EP2586051B1 - Sicherheitsschaltungsanordnung zum fehlersicheren ein- oder ausschalten einer gefährlichen anlage - Google Patents

Sicherheitsschaltungsanordnung zum fehlersicheren ein- oder ausschalten einer gefährlichen anlage Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2586051B1
EP2586051B1 EP11726815.1A EP11726815A EP2586051B1 EP 2586051 B1 EP2586051 B1 EP 2586051B1 EP 11726815 A EP11726815 A EP 11726815A EP 2586051 B1 EP2586051 B1 EP 2586051B1
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EP
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Prior art keywords
signaling device
signal
circuit arrangement
safety circuit
actuator
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EP11726815.1A
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German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
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EP2586051A1 (de
Inventor
Juergen Pullmann
Christoph Zinser
Michael Schlecht
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Pilz GmbH and Co KG
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Pilz GmbH and Co KG
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01H—ELECTRIC SWITCHES; RELAYS; SELECTORS; EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE DEVICES
    • H01H47/00—Circuit arrangements not adapted to a particular application of the relay and designed to obtain desired operating characteristics or to provide energising current
    • H01H47/002—Monitoring or fail-safe circuits
    • H01H47/004—Monitoring or fail-safe circuits using plural redundant serial connected relay operated contacts in controlled circuit
    • H01H47/005—Safety control circuits therefor, e.g. chain of relays mutually monitoring each other

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a safety circuit arrangement for fail-safe switching on or off of a hazardous system, with a control device which is adapted to fail-safe to close or interrupt a power supply path to the system, and with a signaling device, via a number of lines with the Controlling device is connected, wherein the signaling device comprises an actuator which is changeable between a defined first state and a second state, and a pulse generator which is adapted to generate a defined pulse signal with a plurality of signal pulses on the lines when the actuator in the defined first state.
  • the invention further relates to a signaling device for such a safety circuit arrangement, with a number of terminals for connecting a multi-wire line, via which the signaling device connected to the control unit with an actuator that is changeable between a defined first and a second state and with a pulse generator configured to generate a defined pulse signal having a plurality of signal pulses on the multi-wire line when the actuator is in the defined first State is.
  • a safety circuit arrangement and a signaling device of this type are out DE 10 2004 020 997 A1 known.
  • Another example of a safety circuit arrangement is known from DE 10 2006 027135 B3 known.
  • a safety circuit arrangement is a circuit arrangement with at least two function-determining components, which cooperate to secure the dangerous operation of a technical installation, ie to avoid accidents that endanger the health or the life of persons in the area of the plant.
  • the one component is a control unit that is specially designed to fail-safe interrupt a power supply path to the system to bring the system in a safe, de-energized state.
  • this function of the control unit can also be limited to parts or areas of the system, or different areas of a larger system with multiple control units are controlled separately. It is important that the controllers ensure safe plant operation even when faults occur, such as when electronic components fail, a line connection is damaged, or another fault occurs.
  • control units are usually multichannel-redundant and they have internal monitoring functions to detect individual errors early and avoid an accumulation of errors.
  • Suitable control devices can be programmable safety controllers or simpler safety switching devices with a largely defined range of functions.
  • control units are failsafe in the sense of category 3 or higher of the European standard EN 954-1, in the sense of SIL 2 of the international standard IEC 61508 or in the sense of comparable requirements.
  • the control units monitor the operating status of so-called signaling devices or sensors.
  • the signaling devices / sensors provide input signals that are evaluated by the control unit and possibly linked together to turn on or off depending on actuators of the system, such as an electric drive or a solenoid valve.
  • the signaling devices provide fairly simple binary information, such as whether a mechanical protective door is closed or not, whether an emergency stop button is actuated or not, whether a light barrier is interrupted or not.
  • signaling devices / sensors can also provide analog values, such as the temperature of a boiler or the speed of a drive.
  • the control device of the safety circuit arrangement releases the operation of the system only if a safe operation can be assumed based on the signals from the signaling devices / sensors.
  • the aforementioned DE 10 2004 020 997 A1 describes a safety circuit arrangement in which a plurality of signaling devices are connected in series to a fail-safe controller.
  • the controller generates two redundant enable signals, which are fed back via two redundant lines through the row of signaling devices to the controller. If a signaling device of the series interrupts at least one of the redundant enable signals, this is detected in the control device and the power supply path to the system is interrupted.
  • a signaling device of the series interrupts at least one of the redundant enable signals, this is detected in the control device and the power supply path to the system is interrupted.
  • the known circuit arrangement therefore allows a relatively inexpensive construction with flexible diagnostic options.
  • the practical implementation requires at least four separate leads or wires to pass the enable signals from the controller to the annunciators and back.
  • DE 199 11 698 A1 describes another safety circuit arrangement with a control unit and a plurality of signaling devices, which are connected in series to each other to the control unit.
  • Each signaling device has a normally closed contact and is coupled to a code signal generator which provides a characteristic code signal to the controller when the contact has been opened.
  • a code signal generator which provides a characteristic code signal to the controller when the contact has been opened.
  • at least three wires are needed.
  • a cross-circuit between the line at the enable signal output of the control unit and the line at the enable signal input of the control unit can not be readily recognized, so that, if necessary, further redundant signal lines are required for a higher security category.
  • DE 100 11 211 A1 discloses another safety circuit arrangement with signaling devices and a fail-safe control device.
  • the signaling devices are either single-channel connected via a connecting line or two-channel via two redundant connection lines with the control unit.
  • the single-channel connection does not in itself provide fault tolerance and is only proposed for a start button, which in such cases is typically located close to the hazardous installation.
  • two different clock signals are returned as enable signals from the fail-safe control unit via redundant contacts of an emergency stop button to the control unit.
  • DE 102 16 226 A1 describes a safety circuit arrangement with a plurality of signaling devices and control devices, wherein the control devices are connected in series to form a hierarchical control system with different Abschalt weakness.
  • the control units are coupled via a single-channel connection line, via which a potential-related switching signal with a static signal component and a dynamic signal component is transmitted.
  • the realization still requires a common ground for the connected control units.
  • each connected controller requires an operating voltage, which must also be supplied, so that the actual line number is higher.
  • a signaling device with an actuator which is movable between a first and at least a second position.
  • a detector element for detecting the position of the actuating element includes a transponder with an individual transponder identification and a transponder identification reading unit.
  • the signaling device has a signal input for supplying a test signal, with the help of which the reading of the transponder identifier can be suppressed for test purposes.
  • connections are required for a supply voltage, ground and a signal output, via which the signaling device transmits the information of the detector element to a fail-safe control unit can. To connect the signaling device to a control unit so a total of at least four lines are needed.
  • Another signaling device is off DE 100 23 199 A1 known. In a rest position of the signaling device, a switching element is open. In a certain operating position, the switching element is closed. Details for connecting the signaling device to a fail-safe control unit are not described.
  • ASI Actuator Sensor Interface
  • ASI bus Actuator Sensor Interface
  • An ASI bus master sends requests to the sensors connected to the ASI bus at repeated intervals. These then transmit their sensor status to the ASI bus master.
  • ASI bus master sends requests to the sensors connected to the ASI bus at repeated intervals. These then transmit their sensor status to the ASI bus master.
  • ASI bus master sends requests to the sensors connected to the ASI bus at repeated intervals. These then transmit their sensor status to the ASI bus master.
  • this system can handle only two wires.
  • it requires special interface modules that are able to implement the bus protocol.
  • both the control unit and the signaling device must have an ASI bus-compatible interface module, which is too expensive and expensive for some applications.
  • DE 10 2006 027 135 B3 discloses a safety switch having two electronic switches each having an output contact and a controller switching the electronic switches.
  • the output contacts are each connected to the controller and an electrical load. Between the output contacts at least one switch element is arranged.
  • the controller sends a test pulse via one of the output contacts and waits for the return test pulse at the other output contact to obtain information about the switch position of the at least one switch element.
  • this object is achieved by a safety circuit arrangement of the type mentioned above, wherein the signaling device has the pulse generator and the signaling device is connected to the control unit via a two-wire line with a first and a second core, between which a predominantly constant voltage is applied when the actuator is in the second state, and wherein the pulse generator is configured to cause a voltage dip between the first wire and the second wire to produce the plurality of signal pulses.
  • a signaling device of the aforementioned type wherein the multi-wire line is a two-wire line having a first wire and a second wire, between which a predominantly constant voltage is applied when the actuator is in the second state, and wherein the pulse generator is configured to cause a voltage dip between the first wire and the second wire to produce the plurality of signal pulses.
  • the new safety circuit arrangement thus uses a two-wire line, via which the signaling device is connected to the control unit. Compared to known safety circuit arrangements, the number of connecting lines is thus reduced to a minimum. Between the two wires of the two-wire line is a predominantly constant voltage, which is used in advantageous embodiments to supply the signaling device with an operating voltage.
  • the pulse generator of the signaling device generates, for example, by a simple short circuit between the two wires of the connecting line, a plurality of signal pulses that form a defined pulse signal.
  • the pulse generator generates the voltage dip in some embodiments by a complete short circuit between the two wires. The voltage between the two wires then drops to zero.
  • an electrical resistance between the two wires can be activated, resulting in a voltage dip, but leaves a residual voltage greater than zero.
  • the voltage between the two leads are about 24 volts when the actuator is in the second state and drop to about 5 volts when the pulse generator causes the voltage dip.
  • the signaling device thus generates a dynamic, i. temporally changing, signal and provides this dynamic signal as an input signal to the controller available.
  • the new safety circuit arrangement dispenses with a signal loop which originates from the control unit and is returned to the control unit via the signaling device. Rather, only an expectation with respect to the defined pulse signal is stored in the control unit, i. the controller expects exactly the defined pulse signal from the signaling device when the actuator is in the defined first state. It is conceivable that the signaling device can generate a plurality of defined pulse signals which differ from each other, wherein each of the defined pulse signals from the set of defined pulse signals represents the information that the actuator is in the defined first state.
  • the signaling device can transmit further information to the control unit, which information can advantageously be used in the control unit to diagnose a plant operating situation.
  • the differently defined pulse signals may represent information as to whether both actuator channels are actually in the defined first state and if not, which actuator channel has failed, as the case may be.
  • Known safety circuit arrangements usually use a signal loop from the control unit to the signaling device and back. This entails the risk that a cross-circuit between the forward line and the return line of the signal loop bridges the signaling device and erroneously suggests a safe state to the control device.
  • the new safety circuitry dispenses with the conductor loop, thus avoiding a potential source of error in known safety circuit arrangements.
  • the new signaling device generates a dynamic signal with a plurality of signal pulses, so that a stuck-at error in the Signaling device or on the wires of the two-wire line is detected quickly.
  • the combination of the two features makes it possible to connect the signaling device and the control unit with one another in a fail-safe manner via a two-core cable only.
  • the new safety circuit arrangement is therefore particularly suitable for applications in which the number of available cable cores is limited. But even if in principle more wires are available, the new safety circuit arrangement can be used advantageously, since the wiring complexity between signaling device and control unit is minimized.
  • the signaling device independently transmits the dynamic information signal, i. without a prior request from the controller to the controller.
  • the new safety circuit arrangement of bus-based systems, which usually have a bidirectional flow of information with which the control unit queries connected reporting devices.
  • the new safety circuit arrangement can therefore transmit the safety-relevant input or disconnection information without a bidirectional communication protocol to the control unit. It eliminates the need to use special and thus relatively expensive communication controller in the signaling device and / or control unit.
  • bus-based communication between the controller and the reporting device may of course be implemented in addition to the unidirectional information path described herein, if that is advantageous for other reasons.
  • the controller has a signal input terminal electrically connected to the first wire and a ground terminal electrically connected to the second wire.
  • the defined pulse signal is a potential-related signal which is applied between the two wires in the form of voltage pulses.
  • the second wire carries the reference potential for the signal pulses on the first wire.
  • the ground connection is electrically connected to the device ground of the control unit or even equal to the device ground.
  • the first wire is further connected to an operating voltage source, which is arranged remotely from the signaling device.
  • the operating voltage source is arranged in the region of the control unit. It is particularly preferred if the first wire is connected via a pull-up resistor to a terminal which carries an operating voltage potential of the control unit.
  • the operating voltage source is a current source which is able to feed a defined, load-independent current into the two-wire line.
  • This embodiment is particularly advantageous in combination with the previous embodiment. However, it can also be realized separately.
  • the special feature is that the first wire both the input signal for the control unit (from the signaling device to the controller) leads, as well as an operating voltage in the opposite direction for the signaling device provides.
  • the first vein thus fulfills a dual function. This allows a particularly simple and cost-effective implementation, when the signaling device and the control unit are arranged spatially far away from each other.
  • this embodiment also has the advantage in itself that the signaling device can be supplied in a simple manner with an operating voltage, such as when a ground fault ensures the reference ground.
  • a power source also allows faster reloading of the two-wire line and thus a higher reaction speed of the new safety circuit arrangement.
  • the signaling device has a voltage regulator, which generates a largely constant operating voltage for the signal generator on the basis of the predominantly constant voltage between the first and second wire.
  • This configuration helps to ensure a stable and uninterrupted operation of the signaling device, even if the first wire is used in the dual function described above, so on the one hand to transmit the defined pulse signal and on the other hand to supply the signaling device with an operating voltage.
  • the voltage between the first and the second core breaks down as a matter of principle again and again.
  • a voltage regulator is able to compensate for these voltage dips so well that a stable operation of the signaling device is possible even if the signal generator is realized by means of a microcontroller or another, sensitive to voltage drops device.
  • the signal generator has a signal processing circuit and a switching element controlled by the signal processing circuit, which is arranged between the first and the second wire.
  • the signal processing circuit is a microcontroller, microprocessor, an ASIC or an FPGA, thus a programmable signal processing circuit.
  • the switching element that allows the short circuit between the first and the second wire separate from the signal processing circuit, which preferably determines the current state of the actuator.
  • the design makes it possible to effect the short circuit with a switching element, which is optimally dimensioned for receiving the currents and thermal stresses during the short circuit. The design therefore contributes to a long life and reliability of the new signaling device and the new safety circuit arrangement.
  • the signaling device has a first and a second signal generator, which are connected in parallel to each other with the first and the second wire.
  • the signaling device has at least two redundant signal generators.
  • each of the two signal generators is capable of generating a defined pulse signal.
  • the redundancy on the one hand enables an advantageous two-channel implementation and thus offers a higher level of fail-safety.
  • the redundancy also increases the availability, so that the new signaling device, for example, even a pulse signal can transmit to the control unit for diagnostic purposes, even if one of the signal generators fails.
  • the first and the second signal generator jointly generate the defined pulse signal.
  • each of the two signal generators generates part of the signal pulses, wherein only the combination of the signal pulses generated by the signal generators forms the defined pulse signal that corresponds to the expectation in the control unit.
  • the first signal generator has a master function with respect to the second signal generator in that the second signal generator generates signal pulses according to a defined pattern only when it has detected a number of signal pulses of the first signal generator on the first wire. Accordingly, it is also preferred if each signal generator has a read-back input, via which it can read in signal pulses on the lines to the control unit.
  • the design allows a very simple generation of a "two-channel" pulse signal using two redundant signal generators.
  • the new signaling device can therefore be realized quite cost-effectively even in the two-channel variant.
  • a read-back input on the signal generator also allows easier diagnosis of fault conditions, which is why this variant can also be advantageous for single-channel signaling devices.
  • the signaling device has a largely closed device housing, in which the actuator and the pulse generator are arranged.
  • the actuator is a mechanically moved actuator, in particular a manually operated actuator.
  • the essential components of the new signaling device are encapsulated in a device housing.
  • at least the electrical connection of the actuator and the pulse generator are arranged in the device housing.
  • the embodiment has the advantage that the actuator can not be separated from the pulse generator by unintentional incorrect operation, with the result that the defined pulse signal of the pulse generator does not represent the actual state of the actuator due to cross-circuiting or the like. The design therefore offers increased fault tolerance.
  • control unit is designed to determine an error state of the signaling device based on the defined pulse signal.
  • control device is further configured to display the error state, for example on a display unit arranged in the control unit and / or by means of a diagnostic signal provided at a diagnostic output.
  • the fault tolerance of the signaling device in the control unit is "made", ie the decision as to whether an error condition exists or not, and especially the reaction to a possible error of the signaling device takes place in the control unit.
  • the pulse signal is not necessarily a "safe" signal. Only the interpretation of the pulse signal in the control unit, in particular the comparison with the stored in the control unit expectations, allows the statement whether an error exists.
  • the design allows a very cost-effective implementation, since error detection mechanisms are needed anyway in the control unit.
  • the signaling device can be simpler and thus realized cheaper.
  • the safety circuit arrangement 10 includes a control unit 12 and a signaling device 14.
  • the control unit 12 is in this embodiment, a safety switching device with a largely defined range of functions. Suitable safety relays are offered by the applicant under the name PNOZ®.
  • the safety switching device 12 is configured to process input signals from signaling devices to turn on or off depending on an actuator, such as a contactor, a solenoid valve or an electric drive.
  • the controller 12 may be a programmable safety controller, as offered by the applicant under the name PSS® in different variants.
  • the controller 12 is multi-channel redundant and includes test functions configured to detect internal component failures and external faults in the circuitry to place a monitored equipment in a safe condition upon the occurrence of an error.
  • the control unit 12 is failsafe in the sense of category 3 or higher according to the European standard EN 954-1, in the sense of SIL2 according to the international standard IEC 61508 or in terms of comparable requirements. Simplified here are two redundant signal processing channels in the form of two microcontrollers 16a, 16b shown, each controlling a switching element 18a, 18b.
  • the controller 12 could include microprocessors, ASICs, FPGAs or other signal and data processing circuitry.
  • the switching elements 18 are shown here as relays whose working contacts are arranged in series with each other.
  • the normally open contacts form a power supply path 20 between a power supply 22 and an electric drive 24, which symbolizes a machine system here.
  • the machinery may include a variety of electric drives and other actuators.
  • the invention is not limited to machinery in the strict sense of production machines. Rather, it can be used in all technical installations which pose a danger in operation and which in such a case must be brought to a safe condition, in particular by interrupting a power supply path 20.
  • the control unit 12 Have electronic switching elements, in particular power transistors.
  • the controller 12 has a plurality of redundant electronic switching elements on the output side, each providing a potential-related output signal, with which external contactors, solenoid valves or the like can be controlled.
  • the controller 12 has a device housing 26 in which the individual components, in particular the processors 16 and switching elements 18, are arranged. On the device housing terminals are arranged, some of which are designated here by the reference numerals 28, 30, 32, 34.
  • the terminal 30 is in this case a terminal for supplying an operating voltage U B for the control unit 12.
  • the operating voltage U B is a 24-volt DC voltage that is used to power the processors 16, switching elements 18 and other components of the control unit 12th is needed.
  • the terminal 32 is here a ground terminal to which the supply voltage U B refers. Terminal 32 is in this case the device mass of the control unit 12th
  • connection terminal 34 forms a signal input of the control unit 12.
  • An input signal applied to the connection terminal 34 is fed redundantly to the microcontrollers 16 and is redundantly evaluated by the microcontrollers 16 in order to control the switching elements 18 in dependence thereon.
  • the control unit 12 here has a pull-up resistor 36, which connects the terminal 34 with the operating voltage U B at the terminal 30.
  • the potential at the connection terminal 34 is thus "pulled up" to the potential of the operating voltage U B , which is a particularly preferred realization in connection with the signaling device explained below.
  • the pull-up resistor 36 may be integrated with the terminals 30, 34. In other embodiments, the pull-up resistor 36 may be disposed outside of the controller 12.
  • the signaling device 14 has an actuator 40, which is here a manually operated button.
  • the actuator 40 is biased by a spring (not shown here) in a first operating position in which an electrical contact 41 is opened here. This is in the present embodiment, the inactive idle state (second State) of the actuator 40.
  • the actuator 40 can be brought against the spring force in a second operating position 40 ', in which the contact 41 is closed.
  • a pulse generator 42 is connected to the operating voltage U B.
  • the pulse generator 42 then generates a defined pulse signal 44 having a plurality of signal pulses 46.
  • the state 40 ' is thus a defined first state in the sense of the present invention.
  • the pulse generator 42 receives the operating voltage required for generating the signal pulses 46 only when the actuator 40 is activated. Otherwise, it is de-energized. In all presently preferred embodiments, the pulse generator 42 generates the pulse signal 44 only when the actuator 40 is in the defined state 40 '.
  • the actuator is a simple hand-operated NO contact.
  • the actuator may be a normally closed contact or a combination of normally closed and normally closed contacts.
  • the actuator can be a transponder, a light barrier or a temperature, pressure, voltage u.a. his.
  • the signaling device 14 is used for safe switching on of the drive 24 for test and setup purposes.
  • the signaling device 14 can be arranged at a great distance from the drive 24 and the control unit 12.
  • the control unit 12 is arranged in a control cabinet in the vicinity of the drive 24, while the signaling device 14 is several hundred meters away from the control cabinet.
  • the signaling device 14 may be configured as an emergency stop button, protective door switch, proximity switch, light barrier, temperature monitor or the like.
  • the signaling device 14 is connected here via two conductor cores 50, 52 of a two-wire line 54 to the control unit 12.
  • the first line conductor 50 leads from a connection terminal 56 of the signaling device to the connection terminal 34 of the control unit.
  • the second line 52 leads from a terminal 58 of the signaling device to the terminal 32.
  • the terminals 56, 58 are on a device housing 60 which encloses the pulse generator 42 and the actuator 40 (where possible).
  • Characteristic feature of the new safety circuit arrangement 10 is the ability of the signaling device 14, solely in response to the actuation of the actuator 40 to generate a defined "own" pulse signal 44, which is supplied to the control unit 12 via the two-wire line 54.
  • the annunciator 14 does not receive a release or request signal from the controller 12. It rather generates the pulse signal 44 autonomously once the actuator 40 is in the defined first state 40 '.
  • the control unit 12 more precisely in a memory, which is contained for example in the microcontroller 16
  • the defined pulse signal 44 is stored as an expectation. As soon as the microcontroller 16 recognizes the defined pulse signal 44 at the signal input 34, this is interpreted as actuation of the actuator 40. In the illustrated embodiment, the microcontroller 16 then turn on the drive 24 via the switching elements 18.
  • the idle state of the actuator 40 is preferably selected such that the pulse generator 42 continuously generates the pulse signal 44 and interrupts it when the emergency stop button is actuated.
  • the microcontroller 16 detects the absence of the pulse signal 44 and turn off the drive 24 accordingly.
  • the safety circuit arrangement 10 may include further signaling devices 14 ', which are connected in parallel with the signaling device 14 to the connection terminals 32, 34.
  • another signaling device 14 ' generates another defined pulse signal 44', which differs from the pulse signal 44.
  • the control unit 12 can then recognize on the basis of the pulse signals, from which signaling device a pulse signal applied to the input 34 comes.
  • Fig. 2 is shown a further embodiment of the new signaling device.
  • Like reference numerals designate the same elements as before.
  • the signaling device 14 has in this embodiment, a microcontroller 70a and a switching element 72a, which is controlled by the microcontroller 70a.
  • the switching element 72a here is a field-effect transistor (FET) whose source and drain connections are arranged between the connection terminals 56, 58. The FEt is thus able to cause a short circuit between the conductor wires 50, 52 of the two-wire line 54.
  • FET field-effect transistor
  • a bipolar transistor with its collector and emitter connection between the terminals 56, 58 may be arranged.
  • an electrical resistor 73 may be arranged, which forms a voltage divider with the pull-up resistor 36 in the control unit.
  • Such a resistance has the consequence that the voltage between the two conductor wires 50, 52 does not drop to zero in the event of a voltage drop which the signaling device generates, but rather to a voltage value which corresponds to the divider ratio of the voltage divider 36, 73.
  • This variant has the advantage that the operating voltage for the signaling device when generating the signal pulses 46 does not completely break away.
  • the reference numeral 74a designates a voltage regulator (DC / DC converter) which receives the voltage applied to the terminal 56 via a diode 76a.
  • the voltage regulator generates at its output 78a a regulated DC voltage of, for example, 5 volts, which serves as the operating voltage for the microcontroller 70a.
  • the voltage regulator 74a compensates, in particular, for those voltage drops on the line conductor 50 which arise as a result of the generation of the pulse signal 44.
  • the voltage regulator 74 also compensates for other voltage fluctuations, including those caused, for example, by the signaling device 14 '.
  • Reference numeral 40a designates the normally open contact of the actuator 40.
  • the contact 40a forms here with a resistor 80a a (further) voltage divider, at the middle tap an input of the microcontroller 70a is connected.
  • the microcontroller 70a can read in the actuation state of the actuator 40 and generate the pulse signal 44 in dependence thereon by causing a short circuit between the conductor leads 50, 52 with the aid of the switching element 42.
  • the reference numerals 82a, 84a designate two further resistors which form a second voltage divider which is arranged parallel to the connection terminals 56, 58.
  • a middle tap of the voltage divider 82a, 84a leads to a further input of the microcontroller 70a.
  • the microcontroller 70a can read back the signal pulses 46.
  • the signaling device 14 is single-channel. In preferred embodiments, however, the signaling device 14 has a redundant second channel, which is designated here in its entirety by the reference numeral 86b.
  • the channel 86b in the illustrated embodiment is constructed the same as the described first channel 86a, i. it has a microcontroller 70b, a switching element 72b and a voltage regulator 74b.
  • the switching element 72b is connected in parallel with the switching element 72a between the connection terminals 56, 58, so that the microcontroller 70b can also generate a voltage dip between the line leads 50, 52.
  • the two microcontrollers 70, 70b jointly generate the defined pulse signal 44 as soon as the actuator 40 is in its activated state.
  • the microcontroller 70a first generates a first signal pulse 46a by bringing the switching element 72a into a conductive state for a defined period of time (pulse duration).
  • the microcontroller 70b can read the signal pulse 46a via the voltage divider 82b, 84b and generates a delay time after a delay time set in the microcontroller 70b second signal pulse 46b, now bringing the switching element 72b in the conductive state.
  • the resulting short circuit is in Fig. 2 at reference numeral 88.
  • the microcontrollers 70a, 70b generate signal pulses 46a, 46b in a defined sequence by respectively short-circuiting the line conductors 50, 52, which then leads to the defined pulse signal 44.
  • Fig. 2 shows the pulse signal 44 resulting from the combination of the signal pulses 90 of the first channel 86a and the signal pulses 92 of the second channel 86b.
  • the second channel 86b may include a switching element 72b serially connected to the switching element 72a between the terminals 56, 58.
  • the two channels 86a, 86b can be brought together via an AND gate (not shown here). The AND gate then preferably controls the switching element 72a.
  • the variant shown has the advantage that each microcontroller 70a, 70b can generate a defined pulse signal independently of the respective other channel. This can be used advantageously in the control unit 12 in order to determine which of the two channels 86a, 86b is the cause of a faulty pulse signal.

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  • Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
  • Measuring Pulse, Heart Rate, Blood Pressure Or Blood Flow (AREA)
  • Keying Circuit Devices (AREA)
EP11726815.1A 2010-06-25 2011-06-22 Sicherheitsschaltungsanordnung zum fehlersicheren ein- oder ausschalten einer gefährlichen anlage Active EP2586051B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102010025675A DE102010025675B3 (de) 2010-06-25 2010-06-25 Sicherheitsschaltungsanordnung zum fehlersicheren Ein- und Ausschalten einer gefährlichen Anlage
PCT/EP2011/060444 WO2011161158A1 (de) 2010-06-25 2011-06-22 Sicherheitsschaltungsanordnung zum fehlersicheren ein- oder ausschalten einer gefährlichen anlage

Publications (2)

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EP2586051A1 EP2586051A1 (de) 2013-05-01
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EP2720414B1 (de) 2012-10-10 2014-12-10 Sick Ag Bussystem
EP2720098B1 (de) 2012-10-10 2020-04-15 Sick Ag Sicherheitssystem für eine Anlage umfassend einen Testsignalpfad mit Hin- und Rückleitungspfad
EP2720094B1 (de) 2012-10-10 2015-05-20 Sick Ag Sicherheitssystem
EP2720051B1 (de) 2012-10-10 2015-01-21 Sick Ag Sicherheitssystem
DE102013112488A1 (de) 2013-11-13 2015-05-13 Pilz Gmbh & Co. Kg Sicherheitssteuerung mit konfigurierbaren Eingängen
EP2887163B1 (de) * 2013-12-18 2018-01-17 Festo AG & Co. KG Überwachungsvorrichtung, Sicherheitssystem und Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Sicherheitssystems
DE102014100970A1 (de) * 2014-01-28 2015-07-30 Pilz Gmbh & Co. Kg Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum sicheren Abschalten einer elektrischen Last
EP2950174A1 (de) * 2014-05-26 2015-12-02 Sick Ag Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum sicheren Überprüfen eines Zustandes zweier Einrichtungen
EP3133447B1 (de) * 2015-08-06 2021-09-22 EUCHNER GmbH + Co. KG Sicherheitsschalter
US10360790B2 (en) 2016-04-22 2019-07-23 Banner Engineering Corp. Safety touch button system having an intercommunications link
DE102016125031A1 (de) * 2016-12-20 2018-06-21 Pilz Gmbh & Co. Kg Sicherheitsschaltanordnung zum fehlersicheren Abschalten einer elektrisch angetriebenen Anlage
DE102016125382A1 (de) 2016-12-22 2018-06-28 Phoenix Contact Gmbh & Co. Kg Modulare Schaltschützanordnung
DE102017110484A1 (de) * 2017-05-15 2018-11-15 Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule (Rwth) Aachen Verfahren zur Detektion von Störungen in einer Anordnung einer Mehrzahl von elektrischen Bauteilen
EP3557113A1 (de) 2018-04-20 2019-10-23 EUCHNER GmbH + Co. KG Sicherheitsschalter
CN113557481B (zh) * 2019-03-11 2022-09-23 三菱电机株式会社 安全控制装置及安全控制系统
CN110007663A (zh) * 2019-05-14 2019-07-12 中国核动力研究设计院 核安全级dcs的开关量输出动态诊断系统及方法

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JP2013529832A (ja) 2013-07-22
CN103081052B (zh) 2016-06-08
CN103081052A (zh) 2013-05-01
WO2011161158A1 (de) 2011-12-29
US9293285B2 (en) 2016-03-22
DE102010025675B3 (de) 2011-11-10
US20130113304A1 (en) 2013-05-09
JP5778268B2 (ja) 2015-09-16
EP2586051A1 (de) 2013-05-01

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