EP1062641A1 - Procede et dispositif permettant de controler une caracteristique biometrique - Google Patents

Procede et dispositif permettant de controler une caracteristique biometrique

Info

Publication number
EP1062641A1
EP1062641A1 EP99916819A EP99916819A EP1062641A1 EP 1062641 A1 EP1062641 A1 EP 1062641A1 EP 99916819 A EP99916819 A EP 99916819A EP 99916819 A EP99916819 A EP 99916819A EP 1062641 A1 EP1062641 A1 EP 1062641A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
data
data carrier
terminal
refdatal
reference values
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
EP99916819A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Gisela Meister
Albert MÖDL
Robert Müller
Bruno Struif
Dirk Scheuermann
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Giesecke and Devrient GmbH
Original Assignee
Giesecke and Devrient GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Giesecke and Devrient GmbH filed Critical Giesecke and Devrient GmbH
Publication of EP1062641A1 publication Critical patent/EP1062641A1/fr
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06V—IMAGE OR VIDEO RECOGNITION OR UNDERSTANDING
    • G06V40/00—Recognition of biometric, human-related or animal-related patterns in image or video data
    • G06V40/10—Human or animal bodies, e.g. vehicle occupants or pedestrians; Body parts, e.g. hands
    • G06V40/12—Fingerprints or palmprints
    • G06V40/1365—Matching; Classification
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/22—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
    • G07C9/25—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition
    • G07C9/257—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition electronically
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/22—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
    • G07C9/25—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition
    • G07C9/26—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition using a biometric sensor integrated in the pass

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method and a device for testing a biometric feature.
  • Biometric features are used, among other things, to identify or verify authorized persons in connection with access or access controls and to carry out financial transactions. With the help of biometric features, for example, it can be ensured that a data carrier, such as a chip card, which is used as part of the above-mentioned controls or transactions, can only be used by the authorized person, i.e. only the authorized person will have access or access is released or only the authorized person can carry out the transaction.
  • a biometric feature such as a fingerprint, a voice test or the design of the fundus etc., is recorded using measurement technology, and access or access is only possible if the measured values are compared with reference values stored on the data carrier or the transaction of the data carrier is released.
  • the use of the data carrier usually takes place in connection with a terminal with which the data carrier communicates.
  • the comparison of the biometric data recorded by measurement technology with stored reference values can in principle take place both in the data carrier and in the terminal device. Since the biometric measurement data is often very extensive and the evaluation of this data also requires complex computing operations, this requires a high computing power and a lot of storage space. These requirements cannot or only to a limited extent be met by data carriers available today, so that the evaluation of the biometric measurement data is generally carried out in the terminal and the data carrier only serves as a memory for the reference values.
  • Such a terminal is known from DE 4439 593 C2.
  • a device for access and access control is disclosed, which has a microphone for voice detection and a reading device for chip cards.
  • a speech sample is recorded and reduced to typical language parameters in a speech analysis unit.
  • the speech parameters are compared in an evaluation unit with reference values which are stored on the chip card and are transmitted from the chip card to the device for access control for the purpose of comparison.
  • reference values stored on the chip card are given to the outside, and there could therefore be a risk that unauthorized third parties will become aware of these reference values.
  • the device for access control passes on the speech parameters determined from a speech sample to the chip card and the chip card compares the transmitted speech parameters with stored reference values.
  • This procedure has the advantage that the stored reference values do not leave the chip card, and there is therefore no risk that they could be intercepted by unauthorized third parties.
  • the measured values for the speech parameters have to be transmitted between the device and the chip card, there is a risk that the measured values will be listened to by an unauthorized third party instead of the reference values.
  • a knowledge of the measured values of the authorized user by an unauthorized third party is just as explosive as a knowledge of the reference values.
  • the invention is based on the object of specifying a method and a device for testing a biometric feature which offer the highest possible security standard and at the same time can be implemented with reasonable effort.
  • the biometric feature is checked by the data carrier itself and not by the end device with which the data carrier is used as part of its intended use communicates.
  • the sensor or sensors for detecting the biometric feature is or is usually attached to the terminal, and the measured values therefore have to be transmitted from the terminal to the data carrier.
  • the computing and storage capacity of data carriers commonly used today, e.g. Chip cards are generally not sufficient to carry out a reliable comparison with reference values in an acceptable time based on the measured values of the biometric feature.
  • the invention solves these problems in that, on the one hand, all security-relevant operations are carried out within the data carrier and computer-intensive operations are outsourced, as far as security is not impaired, and on the other hand in
  • the data carrier specifies which data are transmitted in what form from the terminal to the data carrier. Instead of sending the complete set of measured values to the data carrier each time, the terminal device pre-evaluates the measured values, in -.4.
  • the outsourcing of computation-intensive and non-security-relevant operations from the data carrier to the end device thus has the advantage that the greatest part of the computing effort is incurred in the end device, which can be equipped accordingly, and only a fraction of the data carrier itself has to be carried out without it there is a reduction in the safety standard.
  • linking the measured values with data from the data carrier before the transfer from the terminal to the data carrier has the advantage that attempts at manipulation by means of intercepted data are made considerably more difficult.
  • the data carrier can systematically or randomly vary its specifications for the linkage and thereby prevent manipulation by replaying the interrogated linkage results.
  • the data carrier can also be used to select a varying subset of the pre-evaluated measured values, so that a potential attacker could only ever get knowledge of some of the measured values, and may also not know which part was just selected by the data carrier.
  • biometric feature “fingerprint” for a system consisting of a chip card and a terminal - 5 -
  • the exemplary embodiment represents only one of many implementation options.
  • the invention can also be used for any other biometric features, such as language, fundus, etc.
  • the details of the implementation e.g. which characteristics of the biometric feature are selected and how these
  • a fingerprint is first acquired by measurement technology, and the characteristics of the fingerprint are determined from the measured values by means of a suitable extraction function.
  • the characteristics can consist, for example, of coordinates and the type of the minutiae of the fingerprint.
  • the minutiae are characteristic points or shapes, etc. of the fingerprint lines, such as line branches or line end points.
  • the chip card gives the terminal e.g. the coordinates of the minutiae determined from the measured values for which the minutiae types are to be evaluated.
  • the terminal then links the specified coordinates with the data material for the minutiae determined from the measured values, determines the type of the minutiae determined at the specified coordinates, and forwards the result to the chip card.
  • the chip card checks the transmitted minute data and determines whether the biometric feature comes from an authorized user. This check can be carried out, for example, by comparison with reference values previously stored on the chip card.
  • 1 is a chip card in supervision
  • FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of the integrated circuit of the chip card from FIG. 1,
  • FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a terminal
  • Fig. 7 shows the method according to the invention
  • the chip card 1 shows a chip card 1 as an example of a data carrier under supervision.
  • the chip card 1 consists of a card body 2 and a chip module 3, which is arranged in a recess in the card body 2.
  • the chip module 3 consists of a contact field 4 and an integrated circuit 5, which is arranged below the contact field 4.
  • the dimensions of chip card 1 are defined by ISO standard 7810 and the
  • the functioning of the integrated circuit 5 is compatible with the ISO standard 7816.
  • the chip card 1 can be provided, for example, as an ID for access control to a building or as an authorization card for access to an electrical device, for example a computer. - 7 -
  • the chip card 1 can be a bank card, a credit card, a check card or the like, with the aid of which financial transactions can be carried out.
  • the invention can also be used in connection with other chip cards or any other data carriers which are capable of storing data.
  • FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of the integrated circuit 5 of the chip card 1 shown in FIG. 1.
  • the integrated circuit 5 is a microprocessor which is capable of carrying out calculations independently.
  • the integrated circuit 5 consists of a central processing unit 6, a memory 7 and an input / output unit 8.
  • the central processing unit 6 is connected both to the memory 7 and to the input / output unit 8 for the purpose of data exchange.
  • the central unit 6 controls the
  • the memory 7 can be designed as a non-volatile memory, as a rule ROM or EEPROM or as a volatile memory, RAM. As a rule, both volatile and non-volatile memory are available at the same time.
  • the commands executed by the central unit 6 are usually stored in ROM, in some cases also in the EEPROM.
  • the reference values for the PIN or for the biometric feature and other data required for the application are also stored in the EEPROM.
  • the RAM serves as a working memory in which the data that is currently required is temporarily stored.
  • the data exchange between the integrated circuit 5 and the outside world takes place via the input / output unit 8, which represents, for example, a serial interface, and with that for the input / output of data provided contact of the contact field 4 is electrically conductively connected.
  • the input / output unit 8 represents, for example, a serial interface
  • the contact field 4 it is not absolutely necessary for the data exchange between the integrated circuit 5 and the outside world to be carried out via the contact field 4.
  • a contactless chip card can also be used, in which the data exchange does not take place via the contact field 4, but instead, for example, via an antenna coil or via electrical coupling surfaces.
  • the chip card 1 can have a fingerprint sensor for measuring the fingerprint. This sensor would then be attached to a suitable location on the card body 2. As a rule, however, the fingerprint sensor will be attached to the terminal, as shown in FIG. 3, since fingerprint sensors suitable for integration into chip cards 1 are currently not or only to a very limited extent available.
  • FIG. 3 shows a block diagram of a terminal 9 with which the chip card 1 enters into data exchange.
  • the terminal 9 has an integrated circuit 10 and a fingerprint sensor 11, a keyboard 12 and a display 13.
  • the fingerprint sensor 11 can be omitted in the variant of the invention in which the chip card has its own fingerprint sensor.
  • the integrated circuit 10 of the terminal 9 has a central unit 14 which is connected to a memory 15 and an input / output unit 16.
  • the central unit 14 is also connected to the fingerprint sensor 11, the keyboard 12 and the display 13.
  • a fingerprint of the user can be recorded by measurement.
  • the data determined in this way can then be saved in - 9 -
  • the central unit 14 can be processed further and the result of this processing can be transmitted via the input / output unit 16 to the corresponding input / output unit 8 of the integrated circuit 5 of the chip card 1.
  • the central unit 14 can likewise receive data from the integrated circuit 5 of the chip card 1 via the two input / output units 8 and 16. The user can manually enter the data required for the respective application via the keyboard 12. Which data entry is required in each case can be shown on the display 13.
  • the chip card 1 can only be used after positive identification or verification of a biometric feature of the user, in the following example the fingerprint , possible.
  • Identification via a biometric feature replaces or supplements the user authentication that is customary with chip cards 1 by entering a secret personal identification number (PIN).
  • PIN personal identification number
  • a reference value for this identification number is stored in the memory 7 of the integrated circuit 5 inaccessible from the outside and is compared with the entered identification number.
  • reference values for the biometric feature are stored in the memory 7 of the integrated circuit 5 in the invention, which reference values are used when the measured values are checked. If the PIN comparison or the check of the biometric feature is positive, the chip card 1 is released for use. Otherwise, a certain number of further attempts are generally permitted and if these attempts are also unsuccessful, the chip card is blocked. - 10 -
  • the fingerprint is made up of a series of more or less strongly curved lines that run as a continuous line within the section shown, branch or have an end point.
  • the coordinates of the branches and the end points can be used as characteristics to be checked, since such a data set represents an individual characteristic of the person from whom the fingerprint originates.
  • the section of the fingerprint shown in FIG. 4 was provided with a coordinate system, and the coordinates xl and yl of a line branch 17 and the coordinates x2 and y2 of a line end point 18 were drawn in by way of example.
  • a complete data set for a fingerprint consists of a whole series of such coordinate pairs, for which the type of characteristic (branching, end point, possibly further) is also given. The structure of such a data record is shown in FIG. 5.
  • FIG. 5 shows a possible structure of a data record refdata, which represents the characteristics of a fingerprint.
  • the first line of the number matrix shown in FIG. 5 indicates the sequential number of the individual coordinate pairs.
  • the second and third lines list the x and y coordinates for determining the positions of the characteristics of the fingerprint.
  • a value z for the individual coordinate pairs indicates the type of the characteristics of the fingerprint, ie whether it is a branch or an end point, etc.
  • the data record consists of a total of n entries, each entry comprising four values (sequential number, x coordinate, y coordinate, type of characteristic). - 11 -
  • FIG. 6 shows the method according to the invention for checking a fingerprint.
  • the method steps that are carried out in the terminal 9 are shown on the left-hand side of FIG. 6 and the processing steps that are carried out in the data carrier and thus in the chip card 1 in the present example are shown on the right-hand side.
  • the arrows between the left and right side of FIG. 6 indicate a data transport between terminal 9 and chip card 1.
  • the actual checking process begins with the acquisition of the cardholder's fingerprint by the terminal device 9.
  • a finger for example the index finger
  • the separation between the initialization and the test in the narrower sense is illustrated in FIG. 6 by a horizontal line.
  • the measured values of the fingerprint determined as part of the fingerprint acquisition are represented by the data record sens.
  • the format and exact appearance of this data set sens is irrelevant for further consideration. It is only important that the terminal 9 has a function calc, with which a data record verdata can be determined from the measurement data record sens, the structure of which - 12 -
  • the chip card 1 transmits a data record refdatal to the terminal.
  • the data record refdatal was previously determined, just like a data record ref data2, from the data record refdata by applying an extraction function extrl or extr2 to the data record refdata.
  • Refdata 1 and refdata2, but in particular refdata, are usually stored in encrypted form.
  • a distinction must be made between two embodiments of the invention.
  • the data set ref data is completely stored in the chip card 1.
  • This data record was generated, for example, in advance by the card-issuing body from measurement data of the fingerprint of the future cardholder and stored in the memory 7 of the chip card 1.
  • the extraction functions extrl and extr2 are always applied to the data set refdata if the data set refdatal or ref data2 is required and is not already available.
  • the data set refdatal describes the coordinates x and y of the characteristics of the fingerprint that are to be checked.
  • the data set refdata2 describes the type of characteristics for the individual coordinates.
  • the dataset refdatal has lines 1 to 3 of the dataset refdata shown in FIG. 5 and the dataset refdata2 lines 1 and 4.
  • the dataset refdatal and as a result also the dataset refdata2 in the - 13 -
  • the data records refdatal and refdata2 each represent only a subset of the individual characteristics of the fingerprint provided with a serial number in the data record refdata. This is of great importance for the method according to the invention described below, since the data record refdatal can be used to select which characteristics of the fingerprint are to be checked.
  • the data set refdata is not stored in the chip card 1. Instead, only the data records refdatal and refdata2 derived from it are stored in the memory 7 of the chip card 1. In this case, however, the stored data records refdatal and refdata2 will generally include all consecutive numbers of the data record refdata, and a subset of the complete data records refdatal and refdata2 is only selected for the check when the fingerprint is checked.
  • the data records refdatal and refdata2 can thus be provided both according to the first embodiment by extracting and forming subsets from the stored data record refdata and, according to the second embodiment, by forming subsets from the stored data records refdatal and refdata2.
  • the datasets refdatal and refdata2 used for the further process are the subsets that resulted from the selection of certain serial numbers and are therefore generally no longer datasets that have all serial numbers.
  • the transmission of the data record refdatal from the chip card 1 to the terminal 9 means that the chip card 1 - 14 -
  • the selection of the characteristics to be checked can be carried out according to different criteria. In order to test as efficiently and reliably as possible, an attempt can be made to select particularly significant or clearly recognizable characteristics. Furthermore, the selection can be varied depending on the circumstances or according to a secret system in order to prevent misuse by listening to the transmitted data by unauthorized third parties, or at least to make it more difficult. Furthermore, the selection can also depend on the current application, so that, for example, in the case of an application in which only small amounts of money are transferred and therefore only a small amount of damage can be caused in the event of fraud, a smaller number of characteristics is selected than in one case where higher amounts are transferred. In this way, the effort involved can be very well adapted to the required security standard. In order to make an attack more difficult in general, it is of course also possible in all cases for the data record refdatal and also further data transmitted between the chip card 1 and the terminal 9 to be transmitted in encrypted form.
  • the transmitted data record refdatal is linked to the data record verdata with the aid of a function f and in this way a data record verdata2 is generated.
  • the type of characteristic of the fingerprint is determined for each of the coordinate pairs transmitted with the dataset refdatal.
  • the data record verdata2 determined in this way thus specifies the type of characteristic found or a specific type of coding for the given coordinates.
  • the data record verdata2 is then transmitted from the terminal 9 to the chip card 1.
  • the chip card 1 checks the data record verdata2 and, depending on the result of this check, the fingerprint is accepted as an authentic biometric feature or not.
  • the check can be, for example, a comparison of the data record verdata2 determined from the measurement with the reference data record ref data2. This comparison can be carried out in such a way that for each serial number of the reference data record refdata2 the type of the characteristic of the fingerprint is compared with the corresponding value of a data record verdata2 determined from the measured values.
  • the measured fingerprint can then be accepted as authentic if, on the one hand, the number of characteristics found in the data record verdata2 either exceeds a predefinable threshold value in absolute or percentage terms and, on the other hand, the correspondence between the data records verdata2 and ref data2 exceeds a further predefinable threshold value.
  • the comparison operations required for this can be carried out with relatively little computation and storage effort and can therefore be handled easily by the chip card 1.
  • a large number of other evaluation methods can also be used. For example, the evaluation of the number of characteristics found can be completely omitted, and only the correspondence between the data records verdata2 and refdata2 can be checked. - 16 -
  • the method according to the invention can also be used for other biometric features, for example for checking speech samples or measurements of the fundus etc.
  • the norm can also be formed using positively definite matrices, and in this way the vector x of the measured values can be compared with the vector y of the reference values.
  • the difference vector z is first formed from the vectors x and y and then the norm of the vector z according to the formula
  • the matrix A serves to weight the individual components of the difference vector z to different extents. - 17 -
  • the matrix A is split into an orthogonal matrix T and a diagonal matrix D, so that:
  • the method according to the invention is carried out by specifying the matrix A for the weighting and the vector y for the reference values. From this, the orthogonal matrix T, the product of the orthogonal matrix T and the reference vector y and the diagonal matrix D are determined by suitable functions and stored in the data carrier 1.
  • FIG. 7 The procedure for checking the biometric feature is shown in FIG. 7. According to FIG. 6, the steps carried out in the terminal 9 are also shown in FIG. 7 on the left side of the image and the steps carried out in the data carrier on the right side of the image. requirement - 18 -
  • the matrices T and D and the product of the matrix T and the reference vector y were previously stored in the data carrier 1.
  • the actual test procedure begins with the biometric feature being recorded by the terminal 9.
  • the result of this data acquisition is the data record sens.
  • the vector x of the measured values is determined from the data set sens with the aid of a suitable function calc.
  • the data carrier 1 then transmits the orthogonal matrix T to the terminal 9.
  • the product is formed from the matrix T and the vector x and transmitted to the data carrier 1.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Human Computer Interaction (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Collating Specific Patterns (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé et un dispositif qui permettent de contrôler une caractéristique biométrique. Une valeur théorique de la caractéristique biométrique est préalablement mise en mémoire sous forme d'un ou plusieurs enregistrements (refdata, refdata 1 ou refdata 2) dans un support de données (1). Afin de contrôler ladite caractéristique, on détecte les valeurs des mesures (sens) représentant la valeur réelle de la caractéristique, qui s'affichent sur un terminal (9). Le support de données (1) transmet à ce dernier au moins un sous-ensemble constitué des premières valeurs de référence (refdata 1), qui dépendent de la ou des enregistrements de données correspondant à la valeur théorique. Le terminal (9) combine les données dérivées (verdata) des valeurs mesurées avec le sous-ensemble des premières valeurs de référence (refdata 1), puis transmet le résultat de la combinaison au support de données (1). Celui-ci contrôle le résultat de la combinaison et détermine si la caractéristique biométrique est authentique, c'est-à-dire si sa valeur réelle correspond à sa valeur théorique, à l'intérieur d'une certaine plage de tolérance.
EP99916819A 1998-03-16 1999-03-15 Procede et dispositif permettant de controler une caracteristique biometrique Ceased EP1062641A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19811332A DE19811332A1 (de) 1998-03-16 1998-03-16 Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Prüfung eines biometrischen Merkmals
DE19811332 1998-03-16
PCT/EP1999/001691 WO1999048056A1 (fr) 1998-03-16 1999-03-15 Procede et dispositif permettant de controler une caracteristique biometrique

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1062641A1 true EP1062641A1 (fr) 2000-12-27

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EP99916819A Ceased EP1062641A1 (fr) 1998-03-16 1999-03-15 Procede et dispositif permettant de controler une caracteristique biometrique

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US6798334B1 (fr)
EP (1) EP1062641A1 (fr)
AU (1) AU3517399A (fr)
DE (1) DE19811332A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO1999048056A1 (fr)

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US6798334B1 (en) 2004-09-28
AU3517399A (en) 1999-10-11
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DE19811332A1 (de) 1999-09-23

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