EP1726181A1 - Protokollerweiterung einer signalisierungsnachricht - Google Patents
Protokollerweiterung einer signalisierungsnachrichtInfo
- Publication number
- EP1726181A1 EP1726181A1 EP05717032A EP05717032A EP1726181A1 EP 1726181 A1 EP1726181 A1 EP 1726181A1 EP 05717032 A EP05717032 A EP 05717032A EP 05717032 A EP05717032 A EP 05717032A EP 1726181 A1 EP1726181 A1 EP 1726181A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- communication terminal
- signaling message
- sgsn
- network
- message
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
- H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
- H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method and a device for detecting a change in a signaling message sent from a network unit to a communication terminal.
- SGSN Serving GPRS Support Node
- UDP User Datagram Protocol
- IP Internet protocol
- From document D3 (2004/0037320 AI) are techniques for transmitting packets from a transmission unit over a wireless communication system to a receiver unit known. Data frames contained in a packet are received. One or more headers are generated for the package for one or more protocols in the protocol field. RTP, UDP, IP, PPP, RLP and variants can be used as protocols.
- Document D4 discloses a method for transmitting a message to a plurality of terminals in a network using a group call service (multicast service).
- the group call message is encrypted and sent to several end devices at the same time. Since the radio interface between a base station and communication terminal or mobile device basically offers many possibilities for attackers, an attacker with a so-called "wrong base station" can position himself between the communication terminal and the real base station. The wrong base station behaves like a base station towards the communication terminal, like a communication terminal towards the real base station. By falsifying the messages that are exchanged between the communication terminal and network units, the wrong base station can e.g.
- a method for protecting against deletion of messages is in the UMTS network according to 3GPP TS 33.102, Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Security architecture, Release 5.3.0 (2003-10-03), Chapter 6.3 implemented.
- UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
- 3G security 3G security
- Security architecture Release 5.3.0 (2003-10-03), Chapter 6.3 implemented.
- an authentication procedure is carried out in which the Mobile device authenticated to the communication network and a secret temporary key IK is agreed between the mobile device and the communication network.
- a signed response (signed response) is created in the communication network or mobile radio network in a special network unit, the authentication center (AuC), from the subscriber's secret key Ki and a random number RAND with the aid of a function f2K (RAND, Ki) ) (SRES) and with the help of another function f4K (RAND, Ki) a temporary secret key IK is calculated.
- RAND, SRES and IK are then sent to the switching unit MSC or to the service GPRS support unit SGSN to which the mobile radio device is currently connected.
- the MSC or SGSN finally sends with a message
- Authentication request the random number RAND to the mobile device.
- the RAND and the secret key Ki with the help of the functions f2K (RAND, Ki) and f4K (RAND, Ki) the signed response (signed response) ( SRES) and the temporary secret key IK is calculated.
- the mobile device then sends the value SRES back to the communication network with an authentication response message.
- the MSC or SGSN compares this value with the value calculated by the AuC authentication center. If both match, the mobile device is considered successfully authenticated.
- the mobile radio device and communication network have generated a temporary secret key IK using this procedure.
- the sender of the message calculates a test value hash (message, IK) with the aid of the secret key IK.
- the check value hash (message, IK) is generated using the temporary key IK calculates because the secret key Ki may never leave the authentication center Authentication Center ia.
- the test message is then transmitted with the message and checked by the mobile radio device. If the message was changed by an incorrect base station, the mobile radio device will usually recognize this from the fact that the test value is no longer correct, since the wrong base station does not know the secret key IK and therefore cannot calculate the test value for the changed message.
- Authentication request message must not change, because otherwise the mobile device wrong SRES value calculated and the authentication procedure does not exist.
- a specially defined bit sequence is entered in the first 32 bits of the RAND parameter, which indicates to the mobile radio device that certain information is transmitted in the following n bits of the RAND parameter.
- Standardization contribution S3-030463 specifically suggests coding in the next 8 bits which GSM cipher algorithms are permitted in the network and which are not. This is to prevent the wrong base station on the radio interface from sending messages to the mobile radio device can manipulate in such a way that a cryptographically weaker cipher algorithm is selected.
- the special bit sequence is required because this protocol extension is not supported by all networks from the start. The longer the special bit sequence, the less likely it is that a
- Communication network that does not yet support the protocol extension, randomly selects the special bit sequence when selecting RAND parameters, and the mobile radio device then mistakenly interprets the other bits in the RAND parameter as information. For 32 bits, this probability is, for example, 1: 2 32 «l: 4xl0 9 .
- a protocol extension should support a
- Protocol extension also supports tampering with the authentication request message.
- the communication terminal or the mobile radio device should also function in old networks (GSM networks, etc.) which do not yet support the protocol extension. Naturally, the communication terminal or the mobile radio device cannot then detect message falsifications.
- the communication terminal or the mobile radio device must be able to recognize whether it is in an old or a new network, in particular also when a wrong base station tries to simulate an "old network" for it.
- n + 1 of the protocol is protected.
- the new version "n + 1" should be backwards compatible with the previous version "n".
- a possible falsification by an incorrect base station could, for example, be that the new message elements are simply omitted.
- the mobile radio device then assumes that it is in a network with protocol version "n".
- the object of the invention is to be seen in proposing a possibility for an efficient and simple detection of a change in a signaling message.
- the object is achieved according to the invention by the subject matter of the independent claims. Developments of the invention are specified in the subclaims.
- a core of the invention is to be seen in that, in order to detect a change in a signaling message sent from a network unit to a communication terminal, a bit sequence known to a network unit and the communication terminal indicates in a sent signaling message (authentication request) that in a
- Signaling message (Authentication Request; further message) a check value is included.
- the signaling message that contains the check value can be an authentication request message or a subsequent message or
- the test value received by the communication terminal is compared with a test value calculated by the communication terminal.
- the communication terminal which is, for example, a mobile radio terminal, a mobile computer, a mobile organizer, etc., then defines a signaling message (Authentication Request; further message) as unchanged if the bit sequence was received in a signaling message (Authentication Request) and the comparison of the both test values delivers a positive result.
- the special bit sequence itself is suitably protected during the transmission, so that changes by an incorrect base station are noticed by the communication terminal or by the network unit.
- the special bit sequence is contained in the RAND parameter. Due to the special bit sequence in the RAND parameter, the communication terminal can handle large Detect security whether the communication network supports the protocol extension of the signaling message. If the wrong base station changes the RAND parameter in order to simulate an "old" network for the communication terminal, this is noticed by the network unit, in particular by a switching unit MSC or by a service GPRS support unit SGSN, because the
- Authentication procedure fails. Another advantage is that by using your own test equipment, the amount of information that can be protected is no longer restricted from the outset. If new message elements are added to the signaling message, these can be automatically taken into account when calculating the test. New message elements can also be added in later ones
- Protocol versions are added.
- the authentication function f2K (RAND, Ki) is weakened less because only the bit sequence in the signaling message is embedded in the RAND parameter, but not the other message elements to be protected.
- the variation options for the RAND parameter remain greater.
- all of the following signaling messages can also be protected by a test value. This leads to more efficient protection against possible attackers with "wrong base stations".
- FIG. 1 shows a network architecture with a “wrong base station
- FIG. 2 shows a simplified network architecture for performing the method according to the invention
- FIG. 3 shows a communication terminal for receiving a signaling message from a network unit
- Figure 4 is a simplified representation of a network unit according to the invention.
- FIG. 1 shows a network architecture of a mobile radio network with a “wrong base station” f-BSS, which is positioned between a communication terminal or mobile radio device MS and a base station BSS.
- the wrong base station behaves with respect to the mobile radio device MS like a base station BSS with respect to the real one Base station BSS like a mobile radio device MS.
- the wrong base station f-BSS can, for example, ensure that a mobile radio call is encrypted using a cryptographically weaker method and is therefore easier to listen to can be a network unit
- MSC / SGSN can be a switching unit MSC or a service GPRS support unit SGSN.
- FIG. 2 shows a simplified illustration for carrying out the method according to the invention.
- the communication network here a mobile radio network
- the authentication center AuC in a special network unit, the authentication center AuC, a "signed response" (using the function f2K (RAND, Ki) is made from the subscriber's secret key Ki and a random number RAND ( SRES) and with the help of another
- Function f4K calculates a temporary secret key IK.
- RAND, -SRES and IK are then, depending on the mobile network used (GSM network, UMTS network etc.), sent to the network unit MSC / SGSN (switching unit MSC or service GPRS support unit SGSN) with which the mobile radio MS is currently connected is.
- the switching unit MSC or the service GPRS support unit SGSN finally sends the random number parameter RAND, a test value created by the network unit MSC / SGSN and further parameters to the mobile radio device MS with a signaling message “Authentication Request” (Authentication Request).
- the RAND - Parameter contains a special bit sequence that both the Mobile radio device as well as the network unit MSC / SGSN is known and is protected against change, for example by a "wrong base station".
- the protection consists in that the communication terminal MS changes the bit sequence by an attacker with "wrong"
- the authentication center AuC could also consist of at least two Bit sequences, which are known both to the network unit MSC / SGSN and to the communication terminal MS, select and use a bit sequence for sending between the network unit MSC / SGSN and the communication terminal MS
- Bit sequences may generally only be generated by the authentication center AuC if it is known that the communication network in which the communication terminal MS or the mobile radio device MS is currently supporting the protocol extension, i.e. if the network unit MSC / SGSN in the It is able to calculate the test value and send it along with the authentication request message.
- S3-030463 3GPP TSG SA WG3 Security, Cipher key Separation for A / Gb security enhancements, 15 - 18 July 2003, San Francisco, USA, Agenda Unige 7.5, Source: Vodafone
- this can be done for the roaming case - That means if "the subscriber is not in his home communication network - can be solved by the authentication center AuC identifying the mobile network (or the switching unit MSC or the
- the test value “hash” f (message, IK) is determined by the network unit MSC / SGSN from the content of the signaling message and the key IK.
- the "signed response" (SRES) and the temporary secret key IK are calculated from the RAND parameter and the secret key Ki using the functions f2K (RAND, Ki) and f4K (RAND, Ki).
- the special 5 bit sequence in the RAND parameter of the signaling message "Authentication request" indicates to the mobile radio device MS that a test value "hash” f (message, IK) must be contained in the signaling message.
- the special bit sequence could also be contained in another parameter if it is ensured that the mobile radio device MS or the network unit MSC / SGSN can recognize a change in this parameter due to an incorrect base station.
- the communication terminal MS or the mobile radio device MS calculates its own test value “hash” (message, IK), which is calculated from the content of the message and the temporary secret key IK, and compares the calculated test value with the test contained in the signaling message.
- FIG. 3 shows a representation of a communication terminal MS for receiving a signaling message from a network unit MSC / SGSN.
- the communication terminal MS has for mobile communication, in particular for mobile communication with a mobile radio network, a receiving unit E and a transmitting unit S.
- a processing unit V can use a special bit sequence in the signaling message, in particular in the RAND parameter, to recognize that the signaling message must contain a test value “hash” f (message, IK).
- the communication terminal MS or the mobile radio device MS calculates one own test value "hash" (message, IK), which is calculated from the content of the message and the temporary secret key IK and compares the calculated test value with the test value contained in the signaling message.
- the communication terminal MS defines the signaling message as unchanged only if the comparison of the two test values delivers a positive result. It is considered a positive result that the two test values are identical.
- the special bit sequence signals that in the communication network in which the communication network is currently also all subsequent messages from the
- Communication network or sent from the network unit MSC / SGSN to the communication terminal MS must contain a test value.
- FIG. 4 shows a simplified illustration of a network unit MSC / SGSN according to the invention.
- the network unit MSC / SGSN has a receiving unit EE and a transmitting unit SE for mobile communication, in particular for mobile communication with a mobile radio network.
- processing work VE receives parameters from an authentication center AuC and determines a test value “hash” f (message, IK), which it (VE) sends together with further parameters to a connected communication terminal MS in a signaling message.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE102004013658A DE102004013658B3 (de) | 2004-03-19 | 2004-03-19 | Protokollerweiterung einer Signalisierungsnachricht |
PCT/EP2005/051152 WO2005091662A1 (de) | 2004-03-19 | 2005-03-15 | Protokollerweiterung einer signalisierungsnachricht |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1726181A1 true EP1726181A1 (de) | 2006-11-29 |
Family
ID=34961404
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP05717032A Withdrawn EP1726181A1 (de) | 2004-03-19 | 2005-03-15 | Protokollerweiterung einer signalisierungsnachricht |
Country Status (8)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US8457313B2 (de) |
EP (1) | EP1726181A1 (de) |
JP (1) | JP4847951B2 (de) |
KR (1) | KR101178272B1 (de) |
DE (1) | DE102004013658B3 (de) |
MX (1) | MXPA06010652A (de) |
RU (1) | RU2384018C2 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2005091662A1 (de) |
Families Citing this family (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102004013658B3 (de) * | 2004-03-19 | 2005-12-08 | Siemens Ag | Protokollerweiterung einer Signalisierungsnachricht |
CN100512300C (zh) * | 2006-01-13 | 2009-07-08 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种在传输实时流时业务切换的方法 |
US20070258384A1 (en) * | 2006-03-03 | 2007-11-08 | Interdigital Technology Corporation | Method and system for enhanced basic service set transition for a high throughput wireless local area network |
TWI406537B (zh) * | 2009-08-24 | 2013-08-21 | Univ Nat Central | Action Group Location System and Its Method |
CN107800539B (zh) * | 2016-09-05 | 2020-07-24 | 华为技术有限公司 | 认证方法、认证装置和认证系统 |
Family Cites Families (19)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR2649842B1 (fr) | 1989-07-17 | 1994-04-08 | Alcatel Cit | Reseau d'acces pour service de telephonie sans fil |
US5537474A (en) * | 1994-07-29 | 1996-07-16 | Motorola, Inc. | Method and apparatus for authentication in a communication system |
US5513245A (en) * | 1994-08-29 | 1996-04-30 | Sony Corporation | Automatic generation of private authentication key for wireless communication systems |
DE19823532C2 (de) * | 1998-05-26 | 2003-08-21 | T Mobile Deutschland Gmbh | Verfahren zur Steuerung eines Teilnehmeridentitätsmoduls (SIM) in Mobilfunksystemen |
GB2340344A (en) * | 1998-07-29 | 2000-02-16 | Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd | Bilateral Data Transfer Verification for Programming a Cellular Phone |
FI107486B (fi) * | 1999-06-04 | 2001-08-15 | Nokia Networks Oy | Autentikaation ja salauksen järjestäminen matkaviestinjärjestelmässä |
GB0004178D0 (en) * | 2000-02-22 | 2000-04-12 | Nokia Networks Oy | Integrity check in a communication system |
FI20000760A0 (fi) * | 2000-03-31 | 2000-03-31 | Nokia Corp | Autentikointi pakettidataverkossa |
EP1209935B1 (de) | 2000-11-24 | 2005-10-12 | Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) | Betrugsfeststellungsverfahren für Mobiltelekommunikationsnetze |
WO2002069560A1 (en) | 2001-02-23 | 2002-09-06 | Nokia Inc. | System and method for strong authentication achieved in a single round trip |
US6985519B1 (en) * | 2001-07-09 | 2006-01-10 | Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. | Software modem for communicating data using separate channels for data and control codes |
WO2003036857A1 (en) * | 2001-10-24 | 2003-05-01 | Nokia Corporation | Ciphering as a part of the multicast cencept |
CN100505623C (zh) * | 2002-03-26 | 2009-06-24 | 诺基亚有限公司 | 用于鉴权的装置、方法和系统 |
WO2003090433A1 (en) | 2002-04-15 | 2003-10-30 | Spatial Wireless, Inc. | Method and system for providing authentication of a mobile terminal in a hybrid network for data and voice services |
US6985459B2 (en) * | 2002-08-21 | 2006-01-10 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Early transmission and playout of packets in wireless communication systems |
AU2003293381A1 (en) * | 2002-12-03 | 2004-06-23 | Funk Software, Inc. | Tunneled authentication protocol for preventing man-in-the-middle attacks |
ES2384634T7 (es) * | 2003-09-26 | 2018-10-11 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Diseño de seguridad mejorado para criptografía en sistemas de comunicaciones de móviles |
DE102004013658B3 (de) * | 2004-03-19 | 2005-12-08 | Siemens Ag | Protokollerweiterung einer Signalisierungsnachricht |
KR100636318B1 (ko) * | 2004-09-07 | 2006-10-18 | 삼성전자주식회사 | CoA 바인딩 프로토콜을 이용한 어드레스 오너쉽인증방법 및 그 시스템 |
-
2004
- 2004-03-19 DE DE102004013658A patent/DE102004013658B3/de not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2005
- 2005-03-15 KR KR1020067020127A patent/KR101178272B1/ko not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2005-03-15 US US10/593,406 patent/US8457313B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2005-03-15 EP EP05717032A patent/EP1726181A1/de not_active Withdrawn
- 2005-03-15 JP JP2007503339A patent/JP4847951B2/ja not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2005-03-15 WO PCT/EP2005/051152 patent/WO2005091662A1/de active Application Filing
- 2005-03-15 MX MXPA06010652A patent/MXPA06010652A/es active IP Right Grant
- 2005-03-15 RU RU2006136911/09A patent/RU2384018C2/ru not_active IP Right Cessation
Non-Patent Citations (2)
Title |
---|
None * |
See also references of WO2005091662A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
KR101178272B1 (ko) | 2012-08-30 |
RU2006136911A (ru) | 2008-04-27 |
MXPA06010652A (es) | 2007-03-30 |
US8457313B2 (en) | 2013-06-04 |
DE102004013658B3 (de) | 2005-12-08 |
JP4847951B2 (ja) | 2011-12-28 |
US20070207776A1 (en) | 2007-09-06 |
RU2384018C2 (ru) | 2010-03-10 |
JP2007529933A (ja) | 2007-10-25 |
WO2005091662A1 (de) | 2005-09-29 |
KR20060129071A (ko) | 2006-12-14 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
DE60109993T2 (de) | Verfahren zur überprüfung der menge übermittelter daten | |
EP1365620B1 (de) | Verfahren zum Registrieren eines Kommunikationsendgeräts in einem Dienstnetz (IMS) | |
EP1952574B1 (de) | Verfahren und anordnung zum bereitstellen eines drahtlosen mesh-netzwerks | |
FI112419B (fi) | Menetelmä tiedonsiirron salaamiseksi | |
DE60125519T2 (de) | Zählerinitialisierung, insbesondere für funkrahmen | |
DE69828572T2 (de) | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur umlenkung einer verbindung in einer verbindung in einem fernmeldenetz mit einer vielzahl von netzelementen | |
EP2025120B1 (de) | Verfahren und system zum bereitstellen eines mobile ip schlüssels | |
DE10138718A1 (de) | Verfahren zur Übermittlung von Chiffrierungsinformationen an Teilnehmer einer Multicast-Gruppe | |
EP1982495B1 (de) | Verfahren zum sichern der authentizität von nachrichten, die gemäss einem mobile internet protokoll ausgetauscht werden | |
WO2007051793A1 (de) | Teilnehmerspezifisches erzwingen von proxy-mobile-ip (pmip) anstelle von client-mobile-ip (cmip) | |
EP1726181A1 (de) | Protokollerweiterung einer signalisierungsnachricht | |
DE602004012465T2 (de) | Vorrichtung und verfahren zur betrugsverhinderung beim zugriff durch drahtlose lokale netzwerke | |
DE60208909T2 (de) | Verfahren zur steuerung einer netzwerkeinheit und einer mobilstation | |
DE102005012667B4 (de) | Protokollerweiterung einer IRI-Informationsnachricht | |
EP1285547B1 (de) | Verfahren und system zum anmelden einer teilnehmer-station an der paketdienst-dienstezustands-steuerfunktion cscf in einem kommunikationssystem | |
DE102006054091B4 (de) | Bootstrapping-Verfahren | |
WO2004021663A1 (de) | Verfahren sowie vorrichtung zur datenquellenspezifischen kennzeichnung von push-nutzdaten | |
EP1680906B1 (de) | Authentizität und aktualität von sitzungsschlüssel-generierungen zwischen einem dienste-netzknoten und mindestens einem kommunikationsendgerät mit einer identifikationskarte | |
EP2528364B1 (de) | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Bereitstellen einer Identifikationskennung eines elektronischen Endgeräts | |
WO2004080093A1 (de) | Erfassung des ortes von abzuhörenden mobilfunkteilnehmern | |
EP2237600A1 (de) | Begrenzung der Datenübertragungsrate für eine Datenverbindung in einem Mobilfunksystem | |
WO2008074620A2 (de) | Verfahren und server zum bereitstellen eines zweckgebundenen schlüssels | |
WO2004043014A2 (de) | Verfahren zum übertragen von daten | |
EP2536101B1 (de) | Verfahren zum Aufbau einer verschlüsselten Verbindung, Netzvermittlungseinheit und Telekommunikationssystem | |
DE10356091A1 (de) | Verfahren zur Sicherung des Datenverkehrs zwischen einem Mobilfunknetz und einem IMS-Netz |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PUAI | Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012 |
|
17P | Request for examination filed |
Effective date: 20060914 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU MC NL PL PT RO SE SI SK TR |
|
17Q | First examination report despatched |
Effective date: 20070110 |
|
DAX | Request for extension of the european patent (deleted) | ||
RAP1 | Party data changed (applicant data changed or rights of an application transferred) |
Owner name: SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT |
|
RAP1 | Party data changed (applicant data changed or rights of an application transferred) |
Owner name: SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT |
|
RIC1 | Information provided on ipc code assigned before grant |
Ipc: H04W 12/12 20090101AFI20170124BHEP Ipc: H04W 12/10 20090101ALN20170124BHEP |
|
GRAP | Despatch of communication of intention to grant a patent |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR1 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: GRANT OF PATENT IS INTENDED |
|
RIC1 | Information provided on ipc code assigned before grant |
Ipc: H04W 12/10 20090101ALN20170302BHEP Ipc: H04W 12/12 20090101AFI20170302BHEP |
|
INTG | Intention to grant announced |
Effective date: 20170313 |
|
RAP1 | Party data changed (applicant data changed or rights of an application transferred) |
Owner name: SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: THE APPLICATION IS DEEMED TO BE WITHDRAWN |
|
18D | Application deemed to be withdrawn |
Effective date: 20170725 |
|
RIC1 | Information provided on ipc code assigned before grant |
Ipc: H04W 12/12 20090101AFI20170302BHEP Ipc: H04W 12/10 20090101ALN20170302BHEP |
|
RIC1 | Information provided on ipc code assigned before grant |
Ipc: H04W 12/10 20090101ALN20170302BHEP Ipc: H04W 12/12 20090101AFI20170302BHEP |