EP1330908A1 - Systeme de bus de terrain pour la commande de process de securite - Google Patents

Systeme de bus de terrain pour la commande de process de securite

Info

Publication number
EP1330908A1
EP1330908A1 EP01993099A EP01993099A EP1330908A1 EP 1330908 A1 EP1330908 A1 EP 1330908A1 EP 01993099 A EP01993099 A EP 01993099A EP 01993099 A EP01993099 A EP 01993099A EP 1330908 A1 EP1330908 A1 EP 1330908A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
bus
communication channel
field bus
telegram
open communication
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
EP01993099A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Alexander Wiegert
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Pilz GmbH and Co KG
Original Assignee
Pilz GmbH and Co KG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Pilz GmbH and Co KG filed Critical Pilz GmbH and Co KG
Publication of EP1330908A1 publication Critical patent/EP1330908A1/fr
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/40—Network security protocols
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B2219/00—Program-control systems
    • G05B2219/30—Nc systems
    • G05B2219/31—From computer integrated manufacturing till monitoring
    • G05B2219/31135—Fieldbus
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B2219/00—Program-control systems
    • G05B2219/30—Nc systems
    • G05B2219/31—From computer integrated manufacturing till monitoring
    • G05B2219/31174—Load, use different protocols, formats, emulators for different systems
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/40—Bus networks
    • H04L12/40169—Flexible bus arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/40—Bus networks
    • H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a fieldbus system for controlling safety-critical processes, with a transmission medium and with a multiplicity of bus subscribers which are connected to the transmission medium, the bus subscribers being able to send bust telegrams for communication with one another via the transmission medium, furthermore with a defined communication protocol, the rules for sending and receiving bus telegrams.
  • the invention further relates to a bus interface module for use in such a fieldbus system, with an interface for connection to a transmission medium and with a communication unit in which a communication protocol is implemented.
  • Such a fieldbus system and a corresponding bus interface module are known, for example, from the article "From Safe Control to Safe Bus", published in DE magazine pa 4-1999.
  • a fieldbus system is a device for data communication in which the individual bus users are connected to a common transmission medium.
  • the bus participants can communicate with each other by accessing the common transmission medium according to defined rules. Messages are sent between the bus participants in the form of so-called bus telegrams. The sum of the defined rules, for example the assignment of priorities to avoid transmission conflicts or the type of addressing of bus messages, is reflected in the defined communication protocol.
  • Each bus participant has a bus interface module in which the rules required to carry out the communication are implemented.
  • Known fieldbus systems are the so-called CAN bus, the so-called Profibus and the so-called Interbus.
  • fieldbus systems Due to the common transmission medium, fieldbus systems have the advantage that a large number of bus users can be connected to one another with a comparatively low cabling effort. This saves time and money when installation and also enables flexible adaptation of the installation to new requirements.
  • a fieldbus system which, in contrast to the generally known fieldbus systems just mentioned, can be used to control safety-critical processes.
  • this is understood to mean a process which, if an error occurs, poses an unacceptable danger to people or material goods. Examples of such processes are the evaluation or monitoring of emergency stop switches, two-hand controls, protective doors or light barriers.
  • the systems and devices used to control such processes require special approval from the relevant supervisory authorities in numerous countries. The criteria for approval are, for example, the European standard EN 954-1 or the German standard DIN 19 250. Devices and systems that meet at least Category 3 of the European standard EN 954-1 are referred to below as "safe".
  • the fieldbus system known from the aforementioned DE magazine even meets the requirements of the highest safety category 4 of the European standard EN 954-1. It is therefore approved for controlling practically all safety-critical processes.
  • the system has the advantage that a large number of safe devices, for example a safe control unit, safe input / output devices and light barriers, can be connected to form a complex, safe control system with a limited amount of wiring.
  • a certain amount of cabling remains, however, because the known system made of green only the specially routed, line-bound transmission media, ie electrical and / or optical cables, are used for fault safety.
  • the known safe fieldbus system is therefore based on a self-contained communication channel to which only the registered safe bus users have access.
  • the transmission medium has an open communication channel and in that the communication protocol contains an individual system identifier which is connected at least to each bus telegram sent via the open communication channel.
  • a bus interface module of the type mentioned at the outset, in which the interface is an open communication interface and in which the implemented communication protocol contains an individual system identifier which is connected to a bus telegram to be sent.
  • the fieldbus system contains an open (non-closed) communication channel as the transmission medium is also accessible to communication participants of other communication connections.
  • this can be an existing, standardized line connection, such as an Ethernet connection of an existing computer network, or a radio connection.
  • the transmission medium contains a radio channel, in the former case an (existing) Ethernet connection.
  • the fieldbus system according to the invention thus for the first time and against all previous approaches abandons the fundamental principle in the field of safety technology that a safe system must be self-contained in order to reliably prevent external influences and thus ensure the required intrinsic safety.
  • the inventor recognized that the required intrinsic safety can also be achieved with an inherently unsafe, because open, transmission medium by implementing an individual system identifier in the communication protocol and thus creating a "virtual" isolation.
  • the individual system identifier uniquely identifies the fieldbus system as a whole compared to other fieldbus systems of the same type.
  • the system identifier can be set individually, so that two different fieldbus systems can be assigned different individual system identifiers.
  • the individual system identifier is clearly and permanently assigned to a defined fieldbus system as a whole, so that the bus telegrams belonging to this fieldbus system can be reliably distinguished from those of any other communication connection. This prevents confusion of bust frames even between fieldbus systems of the same type.
  • the fieldbus system according to the invention is consequently despite the use of the open and therefore unsafe ren transmission medium a secure system that is "isolated" from foreign bus telegrams.
  • the fieldbus system according to the invention can use existing, even otherwise used line connections or even wireless radio connections and thus provide the same high level of error security as the fieldbus system mentioned at the beginning, with an extremely low cabling effort. Like this, it can therefore be used as a safe fieldbus system for controlling safety-critical processes.
  • the bus interface module contains both the interface required for communication via the open (standard) communication channel and the individual system identifier with which a bus telegram to be sent is connected in order to achieve virtual isolation.
  • the fieldbus system according to the invention can be constructed in a very simple manner with such a bus connection module, and otherwise existing standardized technologies can be used.
  • the individual system identifier is inherently redundant.
  • the individual system identifier contains at least two mutually redundant sub-components that must be sent or received together in order to enable an effective identification of the associated bus telegram.
  • the components can, for example be two data values that are related to each other.
  • the one data value is preferably a checksum derived from the other, for example a CRC checksum (Cyclic Redundancy Check).
  • CRC checksum Cyclic Redundancy Check
  • the individual system identifier contains a defined frequency signal that is transmitted with the bus telegram via the open communication channel.
  • the individual system identifier is implemented in the frequency domain. This is possible particularly easily when transmitting the bus telegram by adding an additional, individually determined "tone" to the message spectrum to be transmitted.
  • the measure has the advantage that the system identifier is implemented independently of the bus telegram to be transmitted. The system identifier is therefore independent of any data errors that may influence the bus telegram to be transmitted. As a result, an incorrectly transmitted bus telegram can always be uniquely assigned to the fieldbus system concerned.
  • the individual system identifier contains a data value that is sent as part of the bus telegram.
  • the individual system identifier is added as a data value to the bus message that is actually to be transmitted. On the one hand, this can take place within a data frame provided by the bus telegram.
  • the individual system identifier is preferably added "outside" to the existing data frame, since in this case the data frame itself does not have to be changed. The individual system identifier can therefore be easily supplemented even with older existing communication protocols. In both cases, the individual system identifier can be generated in terms of software using measures known per se, which represents a very inexpensive and flexible possibility.
  • the data value is independently secured against data errors.
  • This measure has the advantage that the individual system identifier is independent of data protection measures that the communication protocol provides as standard. This makes it very easy to implement the individual system identifier even with an existing communication protocol. The original communication protocol itself can remain unchanged, it is only supplemented by adding the individual system identifier. Protection against data errors is preferably carried out by means of a CRC checksum or a comparable checksum, which is generated in addition to existing checksums.
  • the transmission medium also has a closed communication channel on, which is connected to the open communication channel via a signal converter.
  • the fieldbus system according to the invention has both open and closed transmission paths.
  • the measure has the advantage that the fieldbus system according to the invention can be optimally adapted to existing environments.
  • a closed, line-bound part can be installed in spatial areas with particularly strong electromagnetic interference radiation, while at the same time larger transmission links in other areas are bridged wirelessly.
  • a closed, line-bound transmission medium at least according to the current state of the art, a higher transmission speed can be achieved at comparable costs.
  • the fieldbus system according to the invention thus benefits from the advantages of the different transmission media.
  • the signal converter has a first security stage which connects a bus telegram to be sent via the open communication channel to the system identifier.
  • the measure has the advantage that the bus subscribers in the closed part of the fieldbus system are relieved of the task of providing a bus telegram to be sent with the system identifier. This increases their processing speed.
  • an existing closed fieldbus system can be supplemented in this way very cost-effectively with open, for example wireless, transmission sections.
  • the signal converter has a second security stage which checks the system identifier of a bus telegram received via the open communication channel.
  • the signal converter also takes on the second subtask, which is associated with the individual system identifier, namely its checking when a bus telegram is received.
  • the bus participants in the closed part of the fieldbus system can be relieved completely of the tasks associated with the system identifier.
  • the closed part of the safe fieldbus system can therefore easily be supplemented with, for example, wireless transmission paths using the signal converter.
  • the signal converter has a filter stage which selects bus telegrams to be sent via the open communication channel.
  • the signal converter has the ability to transmit only those bus telegrams via the open communication channel that are intended for bus users "on the other side" of this channel. Bus telegrams whose addressees are not on the other side of the open communication channel are not transmitted.
  • the measure has the advantage that the open communication channel is relieved of unnecessary bus telegrams, which enables a higher transmission speed.
  • the signal converter has an exchangeable storage medium on which the system identifier is stored in a non-volatile manner.
  • the exchangeable storage medium is preferably a chip card.
  • the measure has the advantage that the individual system identifier can be assigned to the signal converter very simply and nevertheless fail-safe. It is also easy and inexpensive to replace a defective signal converter.
  • a checksum assigned to it is preferably stored on the exchangeable storage medium, which enables a particularly fail-safe assignment of the system identifier.
  • each bus subscriber has an exchangeable storage medium on which the system identifier is stored in a non-volatile manner.
  • This measure enables simple and inexpensive integration of bus subscribers into the fieldbus system according to the invention, especially when the bus subscribers themselves require the system identifier for participation in the data communication.
  • an individual subscriber address is also stored in a non-volatile manner on the exchangeable storage medium.
  • Fig. 1 shows a first embodiment of the invention, in which two field bus systems of the same type according to the invention are arranged spatially adjacent to each other with an open radio channel, and
  • Fig. 2 shows a second embodiment of a fieldbus system according to the invention.
  • FIG. 1 two fieldbus systems according to the invention are designated in their entirety with the reference numbers 10 and 12, respectively.
  • Each of the two field bus systems 10, 12 contains a radio channel 14 or 16 as the transmission medium, that is to say an open communication channel which is not secure per se.
  • the two fieldbus systems 10, 12 could work together on an existing Ethernet connection or another open network connection.
  • each bus subscribe 18 to 28 has a bus interface module 30 with an antenna 32, which forms an interface to the radio channels 14 and 16, respectively.
  • each bus connection module 30 has a communication unit 34 in which a communication protocol is implemented.
  • each bus connection module 30 contains a card reader for reading out a chip card 36.
  • An individual data value and an associated checksum are stored in each case on the chip cards 36. Both are part of an individual system identifier, which are assigned to the bus systems 10 and 12, more precisely to the associated bus users 18 to 22 and 24 to 28, respectively.
  • the data value is designated schematically by reference number 38 and the checksum by reference number 40 (designated as representative of all other bus users at bus user 22).
  • the same data 38 and the same checksum 40 are assigned to all bus subscribers 18 to 22 of the bus system 10. This means that the chip cards 36 are the same for all bus subscribers 18 to 22. As an example, it is assumed here that the data value 38 is "0815" for all bus subscribers 18 to 22.
  • the data value is shown schematically with reference number 42 and the checksum with reference number 44. draws (designated as representative of all other bus subscribers at bus subscriber 26).
  • the same data value 42 and the same checksum 44 are assigned to all bus subscribers 24 to 28.
  • the data value 42 here is "4711" for all bus users.
  • the bus subscribers 18 to 28 are each safe bus subscribers here, and they are used to control safety-critical processes, such as, for example, monitoring emergency stop switches on a complex machine system.
  • the fieldbus system 10 is assigned to a first machine system (not shown), while the fieldbus system 12 is assigned to a second machine system (also not shown) that is independent of it.
  • the machine systems are, for example, production lines arranged side by side in a common production hall.
  • the bus subscribers 18 to 22 or 24 to 28 of each fieldbus system 10, 12 communicate with one another via the radio channels 14, 16.
  • the bus subscriber 18 sends a bus telegram 46 which is received by the bus subscribers 20 and 22 and can be evaluated.
  • the bus telegram 46 is supplemented by the data value 38 (“0815”) and the checksum 40 at the end of its data frame.
  • the bus interface module 30 generates a defined frequency signal 48, which is transmitted simultaneously with the bus telegram 46 via the radio channel 14.
  • the frequency signal 48 forms, together with the data value 38 and the checksum 40, the individual system identifier of the fieldbus system 10, and it thus enables a redundant check of each received signal.
  • NEN bus telegram 46 indicates whether this belongs to the fieldbus system 10.
  • the bus subscriber 26 of the fieldbus system 12 sends a second bus telegram 50 in the situation shown in FIG. 1, to which the data value 42 (“4711”) and its checksum 44 are attached. Furthermore, the bus interface module 30 of the bus subscriber 26 generates a second frequency signal 52 that differs from the first frequency signal 48 of the fieldbus system 10. The frequency signal 52, together with the data value 42 and the checksum 44, forms the individual system identifier which is assigned to the fieldbus system 12.
  • the radio signal transmitted by the bus subscriber 18 also reaches the bus subscriber 24 arranged in close proximity to it, which is indicated schematically by the arrow 54. Due to the different system identifiers, in particular the different data values "0815" and "4711" and the different frequency signals 48 and 52, the bus interface module 30 of the bus subscriber 24 recognizes, however, that the received bus telegram belongs to another fieldbus system, namely the fieldbus system 10. The bus telegram received according to arrow 54 is therefore ignored in the bus subscriber 24. In the fieldbus systems 10 and 12 of the same type, in which the bus telegrams 46, 50 are themselves interchangeable due to the identical communication protocols, this prevents mutual interference.
  • bus telegram 46 is, for example, a switch-on command for the assigned machine system
  • this switch-on command allows the field bus system 12 machine system untouched.
  • the fieldbus systems 10 and 12 therefore have the necessary security for controlling security-critical processes.
  • the two fieldbus systems 10 and 12 operate with different carrier frequencies during radio transmission.
  • the carrier frequencies can simultaneously include the function of the different frequency signals 48, 52.
  • the different frequency signals 48, 52 are, however, again separate signals that are modulated onto the different carrier frequencies.
  • the fieldbus system 12 cannot receive a bus telegram 46 from the fieldbus system 10 in either case. The same applies in reverse. However, should a bus telegram nevertheless "get lost" due to an error, for example due to an incorrect frequency shift or due to an unintentional incorrect setting of the carrier frequency after a maintenance measure, the bus telegram received incorrectly would be ignored as a result of the measures described above.
  • the entire fieldbus system that has received the wrong bus telegram is then put into a safe error state, for example switched off. This signals the error that has occurred and avoids a safety-critical situation.
  • a fieldbus system according to the invention is designated in its entirety by reference number 60.
  • the fieldbus system 60 contains a radio channel 62 as the transmission medium.
  • the radio channel 62 could in turn be an open line connection, such as an Ethernet connection that is still used in another way.
  • the fieldbus system 60 has two closed (dedicated) line connections 64, 66, to each of which a large number of bus users 68, 70, 72, 74, 76 are connected.
  • the bus participants 68 and 70 are each light barriers which have a corresponding bus connection module (not shown here).
  • the bus device 72 is a safe I / O device
  • the bus device 74 is a safe control unit
  • the bus device 76 in turn is a safe I / O device.
  • Both the safe control unit 74 and the I / O devices have bus interface modules, not shown here.
  • the I / O device 72 is connected via inputs or outputs to a first safety-critical process 78 and the I / O device 76 to a second safety-critical process 80. For example, this involves the shutdown of sub-areas of a complex machine system, the shutdown that has taken place being reported to the safe control unit 74 via the inputs of the I / O devices 72, 76.
  • the bus subscribers 68 to 72 are connected via the line connection 64 to a first line-bound subsystem 82.
  • the bus subscribers 74, 76 are connected via the line connection 66 to a second line-bound subsystem 84.
  • the subsystems 82, 84 are in themselves line-bound fieldbus systems of the type known from the aforementioned DE magazine.
  • Reference numbers 86 and 88 respectively denote a signal converter which connects the line connections 64, 66 to the radio channel 62.
  • the two subsystems 82, 84 are thus connected to one another at the same time.
  • Each of the two signal converters 86 has a radio module 90 which can transmit or receive bus telegrams 92 via the radio channel 62.
  • the radio modules 90 are standard modules which are known per se and, on their own, do not have the required error security in the sense of the European standard EN 954-1.
  • each signal converter 86, 88 has a first security level 94, a second security level 96, a filter level 98 and a chip card 100.
  • a bus telegram 92 to be sent over the radio channel 62 is provided with an individual system identifier 102 and an associated checksum 104.
  • the system identifier 102 takes the first security level 94 from the chip card 100.
  • the marked bus telegram is then transmitted to the radio module 90 and from there via the radio channel 62.
  • the second security stage 96 checks the attached system identifier 102 and its checksum 104 to determine whether the bus telegram 92 actually belongs to the fieldbus system 60.
  • the bus telegram 92 is only processed further if this is the case. Otherwise the bus telegram 92 is rejected.
  • the filter stage 98 selects bus telegrams 92 to determine whether they are addressed to a receiver on the other side of the radio channel 62. Only if this is the case does filter stage 98 forward bus telegram 92 to first security stage 94 or radio module 90. In this way, the radio channel 62 is relieved of unnecessary telegram traffic.
  • the bus telegram 92 is supplemented only with the system identifier 102, alternatively only with the checksum 104. This also enables the bus telegrams to be clearly identified on the receiver side. In further exemplary embodiments, only a frequency signal corresponding to the first exemplary embodiment is used as the system identifier.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Medical Informatics (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un système de bus de terrain (10 ; 12) pour la commande de process de sécurité, comprenant un moyen de transmission (14 ; 16) et une pluralité d'abonnés du bus (18, 20, 22 ; 24, 26, 28), reliés à ce moyen de transmission (14 ; 16). Selon cette invention, les abonnés de bus (18, 20, 22 ; 24, 26, 28) peuvent envoyer des télégrammes de bus (46 ; 50) par ce moyen de transmission (14 ; 16) pour communiquer les uns avec les autres. Ce système de bus de terrain (10 ; 12) est caractérisé en ce que le moyen de transmission (14 ; 16) présente un canal de communication ouvert et que le protocole de communication contient une identification système individuelle (38, 40, 48 ; 42, 44, 52), associée au moins à chaque télégramme de bus (46 ; 50) envoyé par ledit canal de communication ouvert (14 ; 16).
EP01993099A 2000-10-30 2001-10-22 Systeme de bus de terrain pour la commande de process de securite Ceased EP1330908A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE10053763 2000-10-30
DE10053763A DE10053763C2 (de) 2000-10-30 2000-10-30 Feldbussystem zum Steuern von sicherheitskritischen Prozessen sowie Busanschaltmodul zur Verwendung in einem solchen Feldbussystem
PCT/EP2001/012156 WO2002037791A1 (fr) 2000-10-30 2001-10-22 Systeme de bus de terrain pour la commande de process de securite

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1330908A1 true EP1330908A1 (fr) 2003-07-30

Family

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Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP01993099A Ceased EP1330908A1 (fr) 2000-10-30 2001-10-22 Systeme de bus de terrain pour la commande de process de securite

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (1) US20040010651A1 (fr)
EP (1) EP1330908A1 (fr)
JP (1) JP4034182B2 (fr)
AU (1) AU2002219045A1 (fr)
DE (1) DE10053763C2 (fr)
WO (1) WO2002037791A1 (fr)

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US20040010651A1 (en) 2004-01-15
DE10053763A1 (de) 2002-05-16
JP4034182B2 (ja) 2008-01-16
DE10053763C2 (de) 2002-10-17
JP2004513568A (ja) 2004-04-30
WO2002037791A1 (fr) 2002-05-10
AU2002219045A1 (en) 2002-05-15

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