EP1705095B1 - Système et procédé de cantonnement de haute sécurité pour lignes ferroviaires à faible trafic - Google Patents

Système et procédé de cantonnement de haute sécurité pour lignes ferroviaires à faible trafic Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1705095B1
EP1705095B1 EP05380052A EP05380052A EP1705095B1 EP 1705095 B1 EP1705095 B1 EP 1705095B1 EP 05380052 A EP05380052 A EP 05380052A EP 05380052 A EP05380052 A EP 05380052A EP 1705095 B1 EP1705095 B1 EP 1705095B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
train
track
gnss
speed
measurements
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EP05380052A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP1705095A1 (fr
Inventor
Sergio De Miguel Sanz
Enric Dominguez Saura
Lluìs Candini Gonzales
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Sener Ingenieria y Sistemas SA
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Sener Ingenieria y Sistemas SA
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Priority to SI200530164T priority Critical patent/SI1705095T1/sl
Priority to DK05380052T priority patent/DK1705095T3/da
Priority to EP05380052A priority patent/EP1705095B1/fr
Priority to ES05380052T priority patent/ES2297653T3/es
Application filed by Sener Ingenieria y Sistemas SA filed Critical Sener Ingenieria y Sistemas SA
Priority to DE602005003551T priority patent/DE602005003551T2/de
Priority to PT05380052T priority patent/PT1705095E/pt
Priority to PL05380052T priority patent/PL1705095T3/pl
Priority to BRPI0601895-5A priority patent/BRPI0601895B1/pt
Priority to ARP060101113A priority patent/AR052951A1/es
Publication of EP1705095A1 publication Critical patent/EP1705095A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1705095B1 publication Critical patent/EP1705095B1/fr
Priority to CY20081100230T priority patent/CY1107217T1/el
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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
    • B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
    • B61L25/021—Measuring and recording of train speed
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
    • B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
    • B61L25/025—Absolute localisation, e.g. providing geodetic coordinates
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
    • B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
    • B61L25/026—Relative localisation, e.g. using odometer
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L2205/00—Communication or navigation systems for railway traffic
    • B61L2205/04—Satellite based navigation systems, e.g. global positioning system [GPS]

Definitions

  • the invention is encompassed within safety systems for railroad traffic control in low traffic density lines. This invention is particularly indicated for lines with low railroad traffic density in which a large investment in line signaling is not economically justified.
  • Block systems came about due to the need to regulate traffic between two collateral stations, particularly on single-tracks.
  • block signaling is any procedure which is carried out verbally, in writing or by means of technology in order to prevent a head-on collision on a single-track and trains catching up with one another on a double-track.
  • the most generalized single-track block signaling has been block signaling (BS) by telephone.
  • BS block signaling
  • the traffic control agents of two stations mutually request authorization to dispatch trains, it being necessary to receive consent and subsequent confirmation of the approach of the train which was dispatched.
  • MEB manual electric block
  • ABS automatic block signaling
  • ABS automatic block system
  • the automatic block system (ABS) used on a double-track ensures that any train found in a section or block limited by a track circuit or axle counter, is protected by the signal located at the entrance of said block which implies an itinerary and which orders any train attempting to enter the block occupied by another train to stop.
  • the block signaling is carried out automatically, since the axles of the train shunt or short-circuit the track, locking the corresponding previous signal.
  • These block signals also allow an increase in line capacity since the blocks are shorter than the space between stations.
  • the so-called two-way automatic block signaling (ABS) system allows traveling on both tracks in either direction with a series of trains.
  • Block systems are based on equipment installed on the track and in the stations (electronic, relay or geographic module interlocking equipment), traffic signals, axle counters, track circuits, switch machines, etc.; these systems allow trains to travel on a single-track for two-way working or a double-track for two-way working or not made two-way, with intrinsic safety without the involvement of any type of personnel.
  • the block system alternative of the invention is to consider eliminating the system called "block signaling by telephone", consisting of two people located in two stations where the intersection of trains (single-track) is carried out reaching an agreement, through the corresponding instructions stipulated in the Regulations for Transit of the Railroad Administration where said block signaling by telephone is specified, on giving an open track to one of the trains, making certain that the route along which said train is to travel is not occupied by any other train, and placing the train without priority in the intersection station where the other train is stopped.
  • block signaling by telephone consisting of two people located in two stations where the intersection of trains (single-track) is carried out reaching an agreement, through the corresponding instructions stipulated in the Regulations for Transit of the Railroad Administration where said block signaling by telephone is specified, on giving an open track to one of the trains, making certain that the route along which said train is to travel is not occupied by any other train, and placing the train without priority in the intersection station where the other train is stopped.
  • US-A-2004/0015275 disclose railroad applications using global navigation satellite systems for applications in which controls and signals of the vehicle, such as brakes, engine or warning signals, are acted on.
  • US-6641090-B2 discloses a location system based on a Kalman filter using GPS measurements and other sensors.
  • Document EP-A-0791518 discloses a method and apparatus for a railway navigation system which provides information defining the position of a railway vehicle on a track system
  • OAS operation aid systems
  • GPS-based OAS do not constitute a block system with intrinsic safety for lines without signaling.
  • This aspect is fundamental as it has essential implications both at the level of requirements and at the level of defining the system architecture and embodiment method (technical solution).
  • a different solution and a higher level of complexity in the system and method are required.
  • the aim is to modernize in a cost-effective manner low traffic density railroad lines, even allowing an increase in the line capacity without having to increase the investment in track infrastructure as a result and maintaining safety levels.
  • This system can also be applied as a redundant system for railroad traffic control should the traffic telecontrol or centralized traffic control (CTC) fail, and through this system control the location of the trains and act in the manner which is thought to be most appropriate through the control post operators.
  • CTC centralized traffic control
  • the invention refers to a system according to claim 1 and a method according to claim 9. Preferred embodiments of the system and of the method are defined in the dependent claims.
  • the block system with intrinsic safety for railroad lines of the present invention is designed so as to be able to be used as a block system in railroad lines without electrification or signaling, or with electrification but no signaling.
  • This new system allows that, from a centralized traffic control (CTC), a person in charge may grant the necessary movement authorizations to the engine drivers through the safe information reaching the CTC regarding the situation of the trains on the track.
  • CTC traffic control
  • the system object of the invention therefore allows carrying out the block signaling without needing personnel and it is ensured by an operator in the CTC that, through this system, it is the operator who authorizes the engine drivers when they can leave the stations collateral to the one where the trains intersect. Neither equipment installed on the track (track circuits, axle counters, etc.) nor traffic signals are required.
  • the block system with intrinsic safety object of the present invention is a safe, autonomous and robust tool for aiding in traffic control.
  • the system of the invention provides improvements in terms of safety, efficiency and flexibility of the railroad infrastructure operation since it provides, among other parameters, the kilometer point of the train, its speed and the track on which it is located. Furthermore, it is economical with respect to other systems in which traffic management depends on telephone communication between the personnel located in the stations where the intersection of trains occurs, or on signaling.
  • this block system has a mixed system of hardware and software in which complementary sensors and processing units are combined with a suitable level of redundancy.
  • algorithms for monitoring and deciding on ambiguities in terms of track occupancy which allow for the block function to ensure a safety integrity level of up to SIL 4 in the entire area of operation.
  • this block system may ensure a hazard rate of less than 10 -8 per hour of operation.
  • the block system of the invention is indicated for trains with a tractor unit or engine and an unlimited number of cars.
  • the system would be installed in all the tractor units.
  • the latter refers to a train traffic block system on one track of a railroad line.
  • the block system comprises an onboard block signaling aid unit per vehicle, in turn including:
  • the two-way radio communication means preferably include a coding and encrypting module.
  • Blocking of blocks can thus be represented automatically and in quasi-real time in the centralized traffic control CTC center without needing to make telephone contact with the personnel in intersection stations or requiring track infrastructure.
  • the proposed block system introduces a high degree of autonomy with respect to other existing block systems (e.g. block signaling by telephone), maintaining safety levels. Said safety is achieved with a hardware architecture strong against failure complemented with mathematical algorithms for detecting hardware failures, as well as a formal development process.
  • the system incorporates means for improving the train location precisions in the cases in which GNSS satellite coverage is lost.
  • An important base of the invention is the fusion of the data from the different sensors and databases.
  • a limit of any satellite-based positioning system is the assurance of precision. Even with dual-frequency differential receivers, position precision is in the range of 1 to 5 meters only 95% of the time. For the other 5% of the time, it can be expected that system features are locally out of the range admissible for this application. This is due, for example, to the bouncing of signals from the satellites caused by near-by obstacles (buildings, vegetation, bridges, etc.) or by interferences. Furthermore, it is always necessary to expect the problem of visibility of the satellite, which may be insufficient in many operating situations. In the case at hand, an SBAS type (Satellite Based Augmentation System) aid constellation is relied upon to improve system features in terms of integrity and precision. The SBAS constellation will later be replaced by a Galileo constellation. The problem of concealment in SBAS is frequent since there are few satellites in the SBAS constellation and depending on the geographical location of the application, its elevation on the horizon may be rather low.
  • a siding passage and track occupancy detection system and method which forms part of the system of the invention.
  • This system or module allows determining the location of the train with integrity by deciding between two or more adjacent tracks.
  • the method allows detection of the occupied track with high availability and integrity.
  • this detection module needs, in addition to the GNSS sensor, a sensor measuring angular rotation of the tractor unit on its vertical axis, for example a gyroscope.
  • a sensor measuring angular rotation of the tractor unit on its vertical axis for example a gyroscope.
  • the odometer speed measurement can further be used.
  • This module requires a prior entry of each siding of the line in a singular point database. At least the georeferenced coordinates of each siding should be entered in said database, for example, in the UTM system they would be the UTMX and UTMY coordinates. To ensure detection of the track actually occupied within a broad range of dynamic conditions, the curvature and length of the siding are also entered. These data are stored in a digital singular point database which said module has access to.
  • the operation of the detection method is preferably as follows. According to the estimated position of the train P est provided by the navigation and decision module, it identifies if the train is in the area close to a siding. If this is the case, said module is actuated, wherein the evolution of the angular speed of the tractor unit ⁇ Z is analyzed. If this evolution of ⁇ Z indicates a turn in the expected direction of the siding and is an angular speed similar to the estimated instant speed of the train S est divided by the radius of curvature of entry in the siding, the module determines that the train has been re-routed. It similarly proceeds to detect the entry on the new track. Entry on the destination track generally occurs after a turn in the direction contrary to the previous turn.
  • the module determines the track occupancy status TS.
  • TS may be 1, 2 or n, n being the maximum number of tracks in said intersection station. If the turn or absence of turn is not detected with enough clarity, the module does not decide on the track and decrees non-determination.
  • the onboard block signaling aid unit is provided with redundant systems. If there is a discrepancy between the primary system and the onboard unit monitoring system, the module can also issue a decision. This may be due to a hardware failure or to other causes.
  • the lateral acceleration and impact the axis of the tractor unit undergoes when changing tracks can optionally be used as an independent TS detection aid member. That is, the perceived impact can be measured by a medium-precision, single or double axis accelerometer which would corroborate whether or not the track has been changed. Should the decision based on angular speed not coincide, a non-determination would occur which would be reported to the CTC.
  • the odometer speed S ODOM is used to calculate the distance traveled between the first turn (corresponding to exiting the track of origin) and the second turn (corresponding to entering the following track of destination). Once it is calibrated by the navigation and decision filter, the odometer speed provides greater precision than the GPS speed at lower speeds and is insensitive to satellite concealment.
  • the siding actuation area is defined as a circumference centered on the UTMX and UTMY coordinates of the siding with a radius at least six times the worst root mean square error expected for this area.
  • this radius will depend on the presence of obstacles in the area that may reduce the visibility of GNSS or SBAS satellites, and therefore may reduce the precision of locating the train in that area.
  • the radius must be such that it does not contain a curved section so as to avoid confusing it with a siding.
  • the onboard block signaling aid unit includes a module of qualification of the GNSS position in the longitudinal direction of the track.
  • This module is called qualification by reasonable position.
  • the module calculates a reasonable position of the train P reas (n) from the position and speed previously estimated by the navigation module respectively P est and S est (n-1). If the position given by the GNSS receiver P GNSS (n) after projection on the digital trac map P proj(n) is more than a qualification distance limit away from P reas (n), the position P GNSS (n) is found to be erroneous. In this case, the navigation module uses the reasonable position as the best estimation of the position of the train. According to this embodiment, situations in which the position P GNSS meets the criterion of qualification by projection on the digital track database, but which is potentially erroneous, can be detected.
  • the data acquisition and reasonability module configured for comparing the speed measurements provided by the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver and by the odometer of the train, would use the restrictions of the train and of the track also as a criterion for checking the reasonability of said speeds.
  • GNSS global navigation satellite system
  • the maximum speed that can be reached by each engine and the minimum radii of curvature of each section are known, therefore higher reasonable speed limits can be determined.
  • the change of speed with respect to the previous measurement is also monitored in this embodiment, and it is labeled as not reasonable if it exceeds a maximum acceleration determined by the railroad regulation for this type of line and train.
  • this data acquisition and reasonability module monitors the reasonability of the angular speed ⁇ z of the tractor unit.
  • the system can use the difference between the speeds S GNSS and S ODOM , already filtered with respect to reasonability, to estimate systematic errors of the odometer.
  • This is carried out by means of a linear recursive filter in which the constant error of the odometer (bias) is estimated continuously and in real time on board the train.
  • This systematic error may be due, for example, to variations of the real radius of the wheel on which the odometer has been installed for each train monitored by this block system.
  • the recursive filter has the basic theory of least squares, and its mathematical formula can be found in the literature. It is an extension of the estimation by least squares for situations in which a filtering of the measurements is to be carried out as the sample increases over time.
  • This optional embodiment allows that when coverage of the satellites of the GNSS or SBAS constellation is lost for a certain time, the error of the estimated position by the navigation and decision filter (from the odometer speed) is much less since the systematic errors can be corrected.
  • This mathematic filter is actuated after a certain minimum speed (e.g. 10 km/h) and it only accepts speeds which have passed the reasonability filter, all this so that the systematic errors of the odometer can be estimated with greater precision and integrity.
  • the latter relates to a train traffic block method in a railroad line comprising:
  • the method preferably comprises estimating from said position P GNSS and S est measurements the likely or estimated location of said train P est and its kilometer point P k , taking into account the decision of a module of safety qualification of the position P GNSS by projection which provides a projection of the safety-qualified position P Proj of the train on the track and a module of qualification by reasonable position P reas (n), understanding that if P GNSS does not comply with one of the criteria of said modules, position estimated in the previous instant P est(n-1) will be used as a starting point instead of P GNSS .
  • S est can be an average value of S GNSS and/or S ODOM once the systematic errors of the odometer have been extracted from S ODOM by means of a linear recursive filter.
  • the method further includes:
  • the information transmitted to the centralized traffic control center is preferably coded and encrypted prior to its transmission and decoded and decrypted in said centralized traffic control center.
  • each train 1 is estimated in the onboard block signaling aid unit 10 located in the front tractor unit 2 of each train, by means of a method based on the GNSS systems and other sensors, which will be explained in more detail below.
  • the position of the train is estimated and qualified according to safety onboard in an automatic manner by means of a data fusion, monitoring and algorithm process.
  • An architecture has been designed and equipment has been chosen that allows qualification and certification following the CENELEC standards, and certification up to the maximum safety integrity level (SIL 4) has been contemplated.
  • the system incorporates redundancy in the hardware to ensure its reliability in a critical safety application.
  • Figure 2 shows the essence of the concept and flow of information and calculation based on the onboard block signaling aid unit.
  • the onboard block signaling aid unit uses the measurements of the following sensors: a differential global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver 11, i.e. with the ability to acquire satellite signals from an SBAS constellation (e.g.
  • GNSS global navigation satellite system
  • OMNISTAR EGNOS
  • Galileo Galileo
  • Galileo Galileo
  • an odometer 14 measuring the rotation speed of a wheel of the tractor unit 2
  • a gyroscope 12 redundant 12'
  • it may also include at least one accelerometer (not shown and which may also be redundant), and which would measure the linear acceleration of the vertical axis a z and/or the lateral acceleration a Y of the engine with respect to an inertial reference.
  • SBAS Shortlite Based Augmentation System
  • the antenna can receive the signals transmitted by the geostationary satellites of said system.
  • said SBAS systems have not been certified as safe as of today in accordance with the definition of CENELEC, it is provided that the combination of both constellations, GPS and SBAS, remarkably improve the features of the GNSS receiver.
  • a safety integrity level of more than 10 -7 cannot foreseeably be maintained, and an availability of more than about 90-95% could not be ensured.
  • the process needs complementary aid methods for ensuring both the availability and integrity of the block aid operation (both insufficient).
  • the SBAS system is highly vulnerable to obstacles present on the terrain since it has few geostationary satellites (typically from 1 to 3).
  • the system is provided with a data acquisition and reasonability module 20 in which basic signal processing tasks (analog-digital filtering and conversion) are carried out, and monitoring of the reasonability of the speed and angular speed measurements of the onboard sensors is carried out.
  • this module the differences between the speed measurements of the GNSS receiver and of the odometer are observed, and said measurements are checked with respect to reasonability criteria, to that end having pre-loaded information in the system concerting dynamic restrictions of train and track 21.
  • the range of numerical values which is considered reasonable in the filtering is set based on a range of expected dynamics of the train (speeds, accelerations, etc.), allowing not only for features of the engine, but also the static profiles of the track (radii of curvature, etc.).
  • both speeds coincide within an acceptable discrepancy value, it is decided that they are reasonable.
  • the acceptable discrepancy value is adjusted according to speed, given that the precision of both sensors is very different at low and high speeds.
  • the odometer is calibrated by means of a linear recursive filter included in the navigation and decision module 40.
  • the onboard block signaling aid unit can continuously estimate the constant error of the odometer, such that when satellite coverage is lost, the effective navigation error is much less.
  • the mathematic recursive filter is actuated after a certain minimum speed (e.g. 10 km/h) and if and only if S GNSS and S ODOM are reasonable. The systematic error of the odometer can thus be estimated with greater precision.
  • the onboard block signaling aid unit includes a module of qualification 30 of the GNSS position in the longitudinal direction of the track, or module of qualification by reasonable position.
  • This module calculates a reasonable position of the train P reas (n) from the position and speed estimated by the navigation and decision module in the previous instant, respectively P est (n-1) and S est (n-1) If the position given by the GNSS receiver P GNSS (n) is more than a limit qualification distance from P reas (n), the P GNSS (n) position is determined to be erroneous.
  • the navigation module uses the reasonable position as the best estimation of the position of the train. According to this embodiment, situations in which the position P GNSS complies with the criterion of qualification by projection on the digital track map 31 but which is potentially erroneous, can be detected.
  • the system of the invention includes a siding passage and track occupancy detection module 50. This module allows determining with integrity the location of the train, deciding between two or more adjacent tracks.
  • this detection module needs, in addition to the GNSS sensor, a sensor measuring angular rotation of the tractor unit on its vertical axis. For greater availability and reliability, the speed measurement of an odometer can further be used.
  • This module requires a prior recording of each siding of the line in a singular point database. At least the georeferenced coordinates of each siding must be introduced in said database, for example in the UTM system these would be the UMTX and UMTY coordinates. To ensure detection of the track actually occupied in a broad range of dynamic conditions, the curvature and length of the siding are also introduced. This data is stored in a digital singular point database 51 which said module has access to.
  • the system further includes a two-way radio communication subsystem for the automatic sending or sending by request of different data of interest (see Figure 10), including the position in terms of kilometer point Pk of said train and the track occupancy status TS to the centralized traffic control CTC center 100.
  • a two-way radio communication subsystem for the automatic sending or sending by request of different data of interest (see Figure 10), including the position in terms of kilometer point Pk of said train and the track occupancy status TS to the centralized traffic control CTC center 100.
  • This two-way communication system includes a coding and encrypting module 71, as well as a radio reception/transmission module 72.
  • FIG 3 shows the implementation of the concept set forth previously in Figure 2.
  • the onboard system has a global navigation satellite system GNSS receiver 11 with the corresponding antenna 110 for receiving the signals provided by the GNSS system 300 (see Figure 1). It also has a radio receiver/transmitter 5, also with its corresponding antenna 150 for radio signal reception.
  • GNSS receiver 11 with the corresponding antenna 110 for receiving the signals provided by the GNSS system 300 (see Figure 1). It also has a radio receiver/transmitter 5, also with its corresponding antenna 150 for radio signal reception.
  • the onboard unit has external interfaces with the odometer 14 of the train and with a power supply source 140 feeding the power supply source 130 of the onboard unit.
  • the odometer is a sensor measuring wheel revolutions per unit of time and is used to report the speed of the train to the engineer.
  • the hardware interface element with the odometer consists of three main subelements: an analog filter circuit for filtering the noise from the odometer signal, an impedance adjustment circuit and an optoisolated device converting the filtered odometer signal to digital pulses (usually TTL levels).
  • Each revolution of the wheel of the train in which the odometer has been installed causes a given number of pulses depending on the type of installation. One pulse will usually be generated for each revolution of a wheel of the tractor unit.
  • the onboard unit has the internal interfaces identified in Figure 3.
  • the element responsible for acquisition of the inertial sensors has the main function of converting the raw data of the sensor into digital format data such that it can be interpreted in the CPU. If low-pass filtering is required, it will be carried out for example by hardware in this interface element system or by software in the CPU. If the inertial sensors have digital output, they can be connected directly to input ports of the processing unit, whereby the input/output I/O function will be included in the CPU.
  • the processing unit CPU 16 has been repeated (redundant 16') so as to be able to detect processing failures (in the failure detection and identification module 60, see Figure 2) in any of the CPUs and/or failures of the angular speed sensors and/or failures of the I/O interfaces of the gyroscopes and of the odometer. These failures may be due to the hardware or to non-determining factor problems created by the running of the software in real time. Note that both CPUs use the same GNSS receiver but different interface elements with the odometer and gyroscopes.
  • the main CPU detects that the result of its calculations do not match the result of the calculations of the CPU of the parallel monitoring system, the main CPU will report the problem to the CTC trough the radio link, placing a specific code in the data validity control field DVC (see Figure 10). The code will allow identifying the level at which the error occurred so as to provide a fast maintenance reaction.
  • the monitoring CPU detects that its decision does not qualitatively match the decision of the main CPU, it will decide that there is an error of comparison between both systems and in this case will send a warning message to the CTC making use of the parallel interface with the onboard radio. Should there be qualitative matching, the monitoring CPU will not send a message to the CTC.
  • the relevant information is transmitted by radio to the CTC.
  • the onboard radio equipment can send the information autonomously to the CTC and/or by request. That is, the sending of information from the train to the CTC can be carried out with one or with combinations of these three options: 1) with a regular time cadence that can be configured by the user (for example, a report every 2 minutes), and/or 2) by request, upon request of the CTC, and/or 3) by passing a singular point (for example, entering a new track section).
  • the system is two-way, allowing train to CTC and CTC to train transmission on the radio channel.
  • the GSM system is used as it has fewer operating costs, which does not reduce the safety level.
  • Typical GSM delay is a few seconds, although it may reach up to a few minutes. This delay would be unacceptable for a system with real time operating requirements. For this reason the system must use a radiotelephony service ensuring acceptable delay times for the operator.
  • This high-performance radiotelephony service is a commercial service and is already used in some railroad lines.
  • system can be adapted to the use of other channels of communications.
  • the following is carried out. Given that availability of the block system must be complete in the areas immediately close to train intersections with track changes (intersection stations, etc.), those intersection points which do not have coverage are identified. Said singular points without coverage are equipped with fixed compatible radio equipment so that connection is made with the CTC through an interface with the standard telephone line. All this is automatic. The contents of the packet and its encrypting are identical to that used for open transmission. In any case, the train must remain on the track on which it is located until receiving authorization to move from the traffic authority.
  • the communications network e.g. GSM
  • All communications messages include a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) and are encrypted so as to prevent fraudulent use.
  • CRC cyclic redundancy check
  • the system sends in this order: vehicle identifier VID by means of the registration thereof, message number NUM, CPU (primary or monitoring CPU) number, time of the measurement HH-MM-SS, code for identifying the route of the train RT, kilometer point where the train is located P k , track where the train is located TS or, where applicable, a non-determination code, speed module SP, direction of movement WM, data validity control flag DVC, and a 32-bit cyclic redundancy check CRC. Similar protocols can optionally be defined for maintenance functions.
  • This message must be encrypted, as required by said railroad standard and the corresponding European standard (EN 50159-2 of the CENELEC).
  • the onboard equipment has built-in tests which check that the hardware and software are correctly running in real time.
  • the data acquisition and processing equipment located in the centralized traffic control center CTC 100 essentially consists of a multibuffer radio equipment 101 connected to an antenna 102, processing equipment 103 and graphic interface or display screen 104, in addition to an operating console 105 and a power supply source 106.
  • the power supply source 106 is connected to an uninterruptible power supply (UPS).
  • UPS uninterruptible power supply
  • the CTC optionally includes a GPS equipment of the same reference model as the one onboard for synchronizing times.
  • the data acquisition and processing equipment in the CTC maintains the assurance of integrity initiated in the onboard equipment and in turn maintained by the radio link through the communications protocol. This feature is indispensable for a critical safety application.
  • the equipment in the CTC in turn have built-in tests which check that the hardware and software are behaving in real time in the expected manner.
  • the equipment in the CTC can be redundant (duplicate or triplicate) similar to the onboard unit if the operator requires a greater level of availability and reliability.
  • the information which the onboard block signaling aid unit sends is decrypted and decoded in the CTC.
  • the block aid system (BAS) in the CTC graphically shows the location of the trains and the occupancy status of the monitored blocks on a data display screen 104 which, together with the console 105, forms the man-machine interface (MMI).
  • MMI man-machine interface
  • the BAS software in the CTC can be configured such that it anticipates the radio message to determine track occupancy of a block adjacent to another occupied block as "undetermined" and that, according to deterministic kinematic models based on the previously estimated position and speed and static speed profiles and a synchronized time measurement, it allows foreseeing that it has been or may very shortly be occupied. This allows the CTC head to manage traffic with greater information and precaution and avoid problems due to small delays in the communications system.
  • the most basic infrastructure in the CTC supports monitoring of up to six trains simultaneously with at least twelve intersection stations.
  • the man-machine interface display screen shows the information that is necessary and sufficient for allowing the CTC head to safely manage the line.
  • the graphic interface in the CTC complies with the railroad operator standards.
  • the main information provided by this graphic interface is the free/occupied/undetermined status of track blocks, stations and platforms, location of the trains and unmistakable identification thereof with the registration code.
  • the location of the train is indicated with the kilometer point at which the train is located.
  • the system In the event of a conflict, for example the BAS detects the presence of more than one train in the same block, the system emits an audible warning signal and identifies the block and trains involved on the display screen.
  • the maximum delay time from the arrival of a message to the CTC until the presentation of the information on the MMI screen, in the worst of cases (6 simultaneous messages and one radio), must be less than 1 second.
  • the console 105 is PC type, and non-recognized commands are rejected.
  • the establishment of a configuration regarding train to CTC communication transmission This may be set as a) periodic mode and/or as b) singular point passing mode.
  • messages are transmitted periodically
  • messages are only transmitted when important points for traffic management are passed (e.g. sidings).
  • the traffic controller can at any moment ask a train to send its report (operation by request).
  • Figure 9 shows as an example a sequence (seq.) in which two trains ID 2775 and ID 0034 approach two stations collateral with unoccupied blocks (seq. 1).
  • two trains ID 2775 and ID 0034 approach two stations collateral with unoccupied blocks (seq. 1).
  • the corresponding blocks are occupied (seq. 2); priority is given to one of the two trains, specifically to the train identified as ID 2775, to occupy the common track section between the two stations.
  • the head of the CTC communicates the authorization to move to said train ID 2775, which then occupies the common track section (seq. 3), while he or she communicates to train ID 0034 that it must wait.
  • Train ID 2775 then enters (seq.
  • train ID 0034 occupies the common track section between collateral stations, while train ID 2775 moves away from the station occupying an unoccupied block (seq. 6).
  • the display at the CTC center would be substantially the same as the one shown in Figure 9, but with the difference that each new line in the figure would not correspond to a moment in the sequence but to different stations and trains.
  • Figure 5 graphically shows the position in two dimensions set by the GNSS receiver, P GNSS , and its projection P proj , on the digital track map.
  • the distance between these two points is defined as distance d 1 .
  • the black dots represent the digital track map, and the lines which delimit the lined area at its top and bottom portions represent the limits set as acceptable by the criterion of qualification; the lined area represents the acceptance area.
  • the real position P reat of the train is also shown in this figure.
  • Distance d 1 is compared to a maximum distance given by the criterion of qualification. If distance d 1 is less than or equal to said maximum distance, this position is qualified as acceptable. However, if distance d 1 is greater than the maximum distance of the criterion of qualification, this position is qualified as unacceptable.
  • the qualification by projection is performed for each new GNSS solution and is typically performed once per second.
  • This module allows increasing the integrity of the block system. It particularly, protects against GNSS receiver or constellation failures, or simply against situations in which the precision of the GNSS solution is less than that desirable.
  • the onboard block assistance system emits an explicit caution message to the CTC in the case of many GNSS measurements being rejected, given that if the situation were to continue it could compromise the safety of the service. This situation could indicate a problem related to the GNSS receiver or the installation.
  • Figure 6 graphically shows the concept of qualification of the position in the longitudinal direction of the track with the reasonable position method.
  • the black dots represent the digital track map; the circle which delimits the lined area represents the limit set as acceptable by this criterion of qualification, and said lined area represents the acceptance area.
  • Point P est (n-1) represents the last position estimated by the navigation and decision filter; point P proj (n) represents the current position given by the GNSS receiver projected on the digital track map, and finally point P reas (n) represents the position considered to be reasonable for the current instant.
  • Position P reas (n) is calculated from the spread of the last position P est (n-1) estimated by the navigation and decision filter taking into account the estimated and verified speed for this interval.
  • the distance between P reas (n) and P Proj (n), defined as distance d 2 is compared with a maximum distance given by a new criterion of qualification. If this distance d 2 is less than or equal to said maximum distance, this position is qualified as acceptable. If, in contrast, this distance d 2 is greater than the criterion of qualification, this position is qualified as unacceptable.
  • the criterion of qualification must be sufficiently strict as to detect excessive errors in the longitudinal axis of the track early, and sufficiently broad as to accept slight errors within the system performance.
  • Figure 7 graphically shows the problem of non-determination in track occupancy which occurs in the absence of a track occupancy detection method.
  • the solid lines represent the tracks and the dots represent different positions of the train given by the GNSS receiver; d 1 and d 2 represent the minimum distances to two adjacent track sections for a same position.
  • Two scenarios of great importance for a railroad block system have been represented. The first scenario corresponds to position A, and the second scenario to position B.
  • Scenario A represents a train in an environment close to a siding.
  • the position set by the GNSS receiver, position A gives rise to a non-determination. It cannot be ensured that the vehicle has entered the siding or not, or which path it has followed, because distances d 1 and d 2 are within the precision range of the GNSS system.
  • An independent method must therefore be defined which ensures the position of the vehicle in such a reduced environment as is a siding.
  • Scenario B represents the environment of a double track.
  • the position set by the GNSS receiver, position B gives rise to a non-determination. It cannot be ensured that the vehicle is on one or the other track of the double track section because distances d 1 and d 2 are not sufficiently significant so as to define a criterion that ensures the position of the vehicle in such a reduced environment as is the separation between tracks.
  • This non-determination entails an unacceptable risk for a railroad block system as this is a system that affects the safety of people and materials.
  • FIG. 8 graphically shows the operating concept.
  • the siding passage and track occupancy detection module forms part of the onboard block aiding system.
  • the object of the module is to determine with certainty the track occupancy in situations in which the train may take more than one path, for example in intersection stations.
  • This module is necessary to complement the locating solution given that the GNSS sensors do not ensure the necessary precision with a sufficient degree of confidence. In short, the module produces an increase in the block system integrity in intersection scenarios.
  • This module constituted by hardware and software elements, detects the passage of a vehicle through a siding and decides the route followed by this vehicle with a high level of integrity.
  • This advantage is achieved by the certain detection of a sustained turn of the tractor unit as it takes the turn for the siding and the expected turn of the tractor unit on exiting the siding and entering the new track.
  • the expected direction of the turn is information which is available a priori and which is introduced in the singular point database in order to check the detected tum direction with the expected turn.
  • an accelerometer can be used to detect the characteristic impact and lateral acceleration which occurs in the vehicle during a turn when passing through a switch turnout.
  • the inertial measurements given by the gyroscope 12, and optionally those given by an accelerometer (not shown in the figure), are used.
  • the inertial sensors can be triplicated in order to ensure the continuity of the service in case of malfunction of one of said sensors, allowing safe traffic until the next maintenance station.
  • the system uses the odometer reading to determine the distance covered along the siding and decide track occupancy without ambiguity.
  • the siding passage detection module When vehicle 1 is far from a siding, the siding passage detection module is in standby mode (standby phase). When the vehicle approaches a siding, the detection module is actuated with sufficient time (actuation phase).
  • An actuation area is defined (as a circumference with its center on the UTMX and UTMY coordinates of the siding with a radius of at least 6 times the worst root mean square error to be expected in that area), inside of which the module shall be active (shown in Figure 8 by the circle of greater radius). It is therefore necessary to have the position of the sidings onboard in database 51.
  • the time with which the detection module is actuated in advance is that which is sufficient to avoid the situation in which the train effectively passes through a siding and the module is in standby. This could occur due to precision problems in determining the position of the vehicle.
  • computers 16 and 16' of the onboard system acquire the measurements from the gyroscopes and from the accelerometers if present. This is performed in an independent manner, on the one hand with a primary set of equipment, processor and inertial sensors, and on the other hand with a set of redundant monitoring equipment to improve the integrity of the detection.
  • the module When the vehicle effectively passes through the siding (detection phase) and occupies a track (case A: the route continues or case B: the route is detoured), the module emits a decision which reports on the track occupied. If it cannot determine this with sufficient certainty, the module reports a "non-determination". This information is transmitted to a CTC in order to block the corresponding track block or mark the blocks as "non-determined" status.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)

Claims (14)

  1. Système de cantonnement pour le trafic des trains (1) sur une ligne à voie unique d'une ligne de chemin de fer comprenant :
    - une unité d'aide à la signalisation de cantonnement embarquée (10), une dans chaque unité de traction du train, comprenant à son tour :
    - un récepteur de système global de navigation par satellite (GNSS) (11) fournissant des mesures de la position géoréférencée PGNSS et/ou de la vitesse SGNSS dudit train pour chaque période temporelle TGNSS,
    - un groupe de capteurs (12) et des moyens de raccordement avec un odomètre (14) fournissant des mesures de la vitesse angulaire ωZ de l'axe vertical de l'unité de traction (2) dudit train et de la vitesse SODOM dudit train,
    - un sous-système de communication radio bidirectionnel (15, 150) pour envoyer des données à un centre de contrôle du trafic centralisé (100) CTC ; ledit système comprend dans le centre de contrôle du trafic centralisé (100) CTC :
    - des moyens de communication radio bidirectionnels (101, 102) pour recevoir des données à partir de l'unité d'aide à la signalisation de cantonnement embarquée (10), et
    - un équipement d'acquisition, de traitement et d'affichage de données (103, 104, 105) ;
    le système est caractérisé en ce qu'il comprend en outre :
    - un module d'acquisition des données et de raisonnabilité (20) configuré afin de recevoir lesdites mesures et de comparer les mesures de vitesse SGNSS et SODOM et de vérifier lesdites mesures par rapport à des critères de raisonnabilité préétablis, de façon à ce qu'en réponse aux deux vitesses coïncidant avec une valeur de divergence prédéfinie, ce module d'acquisition des données et de raisonnabilité (20) décide qu'elles sont raisonnables,
    - un module de qualification de la sécurité (30) de la mesure de la position PGNSS basé sur une base de données numérique de ladite voie (31), et configuré afin de fournir une projection de la position à sécurité qualifiée PProj du train sur la voie et de déterminer si ladite position PProj est acceptable,
    - un module de navigation et de décision (40) configuré afin de recevoir ladite mesure de la position à sécurité qualifiée acceptable PProj et/ou les mesures des vitesses SGNSS et SODOM raisonnables disponibles, toutes deux vérifiées par le module d'acquisition des données et de raisonnabilité, et de déterminer l'emplacement estimé dudit train Pest et son emplacement en termes de point kilométrique Pk et sa vitesse estimée Sest,
    - un module de détection de passage de voie de service et d'occupation des voies (50) configuré afin de recevoir lesdites mesures de la position Pest et de la vitesse angulaire ωz, vérifiées par le module de détermination d'acquisition des données et de raisonnabilité, et configuré afin de déterminer, à partir de la base de données de voies numérique avec les points de voie de service singuliers (51), le statut du train en termes d'occupation des voies TS, et le sous-système de communication radio bidirectionnel (15, 150) de l'unité d'aide à la signalisation de cantonnement embarquée (10) est agencé pour envoyer au moins la position Pk dudit train et le statut d'occupation des voies TS au centre de contrôle du trafic centralisé CTC (100), laquelle position Pk et lequel statut d'occupation des voies TS sont reçus par le moyen de communication radio bidirectionnel (101, 102) du contrôle du trafic centralisé CTC (100), et l'équipement d'acquisition, de traitement et d'affichage de données (103, 104, 105) est configuré afin d'extraire au moins la position Pk et le statut d'occupation des voies TS pour ledit train, et de représenter graphiquement le statut d'occupation des sections de voie de la ligne sur un écran d'affichage de données (104).
  2. Système de cantonnement selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que l'unité d'aide à la signalisation de cantonnement embarquée comprend en outre dans ledit module de qualification de la position PGNSS un module de qualification basé sur la position raisonnable Preas (n) du train, calculée à partir de la diffusion de la dernière position Pest (n-1) estimée par le module de navigation et de décision, en tenant compte de la vitesse qui est estimée et vérifiée pour cet intervalle.
  3. Système de cantonnement selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que l'unité d'aide à la signalisation de cantonnement embarquée (10) comprend en outre dans le module de navigation et de décision des moyens d'étalonnement de la vitesse de l'odomètre au moyen d'un filtre récursif mathématique linéaire qui observe la différence entre la valeur de la vitesse SGNSS fournie par le récepteur du système global de navigation par satellite (GNSS) et la valeur de la vitesse SODOM fournie par l'odomètre (14).
  4. Système selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que l'unité d'aide à la signalisation de cantonnement embarquée comprend au moins un accéléromètre pour vérifier le passage de voie de service en mesurant l'impact survenant lors du changement de voies et/ou de l'accélération latérale.
  5. Système selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que lesdits critères de raisonnabilité préétablis sont basés sur des restrictions de voie et de train dynamiques.
  6. Système selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que l'unité d'aide à la signalisation de cantonnement embarquée comprend un module de codage et de cryptage (71).
  7. Système selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que certains ou l'intégralité des éléments de matériel de l'unité embarquée sont redondants - en double ou en triple exemplaires.
  8. Système selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que les moyens du centre de contrôle du trafic centralisé CTC (100) sont redondants - en double ou en triple exemplaires.
  9. Procédé de cantonnement pour le trafic des trains (1) sur une ligne de chemin de fer à voie unique comprenant :
    - l'acquisition des mesures de la position PGNSS et/ou de la vitesse SGNSS dudit train pour chaque période temporelle TGNSS.
    - l'acquisition des mesures de la vitesse SODOM dudit train et de la vitesse angulaire ωz de l'axe vertical de l'unité de traction,
    - la comparaison desdites mesures de la vitesse SODOM dudit train et de la vitesse angulaire ωZ avec les mesures de la vitesse SGNSS et la vérification de toutes les mesures par rapport aux critères de raisonnabilité préétablis, de façon à ce que si les deux vitesses coïncident dans une valeur de divergence préétablie, il est décidé qu'elles sont raisonnables,
    - la qualification de la sécurité desdites mesures de la position PGNSS basée sur une base de données de voies numérique (31) fournissant des mesures de la position Pproj de train projetée sur la carte des voies numérique, et la détermination de si ladite position PProj est acceptable,
    - la détermination à partir desdites mesures de la position Pproj à sécurité qualifiée acceptable et/ou à partir des mesures de vitesse SODOM et/ou SGNSS raisonnables disponibles, toutes deux vérifiées par un module d'acquisition des données et de raisonnabilité, l'emplacement estimé dudit train Pest, et son emplacement par rapport à un point kilométrique Pk et sa vitesse estimée Sest,
    - la détection du passage de voie de service et de l'occupation de la voie dans les zones avec plus d'une voie adjacente basée sur lesdites mesures de la position Pest et de la vitesse Sest et la vitesse angulaire ωZ déjà vérifiée, et une base de donnés numérique avec des points singuliers ou des voies de service de la voie (51), et la fourniture d'informations concernant le statut d'occupation des voies TS,
    - la transmission périodique et/ou lorsque les points singuliers sont dépassés, d'au moins lesdites certaines estimations de la position Pk et du statut d'occupation des voies TS à un centre de contrôle de trafic centralisé CTC (100), utilisant un protocole permettant la communication bidirectionnelle (72), et
    dans ledit centre de contrôle du trafic centralisé (100) :
    - l'extraction de la position Pk dudit train et du statut d'occupation des voies TS pour ledit train, et la représentation graphique du statut de la voie surveillée le plus récemment sur un écran d'affichage de données.
  10. Procédé selon la revendication 9, caractérisé en ce qu'il comprend en outre l'estimation à partir desdites mesures de la position PGNSS et de la vitesse Sest l'emplacement probable ou estimé dudit train Pest et de son point kilométrique Pk en tenant compte de la décision d'un module de qualification de la sécurité (30) de la position PGNSS par projection qui fournit une projection de la position à sécurité qualifiée PProj du train sur la voie et d'un module de qualification par la position P reas (n) raisonnable, la compréhension du fait que si la position PGNSS ne remplit pas l'un des critères desdits modules, la position estimée dans l'instant précédent Pest (n-1) sera utilisée comme point de départ au lieu de PGNSS.
  11. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 9 à 10, caractérisé en ce que lorsque la position PProj n'est pas disponible, la position estimée dans l'instant précédent Pest (n-1) est utilisée.
  12. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 9 à 11, caractérisé en ce qu'il comprend en outre :
    - la réalisation d'un filtrage récursif linéaire afin d'estimer les erreurs systématiques pour les mesures de l'odomètre (biais) et de corriger la vitesse SODOM en soustrayant lesdites erreurs estimées,
    - la détermination à partir de SGNss et/ou à partir de ladite vitesse SODOM corrigée d'une vitesse de train Sest au moyen du filtrage des deux mesures.
  13. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 9 à 12, caractérisé en ce que la vitesse Sest pour chaque période temporelle est une moyenne de SGNSS et/ou de SODOM une fois que les erreurs systématiques de l'odomètre ont été soustraites de la vitesse SODOM au moyen d'un filtrage récursif linéaire.
  14. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 9 à 13, caractérisé en ce que les informations transmises au centre de contrôle du trafic centralisé (100) sont codées et cryptées.
EP05380052A 2005-03-21 2005-03-21 Système et procédé de cantonnement de haute sécurité pour lignes ferroviaires à faible trafic Active EP1705095B1 (fr)

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EP05380052A EP1705095B1 (fr) 2005-03-21 2005-03-21 Système et procédé de cantonnement de haute sécurité pour lignes ferroviaires à faible trafic
ES05380052T ES2297653T3 (es) 2005-03-21 2005-03-21 Sistema y metodo de bloqueo con seguridad intrinseca, para lineas ferroviarias de baja densidad de trafico.
PT05380052T PT1705095E (pt) 2005-03-21 2005-03-21 Sistema por blocos e método com segurança intrínseca para linhas de baixa densidade de tráfego ferroviário
DE602005003551T DE602005003551T2 (de) 2005-03-21 2005-03-21 Blocksystem und -Verfahren zum sicheren Fahrbetrieb von Bahnstrecken mit niedrigerer Verkehrsdichte
DK05380052T DK1705095T3 (da) 2005-03-21 2005-03-21 Bloksystem og fremgangsmåde med indbygget sikkerhed for linier med ringe togtrafik
PL05380052T PL1705095T3 (pl) 2005-03-21 2005-03-21 Układ blokowy i sposób z wewnętrznym zabezpieczeniem dla tras kolejowych o niskim natężeniu ruchu
SI200530164T SI1705095T1 (sl) 2005-03-21 2005-03-21 Blokovni sistem in postopek z intrinzicno varnostjo za zelezniske proge z nizko gostoto prometa
BRPI0601895-5A BRPI0601895B1 (pt) 2005-03-21 2006-03-20 “Sistema e método de bloqueio de circulação de trens em uma via de uma linha férrea”
ARP060101113A AR052951A1 (es) 2005-03-21 2006-03-21 Sistema y metodo de bloqueo con seguridad intrinseca para lineas de baja densidad de trafico ferroviario
CY20081100230T CY1107217T1 (el) 2005-03-21 2008-02-28 Συστημα αποκλεισμου και μεθοδος με εγγενη ασφαλεια για σιδηροδρομικες γραμμες με μικρη πυκνοτητα κυκλοφοριας

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CN112904779B (zh) * 2021-02-05 2022-08-30 西北铁道电子股份有限公司 一种轨道车运行安全控制系统及方法
DE102021203898A1 (de) * 2021-04-20 2022-10-20 Siemens Mobility GmbH Sensoranordnung und Verfahren zur Positionsbestimmung für ein Schienenfahrzeug
CN114179876A (zh) * 2021-12-14 2022-03-15 交控科技股份有限公司 用于列车的全局调度管理方法及系统

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PT1705095E (pt) 2008-03-11
DE602005003551D1 (de) 2008-01-10
EP1705095A1 (fr) 2006-09-27
AR052951A1 (es) 2007-04-11
DK1705095T3 (da) 2008-04-07
ES2297653T3 (es) 2008-05-01
BRPI0601895A (pt) 2006-12-05
BRPI0601895B1 (pt) 2018-03-06
SI1705095T1 (sl) 2008-04-30
DE602005003551T2 (de) 2008-06-26
PL1705095T3 (pl) 2008-05-30

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