EP1832493B1 - System and method of verifying the integrity of a train - Google Patents

System and method of verifying the integrity of a train Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1832493B1
EP1832493B1 EP07290264A EP07290264A EP1832493B1 EP 1832493 B1 EP1832493 B1 EP 1832493B1 EP 07290264 A EP07290264 A EP 07290264A EP 07290264 A EP07290264 A EP 07290264A EP 1832493 B1 EP1832493 B1 EP 1832493B1
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Prior art keywords
train
length
detection circuit
circuit
short track
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German (de)
French (fr)
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EP1832493A1 (en
Inventor
Jean-Pierre Franckart
Eric Lechevin
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Alstom Belgium SA
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Alstom Belgium SA
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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L1/00—Devices along the route controlled by interaction with the vehicle or train
    • B61L1/14—Devices for indicating the passing of the end of the vehicle or train

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a system and method for verifying the integrity of a train.
  • Verifying the integrity of a train consists in checking that the train has not lost a car.
  • the object of the invention is therefore to provide a system and a method for verifying the integrity of a train which are of reduced cost while providing the necessary security to meet railway standards.
  • the invention also relates to a computer program comprising program code instructions for implementing the steps of the method described above when said program runs on a computer.
  • a train 1 runs on a railway track 2 comprising a detection circuit.
  • this circuit is formed of a short track circuit 3.
  • track circuit refers to the electrical circuit of a perfectly delimited portion of a known length of track that is electrically isolated and which makes it possible to control the occupation of sections of track or needles.
  • a short track circuit corresponds to a portion of track whose length is reduced to the minimum while ensuring that, during the passage of a train, at least one axle of this train is permanently on the portion of track.
  • the short circuit circuit and the corresponding channel portion will be indifferently called short circuit circuit.
  • the short track circuit 3 comprises means 4 for detecting the presence of a train thereon.
  • Train 1 has an odometer 5.
  • This odometer 5 indicates the distance traveled by the train with a relative uncertainty known to the manufacturer. As a general rule, odometers fitted on trains have a relative uncertainty of ⁇ 2%.
  • the short track circuit 3 and the train 1 also comprise communication means 6, 7 enabling them to exchange information.
  • These communication means 6, 7 are radio communication means, or power-line communication means on the rails or any other suitable system.
  • These communication means 6, 7 are adapted to allow the synchronization between the events of the beginning of presence of the train on the short track circuit 3 and the release of the train 1 on the short track circuit 3 and the odometer 5, so the odometer 5 determines the odometric values corresponding to these two events.
  • the train comprises means 8 for storing the odometric values determined by the odometer 5.
  • the train also comprises means 9 for calculating the distance traveled by the train between the moment of beginning of occupation and the instant of release.
  • Calculation means 10 for determining the minimum length of the train are connected to the means 9 for calculating the distance.
  • the train also comprises means 11 integrity information to prevent the driver for example.
  • the means 8, 9 and 10 are integrated in a computer embedded in the train.
  • the figure 2 illustrates the moment when the train 1 begins to occupy the short track circuit 3, that is to say that its first axle enters the short track circuit 3.
  • the odometer 5 indicates an odometric reference D 1 .
  • the short track circuit 3 has a length I cv , the train a length I t and the last car a length I w .
  • the figure 3 illustrates the moment when the train 1 releases the short track circuit 3.
  • the odometer 5 indicates an odometric reference D 2 .
  • the axles are supposed to be positioned at the front and rear limits of the train. It is easily understood that the length of the short track circuit 3 has a length greater than the maximum distance between two axles so that at least one axle is inside the short track circuit for the duration of the passage. of the train.
  • the length I CV of the short track circuit is perfectly known and is stored in the calculation means of the train.
  • the communication means 6 of the short channel circuit 3 have transmitted to the train the value I CV in a prior initialization step.
  • the odometric values D 1 and D 2 comprise uncertainties related to the odometer 5, to the accuracy of the synchronization between the means 4 for detecting the short track circuit and the odometer 5, and to the delays related to the delays. release or occupation of the tracks.
  • the calculation means determine an interval of distances (D min , D max ) such that the probability that the distance traveled by the train is not in this interval is less than a probability compatible with the standards of railway safety, for example 10 -12 .
  • the measured length of the train therefore varies, according to equation (1), between D min -I cv and D max -I cv with D min corresponding to the minimum value of D 2 -D 1 and D max to the value maximum of it.
  • D min D 2min - D 1max
  • D max D 2max - D 1min .
  • D min can be equal to D 2min -D 1min and D max to D 2max -D 1max .
  • the calculation means 10 compare the measured length with the predetermined length l t minus the length of the wagon I w .
  • the minimum measured length is less than the predetermined length of the train minus the length of a wagon, then the train is considered not to be intact.
  • the system thus described therefore advantageously makes it possible to detect the integrity of a train at a reduced cost since the short track circuits are already installed on the tracks to detect the presence or the absence of a train and the new trains currently put in place. in service include onboard odometers.
  • a specially programmed on-board computer connected to the odometer 5 and the control means 4 of the short channel circuit then makes it possible to perform the calculations and to transmit the integrity information.
  • figure 5 two short track circuits 3, 50 spaced by a length I 12 are used to delimit the detection circuit, such that this length I 12 is less than the length of the train.
  • the moments of reading of the odometric references then correspond to the moment when the train 1 enters the second short track circuit 50 and at the instant when it releases the first short track circuit 3, which is therefore upstream. the second short track circuit 50 relative to the train running.
  • the calculated length of the train is equal to the sum between the minimum distance traveled and the distance between these two short track circuits, and is therefore independent of the length of the short track circuits.
  • This variant embodiment makes it possible, by lengthening the measured distance traveled, to reduce the uncertainty of the measurement and therefore to increase the accuracy of the detection system.
  • figure 6 the system comprises means 60 for validating the measurement.
  • These validation means 60 use the maximum distance traveled D max .
  • the measured length of the train is in the range (D min -I cv , D max -I cv ).
  • the validation means 60 conclude that the measurement is invalid and trigger an alarm.
  • This variant is advantageously usable during the formation of the convoy at the marshalling yard, in addition to a conventional car counting system to validate the integrity control system.
  • the short channel circuits are adapted to transmit the occupancy / release detection information accompanied by the time at which this occupancy / release occurred.
  • the accuracy of the system is increased by reducing the uncertainties of the odometric values D1 and D2 related to the delay of transmission of the signal.
  • the system and method thus described thus advantageously make it possible to check the integrity of the trains at a reduced cost by the use of pre-existing elements on railway networks and traction machines.
  • the length I cv of the track circuit used in equation (1) of the embodiment of the figure 1 and the distance between the two short channel circuits -I 12 used in equation (2) corresponds to a generic term termed algebraic length offset of the detection circuit, the detection circuit being able to be described as a channel segment oriented in the direction of travel of the train.
  • the algebraic offset of the detection circuit length reflects a predetermined algebraic bias involved in the calculation of the length of the train.
  • step f) In the case where the result of the test performed in step f) is positive, the train is then suspected of not being integrity and step e) is not performed.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)

Abstract

The system has a communication unit (7) communicating with a detection unit (4) of a short railway circuit (3). The unit (4) detects presence/absence of the train on the circuit (3). A calculation unit (9) calculates the distance traveled by the train between an instant in which the train holds the circuit (3) and an instant in which the train releases the circuit (3). The distance is expressed in the form of a confidence interval so that the probability that the train has not traveled a distance included in the interval is lower than probability compatible with standard railway safety. An independent claim is also included for a method of verifying an integrity of a train of a determined length.

Description

La présente invention concerne un système et un procédé de vérification de l'intégrité d'un train.The present invention relates to a system and method for verifying the integrity of a train.

La vérification de l'intégrité d'un train consiste à contrôler que le train n'a pas perdu de wagon.Verifying the integrity of a train consists in checking that the train has not lost a car.

Actuellement cette vérification se fait par des dispositifs spécialement conçus à cet effet, installés le long des voies, et adaptés pour compter le nombre d'essieux du train.Currently this verification is done by devices specially designed for this purpose, installed along the tracks, and adapted to count the number of axles of the train.

Ces dispositifs sont onéreux puisque nécessitant une adaptation particulière de la voie.These devices are expensive since they require a particular adaptation of the route.

Pour y remédier, il est connu du document GB-A-2 225 887 un système de vérification de l'intégrité d'un train ayant les caractéristiques du préambule de la revendication 1, comprenant des moyens d'odométrie et un circuit de voie.To remedy this, it is known from the document GB-A-2,225,887 a system for verifying the integrity of a train having the features of the preamble of claim 1, comprising odometry means and a track circuit.

Toutefois, se pose le problème d'obtenir une valeur fiable de la longueur du train en utilisant un circuit de voie.However, there is the problem of obtaining a reliable value of the length of the train using a track circuit.

Le but de l'invention est donc de proposer un système et un procédé de vérification de l'intégrité d'un train qui soient de coût réduit tout en assurant la sécurité nécessaire pour répondre aux normes ferroviaires.The object of the invention is therefore to provide a system and a method for verifying the integrity of a train which are of reduced cost while providing the necessary security to meet railway standards.

L'objet de l'invention est un système de vérification de l'intégrité d'un train de longueur prédéterminée, ledit système étant embarqué à bord dudit train et comportant:

  • des moyens de communication et de synchronisation avec des moyens de détection d'un circuit de détection, lesdits moyens de détection étant aptes à détecter la présence / absence d'un train sur le circuit de détection,
  • des moyens d'odométrie, connectés aux moyens de communication et de synchronisation, et aptes à fournir une référence odométrique au début de l'occupation du circuit de détection par le train et lors de la libération du circuit de détection par le train,
  • des moyens de calcul de la distance parcourue par le train entre l'instant de début d'occupation et l'instant de libération par différence des deux références odométriques,
  • des moyens de calcul d'une estimation minimum de la longueur du train, celle-ci étant égale à la distance parcourue calculée diminuée d'un décalage algébrique de longueur du circuit de détection,
  • des moyens d'information d'intégrité aptes à transmettre une information indiquant que le train est intègre quand la longueur calculée du train est supérieure à la longueur prédéterminée du train moins la longueur d'un wagon,
caractérisé en ce que les moyens d'odométrie ayant une incertitude relative déterminée, la distance parcourue calculée s'exprime sous forme d'un intervalle de confiance entre une distance minimale et une distance maximale tel que la probabilité que le train n'ait pas parcouru une distance incluse dans cet intervalle de confiance soit inférieure à une probabilité compatible avec les normes de sécurité ferroviaire, et la longueur du train est alors calculée comme la différence entre la distance minimale et le décalage algébrique de longueur du circuit de détection.The object of the invention is a system for verifying the integrity of a train of predetermined length, said system being embarked on board said train and comprising:
  • communication and synchronization means with detection means of a detection circuit, said detection means being able to detect the presence / absence of a train on the detection circuit,
  • odometry means, connected to the communication and synchronization means, and able to provide an odometric reference at the beginning of the occupation of the detection circuit by the train and during the release of the detection circuit by the train,
  • means for calculating the distance traveled by the train between the moment of beginning of occupation and the moment of release by difference of the two odometric references,
  • means for calculating a minimum estimate of the length of the train, the latter being equal to the calculated distance traveled minus an algebraic length offset of the detection circuit,
  • integrity information means capable of transmitting information indicating that the train is integral when the calculated length of the train is greater than the predetermined length of the train minus the length of a car,
characterized in that the odometry means having a determined relative uncertainty, the calculated distance traveled is expressed as a confidence interval between a minimum distance and a maximum distance such as the probability that the train has not traveled. a distance included in this confidence interval is less than a probability compatible with railway safety standards, and the length of the train is then calculated as the difference between the minimum distance and the algebraic length offset of the detection circuit.

Suivant des modes particuliers de réalisation, le système comporte l'une ou plusieurs des caractéristiques suivantes :

  • le système comporte des moyens de validation de la mesure telle que si la longueur prédéterminée du train est supérieure à la longueur maximale du train, cette longueur maximale mesurée étant calculée comme la différence entre la distance maximale et le décalage algébrique de longueur du circuit de détection, alors la mesure de distance parcourue est considérée comme non valide ;
  • le système comporte des moyens de validation de la mesure telle que si la longueur prédéterminée du train est supérieure à une longueur minimale mesurée augmentée du train, cette longueur minimale mesurée augmentée étant calculée comme la différence entre la distance minimale et le décalage algébrique de la longueur du circuit de détection augmentée de la longueur d'un véhicule, alors le train est suspect de ne plus être intègre ;
  • le circuit de détection comporte un premier circuit de voie court et un second circuit de voie court distant d'une distance déterminée du premier circuit de voie court, distance inférieure à la longueur prédéterminée du train et situé en aval dudit premier circuit de voie court par rapport au sens de marche du train, chaque circuit de voie court comportant des moyens de détection de présence dudit train, le début d'occupation du circuit de détection correspondant au début de l'occupation du second circuit de voie court, la libération du circuit de détection correspondant à la libération du premier circuit de voie court, la longueur algébrique du circuit de détection étant égale à la mesure par rapport au sens de la marche du train du vecteur ayant pour point de départ le point de libération du circuit de détection et pour point d'arrivée le point de début d'occupation du circuit de détection, et le décalage algébrique de longueur du circuit de détection est égal à la longueur algébrique du circuit de détection ;
  • le circuit de détection comporte un circuit de voie court comportant des moyens de détection de présence dudit train, le début d'occupation du circuit de détection correspondant au début de l'occupation du circuit de voie court, et la libération du circuit de détection correspondant à la libération dudit circuit de voie court, et le décalage algébrique de longueur du circuit de détection est égal à la longueur algébrique du circuit de voie court, la longueur algébrique du circuit de voie court étant égale à la mesure par rapport au sens de la marche du train du vecteur ayant pour point de départ le point de libération du circuit de voie court et pour point d'arrivée le point de début d'occupation du circuit de voie court ; et
  • au moins un dispositif de détection par circuit de voie, ledit dispositif étant adapté pour détecter la présence/absence d'un train sur le circuit de voie, et comportant des moyens de communication et de synchronisation avec le système de vérification embarqué pour transmettre à ce système l'instant de début ou de fin d'occupation du circuit de voie par le train.
According to particular embodiments, the system comprises one or more of the following characteristics:
  • the system comprises means for validating the measurement such that if the predetermined length of the train is greater than the maximum length of the train, this maximum measured length being calculated as the difference between the maximum distance and the algebraic length offset of the detection circuit. then the measured distance traveled is considered invalid;
  • the system comprises means for validating the measurement such that if the predetermined length of the train is greater than an increased measured minimum length of the train, this increased minimum measured length being calculated as the difference between the minimum distance and the algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit increased by the length of a vehicle, then the train is suspect of being no longer honest;
  • the detection circuit comprises a first short path circuit and a second short path circuit remote by a determined distance from the first short path circuit, a distance less than the predetermined length of the train and located downstream of said first short path circuit by relative to the running direction of the train, each short track circuit comprising means for detecting the presence of said train, the beginning of occupation of the detection circuit corresponding to the beginning of the occupation of the second short track circuit, the release of the circuit detection means corresponding to the release of the first short channel circuit, the algebraic length of the detection circuit being equal to the measurement with respect to the direction of the train of the vector having as its starting point the release point of the detection circuit and for the end point the start point of occupancy of the detection circuit, and the algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit is equal to the algebraic length of the detection circuit;
  • the detection circuit comprises a short channel circuit comprising means for detecting the presence of said train, the beginning of occupation of the detection circuit corresponding to the beginning of occupation of the short channel circuit, and the release of the corresponding detection circuit at the release of said short channel circuit, and the algebraic length offset of the detection circuit is equal to the algebraic length of the short channel circuit, the algebraic length of the short channel circuit being equal to the measurement relative to the direction of the starting of the vector train starting with the release point of the short channel circuit and the point of arrival the start point of occupation of the short channel circuit; and
  • at least one channel circuit detection device, said device being adapted to detect the presence / absence of a train on the track circuit, and comprising means of communication and synchronization with the on-board verification system for transmitting to this system the moment of beginning or end of occupation of the track circuit by the train.

L'invention a également pour objet un procédé de vérification de l'intégrité d'un train de longueur prédéterminée lors du passage dudit train sur un circuit de détection de longueur déterminée, et ledit train ayant une odométrie embarquée, et ledit procédé comportant les étapes de :

  1. a) stockage de la référence odométrique du train à l'instant de début d'occupation du circuit de détection par le train,
  2. b) stockage de la référence odométrique du train à l'instant de libération du circuit de détection par le train,
  3. c) calcul de la distance parcourue par le train entre l'instant de début d'occupation et l'instant de libération par différence des deux références odométriques précédemment stockées,
  4. d) calcul de la longueur du train, celle-ci étant égale à la distance parcourue calculée diminuée d'un décalage algébrique de longueur du circuit de détection,
  5. e) vérification de l'intégrité du train par vérification que la longueur calculée est supérieure à la longueur prédéterminée du train moins la longueur d'un wagon, caractérisé en ce que les moyens d'odométrie ayant une incertitude relative déterminée, la distance parcourue s'exprime sous forme d'un intervalle de confiance entre une distance minimale et une distance maximale tel que la probabilité que le train n'ait pas parcouru une distance incluse dans cet intervalle de confiance soit inférieure à une probabilité compatible avec les normes de sécurité ferroviaire, et la longueur du train est calculée comme la différence entre la distance minimale et le décalage algébrique de longueur du circuit de détection.
Suivant des modes particuliers de réalisation, le système comporte l'une ou plusieurs des caractéristiques suivants:
  • préalablement à l'étape e) il comporte une étape de validation de la mesure telle que si la longueur prédéterminée du train est supérieure à la longueur maximale du train, cette longueur maximale étant calculée comme la différence entre la distance maximale et le décalage algébrique de longueur du circuit de détection, alors la mesure de distance parcourue est considérée comme non valide et l'étape e) de vérification de l'intégrité n'est pas effectuée,
  • préalablement à l'étape e), il comporte une étape f) de validation de la mesure telle que, si la longueur prédéterminée du train est supérieure à une longueur minimale mesurée augmentée du train, cette longueur minimale mesurée augmentée étant calculée comme la différence entre la distance minimale et le décalage algébrique de la longueur du circuit de détection augmentée de la longueur d'un véhicule, le train est alors suspect de ne pas être intégré et l'étape e) de vérification de l'intégrité n'est pas effectuée,
  • le circuit de détection comporte un premier circuit de voie court et un second circuit de voie court distant d'une longueur déterminée du premier circuit de voie court, distance inférieure à la longueur prédéterminée du train, et situé en aval dudit premier circuit de voie court par rapport au sens de marche du train, chaque circuit de voie court comportant des moyens de détection de présence dudit train, le début d'occupation du circuit de détection correspondant au début de l'occupation du second circuit de voie court, la libération du circuit de détection correspondant à la libération du premier circuit de voie court, la longueur algébrique du circuit de détection étant égale à la mesure par rapport au sens de la marche du train du vecteur ayant pour point de départ le point de libération du circuit de détection et pour point d'arrivée le point de début d'occupation du circuit de détection, et le décalage algébrique de longueur du circuit de détection est égal à la longueur algébrique du circuit de détection,
  • le circuit de détection comporte un circuit de voie court comportant des moyens de détection de présence dudit train, le début d'occupation du circuit de détection correspondant au début de l'occupation du circuit de voie court, et la libération du circuit de détection correspondant à la libération dudit circuit de voie court, et le décalage algébrique de longueur du circuit de détection est égal à la longueur algébrique du circuit de voie court, la longueur algébrique du circuit de voie court étant égale à la mesure par rapport au sens de la marche du train du vecteur ayant pour point de départ le point de libération du circuit de voie court et pour point d'arrivée le point de début d'occupation du circuit de voie court.
The subject of the invention is also a method for verifying the integrity of a train of predetermined length during the passage of said train on a detection circuit of determined length, and said train having an onboard odometry, and said method comprising the steps from:
  1. a) storing the odometric reference of the train at the moment when the detection circuit begins to occupy the detection circuit,
  2. b) storing the odometer reference of the train at the instant of release of the detection circuit by the train,
  3. c) calculating the distance traveled by the train between the start of occupation time and the release time by difference of the two previously stored odometric references,
  4. d) calculating the length of the train, the latter being equal to the calculated distance traveled, minus an algebraic length offset of the detection circuit,
  5. e) checking the integrity of the train by verifying that the calculated length is greater than the predetermined length of the train minus the length of a car, characterized in that the odometry means having a determined relative uncertainty, the distance traveled expresses in the form of a confidence interval between a minimum distance and a maximum distance such that the probability that the train has not traveled a distance included in this confidence interval is less than a probability compatible with railway safety standards , and the length of The train is calculated as the difference between the minimum distance and the algebraic length offset of the detection circuit.
According to particular embodiments, the system comprises one or more of the following characteristics:
  • prior to step e) it comprises a step of validating the measurement such that if the predetermined length of the train is greater than the maximum length of the train, this maximum length being calculated as the difference between the maximum distance and the algebraic offset of length of the detection circuit, then the measurement of distance traveled is considered as invalid and the step e) of verification of the integrity is not carried out,
  • prior to step e), it comprises a step f) for validating the measurement such that, if the predetermined length of the train is greater than an increased measured minimum length of the train, this increased minimum measured length being calculated as the difference between the minimum distance and the algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit increased by the length of a vehicle, the train is then suspect not to be integrated and the step e) integrity check is not performed ,
  • the detection circuit comprises a first short channel circuit and a second short channel circuit remote by a determined length of the first short channel circuit, a distance less than the predetermined length of the train, and located downstream of said first short channel circuit relative to the running direction of the train, each short track circuit including means for detecting the presence of said train, the beginning of occupation of the detection circuit corresponding to the beginning of the occupation of the second short track circuit, the release of the detection circuit corresponding to the release of the first short channel circuit, the algebraic length of the detection circuit being equal to the measurement with respect to the direction of the train of the vector having as its starting point the release point of the detection circuit and for the end point the start point of occupation of the detection circuit, and the algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit is equal to the algebraic length of the detection circuit,
  • the detection circuit comprises a short channel circuit comprising means for detecting the presence of said train, the beginning of occupation of the detection circuit corresponding to the beginning of occupation of the short channel circuit, and the release of the corresponding detection circuit at the release of said short path circuit, and the offset algebraic length of the detection circuit is equal to the algebraic length of the short track circuit, the algebraic length of the short track circuit being equal to the measurement with respect to the direction of travel of the vector train starting from the point of the short path circuit and for the end point the start point of occupation of the short path circuit.

L'invention a également pour objet un programme d'ordinateur comprenant des instructions de code de programme pour mettre en oeuvre les étapes du procédé décrit ci-dessus lorsque ledit programme fonctionne sur un ordinateur.The invention also relates to a computer program comprising program code instructions for implementing the steps of the method described above when said program runs on a computer.

L'invention sera mieux comprise à la lecture de la description qui va suivre, faite uniquement à titre d'exemple, et en relation avec les dessins en annexe dans lesquels :

  • la figure 1 est un schéma d'un train sur une voie, le train étant équipé du système de vérification d'intégrité ;
  • la figure 2 est le schéma d'un train pénétrant sur un circuit de voie court ;
  • la figure 3 est le schéma d'un train libérant un circuit de voie court ;
  • la figure 4 est un ordinogramme du procédé de vérification de l'intégrité d'un train ;
  • la figure 5 est un schéma d'une variante du système ou du procédé de vérification ; et
  • la figure 6 est le schéma d'une variante du système de vérification.
The invention will be better understood on reading the description which follows, made solely by way of example, and in relation to the appended drawings in which:
  • the figure 1 is a diagram of a train on a track, the train being equipped with the integrity check system;
  • the figure 2 is a diagram of a train penetrating a short track circuit;
  • the figure 3 is a diagram of a train releasing a short track circuit;
  • the figure 4 is a flow chart of the process for verifying the integrity of a train;
  • the figure 5 is a diagram of a variation of the verification system or process; and
  • the figure 6 is the schema of a variant of the verification system.

En référence à la figure 1, un train 1 circule sur une voie ferrée 2 comportant un circuit de détection. Dans le mode de réalisation décrit, ce circuit est formé d'un circuit de voie court 3.With reference to the figure 1 a train 1 runs on a railway track 2 comprising a detection circuit. In the embodiment described, this circuit is formed of a short track circuit 3.

De façon classique, on appelle circuit de voie, le circuit électrique d'une portion de voie parfaitement délimitée de longueur connue, isolée électriquement et permettant le contrôle d'occupation de tronçons de voie ou d'aiguilles.Conventionally, the term "track circuit" refers to the electrical circuit of a perfectly delimited portion of a known length of track that is electrically isolated and which makes it possible to control the occupation of sections of track or needles.

Un circuit de voie court correspond à une portion de voie dont la longueur est réduite au minimum tout en garantissant que, lors du passage d'un train, au moins un essieu de ce train se trouve en permanence sur la portion de voie. Par simplification, on appellera indifféremment circuit de voie court le circuit électrique et la portion de voie correspondante.A short track circuit corresponds to a portion of track whose length is reduced to the minimum while ensuring that, during the passage of a train, at least one axle of this train is permanently on the portion of track. For simplicity, the short circuit circuit and the corresponding channel portion will be indifferently called short circuit circuit.

Le circuit de voie court 3 comporte des moyens 4 de détection de la présence d'un train sur celui-ci.The short track circuit 3 comprises means 4 for detecting the presence of a train thereon.

Le train 1 comporte un odomètre 5.Train 1 has an odometer 5.

Cet odomètre 5 indique la distance parcourue par le train avec une incertitude relative connue du fabriquant. En règle générale, les odomètres montés sur les trains ont une incertitude relative de ±2%.This odometer 5 indicates the distance traveled by the train with a relative uncertainty known to the manufacturer. As a general rule, odometers fitted on trains have a relative uncertainty of ± 2%.

Le circuit de voie court 3 et le train 1 comportent également des moyens de communication 6, 7 leur permettant d'échanger des informations. Ces moyens 6, 7 de communication sont des moyens de communication radio, ou des moyens de communication par courant porteur sur les rails ou tout autre système adapté.The short track circuit 3 and the train 1 also comprise communication means 6, 7 enabling them to exchange information. These communication means 6, 7 are radio communication means, or power-line communication means on the rails or any other suitable system.

Ces moyens de communication 6, 7 sont adaptés pour permettre la synchronisation entre les événements de début de présence du train sur le circuit de voie court 3 et de libération du train 1 sur le circuit de voie court 3 et l'odomètre 5, de façon à ce que l'odomètre 5 détermine les valeurs odométriques correspondant à ces deux événements.These communication means 6, 7 are adapted to allow the synchronization between the events of the beginning of presence of the train on the short track circuit 3 and the release of the train 1 on the short track circuit 3 and the odometer 5, so the odometer 5 determines the odometric values corresponding to these two events.

Le train comporte des moyens 8 de stockage des valeurs odométriques déterminées par l'odomètre 5.The train comprises means 8 for storing the odometric values determined by the odometer 5.

Le train comporte également des moyens 9 de calcul de la distance parcourue par le train entre l'instant de début d'occupation et l'instant de libération.The train also comprises means 9 for calculating the distance traveled by the train between the moment of beginning of occupation and the instant of release.

Des moyens 10 de calcul de détermination de la longueur minimale du train sont connectés aux moyens 9 de calcul de la distance.Calculation means 10 for determining the minimum length of the train are connected to the means 9 for calculating the distance.

Le train comporte aussi des moyens 11 d'information d'intégrité pour prévenir le conducteur par exemple.The train also comprises means 11 integrity information to prevent the driver for example.

Dans un mode de réalisation préféré, les moyens 8, 9 et 10 sont intégrés dans un calculateur embarqué dans le train.In a preferred embodiment, the means 8, 9 and 10 are integrated in a computer embedded in the train.

Le fonctionnement du système va maintenant être explicité en référence aux figures 2 et 3.The operation of the system will now be explained with reference to Figures 2 and 3 .

La figure 2 illustre l'instant où le train 1 commence à occuper le circuit de voie court 3, c'est-à-dire que son premier essieu pénètre sur le circuit de voie court 3.The figure 2 illustrates the moment when the train 1 begins to occupy the short track circuit 3, that is to say that its first axle enters the short track circuit 3.

A cet instant, l'odomètre 5 indique une référence odométrique D1.At this moment, the odometer 5 indicates an odometric reference D 1 .

Le circuit de voie court 3 a une longueur Icv, le train une longueur It et le dernier wagon une longueur Iw.The short track circuit 3 has a length I cv , the train a length I t and the last car a length I w .

La figure 3 illustre l'instant où le train 1 libère le circuit de voie court 3.The figure 3 illustrates the moment when the train 1 releases the short track circuit 3.

A cet instant, l'odomètre 5 indique une référence odométrique D2.At this moment, the odometer 5 indicates an odometric reference D 2 .

Ainsi, en l'absence d'incertitude, la distance parcourue D2-D1 est égale à la longueur du train It plus la longueur Icv du circuit de voie court, ou I t = D 2 - D 1 - I CV

Figure imgb0001
Thus, in the absence of uncertainty, the distance traveled D 2 -D 1 is equal to the length of the train I t plus the length I cv of the short track circuit, or I t = D 2 - D 1 - I CV
Figure imgb0001

Sans que cela nuise à la généralité du système, et par souci de simplification, les essieux sont supposés être positionnés aux limites avant et arrière du train. On conçoit aisément que la longueur du circuit de voie court 3 a une longueur supérieure à la distance maximale entre deux essieux de façon à ce qu'au moins un essieu se trouve à l'intérieur du circuit de voie court pendant toute la durée du passage du train.Without affecting the generality of the system, and for the sake of simplicity, the axles are supposed to be positioned at the front and rear limits of the train. It is easily understood that the length of the short track circuit 3 has a length greater than the maximum distance between two axles so that at least one axle is inside the short track circuit for the duration of the passage. of the train.

La longueur Icv du circuit de voie court est parfaitement connue et est mémorisée dans les moyens de calcul du train. Par exemple, les moyens 6 de communication du circuit de voie court 3 ont transmis au train la valeur Icv dans une étape préalable d'initialisation.The length I CV of the short track circuit is perfectly known and is stored in the calculation means of the train. For example, the communication means 6 of the short channel circuit 3 have transmitted to the train the value I CV in a prior initialization step.

Par contre, les valeurs odométriques D1 et D2 comportent des incertitudes liées à l'odomètre 5, à la précision de la synchronisation entre les moyens 4 de détection du circuit de voie court et l'odomètre 5, et aux retards liés aux délais de libération ou d'occupation des voies.On the other hand, the odometric values D 1 and D 2 comprise uncertainties related to the odometer 5, to the accuracy of the synchronization between the means 4 for detecting the short track circuit and the odometer 5, and to the delays related to the delays. release or occupation of the tracks.

Connaissant les différentes incertitudes des mesures, les moyens de calcul déterminent un intervalle de distances (Dmin, Dmax) tel que la probabilité que la distance parcourue par le train ne soit pas dans cet intervalle soit inférieure à une probabilité compatible avec les normes de sécurité ferroviaires, par exemple 10-12.Knowing the different uncertainties of the measurements, the calculation means determine an interval of distances (D min , D max ) such that the probability that the distance traveled by the train is not in this interval is less than a probability compatible with the standards of railway safety, for example 10 -12 .

La longueur mesurée du train varie donc, d'après l'équation (1), entre Dmin-Icv et Dmax-Icv avec Dmin correspondant à la valeur minimale de D2-D1 et Dmax à la valeur maximale de celle-ci. En général, Dmin = D2min - D1max et Dmax = D2max - D1min. Cependant, dans certains types d'odométrie Dmin peut être égal à D2min-D1min et Dmax à D2max-D1max.The measured length of the train therefore varies, according to equation (1), between D min -I cv and D max -I cv with D min corresponding to the minimum value of D 2 -D 1 and D max to the value maximum of it. In general, D min = D 2min - D 1max and D max = D 2max - D 1min . However, in certain types of odometry D min can be equal to D 2min -D 1min and D max to D 2max -D 1max .

Les moyens 10 de calcul comparent la longueur mesurée avec la longueur prédéterminée lt diminuée de la longueur du wagon Iw .The calculation means 10 compare the measured length with the predetermined length l t minus the length of the wagon I w .

Si la longueur minimale mesurée Dmin-Icv est supérieure ou égale à la longueur prédéterminée du train moins la longueur d'un wagon It-Iw, alors le train est intègre. Cette information d'intégrité est utilisable pour libérer le canton précédent.If the minimum measured length D min -I cv is greater than or equal to the predetermined length of the train minus the length of a car I t -I w , then the train is intact. This integrity information can be used to release the previous block.

Si, par contre, la longueur minimale mesurée est inférieure à la longueur prédéterminée du train moins la longueur d'un wagon, alors on considère que le train n'est pas intègre.If, on the other hand, the minimum measured length is less than the predetermined length of the train minus the length of a wagon, then the train is considered not to be intact.

Le système ainsi décrit permet donc avantageusement de détecter l'intégrité d'un train pour un coût réduit puisque les circuits de voie courts sont déjà installés sur les voies pour détecter la présence ou l'absence d'un train et les nouveaux trains actuellement mis en service comportent des odomètres embarqués.The system thus described therefore advantageously makes it possible to detect the integrity of a train at a reduced cost since the short track circuits are already installed on the tracks to detect the presence or the absence of a train and the new trains currently put in place. in service include onboard odometers.

Dans un mode de réalisation, un calculateur embarqué spécialement programmé et connecté à l'odomètre 5 et aux moyens 4 de contrôle du circuit de voie court permet alors d'effectuer les calculs et de transmettre l'information d'intégrité.In one embodiment, a specially programmed on-board computer connected to the odometer 5 and the control means 4 of the short channel circuit then makes it possible to perform the calculations and to transmit the integrity information.

Le programme d'ordinateur met alors en oeuvre le procédé suivant, figure 4 :

  1. a) stockage en 40 de la référence odométrique D1 du train à l'instant de début d'occupation du circuit de voie court par le train,
  2. b) stockage en 41 de la référence odométrique D2 du train à l'instant de libération du circuit de voie court par le train,
  3. c) calcul en 42 de la distance parcourue par le train entre l'instant de début d'occupation et l'instant de libération par différence des deux références odométriques précédemment stockées, soit D2 - D1. Comme expliqué précédemment, cette distance s'exprime sous forme d'un intervalle de confiance entre une distance minimale et une distance maximale tel que la probabilité que le train n'ait pas parcouru une distance incluse dans cet intervalle de confiance soit inférieure à une probabilité compatible avec les normes de sécurité ferroviaire,
  4. d) calcul en 43 de la longueur minimale du train, celle-ci étant égale à la distance parcourue minimale calculée diminuée de la longueur du circuit de voie court,
  5. e) vérification en 44 de l'intégrité du train par vérification que la longueur minimale calculée est supérieure à la longueur prédéterminée du train moins la longueur d'un wagon.
The computer program then implements the following method, figure 4 :
  1. a) storing at 40 the odometric reference D1 of the train at the instant of beginning of occupation of the short track circuit by the train,
  2. b) storage at 41 of the odometric reference D2 of the train at the instant of release of the short track circuit by the train,
  3. c) calculation at 42 of the distance traveled by the train between the start of occupation time and the release time by difference of the two previously stored odometric references, ie D 2 - D 1 . As explained above, this distance is expressed as a confidence interval between a minimum distance and a maximum distance such that the probability that the train has not traveled a distance included in this confidence interval is less than a probability. compatible with railway safety standards,
  4. d) calculating at 43 the minimum length of the train, the latter being equal to the calculated minimum distance traveled minus the length of the short channel circuit,
  5. e) verifying the integrity of the train by checking that the calculated minimum length is greater than the predetermined length of the train minus the length of a car.

Dans une variante, figure 5, on utilise deux circuits de voie courts 3, 50 distants d'une longueur I12 pour délimiter le circuit de détection, tels que cette longueur I12 est inférieure à la longueur du train.In a variant, figure 5 two short track circuits 3, 50 spaced by a length I 12 are used to delimit the detection circuit, such that this length I 12 is less than the length of the train.

Les instants de relevé des références odométriques correspondent alors à l'instant où le train 1 pénètre sur le second circuit de voie court 50 et à l'instant où il libère le premier circuit de voie court 3, celui-ci se trouvant donc en amont du second circuit de voie court 50 par rapport à la marche du train.The moments of reading of the odometric references then correspond to the moment when the train 1 enters the second short track circuit 50 and at the instant when it releases the first short track circuit 3, which is therefore upstream. the second short track circuit 50 relative to the train running.

L'ensemble se comporte alors comme le circuit de voie court du mode de réalisation précédent dans lequel l'équation (1) devient I t = D 2 - D 1 + I 12

Figure imgb0002
The assembly then behaves like the short path circuit of the previous embodiment in which equation (1) becomes I t = D 2 - D 1 + I 12
Figure imgb0002

La longueur calculée du train est égale à la somme entre la distance minimale parcourue et la distance entre ces deux circuits de voie courts, et est donc indépendante de la longueur des circuits de voie courts.The calculated length of the train is equal to the sum between the minimum distance traveled and the distance between these two short track circuits, and is therefore independent of the length of the short track circuits.

Cette variante de réalisation permet, en allongeant la distance parcourue mesurée, de diminuer l'incertitude de la mesure et donc d'augmenter la précision du système de détection.This variant embodiment makes it possible, by lengthening the measured distance traveled, to reduce the uncertainty of the measurement and therefore to increase the accuracy of the detection system.

Dans une deuxième variante de réalisation, figure 6, le système comporte des moyens 60 de validation de la mesure.In a second variant embodiment, figure 6 the system comprises means 60 for validating the measurement.

Ces moyens 60 de validation utilisent la distance parcourue maximale Dmax.These validation means 60 use the maximum distance traveled D max .

En effet, d'après l'équation (1), la longueur mesurée du train est comprise dans l'intervalle (Dmin-Icv, Dmax-Icv).Indeed, according to equation (1), the measured length of the train is in the range (D min -I cv , D max -I cv ).

Si la longueur prédéterminée du train est supérieure à Dmax-lcv, voire à Dmax, les moyens 60 de validation concluent que la mesure est non valide et déclenchent une alarme.If the predetermined length of the train is greater than D max -l cv , or even D max , the validation means 60 conclude that the measurement is invalid and trigger an alarm.

Cette variante est avantageusement utilisable lors de la constitution du convoi en gare de triage, en complément avec un système classique de comptage de wagons pour valider le système de contrôle de l'intégrité.This variant is advantageously usable during the formation of the convoy at the marshalling yard, in addition to a conventional car counting system to validate the integrity control system.

Dans une troisième variante, les circuits de voie courts sont adaptés pour transmettre l'information de détection d'occupation/libération accompagnée de l'heure à laquelle s'est effectuée cette occupation/libération. La précision du système est augmentée par réduction des incertitudes des valeurs odométriques D1 et D2 liées aux délais de transmission du signal.In a third variant, the short channel circuits are adapted to transmit the occupancy / release detection information accompanied by the time at which this occupancy / release occurred. The accuracy of the system is increased by reducing the uncertainties of the odometric values D1 and D2 related to the delay of transmission of the signal.

Le système et le procédé ainsi décrits permettent donc, avantageusement, une vérification de l'intégrité des trains pour un coût réduit par l'utilisation d'éléments préexistants sur les réseaux ferroviaires et les machines de traction.The system and method thus described thus advantageously make it possible to check the integrity of the trains at a reduced cost by the use of pre-existing elements on railway networks and traction machines.

En d'autres termes, la longueur Icv du circuit de voie utilisé dans l'équation (1) du mode de réalisation de la figure 1 et la distance entre les deux circuits de voie court -I12 utilisée dans l'équation (2) correspondent à un terme générique appelé décalage algébrique de longueur du circuit de détection, le circuit de détection pouvant être décrit comme un segment de voie orienté dans le sens de la marche du train. Le décalage algébrique de longueur du circuit de détection traduit un biais algébrique prédéterminé intervenant dans le calcul de la longueur du train.In other words, the length I cv of the track circuit used in equation (1) of the embodiment of the figure 1 and the distance between the two short channel circuits -I 12 used in equation (2) corresponds to a generic term termed algebraic length offset of the detection circuit, the detection circuit being able to be described as a channel segment oriented in the direction of travel of the train. The algebraic offset of the detection circuit length reflects a predetermined algebraic bias involved in the calculation of the length of the train.

En variante, le procédé mis en oeuvre par le programme d'ordinateur comprend préalablement à l'étape e) une étape consistant à :

  • f) vérifier si la longueur prédéterminée du train est supérieure à une longueur minimale mesurée augmentée du train, cette longueur minimale mesurée augmentée étant calculée comme la différence entre la distance minimale et le décalage algébrique de la longueur du circuit de détection augmentée de la longueur d'un véhicule, le véhicule pouvant être un wagon ou une voiture.
In a variant, the method implemented by the computer program comprises, before step e), a step consisting of:
  • f) checking whether the predetermined length of the train is greater than an increased measured minimum length of the train, this increased measured minimum length being calculated as the difference between the minimum distance and the algebraic offset the length of the detection circuit increased by the length of a vehicle, the vehicle can be a wagon or a car.

Dans le cas où le résultat du test effectué dans l'étape f) est positif, le train est alors suspect de ne pas être intègre et l'étape e) n'est pas effectuée.In the case where the result of the test performed in step f) is positive, the train is then suspected of not being integrity and step e) is not performed.

Claims (12)

  1. A system for checking the integrity of a train of a predetermined length, said system being fitted on board said train and comprising:
    - communication and synchronisation means (7) with means (4) for detecting a detection circuit (3), said detection means (4) being capable of detecting the presence / absence of a train on the detection circuit (3),
    - odometry means (5) connected to the communication and synchronisation means (7) and capable of providing an odometric reference at the start of the train occupying the detection circuit and when the train frees the detection circuit,
    - means (9) for calculating the distance covered by the train between the time of the start of occupation and the time of freeing from the difference between the two odometric references,
    - means (10) for calculating a minimum estimate of the length of the train, the latter being equal to the calculated distance covered reduced by an algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit,
    - integrity information means (11) capable of transmitting a piece of information indicating that the train is complete when the calculated length of the train is greater than the predetermined length of the train less the length of a carriage,
    characterised in that since the odometry means have a determined relative uncertainty, the calculated distance covered is expressed in the form of a confidence interval between a minimum distance and a maximum distance such that the probability that the train has not covered a distance included in this confidence interval is smaller than a probability compatible with the railway safety standards, and the length of the train is then calculated as the difference between the minimum distance and the algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit.
  2. The system for checking the integrity of a train according to Claim 1, characterised in that it comprises means (60) for validating the measurement such as whether the predetermined length of the train is greater than the maximum length of the train, this measured maximum length being calculated as the difference between the maximum distance and the algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit, and then the measurement of the distance covered is considered to be invalid.
  3. The system for checking the integrity of a train according to Claim 1, characterised in that it comprises means (60) for validating the measurement such as whether the predetermined length of the train is greater than an increased measured minimum length of the train, this increased measured minimum length being calculated as the difference between the minimum distance and the algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit increased by the length of a vehicle, and then the train is suspected to no longer be complete.
  4. The system for checking the integrity of a train according to any of Claims 1 to 3, characterised in that the detection circuit comprises a first short track circuit and a second short track circuit spaced apart from the first short track circuit by a determined distance, the distance being smaller than the predetermined length of the train and located downstream of said first short track circuit in relation to the direction of travel of the train, each short track circuit comprising means for detecting the presence of said train, the start of occupation of the detection circuit corresponding to the start of occupation of the second short track circuit, the freeing of the detection circuit corresponding to the freeing of the first short track circuit, the algebraic length of the detection circuit being equal to the measurement in relation to the direction of travel of the train of the vector having for its starting point the point of freeing the detection circuit and for its arrival point the point of starting to occupy the detection circuit, and the algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit is equal to the algebraic length of the detection circuit.
  5. The system for checking the integrity of a train according to any of Claims 1 to 3, characterised in that the detection circuit comprises a short track circuit comprising means for detecting the presence of said train, the start of occupation of the detection circuit corresponding to the start of occupation of the short track circuit, and the freeing of the detection circuit corresponding to the freeing of said short track circuit, and the algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit is equal to the algebraic length of the short track circuit, the algebraic length of the short track circuit being equal to the measurement in relation to the direction of travel of the train of the vector having for its starting point the point of freeing the short track circuit and for its arrival point the point of the start of occupation of the short track circuit.
  6. A method of checking the integrity of a train of a predetermined length during the passage of said train over a detection circuit of a determined length, and said train having an on-board odometry, and said method comprising the steps of:
    a) storing (40) the odometric reference of the train at the time of the train starting to occupy the detection circuit,
    b) storing (41) the odometric reference of the train at the time of the train freeing the detection circuit,
    c) calculation (42) of the distance covered by the train between the time of starting occupation and the time of freeing from the difference between the two previously stored odometric references,
    d) calculation (43) of the length of the train, the latter being equal to the calculated distance covered reduced by an algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit,
    e) checking (44) the integrity of the train by checking that the calculated length is greater than the predetermined length of the train less the length of a carriage, characterised in that since the odometry means have a determined relative uncertainty, the distance covered is expressed in the form of a confidence interval between a minimum distance and a maximum distance such that the probability that the train has not covered a distance included in this confidence interval is smaller than a probability compatible with the railway safety standards, and the length of the train is calculated as the difference between the minimum distance and the algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit.
  7. The method of checking the integrity of a train according to Claim 6, characterised in that prior to step e) it comprises a step of measurement validation such as whether the predetermined length of the train is greater than the maximum length of the train, this maximum length being calculated as the difference between the maximum distance and the algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit, then the measurement of the distance covered is considered to be invalid, and step e) of checking the integrity is not implemented.
  8. The method of checking the integrity of a train according to Claim 6, characterised in that prior to step e) it comprises a step f) of measurement validation such as whether the predetermined length of the train is greater than an increased measured minimum length of the train, this increased measured minimum length being calculated as the difference between the minimum distance and the algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit increased by the length of a vehicle, and then the train is suspected to not be complete, and step e) of checking the integrity is not implemented.
  9. The method of checking according to any of Claims 6 to 8, characterised in that the detection circuit comprises a first short track circuit and a second short track circuit spaced apart from the first short track circuit by a determined length, the distance being smaller than the predetermined length of the train and located downstream of said first short track circuit in relation to the direction of travel of the train, each short track circuit comprising means for detecting the presence of said train, the start of occupation of the detection circuit corresponding to the start of occupation of the second short track circuit, the freeing of the detection circuit corresponding to the freeing of the first short track circuit, the algebraic length of the detection circuit being equal to the measurement in relation to the direction of travel of the train of the vector having for its starting point the point of freeing the detection circuit and for its arrival point the point of starting occupation of the detection circuit, and the algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit is equal to the algebraic length of the detection circuit.
  10. The method of checking the integrity of a train according to any of Claims 6 to 8, characterised in that the detection circuit comprises a short track circuit comprising means for detecting the presence of said train, the start of occupation of the detection circuit corresponding to the start of occupation of the short track circuit, and the freeing of the detection circuit corresponding to the freeing of said short track circuit, and the algebraic offset of the length of the detection circuit is equal to the algebraic length of the short track circuit, the algebraic length of the short track circuit being equal to the measurement in relation to the direction of travel of the train of the vector having for its starting point the point of freeing the short track circuit and for its arrival point the point of starting occupation of the short track circuit.
  11. A computer programme product comprising programme code instructions for implementing the steps of the method according to any of Claims 6 to 10 when said programme is functioning on a computer.
  12. A system for checking the integrity of a train of a predetermined length characterised in that it comprises:
    - a checking system fitted on board the train according to any of Claims 1 to 5, and
    - at least one detection device for each track circuit, said device being adapted to detect the presence/absence of a train on the track circuit, and comprising communication and synchronisation means with the on-board checking system in order to transmit to this system the time of the train starting or finishing occupation of the track circuit.
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US20100185347A1 (en) 2010-07-22
CA2580400C (en) 2016-06-14
EP1832493A1 (en) 2007-09-12
AU2007200972A1 (en) 2007-09-27
PT1832493E (en) 2009-02-16
ES2320048T3 (en) 2009-05-18
US7684905B2 (en) 2010-03-23
US8036784B2 (en) 2011-10-11
FR2898322B1 (en) 2009-12-11
US20070213890A1 (en) 2007-09-13
DE602007000413D1 (en) 2009-02-12
FR2898322A1 (en) 2007-09-14
CA2580400A1 (en) 2007-09-09
ZA200701906B (en) 2008-07-30
AU2007200972B2 (en) 2011-09-08
ATE419157T1 (en) 2009-01-15

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