EP2879935A2 - Procédé de signalisation d'erreurs dans un système informatique de poste d'aiguillages et système informatique de poste d'aiguillages - Google Patents

Procédé de signalisation d'erreurs dans un système informatique de poste d'aiguillages et système informatique de poste d'aiguillages

Info

Publication number
EP2879935A2
EP2879935A2 EP13763010.9A EP13763010A EP2879935A2 EP 2879935 A2 EP2879935 A2 EP 2879935A2 EP 13763010 A EP13763010 A EP 13763010A EP 2879935 A2 EP2879935 A2 EP 2879935A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
computer
image
display
computer system
channel
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP13763010.9A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Michael Schaaf
Carsten Sattler
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens AG
Original Assignee
Siemens AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens AG filed Critical Siemens AG
Publication of EP2879935A2 publication Critical patent/EP2879935A2/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L19/00—Arrangements for interlocking between points and signals by means of a single interlocking device, e.g. central control
    • B61L19/06—Interlocking devices having electrical operation
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/30—Trackside multiple control systems, e.g. switch-over between different systems
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L19/00—Arrangements for interlocking between points and signals by means of a single interlocking device, e.g. central control
    • B61L19/06—Interlocking devices having electrical operation
    • B61L2019/065—Interlocking devices having electrical operation with electronic means
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
    • B61L25/06—Indicating or recording the setting of track apparatus, e.g. of points, of signals
    • B61L25/08—Diagrammatic displays

Definitions

  • auxiliary operations of the interlocking computer system is to ensure that the basis for decision, that is the message image on the display, which ⁇ is attached to the operator is the actual state of the railway Siche ⁇ optimization unit, also called grounds, corresponds.
  • Figure 1 a known such system is shown in Figure 1, plus two computer channels la and lb vorgese ⁇ hen.
  • the computer channels la and lb process the Informatio ⁇ nen a railway security system 2 that a secure source of the message, such as an electronic signal box - represents - Electronic Actuator factory.
  • Both computer channels 1a and 1b are identical with respect to their input signals and algorithms used.
  • the checksum of the state image 5b is sent to the status display / operation 3a of the first computer channel 1a , which then transmits both test sums in the context of the auxiliary condition to the railway safety system 2 for comparison. Only the state image 5a is displayed on a display 7. Such tests are carried out cyclically in the background in order to detect incorrect operation at an early stage, for example frozen image pixels, on one of the computer channels 1a or 1b and to reveal errors.
  • a disadvantage of this conventional procedure is the considerable expense for the checksum comparison and for background tests. This involves very high SIL requirements for the individual systems.
  • the SIL safety levels are defined in the CENELEC standard EN50129 by SILO - not technically safe - up to SIL4 - highly safe signaling - defined.
  • Another disadvantage is that the operator must derive from the state ⁇ image 5a on the display 7 itself, which of the many boundary conditions of the railway safety system 2 are not met and what risk arises from it.
  • Output signals of the first computer channel a state image and the output signals of the second computer channel generate a threat ⁇ tion analysis image and that the state image and the hazard analysis image are superimposed on the display.
  • an interlocking computer system in which the second computer channel has a risk analysisfuga ⁇ quality, which upon initiation of operation of a Field element, for example, a light signal, the iron ⁇ rail safety system and a resulting risk ⁇ tion measure to the field element of adjacent sections on the display generates an optical highlighting vulnerable Strekkenabête.
  • a Field element for example, a light signal
  • the iron ⁇ rail safety system and a resulting risk ⁇ tion measure to the field element of adjacent sections on the display generates an optical highlighting vulnerable Strekkenabbalde.
  • the operator receives support in his decision-making process on the basis of the higher-level hazard analysis image. From discrepancies Zvi ⁇ rule the state image and the hazard analysis image, the operator can easily infer correct or incorrect operation of the overall system.
  • the picture of the risk analysis is dependent on the use ⁇ th array element that Gefährdungshunt the relevant dependent field elements - element chain - is the visual emphasis of vulnerable road sections with the corresponding array elements can, for example, representation of vulnerable sections in red and not endangered Streckenab ⁇ cuts in. green.
  • the hazard analysis image is transparent to ⁇ Otherwise, so visible in the currently not sality ⁇ -stabilizing stretches only the state image is.
  • the superimposition of the two images can be derived the hazard potential of operation and verdeut ⁇ light.
  • the operator is thereby significantly supported in his decision-making.
  • the operator can easily check the plausibility of the status picture.
  • ⁇ the Darge by the risk analysis image hazard extent ⁇ provides that are not based on the state image Kgs ⁇ NEN, does not operate one of the two computer channels correctly. Since the representation of the hazard analysis image is only displayed after the first step of the operation, it can be deduced from this whether the image has been updated or not.
  • the risk analysis ⁇ picture the demand by means of a control element can be superimposed.
  • the operating element allows a return to the original state, in which only the status picture is visible.
  • the visibility of Jardindiskrepanzen can still ver ⁇ repaired when re-use as needed.
  • the hazard analysis functionality generated on the display a text box for Visua ⁇ capitalization a hazard.
  • This text field play as examples "flank protection hurt" at a wrong lodged in one section of the route points, priority should be the appropriate array element immediately adjacent on the screen are displayed.
  • Highlighted in red in the example laundri ⁇ re the stretch with the wrong made soft and also labeled with the hazard type, while, for example, a lying in the driving distance in front of a track section is shown in green with a light signal, if the light signal for the intended route indicates the correct signal term.
  • the hazard analysis functionality In order to make the recognizability of the currently operated field element for the operator virtually at a glance, the hazard analysis functionality according to claim 5 generates on the display an optical highlighting of this currently be ⁇ served field element.
  • a colored Hin ⁇ ter groundpper may be provided in which the symbol of the array element is displayed.
  • Figure 1 is an interlocking computer system of known type
  • Figure 1 illustrates the conventional design of an interlocking ⁇ system, which has already been described above.
  • the auxiliary operation is by the Computer channel sent to the electronic signal box 8, in addition, the control action is applied to the Gefährdungsana ⁇ lysefunktionlois Rund 10 of the computer channel 9 transmits 11. From this input and the member status information of the railway protection system 2 by the computer channel 8 determines the hazard analysis ⁇ functionality 10 for the surrounding field elements and wide ⁇ rer lying in the driveway field elements the hazard rate. In the example, there is no flank protection at the switch 12.
  • a risk analysis Figure 13 in which the sections 14 of the switch are shown in red 12 and a text box 15 "injured side protection" with a short description of the hazard appears.
  • the light signal 4, for which the Bedie ⁇ voltage has been initiated, with a blue window 16 ter gives un-. Since the directly adjacent to the light signal 4 Stre ⁇ ckenabterrorism is not compromised 17 to the gate 12, it will be shown in green.
  • this risk analysis Figure 13 the condition image is superimposed on the display 7 5a. in this way, the operator can immediately find the position at which the danger arises in this case, the switch 12, Loka ⁇ taping and is substantially supported in its decision making.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé de signalisation d'erreurs dans un système informatique de poste d'aiguillages ayant au moins un premier canal informatique (1a; 8) et au moins un deuxième canal informatique (1b; 9) dont les signaux d'entrée représentent selon une technique de signaux des messages d'états sûrs d'une installation de sécurité de chemins de fer (2) et dont les signaux de sortie peuvent être représentés sur un affichage (7). La présente invention concerne également un système informatique de poste d'aiguillages pour l'exécution du procédé. L'invention vise à diminuer les consignes de sécurité pour les canaux informatiques (1a; 8 et 1b; 9) et à améliorer le confort d'affichage pour un opérateur. A cet effet, les signaux de sortie du premier canal informatique (1a; 8) génèrent une image d'états (5a) et les signaux de sortie du deuxième canal informatique (9) génèrent une image d'analyse de risques (13), l'image d'état (6a) et l'image d'analyse de risques (13) pouvant être superposées sur l'affichage (7).
EP13763010.9A 2012-09-25 2013-09-06 Procédé de signalisation d'erreurs dans un système informatique de poste d'aiguillages et système informatique de poste d'aiguillages Withdrawn EP2879935A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102012217291.2A DE102012217291A1 (de) 2012-09-25 2012-09-25 Verfahren zur Fehleroffenbarung bei einem Stellwerksrechnersystems und Stellwerksrechnersystem
PCT/EP2013/068459 WO2014048696A2 (fr) 2012-09-25 2013-09-06 Procédé de signalisation d'erreurs dans un système informatique de poste d'aiguillages et système informatique de poste d'aiguillages

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2879935A2 true EP2879935A2 (fr) 2015-06-10

Family

ID=49209329

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP13763010.9A Withdrawn EP2879935A2 (fr) 2012-09-25 2013-09-06 Procédé de signalisation d'erreurs dans un système informatique de poste d'aiguillages et système informatique de poste d'aiguillages

Country Status (4)

Country Link
EP (1) EP2879935A2 (fr)
CN (1) CN104619573A (fr)
DE (1) DE102012217291A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2014048696A2 (fr)

Families Citing this family (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP3018650B1 (fr) * 2014-11-07 2017-05-03 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Appareil de commande pour une machine-outil ou une machine de production et procédé de fonctionnement d'un tel appareil de commande
DE102015200292A1 (de) * 2015-01-13 2016-07-14 Robert Bosch Gmbh Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Ansteuern eines Anzeigegerätes und Anzeigesystem
DE102015208273A1 (de) * 2015-05-05 2016-11-10 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Anzeigen eines Prozessgeschehens zumindest einer Eisenbahnsicherungseinrichtung sowie Eisenbahnsicherungssystem mit einer derartigen Vorrichtung
CN107914734B (zh) * 2017-10-24 2019-07-26 北京全路通信信号研究设计院集团有限公司 道岔控制状态的标记方法及装置、计算机存储介质
EP4169803A1 (fr) * 2021-10-20 2023-04-26 ALSTOM Transport Technologies Système de génération d'un signal d'image, système de signalisation ferroviaire comprenant un tel système de génération, procédé associé et produit-programme informatique

Family Cites Families (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE19703574A1 (de) * 1997-01-31 1998-08-06 Alsthom Cge Alcatel Verfahren zur sicheren Darstellung eines Bildes auf einem Monitor
DE10330115B4 (de) * 2003-07-03 2014-05-28 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Einrichtung zum Steuern eines von einer Bedienperson gesteuerten Systems, insbesondere eines Stellwerks eines Eisenbahnsystems
JP5588000B2 (ja) * 2009-07-06 2014-09-10 ドイタ ヴェルケ ゲーエムベーハー ディスプレイ上にセーフティ関連情報の表示をする方法、及びその方法を適用する装置
JP5197536B2 (ja) * 2009-09-11 2013-05-15 三菱電機株式会社 信号保安システムの試験装置
DE102011004770A1 (de) * 2011-02-25 2012-08-30 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Bedien- und Anzeigeeinrichtung zum Bedienen einer technischen Anlage sowie zum Anzeigen von Daten der technischen Anlage

Non-Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
None *
See also references of WO2014048696A2 *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2014048696A2 (fr) 2014-04-03
DE102012217291A1 (de) 2014-03-27
CN104619573A (zh) 2015-05-13
WO2014048696A3 (fr) 2015-01-22

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