EP2435942A1 - Authentification d'une étiquette rfid à l'aide d'un procédé de cryptographie asymétrique - Google Patents

Authentification d'une étiquette rfid à l'aide d'un procédé de cryptographie asymétrique

Info

Publication number
EP2435942A1
EP2435942A1 EP10712919A EP10712919A EP2435942A1 EP 2435942 A1 EP2435942 A1 EP 2435942A1 EP 10712919 A EP10712919 A EP 10712919A EP 10712919 A EP10712919 A EP 10712919A EP 2435942 A1 EP2435942 A1 EP 2435942A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
rfid tag
rfid
authentication
public key
key
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP10712919A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Michael Braun
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens AG
Original Assignee
Siemens AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens AG filed Critical Siemens AG
Publication of EP2435942A1 publication Critical patent/EP2435942A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
    • G06F21/445—Program or device authentication by mutual authentication, e.g. between devices or programs
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method and a system for the authentication of an RFID tag with an asymmetric cryptography method, which is particularly suitable for preventing RFID tag recycling for counterfeit products.
  • Counteracting counterfeit medicines and recognizing counterfeit drugs in circulation are not only hard-to-copy features such as watermarks, seals or special color markings, but also so-called Auto-ID (Identification) technologies such as barcodes or RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) systems used.
  • Auto-ID Identification
  • barcodes or RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) systems used.
  • RFID Radio Frequency Identification
  • the first approach is based on a track-and-trace system that tracks the movements of a drug throughout the logistics chain.
  • a worldwide unique serial number the so-called Electronic Product Code (EPC)
  • EPC Electronic Product Code
  • the data in the database is checked for consistency. For example, if the same serial number occurs at two different locations at the same time, the drug is likely to be counterfeit.
  • EPC Electronic Product Code
  • the second approach is based on a cryptographic authentication of the RFID tags. Traditional RFID chips with a serial number can be easily cloned by personalizing other RFID chips with just that serial number.
  • cryptographic RFID chips use cryptographically secured authentication and can thus reliably prevent the cloning of authentication information.
  • the RFID chip is no longer a pure data storage, but automatically executes cryptographic algorithms, which require the knowledge of secret key information.
  • the RFID reader only needs the public signature key of the brand manufacturer in order to be able to check the validity of the individual public key received by the RFID chip. In decentralized infrastructures in particular, it is thus possible to prove the authenticity of RFID chips and thus of the product as well, without the need for complex central key management or an online transaction.
  • the object of the present invention is to provide a method for authenticating an RFID tag with an asymmetric cryptography method which ensures protection against the recycling of authentication RFID tags and for this requires no deactivation of the corresponding RFID tag.
  • Cryptography associated with the RFID tag a key pair with a private and at least a first public key. Furthermore, the key pair is assigned a digital signature for authentication of the first public key.
  • the RFID reader authenticates the RFID tag based on the first public key and the digital signature.
  • the private key is in this case stored on the RFID tag, while the first public key and the digital signature are stored physically separated from the RFID tag and can be detected by a data acquisition device by machine.
  • Data collection devices are without limitation the generality of this term devices for reading data from data carriers.
  • Data collection devices include, for example, clear readers, mark readers, bar code readers or RFID readers. In a broader sense, this includes software and devices that convert analog signals into digital data, such as scanners for images and text, video frame grabbers, and voice recognition software.
  • the authentication of the RFID tag comprises the following Steps:
  • the RFID reader detects the first public key and the digital signature and verifies the validity of the first public key based on the digital signature with a second public key of the key issuer. Subsequently, the RFID reader generates and transmits a challenge to the RFID tag.
  • the RFID tag determines a response based on the transmitted challenge and the private key and transmits this response to the RFID reader. Based on the transmitted responses, the RFID reader finally authenticates the RFID tag.
  • the authentication system according to the invention has at least one RFID tag and one RFID reader, which are set up to execute the authentication method according to the invention.
  • FIG. 1 shows a flow diagram of a method according to the invention for authenticating an RFID tag by means of an RFID reader
  • FIG. 2 shows an application example of the system according to the invention.
  • FIG. 1 shows a flow diagram of a method according to the invention for authenticating an RFID tag 101 by an RFID reader 102.
  • the private key is stored on the RFID tag 101 to be authenticated, while the public key assigned to the private key and the digital key Signature are stored on another RFID tag 103.
  • the RFID reader would also need to know the secret key information of the RFID chips in order to carry out the check. This information must either be extensively protected in the RFID reader or the RFID reader must have an online connection to a server on which the secret key is located.
  • the RFID reader does not require any secret information to perform the check. Rather, it is sufficient that the RFID reader is the public key of the asymmetric
  • the RFID reader 102 receives the public key and the signature 104 of the RFID tag 101 to be checked from the further RFID tag 103. This signature is then checked by the RFID reader 102 with the aid of the public key of the drug manufacturer. If the certificate obtained is valid, then a batch is generated by the RFID reader 102 and transmitted 105 to the RFID tag 101. In turn, the RFID tag 101 generates a response based on its private key and the challenge 106 received Response in turn is transmitted to the RFID reader 102. With the help of the public key of the RFID tag 101 to be checked, which the RFID reader 102 has detected from the certificate, the RFID reader 102 now checks the received response. If the response has been formed correctly, the RFID tag 101 has thereby detected to the RFID reader 102 the knowledge of the secret key information necessary to form the response and is accepted as authentic 108.
  • the decisive advantage of the asymmetric authentication method is that any RFID reader can check the authenticity of the RFID chip if it has the brand owner's public signature key. Particularly in decentralized infrastructures, this provides an easy way of proving the authenticity of RFID tags and thus of the product as well, without the need for online transactions and without the need for complex key management.
  • the certificate of an RFID tag to be checked is now not stored on this RFID tag but physically stored separately from this RFID tag. At first, that reads RFID reader the certificate of the RFID tag to be checked before the challenge-response protocol is successfully executed with the RFID tag to be checked. Consequently, an RFID tag for authentication can only be reused if the certificate for this RFID tag is known.
  • the separation of the certificate and the RFID tag to be checked reduces the likelihood that an RFID tag can be reused after use. A counterfeiter is forced to obtain the appropriate certificate first. Once certificates and associated RFID tag have been separated, for example by paper or hazardous waste, the assignment has disappeared and the effort to reassign a found certificate to a found RFID tag increases accordingly.
  • a medicament package 201 includes two blisters, each equipped with an RFID tag for authentication.
  • the two RFID tags each have the private key for authentication.
  • the associated certificates comprising the respective public keys and digital signatures, are not mounted on the respective RFID tag 204 but on the medicine package 201.
  • the RFID tag 204 with the private key and the RFID tag must therefore be present on the packaging 202 with the corresponding public key.
  • the certificate is printed in a two-dimensional barcode on the packaging and must be read before authentication by barcode scanner.
  • the certificate of the first blister RFID tag is stored in the second blister RFID tag and the certificate of the second blister RFID tag Tags in first blister RFID tag.
  • a drug can then be successfully authenticated when all the blisters are in the package. For a counterfeiter, this means that he would have to use the two corresponding blisters at once to fake a product.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Near-Field Transmission Systems (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

Le but de la présente invention est de fournir un procédé permettant d'authentifier une étiquette RFID à l'aide d'un procédé de cryptographie asymétrique qui garantit une protection avant le recyclage d'étiquettes RFID d'authentification et ne nécessite à cet effet aucune désactivation de l'étiquette RFID correspondante. À cet effet, le certificat d'une étiquette RFID à vérifier n'est pas enregistré sur cette étiquette RFID mais est enregistré de manière physiquement séparée de cette dernière. Le lecteur RFID lit tout d'abord le certificat de l'étiquette RFID à vérifier avant que le protocole challenge/réponse soit exécuté avec succès avec l'étiquette RFID à vérifier. Ensuite, une étiquette RFID ne peut plus être réutilisée à des fins d'authentification que quand le certificat pour cette étiquette RFID est connu.
EP10712919A 2009-05-27 2010-03-23 Authentification d'une étiquette rfid à l'aide d'un procédé de cryptographie asymétrique Withdrawn EP2435942A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE200910022850 DE102009022850A1 (de) 2009-05-27 2009-05-27 Authentifikation eines RFID-Tags mit einem asymmetrischen Kryptographieverfahren
PCT/EP2010/053732 WO2010136230A1 (fr) 2009-05-27 2010-03-23 Authentification d'une étiquette rfid à l'aide d'un procédé de cryptographie asymétrique

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2435942A1 true EP2435942A1 (fr) 2012-04-04

Family

ID=42236967

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP10712919A Withdrawn EP2435942A1 (fr) 2009-05-27 2010-03-23 Authentification d'une étiquette rfid à l'aide d'un procédé de cryptographie asymétrique

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (1) US8842831B2 (fr)
EP (1) EP2435942A1 (fr)
JP (1) JP2012528499A (fr)
KR (1) KR20120017082A (fr)
DE (1) DE102009022850A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2010136230A1 (fr)

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
JP2012528499A (ja) 2012-11-12
DE102009022850A1 (de) 2010-12-02
KR20120017082A (ko) 2012-02-27
US20120128157A1 (en) 2012-05-24
WO2010136230A1 (fr) 2010-12-02
US8842831B2 (en) 2014-09-23

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