminal of an operator.
  • the mobile terminal is for example a mobile phone or a digital tablet.
  • Each overhead node 36 is able to connect or disconnect from the communication network 29 by controlling the operator by means of said mobile terminal.
  • the mobile terminal of the operator is able to display the state of the communication network 29 thus making it possible to diagnose a defective network node 30.
  • Each overhead node 36 is associated with an associated unique identifier and is configured to transmit the unique identifier by air.
  • the rail vehicle 12 advantageously comprises a man-machine interface carried, for example, by the electronic control unit 28.
  • the state of the integrity of the railway vehicle 12 is communicated to the driver of the railway vehicle 12 or to an operator by means of of the man-machine interface.
  • the control signal is constituted by an encrypted signal comprising an identification code.
  • the electronic control unit 28 is configured to decrypt the control signal so as to obtain the identification code.
  • control signal transmitted by the transmitter 26 can not be read by a third party connecting to the network of communication 29.
  • the third party can not therefore retrieve the identification code and falsify the control signal.
  • control signal is encrypted by a rotating code in which the encryption key exchanged between the transmitter 26 and the electronic control unit 28 receiving the signal is not unique but changes at each transmission. a new control signal.
  • This encryption technique prevents any attempt at replay attack. Indeed, in the event of recording and repetition of the control signal on the communication network 29 by an external user, the electronic control unit 28 detects the wrong encryption key and does not consider the received signal.
  • the identification code is uniquely associated with the transmitter 26.
  • the communication network 29 of the railway vehicle 12 can not interfere with an additional railway vehicle 12 located near said railway vehicle 12.
  • the network nodes 30 of the railway vehicle 12 and the additional railway vehicle 12 are capable of to connect to each other and to transmit the respective control signals to the other railway vehicle 12, in the event of reception of the control signal of the additional railway vehicle 12 by one of the air nodes 36 of said railway vehicle 12, the control unit electronics 28 detects the wrong identification code and does not consider the received control signal to be valid.
  • the railway vehicle 12 comprises a plurality of accelerometers 38 advantageously dispersed between the cars 13 so that each car 13 is equipped with at least one accelerometer 38.
  • Each network node 30 is connected to an accelerometer 38, said accelerometer 38 being preferably on board the same car 13 as the network node 30.
  • the accelerometers 38 are configured to operate during the coupling phase of the various cars 13 and during the circulation of the railway vehicle 12 on the rails 22.
  • Each network node 30 is configured to transmit on the communication network 29 an acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer 38 connected to said network node 30.
  • the acceleration measurement is constituted by an instantaneous measurement of an acceleration value or by an acceleration profile over a given period of time.
  • the electronic control unit 28 is configured to directly receive the acceleration measurement emitted by each accelerometer 38.
  • the transmitter 26 is configured to receive the acceleration measurement transmitted by each network node 30.
  • the transmitter 26 is also configured to include this acceleration measurement in the control signal.
  • the electronic control unit 28 is then configured to recover, from the control signal, the acceleration measurement measured by each network node 30.
  • the control unit 28 is also configured to compare said acceleration measurements with each other.
  • the electronic control unit 28 is thus able to detect a break in the integrity of the railway vehicle 12 in the case where at least two of said acceleration measurements measured by at least two network nodes 30 diverge significantly. In particular, it is considered that two acceleration measurements diverge when the difference between two acceleration measurements is greater than a predetermined threshold, for example equal to 10% of the greater of the two measured acceleration values.
  • the electronic control unit 28 is also configured to emit an alert signal and / or to trigger the stopping of the railway vehicle 12 when such a break in integrity is detected.
  • the electronic control unit 28 is capable of transmitting the warning signal to a rail traffic control center on the rails 22, which is then able to take appropriate safety measures, such as stopping the transmission. vehicle traffic on rails 22 of the infrastructure.
  • the detection of the rupture of the integrity of the railway vehicle 12 is thus very fast and thus allows a reinforced rail safety.
  • the electronic control unit 28 is configured to transmit on the communication network 29 an acceleration measurement measured by at least one accelerometer 38 located in the head car 16.
  • Each network node 30 is configured to receive said acceleration measurement transmitted by the electronic control unit 28.
  • Each network node 30 is also configured to compare said acceleration measurement transmitted by the electronic control unit 28 with the acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer 38 connected to said network node 30.
  • Each network node 30 is able to connect to the communication network 29 if the acceleration measurement transmitted by the electronic control unit 28 is compatible with the acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer 38 associated with the network node 30.
  • the railway vehicle 12 is a goods transport train.
  • the database of the computer server 11 then contains information relating to goods transported, said information being each associated with at least one unique identifier of an overhead node 36 of the railway vehicle 12.
  • Each radio station 24 located on the side of the rails 22 is furthermore configured to receive the unique identifier issued by at least one overhead node 36 of the railway vehicle 12 when the radio station 24 is within the predetermined perimeter of the at least one air knot 36.
  • the radio station 24 is also configured to, when it has received such a unique identifier, send to the computer server 11 an information signal comprising this unique identifier.
  • the computer server 11 is then able to deduce from this information signal, by comparison of the or each unique identifier included in this signal with the database, the position of goods in the railway infrastructure 14.
  • This composition comprises two steps: the creation of the communication network 29 from the different network nodes 30 and then the coupling of the transmitter 26 and the electronic control unit 28.
  • the creation of the communication network 29 proceeds as follows.
  • a head car 16 is located on the rails 22.
  • An operator creates a communication network grouping the electronic control unit 28 and the air nodes 36 of the head car 16 by means of a dedicated application installed on his mobile terminal.
  • the operator associates with this communication network a unique identifier that he communicates to all the nodes of the network.
  • a car to guide 18 is then juxtaposed with the leading car 16.
  • the car to guide 18 is then mechanically linked to the leading car 16.
  • the operator equipped with a mobile terminal is placed near the car to guide 18.
  • the operator connects to the overhead node 36 by means of the mobile terminal.
  • the operator receives from the overhead node 36 his associated unique identifier and an identification number associated with the car 13 comprising said overhead node 36. If the information received by the operator is coherent, he connects said overhead node 36 to the communication network. of the head car 16 by means of the mobile terminal and communicates a unique identifier associated with said communication network.
  • a new car to guide 18 is juxtaposed to the car to guide 18 previously attached. It is then mechanically linked to the head car 16 via the car to guide 18 previously attached, then its air nodes 36 are connected to the communication network previously mentioned by means of the method described above.
  • This step is repeated for any number of cars to be guided 18, until a tail car 20 is attached.
  • the communication network thus obtained by the addition of the air nodes 36 of the different cars 16, 18, 20 forms the network of communication 29.
  • each overhead node 36 adds the identifier of the communication network 29 in the signals that the overhead node 36 transmits on the network.
  • Each overhead node 36 receives the signals transmitted by other air nodes 36 but transmits the received signal to the rest of the communication network 29 only if the identifier read in the signal corresponds to the unique identifier associated with said communication network 29.
  • the transmitter 26 of said car of tail 20 is coupled to the electronic control unit 28 so that the electronic control unit 28 identifies the identification code of the transmitter 26 and associated with the transmitter 26. This step is the coupling of the transmitter 26 and the electronic control unit 28.
  • the operator performs for example the coupling of the transmitter 26 and the electronic control unit 28 by connecting the transmitter 26 directly to the electronic control unit 28.
  • the transmitter 26 is disconnected from the electronic control unit 28 and positioned in the car tail 20.
  • the transmitter 26 is physically attached to a network node 30 of the car of tail 20.
  • the operator performs the coupling of the transmitter 26 and the electronic control unit 28 by means of the mobile terminal, the transmitter 26 remaining located in the car tail 20.
  • the electronic control unit 28 is configured to be coupled with a single transmitter 26 in order to avoid safety problems in the case where additional cars are added to the vehicle and the transmitter 26 is not not deleted.
  • composition of the rail vehicle 12 is therefore easy, the obtaining of the communication network 29 is done quickly by means of a mobile terminal.
  • the car to guide 18 is then mechanically linked to the leading car 16.
  • the electronic control unit 28 transmits on the communication network 29 the acceleration measurement measured at the time of the mechanical connection by at least one accelerometer 38 located in the head car 16.
  • the acceleration measurement is an instantaneous value or an acceleration profile over a given period of time.
  • This acceleration measurement is broadcast by at least one overhead node 36 of the head car 16 and is picked up by at least one overhead node 36 of the car to be guided 18. This last overhead node 36 compares the acceleration measurement thus received. the acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer 38 associated with said overhead node 36 and connects to the communication network 29 if said acceleration measurements are compatible.
  • each accelerometer 38 transmits on the communication network 29 the acceleration measurement measured at the time of the mechanical connection.
  • Each overhead node 36 of the car to be guided 18 connects to the communication network 29 if one of the acceleration measurements received is compatible with the acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer 38 linked to said overhead node 36.
  • connection of each air node to the communication network 29 must be validated / approved by the operator with his terminal.
  • a new car to guide 18 is juxtaposed to the car to guide 18 previously attached. It is then mechanically linked to the head car 16 via the car to guide 18 previously attached, then its air nodes 36 are connected to the communication network 29 by means of the method described above.
  • This step is repeated for any number of cars to guide 18, to attach a car 20.
  • the transmitter 26 of said car of tail 20 is coupled to the electronic control unit 28 so that the electronic control unit 28 associates the identification code with the transmitter 26.
  • This coupling is typically in a manner similar to that described for the first method of composition.
  • composition of the railway vehicle 12 is thus very simple, no operator action being necessary to obtain the communication network 29.
  • the rail vehicle 12 runs on the rails 22, the integrity of the railway vehicle 12 being ensured.
  • the transmitter 26 continuously transmits an encrypted control signal comprising a unique identification code associated with the transmitter 26.
  • the unique identification code is modified at each new transmission of information by a rotating code algorithm.
  • the communication network 29 conveys this control signal to the electronic control unit 28, the control signal passing through at least one network node 30 of each car 13.
  • the electronic control unit 28 receives and decrypts the signal control.
  • the electronic control unit 29 verifies that the unique identification code received corresponds to that of the transmitter 26 with which the electronic control unit 28 is coupled.
  • each network node 30 transmits at the same time on the communication network 29 an acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer 38 connected to said network node 30.
  • the electronic control unit 28 retrieves the acceleration measurement measured by the accelerometer 38 connected to each network node 30 and compares said acceleration measurements with each other.
  • the electronic control unit 28 receives the unique identification code associated with the transmitter 26 and as long as the acceleration measurements remain compatible, the integrity of the rail vehicle 12 is ensured.
  • the rupture of the integrity of the railway vehicle 12 also has the consequence that the acceleration measurements of at least two network nodes 30 located on either side of the broken interface will diverge. This divergence will be detected by the electronic control unit 28 when it compares these two acceleration measurements, which will again deduce therefrom the rupture of the integrity of the railway vehicle 12 and consequently control the stopping of the railway vehicle. 12.
  • This comparison of the acceleration measurements thus makes it possible to detect the integrity break faster than by simply breaking the transmission of the control signal. In addition, it allows a redundancy of the control means of the integrity of the rail vehicle 12.
  • the electronic control unit 28 emits only an alert signal at the time of detection of the rupture of the integrity of the railway vehicle 12 by comparison of the acceleration measurements. The stop of the railway vehicle 12 is then triggered only at the time of detection of the integrity break by the absence of receipt of the identification code.
  • This invention also allows an easy and fast composition of a railway vehicle 12 and an operation of the integrity control system 15 of the rail vehicle 12 simple, responsive and redundant.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
EP18214188.7A 2017-12-20 2018-12-19 Schienenfahrzeug, entsprechendes schienensystem und verfahren zur zusammensetzung des schienenfahrzeugs Pending EP3501940A1 (de)

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Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR1762658A FR3075144A1 (fr) 2017-12-20 2017-12-20 Vehicule ferroviaire, systeme ferroviaire et procede de composition de vehicule ferroviaire associes

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EP3501940A1 true EP3501940A1 (de) 2019-06-26

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Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP3789263A1 (de) * 2019-09-04 2021-03-10 Ovinto cvba Verfahren und vorrichtung zur überwachung der konfiguration eines zuges
WO2022101842A1 (en) * 2020-11-12 2022-05-19 Faiveley Transport Italia S.P.A. System for verifying the integrity of a convoy, particularly a railway convoy
RU2812024C1 (ru) * 2019-09-04 2024-01-22 Овинто Свба Способ и устройство для мониторинга конфигурации поезда

Families Citing this family (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN112158230B (zh) * 2020-09-28 2022-07-19 交控科技股份有限公司 一种列车完整性检测方法、装置及列车控制单元

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CH676903A5 (en) * 1988-08-02 1991-03-15 Adcount Ltd Information transmission system for train - uses coded microwave signals fed between successive train sections
EP0970870A2 (de) * 1998-07-04 2000-01-12 Thyssen Krupp Stahl AG Einrichtung für die Überwachung eines schienengebundenen Zuges aus einem Triebfahrzeug und mindestens einem Waggon
EP1205370A1 (de) * 2000-11-09 2002-05-15 Alcatel System zur Kommunikation zwischen zwei benachbarten Fahrzeugeinheiten in einem Fahrzeugverbund, sowie ein Verfahren hierfür
DE102007048685A1 (de) * 2007-10-01 2009-04-23 Werner Dipl.-Ing. Niemeyer-Stein Verfahren sowie Sender-Empfänger zum Senden und Empfangen von Funksignalen, Verfahren zur Überwachung eines Zuges, Wagen mit diesem Sender-Empfänger und Zug mit diesen Wagen
WO2010057623A2 (de) * 2008-11-19 2010-05-27 Eureka Navigation Solutions Ag Vorrichtung und verfahren für ein schienenfahrzeug
EP2450250A1 (de) * 2010-09-14 2012-05-09 Thales Deutschland GmbH Stromversorgung für einen Güterwagon und Zugintegritätssystem für einen Güterzug
EP3000688A1 (de) * 2014-09-26 2016-03-30 Siemens Rail Automation S.A.U. System und Verfahren zur Überprüfung der Vollständigkeit eines mehrteiligen Fahrzeuges
DE102016109263A1 (de) * 2016-05-20 2017-11-23 Knorr-Bremse Systeme für Schienenfahrzeuge GmbH Telemetrievorrichtung für ein Schienenfahrzeug

Patent Citations (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CH676903A5 (en) * 1988-08-02 1991-03-15 Adcount Ltd Information transmission system for train - uses coded microwave signals fed between successive train sections
EP0970870A2 (de) * 1998-07-04 2000-01-12 Thyssen Krupp Stahl AG Einrichtung für die Überwachung eines schienengebundenen Zuges aus einem Triebfahrzeug und mindestens einem Waggon
EP1205370A1 (de) * 2000-11-09 2002-05-15 Alcatel System zur Kommunikation zwischen zwei benachbarten Fahrzeugeinheiten in einem Fahrzeugverbund, sowie ein Verfahren hierfür
DE102007048685A1 (de) * 2007-10-01 2009-04-23 Werner Dipl.-Ing. Niemeyer-Stein Verfahren sowie Sender-Empfänger zum Senden und Empfangen von Funksignalen, Verfahren zur Überwachung eines Zuges, Wagen mit diesem Sender-Empfänger und Zug mit diesen Wagen
WO2010057623A2 (de) * 2008-11-19 2010-05-27 Eureka Navigation Solutions Ag Vorrichtung und verfahren für ein schienenfahrzeug
EP2450250A1 (de) * 2010-09-14 2012-05-09 Thales Deutschland GmbH Stromversorgung für einen Güterwagon und Zugintegritätssystem für einen Güterzug
EP3000688A1 (de) * 2014-09-26 2016-03-30 Siemens Rail Automation S.A.U. System und Verfahren zur Überprüfung der Vollständigkeit eines mehrteiligen Fahrzeuges
DE102016109263A1 (de) * 2016-05-20 2017-11-23 Knorr-Bremse Systeme für Schienenfahrzeuge GmbH Telemetrievorrichtung für ein Schienenfahrzeug

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP3789263A1 (de) * 2019-09-04 2021-03-10 Ovinto cvba Verfahren und vorrichtung zur überwachung der konfiguration eines zuges
WO2021043977A1 (en) * 2019-09-04 2021-03-11 Ovinto Cvba Method and device for monitoring the configuration of a train
RU2812024C1 (ru) * 2019-09-04 2024-01-22 Овинто Свба Способ и устройство для мониторинга конфигурации поезда
WO2022101842A1 (en) * 2020-11-12 2022-05-19 Faiveley Transport Italia S.P.A. System for verifying the integrity of a convoy, particularly a railway convoy

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FR3075144A1 (fr) 2019-06-21

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