EP0741307A2 - Tactical ballistic missile early warning radar and defence system - Google Patents
Tactical ballistic missile early warning radar and defence system Download PDFInfo
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- EP0741307A2 EP0741307A2 EP96302896A EP96302896A EP0741307A2 EP 0741307 A2 EP0741307 A2 EP 0741307A2 EP 96302896 A EP96302896 A EP 96302896A EP 96302896 A EP96302896 A EP 96302896A EP 0741307 A2 EP0741307 A2 EP 0741307A2
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- radar
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- tbm
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S13/00—Systems using the reflection or reradiation of radio waves, e.g. radar systems; Analogous systems using reflection or reradiation of waves whose nature or wavelength is irrelevant or unspecified
- G01S13/02—Systems using reflection of radio waves, e.g. primary radar systems; Analogous systems
- G01S13/06—Systems determining position data of a target
- G01S13/42—Simultaneous measurement of distance and other co-ordinates
- G01S13/426—Scanning radar, e.g. 3D radar
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F41—WEAPONS
- F41H—ARMOUR; ARMOURED TURRETS; ARMOURED OR ARMED VEHICLES; MEANS OF ATTACK OR DEFENCE, e.g. CAMOUFLAGE, IN GENERAL
- F41H11/00—Defence installations; Defence devices
- F41H11/02—Anti-aircraft or anti-guided missile or anti-torpedo defence installations or systems
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S13/00—Systems using the reflection or reradiation of radio waves, e.g. radar systems; Analogous systems using reflection or reradiation of waves whose nature or wavelength is irrelevant or unspecified
- G01S13/02—Systems using reflection of radio waves, e.g. primary radar systems; Analogous systems
- G01S13/04—Systems determining presence of a target
Definitions
- This invention relates to radar systems suitable for early warning of attack from ballistic missiles and to their incorporation within an anti tactical ballistic missile defence system (ATBM).
- ABM anti tactical ballistic missile defence system
- TBM Tactical Ballistic Missile
- lofted trajectory missiles can be at elevation angles of up to 80 degs; depressed trajectory missiles can be at elevation angles as low as 10 degs.
- the radar In order to keep scan rates high enough to cover the search area in a reasonable time, the radar must have an extremely high Equivalent Radiated Power (ERP) to achieve an adequate detection range.
- ERP Equivalent Radiated Power
- the wide elevation angle problem can be reduced by using an horizon scan (or "fence") to detect the missiles as they come over the horizon.
- horizon scan or "fence”
- longer range missiles ascend beyond the range of the beam, and are undetected until they drop into the top of the beam, usually much too late to be engaged.
- this attempt to detect the missiles at low elevation angle and long range extends the required azimuth search angle, greatly reducing the advantage gained from the small elevation search angle.
- a search radar may be moved further back from the defended area, away from the threat direction.
- the range between the radar and the defended area represents an additional range performance demand on the radar ERP. For radars with a limited elevation scan capability, this is usually the only way to provide some degree of TBM detection capability.
- a solution to this problem of limited performance at low target elevation is provided by scanning the beam in elevation as well in azimuth.
- a radar system includes means for generating a radar beam and means for scanning the beam at a variable rate wherein the rate of scanning is varied as a function of beam elevation angle, or of azimuth angle, or of both elevation and azimuth angles.
- the target detection range of a radar transceiver can be tailored to suit operational requirements.
- Such a radar system may, advantageously, be incorporated within an anti-ballistic missile defence system and located between a defended area and the ballistic missile threat direction.
- the beam is scanned in both azimuth and elevation and the scanning rate is varied as a function of target detection range.
- the scanning rate is varied as a function of the inverse of the fourth power of target detection range.
- the detection range of the radar maps out a target penetration plane in space, said detection range being much shorter at low elevation than at high elevation angles.
- the target penetration plane is located at a sufficient distance from an associated weapons launching system so that on detection of a threat by the radar, there is sufficient time for the launching system to execute a successful interception.
- the invention permits a horizontally orientated antenna arrangement (i.e. flat) to be employed which is less vulnerable to conventional air attack than the usual vertical arrangement.
- This low profile arrangement is also easier to reinforce e.g. put in a bunker. It also lends itself readily to installation on mobile land, sea or air platforms.
- the fact that the beam can be angled away from rather than pointing towards the threat direction also greatly reduces its vulnerability to ECM.
- a radar transceiver 1 is located on the ground between a defended area 2 and a threat direction 3.
- the threat is represented in the figure by three ballistic missiles 4a, 4b, 4c each on different trajectories.
- a weapons launch system 5 is located adjacent to the defended area 2.
- a conical beam 6 of radiation is transmitted from the radar 1. It is set at a high elevation and canted towards the defended area and has sufficient range so that all possible missile trajectories will pass through it.
- the beam is scanned in azimuth at a variable rate.
- the separation between the radar beam 6 and the weapons launch system 5 (and defended area 2) is dictated by the interception range capability of the anti-ballistic weapons launched therefrom.
- the extremity 6a of the beam 6 defines a target penetration plane as it is scanned.
- the basic (flat earth) geometry for the example of Figure 1 is shown in Figure 2.
- the radar transceiver 1 and defended area 2 are separated by a distance R n .
- a horizontally oriented radar 1 is positioned between the defended area 2 and the threat direction 3.
- the area 2 is defended by the weapons launch system 5 located adjacent thereto and the threat is again represented by three TBMs 4a, 4b and 4c having differing trajectories.
- the radar beam 6 of Figure 4 is scanned in azimuth and in elevation and at a variable rate.
- the total elevation angle of scan is shown as ⁇ .
- the target detection range of the transceiver 1 is represented by the contour 7, with a portion 7a thereof denoting the target penetration plane.
- the contour 7 encloses the effective search volume of the radar 1.
- the radar of Figure 4 requires on average less Equivalent Radiated Power (ERP) than a conventional radar. Because tactical ballistic missiles travel at such extreme velocities, however, the time from initial detection to impact with the target is very much shorter than for air breathing threats. The time it takes for the early warning radar to search for incoming TBM is therefore critical. As a measure of performance therefore, we will use the time to scan the search volume given constant radar ERP.
- ERP Equivalent Radiated Power
- B v Vertical elevation search angle
- B H Horizontal azimuth search angle
- search time for any radar relative to a reference radar may be obtained without knowing C and K.
- the scan rate for the beam 6 of Figure 4 is not constant but varies in proportion to the inverse of the fourth power of the range to the target penetration plane.
- Figure 5 shows the general elevation plane geometry (at the centre of the azimuth scan) for comparison of a conventional radar (x is negative) with the radar of Figure 4 (x is positive).
- the range R p to any point on the target penetration plane 7a may be calculated as follows:-
- the range to all points on the penetration plane i.e. including into the azimuth plane
- a linear approximation to a mean range R may then be obtained and used to calculate a total scan time and measure of performance as shown below.
- the radar includes a two dimensional phased array antenna 8 for scanning a beam in elevation and azimuth.
- a pulsed radar signal is supplied to the antenna 8 by a signal generator 9, and beam steering control signals are supplied to the antenna 8 from an elevation scan control module 10 and an azimuth scan control module 11.
- Conventional receiving circuitry 12 processes radar return signals received via the antenna 8.
- the optimum location of the radar with respect to the defended area and the beam scanning angles, transmitted power and pulse repetition frequency are all determined having regard to the nature of the perceived threat and the capabilities of the weapons launch system. Further geometric parameters of the system relating to target penetration plane location and attitude with respect to the radar are determined and stored in a computation module 13.
- the elevation and azimuth scan control modules 10 and 11 scan the beam between pre-chosen limits so that the required search volume is covered. Instantaneous values of elevation and azimuth angle are relayed by the modules 10 and 11 to the computation module 13 which calculates the value of R p , the range to the target penetration plane from the equation (2). The computation module 13 then scales scanning rate parameters in accordance with the inverse of the fourth power of the calculated value for R p . The elevation and azimuth scan control modules 10 and 11 then modify the scanning rate accordingly.
- a tracking radar (not shown) may be deployed to assist any defensive weapons launched in successfully intercepting the incoming TBM.
- the system reaction time from initial TBM detection to ATBM missile away is assumed to be 30 secs.
- the maximum required detection range (from the ATBM missile launcher) is a function of the ATBM missile performance.
- the difference between any two cases gives the actual change in search time between them in dB e.g. a radar at +50 Km (i.e. at the front edge of the target area) is about 3.5 dB better than a conventional radar at -50 Km (i.e. at the rear edge of the target area).
- a radar at +50 Km i.e. at the front edge of the target area
- -50 Km i.e. at the rear edge of the target area
- a further advantage is that all likely TBM tracks are covered whereas in the case of the conventional radar, earth curvature conceals short range depressed trajectories.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Aviation & Aerospace Engineering (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Radar Systems Or Details Thereof (AREA)
Abstract
Description
- This invention relates to radar systems suitable for early warning of attack from ballistic missiles and to their incorporation within an anti tactical ballistic missile defence system (ATBM).
- The volume of space, in range, azimuth and elevation, over which a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) early warning radar is required to search for incoming missiles is very large. This places very heavy demands on the radar designer, resulting in large, very high power, low mobility radars, with subsequent vulnerability to anti radar missiles and other defence suppression systems. This invention proposes an alternative approach to a TBM early warning radar which considerably reduces both the design and vulnerability problem.
- In a ground-based TBM early warning system where the radar is located to the rear of a defended area, at the ranges at which detection is required, lofted trajectory missiles can be at elevation angles of up to 80 degs; depressed trajectory missiles can be at elevation angles as low as 10 degs. In order to keep scan rates high enough to cover the search area in a reasonable time, the radar must have an extremely high Equivalent Radiated Power (ERP) to achieve an adequate detection range.
- For shorter range missiles, the wide elevation angle problem can be reduced by using an horizon scan (or "fence") to detect the missiles as they come over the horizon. However, unless extremely powerful radars are used, longer range missiles ascend beyond the range of the beam, and are undetected until they drop into the top of the beam, usually much too late to be engaged. Moreover, this attempt to detect the missiles at low elevation angle and long range extends the required azimuth search angle, greatly reducing the advantage gained from the small elevation search angle.
- To increase the altitude coverage, a search radar may be moved further back from the defended area, away from the threat direction. However, it is clear that the range between the radar and the defended area represents an additional range performance demand on the radar ERP. For radars with a limited elevation scan capability, this is usually the only way to provide some degree of TBM detection capability.
- As greater and greater ERP and/or dwell time is sought to counter longer and longer range TBMs, which have more and more flexibility in trajectory shaping, significant additional penalties are incurred:-
- a) The radars become larger and larger, and hence more and more cumbersome and immobile.
- b) The large radars become easier targets to find and hit by conventional aircraft attack or visual stand-off weapons.
- c) The large ERP requirements make the radars vulnerable to long range anti-radar missiles.
- d) The radars are vulnerable to conventional electronic counter measures (ECM) aircraft at low elevation angles, particularly if using an horizon fence search.
- For the threat TBMs of current interest (2000 Km maximum range), re-entry velocities up to 4 Km/Sec may be seen for lofted trajectories. However, for depressed trajectories, atmospheric drag limits the degree of practicable depression. It is unlikely, therefore, that 3 Km/Sec will be exceeded for a depressed trajectory. At comparatively high missile target elevation angles, missile time-in-beam is sufficient not to require scanning in this plane. For lower elevation angles however, this is not the case.
- A solution to this problem of limited performance at low target elevation is provided by scanning the beam in elevation as well in azimuth.
- However, because the slant range of a target missile is much shorter at low elevation angles compared with high elevation angles, the received power will be greater for low elevation targets; therefore it is possible to increase the scanning rate of the beam (at low elevations) without suffering any degradation in target detection probability. This proposal has the advantage of reducing the overall search time of an early warning radar.
- Therefore, according to this invention, a radar system includes means for generating a radar beam and means for scanning the beam at a variable rate wherein the rate of scanning is varied as a function of beam elevation angle, or of azimuth angle, or of both elevation and azimuth angles.
- In this way for a given pulse repetition frequency and transmitted power, the target detection range of a radar transceiver can be tailored to suit operational requirements.
- Such a radar system may, advantageously, be incorporated within an anti-ballistic missile defence system and located between a defended area and the ballistic missile threat direction. In a preferred embodiment, the beam is scanned in both azimuth and elevation and the scanning rate is varied as a function of target detection range.
- In one embodiment, the scanning rate is varied as a function of the inverse of the fourth power of target detection range.
- Thus, the detection range of the radar maps out a target penetration plane in space, said detection range being much shorter at low elevation than at high elevation angles.
- The target penetration plane is located at a sufficient distance from an associated weapons launching system so that on detection of a threat by the radar, there is sufficient time for the launching system to execute a successful interception.
- The invention permits a horizontally orientated antenna arrangement (i.e. flat) to be employed which is less vulnerable to conventional air attack than the usual vertical arrangement. This low profile arrangement is also easier to reinforce e.g. put in a bunker. It also lends itself readily to installation on mobile land, sea or air platforms. In addition, the fact that the beam can be angled away from rather than pointing towards the threat direction also greatly reduces its vulnerability to ECM.
- Some examples of the invention will now be described by way of example only, with reference to the drawings, of which;
- Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a first embodiment;
- Figure 2 is a diagram illustrating the geometry of the first embodiment;
- Figure 3 is a graph illustrating certain performance characteristics of the first embodiment;
- Figure 4 is a schematic representation of a second embodiment of the invention;
- Figure 5 is a diagram illustrating the geometry of the second embodiment;
- Figure 6 is a schematic block diagram showing the constituent parts of the second embodiment; and
- Figure 7 is a graph illustrating performance of the second embodiment.
- In Figure 1 a radar transceiver 1 is located on the ground between a defended
area 2 and athreat direction 3. The threat is represented in the figure by threeballistic missiles weapons launch system 5 is located adjacent to the defendedarea 2. - A
conical beam 6 of radiation is transmitted from the radar 1. It is set at a high elevation and canted towards the defended area and has sufficient range so that all possible missile trajectories will pass through it. The beam is scanned in azimuth at a variable rate. The separation between theradar beam 6 and the weapons launch system 5 (and defended area 2) is dictated by the interception range capability of the anti-ballistic weapons launched therefrom. - The
extremity 6a of thebeam 6 defines a target penetration plane as it is scanned. - The basic (flat earth) geometry for the example of Figure 1 is shown in Figure 2. Here, the radar transceiver 1 and defended
area 2 are separated by a distance Rn. The range capability of the radar at a given azimuth angle is assumed to be 500 Km. =Rmax. - We can determine 'L' the distance travelled in the
beam 6 by amissile 4b at slant range Rr from the radar 1 as follows: -
-
- Figure 3 shows the results for L versus E for Rn = 50 Km and for radar vertical beam widths of Th - 10 degs to 50 degs respectively. It may be noted that L is not particularly sensitive to either Rn or Th.
- As can be seen from Figure 3, by comparing values of L for high and low elevation targets, the distance travelled (or time spent) in the beam by missiles with depressed trajectories is likely to be low enough to place a serious limitation on the detection probability of the radar in such cases.
- To overcome this problem the beam is scanned in elevation as in the embodiment of Figure 4.
- In Figure 4 and in common with the embodiment of Figure 1, a horizontally oriented radar 1 is positioned between the defended
area 2 and thethreat direction 3. Thearea 2 is defended by theweapons launch system 5 located adjacent thereto and the threat is again represented by threeTBMs - In contrast with the first embodiment, the
radar beam 6 of Figure 4 is scanned in azimuth and in elevation and at a variable rate. - The total elevation angle of scan is shown as θ.
- In Figure 4 the target detection range of the transceiver 1 is represented by the
contour 7, with aportion 7a thereof denoting the target penetration plane. Thecontour 7 encloses the effective search volume of the radar 1. - For an given range performance the radar of Figure 4 requires on average less Equivalent Radiated Power (ERP) than a conventional radar. Because tactical ballistic missiles travel at such extreme velocities, however, the time from initial detection to impact with the target is very much shorter than for air breathing threats. The time it takes for the early warning radar to search for incoming TBM is therefore critical. As a measure of performance therefore, we will use the time to scan the search volume given constant radar ERP.
- We will maintain the quotient P / S - C, as a constant where:-
- P = received power
- S = scan rate
-
- Where Bv = Vertical elevation search angle
BH = Horizontal azimuth search angle - Thus, search time for any radar relative to a reference radar may be obtained without knowing C and K.
- It will thus be appreciated that the scan rate for the
beam 6 of Figure 4 is not constant but varies in proportion to the inverse of the fourth power of the range to the target penetration plane. - The geometry of the radar of Figure 4 is shown in Figure 5.
- Figure 5 shows the general elevation plane geometry (at the centre of the azimuth scan) for comparison of a conventional radar (x is negative) with the radar of Figure 4 (x is positive). The range Rp to any point on the
target penetration plane 7a may be calculated as follows:- - Ha = RkOa.Sin(Ta)
- Hi = RkOi.Sin(Ti)
- Ra - RkOa.Cos(Ta) - Rt/2
- Ri = RkOi.Cos(Ti) + Rt/2
- Pa = Arctan(Ha/(x-Ra))
- Pi = Arctan(Hi/(Ri-x))
Where x is the distance between the radar 1 and the closest point of the defendedarea 2 - Rx = Hi.(Ri-Ra)/(Ha-Hi)
- Si = Arctan(Hi/Rx)
- w - 180 - P - Si
- Rp = Sin(Si).(Ri - x + Rx)/Sin(w)
- Taking into account azimuth angle as well,
Rp -sin(Si).(Ri-x+Rx)/(sin(w) cos(a)) (2) where 'a' is the azimuth angle relative to the centre of the scan. - Thus, the range to all points on the penetration plane (i.e. including into the azimuth plane) may be calculated ; a linear approximation to a mean range R may then be obtained and used to calculate a total scan time and measure of performance as shown below.
- The operation of the anti-ballistic missile defence system of Figure 4, and in particular that of the radar 1 will now be described with reference to Figure 6.
- The radar includes a two dimensional phased
array antenna 8 for scanning a beam in elevation and azimuth. - A pulsed radar signal is supplied to the
antenna 8 by asignal generator 9, and beam steering control signals are supplied to theantenna 8 from an elevationscan control module 10 and an azimuthscan control module 11. Conventional receivingcircuitry 12 processes radar return signals received via theantenna 8. - The optimum location of the radar with respect to the defended area and the beam scanning angles, transmitted power and pulse repetition frequency are all determined having regard to the nature of the perceived threat and the capabilities of the weapons launch system. Further geometric parameters of the system relating to target penetration plane location and attitude with respect to the radar are determined and stored in a
computation module 13. - In operation, the elevation and azimuth
scan control modules modules computation module 13 which calculates the value of Rp, the range to the target penetration plane from the equation (2). Thecomputation module 13 then scales scanning rate parameters in accordance with the inverse of the fourth power of the calculated value for Rp. The elevation and azimuthscan control modules - On detection of a target missile by the radar transceiver, the weapons launch system is alerted. A tracking radar (not shown) may be deployed to assist any defensive weapons launched in successfully intercepting the incoming TBM.
- An example of the threat TBM and defending ATBM system is defined below.
-
- Threat Azimuth 120 degs.
- Max range 2000Km
- Min range 300 Km
- Max Velocities:-
- Elevation angle =
- 80 degs velocity = 4 Km/s
45 degs velocity = 3 Km/s
10 degs velocity = 1.5 Km/s
-
- Missile maximum range 100 Km
- Missile
maximum altitude 30 Km - Tracking radar maximum range 200 Km
- The system reaction time from initial TBM detection to ATBM missile away is assumed to be 30 secs.
- The maximum required detection range (from the ATBM missile launcher) is a function of the ATBM missile performance.
- Max missile intercept slant range S at Elevation E (S(E)) at 30 Km altitude:-
- S(80) = 30.1 Km
- S(45) = 42.5 Km
- S(10) = 172 Km
- S(10) exceeds the ABTM max range i.e. S(10) = 100 Km
- Corresponding fly-out times F(E) for the ATBM:-
- F(80) = 12 secs
- F(45) = 17 secs
- F(10) = 40 secs
- Total time from initial detection to intercept T(E):-
- T(80) = 42 secs
- T(45) = 47 secs
- T(10) = 70 secs
- Distance R(E) travelled by TBM in these times:-
- R(80) = 168 Km
- R(45) = 141 Km
- R(10) = 105 Km
- Max detection range D(E) = R(E) + S(E):-
- D(80) = 198 Km
- D(45) = 184 Km
- D(10) = 205 Km
- Although the total elevation scan angle θ is somewhat greater for the radar of Figure 4 than for most conventional search radars (which are positioned beyond the target area, away from the threat direction) this is more than compensated for by the range-adaptive scanning provision.
- Using equations (1) and (2) above, the variation in scan time relative to an arbitrary reference radar can be computed.
- Figure 7 shows the variation in dB in search time as x varies (see Figure 5) from x = -200 Km to x = +200 Km. The difference between any two cases gives the actual change in search time between them in dB e.g. a radar at +50 Km (i.e. at the front edge of the target area) is about 3.5 dB better than a conventional radar at -50 Km (i.e. at the rear edge of the target area). Thus, it would search the required volume in less than half the time. By placing the
radar 50 Km in front of the target area, the search time would be reduced to 20% of the -50 Km value. - A further advantage is that all likely TBM tracks are covered whereas in the case of the conventional radar, earth curvature conceals short range depressed trajectories.
Claims (6)
- A radar system (1) including means (8,9) for generating a beam, and means (10) for scanning the beam in elevation at a variable rate, wherein the rate of scanning is varied as a function of beam elevation angle.
- A radar system (1) including means (8,9) for generating a beam, and means (11) for scanning the beam in azimuth at a variable rate, wherein the rate of scanning is varied as a function of beam azimuth angle.
- A method for controlling the target detection range (Rp) of a radar (1) by varying the scanning rate of the transmitted beam during a complete scan.
- An anti-ballistic missile defence system including a radar (1), in accordance with either of claims 1 or 2, located between a defended area (2) and the ballistic missile threat direction (3).
- An anti-ballistic missile defence system according to claim 4 in which the radar (1) includes means (10, 11) for scanning a beam at a rate which varies as a function of target detection range (Rp).
- An anti-ballistic missile defence system as claimed in Claim 5 in which the scanning rate of the beam is varied in proportion to the reciprocal of the fourth power of the target detectidn range (Rp).
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
GBGB9508973.6A GB9508973D0 (en) | 1995-05-03 | 1995-05-03 | Tactical ballistic missile early warning radar and defence system |
GB9508973 | 1995-05-03 |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP0741307A2 true EP0741307A2 (en) | 1996-11-06 |
EP0741307A3 EP0741307A3 (en) | 1997-01-29 |
Family
ID=10773907
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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EP96302896A Ceased EP0741307A3 (en) | 1995-05-03 | 1996-04-25 | Tactical ballistic missile early warning radar and defence system |
Country Status (4)
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US (1) | US5757310A (en) |
EP (1) | EP0741307A3 (en) |
JP (1) | JPH08320374A (en) |
GB (1) | GB9508973D0 (en) |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US5757310A (en) | 1998-05-26 |
GB9508973D0 (en) | 1996-04-24 |
JPH08320374A (en) | 1996-12-03 |
EP0741307A3 (en) | 1997-01-29 |
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