EP0700021B1 - Procédé de transmission d'informations entre un centre de contrôle informatisé et une pluralité de machines à affranchir électroniques - Google Patents

Procédé de transmission d'informations entre un centre de contrôle informatisé et une pluralité de machines à affranchir électroniques Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0700021B1
EP0700021B1 EP95401980A EP95401980A EP0700021B1 EP 0700021 B1 EP0700021 B1 EP 0700021B1 EP 95401980 A EP95401980 A EP 95401980A EP 95401980 A EP95401980 A EP 95401980A EP 0700021 B1 EP0700021 B1 EP 0700021B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
machine
centre
memory
data
information
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP95401980A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP0700021A1 (fr
Inventor
Jean-Philippe Bailleux
Claude Martin
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
SECAP Groupe Pitney Bowes SAS
Original Assignee
Secap SA
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Secap SA filed Critical Secap SA
Publication of EP0700021A1 publication Critical patent/EP0700021A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0700021B1 publication Critical patent/EP0700021B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00016—Relations between apparatus, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office, in a franking system
    • G07B17/0008—Communication details outside or between apparatus
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00016—Relations between apparatus, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office, in a franking system
    • G07B17/0008—Communication details outside or between apparatus
    • G07B2017/00153—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information
    • G07B2017/00161—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information from a central, non-user location, e.g. for updating rates or software, or for refilling funds
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00016—Relations between apparatus, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office, in a franking system
    • G07B17/0008—Communication details outside or between apparatus
    • G07B2017/00153—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information
    • G07B2017/00177—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information from a portable device, e.g. a card or a PCMCIA
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00822—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system including unique details

Definitions

  • the invention relates to franking machines which fall under a control center computerized.
  • the franking machines have different counters, usually at least one counter says ascending whose value, with each impression of a postage, is increased by the amount thereof, and a so-called downward counter whose value is decreased by amount of postage, the value of the ascending counter representing the sum total of postage printed by the machine since its commissioning while the value of the descending counter indicates the credit no still consumed since the last reloading of the machine in monetary units.
  • the aim of the invention is to enable the transmission information with the same degree of security, but more economical way.
  • the invention takes advantage of the fact that computerized control centers and franking electronics are already provided with means of protection against fraud, and in particular secure, that is to say, protected access, in a way that allows the transmission to benefit from these securities already existing, instead of providing security additional information specific to transmission, as in previous systems mentioned above.
  • the invention thus makes it possible to avoid the costs associated with to these additional security.
  • we use portable objects and means of inscription and reading of their memory which are particularly simple and economical because the inscription and the reading of the memory are entirely free.
  • the authentication means that comprise the data sent is the secret number, that is to say a element even secret information stored in memory secure.
  • the indexes associated with this number avoids its reuse, this which is necessary since the number may have been revealed to one-third, since the portable object is reading free.
  • the machine is assigned a single value of meter reloading, which it takes every time she reloads her meter.
  • the means of authentication of the transmitted data that form the cryptogram is here not directly a secret information element but it can not be obtained only by access to the appropriate secret digital key.
  • the data with which is calculated cryptogram can be characters listed in the information given, or else, particularly in the case where the information provided involves relatively few characters, the data with which the cryptogram is calculated are randomly generated characters, which are also written in the memory of the portable object.
  • the center 1 shown on this last figure includes a computer set consisting of a computer server 2 to which three management computers are connected 3 to each of which is connected a card reader / encoder 4 chip and a printer 5 labels, a modem 6 directly connected to the computer 2 being connected to a line telephone 7 which is dedicated to him.
  • the franking machine 8 shown in particular on Figures 2 and 4 conventionally comprises a plate 9 of the object on which the postage must be printed by a head 10 located above the plate 9, and various other usual elements not shown, in particular a keyboard and a scale, as well as internal circuits of control and management controlled by a microcontroller equipped a known type of franking management software, corresponding for example to that described in the application for French patent 93-04694 belonging to the Applicant.
  • the machine 8 has a connector 11 through which we have access to its internal circuits, in order to perform an operation initialization by connecting these circuits to the computers of the center 1 thanks to the cable 12, one end of which has a connector 13 adapted to cooperate with the connector 11, the other end of the cable 12 being directly connected to one computers from center 1, when the initialization operation on the spot, or through a line secure data transmission when the operation is performed remotely.
  • connector 11 is masked by a tamper-proof protective envelope.
  • the machine 8 has other elements, described below, which allow it to cooperate with the chip card 14 shown in FIG.
  • this card has a format of the non volatile memory type, rewritable, like EEPROM, or equivalent.
  • This microcircuit does not include no logical input protection, which means that the Read and write data are completely free on the map 14.
  • the card 14 presents a hole 16 practiced in its thickness, this hole being covered in some cases, mentioned below, by a label printed with one of the printers 5 in center 1, that sticks to the location shown in Figure 3 by the frame 17 in broken line.
  • the machine postage 8 has an element 18 for housing the card 14, which opens outwards through a slot 19, the housing 18 being associated, as shown in FIG. 5, with a two-part connector 20 that goes into action when the card is pushed to the bottom, and an electromagnet 21 equipped with a plunger 22 ending in a point (see Figure 6), the plunger 22 being provided, when actuated, to pass through the hole 16 of the card 14, and thus to perforate at the level of the hole 16 the label 23 possibly stuck on map 14 at location 17.
  • the microcontroller piloting the management and control circuits of the machine 8 is also equipped with additional software that allows this same microcontroller to manage the various operations related to the transmission of information carried out through Map 14, which operations will now be described.
  • Machine 8 is secretly assigned a set of different random numbers, for example 250 numbers of ten decimal digits, we record in the center folder the number of the machine and the series of 250 numbers, and this same data is transmitted to the machine 8, which saves them automatically on permanent memories (non-volatile), each number being associated, whether in the center file or in the machine's memories, an index that can take at least the zero and one states, and which is at this point in the zero state.
  • permanent memories non-volatile
  • the file part of the 250 random numbers secrets is saved securely in the center 1, so that even during maintenance operations, the unauthorized persons can not access it.
  • the machine 8 When the initialization operation is complete, the machine 8 is enclosed in its envelope of security, which is itself sealed with a tamper-proof seal, and the machine is ready for commissioning.
  • the machine 8 Once the machine 8 has been installed in the where it is to be used, it must, in order to function, receive via card 14 a reloading instruction from his descending counter, which is zero.
  • This instruction is actually given by the receiving one of the 250 numbers contained in the registers memories of machine 8, provided that it has not already been used.
  • issuing card 14 containing the instruction authorizing reloading of the downward counter is provided by the center 1.
  • the center when asked for permission, by mail or telephone, uses one of the readers / encoders 4 to write in the memory of a card 14 a certain amount of information intended to designate the machine for which it is intended, particular number of this machine, as well as one of the secret numbers, not yet used (index to zero), among the 250 that are assigned to this machine, the index of the number transmitted being then set to one to show that it was used.
  • a label 23 is printed in clear with data identification of the machine to which is intended the authorization, and that label, when map 14 was coded, is glued to location 17 where it closes the opening 16, this label being made with an impression background which makes it possible to recognize its origin and limits the risks of having it replaced with fraudulent intent.
  • the center 1 After having prepared map 14, the center 1 send it, for example by a porter or by mail, to the site where machine 8 is located, and when arrives at this site, we introduce the card 14 in the housing 18, the connectors 20 are activated when the card is fully pressed, the data on the map are read and communicated to the internal circuits of the machine, these check whether the identification number in the data that has just been received correspond to the identification number which has been assigned to him in the initialization, if it is the case, the circuits control the electromagnet 21 for the plunger 22 to descend then goes back, that is to say to make it pass from his rest position where it is outside the reception area of the card 14 which opens outwards through the slot 19, to an actuated position where it passes through this space, then at the rest position, so that it punches the label 23 at hole 16, the circuits look for if the number in the data that has just been read part of the secret numbers kept in his registers of memory, and if the machine finds this number associated with a index in the zero state, it puts it
  • the reload value can of course vary from one machine to another, with regard to consumption foreseeable or any other consideration, but for a given machine, it can not be changed remotely.
  • the machine in the initialization phase, provides for several sets of different random numbers to each of which corresponds to a distinct value of reloading the meter, the machine, when charging counter, taking into account the value corresponding to the series which includes the secret number it comes from to receive.
  • the same method for other meters controlling the use of the machine for example to allow the machine to operate for a predetermined period of time, or to authorize to operate until the ascending counter has reaches a calculated value by adding the reload value to the value that this meter had at the time the reloading took place.
  • the meter reloading can not occur, after initialization, a number of times corresponding to the amount of secret numbers attributed during the initialization phase, which is 250 in the this example. In case the machine still has to be used, a new operation must be carried out initializing.
  • the center 1 which is the transmitter of the information to be transmitted, and the machine 8 who is the recipient or receiver, but it is also possible to have the machine 8 as transmitter and the center 1 as a recipient, in particular to transmit to this last an ascending meter reading or other data stored in the machine 8, for example statistics of use of the various franking units, the machine 8 transmitting the data to the center 1 for example in response to an order written by the center on the map in same time as the meter reload instruction.
  • the calculation of the authentication cryptogram is done by the electronic circuits machine 8, the algorithm being contained in the additional software which is provided with the microcontroller, this algorithm being for example of the DES type.
  • the ability to make machine 8 send back data in center 1 can in particular be used to proceed, on command, as indicated above, to the statement of upward counter, in order to bill machines according to their actual consumption.
  • a card is issued by the center and sent to the organization responsible for maintenance. This card is numbered machine to check, and a deadline to proceed to the verification. A technician must then go to the machine, insert the card into it, which will indicate the requested information on the state of said machine. The evidence of the intervention will be given by the return of the map in the center 1.
  • the transmitter at authenticate either the center 1. In this case, if it has no data to be transmitted or if they are insufficient in number, it generates a series of characters randomly it calculates on the basis of these the cryptogram, and it inscribes both the series of characters and the cryptogram, this one being checked on arrival by machine 8.
  • the terminal 24 includes in a single housing at least one reader / encoder 25 smart card, the same kind as the reader / encoder 4 of center 1 or that which is provided in the machines 8 and which has a housing 18 for the card.
  • reader / encoder 25 the terminal 24 has circuits control logic as well as a modem, and possibly as in the example shown in Figure 7, a keyboard 26 and a screen 27.
  • the control logic circuits are sensitive to the introduction of a card in the reader / encoder 25, recognize the type of card introduced and verify that the card contains the appropriate credentials. According to the information read on the map (see below), the control circuits can start the execution of a reading operation of the card, a write operation, or call automatically center 1 by means of the modem to request a transaction, transmit information to or from the center.
  • the card machine-specific who needs it is introduced in this last, the card being recognized, the machine 8 will record on the map 14 that is his own, and in particular the value of some of its meters, as well as the use cryptogram.
  • the user then removes the card from the machine, and introduces it into the terminal.
  • This one recognizes the map, and calls the center through its modem, communication through the public telephone network 7 and the modem 6 of center 1, the data transmitted being those are recorded in the memory of the map 14.
  • center 1 After receiving the data, center 1 checks the authenticity of these thanks to the cryptogram, and if all the conditions are fulfilled, he sends back a message containing the data to be entered on the map for build a meter reload instruction, and especially one of the 250 numbers still valid.
  • the user retrieves the terminal card and insert it back into the machine, which performs the same operations described above until reloading counter, some data that can be written on the map for the process to reproduce when it will be at new need to request a new instruction from meter reloading.

Landscapes

  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Devices For Checking Fares Or Tickets At Control Points (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
EP95401980A 1994-09-01 1995-08-31 Procédé de transmission d'informations entre un centre de contrôle informatisé et une pluralité de machines à affranchir électroniques Expired - Lifetime EP0700021B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR9410530A FR2724244A1 (fr) 1994-09-01 1994-09-01 Procede de transmission d'informations entre un centre de controle informatise et une pluralite de machines a affranchir electroniques
FR9410530 1994-09-01

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0700021A1 EP0700021A1 (fr) 1996-03-06
EP0700021B1 true EP0700021B1 (fr) 2005-03-16

Family

ID=9466636

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP95401980A Expired - Lifetime EP0700021B1 (fr) 1994-09-01 1995-08-31 Procédé de transmission d'informations entre un centre de contrôle informatisé et une pluralité de machines à affranchir électroniques

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US5675651A (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
EP (1) EP0700021B1 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
CA (1) CA2156791C (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
DE (1) DE69534073T2 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
FR (1) FR2724244A1 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)

Families Citing this family (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2793332B1 (fr) 1999-05-05 2001-08-10 Secap Machine a affranchir et son procede de fonctionnement
DE10023145A1 (de) * 2000-05-12 2001-11-15 Francotyp Postalia Gmbh Frankiermaschine und Verfahren zur Freigabe einer Frankiermaschine
US20030097337A1 (en) * 2001-11-16 2003-05-22 George Brookner Secure data capture apparatus and method
WO2003044621A2 (en) * 2001-11-16 2003-05-30 Neopost Group Secure data capture apparatus and method
FI124437B (fi) 2009-12-18 2014-08-29 Itella Oyj Järjestelmä, menetelmä ja palvelu varojen lisäämiseksi etukäteen maksettavaan palveluun

Family Cites Families (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE2916207A1 (de) * 1979-04-21 1980-11-13 Hess Richard Vorrichtung und ein mit dieser vorrichtung codierter wertcoupon zum vorbestellen von menues o.dgl. in dieser vorrichtung
US4436992A (en) * 1981-01-08 1984-03-13 Simjian Luther G Check controlled metering device
GB8400809D0 (en) * 1984-01-12 1984-02-15 De La Rue Co Plc Prepayment metering system
GB2173738B (en) * 1985-04-19 1989-07-12 Roneo Alcatel Ltd Secure transport of information between electronic stations
CA1301335C (en) * 1988-02-08 1992-05-19 Robert K.T. Chen Postage meter value card system
CH678368A5 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow) * 1989-03-29 1991-08-30 Frama Ag
GB2251210B (en) * 1990-12-31 1995-01-18 Alcatel Business Systems Postage meter system

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE69534073D1 (de) 2005-04-21
EP0700021A1 (fr) 1996-03-06
DE69534073T2 (de) 2006-02-09
CA2156791A1 (fr) 1996-03-02
FR2724244B1 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow) 1997-02-21
FR2724244A1 (fr) 1996-03-08
US5675651A (en) 1997-10-07
CA2156791C (fr) 2002-10-22

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