EP1810151A2 - Procede et dispositif pour controler la redondance de dispositifs electriques - Google Patents

Procede et dispositif pour controler la redondance de dispositifs electriques

Info

Publication number
EP1810151A2
EP1810151A2 EP05786985A EP05786985A EP1810151A2 EP 1810151 A2 EP1810151 A2 EP 1810151A2 EP 05786985 A EP05786985 A EP 05786985A EP 05786985 A EP05786985 A EP 05786985A EP 1810151 A2 EP1810151 A2 EP 1810151A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
control
redundancy
electrical
platform
internal
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP05786985A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Norbert LÖBIG
Jürgen TEGELER
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Nokia Solutions and Networks GmbH and Co KG
Original Assignee
Siemens AG
Nokia Siemens Networks GmbH and Co KG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens AG, Nokia Siemens Networks GmbH and Co KG filed Critical Siemens AG
Publication of EP1810151A2 publication Critical patent/EP1810151A2/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/02—Protocols based on web technology, e.g. hypertext transfer protocol [HTTP]
    • H04L67/025—Protocols based on web technology, e.g. hypertext transfer protocol [HTTP] for remote control or remote monitoring of applications
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
    • G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
    • G06F11/16—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware
    • G06F11/20—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements
    • G06F11/202—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements where processing functionality is redundant
    • G06F11/2023—Failover techniques
    • G06F11/2028—Failover techniques eliminating a faulty processor or activating a spare
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
    • G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
    • G06F11/16—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware
    • G06F11/20—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements
    • G06F11/202—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements where processing functionality is redundant
    • G06F11/2038—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements where processing functionality is redundant with a single idle spare processing component
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
    • H04L1/22—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received using redundant apparatus to increase reliability
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/06—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications
    • H04L41/0654—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications using network fault recovery
    • H04L41/0668—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications using network fault recovery by dynamic selection of recovery network elements, e.g. replacement by the most appropriate element after failure
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks

Definitions

  • a plurality of devices are provided, which from the point of view of the application for which they provide redundancy are completely homogeneous.
  • a resource pool with a plurality of devices is defined, which in the event of an error is the resources running on an erroneous electrical device assigns to functioning devices (eg MGCP protocol, code receiver, echo canceller).
  • functioning devices eg MGCP protocol, code receiver, echo canceller.
  • two electrical devices constantly monitor each other. This will be one of the electrical facilities in an active operating state (act) controlled while the remaining electrical device in a standby or standby mode (stb) remains. In this case, all applications of the electrical devices located in the standby operating state are deactivated. Now travels the latter to the conclusion that the active electrical Einrich ⁇ processing fails, it controls itself into a akti ⁇ ven operating condition.
  • the advantage of the invention lies in the provision of a simple and efficient redundancy mechanism which requires no additional hardware for the redundancy check, and at the same time ensures maximum availability and operational reliability.
  • This is achieved by the provision of a two-stage redundancy checking, wherein the first stage (Control 1) has a neutral, third instance, which decides on the equivalent circuit within a redundant pair (Re ⁇ dancy Unit).
  • This concept reduces the Ge ⁇ propelled split brain significantly.
  • the controlling pair is at the same time a controlled pair according to the same mechanism. So there is no separate mechanism for the replacement circuit of the controller.
  • the Redun ⁇ is danzkontrolle simple and efficient. All redundancy control unit platforms can be loaded with applications that require redundancy control. This means that no additional hardware is required.
  • One and the same procedure makes both the controller and the controlled unit highly available.
  • a second stage (Control 2) is optionally provided, the write control within a redundancy unit be ⁇ . It can be provided in addition to the first stage.
  • the combination of both stages has the advantage of a particularly robust redundancy configuration which also withstands certain multiple failures of electrical devices within the quadruple. In practice, this means that whenever a replacement switchable function even one functional platform exists, this continues the associated services.
  • the redundancy handling of functions or processes is supported, which in a certain form (eg with a certain peri pherie in relation) only in each case run on a platform at the same time or allowed to run (eg H.248, where the simultaneous access of different MGCs to one (in the sense of the H.248.1 standard virtual) MG is not permitted), but which must be highly available.
  • Functions or processes that do not have this restriction can architecture be operated on the redundancy unit in server farm.
  • the introduction of the method is completely transparent. This means that the use of the method has no effect on functions of function that do not need it, and thus also in animal end exis ⁇ systems can be easily inserted.
  • RCU 1 shows a redundancy control unit RCU with t redundancy units RUi, RU 2 , RU 3 , RU t ,
  • FIG. 2 shows the conditions in a communication system, consisting of a server farm controller with servers (platforms) of a plurality of redundancy units arranged in pairs,
  • FIG. 3 shows a case example according to which a higher-level device (server farm controller SFC) has no knowledge of the operating state of the individual platforms (servers) of a plurality of redundancy units,
  • redundancy control unit RCU redundancy control unit
  • RCU redundancy control unit
  • RUi redundancy unit
  • RU 2 redundancy unit
  • RU 3 redundancy unit
  • RU t redundancy unit
  • RCU redundancy control unit
  • RUi redundancy unit
  • RU 2 redundancy unit
  • RU 3 redundancy unit
  • RU t redundancy unit
  • Each redundancy unit may have a number k, 1, m, n of platforms different from the other redundancy units.
  • the platforms have the property that each function / application running on a platform of the redundancy unit can be taken over by any other platform of the redundancy unit.
  • Fig. 1 shows a configuration in a general form. This shows a ring topology of redundancy units (each RU monitors its successor and is itself overseen by its predecessor) but it is not necessary for the RU to be a supervisor and a supervised one, all that is required is that each RU of ei is ⁇ ner different monitors. This means that a RU can monitor several other RUs, but each RU the RCU is turned by exactly one whose RU monitors. Quasi star-shaped topologies are therefore also conceivable (eg: RUl monitors RU2, RU3 and RUt. RU2 monitors RUl).
  • the redundancy control unit RCU is formed from two redundancy units, which in turn each consist of two platforms, with which a quadruple is defined.
  • act active mode
  • STB standing ready or standby mode
  • the redundancy control unit RCU illustrated in FIG. 1 represents a two-stage redundancy control / redundancy monitoring. Stage 1 is represented by a control function Control 1 and Level 2 by a control function Control 2. The entire functionality is formed by the two control functions ⁇ Control 1 and Control 2 and represents the redundancy control.
  • the redundancy units monitor each other.
  • the monitoring is carried out such that each Redundanzein ⁇ is standardized maximum monitored by another redundancy unit and turn th monitored none, one or more Redundanzeinhei-.
  • each Redundanzein ⁇ is standardized maximum monitored by another redundancy unit and turn th monitored none, one or more Redundanzeinhei-.
  • the controller monitors and determines the states of all platforms within the controlled redundancy pair. It also has the task of ensuring consistency in terms of redundancy (ie in each case only one platform in "act") within the redundancy few worries.
  • the check is carried out by regularly checking the communication relationship with the associated pair of redundancy.
  • the Kontrollierer determines that the Varu ⁇ munication "act” to a platform in the state a certain amount of time is disrupted, it tries to disable this, it means the “stb” to give state and activates its Re by ⁇ dancy partner ( Entry of the state "act”).
  • Control messages are provided for the realization of this function. These are sent over the control function at least of the Control 1, Chen in the active operating state befindli ⁇ platform in the monitoring redundant pair.
  • the control messages optionally contain parameters such. B. "goto act / stb" by which they tell the receiver that he should go into the active or standby mode.
  • This parameter is always set when the sender has the information as to which of the two platforms should be “act” and which should be “stb”.
  • the acknowledgments on control messages contain the state of the controlled platforms (act / stb).
  • the Kontrol ⁇ losers two ways the monitored platforms (act / stb) states must allocate. He either takes the relevant information from his receipts and accepts them. As an alternative to this, he assigns the first platform, which acknowledges (again), the active operating state. The fact that the parameter "go to act / stb" is always set when it can be set, achieves maximum security.
  • Level 2 describes the control within a redundancy ⁇ unit. It can be provided in addition to the control function Control 1 and ensures consistent (act / stb) states within a monitored redundancy unit (ie only one platform may be active) if Control 1 has failed. This is done by an internal mutual surveil ⁇ monitoring of the platforms, the results are also used to Steue ⁇ the redundancy tion states (act / stb) of the platforms of the re dundanziens. Control 2 operates autonomously and is thus able to provide an alternative switching function within the redundancy pair even if the control function Control 1 has failed. Conversely, the results of Control 2 can preferably only be evaluated if Control 1 has failed.
  • Control 1 whenever Control 1 is active, it also has the redundancy control in this case.
  • Control 2 runs constantly and takes control immediately if Control 1 fails.
  • a simple software can achieve structure with clear division of responsibilities and the risk of compe ⁇ tenzkonflikts between Control 1 and Control 2 avoided ⁇ to.
  • Control 2 only needs to be active on the monitored redundancy unit.
  • the messages exchanged in the context of Control 1 and Control 2 can be used in addition to the setting information regarding the alternative functions to be switched (ACT / STB) and also other information such.
  • B. in the case where the active platform is temporarily not reached by the controlling Platform, but an STB platform of the controlled redundancy unit is reachable and announces that it itself has communication to the active platform.
  • the acknowledgments on control messages may also contain other information which is relevant for the decision of the controller, which platform should be act and which stb should be. For example, may be a relevant criterion as to whether the RU's platforms are in contact with other units of the overall system. If the stb platform has a better connection status here, this could be a reason for switching.
  • control function Control 2 is implemented within the redundant pair so that only the active platform sen regularly control commands to their redundancy partner ⁇ det.
  • the active platform monitors whether its control messages are acknowledged.
  • Both platforms of the redundancy pair monitor whether they receive control commands from the redundancy partner .
  • each platform of the redundancy pair obtains information as to whether its partner platform ever communicates with it and, if so, in which state (act / stb) the partner platform is located.
  • each acknowledgment on a control command must contain the status (act / stb) of the recipient of the control command. Furthermore, it must each of the two flat ⁇ form at each cycle (control command / receipt) to ei ⁇ -related state against the redundancy partner (the sender of control commands must always be active) check. If there is an inconsistency (eg both platforms in active operating state), this can be done eg. This can be remedied by, for example, dropping each of the platforms back into their default redundancy state (which, of course, only one active platform within the redundancy couple). For security, a check of the internal communication network should additionally take place in order to rule out that a failure of the same leads to the fact that several platforms of a redundancy unit become active.
  • the redundancy unit RU t represents kontrollie ⁇ Rende redundancy unit. It monitors the communication relations between itself and all platforms Plfl ... Plfk of the controlled redundancy unit (eg RUi).
  • the controlling redundancy unit RU t also sets the to ⁇ stands (act / stb) on all platforms Plfl ... Plfk the kon ⁇ trolled redundancy unit RUi and is responsible for borrowed that these are consistent, ie profiled in the kontrol ⁇ redundancy unit RUi is merely a platform in ak ⁇ tive operating condition.
  • the active platform PIf1 controlled by the platform PIf3 has failed. This answers no more control commands of the platform Plf3.
  • Platform Plf3 monitors whether its control commands are acknowledged. If no receipt was ⁇ troll details received for a certain number Kon and no contrary indication from the communication with the redundant to Plfl platform PLF2 is present, the Platt ⁇ includes form pLF3 that Plfl has failed and is from now on in the control messages to the platform PIf 1 the parameter "go to stb" and in the control messages to the platform PIf2 the parameter "go to act”.
  • the platform goes PIP2 is ⁇ aufhin to "act”.
  • the platform Plfl is the message we ⁇ gen recovery or defect usually not initially empfan- gen.
  • platform Plf4 notices that the control commands of the platform Plf3 are missing and after a certain time itself goes to "act”. This means that even with 3 out ⁇ incurred platforms fourth "act" within the redundancy control unit principle and the maximum in these circumstances service provides. It also serves the control function Control 1 in relation to the platforms Plfl / Plf2 and also the control function Control 2 opposite to the platform Plf3. That is, when one of these pills becomes available again, it automatically goes into the right state.
  • any platform in the quad will finish its recovery first. There is therefore no overlapping of control messages. If a platform has completed the recovery of its other functionality (except for the redundancy check) and is thus able to run, it must they undergo a specific handling for the redundancy check in order to decide whether they are in the "act" or "stb" state in the sense of the redundancy check. To do this, she defines a certain guard time, in which she listens to which control commands she receives. Three cases differ to un ⁇ :
  • one of the platforms is first a Redundanzpaa ⁇ res, such as taking the platform Plfl out of service. Thereafter, the platform Plf2 is automatically controlled to the active operating state (if it was not already), the control function Control 1 remains active on both sides. This still gives a very high availability and security of the 3 remaining, functional platforms.
  • the "stb" platform can be deliberately taken out of service so that there is no impairment of the services at all at this point.
  • the decommissioned platform Plfl is loaded with the new software and started up again.
  • the platform PfIl is assigned a standby mode, the other states in the quadruple do not change.
  • the active platform Plf2 in the same redundancy pair is now decommissioned, which automatically puts the platform PIf1 into active mode. This is the SW upgrade in operation.
  • the control function Control 1 is again available on both sides after a very short time. After loading the new software on the platform PIP2, these naval vessel ⁇ will go.
  • the platform Pf12 is assigned the standby mode, the other states in the quadruple do not change. This completes the SW upgrade in the redundancy pair (PIf1, PIf2).
  • (, pLF4 pLF3) do likewise with other Redun ⁇ impedance pairs.
  • the simultaneous shutdown configuration and reloading of the STB platforms can alternatively be performed, followed by the decommissioning and reloading of the existing ACT platforms.
  • Fig. 3 shows a configuration in a Medunikationssys ⁇ system is described that incorporates the architecture described above.
  • An example of such devices are server farm architectures of a switching system.
  • Egg ⁇ ne server farm consists here usually consists of a server farm controller and multiple servers.
  • the server farm controller distributes the incoming traffic according to certain criteria to the servers that are available from his point of view. To find out, he monitors the servers with the help of a control protocol.
  • the server farm controller uses the platforms in load-sharing operation and issues jobs to all platforms of a redundancy unit, although according to the redundancy mechanism according to the invention only a single one of them is able to accept these jobs operate (Fig. 3).
  • a so-called "Relay” function is introduced.
  • the relay function causes messages via an internal communication interface to a "stb" platform ge ⁇ sends are (1) to be forwarded by this sight unseen on their "act" re- dancy partner (2).
  • the active Platt ⁇ form processes these messages as if they had come directly from the server farm controller. If a receipt zu ⁇ back sent must be, by either the acti ⁇ ven platform directly to the server farm controllerlitisge- posted (5) or it goes way back on standby
  • the server farm controller uses the redundancy unit, in particular a pair of redundancy already after one self-defined active / standby mode, which only coincidentally o- at least not sure to coincide with the determined by the inventive method certain.
  • the alternative use is determined by the responsiveness of the redundancy partner selected by the server farm controller or by explicit, application-specific communication between the redundancy partner selected by the server farm controller and the server farm controller.
  • the stand-by platform disables its communication with the server farm controller, forcing it to switch to the remaining enabled platform.
  • the Appli cation ⁇ informed on the ge from the standby mode to the active mode ⁇ switched platforms the server farm controller on appli- cation level about the availability of the platform with respect to the application. For this purpose, if necessary, an existing or a new interface to be used, which may ge ⁇ ringer adaptation effort in the server farm controller may arise.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Quality & Reliability (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Hardware Redundancy (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Les dispositifs électriques offrent en règle générale une fiabilité élevée et une bonne sécurité de fonctionnement. Cela se vérifie en particulier pour des systèmes de communication où la disponibilité constante de tous les dispositifs est indispensable. Pour cette raison, pour garantir une bonne sécurité de fonctionnement, de la capacité de calcul est maintenue en réserve pour permettre, en cas de panne d'un dispositif électrique, la transmission des fonctions momentanément interrompues, à un autre dispositif électrique (actif). La commande de ces processus est prise en charge par un système de contrôle de redondance. Dans l'état de la technique se pose le problème que tous les procédés de contrôle de redondance s'avèrent onéreux (dispositifs/HW supplémentaires) ou peu fiables (risque de dichotomie) ou parfois les deux. Pour pallier cet inconvénient, chacun des dispositifs électriques est selon l'invention surveillé par un autre des dispositifs électriques, et surveille éventuellement de son côté au moins l'un des dispositifs électriques.
EP05786985A 2004-10-15 2005-09-16 Procede et dispositif pour controler la redondance de dispositifs electriques Withdrawn EP1810151A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102004050350A DE102004050350B4 (de) 2004-10-15 2004-10-15 Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Redundanzkontrolle von elektrischen Einrichtungen
PCT/EP2005/054609 WO2006042775A2 (fr) 2004-10-15 2005-09-16 Procede et dispositif pour controler la redondance de dispositifs electriques

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1810151A2 true EP1810151A2 (fr) 2007-07-25

Family

ID=36120552

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP05786985A Withdrawn EP1810151A2 (fr) 2004-10-15 2005-09-16 Procede et dispositif pour controler la redondance de dispositifs electriques

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (1) US20070270984A1 (fr)
EP (1) EP1810151A2 (fr)
CN (1) CN101040264B (fr)
DE (1) DE102004050350B4 (fr)
RU (1) RU2007117921A (fr)
WO (1) WO2006042775A2 (fr)

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE102004050350B4 (de) 2006-11-23
WO2006042775A3 (fr) 2007-02-08
WO2006042775A2 (fr) 2006-04-27
DE102004050350A1 (de) 2006-04-20
CN101040264A (zh) 2007-09-19
US20070270984A1 (en) 2007-11-22
CN101040264B (zh) 2011-09-14
RU2007117921A (ru) 2008-11-20

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