EP2057056A2

EP2057056A2 - Method and device for a modular adaptive system for controlling and monitoring railway safety installations

Info

Publication number: EP2057056A2
Application number: EP07801440A
Authority: EP
Inventors: Daniel Helfer; Anton Reichlin; Arthur Windich
Original assignee: Siemens Schweiz AG
Current assignee: Siemens Schweiz AG
Priority date: 2006-08-29
Filing date: 2007-07-20
Publication date: 2009-05-13
Anticipated expiration: 2027-07-20
Also published as: WO2008025414A3; HUE031279T2; WO2008025414A2; EP2057056B1

Abstract

The invention relates to a method and a system for controlling and/or monitoring rail-borne vehicles, comprising: a) at least one signal cabin provided with a signal box computer, b) at least one component arranged along the track in the region of the rails, for the safety of the train, especially a signal, a marker, a loop cable, a leakage flux cable, and an axle counter, c) at least one component arranged along the track in the region of the rails, for adjusting the track, especially a point comprising a point drive, d) at least one decentralised adjusting part for adjusting the components for the safety of the train and the components for adjusting the track. The invention is characterised in that the components for train safety and the components for adjusting the track by means of the decentralised adjustment part associated therewith are coupled to the signal cabin computer by means of a data bus, and safety information is transmitted to the signal box computer or obtained therefrom according to a pre-determined protocol. A feeding bus which is logically decoupled from the signal box computer is provided for electrically feeding at least some of said components.

Description

Method and device for a .nodular adaptive system for controlling and monitoring railway safety systems

The present invention relates to a method and apparatus for a modular adaptive system for controlling and monitoring railway maintenance systems.

For an explanation of the terms that are used again and again, Table 1 is used.

Table 1: Definition of recurring terms Below are a few more comments on the terms explained above.

Systems and subsystems are well-known parts of a system and describe a "compilation" of several elements interacting with each other. The use of the term "system" is inherently problematic in this context, since it can in principle be used at any point, the main reason being the problem of scaling the concept of the "element". It can range from the basic component or raw material through the component to the functional unit. At this point, the concept of the system is defined as encompassing the considered travel limits.

Today, the railroad safety systems consist primarily of signal boxes with their indoor unit and their functional units in the track area in the outdoor area. The signal boxes meet the requirements for safe

Track control of railway vehicles by means of control and monitoring of point machines and by means of the corresponding vehicle control by signals, train control components, such as ETCS components (balises and loop cables), anti-free-fall devices (axle counters and DC circuits).

The signal boxes themselves have block connections in order to manage the common interfaces at the monitoring limits in the network links in a safety-relevant manner.

The control of the functional units in the track area on the one hand by means of central control units (control parts), which are housed in the interlocking space. On the other hand, the control is carried out partially circumferentially partially with decentralized control parts, which in the vicinity of the functional units in the Outside system are arranged and are usually supplied via coming from the interlocking signal cable with energy and data.

The spatial arrangement of the signal boxes is today usually in the area of the stations. Reason for this localization are the concentration of functional units in the outdoor area in the station area as well as the required control of the two outgoing sides of the route network with their sections and their security technical

Functional units. Generally speaking, this is the classic arrangement of the railway safety technology with its interlocking systems.

In some cases, if the distance for the required secure data connection is not too large, instead of another interlocking also remote subunits (sub-interlocking) used in adjacent mostly smaller stations or in areas with extensive track systems. These safety systems line up seamlessly with each other along the track, with only the safety-related sections of the track.

As a rule, each attachment is explicitly to the backup tasks for the competent section of the

Rail network (route section) projected. This means that usually every interlocking is not identical to another interlocking in the route network. This difference may not exist if there are very simple lane-in routes with one escape point in each station and with equal distances between the stations. However, this constellation is unlikely to exist in European railway networks.

For all these specifications, it should be noted that the limited control distances between interlocking and functional units in the outdoor system on the track with the Today's use of central actuators represent an insurmountable and the planning degrees of freedom severely limiting. The high safety requirements (mostly SIL4) and the influence of traction currents and weather influences, such as

Lightning strikes, due to characteristics of the connecting cables (wire resistance in the transmission of energy, for example for the point machine - telegraph equations), limit the possible positioning distance between interlocking and functional unit on the track to a current maximum distance of about 6.5 km established in professional circles. A use of decentralized actuators can increase this maximum distance.

Few techniques are known today, with which distances up to 10 km and more can be bridged, sometimes even at the cost of considerable restrictions. A decisive factor for these limits are the disturbing influences and the consumed power at the control unit or at the functional unit (voltage drops).

New operating procedures indicate that the boundaries regarding the responsibilities for corresponding sections of the route are becoming increasingly blurred. The following examples show this situation:

• Introducing the lane coupling eliminates the block controls as a boundary between

Railway stations

• The construction of high-speed lines and, in addition, the use of RBCs to operate the train control system from ETCS level 2 and higher, will decrease the concentration of functional units along the route and tend to shift their intended function.

• Function assignments in the railway safety process are increasingly being carried out according to the principle of minimizing effort in the systems and should for example be done using simple platforms. Thus, there is the possibility that functions and possibly control of a signal box or alternatively in another system from the associated RBC done. On the one hand this reduces the expenses in the project planning and in the interior plant, on the other hand there is an additional effort in the realization of cross connections.

Furthermore, disruptive natural phenomena caused by climate change are becoming increasingly topical. There are now risks to operational readiness due to the effects of natural phenomena such as floods, landslides and earthquakes, but also fires and a terrorist or non-terrorist motivated sabotage must not be neglected.

If an interlocking and / or a RBC thereby destroyed, then it is usually not possible, from logistic and

Infrastructure reasons, such a system, such as a signal box or a RBC rebuild at short notice. There are no possibilities to provide the systems temporarily also elsewhere by means of makeshift means to create and operate. The cable heads of the

Connecting lines are real estate and thus immovable.

The data access takes place today in the concentration points in the expansion to one or more buildings distributed over a LAN. The connection between remote control centers and control centers requires corresponding network connections. The data-related connection of functional units in the outdoor system is carried out according to the distance, the interference, the data throughput and the required security level with the appropriate technology. Example: decentralized control unit MSTT with connection to the signal box by means of ISDN and CU ladders in interlocking cables.

The supply of equipment such as signal boxes and RBC, from the public network in conjunction with the railway network as a second source and downstream of the use of a UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) are now state of the art and have proven themselves. It is more difficult with the supply of the functional units in the track area. Along the track there is no generally valid food structure with the exception of the contact wire for electrified trains. Thus, the technique used has adapted to this situation. The power supply of the outdoor units is thus usually individual, for each functional unit in the outdoor system, it is thus tailored exactly.

In summary, this means that functional units on the track, controlled by central control units, form a whole and connected to each other usually via interlocking cables. The effective supply is done in the interlocking, via the cable to the functional units run the necessary circuits for the formation of the function.

However, such a general feed along the route network would be desirable.

In decentralized control parts but today the supply of the supply via the interlock cable is required. The source impedance of the supply at the decentralized control element is the limit. If more and more functions are centrally located in the signal box at the location of their effect in the track system, the continuous feed (via a supply bus) is advantageous.

However, since the availability must be large, is an appropriate architecture, as well as a monitoring with Diagnostics and the triggering of measures in case of error indispensable. However, the required data exchange is not possible on this network (or on the same lines).

As an alternative to feeding from the grid, a supply of the contact wire is also possible. This is particularly advantageous if the density of the functional units to be supplied along the route is very low and it is remote areas without a basic infrastructure for

Energy supply is. A suitable substructure for the supply of several closely spaced units is expedient.

Object of the invention

The object of the invention is to provide a method and an arrangement which make it possible:

a) in a railway system for each required system unit of arbitrary granularity (see as examples of possible system units in Table 1) determine an optimal position along the rail network according to any definable functional criteria and to operate them there, which is currently not possible according to the prior art ;

b) to be able to combine several installations, such as distributed interlockings, in a single installation, which performs all tasks in summary;

c) for installations with high requirements, e.g. to be able to execute the availability of a single and / or summary redundancy in the area of the network.

This object is achieved according to the invention by the features of claims 1 and xy. With the use of the method according to the invention and explained further below, the geographical positions of the system units in the railway installations determined for the operation can be fully implemented without the disadvantageous influences due to limit values of the superordinate structures.

Data communication among the system units

In order to optimally connect the system units with each other in terms of communication, a data network is used. The network fulfills the requirements regarding real-time, the security of the communication is covered by procedures according to EN 50159-1 for closed systems, the availability is ensured by redundant design of the data network.

For system units of any suitable granularity, access to a data bus is ensured at a freely selectable point in the system. All defined system units are connected to the data network. The data network can also be used for other plant services. The access points on the data network provide at any point a number of standardized interfaces of different technology and performance.

Approaches and techniques used in terms of process and physical form:

Option 1 Exemplary for such a network is the product OTN (Optical Transport Network) from Siemens and others.

Option 2

Using the contact wire as a communication line. In this case, a redundant design of the strands is possible with separate leadership on two lanes. Option 3

The use of a wireless network on the established

Techniques such as e.g. WLAN etc.

In principle, any combination of the aforementioned options is also possible here.

The communication between the units connected to the network from the signal box to the sensor / actuator / control unit now takes place via the data network. This above

Execution does not generally exclude other localized point-to-point and multipoint data connections outside the primary data network as far as they are suitable for the task. This also wireless solutions are possible.

In order to optimally supply the system units in the area of the feed supply, a feed network is used. There is, for example, a first variant by decoupling the required electrical power from the

Traction voltage and a second variant with a low voltage network with 3P + N + PE. The following explanations are identical.

The power supply with mains takes place in a suitable

Topology, such as a ring, as used by the above exemplified OTN for the data. In the power grid, nodes are used in which the monitoring and the switching to ensure the supply are made.

These nodes are monitored over the data network for availability and controlled when faults and failures occur. This above definition includes more point-to-point and more local limited dining concepts

Multipoint, as far as they are suitable for the task, are not generally sufficient for individual functional units. The solution presented according to the invention has the following advantages: flexible allocation and division of the data network; connected functional units to the parent

Systems which can be located anywhere in the data network; commissioning, service and maintenance of

Function units on the rail network are simplified. The functional units on the network are designed so that they can be commissioned and maintained autonomously;

Adjustment distances from the interlocking to the functional units are only by an appropriate length of the

Data network limited (100 km and more); - a coupling to subsequent (adjacent) networks can be easily realized if needed; the cost of wiring the functional units located on the rail network is reduced considerably; - The solution favors the operator's intended

Combining interlockings, e.g. in secondary lines or even at higher ETCS levels, e.g. at ETCS Level 2.

For ETCS Level 2, only the track vacancy and the point control remain as relevant functional units on the track in the course of these considerations; The same data network (in other channels) can also be used for other services, such as Communication to

Control technology, realize; In the event of a fault and when rectifying the fault, the effects of the fault remain limited to the affected functional unit.

There is a system service bus along a route where vehicles run. The power bus is suitable for reliably supplying a large number of functional units. The limit of the recording power of a functional unit is briefly at some kVA. The length of such dining buses is limit losses so that failures do not have the required reliability. An extension can be achieved by means of another system feed bus, which is not powered on the same basis.

The catenary can serve as a dining bus. The catenary is differentiated, depending on the Einspurstrecke, double track, multiple tracks (stations). Also can be used for the feed bus directly the lines of Traktionsspeisezuführungen. Power can be supplied via a cable with 3L + N + PE (system power bus). The system bus is redundantly implemented where necessary. The feed-in can take place under the following boundary conditions: a) according to an appropriate segmentation of the system feed bus; b) The segmentation of redundant feed buses is geographically offset from one another so that redundant structures can be created.

It can be built in track areas with closely spaced system function units a dining subsystem.

Embodiments of the present invention will be explained in more detail below - also with reference to the drawings. Showing:

Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of the system architecture of a signal box;

Figure 2 shows a schematic representation of the structure of a remote point setting part;

FIG. 3 is a schematic representation of the structure and connection of an axle counting system; Figure 4 is a schematic representation of the structure of an OTN network;

The present invention shows a solution for the execution of railway safety systems, which allow to minimize the infrastructure used in a tunnel, for example, and thus minimize the cost of installation and maintenance of the equipment. The solution "barrier-free tunnel" is based essentially on the following innovations:

• Introduction of a decentral point-setting system with digital communication connection to the interlocking.

• Inserting an axle counting system with a digital communication connection between the decentralized axle counting point and the axle counting computer.

Introduce a data transmission network, in particular based on OTN (Open Transport Network) with optical fibers, as a transmission medium. The network makes it possible, via network nodes, to connect the remote components, such as pointsetting systems and axle counting points, transparently to the interlocking computers or axle counting computers. This transparency enables a process-assured transmission between the components of the interlocking. It would be possible to use this network for any other interlocking services. It is ensured that the requirements for a closed system according to EN 50159-1 are met.

This system has the following advantages: • Innovative and cost-effective solution, based on the future product portfolio available for the backup systems;

• Lower life cycle costs;

• Elimination of the containers with the interlocking and axle counting computers including the associated air conditioning systems in the Multifunction points in the tunnel (for the Alptransit Gotthard -ATG-, for example, the omission in the Sedrun multifunction station (east and west tubes);

• Elimination of the interlocking and axle counting computers in the emergency stop Faido (ATG, east and west tubes).

• Elimination of the redundant axis counting points when implementing a fault-tolerant axis counting.

• Reduction of the proportion of copper cabling between the axle counting points and the axle counting computers, depending on the communication topology.

• The reduced complexity of the components installed in the tunnel simplifies maintenance and servicing.

FIG. 1 shows a schematic representation of the system architecture of an interlocking example for an area of a long tunnel. The exact number and distribution of the network nodes NWN and, concomitantly, the OTN topology are then to be optimized especially in the project planning phase.

The decentralized point control part takes over the control and monitoring of points on site and has the following features:

• Autonomous handling of all operations for the control and monitoring of the points.

• Particularly suitable for switches with multiple drives for the switch blades and moving frogs such as, for example. High-speed corner points (minimization of cabling).

• Preparation of extensive diagnostic data (also preventive) and their transmission to the interlocking.

• Extensive on-site turnout control for commissioning and service using a rugged handheld device. • Limit switches are directly read in by the control unit and the motors are controlled directly.

The interfaces of the control element to the interlocking are:

• Communication: Via two wires, eg in the four-wire signal box cable. Direct coupling in the interlocking to the UCOM module (up to 4 ISDN connections per module) or for longer distances via OTN. • Powering actuator and drive motors: 400V ^ _Q on site.

• Communication distance from interlocking to control unit: Up to 10 km, can be extended over the network OTN to over 100 km.

• Distance from the control unit to the switch: max. 300m. To meet increased availability requirements, such as in tunnels, the actuator can also be built redundant.

FIG. 2 shows the system structure (configuration here without a redundant setting part) for the remote point setting part.

The Weichenstellteil can also be used to control the locking of the lane change gates.

The solution "Axis counting with metering point transmission over long distances" contains a central counting element, a digital metering point (ZP D) with a secure computer core, which reports the recorded axis pulses as an axis number to the UCOM module via the communication interface (ISDN) The measured axle numbers are then transferred to the axle counting calculator (AZR) The AZR takes over the axle numbers received from the various UCOM modules and uses them to determine the current section conditions, which are output via the Interlocking Bus (IL bus) of the Area Control Component (ACC). from the electronic signal box. The interfaces of this digital point of delivery with the peripheral systems are:

• Communication: Via two wires, e.g. in the star quad signal cable, coupling in the interlocking to the UCOM module of the axle counting computer (max 4 connections per module) or via a node from the OTN directly to the Ethernet bus of the AZ computer.

• Power supply point: 230V ^ _Q via two further wires, eg from the same star quad on site. • Communication distance from the axle counting calculator to the

Point of delivery: up to 10 km, this can be extended over the network OTN to over 100 km.

• Distance from the sensor to the point of delivery: Max. 12 m.

As an extension to the axle counting system, the "error correction" functionality is additionally implemented In order to correct any faults or failures in the area of the metering point, an error correction software is provided in the axle counting calculator for the following two fault categories:

a) Error correction with counting point fault

If a metering point separates two track free reporting sections, the system will automatically correct miscounts at the digital metering point ZP D as soon as there is no more train in the two separate from the digital metering point ZP D

Track vacancy (GFM) sections. This correction can be configured individually for each point of delivery / section. The two sections involved are sequentially cleared according to the direction of travel. The automatic correction of the miscount is also reported as an error message to the diagnostic system in the interlocking.

b) Error correction at counting point failure

If a metering point disconnects two track-free reporting sections, the system will be the affected one in the event of a detected outage Counting point ignored and the two track free reporting sections merged into one section. If the error correction is active, the two sections involved are sequentially assigned and cleared according to the direction of travel. The response of the automatic error correction is called

Error message sent to the diagnostic system in the interlocking. This correction can be configured individually for each metering point.

Should it prove in practice that for the

Points areas a redundant point of delivery arrangement is required, a corresponding configuration option (redundant / fault tolerant) can also be provided.

To meet the increased availability requirements of long tunnels, the axle counting calculator (AZR) is built as a 2 by 3 system. When using the above-described error correction can also possibly on a redundant arrangement of the

Metering points are waived. With such a configuration, the number of components is almost halved, which has a positive effect on the disturbances and failures of the axle counting system and the associated operations for troubleshooting. FIG. 3 shows the basic system structure of the axle counting system:

Open Transport Network (OTN)

The OTN is a transmission system based on the latest fiber-optic technology. In the present case it has the following properties:

• Very high availability of the OTN due to redundant design of the transmission system (double fiber optic ring and also redundancy in the network nodes) • Use of the fiber optic system provides galvanic decoupling of the network nodes • low weight

• small size

• very high transmission reliability

• transparent data transmission • very high bandwidth performance (several 100 Mbit)

• very high transmission distances (over 100 km)

• maintenance-free

FIG. 4 shows the basic structure of an OTN system

RAMS Consideration (RAMS = Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety)

RAM decentral point switch part

The possibility of redundant execution of the decentralized point control parts has a very positive effect on the reliability or availability of the entire interlocking system. The frequency of fault class 4 or 3 can be considerably reduced due to the continuous redundancy.

Axle Counting with Digital Axis Number Transmission The embodiment according to the invention offers the same RAM parameters as those of a conventional system conventionally connected to the signal box with regard to the axle counting system.

Axle counting system with error correction The concept of axle counting with integrated error correction provides the same reliability with significantly less (installed) hardware as the conventional axis counting system in a redundant arrangement. At the same time, the cost of maintenance or repair is almost halved. OTN

Due to the redundant design of the communication links, the use of the OTN does not adversely affect the reliability of the overall "interlocking system"

Tunnels result in advantages in terms of maintainability, which in turn increases the availability of the entire interlocking.

Topic Safety The railway safety of the sketched architecture is guaranteed in all cases. The decentralized point adjustment part is subject to the current safety philosophy. The new axle counting system uses the widely used ECC calculator and is configured and operated in the proven 2 of 3 configuration. The

Communication security on the links is ensured through best practices. Thus, the transmission media need not exercise security responsibility.

Claims

Patentansprücha

A system for controlling and / or monitoring rail vehicles, comprising: a) at least one interlocking, comprising an interlocking computer; b) at least one arranged along a guideway in the track area component for train protection, in particular a signal, a .Balise, a loop cable, a leakage cable, an axle counter; c) at least one along the track in the track area arranged component for driving distance adjustment, in particular a turnout comprehensive switch, d) at least one decentralized control unit for adjusting the components for train protection and / or the components for

Fahrwegeinstellung, characterized in that the components for train protection and the components for

Route setting via the decentralized assigned to them. Coupling control part via a data bus to the interlocking computer and safety-related information according to a predetermined protocol to the interlocking computer can be transmitted or can be obtained from this, wherein for the electrical supply of at least a portion of these components a feed bus is provided, the. is logically decoupled from the interlocking computer.

2. System according to claim 1, characterized in that the data bus and / or the bus is redundant or are.

3. System according to claim 2, characterized in that the redundant structure is a segmentation along a

Provides route, the individual segments are preferably arranged offset from one another.

4. System according to one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that the at least one decentralized control part is constructed redundantly.

5. System according to one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that the data bus as OTN network, preferably in fiber optic technology, is configured.

6. System according to one of claims 1 to 5 ", characterized in that a supply of the feed bus from a catenary and / or a supply to the catenary is provided.

7. System according to one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that in case of failure of a Achszählpunktes a next larger track section is formed, which again has a necessary counting security.

8. A method for controlling and / or monitoring of rail vehicles, comprising the steps of: a) providing at least one signal box, which comprises at least one interlocking computer; b) providing at least one train control component arranged along a track in the track area, in particular a signal, a balise, a loop cable, a leak cable, an axle counter; c) providing at least one arranged along the guideway in the track area component for travel setting, in particular a comprehensive at least one point turnout switch, d) providing at least one decentralized control part for adjusting the components for train control and / or Components for driving distance adjustment, characterized in that the components for train protection and the components for driving path setting via their respective associated decentralized actuating part via a data bus to the

Signaling computer are coupled and safety-related information is transmitted to the interlocking computer according to a predetermined protocol or obtained from this, wherein for the electrical supply of at least a portion of these components a feed bus is provided, which is logically decoupled from the interlocking computer.

9. The method according to claim 8,. characterized in that the data bus and / or the bus is redundant or are.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that the redundant structure is a segmentation along a

11. The method according to any one of claims 8 to 10, characterized in that the at least one decentralized control part is constructed redundantly.

12. The method according to any one of claims 8 to 11, characterized in that the data bus as. OTN network, preferably in fiber optic technology, is configured.

13. System according to any one of claims 8 to 12,. characterized in that a supply of the feed bus from a catenary and / or a supply to the catenary is provided.

14. System according to any one of claims 8 to 13, characterized in that in case of failure of an axle counting a next larger track section is formed, which again has a necessary counting security.