EP1887565A1 - Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Erfassung eines Decoders in einem Audiosignal - Google Patents

Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Erfassung eines Decoders in einem Audiosignal Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1887565A1
EP1887565A1 EP07301153A EP07301153A EP1887565A1 EP 1887565 A1 EP1887565 A1 EP 1887565A1 EP 07301153 A EP07301153 A EP 07301153A EP 07301153 A EP07301153 A EP 07301153A EP 1887565 A1 EP1887565 A1 EP 1887565A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
samples
random sequence
identifier
current block
tattoo
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Withdrawn
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EP07301153A
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Olivier Develle
Alain Le Guyader
André Gilloire
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Orange SA
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France Telecom SA
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G10MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS; ACOUSTICS
    • G10LSPEECH ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES OR SPEECH SYNTHESIS; SPEECH RECOGNITION; SPEECH OR VOICE PROCESSING TECHNIQUES; SPEECH OR AUDIO CODING OR DECODING
    • G10L19/00Speech or audio signals analysis-synthesis techniques for redundancy reduction, e.g. in vocoders; Coding or decoding of speech or audio signals, using source filter models or psychoacoustic analysis
    • G10L19/018Audio watermarking, i.e. embedding inaudible data in the audio signal
    • GPHYSICS
    • G10MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS; ACOUSTICS
    • G10LSPEECH ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES OR SPEECH SYNTHESIS; SPEECH RECOGNITION; SPEECH OR VOICE PROCESSING TECHNIQUES; SPEECH OR AUDIO CODING OR DECODING
    • G10L25/00Speech or voice analysis techniques not restricted to a single one of groups G10L15/00 - G10L21/00
    • G10L25/03Speech or voice analysis techniques not restricted to a single one of groups G10L15/00 - G10L21/00 characterised by the type of extracted parameters
    • G10L25/06Speech or voice analysis techniques not restricted to a single one of groups G10L15/00 - G10L21/00 characterised by the type of extracted parameters the extracted parameters being correlation coefficients

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method and a device for detecting a tattoo or mark identifier in an audiovisual signal and in particular an audio signal.
  • Tattooing makes it possible to transmit additional information in support data imperceptibly. For audio-visual data this amounts to establishing a concealed data communication channel, in parallel with the conventional information transport infrastructure.
  • auxiliary data is concealed and attached to the signal and is therefore able to withstand changes in format and sampling frequency giving the tattoo interoperability at the terminals and networks, only the detection-level ends to be compatible with the insertion.
  • a frame of the communication channel concealed in the carrier signal consists of a synchronization mark which may also be called a tattoo identifier, followed by the message inserted in the signal, the beginning of the message being indicated by the identifier. tattoo.
  • the detection After transmitting the tattooed signal, when reading the media, the detection first consists in detecting the tattoo identifier that has been inserted at the beginning of the frame. Once this identifier is identified in the audio content, for example, the detection of the bits of the message can begin. The sequences "tattoo identifier + eventual message" are continuously inserted in the media, the identifier starts coinciding with the areas of sufficient energy suitable for insertion. In reception, the detection of each sequence is also done continuously, thus making it possible to resynchronize in the event of a break in the carrier medium (editing of the signal, cuts by a hacker or even frame losses of the transmission).
  • Tattoo identifiers and messages are formed from random Gaussian sequences from a random number generator or Pseudo-Random sequences (Pseudo-Noise Sequences in English or PN sequences) generated by a shift register whose cells are looped so as to produce an output sequence of maximum length.
  • Any other random sequence resulting from the theory of finite state machines Gold sequences, Baker codes, Walsh sequences, (7) may be suitable provided that its correlation function is close to a Dirac distribution.
  • FIG. 1 A standard procedure for generating a tattooed signal is illustrated in FIG. 1.
  • the module 11 makes it possible to generate a random sequence of length N from an initialization value K fixed in advance. This gives a random sequence w (n).
  • this sequence is modulated by the information to be transmitted by multiplying it by 1 if the bit to be transmitted is 1 and by -1 if the bit to be transmitted is 0.
  • This generation step is performed in the module 12 and generates a modulated sequence ⁇ w (n). In case we just want to insert a tattoo identifier, the random sequence is not modulated.
  • a psychoacoustic model 13 is taken into account by the module 14 to generate the tattoo identifier or the message w f (n) so as to make it inaudible.
  • a gain adjustment step is performed at 15. This tattoo identifier or message is then added at 16 to the audio signal s (n) to form the tattooed signal s w (n).
  • This signal is either stored on a media for later reading by a reader or transmitted over a fixed, mobile or broadcast transmission network.
  • the tattoo identifier In reception, the tattoo identifier must be detected to act on the signal received, for example by blocking the reader in the event of detection of pirated content.
  • FIG. 1 A typical tattoo identifier detection procedure is illustrated in FIG. 1
  • the tattooed audio signal s w (n) is first bleached by inverse filtering by the module 21 (corresponding to the inverse of the consideration of the psycho-acoustic model).
  • the operation of detecting the presence of the tattoo identifier and the content of the frame itself is then carried out by calculation of correlation by the module 22 between the filtered signal x w (n) and the random sequence w (n ) generated by the module 23 in the same way as during the insertion.
  • This detection determines either a frame mark k s when the tattoo identifier is detected, or the bits of the inserted information.
  • This method consists of performing a correlation calculation between the samples of the tattooed signal and the random sequence for each offset of a sample of the tattooed signal, until the beginning of the tattoo identifier is revealed by the fact that the correlation coefficient Cor (k) exceeds a threshold S.
  • N the number of multiplications to be performed per second will be 18010 6 multiplications per second, which is much greater than the capacity of the processors Trade.
  • the property that is exploited to calculate the correlation is the renewed and cyclic application of the random sequence.
  • This method therefore does not apply to the case where it is desired to detect the beginning of a tattoo frame that represents the tattoo identifier in an audio tattoo system.
  • the tattoo is inserted into the Fourier domain, the frequency mark is added to the signal after a shift linked one-to-one with the inserted identifier.
  • the tattooed signal in the time domain is obtained by inverse Fourier transform.
  • each frame is passed in the frequency domain by Fourier transform.
  • Several frames of Fourier coefficients are accumulated, the result of the accumulation being correlated with the frequency mark.
  • the maximum of the correlation gives the value of the offset therefore the content of the message of the frame.
  • the correlation maximum is calculated by inverse Fourier transform of the product of the Fourier transform of the signal accumulated by the conjugate of the Fourier transform of the frequency mark.
  • This method requires many passages from a frequency domain to a transformed domain of the frequency domain and vice versa, the insertion taking place in the frequency domain.
  • the present invention provides a solution that does not have these disadvantages by providing a method of detecting a tattoo identifier that minimizes the number of operations to be performed and the complexity of calculations while allowing a reliable decision.
  • the method according to the invention offers the possibility of using fast correlation calculation algorithms that do not require periodic insertion of synchronization marks.
  • the method according to the invention can be implemented in real time on low capacity processors and in the case of continuous reception of a tattooed signal.
  • this method of block recovery together with the implementation of a rapid transformation method, decreases the number of correlation calculations and the complexity of this calculation with respect to the sliding-window correlation calculation performed sample by sample.
  • the tattoo identifier indicates the position in the audio signal of an inserted message.
  • the detection of the tattoo identifier makes it possible to know where the detection of the inserted message can be carried out.
  • the current block preparation step comprises, in a preferred embodiment, an inverse filtering step of the tattooed signal and a Wiener filtering step using a filter calculated from a correlation function of a training sequence. the tattoo identifier.
  • the at least one initialization value is a key (K a ) that makes it possible to generate the random sequence.
  • the random sequence is obtained by two initialization values, the first being a first key (K a ) making it possible to generate an intermediate random sequence, the second being a second key (K b ) making it possible to encrypt the intermediate random sequence to obtain the random sequence.
  • the method comprises a preliminary initialization step in which the first and second permutation tables as well as the random sequence are calculated and stored.
  • the calculation of the random sequence, of the first and of the second permutation table is optimized by a minimum number of bit operations performed on the bits of an integer representing in each case the shift register. generating the sequence or table.
  • the method comprises an initialization step in which the Fourier transform of the random sequence and its conjugate complex are calculated and stored.
  • the method further comprises a step of correcting the correlation values by eliminating parasitic terms.
  • This variant makes it possible to dispense with the use of a large Fourier transform when the tattoo identifier has a large size.
  • the device thus described is able to implement the method according to the invention.
  • the invention finally relates to a computer program comprising code instructions for implementing the steps of the method according to the invention, when said program is executed by a processor.
  • the device and the computer program have the same advantages as the method they implement.
  • FIG. 3 illustrates the main steps of a tattoo identifier detection method according to the invention.
  • the step E31 is an initialization step which can make it possible to carry out calculations beforehand and to memorize them, for example the generation of the random sequence.
  • Step E32 consists in preparing a first current block of the filtered tattooed signal comprising an N number of samples.
  • a reading of a block of Ns samples of the tattooed signal, N being multiple of Ns, is performed.
  • This filtering step corresponds to the inverse step of the filtering by the psycho-acoustic model carried out during the insertion.
  • Step E32 is followed by step E33 in which a correlation calculation by a fast transformation method is performed on the samples of the current block and the samples of the random sequence generated from the same (s).
  • Initialization value (s) used during insertion This random sequence generation can be carried out just before calculating the correlation or at the initialization stage. It is then in the latter case stored in the initialization step and read during the calculation step.
  • step E34 a test is performed to find out whether the maximum of the correlation values from the correlation calculation of step E33 of the first Ns samples is greater than a threshold S.
  • the tattoo identifier is detected. This value of the correlation maximum greater than the threshold S then indicates the beginning of the tattoo identifier.
  • the detection device can then from this tattoo identifier determine the position in the audio signal of a message that would have been inserted. This message is placed just after the last sample of the tattoo identifier represented by the random sequence of length N.
  • the detection of the inserted message is carried out in a simple manner as mentioned with reference to FIG. 2, by a single correlation calculation. Once the message is detected, the detector will return to the search mode for the tattoo synchronization or identifier to locate the next message. In the case where only tattoo identifiers have been inserted at defined points of the signal, the tattooed signal is scanned as in the previous case continuously. When an identifier is detected, a flag is set to 1 and the detector returns to polling mode.
  • step E34 In the case where in step E34, none of the correlation values of the first Ns samples exceed the threshold S, then a new current block is taken into account by shifting Ns samples E35.
  • FIGS 4a and 4b schematically illustrate the method of the invention.
  • the tattooed signal represented at 40 is continuously received.
  • This tattoo identifier is shown in gray under the reference 41 in FIGS. 4a and 4b.
  • a block analysis of N samples is performed.
  • This current block x w (n) for n ranging from 0 to N-1 is referenced in FIG. 42.
  • a correlation calculation is performed between this current block and the random sequence w (n) generated as at the time of insertion. .
  • the correlation values obtained for the first Ns are then compared as shown at 43 in FIGS. 4a and 4b. If the maximum of the correlation values does not exceed the threshold S, then the current block to be analyzed is shifted by an Ns number of samples as illustrated in FIGS. 4a and 4b.
  • Filtered signal is placed in its right part. This is indicated in FIG. 4b where the block analyzed at 42 becomes the current block. It can be seen in FIG. 4b that the inserted identifier represented in gray at 41 shifted N s samples to the left with respect to the previous block represented at 42 in FIG. 4a (and which was the current block of the step previous).
  • VS ⁇ ⁇ gold w ⁇ vs ⁇ x ⁇ w
  • the matrix w c is a circulating matrix constructed from its first line w T , where T is the transposition operator.
  • Ms 12 and 13 which gives synchronization sequences of size 4095 and 8191.
  • This device comprises a module for obtaining a random sequence w (n) from at least one initialization value.
  • the random sequence can be obtained from a single initialization value, for example, a first key K a .
  • This first key K a will allow in a first embodiment to directly generate the random sequence w (n) used to generate the tattoo identifier.
  • the encryption module 53 is not present.
  • the encryption module 53 is present.
  • the random sequence w (n) used to generate the tattoo identifier is obtained from two initialization values.
  • the first is for example a first key K a which will make it possible to generate an intermediate random sequence w s (n)
  • the second is a second key K b which will make it possible to encrypt this intermediate random sequence to obtain the random sequence w (n ).
  • the random sequence w (n) obtained by the module 51 will serve as in the insertion device of Figure 1 to generate the tattoo identifier by the module 54.
  • a psycho-acoustic model 55 is also taken into account as well as a gain 56 to be added at 57 to the audio signal s (n) and form the tattooed signal s w (n).
  • FIG. 6 represents a device for detecting a tattoo identifier according to the invention.
  • This detection device just like the device insertion includes a module for obtaining the random sequence that has been used to generate the tattoo identifier.
  • this random sequence obtaining module 61 can in a first embodiment comprise only a module for generating the random sequence w (n) from the first key K has or comprise both the module 62 for generating an intermediate random sequence w s (n) from the first key K a and an encryption module 63 of this intermediate sequence from the second key K b for get the random sequence w (n).
  • the detection device can detect the tattoo identifier only if it knows the one or two keys used to obtain the random sequence.
  • An example of a possible application in the embodiment with a single key is for example to associate with each audio content, a user or operator number as a tattoo identifier.
  • the key will be deduced from this number through a correspondence table.
  • the tattoo identifier makes it possible to detect transfers or abusive exchanges of content and to trace the origin of the problem. Indeed, in the presence of pirated content found on a website, the entity holding the user keys can test the detection of the tattoo identifier for each of the keys.
  • the one that will detect the tattoo identifier will be the one that belongs to the user who is at the origin of the abuse. The detection being very fast, the search can be carried out quickly for a large number of keys.
  • the key of the identifier makes it possible to affirm that the signal is tattooed when the presence of the identifier is detected.
  • the possibility of detecting the message can be conditioned by the knowledge of the same key as that of the identifier.
  • the identifier key and the message key may be different.
  • the key K b may represent an order number on a user or dealer and the key K may be specific to the owner of the work or a company operating for several operators.
  • the leakage of pirated content can be located as follows: given a pirated content, the trusted third party holder of the key K has will search for all keys K b, which gives a positive response detection and who will be at the origin of the leak?
  • the key K a represents a user number and the key K b , the number of the work. It is then possible to test if the work number of the right of access license corresponds to that which has actually been inserted by tattooing. If the test result is negative, then the content is hacked and the drive is blocked.
  • one of the keys can be public, for example K b while keeping K a secret.
  • K b represents a content number, it makes it possible to give access to this content.
  • the association of audio sequences with keys K b may be known to all, for example via a database available on the internet.
  • the detection device also comprises a filter module referenced at 64 for whitening and equalizing the tattooed signal during reception and thus forming a signal vector x w sub (n).
  • R wx is a To ⁇ plitz matrix formed from the autocorrelation function of the signal s wz and R dx a correlation vector calculated from a training sequence.
  • the sequence w can be taken as an example from different starting or offset samples.
  • the correlation function is then calculated for offsets ranging from 0 to M k , where M k is the number of filter coefficients.
  • the training sequence makes it possible to take into account certain characteristics of the sequence w and thus to accentuate the possible peaks of detection.
  • the correlation detection module 65 comprises means for preparing a current block of N samples of the filtered tattooed signal, correlation calculation means between the samples of the current block and the random sequence w (n) and comparison means. correlation values obtained at a threshold S.
  • the encryption performed both in the module 53 and the module 63 on a random sequence w s (n) can be performed by random permutation of the samples of the sequence w s (n) or by an encryption method such as that described for example in the document B. Schneier "Applied Cryptography, Protocols and Sources in C”. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996 p397 and 398 .
  • the heart of the algorithm is to calculate a permutation matrix by means of a key of 16 bytes or 128 bits.
  • a TabS array is first initialized in step E71 at values from 0 to N-1.
  • a 256-byte size TabK table is initialized at step E72 by repetition, as many as many times as necessary, the contents of the Key key table containing the 16 bytes of the key.
  • the CurPos integer is initialized to 0.
  • a CurPos index is generated randomly by addition of CurPos, TabS of index i and TabK of index i modulo 256, the TabK table being of size 256, the whole being taken modulo N.
  • the permutation table that will be used to scramble or encrypt the random sequence is obtained by permuting the two values it contains to the index curpos and to the index i with the aid of the intermediate variable TmpVal.
  • a method of generating a PN sequence is for example a method as described in the document B. Schneier. "Applied cryptography, protocols and sources in C”. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996, pages 372 to 375 .
  • the loopback points of the register are given by the generator polynomial of the sequence.
  • the loopback points then correspond to the bits equal to 1 in the binary decomposition of poly.
  • the integer state contains the current state of the shift register, each cell of the register being represented by a bit location of the integer state. It is initialized to 1. To calculate the state state at the next instant, the state content is shifted to the left of the bit position, then a mask is made by doing a binary operation "and" of the result with N the integer containing M s bits of low weight to 1. It remains only to insert in the least significant bit position, by addition by means of a binary operation "or", the operation of " or exclusive '(xor) bits of the bitwise product of the register state with the polynomial generator (poly & state).
  • the function xor (n) calculates one or exclusive bits of the integer n as an argument.
  • This PN sequence thus generated can be used for example in the first embodiment described with reference to FIG. 8.
  • FIG. 8 illustrates in detail, in flowchart form, the correlation calculation step E33 of FIG. 3 in the case of a first embodiment of the invention.
  • This first embodiment uses the fast transform method of Hadamard as a method of rapid transformation.
  • step E32 a current block x w ( n ) of N samples has been prepared.
  • the next operation E81 is to swap the vector x w ( n ), that is to say the re index according to a first permutation Pe.
  • a vector xe ( i ), i 0, ..., N -1.
  • An explanation of Hadamard's method can be found in the paper A. Alrutz, MR Schroeder "A Fast Hadamard Transforms Method for the Evaluation of Measurement Using Pseudo Random Test Signals", Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Acoustics, Paris, 1983 .
  • Step E82 is followed by step E83 in which a second permutation Ps is applied to the vector resulting from the Hadamard transform, in order to obtain the correlation values corresponding to the order of the initial sampling times.
  • step E83 correlation values Cor (k) are obtained which can be used directly in step E34 described with reference to FIG.
  • a correction step E84 is implemented.
  • step E84 corrected correlation values Cor (k) are compared with a threshold at step E34 as described with reference to FIG.
  • the permutations Pe and Ps are defined by respective tables TabPe and TabPs which are calculated at the initialization step E31 of FIG.
  • the state of the state register will take all values between 1 and N-1 but in an order that will be characterized by the permutation table.
  • the state state is first initialized to 1.
  • the state bits at the current time are shifted to the left of a position and masked by the integer having M s bits of low weight to 1.
  • the result of this operation in the least significant bit position, the result of the exclusive or the product of the polynomial by the state (poly & state) masked by the integer 1.
  • the permutation sequence is calculated using the minimum number of bit operations as previously described for generation of the PN sequence.
  • the state variable of the state register is first initialized to 2 Ms -1. Then, to calculate the state state at the next instant, the state bits at the current time are first shifted one position to the right. The state at the next instant is the result of the operation "or exclusive" bit by bit of the result of the previous operation with the product of the polynomial by the state (poly & state) masked by the integer 1.
  • the permutation sequence is calculated using the minimum number of bit operations.
  • the fast transformation method is a Fourier transform method.
  • step E32 a current block x w ( n ) of N samples was prepared.
  • the following operation E91 consists of calculating the Fourier transform of the vector x w ( n ) to get the transform X w .
  • the transform of the random sequence w is either performed during step E91, or performed at the initialization step and then stored as for obtaining the random sequence.
  • this sequence is not generated according to the PN sequence generation method described above but according to a random sequence generation based for example on a generation of random numbers.
  • the conjugate complex W * of the Fourier transform W is also calculated and stored in memory.
  • step E92 the product of W * X w in the Fourier domain is performed.
  • Y ( k ) X w ( k ) W * ( k ) for k ranging from 0 to N-1.
  • step E93 an inverse Fourier transform of this product is applied to deduce the cross-correlation as described by equation (12).
  • the correlation values Cor (k) are thus obtained which are compared with a threshold for the first Ns samples as described in step E34 with reference to FIG.
  • a device embodying the invention is for example a microcomputer 210 which comprises, in a known manner, notably a processing unit 220 equipped with a microprocessor, a read-only memory type ROM 230, RAM RAM type 240.
  • the microcomputer 210 may include in a conventional and non-exhaustive manner the following elements: a keyboard, a screen, a microphone, a speaker, a communication interface, a disk drive, a storage medium ...
  • the ROM 230 includes registers storing a computer program PG including program instructions adapted to implement a tattoo identifier detection method according to the invention as described with reference to Figure 3.
  • This program PG is thus adapted to prepare a current block of N samples of a tattooed signal received at input 250, to perform a correlation calculation by a method of rapid transformation between the samples of the current block and those of the random sequence obtained from at least one initialization value received at input 260 and comparing the resulting correlation values to a threshold to derive the position of the output tattoo identifier 270.
  • the PG program stored in the read-only memory 230 is transferred into the random access memory which will then contain the executable code of the invention as well as registers for storing the variables necessary for the implementation of the invention. .
  • a means of storage readable by a computer or by a microprocessor, whether or not integrated into the device, possibly removable, stores a program implementing the tattoo identifier detection method according to the invention.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computational Linguistics (AREA)
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  • Audiology, Speech & Language Pathology (AREA)
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EP07301153A 2006-07-11 2007-06-27 Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Erfassung eines Decoders in einem Audiosignal Withdrawn EP1887565A1 (de)

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Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106024012A (zh) * 2015-08-26 2016-10-12 芯盾(北京)信息技术有限公司 用于声码器前信源语音数据同步的语音数据处理方法
CN106024012B (zh) * 2015-08-26 2019-11-12 河南芯盾网安科技发展有限公司 用于声码器前信源语音数据同步的语音数据处理方法

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