EP1827045A1 - Réseau de communication avec un terminal radio mobile et un système de contrôle radio pour le chiffrage de données à des niveaux de securité différents - Google Patents

Réseau de communication avec un terminal radio mobile et un système de contrôle radio pour le chiffrage de données à des niveaux de securité différents Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1827045A1
EP1827045A1 EP06252584A EP06252584A EP1827045A1 EP 1827045 A1 EP1827045 A1 EP 1827045A1 EP 06252584 A EP06252584 A EP 06252584A EP 06252584 A EP06252584 A EP 06252584A EP 1827045 A1 EP1827045 A1 EP 1827045A1
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Prior art keywords
confidentiality
security
security level
mobile radio
level
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EP06252584A
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Masayuki c/o Fujitsu Limited Hara
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Fujitsu Ltd
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Fujitsu Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/105—Multiple levels of security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/67—Risk-dependent, e.g. selecting a security level depending on risk profiles
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W28/00—Network traffic management; Network resource management
    • H04W28/16—Central resource management; Negotiation of resources or communication parameters, e.g. negotiating bandwidth or QoS [Quality of Service]
    • H04W28/18—Negotiating wireless communication parameters

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a communication network including mobile radio equipment and a radio control system, and more particularly to mobile radio equipment and a radio control system suitable for the 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP), a standard of the mobile communication system developed by the standardization project of the 3rd generation mobile communication system.
  • 3GPP 3rd generation partnership project
  • Fig. 12 is a diagram showing a network architecture of the 3GPP system.
  • the 3GPP system includes: a core network (CN) 1; a plurality of radio network controllers (RNC) 2 connected to the core network (CN) 1; a plurality of radio base stations (Node B) 3 connected to each radio network controller (RNC) 2; and a plurality of mobile terminals (below, "mobile radio equipment” or “user equipment” (UE)) 4 moving freely among the cells 6 covered by the radio base stations (Node B) 3.
  • CN core network
  • RNC radio network controllers
  • Node B radio base stations
  • UE user equipment
  • a network constituted by the radio network controllers (RNC) 2 and their subordinate radio base stations (Node B) 3 is called a UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN) 5.
  • RNC radio network controllers
  • Node B subordinate radio base stations
  • UTRAN UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network
  • the whole system on the base station side containing the UTRAN 5 and the core network (CN) 1 is called a radio control system, in contrast to the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4.
  • Communication through a transmission line (Uu) between the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 and the radio base station (Node B) 3 is performed by radio.
  • communications through a transmission line (Iub) between the radio base station (Node B) 3 and the radio network controller (RNC) 2 through a transmission line (Iu) between the radio network controller (RNC) 2 and the core network (CN) 1, and through a transmission line (Iur) between the radio network controller (RNC) 2 and another radio network controller (RNC) 2 are performed by wire or optical fibre.
  • the data flow direction from the core network (CN) 1 to the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 is referred to as the downlink (DL), and the opposite direction as the uplink (UL).
  • DL downlink
  • UL uplink
  • Node B radio base stations
  • RNC radio network controller
  • information transmitted between the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 and the UTRAN 5 such as user data, control information, and Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) which is a temporary user-identifier are encrypted/decrypted by the KASUMI algorithm.
  • UE mobile radio equipment
  • TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
  • Fig. 13 is a diagram for explaining the encryption/decryption mechanism of the conventional 3GPP.
  • the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 serves as a transmitter
  • the radio network controller (RNC) 2 serves as a receiver. The situation between them is reversed in the case of the downlink.
  • Each item of mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 and UTRAN 5 includes an identical confidentiality processing (encryption) section, including a confidentiality-code generation block 7 and an exclusive OR operation unit 8.
  • the confidentiality-code generation block 7 performs a so-called f8 algorithm specified by the 3GPP based on confidentiality parameters to generate a confidentiality code KEYSTREAM BLOCK.
  • the exclusive OR operation unit 8 takes an exclusive OR of the confidentiality code KEYSTREAM BLOCK and unencrypted data bit by bit, to encrypt the unencrypted data.
  • Confidentiality parameters required to generate the confidentiality code KEYSTREAM BLOCK are: a frame number COUNT-C; a connection type BEARER; transmission direction DIRECTION; the bit length to be encrypted or decrypted LENGTH; and the confidentiality key (encryption key) CK.
  • the frame number COUNT-C is variable and changes with conditions.
  • the frame number COUNT-C consists of a total of 32 bits consisting of a long period part (HFN) of 24, 25 or 20 bits and a short period part (CFN or SN) of 8, 7, or 12 bits.
  • FSN long period part
  • CFN or SN short period part
  • Other confidentiality parameters are fixed values.
  • the confidentiality-code generation block 7 On the receiver side, the confidentiality-code generation block 7 generates a confidentiality code KEYSTREAM BLOCK by the f8 algorithm using the same confidentiality parameters as the transmitter side; and the exclusive OR operation unit 8 calculates bit by bit the exclusive OR of the confidentiality code KEYSTREAM BLOCK and the received data, to decrypt the data encrypted by the transmitter side.
  • Fig. 14 is a sequence diagram showing the conventional simple confidentiality execution procedure of a dedicated traffic channel (DTCH) for a circuit-switched (CS) call between the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 and UTRAN 5.
  • DTCH dedicated traffic channel
  • CS circuit-switched
  • UE mobile radio equipment
  • UTRAN UTRAN 5
  • COUNT-C connection frame number
  • CFN connection frame number
  • CFN is used as a parameter for matching the time period with each node.
  • the CFN takes a value from 0 to 255, and is incremented with a cycle of 10 ms.
  • the initial value of the hyper frame number (HFN) which is the long period part of the frame number COUNT-C, is notified from the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4, after the RRC connection is established.
  • a ciphering mode info and an activation time which indicate the confidentiality start time, i.e., CFN, are notified by the security mode command to the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 from UTRAN 5.
  • the CFN is set to 12 as the activation time, so that the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 and UTRAN 5 can start the synchronized confidentiality processing when the CFN is 12.
  • confidentiality synchronization cannot be established when the values of the frame number COUNT-C are not in agreement between the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 and UTRAN 5, normal confidentiality processing, i.e., decryption by the UTRAN 5 of the data encrypted by the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4, becomes impossible.
  • Fig. 15 is a diagram for explaining the case where the confidentiality synchronization cannot be established in the confidentiality execution sequence.
  • the radio quality of the transmission line (Uu) between the radio base station (Node B) 3 and the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 is so bad that the data is canceled (becomes lost) in the midway on the transmission line (Uu)
  • re-transmitting of the radio bearer setup signal including the activation time information may sometimes be repeated, as shown in Fig. 15.
  • a radio bearer setup signal may sometimes reach the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 after the original confidentiality start time intended by the side of UTRAN 5 is over. Since the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 derives the activation time from the received radio bearer setup signal, a gap will be produced between the confidentiality start time of UTRAN 5 and that of the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4.
  • a mobile communication terminal having security communication facilities and a server device communicating with the mobile communication terminal through a communication network
  • the mobile communication terminal detects the security level of the connection destination by a detection unit, and reports the detected security level to a user by a reporting unit. By these procedures, the user can check whether the security is ensured at the connection destination.
  • the server device includes a server side detection unit for detecting the security level, and a server side security level setting unit for setting up a security level with which communication is permitted and/or a security level with which communication is not permitted. This allows a user to freely set up a required security level.
  • a different confidentiality code KEYSTREAM BLOCK is generated for every smallest unit of transmission to apply confidentiality on the data, so that most processing capacity of the radio network controller (RNC) 2 and of the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 is spent on this confidentiality processing. Therefore, the throughput capacity of both devices will be lowered. If the throughput capacity of the radio network controller (RNC) 2 is low, it will affect the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 accommodating capacity, and the number of the mobile terminals (UE) 4 to be accommodated will be restricted.
  • a communication network includes mobile radio equipment and a radio control system between which data encrypted at different security levels are transmitted bi-directionally.
  • the mobile radio equipment includes: a security-level selection unit that selects a security level from among a plurality of security levels; an encryption unit that encrypts transmitting data to be transmitted to the radio control system using confidentiality parameters that are notified from the radio control system and correspond to the security level chosen by the security-level selection unit; and a decryption unit that decrypts received data from the radio control system using the confidentiality parameters that are notified from the radio control system and correspond to the security level chosen by the security-level selection unit.
  • Fig. 1 is a diagram showing the constitution of mobile radio equipment (a user terminal or user equipment UE) according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100 includes a security-level selection unit 11, a security-level registration unit 12, a security-level-change request unit 13, an encryption unit 14, a decryption unit 15, a transmitting unit 16, a receiving unit 17, and a bus 10 connecting them mutually.
  • the transmitting unit 16 transmits data to the radio control system 200 shown in Fig. 2 by radio.
  • the receiving unit 17 receives data from the radio control system 200 by radio.
  • the security-level selection unit 11 selects one security level among a plurality of security levels. Upon selection, the user may just operate a user interface, such as a numerical keypad (not shown) of the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100.
  • the security-level registration unit 12 registers beforehand with the radio control system 200 the security level used by the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100 for receiving signals.
  • the security-level-change request unit 13 requests the radio control system 200 to change the security level during a call.
  • the user may just operate the user interface, such as the numerical keypad of the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100, during a call.
  • UE mobile radio equipment
  • the encryption unit 14 encrypts the data to be transmitted to the radio control system 200 using the confidentiality parameters notified from the radio control system 200 corresponding to the security level chosen by the security-level selection unit 11.
  • the encryption unit 14 changes the confidentiality parameters used for encrypting the transmitting data to the confidentiality parameters corresponding to the security level after change, with the timing notified from the radio control system 200 in response to the change request of the security level.
  • the decryption unit 15 decrypts the data received from the radio control system 200 using the confidentiality parameters notified from the radio control system 200 in response to the security level chosen by the security-level selection unit 11.
  • the decryption unit 15 changes the confidentiality parameters used for decrypting the received data to the confidentiality parameters corresponding to the updated security level, with the timing notified from the radio control system 200 in response to the change request of the security level.
  • Fig. 2 is a diagram showing the constitution of the radio control system according to the embodiment of the present invention.
  • the radio control system 200 includes a confidentiality-parameter notifying unit 21, a security-level storage unit 22, a security-level acquisition unit 23, a security-level-change-request acquisition unit 24, a fee change unit 25, an encryption unit 26, a decryption unit 27, a transmitting unit 28, a receiving unit 29, and a signal line 20 connecting the above units to each other.
  • the signal line 20 is a bus when the radio control system 200 consists of a single device, but it is a signal line by wire, such as a fiber-optic cable, when the radio control system 200 is constituted by two or more devices.
  • the transmitting unit 28 transmits data to the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100 by radio.
  • the receiving unit 29 receives data from the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100 by radio.
  • the confidentiality-parameter notifying unit 21 notifies the confidentiality parameters corresponding to the security level notified from the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100 to the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100.
  • the confidentiality-parameter notifying unit 21 notifies the confidentiality parameters corresponding to the security level which the security-level acquisition unit 23 has acquired, to the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100.
  • the security-level-change-request acquisition unit 24 acquires a security level change request from the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100
  • the confidentiality-parameter notifying unit 21 notifies the confidentiality parameters corresponding to the changed security level, and the security level change start timing, to the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100.
  • the security-level storage unit 22 stores the security level notified from the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100 in advance to be used for receiving data.
  • the security-level acquisition unit 23 acquires the security level stored in the security-level storage unit 22.
  • the security-level-change-request acquisition unit 24 acquires the security level change request from the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100 during a call.
  • the fee change unit 25 changes the fee corresponding to the security level before the change into the fee corresponding to the security level after the change, when the security-level-change-request acquisition unit 24 acquires the security level change request from the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100.
  • the encryption unit 26 encrypts the data for transmitting to the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100, using the same confidentiality parameters as those the confidentiality-parameter notifying unit 21 has notified to the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100.
  • the security-level-change-request acquisition unit 24 acquires the security level change request during a call
  • the encryption unit 26 changes the confidentiality parameters used for encrypting the transmitting data to the confidentiality parameters corresponding to the new security level, with a security level change start timing which the confidentiality-parameter notifying unit 21 has notified to the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100.
  • the decryption unit 26 decrypts the data received from the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100, using the same confidentiality parameters as those the confidentiality-parameter notifying unit 21 has notified to the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100.
  • the security-level-change-request acquisition unit 24 acquires the security level change request during a call
  • the decryption unit 27 changes the confidentiality parameters used for decrypting the received data to the confidentiality parameters corresponding to the security level as changed, with the security level change start timing which the confidentiality-parameter notifying unit 21 has notified to the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100.
  • the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100 with the constitution shown in Fig. 1 corresponds to the mobile radio equipment (UE) 4 in the network configuration shown in Fig. 12.
  • the confidentiality-parameter notifying unit 21 and the security-level-change-request acquisition unit 24 in the radio control system 200 shown in Fig. 2 correspond, in the network configuration shown in Fig. 12, to the mobile-services switching center (MSC) (not shown) in the core network (CN) 1 and the radio network controller (RNC) 2 in UTRAN 5.
  • MSC mobile-services switching center
  • RNC radio network controller
  • the security-level acquisition unit 23 and the fee change unit 25 correspond to the MSC.
  • the security-level storage unit 22 corresponds to a home location register (HLR) (not shown) in the core network (CN) 1 in the network configuration shown in Fig. 12.
  • the encryption unit 26, the decryption unit 27, the transmitting unit 28, and the receiving unit 29 correspond to the radio network controller (RNC) 2 in UTRAN 5 in the network configuration shown in Fig. 12.
  • RNC radio network controller
  • Fig. 3 is a diagram showing the constitution of the encryption unit in the mobile radio equipment (UE) and the radio control system.
  • each of the encryption unit 14 of the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100 and the encryption unit 26 of the radio control system 200 includes a confidentiality-code generation block 31 which generates the confidentiality code KEYSTREAM BLOCK by using parameters selected dependent on the security level among six confidentiality parameters: the frame number COUNT-C; the connection type (carrier) BEARER; the direction of transmission DIRECTION; the bit length to be encrypted LENGTH; the confidentiality key CK; and the ALGORITHM which specifies the ciphering (encryption) algorithm according to the security level (hereafter referred to as ciphering algorithm ALGORITHM).
  • Each of the encryption units 14 and 26 also includes an exclusive OR operation unit 32 which encrypts unencrypted data by taking bit by bit the exclusive OR of the confidentiality code KEYSTREAM BLOCK and data to be encrypted.
  • Fig. 4 is a diagram showing the constitution of the decryption unit in the mobile radio equipment (UE) and the radio control system.
  • each of the decryption unit 15 of the mobile radio equipment (UE) 100 and the decryption unit 27 of the radio control system 200 includes a confidentiality-code generation block 33 which generates the confidentiality code KEYSTREAM BLOCK by using the same parameters as the transmitter, selected among six confidentiality parameters: the frame number COUNT-C; the connection type BEARER; the direction of transmission DIRECTION; the bit length to be encrypted LENGTH, the confidentiality key CK; and ciphering algorithm ALGORITHM.
  • Each of the decryption units 15 and 27 also includes an exclusive OR operation unit 34 which decrypts encrypted data by taking bit by bit the exclusive OR of the confidentiality code KEYSTREAM BLOCK and received data.
  • Table 1 COUNT Frame dependent input COUNT [0] ... COUNT [31] BEARER Bearer identity BEARER [0] ... BEARER [4] DIRECTION Direction of transmission DIRECTION[0] CK Confidentiality key CK [0] ...
  • Fig. 5 is a diagram for explaining the confidentiality mechanism at the security level 2. As shown in Fig. 5, confidentiality is applied to the data by scrambling the data with the confidentiality key CK, using the bit length LENGTH and the confidentiality key CK as the confidentiality code KEYSTREAM BLOCK. Therefore, the fee is higher than that at the security level 1.
  • the fee is less expensive than the security level 3 and security level 4 described later.
  • the processing load on the radio network controller (RNC) is reduced compared with the load of confidentiality processing at the security level 4 described later, a user accommodation capacity can be improved.
  • Fig. 6 is a diagram for explaining the confidentiality mechanism at the security level 3.
  • the frame number COUNT-C is fixed.
  • the confidentiality code KEYSTREAM BLOCK is generated with the f8 algorithm using this fixed COUNT-C, the connection type BEARER, the transmission direction DIRECTION, the bit length LENGTH and the confidentiality key CK, to scramble data. Because the confidentiality code KEYSTREAM BLOCK is calculated with the f8 algorithm, the fee is higher than that at the security level 2.
  • the frame number COUNT-C is fixed at the security level 3, the values of COUNT-C do not differ between the mobile radio equipment (UE) and the radio network controller (RNC). That is, it is always possible to establish the confidentiality (encryption/decryption) synchronization. Therefore, the mobile radio equipment (UE) and the radio network controller (RNC) do not need to regulate (synchronize) the frame numbers COUNT-C, a processing load of the radio network controller (RNC) is reduced by that amount, and the user accommodation capacity is improved.
  • the security level is "4". Since confidentiality processing is performed using a variable frame number COUNT-C, the connection type BEARER, the transmission direction DIRECTION, the bit length LENGTH, and the confidentiality key CK, the fee is the highest.
  • the confidentiality processing (level of security) is the same as in the conventional 3GPP system.
  • Fig. 7 is a sequence diagram showing the communication procedure in the case when the mobile radio equipment (UE) transmits signals.
  • the user first operates the mobile radio equipment (UE) to select the security level for the communication to be performed from now on, and performs transmission (Step S1).
  • RRC radio network controller
  • the communication path to the MSC side is secured.
  • CM service request is given in the following Table 3.
  • MSC transmits an authentication request to the mobile radio equipment (UE), in order to perform authentication with the mobile radio equipment (UE) (Step S3).
  • the mobile radio equipment (UE) performs authentication when it receives the authentication request, and notifies the authentication result to MSC by an authentication response (Step S4).
  • MSC Upon receiving the authentication response, MSC notifies the confidentiality parameters conforming with the security level notified from mobile radio equipment (UE) to the radio network controller (RNC) by a security mode command (Step S5). On that occasion, MSC notifies all the confidentiality parameters in order to deal with the security level switching-over during telecommunication.
  • UE mobile radio equipment
  • RNC radio network controller
  • the radio network controller receives the security mode command and notifies the parameters to be used to the mobile radio equipment (UE) by the security mode command, in order to establish the confidentiality synchronization with the mobile radio equipment (UE) following the specified confidentiality procedure (Step S6).
  • the confidentiality at the security level specified by the mobile radio equipment (UE) becomes executable, and subsequently a call (communication) establishment procedure is performed.
  • Fig. 8 is a sequence diagram showing the communication procedure in the case when the mobile radio equipment (UE) receives signals.
  • a signal is transmitted toward destination mobile radio equipment (UE) from same-network mobile radio equipment (UE) or from mobile radio equipment (UE) in another network, it is notified to MSC of the area of the destination mobile radio equipment (UE) (Step S11).
  • MSC makes an inquiry to HLR in order to acquire the position information such as the location registration area of the destination mobile radio equipment (UE) (Step S12).
  • HLR notifies the position information of the corresponding destination mobile radio equipment (UE) to MSC (Step S13).
  • MSC executes paging in order to notify the destination mobile radio equipment (UE) that it has received an arrival (i.e. a call is being placed) (Step S14).
  • the destination mobile radio equipment (UE) receives the paging and returns a paging response to MSC (Step S15).
  • MSC transmits an authentication request to the destination mobile radio equipment (UE) in order to perform authentication with the destination mobile radio equipment (UE) (Step S16).
  • the destination mobile radio equipment (UE) receives the authentication request, it performs authentication and notifies the authentication result to MSC by the authentication response (Step S17).
  • MSC makes a request to HLR for acquisition of the security level registered beforehand by the destination mobile radio equipment (UE) (Step S18), and acquires (downloads) the registered security level from HLR (Step S19). Then, MSC notifies the confidentiality parameters matched to the security level acquired from HLR to the radio network controller (RNC) by a security mode command (Step S20). On that occasion, MSC notifies all the confidentiality parameters in order to deal with the security level switching-over during telecommunication.
  • RNC radio network controller
  • the radio network controller receives the security mode command and notifies the parameters to be used to the destination mobile radio equipment (UE) by the security mode command, in order to establish confidentiality synchronization with the destination mobile radio equipment (UE) following the specified confidentiality procedure (Step S21). Then, a call (communication) establishment procedure is performed. Thus, the confidentiality at the security level registered beforehand by the destination mobile radio equipment (UE) becomes executable.
  • Fig. 9 is a sequence diagram showing the procedure in the case when the mobile radio equipment (UE) registers a security level on reception (e.g. upon connecting with the MSC).
  • the user first operates the mobile radio equipment (UE) to select a security level and performs security level registration (Step S31).
  • RRC radio network controller
  • the communication path to the MSC side is secured.
  • the mobile radio equipment (UE) notifies to MSC by a CM service request that it is performing security level registration (Step S32). Then, MSC transmits an authentication request to the mobile radio equipment (UE), in order to perform authentication with the mobile radio equipment (UE) (Step S33). Upon receiving the authentication request, the mobile radio equipment (UE) performs authentication and notifies the authentication result to MSC by an authentication response (Step S34).
  • MSC Upon receiving the authentication response, if the security level on reception has been already registered, MSC notifies the confidentiality parameters matched with the registered security level to the radio network controller (RNC) by the security mode command. When the security level on reception has not yet been registered, the confidentiality parameters matched with the default security level are notified (Step S35).
  • the default setup although not particularly limited, is security level 4, for example.
  • the radio network controller receives the security mode command and notifies the mobile radio equipment (UE) by the security mode command of the parameters to be used, in order to establish the confidentiality synchronization with the mobile radio equipment (UE) following the specified confidentiality procedure (Step S36). Next, after the confidentiality is established, the mobile radio equipment (UE) notifies the security level it requests to MSC by a security level request (Step S37).
  • MSC receives the security level request and asks for registration of the requested security level to HLR (Step S38).
  • HLR returns a registration completion response to MSC, after registration of the security level is completed (Step S39).
  • MSC transmits a security level completion notification to the mobile radio equipment (UE) to notify that the registration of the security level is completed (Step S40).
  • the security level of the mobile radio equipment (UE) on reception is registered.
  • Fig. 10 is a sequence diagram showing the procedure in the case of changing the security level during a call.
  • the user when the user changes the security level during the call after execution of a call (communication) establishment procedure, the user operates the mobile radio equipment (UE) to request the security level change (Step S51). Then, the mobile radio equipment (UE) transmits a security level change request to the radio network controller (RNC) (Step S52).
  • RNC radio network controller
  • a value of the encryption algorithm ALGORITHM for specifying the security level after change is included in this security level change request.
  • the radio network controller Upon receiving the security level change request, the radio network controller (RNC) computes an activation time to determine the timing for changing the security level. It is necessary to change the fee system together with the change of the security level. Thus, the radio network controller (RNC) transmits the security level change request to MSC to notify that the security level is changed (Step S53).
  • MSC Upon receiving the security level change request, MSC changes the fee setting. After completion of the fee setting change, MSC transmits security level change complete to the radio network controller (RNC) to notify the radio network controller (RNC) that change of fee setting has been completed (Step S54). On receiving the security level change complete, the radio network controller (RNC) notifies the computed activation time to the mobile radio equipment (UE) by a security level change complete (Step S55).
  • the mobile radio equipment (UE) and the radio network controller (RNC) switch-over the confidentiality level synchronously. This is effective when interception by a third party must be prevented for the reasons such as change of the transmitting topic to an important one in the middle of a call.
  • Fig. 11 is a diagram showing an image of the security level change during a call.
  • the radio network controller notifies the mobile radio equipment (UE) that the activation time is "09" and the ciphering algorithm ALGORITHM is "04". Therefore, before the activation time of 9, the security level is 2, for example, so that the frame number COUNT-C, the connection type BEARER, and the transmission direction DIRECTION are invalid.
  • the frame number COUNT-C, the connection type BEARER, and the transmission direction DIRECTION become valid, and the security level changes into the level 4.
  • An example of accounting of CS call is shown in the following Table 4.
  • An example of accounting of packet switched (PS) call is shown in the following Table 5.
  • PS packet switched
  • Table 4 For example, in the case of CS call, communication time is measured and charge is imposed according to the communication time.
  • a packet quantity is measured, and charge is imposed according to the packet quantity.
  • the user of the mobile radio equipment can select the security level freely.
  • such users of mobile radio equipment that select the security level 3 or the security level 4 of high confidentiality for transmission and reception of highly confidential data and select the security level 1 or the security level 2 of low confidentiality for transmission and reception of low confidentiality data will increase in number so that the load on the radio control system side can be reduced. And therefore, the mobile radio equipment accommodation capacity can be increased.
  • the user of the mobile radio equipment (UE) cannot utilize the communication service due to the reason that the confidentiality synchronization cannot be established, the user can restore from the state unable to establish confidentiality synchronization by changing the security level, and becomes able to utilize the communication service.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
EP06252584A 2006-02-28 2006-05-18 Réseau de communication avec un terminal radio mobile et un système de contrôle radio pour le chiffrage de données à des niveaux de securité différents Withdrawn EP1827045A1 (fr)

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JP2006052429A JP2007235353A (ja) 2006-02-28 2006-02-28 移動無線端末および無線制御システム

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