EP2836412A1 - Systèmes de verrouillage de l'itinéraire - Google Patents

Systèmes de verrouillage de l'itinéraire

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Publication number
EP2836412A1
EP2836412A1 EP13718359.6A EP13718359A EP2836412A1 EP 2836412 A1 EP2836412 A1 EP 2836412A1 EP 13718359 A EP13718359 A EP 13718359A EP 2836412 A1 EP2836412 A1 EP 2836412A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
train
route
architecture
signalling
supervised
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP13718359.6A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP2836412B1 (fr
Inventor
Dominic Laurence TAYLOR
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens Mobility Ltd
Original Assignee
Siemens Rail Automation Holdings Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Rail Automation Holdings Ltd filed Critical Siemens Rail Automation Holdings Ltd
Publication of EP2836412A1 publication Critical patent/EP2836412A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP2836412B1 publication Critical patent/EP2836412B1/fr
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

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Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L19/00—Arrangements for interlocking between points and signals by means of a single interlocking device, e.g. central control
    • B61L19/06—Interlocking devices having electrical operation
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/30—Trackside multiple control systems, e.g. switch-over between different systems
    • B61L27/37—Migration, e.g. parallel installations running simultaneously
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • B61L2027/202—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. braking curve calculation using European Train Control System [ETCS]
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • B61L2027/204—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. braking curve calculation using Communication-based Train Control [CBTC]

Definitions

  • This invention relates to a method of applying interlocking logic, an interlocking for a railway track and railway systems.
  • the invention relates to interlocking of railway trackside signalling equipment, in particular, to interlocking of railway trackside signalling equipment on lines where different trains can be supervised in different ways by on-board signalling equipment. It also applies to lines on which a given train can be supervised in different ways at different times.
  • the invention relates to interlocking of railway trackside signalling equipment on lines where movement authorities are presented to trains, and supervised by signalling equipment on-board these trains, in different ways.
  • railway trackside signalling equipment is that equipment which authorises train movements on railway lines.
  • Interlocking is the functionality within this equipment that ensures movement authorities are only given when it is safe to do so.
  • the trackside signalling equipment applies interlocking logic to determine whether to authorize a train to enter a specific signalling route. This equipment selects between different interlocking logic according to whether the next train to enter the route is supervised by on-board signalling equipment in a specific way, suitable methods / systems for this selection being known in the art.
  • Fig. 1 schematically shows two such architectures, here referred to as “System A” and “System B”. It will be understood that only one such architecture will be used to authorize train movements at a given time, and in Fig. 1 these architectures are shown with the same train 1 to provide clear comparison only.
  • Systems A and B comprise trackside (i.e. located proximate track 2) equipment 3A and 3B respectively, installed on the railway infrastructure.
  • System B trackside equipment 3B provides information directly to the train driver 4 whereas System A trackside equipment 3A does not.
  • Both sets of trackside equipment 3A, 3B are controlled by interlocking equipment 5, which also received inputs from fail safe train detection equipment 6.
  • System A includes equipment 7A on-board the train; this equipment 7A provides information to the driver and interfaces to train traction and / or braking equipment (shown generally at 8).
  • System B may also have such on-board equipment 7B.
  • System A and System B inform the train driver 4 him how far and how fast the train is authorized to proceed, as determined by interlocking equipment 5.
  • System A presents this information to the driver 4 from a display (not shown) within the driving cab, and this is known as 'cab signalling'.
  • System B presents the information to the driver 4 from components of its trackside equipment 3B, known as 'signals'. System B may supplement this information from signals with information presented within the driving cab.
  • System A cuts traction and / or applies brakes if the train 1 travels further or faster than is safe. This is known as 'Automatic Train Protection (ATP)'.
  • System B may also optionally provide ATP functionality.
  • System A comprises European Train Control System (ETCS) Level 2 / ETCS Level 3 and System B comprises colour light signals.
  • ETCS European Train Control System
  • trackside equipment 3A comprises a device known as a Radio Block Centre (RBC).
  • RBC Radio Block Centre
  • System A ETCS movement authorities are issued via radio from the RBC 3A to the train.
  • ETCS movement authorities are processed by ETCS on-board equipment 7A and presented to the driver as cab-signalling information.
  • the ETCS on-board equipment 7A also provides ATP functionality by supervising train speed such that the train never travels further nor faster than authorized in its ETCS movement authorities.
  • System A comprises Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) and System B comprises colour light signals.
  • CBTC Communication Based Train Control
  • the benefits and functionality work in a similar way to that for ETCS Level 2 / ETCS Level 3 described above.
  • System A can be viewed as any signalling system which provides movement authorities and utilises cab-signalling, while System B may be any signalling system which relies upon trackside signals rather than cab-signalling.
  • Trains signalled by System A can operate on the same railway line as trains signalled by System B.
  • System B trackside equipment presents information directly to drivers
  • System B information is also presented to drivers of trains operating under System A.
  • a key requirement for such mixed traffic operation is that this System B information does not contradict that which the driver receives from System A.
  • the interlocking conditions for authorizing train movements can be less restrictive for trains operating under System A than for those operating under System B. This is principally because System A does not suffer from the constraints associated with presenting information to drivers from trackside equipment. Furthermore, System A provides ATP supervision, which can be used as an alternative mitigation to risks that are mitigated by restrictive interlocking conditions in System B.
  • System A is very flexible in terms of where movement authorities can be issued from and to.
  • System B can only issue movement authorities from one signal to another.
  • the ATP functionality of System A means that interlocking controls to control speed or mitigate the risk of a train travelling too far in System B are not required.
  • Fig. 2 illustrates that to benefit from this enhanced functionality, the aspects displayed in a System B signal 9 to drivers of trains supervised by System A ETCS on-board equipment, such as train 1A as shown, need to be consistent with ETCS movement authorities held by that ETCS on-board equipment.
  • signal 9 provides a yellow "proceed" aspect consistent with ETCS movement authority (MA).
  • MA ETCS movement authority
  • This aim is achieved, by the present invention, by using a failsafe method of applying different interlocking logic for authorizing trains supervised by System A to enter a route compared to the logic used for trains that are not supervised by System A.
  • the logic applied for trains supervised by System A is less restrictive than that for other trains.
  • the invention is failsafe because it ensures that this logic is never used to authorize a train not supervised by System A to enter a route.
  • trains are either authorized to enter the route based on (more restrictive) logic appropriate to System B operation or not authorized to enter the route at all. Having detected a first train entering the route, after having applied interlocking conditions for a train supervised by System A, the trackside signalling equipment will provide new authorization to enter the route in any of the following scenarios:
  • Trackside signalling equipment receives a report from the on-board signalling equipment supervising the first train, for which the interlocking conditions were selected, indicating that the first train has entered the route. In this case, the process of selecting interlocking conditions is repeated for the following train.
  • Trackside signalling equipment receives a report from the on-board signalling equipment, indicating that the first train is still on the approach to the route. This scenario can occur when the indication of a train entering a route resulted from a failure. In this case, trackside signalling equipment requires manual intervention by a signaller before providing a new authorization for a following train to enter the route. Following such signaller intervention, the process of selecting interlocking conditions is repeated for the following train (that has not yet entered the route).
  • Trackside signalling equipment receives no report from the on-board signalling equipment of the first train for more than a configurable period of time. This scenario can occur as a result of a communications failure between the onboard and trackside signalling equipment for example. In this case, the processes of identifying the next train to enter the route and of selecting interlocking conditions are repeated.
  • the trackside signalling equipment also ceases to authorize entry into the route if either of the following conditions occur without the trackside signalling equipment detecting a train entering the route:
  • trackside signalling equipment receives a report from the on-board signalling equipment, that was supervising that train, indicating that it is no longer supervising the System A train for which the interlocking conditions were selected, and has not yet entered the route.
  • trackside signalling equipment requires manual intervention by a signaller before authorizing entry for that train into the route. Following such signaller intervention, the process of selecting interlocking conditions is repeated for the train based on the new way in which the train is being supervised.
  • trackside signalling equipment receives no report from the on-board signalling equipment for more than a configurable period of time.
  • trackside signalling equipment requires manual intervention by a signaller before providing new authorization for that train to enter the route. Following such signaller intervention, the processes of identifying the next train to enter the route and of selecting interlocking conditions are repeated.
  • the present invention provides, for example:
  • a fail-safe means of identifying that the next train to enter a route is supervised by on-board signalling equipment in a specific way (referred to as System A herein);
  • a method of applying interlocking logic for a train approaching a route comprising the steps of:
  • an interlocking for a railway track configured to apply interlocking logic for a train, comprising means for effecting either a first or a modified signal stick function, the stick function being effected being dependent on the signalling architecture used by that train, the signalling architecture comprising one of a first architecture in which cab-signalling is used and a second signalling architecture reliant upon trackside signalling.
  • a railway system comprising the interlocking of the second aspect.
  • a railway system operable to effect the method of the first aspect.
  • Fig. 1 schematically shows two signalling architectures
  • Fig. 2 schematically shows a length of railway track
  • FIGs. 3a-f schematically show a first scenario in accordance with the present invention
  • FIG. 4a-f schematically show a modification of the first scenario
  • Figs. 5a-e schematically show a modification of the first scenario
  • FIGs. 6a-e schematically show a second scenario in accordance with the present invention
  • Figs. 7a-f schematically show a modification of the second scenario
  • FIGs. 8a-f schematically show a third scenario in accordance with the present invention.
  • Figs. 9a-f schematically show a modification of the third scenario
  • FIGs. 10a-e schematically show a fourth scenario in accordance with the present invention.
  • Figs. 1 1 a-d schematically show a modification of the fourth scenario
  • Figs. 12a-d schematically show an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIGs. 13a-d schematically show a further embodiment of the present invention.
  • Fig. 14 schematically shows a yet further embodiment of the present invention.
  • Fig. 15 schematically shows an additional embodiment of the present invention
  • Fig. 16 schematically shows a further embodiment of the present invention.
  • An initial step is to identify trains that are supervised by System A, i.e. those which are fitted with some form of wireless signalling system providing cab signalling, as opposed to those supervised by System B, i.e. a signalling system relying on trackside signals.
  • Trackside signalling equipment regards the next train to enter a route as being supervised in a specific way, i.e. by System A, for the purposes of applying less restrictive interlocking logic, when all of the following conditions are true: i) Trackside signalling equipment has identified a train that is approaching the route. This means that the train is on a path that leads to the route and is heading in the direction of the route entrance;
  • Trackside signalling equipment authorizes this train to enter the route when the interlocking conditions, contained in the interlocking logic selected for a train supervised in the specific way, are satisfied.
  • trackside signalling equipment regards the train as not supervised by System A for the purposes of applying less restrictive interlocking logic.
  • (more restrictive) interlocking logic appropriate for a train signalled by System B is used. This applies even if the train is supervised by System A, but cannot be proven to be so.
  • trackside signalling equipment In addition to determining whether a train is supervised by System A in the fail-safe manner above, trackside signalling equipment also determines whether a train is potentially supervised by System A. This is important when trains transition from being signalled by System B, and not supervised by System A, to being supervised by System A and vice versa. During this transition, the ETCS stick invention is applied as a precursor to applying less restrictive interlocking conditions.
  • Criteria i), ii), iv) and v) above are retained for regarding a train as potentially supervised by System A. However, criterion iii) above is replaced by the following: iii * ) On-board signalling equipment has reported its status that the train is capable of receiving System A movement authority information that would cause it to be supervised by System A. Signal stick conditions
  • the 'signal stick' (otherwise known as 'disengagement') function is a conventional signalling function (the name 'stick' here originating from relay signalling technology, in which a current path used to keep a relay energised via one its own contacts is known as a 'stick' path).
  • the term "signal stick” itself is listed for example in the Glossary of Signalling Terms published by the Rail Safety and Standards Board, where it is defined as "The disengaging of a signal after it has been used by a train, to prevent the signal from subsequently showing a proceed aspect until the route has been cancelled and again set", while the term “disengagement” is also referred to in the British Railway Group Standards.
  • the signal stick is a function that ensures that only one train is authorized to enter a route each time that a route is set (from a signal or other location). It is overridden if the route is working automatically, i.e. such that no action is required from a signaller or separate route-setting device to authorize a train to enter that route.
  • System B trains are only authorized to enter the route when this conventional signal stick latch is set. The latch becomes set when a route is cancelled and is permanently set when a route is working automatically. It becomes unset when all of the following conditions are true:
  • a train is detected entering the route via train detection equipment that fails to the 'safe state' of detecting a train entering the route;
  • the route is not working automatically.
  • this conventional signal stick functionality is maintained for trains that are supervised by System B - including those that are not identified as being either supervised or potentially supervised by System A.
  • ETCS signal stick function is based on the conventional stick function.
  • the application of ETCS signal stick functionality is a necessary condition for the application of less restrictive interlocking principles to trains supervised by System A. [A further condition is that the train be regarded as 'supervised' rather than 'potentially supervised' by System A]. The state of the signal stick latch remains the same during this transition, but the following logic subsequently applies to it.
  • the signal stick latch becomes unset when a train is detected entering the route via the same failsafe train detection equipment used for conventional signal stick functionality. This occurs regardless of whether the train is actually authorized to enter the route and regardless of whether the route is working automatically.
  • the signal stick latch becomes set again when any one of the following occurs:
  • a length of railway track is shown, with first and second signals 9 and 10 located along the track, similarly to as shown in Fig. 2, delimiting a route therebetween.
  • Scenario 1 conventional signal stick functionality
  • Figs. 3, 4 and 5 illustrate a first scenario, wherein a leading train 1 LB signalled by System B approaches and enters the route.
  • signal stick functionality behaves in the conventional manner.
  • the route is working automatically, hence the signal stick bit remains permanently set.
  • a following train 1 FB is signalled by System B.
  • the leading train 1 LB which is approaching the route, fails to meet the criteria for identification as under System A (i.e. it is likely to be signalled by System B), and the signal stick is set.
  • Signal 9 provides a "proceed” (green) indication, as does signal 10.
  • leading train 1 LB approaches the end of the route.
  • Fig. 5 the following train 1 FA is signalled by System A.
  • Figs. 5a-c are identical to Figs. 3a-c, but in Fig. 5d the System A movement authority granted to train 1 FA is shown as extending up to signal 9.
  • the MA granted to it can now extend past the signal 9, i.e. so that less restrictive interlocking conditions are be applied.
  • Signal 9 provides a proceed indication into the occupied route.
  • Figs. 6 and 7 illustrate a second scenario, wherein ETCS stick functionality is applied when the next (i.e. leading) train 1 LA to enter a route is (or potentially could be) supervised by System A.
  • the latch always becomes unset when a train is detected entering the route by failsafe train detection. This prevents new System A movement authorities being issued into the route, but does not affect any that have previously been issued. If the route is working automatically (or is cancelled), the latch becomes set again when the train confirms that it has entered the route as illustrated in Fig. 6. It should be noted that the latch also becomes set following route cancellation as for conventional signal stick functionality.
  • leading train 1 LA approaching signal 9 confirms that it is signalled by System A, and the signal stick latch is set.
  • the movement authority granted to the train extends past signal 10, with both signals 9 and 10 being green.
  • the train 1 LA is detected entering the route by failsafe train detection means. This causes the latch to become unset.
  • the train's MA is unaffected, but no new MAs may be issued which extend into the route.
  • train 1 LA confirms that it has entered the route to the System A trackside equipment. This causes the latch to become set again.
  • a following train 1 FA which in this case is signalled by System A, approaches signal 9, and its MA extends up to that signal.
  • Fig. 6e shows that - similarly to Fig. 5 - as the following train is signalled by System A, its MA may extend into the route, i.e. past signal 9, even though leading train 1 LA is still located within that route.
  • ETCS stick functionality applies regardless of whether the following train is also signalled by System A, as in Fig. 6, or by System B as illustrated in Fig. 7. In the latter case, the subsequent behaviour of the signal stick latch will be in accordance with conventional signal stick functionality and potentially more restrictive interlocking conditions applied.
  • Figs. 7a-c are identical to Figs. 6a-c.
  • a System B signalled following train 1 FB approaches the route, and is identified as not being signalled by System A.
  • the signal stick latch remains set.
  • Figs. 7e-f show that following train 1 FB may only enter the route once leading train 1 LA has exited the route, at which point signal 9 changes to provide a proceed indication, and signal 10 changes to red.
  • Figs. 8 and 9 illustrate a third scenario, wherein a System A-signalled leading train 1 LA is erroneously indicated as entering the route.
  • the train detection equipment used to unset the signal stick latch is designed to fail to the safe state of detecting a train entering the route. There is therefore a failure mode in which the signal stick latch becomes unset when no train has entered the route.
  • ETCS stick functionality being employed, System B authorization to enter the route is withdrawn as it would be had a train actually entered the route. This ensures that no System B authorization, based on less restrictive interlocking conditions applicable to a System A train that may now have entered the route, is given to a following System B train.
  • the signaller must cancel the route to set the signal stick latch.
  • the signaller must then set the route again to provide new authorization for a train to enter it.
  • the process of determining whether the next train to enter the route is / is supervised by System A is then repeated as though for a new train approaching the route entrance. This is illustrated in Fig. 8 for the case where the train remains supervised by System A and in Fig. 9 where it reports that it is no longer supervised by System A.
  • the leading train 1 LA identified as being signalled by System A, approaches the route. Its MA extends past signal 10, and the latch is set.
  • Figs. 8d, 9d show the train's MA having been withdrawn.
  • the latch is re-set due to the route cancellation.
  • the train 1 LA is again determined to be signalled by System A, and reports itself as approaching the route. The signaller then sets the route again.
  • a proceed indication is provided by signal 9, enabling the train to enter the route.
  • Figs. 10 and 1 1 illustrate a fourth scenario, wherein communications equipment of System A on-board equipment fails.
  • trackside signalling equipment will stop receiving reports from trains supervised by System A. It will therefore fail to receive confirmation that such a train has entered a route after train detection equipment indicates that this has occurred.
  • trackside signalling equipment fails to receive a report for more than a pre- configured period of time from a train supervised by System A, it will regard that train as not supervised by System A. It should be noted that System A equipment onboard the train itself may also regard its authorization as invalid after a similar period of time. If the route is working automatically, the signal stick latch will be set again and the process of determining the state of the next train to enter the route is begun anew. Fig. 10 illustrates this for the case where the train has entered the route.
  • leading train 1 LA approaching signal 9 is identified as being signalled by System A, and the signal stick latch is set.
  • the movement authority granted to the train extends past signal 10, with both signals 9 and 10 being green.
  • the train 1 LA is detected entering the route by failsafe train detection means. This causes the latch to become unset.
  • the train's MA is unaffected, but no new MAs may be issued which extend into the route.
  • the failure of communications from a train supervised by System A can occur at the same time as the signal stick latch is unset due to a right side failure of train detection equipment. In this case, the train remains on the approach to the route and, if the route is working automatically, the signal stick latch becomes set after expiry of the timer. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 1 .
  • the leading train 1 LA identified as being signalled by System A, approaches the route. Its MA extends past signal 10, and the latch is set.
  • the present invention provides additional functionality for handling trains that were regarded as supervised by System A, but can no longer meet the criteria for being so.
  • This additional functionality is concerned specifically with routes that the train supervised by System A has not yet entered. The train ceases to be regarded as supervised by System A when:
  • the signal stick latch is unset when a train that has not entered a route from the signal ceases to be regarded as supervised by System A.
  • the signaller To authorize the train to move again, the signaller must manually cancel the route and set it again (regardless of whether it is working automatically or not). This is illustrated in Fig. 12 for the case where the train reports that it is no longer supervised and in Fig. 13 for the case where no report is received from the train for a period of time.
  • Fig. 12a the leading train 1 LA, identified as being signalled by System A, approaches the route. Its MA extends past signal 10, and the latch is set.
  • train 1 LA reports that it is no longer supervised by System A. This causes the latch to unset. The signaller then cancels the route.
  • the leading train 1 LA identified as being signalled by System A, approaches the route. Its MA extends past signal 10, and the latch is set. However, the timer expires before the route is entered.
  • the device performing interlocking logic requires revocation of all indications from System A trackside equipment that the next train to enter the route is supervised by System A before new authorization to enter the route is given (via either system).
  • the device performing interlocking logic requires manual intervention by the signaller before new authorization to enter the route is given.
  • Fig. 14 schematically illustrates a possible application whereby the methodology of the present invention can be used to improve railway capacity for trains supervised by System A on lines shared with trains signalled by System B by enabling the former to operate with shorter signalling block sections or with moving block sections.
  • five trains are present on a section of track, with the three leftmost trains being supervised by System A and the fourth train being signalled by System B.
  • the signalling system used by the fifth (rightmost) train is not of relevance for this discussion. It should be noted that in most normal operation scenarios, only one train is permitted to enter a block section at once, and consequently, shorter block sections enable trains to travel closer together.
  • Fig. 15 schematically shows how the methodology of the present invention can be used to improve railway capacity for trains supervised by System A on lines shared with trains signalled by System B by overriding restrictive interlocking controls that are not needed for System A.
  • An example of such a control is the practice, known as approach control, of controlling speed by withholding authorization to enter a route until a train detection section has been occupied for a period.
  • Approach control is not needed for System A as speed is indicated and supervised by other, less intrusive, means as is known in the art; it can therefore be overridden as illustrated.
  • Fig. 15 shows a three-stage time sequence for a train approaching a signalled junction 12 for each of the cases of a System A train 1 A and a System B train 1 B.
  • the signaller sets a route, and the correct exit from the junction is effected.
  • the System A train may be granted an MA which extends past the junction
  • the System B train has its proceed authorization withheld (i.e. the signal remains red) until an approach control timer determines that a set period has elapsed, at which point the signal provides a proceed indication.
  • Fig. 16 schematically illustrates a feature made possible by the present invention whereby railway flexibility can be improved by enabling the provision of routes exclusively for trains supervised by System A.
  • two generally parallel railway lines 13, 14 are shown, the arrangement being such that for line 13, by virtue of their signalling, System B trains may only travel from left to right, but for line 14 System B trains may only travel from right to left.
  • System A trains conversely can be signalled, and thus may travel, bi-directionally on each of these lines.
  • this provides the possibility that a system A train 1A may be provided with an MA to enable travel from line 13 to line 14 and back to line 13, thus circumventing a track section of line 13.
  • the methodology of the present invention can be used to reduce railway journey times by enabling trains supervised by System A to operate at higher speeds.
  • System A enables trains to travel at higher speeds by providing them with longer movement authorities than is possible with System B. It should be noted that trains take a longer distance to stop from higher speeds, and therefore need longer movement authorities to travel safely at such speeds. However, in addition to this, the conditions appropriate for the releasing the route, known as 'approach locking conditions,' must be appropriate for the higher speed. There must never be a situation in which a route is released in front of a train, because the train was unable to stop before entering it.
  • the methodology of the present invention may cause approach locking conditions appropriate to the higher speed to be applied when a train potentially supervised by System A approaches the route. Unlike the examples discussed so far, these interlocking conditions are more restrictive than those for System B, hence they are applied even if the absence of positive confirmation that the train is actually supervised by System A. Application of these more restrictive approach locking conditions is then a pre-requisite to authorizing a train to enter a route via System A (and thereby at higher speed than via System B). These more restrictive approach locking conditions remain in force whilst there is a possibility that the train has or could receive a System A movement authority into the route.

Abstract

La présente invention se rapporte à un procédé permettant d'appliquer une logique de verrouillage de l'itinéraire pour un train qui s'approche d'une voie, la logique de verrouillage de l'itinéraire étant fonction de l'architecture de signalisation utilisée par ce train, l'architecture de signalisation comprenant une première architecture dans laquelle une signalisation d'abri est utilisée, ou une seconde architecture de signalisation dépendante des signaux de voie, ledit procédé comprenant les étapes consistant à : a) déterminer si le train est au moins potentiellement supervisé par la première architecture ; b) déterminer si le train est le train suivant qui doit se présenter sur la voie ; et c) si au cours des étapes a) et b), le train n'est pas ainsi déterminé, appliquer alors une première fonction de tige de signal sur la voie ; ou d) si au cours des étapes a) et b), le train est ainsi déterminé, appliquer alors une fonction de tige de signal modifiée sur la voie.
EP13718359.6A 2012-04-12 2013-04-12 Procédé de verrouillage d'un itinéraire et poste d'aiguillage Active EP2836412B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GBGB1206465.5A GB201206465D0 (en) 2012-04-12 2012-04-12 Interlocking systems
PCT/GB2013/050946 WO2013153396A1 (fr) 2012-04-12 2013-04-12 Systèmes de verrouillage de l'itinéraire

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2836412A1 true EP2836412A1 (fr) 2015-02-18
EP2836412B1 EP2836412B1 (fr) 2018-09-26

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EP13718359.6A Active EP2836412B1 (fr) 2012-04-12 2013-04-12 Procédé de verrouillage d'un itinéraire et poste d'aiguillage

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EP3312795A4 (fr) * 2015-06-22 2018-12-05 Hitachi, Ltd. Système de commande de trafic ferroviaire et procédé pour commander manuellement des installations ferroviaires
CN105438225B (zh) * 2015-12-14 2017-11-28 江苏方兴电控设备有限公司 一种atp安全自动控制装置
DE102019204135A1 (de) 2019-03-26 2020-10-01 Siemens Mobility GmbH Verfahren zum gemischten Betrieb eines gleisgebundenen Streckenabschnitts mit Weiche sowie Streckenabschnitt und Weiche
CN110920683B (zh) * 2019-10-31 2021-11-12 交控科技股份有限公司 一种列车跨压关灯命令处理方法及系统

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