EP2422324A1 - Selbstbedienungsterminal mit kamera-anordnung zum erkennen von manipulationsversuchen - Google Patents
Selbstbedienungsterminal mit kamera-anordnung zum erkennen von manipulationsversuchenInfo
- Publication number
- EP2422324A1 EP2422324A1 EP10715523A EP10715523A EP2422324A1 EP 2422324 A1 EP2422324 A1 EP 2422324A1 EP 10715523 A EP10715523 A EP 10715523A EP 10715523 A EP10715523 A EP 10715523A EP 2422324 A1 EP2422324 A1 EP 2422324A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- atm
- self
- service terminal
- cameras
- camera
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
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Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
- G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
- G07F19/207—Surveillance aspects at ATMs
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
- G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
Definitions
- the invention relates to a self-service terminal and a camera arrangement for detecting manipulation attempts according to the preamble of one of the independent claims.
- the invention relates to a self-service terminal, which is designed as an ATM.
- the spied out data is then transmitted to a remote receiver via a transmitter built into the keyboard superstructure, or is located in a keyboard overlay Data memory saved.
- a transmitter built into the keyboard superstructure or is located in a keyboard overlay Data memory saved.
- the object is achieved by a self-service terminal with the features of claim 1 or by a camera arrangement with the features of the independent claim.
- a self-service terminal which has provided in a control panel of the self-service terminal elements that are provided for users of the self-service terminal, and having a camera arrangement, wherein for detecting tampering with the self-service terminal at least two of the cameras or are mounted in the self-service terminal in the vicinity of the control panel and each detect at least one of the elements.
- the elements detected by the cameras are, for example, manipulation-suitable elements, such as, for example, the keyboard, the cash-out compartment or the card-input hopper, ie control elements in the narrower sense. It may also be arranged in manipulation-suitable areas of the control panel elements, such as a shelf or the like.
- the at least two cameras are integrated in the self-service terminal and connected to a data processing unit which processes the image data generated by the cameras.
- Elements are recorded, available for data processing.
- individual of the cameras can be targeted, e.g. be aligned with a particular control or even integrated in a control.
- the data processing unit combines and evaluates the image data generated by the plurality of cameras in order to detect manipulations on one or more of the cameras. Also, by combining and evaluating the image data, manipulations in the detection range of one or more of the cameras can be detected.
- the data processing unit can combine and evaluate the image data in order to detect deviations that relate to the image content, the image structure and / or the image quality, in particular the image illumination and / or brightness.
- At least some of the cameras may be mounted in a housing section of the self-service terminal surrounding the control panel, in particular being installed in that housing section of the self-service terminal which delimits the control panel laterally or upwardly.
- a single one of the cameras can also detect at least two of the elements provided in the control panel, in particular two control elements, such as e.g. a cashbox and a keyboard, capture.
- another camera may be integrated in one of the elements provided in the control panel, in particular integrated in a card input hopper.
- an additional camera for an area is provided on the self-service terminal at which a user, in particular his head, is located during the operation of the self-service terminal.
- a portrait of the user can be included.
- the data processing unit may be integrated in the self-service terminal.
- the data processing unit preferably has a first stage receiving the image data for image processing, in particular for shadow removal, edge detection, vectorization and / or segmentation.
- the data processing unit may have a second stage downstream of the first stage for feature extraction, in particular by means of blob analysis, edge position and / or color distribution.
- the data processing unit can still one the second stage downstream third stage for classification.
- the data processing unit can also have interfaces for video surveillance systems or units (so-called CCTV) and / or security systems.
- CCTV video surveillance systems or units
- the data processing unit if it detects a manipulation attempt on one of the elements by means of the processing of the image data and / or detects a manipulation on one of the multiple cameras, triggers an alarm, blocks the self-service terminal and / or triggers the additional camera. It can also be provided that the cameras and / or the data processing unit are or is deactivated during the operation and / or maintenance of the self-service terminal.
- Fig. 1 shows a perspective view of the
- Fig. 2 shows the detection range of that camera of Fig. 1 which detects the control panel from the side;
- Fig. 3 outputs the detection range of that camera
- Fig. 1 again, which detects the control panel from the top;
- Fig. 4a shows the installation situation of the camera integrated in the card input hopper
- Fig. 4a shows the detection range of this camera of Fig. 4a again.
- FIG. 5 shows a block diagram of a data processing unit connected to a plurality of cameras and a video surveillance unit connected thereto.
- Fig. 1 shows a perspective view of the basic structure of a self-service terminal in the form of an ATM ATM.
- a cash dispenser 1 also referred to as a shutter
- a keyboard 2 i. Controls to which manipulation attempts, e.g. in the form of superstructures, for the purpose of skimming.
- the ATM ATM is equipped with a camera arrangement according to the invention for detecting such and similar manipulation attempts.
- the camera arrangement comprises a plurality of cameras mounted at different locations, namely a lateral camera CAMS, a top view camera CAMD, a camera CAMK (shown in FIG. 4a) integrated in the card input hopper, and an additional portrait camera CAMO ,
- At least two of the cameras CAMS and CAMD are in the vicinity of the control panel, ie within a boundary, frame or the like and are mounted there.
- Each of these cameras here in Fig. 1, for example the camera CAMS or CAMD, detects in each case at least one of the elements arranged in the control panel of the ATM, eg the cash dispenser 1 (shutter) and / or the keyboard 2.
- the lateral camera CAMS preferably detects exactly these two elements 1 and 2; the top view camera CAMD also detects further elements (see FIG. 3).
- the camera CAMK integrated in the card input hopper 4 is also provided (see Fig. 4a), which detects only the area of the card discharge hopper. All these cameras are therefore located in the vicinity of the control panel and are equipped with single or multiple elements.
- the additional camera CAMO is located in the upper housing part of the ATM ATM and is directed to the area in which the user is operating the ATM.
- this camera captures CAMO the head or the face of the user and is therefore referred to here as a portrait camera.
- FIG. 2 shows the detection range of the camera CAMS, which is located in a lateral housing part, which frames or surrounds the control panel of the ATM ATM.
- the camera CAMS is equipped with a wide-angle lens in order to detect at least these two elements or partial areas of the control panel.
- the ATM ATM is designed so that said elements 1 and 2 preferably have the most homogeneous surfaces with these delimiting edges. This simplifies object recognition. By attaching the camera CAMS in this most suitable position, the mentioned Subareas or elements 1 and 2 are very reliably measured optical. It can be provided that the camera is focused in particular on certain areas.
- FIG. 1 Another perspective, namely that of the top view camera CAMD, is illustrated with reference to FIG.
- the detection field of this camera CAMD is illustrated, which is installed in the upper area of the ATM ATM (see also Fig. 1) and which captures the control panel from above.
- other elements may also be provided in the detection area of the camera, such as e.g. a shelf near the keyboard, a card entry hopper 4, i. the feeding part for the card reader, as well as e.g. a screen 5 or display.
- These further mentioned elements 3, 4 and 5 represent potential targets for manipulation attempts.
- FIG. 4a For the card input funnel 4 itself, the camera CAMK integrated therein is provided.
- FIG. 4b illustrates the detection range of the camera CAMK, and clearly shows that it can be subdivided substantially into three subregions I, II and III.
- At least the cameras CAMS mounted in the vicinity of the control panel; CAMD and CAMK are connected to a special data processing unit 10 (see FIG. 5) in order to significantly improve the detection of manipulations by combining image data.
- This data processing unit described later makes it possible to optimally evaluate the image data generated by the camera, in order thus With high security a manipulation attempt, such as a superstructure of the keyboard 2 or a manipulation on one of the cameras, to detect immediately and possibly trigger alarms and deactivations.
- the following manipulations can be reliably detected, among others:
- FIG. 5 shows the block diagram of a data processing unit 10 according to the invention, to which the cameras CAMS, CAMD and CAMK are connected, as well as one Video surveillance or CCTV unit 20, which is connected to the data processing unit 10.
- the data processing unit 10 has in particular the following stages or modules:
- the stage 13 is connected to an interface 14, via which various alarm or monitoring devices can be activated or addressed.
- alarm or monitoring devices include, inter alia, a Schmemblschungs- or manipulation detection (IFD).
- the first stage 11, which serves for image processing, is also connected to a second interface 15 via which a connection to the CCTV unit 20 is established. With the help of this CCTV unit, for example, a remote monitoring or remote diagnosis can be performed.
- the data processing unit 10 For processing the image data D generated by the cameras CAMS, CAMD and CAMK, the data processing unit 10 is initially responsible.
- the image data D first reaches the first stage 11, which carries out a preprocessing of the incoming image data, in which case, in particular, measures such as shadow removal, edge detection, vectorization and / or segmentation are performed.
- the downstream second stage 12 serves the feature extraction, which can be carried out for example by means of a so-called Blobanalysis, an edge positioning and / or a color distribution.
- Blob analysis is used to detect contiguous regions in an image and to make measurements on the blobs.
- a Blob (Binary Large Object) is an area of adjacent pixels the same logical state. All the pixels in a picture belonging to a blob are in the foreground. All other pixels are in the background. In a binary image, pixels in the background have values that correspond to zero, while every pixel other than zero is part of a binary object.
- a classification is made which determines whether or not an enemy manipulation has occurred at the self-service terminal ATM on the basis of the extracted features.
- the data processing unit 10 can be realized for example by means of a personal computer with the
- ATM ATM is connected or integrated into it.
- the additional camera CAMO can also be mounted on the ATM ATM (see FIG.
- Camera CAMO may be triggered upon detection of a tamper attack to take a picture of the person at the ATM. For example, once a skimming attack is detected, the described system can perform the following actions:
- the size and nature of the actions taken or countermeasures can be configured by the operator of the ATM via the system described here.
- the cameras CAMS and CAMD detecting the control panel from the outside and the camera CAMK e.g. the card entry funnel from inside detected.
- an additional portrait camera can be installed (see CAMO in Fig. 1).
- the CAMS and CAMD cameras are used on the control panel and the CAMK camera in the card input.
- the portrait camera CAMO is also used.
- all cameras have a resolution of at least 2 megapixels.
- the lenses used have a viewing angle of about 140 degrees and more.
- the exposure time of the cameras used in a wide range for example, 0.25 msec to 8,000 msec (8 s) is freely adjustable. This allows adaptation to a wide variety of lighting conditions. Applicant's experiments have shown that a camera resolution of about 10 pixels per degree can be achieved. Based on a distance of one meter, an accuracy of 1.5 mm per pixel can be achieved. This in turn means that manipulation can be reliably detected from a reference deviation of as little as 2 to 3 mm. The closer the camera lens is to the detected element or object, the more accurate the measurement can be. Thus, in closer areas even an accuracy of less than 1 mm can be achieved.
- the detection of the cash dispenser (shutter) 1 makes it possible to check manipulations in the form of so-called cash trappers, i. special superstructures.
- the detection of the keypad makes it possible to determine there manipulation attempts by superstructures or changes to light protection measures and the like.
- the detection of the support surface makes it possible in particular to detect complete overbuilding.
- the detection of the card input funnel 4, in particular by a camera integrated therein, makes it possible to detect local manipulations.
- Deviations at the rear outer edge of the support surface can already be detected from 4 mm become. Deviations at the lower edge of the shutter can already be detected from 8 mm.
- the data processing unit 10 performs, in particular, a comparison of the recorded image data D with reference data.
- a comparison of the recorded image data D with reference data In this case, in particular, an image of the outside area can be examined for its homogeneity and compared with the image of the outside area of the control panel camera.
- the image data of the various cameras CAMS, CAMD and / or CAMK are compared with each other, e.g. determine if any of the cameras have been tampered with. If, for example, the CAMD camera has been covered, the result is a discrepancy with the images of the other cameras.
- the image data or information can also be used as follows:
- Distinction between artificial and natural obscuration If a camera is covered, its recorded image is in conflict with the images of the other cameras. If the natural light (daylight) or the artificial light (room lighting) fails, the effect is the same or at least similar on all cameras. Otherwise, the system detects a tampering attempt. Detection of deceptive attacks on the camera arrangement, eg through pre-glued photos: If a single camera shows a different image (brightness, movement, colors, especially with regard to the outside area), this indicates one
- the connection of the system to the Internet via the interface 23 makes it possible to remotely control the camera or the various cameras.
- the acquired image data can also be transmitted via the Internet connection to a video server.
- the respective camera guasi acts as a virtual IP camera.
- the CCTV unit 20 described above is used for such a video surveillance facility, wherein the interface 15 to the CCTV unit is designed for the following functions:
- the system is designed so that no false alarms are generated by hands and / or objects in the picture during normal operation (eg withdrawing money, checking account balance, etc.). Therefore, the tamper detection is disabled during the period of normal machine use. Also, in time periods in which, for example, a cleaning or a short-term other use (storage of account statements, interactions before and after the start of a transaction) are not used for tamper detection. Essentially, therefore, only rigid and immovable manipulation attempts are preferably analyzed and recognized.
- the system is designed to work in a wide variety of lighting conditions (day, night, rain, cloudy, etc.). Also, briefly changing light conditions, such as light reflections, shadows and the like, are compensated or ignored during image processing to avoid a false alarm. In addition, technically occurring events, such as the failure of a lighting and the like, are taken into account. These and other special cases are recognized and solved in particular by the third stage for classification.
- the method for manipulation detection performed by the described system has in particular the following sequence (see also FIG.
- an image acquisition (stage 11), wherein the camera parameters are adjusted to produce suitable recordings.
- a series of images or corresponding image data D is recorded, which then serves as the basis or reference for the preprocessing.
- a preprocessing of the image data D takes place
- Level 11 which are processed so that they are as good as possible for further processing.
- several images are combined to form a target image and optimized by means of image enhancement algorithms.
- the following steps are carried out:
- Shadow removal, removal of moving objects, removal of noise and / or summary of various exposed shots are annoying and/or recommended to be used as a background.
- the cameras are u.a. set to different exposure times to remove reflections and to collect well-lit areas.
- the images are collected over a predetermined period of time to obtain the best possible output images for manipulation detection.
- a feature extraction is performed (step 12) in which image analysis processes are performed on the preprocessed images to validate them for particular features, such as image analysis. on edge positions or color distributions. For each feature, a number or a value can be specified, which indicates how well the corresponding feature was found again in the viewed image. The values are summarized in a so-called feature vector.
- a classification is carried out (step 13), ie the feature vector is passed to a classification procedure to make a decision as to whether there is a manipulation or not.
- a classification procedure to make a decision as to whether there is a manipulation or not.
- those types of classifiers are used which can indicate confidence, ie a probability or certainty, with which the decision applies.
- Classification mechanisms used can be, for example:
- the system described herein is preferably modular in design to allow for different configurations.
- the actual image processing and the CCTV connection are realized in different modules (see FIG. 4).
- the system presented here is also suitable for documenting the detected manipulations or digitally archiving them.
- the captured images are provided with corresponding meta information, such as. Timestamp, type of manipulation, etc., stored on a hard disk in the system or in a connected PC.
- messages may be forwarded to a platform, e.g. Error messages, status messages (deactivation, mode change), statistics, suspected manipulation and / or alarm messages.
- a corresponding message with the respective alarm level can be forwarded to the administration interface or the interface.
- the following options are also implemented at this interface:
- Query of camera data such as number of cameras, construction status, serial number, etc., camera master data or Set camera parameters and / or register for alarms (notifications).
- the invention presented here is particularly suitable for carrying out hostile manipulations on a self-service terminal, such as e.g. at an ATM, reliable to recognize.
- the control panel is continuously and automatically monitored by at least one camera.
- the elements detected by the camera are optically measured in order to detect deviations from reference data. It has been shown that even deviations in the millimeter range can be reliably detected.
- a combination of edge detection and segmentation is preferably used, so that contours of left objects can be clearly recognized and marked. In the case of a manipulation attempt countermeasures or actions can be triggered.
- the invention significantly increases the reliability with which manipulations can be detected.
- the invention has the following camera arrangement:
- the cameras are connected to the described data processing unit.
- Within the data processing unit are those of the cameras obtained image data or information among other things used as follows:
- Recognition or distinction of artificial and natural obscuration If a camera is covered, its captured image contradicts the images from the cameras. If natural or artificial light fails, this effect is equally noticeable on all cameras. Detection of deception attacks on the camera system, e.g. through pre-clicked photos: If a camera displays a different picture (different brightness, movement, colors, etc.), this indicates an attempt to deceive. Increasing the robustness of the cover detection on the card input hopper: If the card slot is hidden, the integrated camera CAMK displays a different image of the outside area than the other cameras do.
- a self-service terminal with a camera arrangement which has a plurality of cameras, which are mounted in the vicinity of the control panel of the self-service terminal and detect there provided elements, such as keyboard, cash dispenser, card slot to detect tampering attempts on the self-service terminal.
- one of the cameras is integrated in the card insertion hopper.
- the cameras are connected to a data processing unit which processes the image data generated by the cameras.
- the image data is also combined and evaluated to allow manipulation of one or more of the cameras detect. In particular, for this purpose, deviations are evaluated which relate to the image content, the image structure and / or the image quality, in particular the image illumination and / or brightness.
- the present invention has been described using the example of an ATM, but is not limited thereto, but can be applied to any type of self-service terminals.
- ATM self-service terminal designed as an ATM, with a control panel CP, ia. having:
- Video surveillance or CCTV unit with:
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Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE200910018321 DE102009018321A1 (de) | 2009-04-22 | 2009-04-22 | Selbstbedienungsterminal mit Kamera-Anordnung zum Erkennen von Manipulationsversuchen |
PCT/EP2010/055011 WO2010121954A1 (de) | 2009-04-22 | 2010-04-16 | Selbstbedienungsterminal mit kamera-anordnung zum erkennen von manipulationsversuchen |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2422324A1 true EP2422324A1 (de) | 2012-02-29 |
EP2422324B1 EP2422324B1 (de) | 2019-02-27 |
Family
ID=42269645
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP10715523.6A Active EP2422324B1 (de) | 2009-04-22 | 2010-04-16 | Selbstbedienungsterminal mit kamera-anordnung zum erkennen von manipulationsversuchen |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP2422324B1 (de) |
DE (1) | DE102009018321A1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2010121954A1 (de) |
Families Citing this family (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102010060624A1 (de) * | 2010-11-17 | 2012-05-24 | Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Abwehr von Manipulationsversuchen an einem Kamera-System |
CN112542007A (zh) * | 2020-11-30 | 2021-03-23 | 福州外语外贸学院 | 一种金融取款间危险目标检测方法及系统 |
Family Cites Families (9)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
GB351585A (en) * | 1930-04-02 | 1931-07-02 | Ig Farbenindustrie Ag | Manufacture of an azo-dyestuff |
DE19750644A1 (de) * | 1997-11-14 | 1999-05-27 | Leicher Gmbh & Co | Einzahlungsautomat |
US6583813B1 (en) | 1998-10-09 | 2003-06-24 | Diebold, Incorporated | System and method for capturing and searching image data associated with transactions |
GB2351585B (en) * | 1999-06-29 | 2003-09-03 | Ncr Int Inc | Self service terminal |
DE20102477U1 (de) * | 2000-02-22 | 2001-05-03 | Wincor Nixdorf Gmbh & Co Kg | Einrichtung zum Schutz von SB-Automaten gegen Manipulationen |
AT408377B (de) * | 2000-03-31 | 2001-11-26 | Oesterr Forsch Seibersdorf | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur prüfung bzw. untersuchung von gegenständen |
US20070200928A1 (en) * | 2006-02-13 | 2007-08-30 | O'doherty Phelim A | Method and apparatus for automated video surveillance |
DE102006040966A1 (de) * | 2006-08-31 | 2008-03-20 | Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh | Selbstbedienungsgerät mit Überwachungsvorrichtung |
EP1965361A3 (de) * | 2007-03-01 | 2009-09-02 | Fonoklik Iletisim Hizmetleri Ve Ticaret Anonim | Elektronisches Transaktions- und Anwendungsendgerät mit visueller Identifkationsprüffunktion |
-
2009
- 2009-04-22 DE DE200910018321 patent/DE102009018321A1/de not_active Withdrawn
-
2010
- 2010-04-16 WO PCT/EP2010/055011 patent/WO2010121954A1/de active Application Filing
- 2010-04-16 EP EP10715523.6A patent/EP2422324B1/de active Active
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
See references of WO2010121954A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
DE102009018321A1 (de) | 2010-10-28 |
WO2010121954A1 (de) | 2010-10-28 |
EP2422324B1 (de) | 2019-02-27 |
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