EP1266147B1 - Fluidtechnisches system mit sicherheitsfunktion - Google Patents
Fluidtechnisches system mit sicherheitsfunktion Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP1266147B1 EP1266147B1 EP01923550A EP01923550A EP1266147B1 EP 1266147 B1 EP1266147 B1 EP 1266147B1 EP 01923550 A EP01923550 A EP 01923550A EP 01923550 A EP01923550 A EP 01923550A EP 1266147 B1 EP1266147 B1 EP 1266147B1
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- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- control device
- local control
- monitoring
- local
- deactivation
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Lifetime
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Classifications
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F15—FLUID-PRESSURE ACTUATORS; HYDRAULICS OR PNEUMATICS IN GENERAL
- F15B—SYSTEMS ACTING BY MEANS OF FLUIDS IN GENERAL; FLUID-PRESSURE ACTUATORS, e.g. SERVOMOTORS; DETAILS OF FLUID-PRESSURE SYSTEMS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- F15B19/00—Testing; Calibrating; Fault detection or monitoring; Simulation or modelling of fluid-pressure systems or apparatus not otherwise provided for
- F15B19/005—Fault detection or monitoring
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F15—FLUID-PRESSURE ACTUATORS; HYDRAULICS OR PNEUMATICS IN GENERAL
- F15B—SYSTEMS ACTING BY MEANS OF FLUIDS IN GENERAL; FLUID-PRESSURE ACTUATORS, e.g. SERVOMOTORS; DETAILS OF FLUID-PRESSURE SYSTEMS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- F15B20/00—Safety arrangements for fluid actuator systems; Applications of safety devices in fluid actuator systems; Emergency measures for fluid actuator systems
- F15B20/008—Valve failure
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a local control device for a fluid power system with at least one fluidic actuator by the local control device can be controlled by control means, wherein at least a sensor for transmitting at least one piece of information via at least one operating state of the fluidic System provided to the local control device is, wherein the local control device designed in such a way is that they have the at least one information to identify Evaluate at least one safety-critical condition can and that they are in the presence of at least one safety-critical Condition at least a predetermined Performs subsequent action, and wherein the fluid power system switch-off means which can be controlled by the local control device for switching off the active function of the control means the at least one fluidic actuator and with the local Control means cooperating control checking means for checking the control means.
- the invention further relates to a fluidic system, a software module for a local control device of a fluid technical system and a method of operation a fluidic system.
- Fluidtechnisch designated System
- a pneumatic system with the help of compressed air or as a hydraulic system with Help of hydraulic oil as a pressure medium ( "fluid") operated become.
- an electrical control device controls via control means, e.g. Valves, the flow of the pressure medium for actuating the fluidic or the actuators.
- One such actuator is for example a working cylinder.
- the respective Operating state of the fluid power system is doing monitored with the help of a sensor. It can e.g. to the fluidic actuator mounted a position sensor be the controller of the information about the communicates respective position of the actuator, so that this e.g. based on the information, the position of the actuator by appropriate Influencing the admission of the actuator with the pressure medium can.
- JP 07 01 207A is a fluid power system in the form of a hydraulic circuit known in which a local control device in the form of a Controller recognizes a safety-critical situation and switching off control means, which are used to control an actuator, for example in the form of a hydraulic cylinder, shuts off.
- a control means contains the known hydraulic Circuit among other things a proportional valve.
- a shutdown shut-off valves are provided.
- This task is performed by a local controller of the type mentioned above, is provided in the, that they are based on a review of the shutdown means shutdown checking means cooperating with the local controller and / or to review the Control means based on the control verification means for at least partial shutdown of the action function of the control means with the help of the shutdown and after the review to reactivate the function of the Control means is designed.
- the object is further achieved by a fluidic system, a software module and a method according to the technical Teaching solved further independent claims.
- the invention is based on the idea, in the fluid technology System for controlling the actuator safety functions to integrate, the simple and high so-called Requirement classes e.g. comply with European standard EN 941-1.
- the fluidic actuator may e.g. a valve arrangement, a pneumatic drive or a maintenance unit be.
- the control means may e.g. from a valve arrangement consist of an electronic control module as be controlled local control device. Kicks in the control means, the local control device or on the controlled fluidic actuator safety critical Malfunction, so recognizes the local control device solves this problem and resolves it Follow-up action.
- the local control device ensures that a safety-critical State does not go unnoticed.
- the supervision The security function can be adapted to the respective fluid power system, in particular also to be controlled Actuator be optimally tuned.
- Already existing sensors can also be used for security functions become. However, it is also possible that with the help of some additional sensors meet higher safety criteria become.
- the fluid power system as a complete, compact and prefabricated unit to be used already has integrated safety functions, e.g. interact with a higher-level control device can. This then does not need the locally required security functions be tuned consuming.
- the local Control device can also be used specifically for the notification of safety-related information and for the administration of safety-relevant information Commands to send crafted messages and receive.
- the safety-oriented fluid technology according to the invention System can be considered as part of a fluidic actuator be educated.
- the fluidic System integrated in a locally controlled valve assembly be that a single valve or a valve group, so one so-called valve terminal, can be.
- the inventive safety-oriented fluid power system component a fluid power drive, for example a pneumatic gripper, a pneumatic cylinder or a pneumatic linear drive.
- a switch-on valve, a maintenance device e.g. an oiler, or a "pneumatic emergency” can by an inventive external or integrated fluid power system safety-oriented to be controlled.
- a pneumatic cylinder Check valves are safety-oriented controlled.
- control device an information that a sensor for monitoring the speed of movement the actor delivers, then check whether a predetermined movement speed of the actuator is exceeded.
- the sensor can even be used for several functions, on the one hand for the Control the speed of movement to a predetermined and on the other hand to monitor whether the actuator is a safety critical Movement speed exceeded Has.
- the fluid power system points from the local controller controllable, in particular fluidic and / or electrical actuatable shut-off means for switching off the Active function of the control means on the fluidic actuator on.
- the turn-off means are e.g. between the control means and the actuator switched shut-off valves. This makes it possible that the control means is switched off and thus by the actuator be decoupled when an error occurs in the control means. For example, a valve may leak, so that the actor may be an undefined, unwanted one Takes position.
- the local control device may have a such error e.g. through co-operating control checking means, e.g. Pressure sensors, for verification determine the control means.
- the local Control device first, the function of the Control means by means of the shutdown means at least partially turns off and then performs a review of the control means.
- the control means without unwanted Affecting the actuator are actuated and e.g. a test cycle run through.
- a test cycle is e.g. each go through before the control means, so that the Control means only used to actuate the actuator if they work correctly.
- the control means can also be checked cyclically, so that too Correct functioning of the control means ensured if necessary if this does not work for a long time been used.
- the shutdown means checked by e.g. Sensors on the shutdown means are arranged, the state changes of the shutdown capture and report to the local controller.
- the local control device determines whether the reported state changes predetermined, expected state changes correspond or whether one - possibly safety-critical - Malfunction of the shutdown is present.
- the local controller can then do this malfunction e.g. Report to the higher-level control device or trigger an "emergency stop" function.
- the control device can also cyclically check the shutdown or in each case after actuation of the control means or the Cut-off means.
- the local control device After the local control device has a presence of a For example, it can determine safety-critical status as a consequence of the fluidic actuator for Triggering a safe operating state, e.g. a triggering so-called "emergency stop” function, where the actuator is stopped.
- a safe operating state e.g. a triggering so-called "emergency stop” function
- the local control means may e.g. over a LED or a speaker the presence of safety critical State signal and so troubleshooting by an operator.
- the Local control device of a higher-level control device a message about the existence of the safety-critical State to send when the local control device e.g. as a so-called "slave” on a bus and acts as the "master" working parent Control device is controlled and monitored. It is also possible that the higher-level control device the local control device for controlling the fluidic Directing the actuator to a safe operating condition So for example, to the already mentioned "Emergency Stop" function.
- the fluid power system can also be from the parent Control device with a verification instruction to it be instructed, the control means and the shutdown cyclically or for each received verification instruction to check.
- FIG. 1 shows a working cylinder 10 as a fluidic Actuator with a piston 11 and a piston rod 12, which is in a working space 13 can move back and forth.
- a fluid as a pressure medium in this case compressed air, can over one on the bearing cap, the 12 facing the piston rod Front side of the working space 13, opening line 14 in the Flow workspace 13.
- the piston 11 enters the piston rod 12 thus moves into the working space 13 into it, if on the opposite, the piston surface of the Piston 11 facing end face, the end cap of the Working space 13 via a line 15 through the moving Piston 11 displaced air can escape, the working space 13 is vented.
- the Piston rod 12 thus moves out of the working space 13, if air can escape via line 14.
- One Sensor 16 detects whether the piston 11 is extended, and a Sensor 17 detects whether the piston 11 is retracted.
- the working cylinder 10 can also be a linear drive, for example, a maintenance unit for the treatment of compressed air or a pneumatically actuated valve as a fluidic Actuator be used.
- the line 14 can via a directional control valve 20, the line 15th be blocked via a directional control valve 21, in which case neither Compressed air in the working chamber 13 still flow through the Escape piston 11 displaced air from the working space 13 can.
- the directional valves 20 and 21 thus act as a shutdown and are so-called 2/2-way valves.
- a 2/2-way valve has an input and an output that either by a blocking position of the respective directional valve from each other are separated or in a passage position of the respective Directional valve are interconnected.
- the output of the Directional valve 20 is connected to the line 14, the output of the directional control valve 21 connected to the line 15.
- the directional valves 20 and 21 are acted upon by a line 22 with compressed air and then move in für woolwolf.
- the line 22 is acted upon via a directional control valve 23 with compressed air or vented.
- the directional control valve 23 is a 3/2-way valve with a working output for the line 22, a Input connected to a pressure source 24 and a Vent outlet 25.
- the directional control valve 23 is in Figure 1 in Vent position shown as rest position indicated by a spring in which the line 22 through the vent outlet 25 is vented.
- an electric drive 26 e.g. a coil drive
- the directional control valve 23 in Switch position be brought, in which case compressed air from the Pressure source 24 flows into the conduit 22 and the directional control valves 20 and 21 are moved in passage position.
- a pressure sensor 27 is further connected to the recorded on line 22 existing pressure.
- the pressure sensor 27 serves as a shutdown checking means for checking the acting as a shutdown directional valves 20, 21 and 23. Instead of the pressure sensor 27 could serve as shutdown checking means Also, for example, sensors for position detection attached to the directional control valves 20, 21 and 23 be.
- a control means for controlling the working cylinder 10th acts a directional control valve 30, which in the present case, a 5/3-way valve is with three positions, a rest position 31, a (piston) extended position 32 and a (piston) retracted position 33 and a total of five inputs / outputs, of which an input with a pressure source 34 for feeding with Compressed air is connected, depending on an output 35 and 36 for venting serves as well as an input / output via a line 37 with the directional control valve 20 and an input / output via a line 38 is connected to the directional control valve 21.
- a directional control valve 30 which in the present case, a 5/3-way valve is with three positions, a rest position 31, a (piston) extended position 32 and a (piston) retracted position 33 and a total of five inputs / outputs, of which an input with a pressure source 34 for feeding with Compressed air is connected, depending on an output 35 and 36 for venting serves as well as an input
- the valves 20 and 22 are for the following explanation the function of the directional control valve 30 in passage position.
- the Lines 14 and 37 and the lines 15 and 38 are included each connected to each other.
- drive 39 is activated, the directional control valve 30 is in the extended position 32 moves in the compressed air in the lines 38 and 15th flows in and air via the lines 14 and 37 and the Exit 35 can escape.
- the piston rod 12 moves out of the cylinder 10 out.
- the directional control valve 30 brought into the Einfahr too 33, so that Compressed air on the one hand flows into the lines 14 and 37 and on the other hand via the lines 38 and 15 can escape.
- the piston rod 12 moves while in the working cylinder 10th into it.
- the directional control valve 30 are also other valve arrangements possible.
- the lines 37 and 38 each connected to a 3/3-way valves be, with each one aeration, a venting and blocking the lines 37 and 38 is possible.
- a Pressure sensor 41 to the line 37, another pressure sensor 42nd connected to the line 38.
- the pressure sensors 41 and 42 act as a tax checker. Further, as a tax check-up tool also a sensor, for example in Form of limit switches, for monitoring the function of the directional control valve 30 may be arranged on this.
- the directional valves 20, 21 and 23, interconnected by the line 22 and powered by the pressure source 24, are Shutdown means for switching off the effective function of the control means acting directional valve 30.
- the functions of the directional valves 23 and 30 are over the respective Drives 26 and 39 and 40 from a local controller 50 controlled.
- the local control device 50 has an input / output module 51, a processor 52, Storage means 53 and interface modules 54 and 55 as Connecting means, each by not shown connections are interconnected.
- the local control device 50 is powered by an operating system as well Software modules are operated, which are stored in the storage means 53 are and their program code sequences by the Processor 52 are executed.
- the local controller 50 Via the interface module 54 connected to a bus 56 is the local controller 50 with a parent Control means 57 connected by the controller 50 control commands can be received and sent to the Control device 50 can send messages.
- AS-i actor sensor Interface
- the parent Control device 57 is in the present example a Bus master, while the local control device 50 bus slave is. It is also possible that the local control device 50 even without the higher-level control device 57 is used or that more valves or drives be connected to the controller 50.
- the higher-level control device 57 can also completely omitted.
- the local control device 50 with the higher-level control device 57 via digital Be connected inputs and outputs.
- the interface module 55 is via connecting lines 58 is connected to a display and command input module 59.
- the Control device 50 e.g. via electric handswitch received control commands received.
- the control device 50 to the module 59 outputs messages that can display the module 59, for example via LEDs. It is also possible that the module 59 in the control device 50 is integrated or completely eliminated.
- the input / output module 51 is connected via a connection 61 with the Drive 39, via a connection 62 to the drive 40 as well connected via a connection 63 to the drive 26. about the links 61, 62 and 63 may be the controller 50 activate the connected drives. Further reports the pressure sensor 41 via a connection 64, the pressure sensor 42 via a connection 65 and the pressure sensor 27 via a connection 66 the respectively detected pressure values to the Input / output module 51 and thus to the controller 50. Next, the sensor 16 transmits via a connection 67 and the sensor 17 via a connection 68 to each the operating cylinder 10 detected values to the control device 50.
- the (monitoring) connections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 and the (control) connections 61, 62 and 63 can be discrete lines or lead over a bus.
- FIGS. 2 and 3 Test cycle for checking the safe function the arrangement of Figure 1 shown.
- Figures 2 and 3 each show a table, in its left, with "ST" overwritten Column test or work steps entered are.
- FIG. 2 shows a test cycle starting with a step 200 with fully “retracted” piston 11.
- the sensor 17 gives the signal “1", the sensor 16 the signal “0".
- the pressure sensor 41 gives Therefore, the signal "1" off, while on the currently vented Line 38 outputs connected pressure sensor "0".
- a step 201 the first working cylinder 10 of leading to the directional control valve 30 line 37 and 38 and thus from unwanted pressurization and venting separated.
- the control device 50 controls the Directional valve 23 to take the venting position, so that the line 22 is vented, the pressure sensor 27 on “0" going pressure reports ("1 ⁇ 0") and the directional control valves 20 and 21 go into locked position ("1 ⁇ 0").
- the transition phase up for taking the venting position of the directional control valve 23 give pressure sensors 41 and 42 an undefined signal "X".
- a step 202 the directional valves 20 and 21 and the pressure sensors 41 and 42 tested. Because the directional valves 20 and 21 are in blocking position, can now without influence the working cylinder 10, the directional control valve 30 are actuated.
- the control device 50 activates the drive 39 for this purpose and deactivates the drive 40 so that the directional control valve of the retraction position 33 switches to the extended position 32, the pressure sensor 42 due to in the line 38 incoming Compressed air changes from "0" to "1", the pressure sensor 41 because of the now venting line 37 a from "1" signal changing to "0". This is not the case, is due to an error that the controller 50 recognizes and for example to the higher-level control device 57 reports.
- a step 203 then the directional control valve 30 is at rest 31 brought by the controller 50 also the Drive 39 deactivated.
- the lines 37 and 38 and thus also the chambers of the working cylinder 10 are then both through the directional control valves 20 and 21 as well as through the directional control valve 30 separated from a pressurization or a vent.
- the directional control valve 23 and dependent thereon the directional control valves 20 and 21 are activated. Their respective Control signals go as well as measured by the pressure sensor 27 Value from “0" to "1". If this is not the case, there is an error in the shutdown, the control device 50 detects. It is also possible that in the Directional valves 23, 20 and 21 each with the control device 50 connected sensors are arranged, whose signals the controller 50 checks at step 203. If an error occurs, the control device 50 from it to a safety-critical condition close and take a countermeasure, e.g. another Prevent actuation of the directional valve 30.
- a countermeasure e.g. another Prevent actuation of the directional valve 30.
- the directional control valve 20 is in passage position can still in cylinder 10 bearing cap side and in the Line 14 flow compressed air into the conduit 37, so that the pressure sensor 41 changes from "0" to "1" Values signaled by the controller 50 as expected values are monitored and if they are absent the control device 50 a safety-critical Condition determined.
- step 204 the control device controls 50 in a step 205, the directional control valve 30th again in Einfahrhus 33 and that by activating the Drive 40, so by giving one of "0" to "1" changing Actuating signal.
- the line 15 via the Line 38 and the vent outlet 36 vented, the Pressure sensor 42 indicates “1” during trouble-free operation "0" changing values.
- test cycle with "retracted” working cylinder 10 is so completed.
- Such a test cycle can also be used at any time Not moving the working cylinder 10, e.g. at fixed time intervals, be repeated as well as for example after the working cylinder 10 has been “retracted” or before the working cylinder 10 is “extended”.
- Such a “Extend operation” is shown in a step 206.
- the control device 50 activates the drive 39 Giving a control signal that changes from "0" to "1".
- control device 50 deactivates the drive 40, so that the line 14 via the line 37 and the vent outlet 35 is vented and the pressure sensor 41 at trouble-free operation from “1" to “0" changing values, while the lines 38 and 15 acted upon with compressed air the pressure sensor 42 changes from "0" to "1” Values reports and the piston 11 from the working cylinder 10th “Extends". If the piston 11 has reached the bearing cap side, the sensor 16 signals a signal "1", the sensor 17 a signal "0".
- step 300 The then reached extension end position is at the same time in 3 illustrated starting position, there referred to as step 300. Even in Ausfahr-End ein can beauklüs be traversed, as shown below.
- Step 301 is first the working cylinder 10 of the zu the directional control valve 30 leading lines 37 and 38 and thus of an undesired pressurization and venting separately.
- a step 302 corresponding to step 202 then the directional control valves 20 and 21 and the pressure sensors 41 and 42 tested.
- the directional control valves 20 and 21 are in the blocking position and the directional control valve 30 can therefore by the controller 50 without affecting the working cylinder 10 of the Extended position 32 are switched to the retracted position 33.
- the control device 50 activates the drive for this purpose 40 and disables the drive 39, so that the pressure sensor 41 due to compressed air flowing into line 37 a value of "0" changing to "1", the pressure sensor 42 because of the now venting line 38 is changing from "1" to "0” Signal reports. If this is not the case, there is a safety-critical one Error before, the controller 50th detects and, for example, a warning LED on the display and command input module 59.
- a step 303 the controller 50 deactivates also the drive 40, so that the directional control valve 30 in the rest position goes and the lines 37 and 38 are not vented yet can be supplied externally with compressed air. Then can in a step 204, the directional control valve 23 and depending on the Directional control valves 20 and 21 are activated again while in Passage position go, so that still in the working cylinder 10th end cap side and in the line 15 located Compressed air into the line 38 and the pressure sensor 42nd signals changing from "0" to "1". These will monitored by controller 50 as expected values, such that the control device 50 in the event of a fault reports a safety-critical error.
- a step 305 the controller 50 activates again drive 39, so that the directional control valve 30 back in Extension position is and in the lines 14 and 37 located Compressed air can escape.
- the pressure sensor 41 then reports values changing from “1" to "0". Also this now completed Test cycle can be repeated at any time.
- a step 306 shows how the piston 11 is "retracted” again can be.
- the drive 39 is deactivated, the drive 40 activated.
- the pressure sensor 42 indicates by venting falling pressure values, the pressure sensor 41 by applying with compressed air rising pressure values. After the Piston 11 has reached the end cap, the sensor gives 17, the signal "1", the sensor 16, the signal "0".
- the control device 50 the basis of Figure 2 and 3, according to predetermined, e.g. self-determined by configuration data criteria carry out. It is also possible that the control device 50 at the display and command input module 59 or from the higher-level control device 57 a command to Performing the test steps is given. Furthermore, the Control device 50 from there also a safety-oriented Command received, in which the controller 50 is instructed to a safety critical condition to be stopped by the controller 50, for example the directional control valves 20 and 21 brings in blocking position.
- FIG. 4 essentially shows the arrangement known from FIG. 1, where identical or equivalent components with the same Reference numerals are provided.
- the as Shutdown used components in particular the directional control valves 20, 21 and 23 together with cables, as well as the shutdown checking means used pressure sensor 27 is not more included.
- the sensor 17 is omitted while the sensor 16 is now designed as a distance sensor, the the distance of the piston 11 from the bearing cap of the working cylinder 10 recorded.
- a pressure sensor 70 is shown which the pressure of the supplied from the pressure source 34 and on the Line 69 detected to the directional control valve 30 compressed air and via a connection 71 to the controller 50 reports.
- the controller 50 may be that of the pressure source 34 in the line 69 fed pressure over Throttle valve 72 set, which via a control connection 73 is connected to the input / output module 51.
- the throttle valve 72 is thus part of the tax funds.
- the controller determines 50, as already explained above, the direction of movement of the piston 11, by controlling the throttle valve 72 whose holding forces and its speed of movement.
- the movement speed may be the control device 50 based on the measured by the sensor 16, during movement of the Piston 11 changing the distance of the piston 11 of the Determine bearing cap.
- the controller 50 detects with Help the sensor 16 such a safety-critical state and therefore controls the directional control valve in an "emergency stop function" 30 in the rest position 31, so that the working space 13 separated from the pressure source 34 and at the same time to a vent is prevented and therefore the piston 11 is braked.
- the controller 50 may recognize this and cause a follow-up action to remedy this. If namely, the directional control valve 30, for example, in extended position 32, so must from the pressure sensor 42 and the pressure sensor 70 matching pressures are determined, the essential are higher than those of the pressure sensor 41 in consequence of Vent the line 14 measured values. Is not this In the case, the controller 50 recognizes this problem and signals the problem in a safety alert to the higher-level control device 57. This can then, for example, the controller 50 in a safety emergency command To do this, instruct the throttle valve 72 completely close.
- control device 50 a not shown subordinate control device in the illustrated manner safety-oriented and, for. on one of these sent warning messages the working cylinder 10 in an "emergency stop" off.
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Description
- Figur 1
- ein erstes Ausführungsbeispiel der Erfindung mit einem fluidtechnischen System, das durch eine lokale Steuerungseinrichtung gesteuert wird und auf einen Arbeitszylinder wirkt,
- Figur 2
- eine Tabelle mit einem Prüfablauf des Ausführungsbeispiels aus Figur 1 bei eingefahrenem Arbeitszylinder,
- Figur 3
- eine Tabelle wie in Figur 2 mit einem weiteren Prüfablauf, jedoch bei ausgefahrenem Arbeitszylinder,
- Figur 4
- ein zweites Ausführungsbeispiel der Erfindung, mit im Vergleich zu Figur 1 teilweise geänderten oder fehlenden Komponenten.
Claims (17)
- Lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) für ein fluidtechnisches System mit zumindest einem fluidtechnischen Aktor (10), der durch die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) über Steuermittel (30) gesteuert werden kann, wobei zumindest ein Sensor (16, 17, 27, 41, 42) zur Übermittlung zumindest einer Information über zumindest einen Betriebszustand des fluidtechnischen Systems an die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) vorgesehen ist, wobei die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) derart ausgestaltet ist, dass sie die zumindest eine Information zur Ermittlung zumindest eines sicherheitskritischen Zustandes auswerten kann und dass sie bei Vorliegen des zumindest einen sicherheitskritischen Zustandes zumindest eine vorbestimmte Folgeaktion ausführt, und wobei das fluidtechnische System von der lokalen Steuerungseinrichtung (50) ansteuerbare Abschaltmittel (20, 21, 23) zur Abschaltung der Wirkfunktion der Steuermittel (30) auf den zumindest einen fluidtechnischen Aktor (10) und mit der lokalen Steuerungseinrichtung (50) zusammenwirkende Steuer-Überprüfungsmittel (41, 42) zur Überprüfung der Steuermittel (30) aufweist, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) zu einer Überprüfung der Abschaltmittel (20, 21, 23) anhand von mit der lokalen Steuerungseinrichtung (50) zusammenwirkenden Abschalte-Überprüfungsmitteln (27) und/oder zur Überprüfung der Steuermittel (30) anhand der Steuer-Überprüfungsmittel (41, 42) zum zumindest teilweisen Abschalten der Wirkfunktion der Steuermittel (30) mit Hilfe der Abschaltmittel (20, 21, 23) und nach der Überprüfung zum wieder Einschalten der Wirkfunktion der Steuermittel (30) ausgestaltet ist.
- Lokale Steuerungseinrichtung nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) als Folgeaktion den fluidtechnischen Aktor (10) zur Einnahme eines sicheren Betriebszustandes ansteuert.
- Lokale Steuerungseinrichtung nach Anspruch 1 oder 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass sie Verbindungsmittel (54) zu einer übergeordneten Steuerungseinrichtung zum Versenden einer Information über das Vorliegen des sicherheitskritischen Zustandes durch die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) als Folgeaktion aufweist.
- Lokale Steuerungseinrichtung nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 3, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass sie derart ausgestaltet ist, dass sie zur Überprüfung der Abschaltmittel (20, 21, 23) die Steuermittel (30) in vorbestimmter Weise betätigen kann.
- Lokale Steuerungseinrichtung nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass sie derart ausgestaltet ist, dass sie die Steuermittel (30) in Abhängigkeit von einer vorbestimmten Betätigung der Steuermittel (30), insbesondere nach Erreichen einer Endlage des zumindest einen fluidtechnischen Aktors (10), und/oder zu vorbestimmten Zeitpunkten überprüfen kann.
- Lokale Steuerungseinrichtung nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass sie derart ausgestaltet ist, dass sie die Abschaltmittel (20, 21, 23) in Abhängigkeit von einer vorbestimmten Betätigung der Abschaltmittel (20, 21, 23) oder der Steuermittel (30), insbesondere nach Erreichen einer Endlage des zumindest einen fluidtechnischen Aktors (10), und/oder zu vorbestimmten Zeitpunkten überprüfen kann.
- Lokale Steuerungseinrichtung nach einem der Ansprüche 3 bis 6, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass sie derart ausgestaltet ist, dass sie über die Verbindungsmittel (54) von der übergeordneten Steuerungseinrichtung eine Sicherheitsanweisung empfangen kann, in der die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) zur Ansteuerung des fluidtechnischen Aktors (10) in einen sicheren Betriebszustandes angewiesen wird.
- Lokale Steuerungseinrichtung nach einem der Ansprüche 3 bis 7, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass sie derart ausgestaltet ist, dass sie über die Verbindungsmittel von der übergeordneten Steuerungseinrichtung eine Überprüfungsanweisung empfangen kann, in der die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) zur Überprüfung der Steuermittel (30) angewiesen wird.
- Lokale Steuerungseinrichtung nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass sie derart ausgestaltet'ist, dass sie bei Empfang einer Anweisung zur Betätigung der Steuermittel (30) ermittelt, ob ein sicherheitskritischer Zustand vorliegt und dass die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) die Anweisung nur dann ausführt, wenn kein sicherheitskritischer Zustand vorliegt.
- Fluidtechnisches System zur sicherheitsorientierten Steuerung zumindest eines fluidtechnischen Aktors (10), dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass es zumindest eine lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche aufweist, wobei zumindest ein Sensor (16, 17, 27, 41, 42) zur Übermittlung zumindest einer Information über zumindest einen Betriebszustand des fluidtechnischen Systems an die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) vorgesehen ist, und dass es von der lokalen Steuerungseinrichtung (50) ansteuerbare Abschaltmittel (20, 21, 23) zur Abschaltung der Wirkfunktion der Steuermittel (30) auf den zumindest einen fluidtechnischen Aktor (10) und mit der lokalen Steuerungseinrichtung (50) zusammenwirkende Steuer-Überprüfungsmittel (41, 42) zur Überprüfung der Steuermittel (30) aufweist.
- Fluidtechnisches System nach Anspruch 10, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass die Abschaltmittel (20, 21, 23) fluidisch und/oder elektrisch betätigbar sind.
- Fluidtechnisches System nach Anspruch 10 oder 11, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass es als Folgeaktion eine optische und/oder akustische Meldeeinrichtung (59) zum Melden des sicherheitskritischen Zustandes ansteuert.
- Fluidtechnisches System nach einem der Ansprüche 10 bis 12, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass es den fluidtechnischen Aktor (10) enthält.
- Software-Modul für eine lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) eines fluidtechnischen Systems mit zumindest einem fluidtechnischen Aktor (10), der durch die lokale elektrische Steuerungseinrichtung (50) über Steuermittel (30) gesteuert werden kann, wobei das Software-Modul Programmcode enthält, der von zumindest einem Prozessor (52) der lokalen Steuerungseinrichtung (50) ausgeführt werden kann, wobei in dem fluidtechnischen System zumindest ein Sensor (16, 17, 27, 41, 42) zur Übermittlung zumindest einer Information über zumindest einen Betriebszustand des fluidtechnischen Systems an die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) vorgesehen ist, wobei das Software-Modul Auswertemittel aufweist, die derart ausgestaltet sind, dass die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) die zumindest eine Information zur Ermittlung zumindest eines sicherheitskritischen Zustandes auswerten kann, und wobei das Software-Modul Reaktionsmittel aufweist, die derart ausgestaltet sind, dass die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) bei Vorliegen des zumindest einen sicherheitskritischen Zustandes zumindest eine vorbestimmte Folgeaktion ausführen kann, wobei das fluidtechnische System von der lokalen Steuerungseinrichtung (50) ansteuerbare Abschaltmittel (20, 21, 23) zur Abschaltung der Wirkfunktion der Steuermittel (30) auf den zumindest einen fluidtechnischen Aktor (10) und mit der lokalen Steuerungseinrichtung (50) zusammenwirkende Steuer-Überprüfungsmittel (41, 42) zur Überprüfung der Steuermittel (30) aufweist, wobei das Software-Modul derart ausgestaltet ist, dass es zu einer Überprüfung der Abschaltmittel (20, 21, 23) anhand von mit der lokalen Steuerungseinrichtung (50) zusammenwirkenden Abschalte-Überprüfungsmitteln (27) und/oder zur Überprüfung der Steuermittel (30) anhand der Steuer-Überprüfungsmittel (41, 42) die Wirkfunktion der Steuermittel (30) mit Hilfe der Abschaltmittel (20, 21, 23) zumindest teilweise abschaltet und nach der Überprüfung wieder einschaltet.
- Verfahren für ein fluidtechnisches System, mit zumindest einem fluidtechnischen Aktor (10), der durch Steuermittel (30) zumindest einer lokalen Steuerungseinrichtung (50) gesteuert werden kann, mit den Schritten:die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) steuert zu einer Überprüfung der Abschaltmittel (20, 21, 23) anhand von mit der lokalen Steuerungseinrichtung (50) zusammenwirkenden Abschalte-Überprüfungsmitteln (27) und/oder zur Überprüfung der Steuermittel (30) anhand von Steuer-Überprüfungsmitteln (41, 42) Abschaltmittel (20, 21, 23) zur Abschaltung der Wirkfunktion der Steuermittel (30) auf den zumindest einen fluidtechnischen Aktor (10) an,die Steuer-Überprüfungsmittel (41, 42) zur Überprüfung der Steuermittel (30) und/oder die Abschalte-Überprüfungsmittel (27) zu einer Überprüfung der Abschaltmittel (20, 21, 23) mit zumindest einem Sensor (16, 17, 27, 41, 42) übermitteln zumindest eine Information über zumindest einen Betriebszustand des fluidtechnischen Systems an die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50),die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) ermittelt aus der zumindest einen Information, ob ein sicherheitskritischer Zustand vorliegt, unddie lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) führt bei Vorliegen eines sicherheitskritischen Zustandes zumindest eine vorbestimmte Folgeaktion aus.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 15, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) die Steuermittel (30) in Abhängigkeit von einer vorbestimmten Betätigung der Steuermittel (30), insbesondere nach Erreichen einer Endlage des zumindest einen fluidtechnischen Aktors (10), und/oder zu vorbestimmten Zeitpunkten überprüft.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 16, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass die lokale Steuerungseinrichtung (50) die Steuermittel (30) mit Hilfe einer Folge vorbestimmter Prüfschritte (201, 202, 203, 204, 205) überprüft.
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DK01923550T DK1266147T3 (da) | 2000-02-12 | 2001-01-20 | Fluidteknisk system med sikkerhedsfunktion |
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE10006367A DE10006367A1 (de) | 2000-02-12 | 2000-02-12 | Fluidtechnisches System mit Sicherheitsfunktion |
DE10006367 | 2000-02-12 | ||
PCT/EP2001/000624 WO2001059307A1 (de) | 2000-02-12 | 2001-01-20 | Fluidtechnisches system mit sicherheitsfunktion |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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EP1266147A1 EP1266147A1 (de) | 2002-12-18 |
EP1266147B1 true EP1266147B1 (de) | 2005-03-09 |
Family
ID=7630766
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Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP01923550A Expired - Lifetime EP1266147B1 (de) | 2000-02-12 | 2001-01-20 | Fluidtechnisches system mit sicherheitsfunktion |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US6769250B2 (de) |
EP (1) | EP1266147B1 (de) |
JP (1) | JP2003522909A (de) |
AT (1) | ATE290654T1 (de) |
DE (2) | DE10006367A1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2001059307A1 (de) |
Cited By (4)
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DE102014006357B3 (de) * | 2014-04-30 | 2015-06-25 | Festo Ag & Co. Kg | Druckluftsystem mit Sicherheitsfunktion und Verfahren zum Betreiben eines solchen Druckluftsystems |
DE102017106428A1 (de) * | 2017-03-24 | 2018-09-27 | Schunk Gmbh & Co. Kg Spann- Und Greiftechnik | Linear-, Greif-, Spann-, Dreh- oder Schwenkvorrichtung und Verfahren zum Betreiben einer derartigen Vorrichtung |
DE102015015626B4 (de) * | 2014-12-03 | 2018-10-25 | Liebherr-Werk Bischofshofen Gmbh | Arbeitshydraulik |
DE102017109291B4 (de) | 2016-04-28 | 2019-12-24 | Karsten Weiß | Greifmodul |
Families Citing this family (14)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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US7026945B2 (en) * | 2003-08-27 | 2006-04-11 | Bobby Dwyane Hill | Alarm device interface system |
WO2008101513A1 (de) * | 2007-02-22 | 2008-08-28 | Festo Ag & Co. Kg | Schnittstellenmodul zur steuerung einer ventileinheit |
DE102007038611A1 (de) * | 2007-08-16 | 2009-02-19 | Festo Ag & Co. Kg | Ventilmodul |
ES2432543T3 (es) * | 2009-04-17 | 2013-12-04 | Hawe Hydraulik Se | Batería de válvulas con válvula de circulación de bus CAN |
CN102667005B (zh) | 2009-09-22 | 2015-10-07 | 伊恩.希尔 | 带有用于将附件联接到工作机械上的销保持系统的液压联接器 |
GB2474572B (en) * | 2009-10-16 | 2014-11-26 | Hill Engineering Ltd | Control system for a hydraulic coupler |
GB2474576B (en) * | 2009-10-16 | 2014-03-19 | Ian Hill | Coupler |
FR2972234B1 (fr) | 2011-03-03 | 2013-03-22 | Coval | Ensemble de modules generateurs de vide par effet venturi et module de cet ensemble |
DE102012005224A1 (de) * | 2012-03-15 | 2013-09-19 | Festo Ag & Co. Kg | Fluidsystem und Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Fluidsystems |
WO2014172704A1 (en) * | 2013-04-19 | 2014-10-23 | Parker-Hannifin Corporation | Method to detect hydraulic valve failure in hydraulic system |
EP2881595B1 (de) * | 2013-12-03 | 2018-08-22 | Ansaldo Energia IP UK Limited | Vorrichtung für Notbetrieb von Aktuatoren |
CN107387495A (zh) * | 2017-06-19 | 2017-11-24 | 镇江四联机电科技有限公司 | 一种模块化液压测试试验台 |
DE102017009374B4 (de) * | 2017-10-10 | 2019-08-22 | Aventics Gmbh | Ventilanordnung und Steuerungsverfahren |
DE102018202416A1 (de) * | 2018-02-16 | 2019-08-22 | Festo Ag & Co. Kg | Verbrauchersteuervorrichtung und Steuerungsverfahren |
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US3724330A (en) * | 1971-07-12 | 1973-04-03 | Textron Inc | Self monitoring control system utilizing an electrical model for each control means |
DE2655906A1 (de) * | 1976-12-09 | 1978-06-22 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Elektronische sicherheitsschaltung fuer verstelleinrichtungen |
FR2442484A1 (fr) * | 1978-11-22 | 1980-06-20 | Materiel Telephonique | Dispositif electronique de surveillance de fonctionnement de servoverin hydraulique |
US5422553A (en) * | 1984-12-04 | 1995-06-06 | United Technologies Corporation | Servo actuator diagnostic monitoring |
JPH01283402A (ja) | 1988-05-09 | 1989-11-15 | Toyota Autom Loom Works Ltd | 産業車両における荷役用コントロールバルブ制御装置の安全装置 |
JPH0226301A (ja) * | 1988-07-12 | 1990-01-29 | Teijin Seiki Co Ltd | サーボ制御装置 |
US5269098A (en) * | 1990-07-13 | 1993-12-14 | Post Industries Incorporated | Door with fluid actuator door opening and closing mechanism |
EP0860609B1 (de) | 1991-09-10 | 2005-11-30 | Smc Kabushiki Kaisha | Durch Flüssigkeitsdruck betätigte Vorrichtung |
JPH0719207A (ja) * | 1993-07-02 | 1995-01-20 | Hitachi Constr Mach Co Ltd | 油圧機械の駆動制御装置 |
GB2318426A (en) | 1996-10-11 | 1998-04-22 | Ultra Hydraulics Ltd | Valve malfunction recovery system |
DE19927372C2 (de) * | 1999-06-16 | 2003-06-18 | Eads Deutschland Gmbh | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Erkennen einer Fehlfunktion von Stellantrieben |
-
2000
- 2000-02-12 DE DE10006367A patent/DE10006367A1/de not_active Withdrawn
-
2001
- 2001-01-20 US US10/182,489 patent/US6769250B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2001-01-20 AT AT01923550T patent/ATE290654T1/de active
- 2001-01-20 EP EP01923550A patent/EP1266147B1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2001-01-20 JP JP2001558617A patent/JP2003522909A/ja active Pending
- 2001-01-20 WO PCT/EP2001/000624 patent/WO2001059307A1/de active IP Right Grant
- 2001-01-20 DE DE50105536T patent/DE50105536D1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
Cited By (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102014006357B3 (de) * | 2014-04-30 | 2015-06-25 | Festo Ag & Co. Kg | Druckluftsystem mit Sicherheitsfunktion und Verfahren zum Betreiben eines solchen Druckluftsystems |
WO2015165561A1 (de) | 2014-04-30 | 2015-11-05 | Festo Ag & Co. Kg | Druckluftsystem mit sicherheitsfunktion und verfahren zum betreiben eines solchen druckluftsystems |
US10066651B2 (en) | 2014-04-30 | 2018-09-04 | Festo Ag & Co. Kg | Compressed-air system having a safety function and method for operating such a compressed-air system |
DE102015015626B4 (de) * | 2014-12-03 | 2018-10-25 | Liebherr-Werk Bischofshofen Gmbh | Arbeitshydraulik |
DE102017109291B4 (de) | 2016-04-28 | 2019-12-24 | Karsten Weiß | Greifmodul |
DE102017106428A1 (de) * | 2017-03-24 | 2018-09-27 | Schunk Gmbh & Co. Kg Spann- Und Greiftechnik | Linear-, Greif-, Spann-, Dreh- oder Schwenkvorrichtung und Verfahren zum Betreiben einer derartigen Vorrichtung |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP1266147A1 (de) | 2002-12-18 |
DE10006367A1 (de) | 2001-08-16 |
WO2001059307A1 (de) | 2001-08-16 |
JP2003522909A (ja) | 2003-07-29 |
US6769250B2 (en) | 2004-08-03 |
ATE290654T1 (de) | 2005-03-15 |
DE50105536D1 (de) | 2005-04-14 |
US20030010198A1 (en) | 2003-01-16 |
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