EP1935151A1 - Procede et dispositif pour verifier une adresse d'expediteur transmise au cours d'une demande de liaison pour etablir une liaison de communication dans un reseau de communication ip - Google Patents

Procede et dispositif pour verifier une adresse d'expediteur transmise au cours d'une demande de liaison pour etablir une liaison de communication dans un reseau de communication ip

Info

Publication number
EP1935151A1
EP1935151A1 EP06792925A EP06792925A EP1935151A1 EP 1935151 A1 EP1935151 A1 EP 1935151A1 EP 06792925 A EP06792925 A EP 06792925A EP 06792925 A EP06792925 A EP 06792925A EP 1935151 A1 EP1935151 A1 EP 1935151A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
terminal
subscriber
transmitted
request
sender address
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP06792925A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Joachim Charzinski
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Nokia Solutions and Networks GmbH and Co KG
Original Assignee
Nokia Siemens Networks GmbH and Co KG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Nokia Siemens Networks GmbH and Co KG filed Critical Nokia Siemens Networks GmbH and Co KG
Publication of EP1935151A1 publication Critical patent/EP1935151A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04M7/00—Arrangements for interconnection between switching centres
    • H04M7/006—Networks other than PSTN/ISDN providing telephone service, e.g. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), including next generation networks with a packet-switched transport layer
    • H04M7/0078—Security; Fraud detection; Fraud prevention
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L51/00—User-to-user messaging in packet-switching networks, transmitted according to store-and-forward or real-time protocols, e.g. e-mail
    • H04L51/21—Monitoring or handling of messages
    • H04L51/212—Monitoring or handling of messages using filtering or selective blocking
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04M3/00—Automatic or semi-automatic exchanges
    • H04M3/42—Systems providing special services or facilities to subscribers
    • H04M3/42025—Calling or Called party identification service
    • H04M3/42034—Calling party identification service
    • H04M3/42059—Making use of the calling party identifier
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04M3/00—Automatic or semi-automatic exchanges
    • H04M3/42—Systems providing special services or facilities to subscribers
    • H04M3/436—Arrangements for screening incoming calls, i.e. evaluating the characteristics of a call before deciding whether to answer it
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L51/00—User-to-user messaging in packet-switching networks, transmitted according to store-and-forward or real-time protocols, e.g. e-mail
    • H04L51/04—Real-time or near real-time messaging, e.g. instant messaging [IM]

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method and an arrangement for verifying a sender address transmitted in the course of a connection request for the purpose of establishing a communication connection in an IP communication network.
  • spammming refers to the mass sending of unwanted messages (“spam”). Is favored
  • spamm benefits from the fact that causers, such as advertisers, almost no effective costs incurred in addition to the management of corresponding email address lists through the "spamming".
  • spamming is now causing high public costs, including indirect costs such as loss of productivity or overcrowded electronic mailboxes Even more serious are the costs incurred by the relevant infrastructure providers, such as Internet service providers.
  • an increase in bandwidth capacity is necessary because the available bandwidths are no longer sufficient to cope with the flood of "spams".
  • VoIP Voice over IP
  • SPIT Packet Transfer Protocol over Internet Telephony
  • PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
  • VoIP subscribers can be conducted almost free of charge for the caller due to the deviating billing model, which can be expected to generate a massive amount of SPIT for the future.
  • the ability to send recorded voice files in bulk should be interesting for advertisers. It can be assumed that the affected VoIP subscribers will ask their respective VoIP provider for appropriate measures to be protected against unwanted calls.
  • a whitelist for a subscriber X contains subscriber-specific information about such other subscribers Y in the communication network, which are known as have been trusted and are thus entitled to call subscriber X.
  • a blacklist contains the same payer-specific information as a whitelist, but in a blacklist trustworthy subscribers are registered whose calls are automatically rejected.
  • whitelists and blacklists do not provide protection against SPIT when, for example, a SPIT originator fakes its sender address in the SIP header of the SPIT message, for example, by abusively using a sender address from the called party's White List X as its sender address.
  • each network operator has hitherto ensured that a subscriber authenticates himself, for example with a user name and password.
  • a verification of the authentication takes place, for example, on a SIP server of a network operator, which checks whether the subscriber is authorized to use the sender address specified by him.
  • Network operators each adjacent sub-communication networks trust in the fact that the respective neighbor also performs a verification of the authentication of each participant.
  • the object of the invention is to provide a method and an arrangement for the verification of a connection request for the purpose of establishing a communication connection. design the transmitted sender address in an IP communication network.
  • Patent claim 14 solved with respect to the arrangement. Further developments of the invention are specified in the subclaims.
  • the invention relates to a method for verifying a transmitted in the course of a connection request for the purpose of establishing a communication connection in an IP communication network between a terminal of a first subscriber and a terminal of a second subscriber sender.
  • the verification of the transmitted sender address is carried out before establishing the communication connection by a confirmation request of the terminal of the second subscriber to the transmitted sender address and an evaluation of a response to the confirmation request by the terminal of the second subscriber.
  • a terminal whose address matches the transmitted sender address transmits an acknowledgment to the terminal of the second subscriber in the event that the terminal is identical to the terminal of the first subscriber. In the event that the terminal is not identical to the terminal of the first subscriber, the terminal transmits a message corresponding to a rejection to the terminal of the second subscriber.
  • the invention relates to an arrangement and devices for carrying out the method illustrated.
  • the invention has the advantage that a sender address can be verified in an IP communication network.
  • FIG. 1 VoIP communication network with two subscribers A and B.
  • FIG. 2 VoIP communication network with two subscribers A, B and a SPIT originator M.
  • FIG. 1 VoIP communication network with two subscribers A and B.
  • FIG. 2 VoIP communication network with two subscribers A, B and a SPIT originator M.
  • FIG. 1 shows a VoIP communication network with a first subscriber A who calls a second subscriber B. Furthermore, a first, a second and a third sub-communication network Nl, N2, N3 are shown with a first, a second and a third SIP server SPl, SP2, SP3.
  • the SIP servers SP1, SP2, SP3 are preferably represented by soft switches or SIP proxies.
  • FIG. 1 also shows the signaling route Si for the call and the voice connection Sp resulting from the call between the first subscriber A and the second subscriber B.
  • the signaling route Si leads from a terminal of the first subscriber A via the SIP server SP1.
  • SP2, SP3 of the sub-communication networks Nl, N2, N3 to a terminal of the second subscriber B.
  • the network architecture shown represents only one embodiment. Other architectural variants are conceivable.
  • FIG. 2 shows a similar network architecture as shown in Figure 1, but extended by a fourth and fifth sub-communication network N4, N5 and a fourth SIP server SP4. Furthermore, FIG. 2 shows a SPIT cause M.
  • the SPIT originator M uses a configuration weakness of the fourth SIP server SP4 in the fourth sub-communication network N4: This configuration weakness allows, for example, that external callers can signal their calls via the fourth SIP server SP4. Even if the operator of the third sub-communication network N3 demanded that the SIP server operated by him only from known neighboring SIP Servers should receive signaling information, the exploitation of the configuration weakness could not be prevented if one of the neighboring SIP server this restriction did not enforce itself.
  • the SPIT originator M can thus access the fourth SIP server SP4 in the fourth sub-communication network N4 via a fifth sub-communication network N5 and signal a call with the sender address of the first subscriber A to the second subscriber B. If the first subscriber A is on a whitelist of the second subscriber B, the SPIT originator M can take advantage of this and place a call to the second subscriber B, which would not be possible by stating his own sender address. In this way, the security standard for the entire communication network decreases significantly as described above.
  • a query in the form of a callback from the terminal of the second subscriber B to that of the first subscriber A transmitted sender address corresponds to the content of the "Contact:” field or the content of the "From:” field of the INVITE message transmitted by the terminal of the first subscriber A in the course of the connection request.
  • This callback is used to verify the identity of the first subscriber A prior to the establishment of a communication connection: It is checked in this way according to the invention, whether the transmitted sender address associated first subscriber A corresponds to the actual calling subscriber.
  • the terminal of the first answers Participant A with a confirmation on the callback.
  • the terminal of the first participant A responds and notifies the terminal of the second participant B in this way that the first participant A does not identical to the actual caller.
  • FIG. 3 shows the signaling Si, based on the SIP protocol, between the terminal of the first subscriber A and the terminal of the second subscriber B for the situation described in FIG. 1:
  • the terminal of the first subscriber A sends an INVITE Message to the terminal of the second party B.
  • a modified INVITE message INVITE * back to the terminal of the first party A.
  • the destination address is preferably the used in the original message in the SIP header "Contact:" (English Caller ID)
  • the Caller ID used in the SIP header "From:” can be used.
  • the modification of the INVITE * message from the original INVITE message is to include an additional entry in the form of an additional header or field in the body of the message.
  • This additional entry is used to inform the terminal of the first subscriber A that the callback is not a regular call but a confirmation request.
  • the alternative INVITE * message is modified so that the terminal of the first subscriber A certainly does not signal an incoming call, for example by dialing a previously non-existent and specifically defined for the purpose
  • the terminal of the first subscriber A responds in a third step 3 with a pseudo-acknowledgment of the INVITE * message, preferably with a return code 381 ".
  • the terminal of the first subscriber A in a separate header field, for example in a field "Ack-Call-ID:” or alternatively in the body of the message again the content of the "Call-ID:” field, That is, the call identifier (English Call ID) transmitted with the original INVITE message
  • the terminal of the second party B checks the indication contained in the "Ack Call ID:" header in a fourth step 4.
  • the terminal of the second subscriber B rejects the connection request of the first subscriber A.
  • the entry in the "Ack Call ID:” header matches the originally transmitted Call ID, and the terminal of the second subscriber B transmits a confirmation to the terminal of the first subscriber in a fifth step A.
  • the connection request is thus accepted, and in a sixth step, for example, a voice connection between the first subscriber A and the second subscriber B is established.
  • the SPIT originator M transmits a connection request in the form of a SIP INVITE message from a fifth sub-communication network N5 the fourth SIP server SP4 is configured insecure, for example, in that it accepts and forwards a connection request without checking whether the requesting subscriber is trustworthy.
  • the sender address of the first subscriber A is indicated fraudulently instead of the sender address of the SPIT originator M.
  • the INVITE message is routed via the second SIP server SP2, which, ironically enough, trusts the fourth SIP server SP4, and then via the third SIP server SP3 to the terminal of the second subscriber B.
  • the terminal of the second subscriber B checks the identity of the calling subscriber in a second step 2 by sending the modified INVITE * message to the terminal of the first subscriber A according to the inventive method.
  • the terminal of the first subscriber A receives the modified INVITE * message and in a third step 3 replies, for example, with the transmission of the code 481 for "call / transaction does not exist.”
  • the terminal rejects the connection request in a fourth step 4, for example, by transmitting the code 487 for "terminated".
  • the inventive method can be used in addition to the scenarios shown in the figures also in the case of asymmetric call routing, if the terminal of the first subscriber A from the terminal of the second subscriber B is reached.
  • the inventive method is also Maschinenbaubar if it is not explicitly supported by one or more SIP servers SP1-SP4.
  • SIP protocol elements shown in the figures, it is also possible to use other protocol elements to be defined for carrying out the method according to the invention.
  • a suitable protocol to be defined can be used for the purpose of the confirmation request.
  • the billing of the callback according to the invention for verification of the identity of the first caller A can be made separately from the standard signaling of a connection request.
  • the callback according to the invention can for example also be offered free of charge by a network operator.
  • an INVITE message is sent from the terminal of the second subscriber B to the terminal of the first subscriber A, which is modified in such a way, for example. that it is rejected by the terminal of the first subscriber A.
  • an INVITE message is sent from the terminal of the second subscriber B to the terminal of the first subscriber A, which is modified in such a way, for example. that it is rejected by the terminal of the first subscriber A.
  • the INVITE message may request a generally unknown codec.
  • the response of the terminal of the first party A to such a modified INVITE message contains, for example, a code 415 for "unsupported media type.” Based on this response, the terminal of the second party B recognizes that the sender address transmitted in the originally transmitted INVITE message does not matches the address of the terminal of the first party A and rejects the connection request.
  • the terminal of the first subscriber A additionally transmits the original call identification to the terminal of the second subscriber B in response to the modified INVITE * message.
  • the terminal of the second subscriber B transmits the original call identification or a part thereof in the course of the confirmation request to the terminal of the first subscriber A to signal to the terminal of the first subscriber A that it is a Consultation confirming the identity of the first participant A is.
  • At least one statistics counter for recording successful and unsuccessful attempts at connection requests is maintained in the communication network, wherein a confirmation request and a response to a confirmation request are irrelevant for the detection.
  • At least one statistics counter for detecting successful and unsuccessful confirmation requests is maintained in the communication network.
  • the at least one statistics counter can be implemented, for example, on one or more SIP servers SP1-SP4. In this way, the success rate of confirmation requests can be monitored.
  • the at least one statistics counter is monitored for detecting successful and unsuccessful confirmation requests, and frequently occurring sender addresses are blocked for a predetermined time.
  • a suitable proxy device in the event that the first subscriber A is in the state of "roaming", for example, can be used to make the connection request known to the home network operator In addition, for a positive answer to a confirmation request and / or, for example, automatically configured diversion to the not resident in the home network first participant A used.
  • the terminal of the first subscriber A notifies its support of the method according to the invention by a suitable entry in the header and / or body of the INVITE message in the first step 1 of the method according to the invention to the terminal of the second subscriber B.
  • the method according to the invention is the use of a white list and / or anonymous call rejection method and / or an indication of the calling number of the calling first subscriber A on the terminal of the second Participant B combinable.
  • the communication connection is an e-mail-based communication connection.
  • a device A, B, SP1, SP2, SP3, SP4 executing the method according to the invention checks a sender address only if this sender address differs from the sender address of the requesting device. In this way, endless looping of checks is avoidable.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé pour vérifier une adresse d'expéditeur transmise au cours d'une demande de liaison pour établir une liaison de communication dans un réseau de communication IP entre un terminal d'un premier abonné (A) et un terminal d'un second abonné (B). Cette vérification de l'adresse d'expéditeur a lieu avant l'établissement de la liaison de communication, au moyen d'une demande de confirmation du terminal du second abonné (B) à l'adresse d'expéditeur et d'une évaluation d'une réponse à la demande de confirmation par le terminal du second abonné (B).
EP06792925A 2005-09-30 2006-08-22 Procede et dispositif pour verifier une adresse d'expediteur transmise au cours d'une demande de liaison pour etablir une liaison de communication dans un reseau de communication ip Withdrawn EP1935151A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102005046965A DE102005046965B3 (de) 2005-09-30 2005-09-30 Verfahren und Anordnung zur Verifikation einer im Zuge einer Verbindungsanfrage zum Zweck des Aufbaus einer Sprach-Kommunikationsverbindung übermittelten Absenderadresse in einem IP-Kommunikationsnetzwerk
PCT/EP2006/065535 WO2007039348A1 (fr) 2005-09-30 2006-08-22 Procede et dispositif pour verifier une adresse d'expediteur transmise au cours d'une demande de liaison pour etablir une liaison de communication dans un reseau de communication ip

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1935151A1 true EP1935151A1 (fr) 2008-06-25

Family

ID=37441737

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP06792925A Withdrawn EP1935151A1 (fr) 2005-09-30 2006-08-22 Procede et dispositif pour verifier une adresse d'expediteur transmise au cours d'une demande de liaison pour etablir une liaison de communication dans un reseau de communication ip

Country Status (7)

Country Link
US (1) US20080253376A1 (fr)
EP (1) EP1935151A1 (fr)
CN (1) CN101341700A (fr)
AU (1) AU2006298913A1 (fr)
CA (1) CA2624145A1 (fr)
DE (1) DE102005046965B3 (fr)
WO (1) WO2007039348A1 (fr)

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DE102006020244B3 (de) * 2006-04-27 2007-09-20 Siemens Ag Positiv-Listen zur SPIT-Abwehr
KR100800693B1 (ko) * 2006-11-28 2008-02-01 삼성전자주식회사 발신자 정보를 이용한 가드 서비스 제공 시스템 및 방법
JP5146693B2 (ja) * 2007-03-08 2013-02-20 日本電気株式会社 擬似的応答フレーム通信システム、擬似的応答フレーム通信方法及び擬似的応答フレーム送信装置
EP1998498B1 (fr) * 2007-05-26 2018-01-03 Vector Informatik GmbH Dispositif de test et procédé de test
DE102007046350A1 (de) * 2007-09-27 2009-04-02 Siemens Enterprise Communications Gmbh & Co. Kg Verfahren und Anordnung zum Bereitstellen von VoIP-Kommunikation
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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE102005046965B3 (de) 2007-02-15
CA2624145A1 (fr) 2007-04-12
AU2006298913A1 (en) 2007-04-12
WO2007039348A1 (fr) 2007-04-12
US20080253376A1 (en) 2008-10-16
CN101341700A (zh) 2009-01-07

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