EP1061211B1 - Verfahren zur Sicherung einer bidirektionellen Datenübertragung mit einer Kennzeichnung und System zu dessen Durchführung - Google Patents

Verfahren zur Sicherung einer bidirektionellen Datenübertragung mit einer Kennzeichnung und System zu dessen Durchführung Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1061211B1
EP1061211B1 EP00401666A EP00401666A EP1061211B1 EP 1061211 B1 EP1061211 B1 EP 1061211B1 EP 00401666 A EP00401666 A EP 00401666A EP 00401666 A EP00401666 A EP 00401666A EP 1061211 B1 EP1061211 B1 EP 1061211B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
signal
identification device
identifier
identification
phase
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EP00401666A
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English (en)
French (fr)
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EP1061211A1 (de
Inventor
Jean-Jacques Avenel
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Valeo Comfort and Driving Assistance SAS
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Valeo Securite Habitacle SAS
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Publication of EP1061211A1 publication Critical patent/EP1061211A1/de
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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/28—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass the pass enabling tracking or indicating presence
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00317—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks keyless data carrier having only one limited data transmission range
    • G07C2009/00325—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks keyless data carrier having only one limited data transmission range and the lock having only one limited data transmission range
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00555—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
    • G07C2209/60—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00174 - G07C9/00944
    • G07C2209/63—Comprising locating means for detecting the position of the data carrier, i.e. within the vehicle or within a certain distance from the vehicle

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for securing a bidirectional transmission of data with an identifier and a system for its implementation.
  • a system of this kind usually includes a identification device having a transmission circuit and a circuit of reception, installed in the confined space, and an identifier carried by a user who wishes to obtain access, a data exchange between identification device and identifier being provided for establishing itself normally when the distance between the identifier and the device identification is less than a predetermined limit, access being authorized only when the identification device has authenticated the identifier.
  • the invention relates more particularly, because it is in this case that its application seems to have the most of interest, but not exclusively, a system for securing access to a motor vehicle including the opening, in particular the doors of the cabin, have locks controlled by the system access.
  • this start of the operation can be obtained, for example, by action on a control button located on the opening, or by a command to distance, or possibly by a presence detector installed in the enclosed space.
  • this start of the operation identification is provided to require proximity to the user in relation to the enclosed space he wishes to access.
  • the identification operation is carried out on the basis of a exchange of data between the identification device and the identifier constituted, for example, by a badge with transponder electromagnetic.
  • the device identification device installed in the confined space, generally emits a query that activates the identifier, which returns a coded signal analyzed by the identification device. If the coded signal matches authorized code, the identification device authorizes access by example by unlocking one or more locks.
  • the signals exchanged are usually electromagnetic signals.
  • the system is designed in such a way so that the transmission range is reduced and an exchange of identification data between identification device and identifier can normally be established only when the distance between the enclosed space and the identifier is less than a predetermined limit, for example of the order of a few meters.
  • two malefactors acting in cans could gain access to the confined space in the following manner.
  • a first malefactor equipped with a transceiver system installed for example in a bag, approaches the closed vehicle that comes to leave an authorized user, while a second malefactor, equipped a transmission-reception system similar to that of the first criminal, follows the authorized user carrying the identifier.
  • the first malefactor triggers an identification operation, for example by pressing a control button located on an opening.
  • the signals emitted by the identification device are relayed by the transmission-reception system from the first malefactor to the system of the second malefactor, which repeats the signals from the identification device to the identifier. This last will then respond with the authorized code, which is retransmitted by the repeater system to the identification device which controls the unlocking the locks and gives access to the perpetrator.
  • the principle is to detect an abnormal delay time resulting from the interposition of a repeater not allowed between the identification device on the vehicle and the identifier worn by the user.
  • the interrogation signal emitted by the device identification is simply reissued, without modulation, by the identifier back to the vehicle, it is possible for a hacker to determine when this measure of abnormal delay time is performed and send back the anti-piracy signal directly to the vehicle using only the transmission / reception system located at near the vehicle. In other words, the hacker can bypass the communication with the vehicle, using a simple repeater, without go through the identifier.
  • the object of the invention is to propose a method which enables to secure bidirectional data transmission for access to an enclosed space, preventing a possible violation by a set hijacker-reception hijacker as mentioned above.
  • the principle of the invention consists, for example during the measure a delay time, do not use the identifier in simple repeater of the signal emitted by the vehicle, in order to force the hacker to retransmit the signal transmitted by the identifier, which generates necessarily a longer delay time.
  • the subject of the invention is a method for securing a bidirectional transmission of data, for access to enclosed space, in particular to a motor vehicle, consisting of establish a remote exchange of data between a device installed in the confined space and an identifier intended to be carried by the user, when the distance between the identifier and the identification device is less than a predetermined limit, access being authorized only when the identification device has been authenticated the identifier, the identification operation comprising the transmission by the identification device of a first coded signal identification and at least one second interrogation signal, characterized by the fact that to prevent data exchange of identification between the identification device and a non-repeater authorized, without going through the identifier, the process consists, on the one hand, in decode, at the identifier level, the first coded signal identification received by the identifier from the device identification, at the beginning of the identification operation, at sequentially reverse the phase of the second interrogation signal received by the identifier from the identification device, in function of the identification code previously obtained by decoding
  • This identification code can be consisting of a pseudo-random sequence according to an algorithm predetermined, that the pirate can not know. So, if the hacker uses a simple repeater to interact directly with the device identification, the latter will receive the second interrogation signal, without phase inversion, which will not correspond to the code identified by the identification device, thereby preventing access to the vehicle.
  • the second interrogation signal generated by the identification device is a pulsed oscillating signal and the identification code is a multi-bit digital code, for example example to three bytes, so as to successively enable or disable the phase inversion of a pulse of the second signal query, at the identifier level, according to the binary value of each bit of this identification code.
  • the method consists in level of the identification device, to add a phase shift additional 90 ° to the second interrogation signal received by the identification device, and in the phase shift detection step, assign a binary value for each pulse of the second signal, depending on whether the phase of the second signal received is in advance or late approximately 90 ° with respect to the phase of the second generated signal, so that to check if the sequence of binary values thus affected corresponds well to the identification code known by the identification device.
  • the method further comprises, at the level of the identification device, discriminate the phase between the second interrogation signal generated by the identification device and said second signal received by the identification device from the identifier, to filter the signal resulting from phase discrimination to deliver a signal representative of the phase shift and to maintain the prohibition of access when the difference between the amplitude of said continuous signal and the amplitude of a reference signal exceeds a threshold value predetermined.
  • the invention also aims at a system for the implementation process of the aforementioned method, in which the identification device comprises a transmitting circuit and a receiving circuit, and the identifier comprises a transmitter and a receiver, characterized by the fact that it comprises, at the level of the identifier, a means of decoding to decode the first coded identification signal, a means phase inverter to reverse the phase of at least a second interrogation signal according to a sequence controlled by a unit control center according to the identification code provided by the means of decoding, and at the level of the identification device, a phase shift detector receiving, at the input, both the second interrogation signal generated by a generator of the identification device, and said second interrogation signal received by the receiving circuit of the identification device from identifier, and a central processing unit capable of analyzing the phase shift thus detected according to the identification code known by the identification device.
  • the generator of the device identification generates the second interrogation signal under the pulsed oscillatory signal, each pulse of which has a predetermined carrier frequency, for example in low frequency at 125 KHz, said pulses having a recurrence period predetermined, for example of the order of 8 ⁇ s, and the code identification is a binary code with several bits, of unit duration for example 200 ⁇ s, for example three bytes, the value 1 or 0 of each bit being intended to enable or disable the inverter means of phase for a period corresponding substantially to that of bit 1 or 0.
  • the identifier comprises a low frequency receiver having a feedback circuit form of the signal whose output is connected, on the one hand, by means of aforementioned decoding, and on the other hand, to an input of a logic gate OR which constitutes the phase reverser means mentioned above, the other input of said gate receiving the bits of the identification code according to the frequency of recurrence of the pulses of the second signal interrogation, the output of said logic gate being connected to a radio-frequency transmitter modulated by said output signal from the door logic.
  • a switch can be inserted between said logic gate and the radio-frequency transmitter of the identifier, said switch being controlled by the central control unit for open the link between the logic gate and the transmitter during the phase of decoding the first identification signal and closing said link during reception and retransmission of the second interrogation signal by the identifier.
  • a phase shift means is interposed between a radio-frequency receiver of the device identification and the aforementioned phase shift detection means, for add to the second polling signal received from the identifier an additional phase shift of 90 ° at the input of said means of phase-shift detection, the latter consisting of a D flip-flop receiving on another input the second interrogation signal generated by the generator of the identification device, to deliver at the output, for each pulse of said second interrogation signal, a binary value 1 or 0 depending on the phase of the second signal received is in advance or late by approximately 90 ° compared to the phase of the second interrogation signal generated, the output of said flip-flop D being connected to the central processing unit to compare it to the above identification code.
  • the system includes, in parallel to the phase shift detection means, a discriminator means phase receiving, as input, the second signal generated by the generator of the identification device and the second signal received by the reception circuit from the identifier, a means of filtering being connected at the output of said phase discriminating means, to deliver, at the output, a continuous signal representative of the phase shift said signals, said continuous signal being delivered to the central unit of treatment which is sensitive to the difference between the amplitude of said transmitted continuous signal and the amplitude of a reference signal, for maintain the prohibition of access where the difference exceeds predetermined threshold value.
  • the reception circuit of the identification device comprises an antenna connected to a receiver radio frequency, for example at 434 MHz, connected, on the one hand, to a entry of the aforementioned phase discriminating means and, on the other hand, to a input of the aforementioned phase detection means
  • the transmission circuit of the identification device comprises a low frequency generator, for example at 125 KHz connected, in parallel, to the other input of the phase discriminator means, at the other input of the detector means of phase shift, and to an antenna amplifier.
  • the means phase discriminator is an exclusive OR logic gate that outputs a signal whose continuous component varies linearly as a function of the phase difference between the second signals generated and received supra for half a period.
  • the means filtering above can be a low-pass filter for example with a cut-off frequency of the order of 10 KHz.
  • the central processing unit comprises a microcontroller equipped with an analog / digital converter, to numerically process the difference in value between the voltage continuously delivered and the reference voltage, and to compare the binary values of the output signal of the flip-flop D and the code Identification.
  • the low-frequency generator of the device identification can be modulated in frequency by the central unit of treatment, preferably in a random manner, for example on a range from 120 to 130 KHz and with a period of about one ms.
  • the system comprises a means for measuring the delay time between the second signals generated and received above, so that the central processing unit maintain the access ban when the value of the delay time measured value exceeds a predetermined threshold value, for example a or two periods of recurrence of said second signal.
  • a predetermined threshold value for example a or two periods of recurrence of said second signal.
  • the reference voltage, at which is compared the DC voltage delivered by the filtering means is constituted by an initially stored value, which is learned by the system.
  • the on-board identification device for example on a vehicle, comprises a low-frequency voltage generator VF, for example at 125 KHz, delivering a voltage V E in the form of slots.
  • the voltage V E is sent, on the one hand, to an input of an exclusive OR logic gate 1 and to an input Ck of a flip-flop 21 called flip-flop D, and on the other hand, to the input of a amplifier 2.
  • the output of the amplifier 2 is connected to a capacitor 3 and an inductor 4 in series, a terminal of the inductor 4 being connected to ground.
  • the inductor 4 constitutes the transmission antenna BF of the identification device.
  • the identification device further comprises an antenna 5 connected to the input of an RF radio receiver 6, for example at 434 MHz.
  • the output of the RF receiver 6 is connected in series with a phase shift means 7 to introduce a phase shift of 90 ° into the received signal V R.
  • the output of the phase shift means 7 is connected in parallel to the other input of the logic gate 1 and to another input Dat of the flip-flop D.
  • the logic gate 1 is connected at the output to a low-pass filter 8 of order four, with a cut-off frequency of approximately 10 KHz.
  • the filter 8 makes it possible to output the DC component Vcc of signal leaving the logic gate 1.
  • the voltage Vcc is received by a processing unit 9 comprising a microcontroller equipped with a 8 bit analog / digital converter.
  • the processing unit 9 is adapted to control the above-mentioned generator BF, a terminal of which is connected to the mass.
  • the terminals Pr and Cl of the flip-flop D are connected to the ground and the output Q of the flip-flop 21 is connected to the unit 9.
  • the flip-flop 21 does not will not be described in more detail because it is known in itself.
  • the identifier for example worn on a badge, comprises an inductor 10 which is connected in parallel to a capacitor 11 and to the two input terminals of a comparator 12.
  • the assembly 11, 12 constitutes a BF receiver 13 comprising a very low-power wake-up circuit which reshapes the signal to deliver an induced signal V I in the form of slots.
  • the output of the comparator 12 is connected, on the one hand, to an input of another exclusive OR logic gate 22 and to the input of a decoding means 23.
  • the output of the decoding means is connected to a central unit 24 which is able to control a switch 25 by a link 26 and adapted to provide a signal consisting of a sequence of binary values to a second input of the logic gate 22.
  • the output signal of the gate 22 can modulate an RF transmitter 14 which delivers a modulated signal to an antenna 15 of the identifier, when the switch 25 is closed.
  • the arrow F1 indicates the transmission of the BF signal between the antenna 4 and the antenna 10
  • the arrow F2 indicates the transmission of the RF signal between the antenna 15 and the antenna 5.
  • the generator V generates a first coded signal identification, consisting of identification bits, which is issued by the antenna 4 of the identification device and received by the antenna 10 of the identifier.
  • This first identification code signal is decoded by the decoding means 23 which, simultaneously, gives the order to the unit control unit 24 to control the opening of the switch 25, to avoid a reissue of this first signal by the identifier.
  • the first coded identification signal is issued with a period about 200 ⁇ s per identification bit.
  • the generator V generates a second interrogation signal which consists of a voltage V E in the form of slots with a carrier frequency of 125 KHz and a peak amplitude, for each pulse I E , of 5 volts.
  • the period of recurrence of the pulses of the second signal is 8 ⁇ s.
  • This second interrogation signal is received by the identifier and delivers at the output of its receiver 13 a slotted oscillating signal V I whose signal envelope is represented in FIG. 1.
  • the signal V I is received at the input of the logic gate 22 which furthermore receives, as input, a continuous signal in the form of slots representative of the successive bits of the identification code previously obtained via the decoding means 23.
  • the central processing unit command 24 has commanded the switch 25 to close the link to the transmitter 14. If a bit of the identification code is 0, during a pulse I I of the signal V I , the logic gate 22 will output said pulse I I , while if the bit is 1, the logic gate 22 will output a pulse whose phase will be inverted by 180 ° and for the duration of an identification bit, or 200 microseconds.
  • the second interrogation signal does not pass not by decoding means 23.
  • the received signal V R has a slight phase shift with respect to the signal V E , for example of the order of a few hundred ns, because of the transmission time of the signal resulting from the distance and the electronic components.
  • the logic gate 1 will output a signal whose frequency will be double, that is to say of the order of 250 KHz.
  • the low-pass filter 8 will eliminate the carrier frequency at 250 KHz, to keep as the continuous component of the signal.
  • the predetermined threshold value could be of the order of 250 mV, which would correspond to a delay about 200 ns, whereas the value of the reference voltage would be 0 V.
  • Vcc is for example between 0.25 and 4.75 V, this will mean that the transmitted and received signals are out of phase in an irregular manner, which will maintain the prohibition of access to vehicle and / or may sound an audible or visual alarm.
  • the flip-flop 21 is not used, but only the logic gate 1 is used as a phase-shift detector means.
  • the central processing unit 9 may assign to said pulse a binary value equal to 0, and if the voltage Vcc is between 4 and 5 volts, the pulse can be assigned a binary value equal to 1, in order to compare the sequence of said binary values with the identification code known by the vehicle.
  • the logic gate 1 can serve both to detect a delay and to verify that the signal has passed through the identifier.
  • the invention assumes that the antenna of receipt of the identifier is not returned in relation to the antenna issuing the identification device, during the analysis of the second signal otherwise the comparison with the identification code will be distorted.
  • phase shift 7 to introduce an additional phase shift of 90 °.
  • the logic gate 1 will detect a phase shift that will always be of the order of 90 °, which corresponds to a signal Vcc of the order of 2.5 V, with a margin of error of the order of 10%, that is to say 0.25 V.
  • the fact to add the phase shift means 7 makes it possible to have in memory a only reference voltage value.
  • the overall delay time could, for example, for example, be of the order of 1 ⁇ s, which would correspond to a phase shift an additional 45 ° between the received signal and the transmitted signal.
  • the system could seek to increase the phase shift, for the for example, from 45 ° to 180 °, which would make the use of the transparent repeater for the system.
  • the hacker could, artificially, increase the delay time of the received signal, the received signal is always in phase or in opposition to phase with the transmitted signal.
  • the frequency of the signal generated for example on a range from 120 to 130 KHz, with a variation of the frequency, for example every millisecond.
  • the hacker thinks that the broadcast frequency is 125 KHz, it can seek to return the signal with a time delay of the order of 8 ⁇ s. If, however, the broadcast signal has, in fact, at that moment, a frequency of 120 KHz, which corresponds to period of 8.33 ⁇ s, the received signal will be out of phase with signal with a delay of 0.33 ⁇ s, which corresponds to a phase shift of about 14 ° and therefore to a variation of the voltage continuous Vc of the order of 0.4 V, which is much higher than the value threshold of 250 mV.
  • the hacker could, first of all, analyze the signal emitted by the device for a complete period, in order to identify its frequency, then send the signal back to the identification device, with an overall delay of two or more periods, which would make again the transparent hacking vis-à-vis the system.
  • phase shift means 7 it is possible to use the latch 21 above, to detect the phase difference between the signals on its inputs Ck and Dat, so that its output Q delivers a binary signal whose value is equal to 1, if the input Ck is late of 90 ° with respect to the entry Dat and equal to 0 if the entry Ck is in advance of 90 ° with respect to the Dat.
  • the Q output of flip-flop 21 is analyzed by the microprocessor of the central unit 9, in order to compare to the known identification code by the known device Identification.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)

Claims (17)

  1. Verfahren zur Absicherung einer bidirektionalen Datenübertragung für den Zugang zu einem abgeschlossenen Raum, insbesondere zu einem Kraftfahrzeug, das darin besteht, zwischen einer im geschlossenen Raum installierten Identifikationsvorrichtung und einem zum Mitführen durch den Benutzer bestimmten Identifizierer einen Datenaustausch über eine Entfernung durchzuführen, wenn die Entfernung zwischen Identifizierer und Identifikationsvorrichtung geringer ist als ein vorbestimmter Grenzwert, wobei der Zugang nur dann gestattet ist, wenn die Identifikationsvorrichtung den Identifizierer authentifiziert hat, wobei der Identifikationsvorgang das Ausgeben eines ersten codierten Identifikationssignals und zumindest eines zweiten Abfragesignals (VE) durch die Identifikationsvorrichtung umfasst, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass zum Verhindern eines Identifikationsdatenaustauschs zwischen der Identifikationsvorrichtung und einem nicht autorisierten Abfangsender ohne Übertragung durch den Identifizierer das Verfahren darin besteht, einerseits im Bereich des Identifizierers das von der Identifikationsvorrichtung stammende, vom Identifizierer empfangene, erste codierte Identifikationssignal zu Beginn des Identifikationsvorgangs zu decodieren, die Phase des von der Identifikationsvorrichtung stammenden, vom Identifizierer empfangenen zweiten Abfragesignals in Abhängigkeit vom zuvor durch Decodieren erhaltenen Identifikationscode sequentiell umzukehren, das genannte zweite Signal zur Identifikationsvorrichtung zurückzusenden, damit diese die Phasenverschiebung zwischen dem von der Identifikationsvorrichtung erzeugten zweiten Abfragesignal (VE) und dem vom Identifizierer stammenden, von der Identifikationsvorrichtung empfangenen zweiten Signal (VR) erfassen kann, und die Zugangsunterbindung aufrechtzuerhalten, wenn die erfasste Phasenverschiebungssequenz nicht dem der Identifikationsvorrichtung bekannten Identifikationscode entspricht.
  2. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass das von der Identifikationsvorrichtung erzeugte zweite Abfragesignal (VE) ein gepulstes Schwingsignal und der Identifikationscode ein digitaler Code mit einigen Bits, beispielsweise drei Bytes, ist, so dass die Phasenumkehr eines Impulses (II) des zweiten Abfragesignals (VI) im Bereich des Identifizierers je nach Binärwert eines jeden Bit dieses Identifikationscodes aufeinanderfolgend aktiviert bzw. deaktiviert wird.
  3. Verfahren nach Anspruch 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass es darin besteht, dem von der Identifikationsvorrichtung empfangenen zweiten Abfragesignal (VR) im Bereich der Identifikationsvorrichtung eine zusätzliche Phasenverschiebung um 90° aufzuprägen und im Schritt zum Erfassen der Phasenverschiebung einen Binärwert für jeden Impuls des zweiten Signals zuzuordnen, je nachdem, ob die Phase des empfangenen zweiten Signals um etwa 90° bezüglich der Phase des erzeugten zweiten Signals (VE) vor- oder nacheilt, um zu überprüfen, ob die Sequenz der so zugeordneten Binärwerte wohl dem der Identifikationsvorrichtung bekannten Identifikationscode entspricht.
  4. Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 3, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass zum Verhindern eines Identifikationsdatenaustauschs über eine Entfernung, die über dem vorgenannten, vorbestimmten Grenzwert liegt, insbesondere durch Zwischenschaltung eines nicht autorisierten Abfangsenders zwischen Identifikationsvorrichtung und Identifizierer, das Verfahren ferner darin besteht, im Bereich der Identifikationsvorrichtung die Phase zwischen dem von der Identifikationsvorrichtung erzeugten zweiten Abfragesignals (VE) und dem vom Identifizierer stammenden, von der Identifikationsvorrichtung empfangenen zweiten Signal (VR) zu diskriminieren, das bei der Phasendiskriminierung entstandene Signal zu filtern, um ein Gleichspannungssignal auszugeben, das für die Phasenverschiebung repräsentativ ist, und die Zugangsunterbindung aufrechtzuerhalten, wenn die Differenz zwischen der Amplitude des genannten Gleichspannungssignals (Vcc) und der Amplitude eines Bezugssignals einen vorbestimmten Schwellenwert übersteigt.
  5. System zum Durchführen des Verfahrens nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 4, bei dem die Identifikationsvorrichtung eine Sendeschaltung (2 - 4) mit Mitteln zum Ausgeben eines ersten codierten Identifikationssignals und zumindest eines zweiten Abfragesignals und eine Empfangsschaltung (5 - 7) enthält und der Identifizierer einen Sender (14) und einen Empfänger (13) aufweist, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass es im Bereich des Identifizierers ein Decodiermittel (23) zum Decodieren des ersten codierten Identifikationssignals, ein Phasenumkehrmittel (22) zum Umkehren der Phase zumindest eines zweiten Abfragesignals (VI) gemäß einer Sequenz, die von einer Steuerzentraleinheit (24) in Abhängigkeit vom Identifikationscode gesteuert wird, der von dem Decodiermittel geliefert wird, und im Bereich der Identifikationsvorrichtung ein Phasenverschiebungserfassungsmittel (21) enthält, das am Eingang zugleich das von einem Generator (V) der Identifikationsvorrichtung erzeugte zweite Abfragesignal (VE) und das von dem Identifizierer stammende, von der Empfangsschaltung der Identifikationsvorrichtung empfangene zweite Signal (VR) empfängt, sowie eine Verarbeitungszentraleinheit (9), welche die Phasenverschiebung analysieren kann, die so in Abhängigkeit von dem der Identifikationsvorrichtung bekannten Identifikationscode erfasst wird, wobei die Einheit Mittel enthält, um eine Zugangsunterbindung aufrechtzuerhalten, wenn die erfasste Phasenverschiebungssequenz nicht dem Identifikationscode entspricht.
  6. System nach Anspruch 5, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der Generator (V) der Identifikationsvorrichtung das zweite Abfragesignal (VE) in Form eines gepulsten Schwingsignals erzeugt, von dem jeder Impuls (IE) eine vorbestimmte Trägerfrequenz hat, beispielsweise in Niederfrequenz bei 125 KHz, wobei die genannten Impulse eine vorbestimmte Wiederholungsperiode beispielsweise in der Größenordnung von 8 µs haben, und der Identifikationscode ein binärer Code mit einigen Bits ist, mit einer Einheitsdauer von beispielsweise 200 µs, beispielsweise mit drei Bytes, wobei der Wert 1 bzw. 0 eines jeden Bit dazu bestimmt ist, das Phasenumkehrmittel (22) für eine Dauer zu aktivierten bzw. zu deaktivieren, die im wesentlichen der des Bit 1 bzw. 0 entspricht.
  7. System nach Anspruch 6, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der Identifizierer einen Niederfrequenz-Empfänger (13) mit einem Signalaufbereitungskreis enthält, dessen Ausgang einerseits mit dem vorgenannten Decodiermittel (23) und andererseits mit einem Eingang eines EXCLUSIVE-OR-Gate (22) verbunden ist, welches das vorgenannte Phasenumkehrmittel bildet, wobei der andere Eingang des Gate die Bits des Identifikationscodes gemäß der Wiederholungsfrequenz der Impulse (II) des zweiten Abfragesignals (VI) empfängt, wobei der Ausgang des Gate mit einem Hochfrequenz-Sender (14) verbunden ist, der durch das Ausgangssignal des Gate moduliert wird.
  8. System nach Anspruch 7, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass zwischen dem Gate (22) und dem Hochfrequenz-Sender (14) des Identifizierers ein Schalter eingefügt ist, wobei der Schalter von der Steuerzentraleinheit (24) gesteuert wird, um die Verbindung zwischen Gate und Sender während der Decodierphase des ersten Identifikationssignals zu öffnen und die Verbindung während des Empfangs und der Weiterleitung des zweiten Abfragesignals durch den Identifizierer zu schließen.
  9. System nach einem der Ansprüche 5 bis 8, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass ein Phasenverschiebungsmittel (7) zwischen einem Hochfrequenz-Empfänger (6) der Identifikationsvorrichtung und dem Phasenverschiebungserfassungsmittel (21) geschaltet ist, um dem vom Identifizierer stammenden, empfangenen zweiten Abfragesignal (VR) eine zusätzliche Phasenverschiebung um 90° am Eingang des Phasenverschiebungserfassungsmittels aufzuprägen, wobei letzteres aus einem D-Flipflop besteht, welche an einem weiteren Eingang das von dem Generator (V) der Identifikationsvorrichtung erzeugte zweite Abfragesignal (VE) empfängt, um am Ausgang für jeden Impuls des zweiten Abfragsignals einen Binärwert 1 bzw. 0 zuzuordnen, je nachdem, ob die Phase des empfangenen zweiten Abfragesignals (VR) um etwa 90° bezüglich der Phase des erzeugten zweiten Abfragesignals (VE) vor- oder nacheilt, wobei der Ausgang des genannten D-Flipflops mit der Verarbeitungszentraleinheit (9) verbunden ist, um sie mit dem vorgenannten Identifikationscode zu vergleichen.
  10. System nach einem der Ansprüche 5 bis 9, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass zum Verhindern eines Identifikationsdatenaustauschs über eine Entfernung, die über dem vorgenannten, vorbestimmten Grenzwert liegt, insbesondere durch Zwischenschaltung eines nicht autorisierten Abfangsenders zwischen Identifikationsvorrichtung und Identifizierer, das System parallel zum Phasenverschiebungserfassungsmittel (21) geschaltet einen Phasendiskriminator (1) enthält, der am Eingang das vom Generator (V) der Identifikationsvorrichtung erzeugte zweite Signal (VE) und das vom Identifizierer stammende, von der Empfangsschaltung (5 - 7) empfangene zweite Signal (VR) empfängt, wobei ein Filtermittel (8) am Ausgang des genannten Phasendiskriminators angeschlossen ist, um am Ausgang ein Gleichspannungssignal (Vcc) auszugeben, das für die Phasenverschiebung der genannten Signale repräsentativ ist, wobei das Gleichspannungssignal an die Verarbeitungszentraleinheit (9) ausgegeben wird, welche für die Differenz zwischen der Amplitude des ausgegebenen Gleichspannungssignals und der Amplitude eines Bezugssignals empfindlich ist, um die Zugangsunterbindung aufrechtzuerhalten, wenn die Differenz einen vorbestimmten Schwellenwert übersteigt.
  11. System nach Anspruch 10, dadurch gekennzeichnet dass die Empfangsschaltung (5 - 7) der Identifikationsvorrichtung eine Antenne (5) enthält, die mit einem Hochfrequenz-Empfänger (6) von beispielsweise 434 MHz verbunden ist, der einerseits an einen Eingang des vorgenannten Phasendiskriminators (1) und andererseits an einen Eingang des vorgenannten Phasenverschiebungserfassungsmittels (21) angeschlossen ist, und dass die Sendeschaltung (2 - 4) der Identifikationsvorrichtung einen Niederfrequenz-Generator (V) von beispielsweise 125 KHz enthält, der parallel an den weiteren Eingang des Phasendiskriminators, an den weiteren Eingang des Phasenverschiebungserfassungsmittels und an einen Antennenverstärker (2) angeschlossen ist.
  12. System nach Anspruch 10 oder 11, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der vorgenannte Phasendiskriminator (1) ein EXCLUSIVE-OR-Gate ist, das am Ausgang ein Signal ausgibt, dessen Gleichspannungskomponente linear in Abhängigkeit von der Phasenverschiebung zwischen dem erzeugten Signal (VE) und dem empfangenen Signal (VR) über eine Halbperiode variiert.
  13. System nach Anspruch 12, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass das vorgenannte Filtermittel (8) ein Tiefpassfilter ist, beispielsweise mit einer Trennfrequenz im Bereich von 10 KHz.
  14. System nach einem der Ansprüche 10 bis 13, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass die Verarbeitungszentraleinheit (9) einen Mikrokontroller enthält, der mit einem AD-Wandler ausgestattet ist, um den Differenzwert zwischen ausgegebener Gleichspannung (Vcc) und Bezugsspannung digital zu verarbeiten und die Binärwerte des Ausgangssignals des D-Flipflops (21) und den Identifikationscode zu vergleichen.
  15. System nach Anspruch 14, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der Niederfrequenz-Generator (V) der Identifikationsvorrichtung von der Verarbeitungszentraleinheit (9) beispielsweise in einem Bereich von 120 - 130 KHz und mit einer Periode von etwa 1 ms vorzugsweise zufallsbedingt frequenzmoduliert wird.
  16. System nach einem der Ansprüche 10 bis 15, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass das System ein Mittel zum Messen der Verzögerungszeit zwischen dem erzeugten Signal und dem empfangenen Signal enthält, damit die Verarbeitungszentraleinheit (9) die Zugangsunterbindung aufrecht hält, wenn der Messwert der Verzögerungszeit einen vorbestimmten Schwellenwert von beispielsweise einer oder zwei Wiederholungsperioden des zweiten Signals übersteigt.
  17. System nach einem der Ansprüche 10 bis 16, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass die Bezugsspannung, mit der die vom Filtermittel (8) ausgegebene Gleichspannung (Vcc) verglichen wird, aus einem anfänglich abgespeicherten Wert besteht, der vom System erlernt wurde.
EP00401666A 1999-06-15 2000-06-13 Verfahren zur Sicherung einer bidirektionellen Datenübertragung mit einer Kennzeichnung und System zu dessen Durchführung Expired - Lifetime EP1061211B1 (de)

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FR9907529A FR2795263B1 (fr) 1999-06-15 1999-06-15 Procede pour securiser une transmission bidirectionnelle de donnees avec un identifiant et systeme pour sa mise en oeuvre
FR9907529 1999-06-15

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WO2002054353A1 (de) * 2000-12-29 2002-07-11 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Identifikationssystem zum nachweis einer berechtigung für den zugang zu einem objekt oder die benutzung eines objekts, insbesondere eines kraftfahrzeugs
FR3040498B1 (fr) * 2015-08-31 2018-02-09 Valeo Comfort And Driving Assistance Procede de determination d'une distance entre un vehicule et un identifiant d'acces et de demarrage du vehicule

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US4899158A (en) * 1987-09-26 1990-02-06 Matsushita Electric Works, Ltd. Moving object discriminating system
FR2723238B1 (fr) * 1994-07-27 1996-09-13 Suisse Electronique Microtech Systeme de communication entre une station de base et un transpondeur passif
DE59409716D1 (de) * 1994-11-07 2001-05-10 Siemens Ag Diebstahlschutzsystem für ein Kraftfahrzeug

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FR2795263A1 (fr) 2000-12-22
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DE60018327T2 (de) 2006-04-13
FR2795263B1 (fr) 2001-08-24

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